1)^ LIBRARY CW-li SMC Efi: »•* Of DIEGO Xen impiety ; we loathe food when we are sick. ABIDE In the moral acceptance loathe is a strong figure of speech to mark the ab- horrence and disgust which the sight or thought of offensive objects produces. ABIDE, Sojourn, Dwell, Live, Reside, Inhabit. Abide, in Anglo- Saxon abidan, signifies to await, to ex- pect. Sojourn, in French sejourner, irom sub and diurnus, in the daytime, signifies to pass the day — that is, a certain portion of one's time — in a place. Dwell is from a Teutonic root meaning to wander, to lead astray, to tarry. This was the meaning of the Anglo-Saxon dwellan; the present meaning of the word is a pecviliar de- velopment in English paralleled only by some uses of the word in the Scan- dinavian tongues. At the present it implies a stay in a place by way of residence, which is expressed in com- mon discourse by the word live, for passing one's fife. Reside, from the Latin re and sedere, to sit down, con- veys the full idea of a settlement. In- hahit, from the Latin habito, a frequen- tative of habeo, signifies to have or occupy for a permanency. The length of stay implied in these terms is marked by a certain gradation. Abide denotes the shortest stay; to so- journ is of longer continuance; dwell comprehends the idea of perpetuity in a given place, but reside and inhabit are partial and local — we dwell only in one spot, but we may reside at or inhabit many places. These words have hke- wise a reference to the state of society. Abide and sojourn relate more properly to the wandering habits of men in a primitive state of, society. Dwell, as implying a stay under a cover, is uni- versal in its apphcation; for we may dwell either in a palace, a house, a cot- tage, or any shelter. Live, reside, and inhabit are confined to a civilized state of society; the former aoplying to the abodes of the inferior orders, the latter to those of the higher classes. The word inhabit is never used but in con- nection with the place inhabited. The Easterners abode with one an- other, sojourned in a covmtry, and dwelt in tents. The angels abode with Lot that night; Abram sojourned in the land of Canaan; the Israelites dioelt in the land of Goshen. Savages either dwell in the cavities which nature has formed for them, or in some rude structure erected for a temporary pur- pose; but as men increase in cultiva- tion they build places for themselves which they can inhabit; the poor have their cottages in which tjiey can live; the wealthy provide themselves with superb buildings in which they reside. ABILITY, Capacity. Ability, in French habilite, Latin habilitas, comes from able, habile, habilis, and habeo, to have, because possession and power are inseparable. Capacity, in French ca- pacite, Latin capacitas, from capax and capio, to receive, marks the abstract quality of being able to receive or hold. Ability is to capacity as the genus to the species. Ability comprehends the power of doing in general, without spec- ifying the quality or degree; capacity is a particular kind of ability. Ability may be either physical or mental; capacity, when said of persons, is men- tal only. Ability respects action, ca- pacity respects thought. Ability al- ways supposes something able to be done; capacity is a mental endowment, and always supposes something ready to receive or hold. Ability is no wise limited in its ex- tent ; it may be small or great ; capacity of itself always implies a positive and superior degree of power, although it may be modified by epithets to denote different degrees; a boy of capacity wiU have the advantage over his school-fel- lows, particularly if he be classed with those of a dull capacity. Abilities, when used in the plural only, is confined to the signification of mental endowments, and comprehends the operations of thought in general; capacity, on the other hand, is that peculiar endowment, that enlargement of imderstanding, that exalts the pos- sessor above the rest of mankind. Many men have the abilities for man- aging the concerns of others who would not have the capacity for conducting a concern of their own. We should not judge highly of that man's abilities who could only mar the plans of others, but had no capacity for conceiving and proposing anything better in their stead. Ability, Faculty, Talent. — These terms all agree in denoting a power. Ability is, as in the preceding case, the ABILITY general term. FacuUy, in Latin facul- tas, changed from facilitas and facere, to do, signifying an ability to do; and talent, in Latin talentum, a Greek coin exceeding one hundred pounds sterling, and employed figuratively, as in Matthew 25, 15, for a gift, possession, or power — denote definite kinds of power. Ability relates to human power gener- ally, by which a man is enabled to act; it may vary in degree and quaUty with times, persons, and circumstances; health, strength, and fortune are abili- ties; faculty is a gift of nature directed to a certain end and following a cer- tain rule. An ability may be acquired, and consequently is properly applied to individuals, an ability to speak extem- Eore or an ability to write; but & faculty elongs to the species, as a faculty of speech or of hearing, etc. Ability being in general the power of doing, may be appUed in its imqualified sense to the whole species, without any distinction. Faculty is always taken in a restricted sense, although applied to the species. Faculty and talent are both gifts of natvu-e, but a faculty is supposed to be given in an equal de- gree to all, a talent in an imequal de- gree; as the faculty of seeing, the talent of mimicry, the talent for music; a faculty may be impaired by age, dis- ease, or other circumstances; a talent is improved by exercise. As all these terms may be applied to different objects, they are aptly enough used in the plural to denote so many distinct powers: abilities denote all our powers generally, corporeal and men- tal, but more especially the latter; faculties relate to the ordinary powers of body and mind, as when we speak of a person's retaining or losing his faculties; talents relate to the particular gifts or powers which may serve a beneficial purpose, as to employ one's talents usefully. Ability, Dexterity, Address. — Ability is, as before observed, a general term, without any qualification. Dexterity, from dexter, the right hand, signifying mechanical or manual facility, and ad- dress, signifying a mode of address, are particular terms. Ability may be used to denote any degree, as to do accord- ing to the best of one's ability; and it may be qualified to denote a small degree of ability. Dexterity and ad- dress are positive degrees of ability. Ability is, however, frequently taken in a restricted sense for a positive de- gree of ability, which brings it still nearer to the two other terms, from which it differs only in the apphcation; ability in this case refers to intellectual endowment generally, dexterity relates to a particular power or faciUty of exe- cuting, and address to a particular mode or manner of addressing one's self on particular occasions. Ability shows itself in the most important transactions and the general conduct in the highest stations, as a minister of state displays his ability; dexterity and address are employed occasionally, the former in removing difficulties and escaping dangers, the latter in improv- ing advantages and accommodating tempers; the former in directing the course of things, the latter in manag- ing of men. Able, Capable, Capacious. — These epithets, from which the preceding ab- stract nouns are derived, have dis- tinctions pecuhar to themselves. Able and capable are apphed to ordinary ac- tions, but not always indifferently, the one lor the other: able is said of the abiUties generally, as a child is able or not able to walk; capable is said of one's ability to do particular things, as to be capable of performing a great journey. Able is said of that which one can do, as to be able to write or read; capable is said of that which either a person or a thing can take, receive, or hold; a person is capable of an office, or capable of great things; a thing is capable of improvement. Able may be added to a noun by way of epithet when it denotes a positive degree of ability, as an able command- er, an able financier. Capable may be u.sed absolutely to express a mental power. Capable and capacious, though de- rived from the same verb capio, to take or receive, are distinguished from each other in respect to the powers or properties of the objects to which they are appUed, capable being said of powers generally, capacious only of the property of having ampUtude of space or a power to take in or compre- 8 ABIOGENIC hend; and men axe capable of thought or reason, of life or death, etc.; a hall may be said to be capadoiis, or, figm-atively, a man has a capacious mind. ABIOGENIC, Lifeless, Source- less. Abiogenic is a recently coined word that has no real synonyms; abio- genic, the adjective of abiogenesis, a compound of the Greek a, without, /3i6c, life, and yivEmg, origin, invented by Huxley, signifies, literally, spontaneous generation, the opposite of sexual gen- eration and biogenesis (which see). Abiogenic pertains to the production of life or Uving beings imder certain physi- cal conditions without the intervention of antecedent hving forms, Huxley hav- ing propounded the theory that Uving matter can be produced from that which in itself is not Uving matter. Hence, it is claimed, as the basis of abiogenesis, that certain material ob- jects may be developed from other ob- jects that in themselves are lifeless and, as far as known, sourceless. Biologists at one time held the view that some of the lower animals or plants, or the primordial of one or the other, or both, of the animal and vegetable kingdoms may have sprung from lifeless matter without the in- tervention of any previously existing parent. On the demonstration that alleged instances of such spontaneous generation were unfounded, the early view was discarded tiU Haeckel and other evolutionists revived it and Huxley gave it a name. ABJURE, Recant, Retract, Re- call, Revoke. Abjure, in Latin ab~ juro, is compounded of the privative ab and juro, swear, signifying to swear to the contrary, or give up with an oath. Recant, in Latin recanto, is compounded of the privative re and canto, to sing or declare, signifying to unsay, to contradict by a counter dec- laration. Retract, in Latin retractus, participle of retraho, is compoimded of re, back, and traho, to draw, signifying to draw back what has been let go. Revoke and recall have the same original sense as recant, with this difference only, that the word call, which is ex- pressed also by voke, or in Latin voco, impUes an action more suited to a multitude than the word canto, to sing. which may pass in soUtude. We ab- jure a reUgion^ we recant a doctrine, we retract a promise, we revoke a command, we recall an expression, and, where the initiative, referendum, and recall pre- vail, an incompetent or unfaithful official. What has been solemnly professed is renounced by abjuration; what has been pubUcly maintained as a set- tled point of beUef is as publicly given up by recanting; what has been pledged so as to gain credit is con- tradicted by retracting; what has been pronounced by an act of authority is rendered null by revocation; what has been misspoken through inadvertence or mistake is rectified by recalling the words. Although Archbishop Cranmer re- canted the principles of the Reforma- tion, yet he soon after recalled his words, and died boldly for his faith. Henry IV. of France abjured Calvinism, but he did not retract the promise which he had made to the Calvinists of his protection. Louis XIV. drove many of his best subjects from France by revoking the Edict of Nantes. Interest but too often leads men to abjure their faith; the fear of shame or punishment leads them to recant their opinions; the want of principle dictates the re- tracting of one's promise; reasons of state occasion the revoking of decrees; a love of precision commonly induces a speaker or writer to recall a false expression. ABOLISH, Abrogate, Repeal, Re- voke, Annul, Cancel. Abolish, in French abolir, Latin abolere, to grow less, is compounded of ab, away, and olere, to grow. Abrogate, in French abroger, Latin abrogatus, participle of abrogo, compoimded of ab, away, and rogare, to ask, signifies to ask away, or to ask that a thing may be done away; in aUusion to the custom of the Romans, among whom no law was vaUd unless the consent of the people was obtained by asking, and in like manner no law was immade without asking their consent. Repeal, in French rappdler, from the Latin words re and appeUo, signifies literaUy to call back or unsay what has been said, which is in I Uke manner the original meaning of re- ABOVE voke. Annul, in French annuUer, comes from Latin nidliis, ne-vUtis, not any, sig- nifying to reduce to nothing. Cancel, in French canceller, comes from the Latin cancello, cut crosswise, signify- ing to strike out crosswise — that is, to cross out. The word abolish conveys the idea of putting a total end to a thing, and is ap- pUed properly* to those things which have been long in existence and firmly estabUshed: an o6oZiossible, you should be succeeded by one even more wicked." The exaggeration conveyed by these expressions has given rise to their abuse in vulgar discourse, where they are often employed indifferently to serve the humor of the speaker. ABOMINATE. See Abhor. ABORIGINAL. See First. ABORTION. See F.\ilure. ABOVE, Over, Upon, Beyond. When an object is (dtove another, it exceeds it in height; when it is over another, it extends along its superior surface; when it is wpon another, it comes in contact with its superior sur- face; when it is beyond another, it hea at a greater distance. Trees frequent- ly grow above a wall, and sometimes the branches hang over the wail, or rest upon it, but they seldom stretch much beyond it. 10 ABRIDGE In the figurative sense, the first is mostly employed to convey the idea of superiority; the second, of authority; the third, of immediate influence; and the fourth, of extent. Every one should be above falsehood, but particularly those who are set over others, who may have an influence on their minds be- yond all calculation. ABRIDGE, Abbreviate, Curtail, Contract. Abridge, in French abreger, Latin abbreviare, is comj>ounded of the intensive syllabh ab and breviare, from brevis, short, signifying to make short. Abridge and abbreviate, by derivation, have therefore exactly the same mean- ing, though they are used in different connections. We abbreviate a word; we abridge a book. Curtail, in French court, short, and iaiUer, to cut, sig- nifies to diminish in length by cut- ting. Contract, in Latin contractus, par- ticiple of contraho, is compounded of con and traho, signifying to draw close together. By abridging, in the figurative as well as the Uteral sense, the quantity is di- minished; by curtailing, the measure or number is reduced; by contracting, the compass is reduced. Privileges are abridged, pleasiu-es curtailed, and powers contracted. It is ungenerous to abridge the hberty of any one, or cur- tail him of his advantages, while he makes no improper use of them; otherwise it is advisable, in order to contract his means of doing mischief. ( See also Deprive. Abridgment, Compendium, Epitome, Digest, Summary, Abstract. — The first four terms are apphed to a distinct work, the two latter to parts of a work. An abridgment is the reduction of a work into a smaller compass. A com- pendium is a general and concise view of any science, as geography or astrono- my. An epitome is a compressed view of all the substantial parts of a thing, or, in other words, the whole of any matter brought into a smaU compass. A digest is any materials digested in order. A summary comprehends the heads and subdivisions of a work. An abstract includes a brief but compre- hensive view of any particular proceed- ing. Abridgments often surpass the originals in values when they are made with judgment. Compendiums are fit- ted for young persons to commit to memory on commencing the study of any science. There is perhaps not a better epitome than that of the Univer- sal History by Bossuet, nor a better digest than that of the laws made by order of Justinian. Systematic writers give occasional summaries of what they have been treating upon. It is neces- sary to make abstracts of deeds or judi- cial proceedings. Epitome and abstract are taken for other objects, which con- tain within a small compass the essence of a thing. ABROAD. See Out. ABROGATE. See Abolish. ABRUPT, Rugged, Rough. Ab- rupt, in Latin abruptus, participle of abrumpere, to break off, signifies the state of being broken off. Rugged is a Scandinavian word signifying hairy, hence unshaven, rough. Rough, from Anglo-Saxon ruh, hairy, rough, had the same meaning and develop- ment. These words mark different degrees of unevenness. What is abrupt has greater cavities and protuberances than what is rugged; what is rugged has greater irregularities than what is rou^h. In the natural sense abrupt is opposed to what is unbroken, rugged to what is even, and rough to what is smooth. A precipice is abrupt, a path is rugged, a plank is rough. The abrupt- ness of a body is generally occasioned by a violent concussion and separa- tion of its parts; ruggedness arises from natural, but less violent, causes; rough- ness is mostly a natural property, al- though sometimes produced by fric- tion. In the figurative or extended appli- cation, the distinction is equally clear. Words and manners are abrupt when they are sudden and unconnected; the temper is rugged which is exposed to frequent ebullitions of angry humor; actions are rou^h when performed with violence and incaution. An abrupt be- havior is the consequence of an agi- tated mind; a rugged disposition is inherent in the character; a rou{)h de- portment arises from an undiscipUned state of feeUng. An habitual steadi- ness and coolness of reflection is best fitted to prevent or correct any abrupt- ness of manner; a cultivation of the ABSOLUTE 11 Christian temper cannot fail of smooth- ing down all ruggedness of humor; an intercourse with polished society wiU in- evitably refine down all roughness of behavior. See also Sudden. ABSCOND, Steal Away, Secrete One's Self. Abscond, in Latin ab- scondo, is compounded of abs and condo, signifying to hide from the view, which is the original meaning of the other words; to abscond is to remove one's self for the sake of not being discovered by those with whom we are acquaint- ed. To steal away is to get away so as to elude observation. To secrete one's self is to get into a place of secrecy without being perceived. Dishonest men abscond, thieves steal away when they dread detection, and fugitives secrete themselves. Those who cS>scond win have frequent occasion to steal away, and stiU more frequent occasion to secrete themselves. ABSENT, Abstracted, Abstract, Diverted, Distracted. Absent, in French absent, Latin absens, comes from ab, from, and sum, to be, signify- ing away or at a distance from all ob- jects. Abstracted, or abstract, in French abstrait, Latin abstracivs, participle of abstraho, or abs, from, and traho, to draw, signifies drawn or separated from all objects. Diverted, in French divert'^, Latin diverto, compoimded of dis, asunder, and vertere, to turn, signi- fies turned aside from the object that is § resent. Distracted, of course, imphes rawn asunder by different objects. A want of proper attention is im- plied in all these terms, but in different d^rees and under different circum- stances. Absence of mind is either a state or a habit; a man may be occasionally absent. Or a man may contract an habitual absence, either from profound study, or from any other less commendable cause. Ab- straction denotes a state, and, for the most part, a temporary state. The term absent simply implies not present with one's mind, not observant of present objects, but it does not neces- sarily imply thinking of anything; a man man be absent who is thinking of nothing. Abstra^Ued, on the other hand, de- notes deep thought of something not present. Abstract may in poetry be used in the sense of abstracted. Absent and abstracted denote an ex- clusion of present objects; diverted and distracted, a misappUed attention to present objects, or to such objects as do not demand attention. An absent man never has his body and mind in the same place; the abstracted man is lost in thinking; a man who is easily diverted seeks to take an interest in every passing object; a distracted man is unable to think properly of any- thing: it may be good to be sometimes diverted. It is bad at any time to be distracted, particularly when it arises from passion. ABSOLUTE, Despotic, Arbitrary, Tyrannical. Absolute, in Latin ab- soluttu^, participle of absolvo, signifies absolved or set at hberty from all re- straint as it regards persons; uncon- ditional, unhmited, as it regards things. Despotic, from despot, in Greek SeaTroTtig, a master or lord (the same root appears in the word potent), imphes being like a lord, imcontrolled. Arbitrary, in French arbitraire, from the Latin ar- bitror, act as an umpire, decide, imphes indep)endence of judgment and will. Tyrannical signifies being hke a tyrant. Absolute power is indef)endent of and superior to all other power: an absolute monarch is uncontrolled not only by men, but things; he is above all law except what emanates from himself. When this absolute povror is assigned to any one according to the constitu- tion of a government, it is despotic. Despotic power is therefore something less than absoluie power; a prince is absolute of himself; he is despotic by the consent of others. In the early ages of society monarchs were absolute, and among the Eastern nations they still retain the absolute form of 'govern- ment, though much limited by estab- lished usage. In the more civilized stages of society the power of despots has been considerably restricted by prescribed laws, in so much that de*- potism is now classed among the regular forms of goverament. Absolute is a term of a general apv- phcation in the sense of cAsolved or freed from all control or Umit; in this sense God is said to be absolute. Some- times it is appUed either to the powa 12 ABSOLUTION itself or to the exercise of power, as absoliUe rule or dominion; despotic is likewise applied to the exercise of the power as well as the power itself, as despotic sway; arbitrary and tyrannical are used only in this last appUcation: the latter is always taken in a bad sense, the former sometimes in an in- different sense. With arbitrariness is associated the idea of caprice and self- ishness. With tyranny is associated the idea of oppression and injustice. Among the Greeks the word Tvpavvog, a tyrant, impUed no more than what we now understand by despot, or, more properly, one who gained the supreme power in a republic; but from the natural abuse of such power, it has ac- quired the sigmification now attached to it, namely, of exercising power to the injury of another. If absolute pow- er come into the hands of any one man or body of men, it is fair to expect that it will be used arbitrarily. In despotic governments the tyrannical proceed- ings of the subordinate officers are often more intolerable than those of the prince. ABSOLUTION. See Forgive. ABSOLVE, Acquit. Absolve, in Latin absolvo, is compounded of ab, from, and solvere, to loose, signifying to loose from that with which one is bound. Acquit, in French acquilter, is compounded of the intensive syllable a^ or ad, and qiiit, quitter, from Latin quietus, quiet, signifying to make easy by the removal of a charge. These terms imply the setting free from guilt or its consequences. Absolv- ing may sometimes be appUed to of- fences against the laws of man, but more frequently to offences against God; acquitting applies solely to of- fences against man. The conscience is released by absolution; the body, goods, or reputation are set free by an ac- quitted. See also Forgive. Absolve, Acquit, Clear. — Absolve in this case, as distinguished from the former article, is extended to all mat- ters affecting the conscience generally. Acquit and clear, in the sense of mak- ing clear or free from, are' appUed to everything which may call for blame, or the imputation of what is not right. A person may be absolved from his oath. acquitted or pronounced quit of every charge, and cleared from every impu- tation. ABSORB, Swallow Up, Ingulf, Engross, Imbibe. Absorb, French ab- sorber, Latin absorbeo, is compounded of ab and sorbeo, to sup up, in distinction from swallow up — the former denoting a gradual consumption; the latter, a sudden envelopment of the whole ob- ject. The excessive heat of the sun ab- sorbs all the nutritious fluids of bodies, animal and vegetable. The gaming- table is a vortex in which the principle of every man is swallowed up with his estate. Ingulf, compounded of in and gulf, signifies to be enclosed in a great gulf, which is a strong figurative repre- sentation for being swallowed up. As it apphes to grand and sublime objects, it is used only in the higher style. Engross, which is compounded of the French words en gros, whole, sig- nifies to purchase wholesale, so as to swallow up the profits of others. In the moral apphcation therefore it is very analogous to absorb. The mind is absorbed in the contemplation of any subject when aU its powers are so bent upon it as not to admit distrac- tion. The mind is engrossed by any subject when the thoughts of it force themselves upon its contemplation to the exclusion of others which should engage the attention. Absorb conveys the idea not only of taking from something, but also of tak- ing to itseK; engross conveys the idea of taking to itself, to the exclusion of others; a certain subject absorbs the faculties, and, metaphorically, the roots of plants absorb moisture; a person en- grosses the conversation so that others cannot take part in it. Absorb, and imbibe, from in and bibo, to drink, both imply the taking in by a gradual process; but the former in- cludes the idea of being taken in so as to be lost, the latter that of being taken in so as to form a part of that by which it is received. So in the im- proper appUcation, an idea absorbs the mind, and the mind imbibes the idea. See also Monopolize. ABSORBABLE. See Assimilable. ABSTAIN, Forbear, Refrain. Abstain, in French abstenir, Latin ab- siineo, is compounded of ab or abs, from. ABSTRACT 13 and tenere, to keep, signifying to keep one's self from a thing. Forbear is compounded of the prepxasition for, or from, and the verb to bear or carry, signifying to carry or take one's self from a thing. Refrain, in French re- frener, Latin refrceno, is compovmded of re, back, and frcenum, a bridle, signify- ing to keep back as it were by a bridle, to bridle in. AU these terms imply the omission to do anything, but vary in the circum- stances and in the motives for the omission. To abstain is the general term, to forbear and refrain are partic- ular modes of abstaining. Abstaining is an act that may require no self-denial, nor oppose any incUnation; forbearing and refraining both imply a certain degree of opposition to the will or inclination, the latter much more than the former. We abstain from doing indifferent things from motives of con- venience, as -to abstain from speaking upon a particular subject, or we ab- stain from important matters from a sense of duty, as "to abstain from the appearance of evil." We forbear from prudence or duty to do that which we have motives for doing; as we for- bear to do an injury though in retiuTi for an injur>'. We refrain, from the same motives, from doing that which we are strongly inclined or impelled to do, as to rdfrain from expressing the feeUngs of the moment. These words are often coupled with a negative, to show the inability of the agent to omit doing a thing, as when it is said, "I cannot abstain from the gratification," or "I cannot forbear mentioning, etc., or "she was so affected that she could not refrain" from t#ars. Abstaining as a religious duty is mostly said of indulgences as to food or otherwise which are prohibited; as it is the part of the Mohammedan faith to abstain from wine; forbearing is mostly said of that which concerns others. Every one is too liable to offend, not to have motives for for- bearing to deal harshly with the of- fences of others; for being patient, in- dulgent, long-suffering. Abstinence, Fast, Abstinent, Sober, Abstemious, Temperate. — Abstinence is a general term, applicable to any ob- ject from which we abstain; fast is a species of abstinence, namely, an abstaining from food. The general term is Ukewise used in the particular sense, to imply a partial abstinence from particular food; but fast signifies an abstinence from food altogether. Abstinent respects everything that acts on the senses, and in a limited sense apphes particularly to soUd food. Sober, from the Latin sobritis, com- poimded of so or se, expressing separa- tion (cf. se in separation) and ebrius, drunk, impUes an abstinence from ex- cessive drinking. Abstemious, from the Latin ahstemius, compoimded of abs and tenietum, wine, implies the ab- staining from wine or strong hquor in general. Temperate, in Latin tempera- tiis, participle of tempero, to moderate or regulate, imphes a well-regulated abstinence in all manner of sensual indulgence. The first of the last four terms is generic, the rest specific. We may be abstinent without being sober, sober without being abstemious, and aU to- gether without being temperate. An abstinent man does not eat or drink as much as he could enjoy; a sober man may drink much without being affect- ed; an abstemiov^oor man, which would be refused by one less needy than himself; harmonious sounds are always grateful to a musical ear. Welcome signifies come well or in season for us. Acceptable and welcome both apply to external circumstances, and are therefore relatively employed; but the former is confined to such things as are offered for our choice, the latter refers to whatever happens ac- cording to our wishes; we may not iJways accept that which is acceptable, but we shall never reject that which is welcome; it is an insult to offer any- thing by way of a gift to another which is not acceptable; it is a graJtefvl task to be the bearer of welcome inteUigence to our friends. Accevtance, Acceptation. — Though both derived from the verb cuxept, these terms have this difference, that the former is employed to express the active sense of the verb, the latter the passive sense. Acceptance is the act of accepting, acceptation the state of being accepted, as the acceptance of a favor lay^ a person imder an obliga- tion. A book, or whatever else is of- fered to us, may be worthy of our acceptance or not; a word acquires its acceptation from the manner m which it is generally accepted by the learned. ACCESS. See Approach. 16 ACCESSION ACCESSION. See Increase. ACCESSORY. See Abettor. ACCIDENT, Chance. Accident, in Latin accidens, from ad and cadens, fall- ing, and chance (in French chance, also connected with cadens), both signify falling out (cf. English befall) — i. e., without any design; but the former, by the force of the ac or ad, signifies fall- ing out at a given time, or vmder given circumstances; chance, on the other hand, signifies falling out without any quahfication or restriction. Both may be employed to denote either the man- ner or cause of things happening, or the things themselves that so happen; in the first sense, accident and chance may be used indifferently in the col- loquial expressions to happen by chance or by accident, but otherwise accident is used only in respect to par- ticular events as, it was pure accident; but chance is employed to denote a hidden senseless cause of things, as opposed to a positive intelligent cause. Atheists ascribe all things to chance; whatever happens by secondary causes hidden from our view we are accus- tomed to ascribe to chance, which is only a mode of confessing our ignorance as to how it happens. When taken for the thing that hap- pens, accident is said ordinarily of things that have been; chance of things that are to be. That is an accident which is done without intention; that is a chance which cannot be brought about by the use of means. It is an accident when a house falls; it is a chance when and how it may fall. Accidents cannot be prevented; chances cannot be calculated upon. Accidents may sometimes be remedied; chances can never be controlled. Accidents ^ve rise to sorrow; they mostly occa- sion mischief: chances give rise to hope; they often produce disappoint- ment; it is wise to dwell upon neither. Sometimes chance is used without reference to time for any fortuitous event, and in that case it is more ex- pressive than the word accident. The term accident may likewise sometimes be taken for what may happen in the future. See also Event. Accident, Contingency, CasuaUy, Ac- cidental, Incidental, Casual, Contingent. — Accident (see above). Contingency, in French contingence, Latin contingens, participle of contingo, compoimded of con, together, and tangere, to touch one another, signifies the falling out or happening together, or the thing that happens in conjimction with another. Casiuilty, in French casualite, from the Latin casualis, and cado, to fall or hap- pen, signifies the thing that happens in the course of events. All these words imply whatever takes place independently of our intentions. Accidents express more than contin- gencies; the former comprehend events with their causes and consequences; the latter respect collateral actions, or circumstances appended to events; casualties have regard simply to cir- cumstances. Accidents are frequently occasioned by carelessness, and contin- gencies by trivial mistakes; but casual- ties are altogether independent of oiu*- selves. The overturning of a carriage is an accident; our situation in a carriage at the time is a contingency, which may occasion us to be more or less hm-t; the passing of any one at the time is a casualty. We are all exposed to the most calamitous accidents, and our happiness or misery depends upon a thousand contingencies; the best-con- certed schemes may be thwarted by. casualties, which no human foresight can prevent. Accidentcd, see under Accident. Incidental, from incident, in Latin in- cidens and incido, or in, on, and cadere, to fall upon, signifies belonging to a thing by chance. Casual, see Casuait- TY above. Contingent, see Contin- gency above. Accidental is opposed to what is de- signed or planned ; incidental to what is premeditated; casual to what is con- stant and regular; contingent to what is definite and fixed. A meeting may be accidental, an expression incidental, a look, expression, etc., casual, an expense or circumstance contingent. We do not expect what is accidental; we do not suspect or guard against what is inci- dental; we do not heed what is casual; we are not prepared for what is conr- tingenl. Many of the most fortimate and important occurrences in our Uves are accidental; many remarks, seem- ingly incidental, do in reaUty conceal ACCOMPANY 17 a settled intent; a casual remark in the course of conversation will some- times make a stronger impression on the minds of children than the most eloquent and impressive discourse or repeated counsel; in the prosecution of any plan we ought to be prepared for the nimierous contingencies which we may meet with to interfere with our arrangements. ACCLAMATION. See Applause. ACCLIMATE. See Naturalize. ACCOMMODATE. See Fit. ACCOMMODATOR, Assistant, Helper. Accommodator, from the Latin accommodatiis or accommodo, that from ad, to, and commodo, to adapt, sig- nifies, Uterally, one who accommodates another, who adapts himself or herself to the wishes of another. While the accommodation may be rendered in any desired direction, the term ac- commodator has recently taken on a new application, and now implies a man or woman who makes a business of hiring out by the hour or day to render what- ever assistance or help a housewife may require. Assistant (for the derivation see assist under Help) has a less speciaUzed meaning. It designates any one whose office it is to aid another in his work — assistant secretary, assistant editor, assistant to the president, etc. Helper is more colloquial and informal. We speak of the helpers in any regularly organized business office as assistants, but an assistant in certain household duties is often called a "mother's helper," and coimtry people speak of their "hired help" rather than of their "hired assistants." ACCOMPANIMENT, Companion, Concoiutant. Accompaniment is prop- erly a collective term to express what goes in company, and is appUed only to things; companion, which also sig- nifies what is in the company, is ap- plied either to persons or to things. Concomitant, from the intensive syllable con and comes, a companion, implies what is attached to an object, or goes in its train, and is applied only to things. When said in relation to things, ac- companim^nt implies a necessary con- nection, companion an incidental con- nection; the former is as a part to a whole, the latter is as one whole to an- other; the accompaniment belongs to the thing accompanied, inasmuch as it serves to render it more or less com- plete; the companion belongs to the thing accompanied, inasmuch as they correspond: in this manner singing is an accompaniment to instrumental mu^ic; subordinate ceremonies are the accompaniments in any solemn service: but a picture may be the companion oi another picture from their fitness to stand together. A concomitant is as much of an appendage as the accom^ paniment, but it is applied only to moral objects; thus morahty is a concomitant to reUgion. ACCOMPANY, Attend, Escort. Accompany, Old French companie, Low Latin companiem, is compoimded of con, with, and panis, bread, and sig- nifies the breaking of bread together, hence friendly intercourse and society. Accompany is compounded of ad, to, and companiem, and hence means to give one's society to another. Attend, in French attendre, compounded of ad and tendere, to tend or incline toward, signifies to direct one's notice or care toward any object. Escort, in French escorter, from the Latin ex and corrigo (set right or correct), meant to guide in the right direction, and re- ferred especially to the band of armed attendants delegated to guide a trav- eler through a dangerous country. We accompany those with whom we wish to go; we attend those whom we wish to serve; we escort those whom we are called upon to protect or guard. We accompany our equals, we attend our superiors, and escort superiors or in- feriors. The desire of pleasing or being pleased actuates in the first case; the desire of serving or being served, in the second case; the fear of danger or the desire of security, in the last place. One is said to have a numerous com- pany, a crowd of attendants, and a strong escort; but otherwise one per- son only may accompany or atCend, though several are wanting for an es- cort. Friends accompany each other in their excursions; a servant attends his master on a journey; a strong escort is necessary in traveling through unfre- quented and dangerous roads. Accompany and attend may likewise be said of things as well as persons. 18 ACCOMPLICE In this case the former is applied to what goes with an object so as to form a part of it; the latter to that which follows an object as a dependent upon it. Pride is often accompanied by mean- ness, and attended with much inconveni- ence to the possessor. ACCOMPLICE. See Abettor; Confederate. ACCOMPLISH, Effect, Execute, Achieve. Accomplish, in French a/:- complir, is compounded of the inten- sive syllable ac or ad, and complir, in Latin compleo, fill to the top, signify- ing to finish entirely. Effeci, in Latin effectus, participle of efficio, compounded of ex, out of or up, and facere, to make, signifies to make until nothing remains to be done. (Compare the colloquial phrase "How did you make out with it?") Execute, in Latin executus, par- ticiple of exsequor, compounded of ex and sequor, follow, signifies to carry through to the end. (Compare the business slang "follow-up methods," etc.) Achieve, in French achever, from the phrase venir a chef, Latin ad caput venire, come to a head, expresses the same meaning by another and, to us also, a familiar metaphor. To accomplish is properly a mode of effecting, namely, to effect completely, or to the utmost extent proposed; to ac- complish an object, therefore, signifies more than simply to effect a purpose, both as to the thing aimed at and the means employed in bringing it about. Extraordinary means are requisite for accomplishing, and ordinary means for effecting. To accomplish is properly said of that which a person sets before himself; but to effect, execide, and achieve do not relate to the views of the person acting, but to the thing brought about. To effect expresses less than ex- ecute or achieve; whatever is brought about or into effect is effected; what is execrded is comphcated in its nature, as to execute a design or project; what is achieved is grand, as to achieve an enter- prise. Practical abUities are requisite for effecting, skill for executing, spirit and talent for achieving. Some persons are always striving to attain an end without even accomplishing what they propose. It is the part of wisdom to suit the means to the end when we have any scheme to effect. Those who are readiest in forming projects are not always the fittest for carrying them into execution. That ardor of char- acter which impels to the achievement of arduous imdertakings belongs but to very few. We should never give up what we have the least chance of accomplishing, if it be worth the labor; nor pursue any plan which af- fords us no prospect of effecting what we wish; nor undertake what we do not feel ourselves competent to exe- cute, particularly when there is any- thing extraordinary to achieve. See also Fulfil. Accomplished, Perfect, Accomplish-' m^nt. Perfection. — These epithets ex- press an assemblage of all the quah- ties suitable to the subject; and mark the qualification in the high- est degree. Accomplished refers only to the artificial refinements of the mind; perfect is said of things in gen- eral, whether natural or artificial, mental or corporeal. An acquaintance with modem lan- guages and the ornamental branches of the arts and sciences constitutes a per- son accomplished; the highest possible degree of skill in any art constitutes a man a perfect artist. An accomplishment is acquired; but a perfection is either acquired or natural. See also. Qualification. ACCORD. See Agree; Tally. ACCORDANCE. See Melody. ACCORDANT. See Consonant. ACCORDINGLY. See Therefore.! ACCOST, Salute, Address, Greet, Hail, Welcome. Accost, in French accoster, is compounded of ad, and the Latin casta, a rib or side, signifying to come by the side of a person. Salute, in Latin salvia, from solus, health, sig- nifies to bid good-speed. Address, in French adresser, compounded of ad and dresser, from the Low Latin drictu^, a contracted form of directum, straight, signifies to direct one's discourse to a person. See also under ABiLTTy. To accost and saluie are said of per- sons on their first meeting; address may be said of those who direct their dis- course to others at any time. The lead- ing idea of accost is that of speaking to a person on coming up to him; salute is to notice a person, which may be by ACCOUNT 19 words or otherwise; that of address is to direct one's words to the individual, which may either be personally or by writing. Accosting is an act of famil- iarity not warranted by anything but an intimate acquaintance, or for pur- poses of business; saluting is an act of courtesy between friends which cannot be dispensed with; addressing is a nia,tr- ter of convenience or discretion. Greet, Anglo-Saxon gretan, to visit or address, impUes a verbal and friendly salute between equals, conveying a good and kind wish. Hail, from heal and health, denotes a wish for the health and long life of the person ad- dressed, which was a customary form of address among the Eastern nations on approaching their sovereign; the word is now used to denote a similar expression on solemn occasions, par- ticularly by the poets. Welcome de- notes an expression of good wishes and kind regards on a person's first arrival; it is therefore confined to strangers or those who have been absent for a time. See also under Acceptabi^. ACCOUNT, Reckoning, Bill. Ac- count, compounded of ad and count, signifies to count to a person; an ac- coimt is the thing so counted. Reckon- ing, from the verb to reckon, signifies the thing reckoned up. Bill, Low Latin biUa, is derived from Latin bulla, a sealed writing fastened with a bulla or a round seal like a knob, knob being the original meaning of the word. (The same root appears in the words bulle- tin. Papal biM, billet-doux, etc.) These words, which are very similar in signifi- cation, may frequently be substituted for one another. Account is the generic, the others the specific terms; a reckoning and bill is an account, though not always vice versa; account expresses the details, with the sum of them counted up ; reckoning im- plies the register and notation of the things to be reckoned up; hill denotes the details, with their particular charges. An account should be correct, containing neither more nor less than is proper; a reckoning should be ex- S licit, leaving nothing unnoticed as to ates and names; a bill should be fair. We speak of keeping an account, of coming to a reckoning, of sending in a bill. Customers have an account with their tradespeople; masters have a reckoning with their workpeople; trades- men send in their bills at stated periods. Account, from the extensive use of the term, is applicable to everything that is noted down, the particulars of which are considered worthy of notice, indi- vidually or collectively: merchants keep their accounts; an account is taken at the Custom-House of all that goes in and out of the kingdom; an account is taken of all transactions, of the weather, of natural phenomena, and whatever is remarkable. Reckoning, as a particular term, is more partial in its use; it is mostly confinea to the dealings of men with one another; in which sense it is superseded by the preceding term, and now serves to express only an explan- atory enumeration, which may be either verbal or written. Bill, as im- plying something charged or engaged, is used not only in a mercantile, but a legal sense; hence, we speak of a bill of lading, a bill of parcels, a bill of ex- change, a bill of indictment, or a bill in ParUament, Congress, or a Legislature. See also Reckon; Sake. Account, Narrative, Description. — Account is the most general of these terms; whatever is noted as worthy of remark is an account. Narrative, from narrate, in Latin narratu^, from narus or gnarus, knowing, signifies the thing made known. Description, from de- scribe, in Latin describo, from de, down, and scribere, to write, signifies the thing written down. Account has no reference to the per- son giving the accoimt; a narrative must have a narrator; a description must have a describer. An account may come from one or several quarters, or no specified quarter; but a narrative and description bespeak themselves as the production of some individual. Ac- counts from the armies are anxiously looked for in time of war; he suddenly broke off his narrative; his book is full of descriptions. An account may be given of poHtical events, domestic occurrences, or natural phenomena, but more particularly of matters of temporary and immeaiate interest ; it may be true or false ; a nar- rative is mostly personal, respecting the proceedings, accidents, or adventures of individuals; it may be real or ficti> 20 ACCOUNTABLE tious; a description does not so much embrace occurrences as local circum- stances, properties, and characteristics; it is either correct or otherwise. ACCOUNTABLE, See Answer- able. ACCUMULATE. See Absorb; Ac- quire; Collect; Gain; Gather; Heap. ACCURATE, Exact, Precise. Ac- curate, in French accurate, Latin accura- tus, participle of accuro, compounded of the intensive ad and curare, to take care of, signifies done with great care. Exact, in French exacte, Latin exactus, participle of exigere, to finish or com- plete, denotes the quaUty of complete- ness, the absence of defect. Precise, in French precis, Latin prcedsus, participle of praeciAere, to cut by rule after the manner of carpenters, signifies the quaUty of doing by rule. Accurate refers to the care bestowed upon any matter to make it what it ought to be; exact and precise simply denote the quahty of the thing, the former implying completeness, the lat- ter nicety as to the manner of executing anything. From this difference in their meaning arises a difference in their ap- plication; a painting, on examination or on observation, is more properly said to be accurate; a model, figure, or measure, to be exact; a line, a rule, or a form, to be precise. These epithets rise in sense upon each other, eooact signifying more than accu- rate, and precise a greater degree of mi- nuteness than either. With this distinc- tion they may be applied to the same or similar objects: a description or view may be accurate and exact, but in the former case it is only just as far as it goes, in the latter it is fuller of partic- ulars and details. In denoting moral quaUties or habits, accuracy may be appUed to whatever men attempt to do; exactness to mat- ters of economy, prudence, and duty; precision, in regard to manners, modes, and forms. Accuracy is indispensable in either business or science, but partic- ularly in commercial and legal transac- tions; exactness is requisite in the pay- ment of debts and the observance of all obhgations. Some men may be very accurate in their particular fine who are not very exact in fulfilling their engage- ments. In some cases, where great re- sults may flow from trifling causes, the greatest precision becomes requisite; we may, however, be too precise when' we dwell on vuiimportant particulars or adhere too tenaciously to forms and modes, but we never can be too ci^cu/- rate or exact; hence the epithet precise is sometimes taken for affectedly exact. A man may be precise in his dress who is not remarkable either for accuracy or exactness in his general conduct. A time or a period is said to be exact, an hour, a moment, or instant, precise; an expression accurate; the meaning of a word precise. ACCUSATION. See Complaint. ACCUSE, Charge, Impeach, Ar- raign. Accuse, in Latin accuro, com- pounded of ad and causa, a cause or trial, signifies to bring to trial. Charge, hke cargo, is derived from Low Latin carrico, to load a car (Latin carrv^). Impeach, in French empecher, to hinder or disturb, compounded of in and pes, the foot, signifies to entangle the feet in anything. Arraign, Old French aranier, areisnicr, from Latin ad and ratio, reason, meant to reason against, to bring a formal charge against an- other. The idea of asserting something to the prejudice of another is common to these terms; but accuse is said of acts, charge of moral quaUties constituting the character: we accuse a person of murder; we charge him with dishon- esty. Accuse is properly a formal ac- tion; cJmrge is an informal action: criminals' are accused, and their accusa- tion is proved in a court of judicature to be true or false; any person may be charged, and the charge may be either substantiated or refuted in the judg- ment of a third person. Impeach and arraign are both species of accusing; the former in application to statesmen and state concerns, the latter in regard to the general conduct or principles; with this difference, that he who impeaches only asserts the guilt, but does not determine it; but those who arraign also take upon themselves to decide: statesmen are impeached for misdemeanors in the administration of government: kings arraign governors of provinces and subordinate princes, and in this manner kings are sometimes ACQUAINTANCE 21 arraigned before mock tribunals: our Saviour was arraigned before Pilate; and creatures in the madness of pre- sumption arraign their Creator. Accuse, Censure. — Accuse, see above. Censure, in French censure, in Latin censura, is derived from censor, a Ro- man magistrate who took cognizance of the morals and manners of the citi- zens, as also of the domestic arrange- ments of the city. It signifies not only the office of censor, but, in an extended sense, the act of blaming or punish- ing offenders against morahty, which formed a prominent feature in his office. To accuse is only to assert that which is prejudicial to another; to censure is to take the fault for granted. We cu>- cuse only to make known the offence, to p?ovoke inquiry; we censure in order to inflict a punishment. An accusation may be false or true; a censure mild or severe. It is extremely wrong to accuse another without sufficient grounds; but still worse to censure him without the most substantial grounds. Every one is at hberty to accuse another of offences which he knows him for a certainty to have committed; but none can censure who are not authorized by their age or station. ACHIEVE. See Accomplish. ACHIEVEMENT. See Deed. ACKNOWLEDGE, Own, Con- fess, Avow. The first of these terms, compounded of a and knowledge, im- EUes to bring to knowledge, to make nown. Ovm is a famiUar figure, sig- nifying to take to one's self, to make one's own; it is a common substitute for confess. Confess, in French con- fesser, Latin confessus, participle of con- fiteor, comp>ounded of con, together, and fateor, I speak, signifies to impart to any one. Avow, in French avouer, Latin advoveo, signifies to vow or pro- test to anyone. These words all denote the making known to others what relates to one's self, or that in which one has taken a part; ackyioivledge is used in this general sense in a diversity of applications; the other terms are partially employed, and with various modifications m their meaning. Acknowledge and own are em- ployed either in matters of indifference or those which are blameworthy; con- fess mostly in such matters as are crim- inal or in a high degree culpable. A person acknowledges that he was pres- ent, or ovms that he assisted another, he confesses a theft, or confesses his guilt, or a sinner confesses his sins. To acknowledge and own, when appUed to culpable matters, may either have re- spect to particular transactions or gen- eral characteristics, as to acknowledge or own the fact, to cu:knowledge or oum one's weakness, fallibility, incapacity, etc. ; to confess is mostly said of partic- ular transactions, as to confess the crime laid to one's charge. To acknowl- edge, being a voluntary act, may be either by words or actions, or tacitly without any outward expression; con- fessing, on the other hand, being mostly called for in consequence of an in- terrogatory or the necessities of the party, must always be by express words. To acknowledge and oum also signify to admit that a thing belongs to one, but the former denotes only a general relationship, the latter a special owner- ship; with this distinction we may speak of acknowledging or owning a son; but we may Ukewise acknowledge many things which we cannot properly own, as to acknowledge a woman as one's wife, or any particular person as a prince, or any particular state as inde- pendent. To acknowledge, own, and confess are all used in the sense of expressing one's mind or what passes in one's mind, in which appUcation they are comparable with avow. In this case to acknmoledge is most properly appUed to matters of opinion, own to matters of feehng, al- though they may in many such cases be indifferently employed. To acknowledge is to declare in a general manner one's assent to any- thing; to confess is to declare in a sol- emn manner one's assent to matters of faith; to avow is to declare the motives or reasons of one's actions, particularly such as might with more propriety be concealed; as to acknowledge the just- ness of a remark, to confess the faith, to avow one's motives, contempt, scorn, etc. See also Recognize. ACME. See Zenith. ACQUAINT. See Inform. ACQUAINTANCE. Familiarity, 22 ACQUIESCE Intimacy. Acquaintance, from ac- quaint, is derived from the Old 'French acointer (Latin ad and cognitus, from the verb cognosco which is cognate with the English know and has the same meaning); it signifies being known to another. Familiarity comes from familiar, in Latin familiaris and- familia (from famulus, a servant), sig- nifying known as one of the household. Intimacy, from Latin intimus, inner- most, signifies known to the inner- most recesses of the heart. These terms mark different degrees of closeness in the social intercourse; acquxiintance ex- pressing less than familiarity, and that less than intimacy. Acquaintance springs from occasional intercourse; familiarity is produced by a daily intercourse, which wears off aU constraint and banishes all ceremony; intimacy arises not merely from fre- quent intercourse, but unreserved com- mxmication. An acquxiintance wiU be occasionally a guest; but one that is on terms of familiarity has easy access to our table; and an iniimaie Ukewise lays claim to a share, at least, of our confi- dence. An acquxiintance with a person affords but Httle opportimity for know- ing his character; familiarity puts us in the way of seeing his foibles, rather than his virtues; but intimacy enables us to appreciate his worth. A simple acquxiintance is the most de- sirable footing on which to stand with all persons, however deserving. If it have not the pleasures of familiarity or intimacy, it can claim the privilege of being exempted from their pains. "Too ranch, familiarity," according to the old proverb, "breeds contempt." The unhcensed freedom which com- monly attends familiarity affords but too ample scope for the indulgence of the selfish and unamiable passions. Intimacies begun in love often end in hatred, as ill-chosen friends commonly become the bitterest enemies. A man may have a thousand acquaintances, and not one whom he should make his intimate. These terms may be applied to things as well as persons, in which case they bear a similar analogy. An acquxiint- ance with a subject is opposed to entire ignorance upon it; familiarity with it is tne consequence of frequent repetition; and intimacy of a steady and thorough research. In our intercourse with the world we become daily acquxiinted with fresh subjects to engage our attention. Some men have by extraordinary dili- gence a,cquired a considerable famil- iarity with more than one language and science; but few, if any, can boast of having possessed an intimate acquaint- ance with all the particulars of even one language or science. When we can translate the authors of any foreign language, we may claim an acquaintance with it; when we can speak or write it freely, we may be said to be familiar with it; but an intimate acquaintance comprehends a thorough critical inti- macy with aU the niceties and subtle- ties of its structure. ACQUIESCE. See Agree. ACQUIRE, Obtain, Gain, Win, Earn. Acquire, Old French acquerir, Latin acquiro, is compounded of ad, to, and quxerere, to seek, signifying to seek or get for one's self. Obtain, in French obtenir, Latin obtineo, is compoimded of ob, near, and tenere, to hold, signifying to lay hold or secure within one's reach. Gain comes from French gagne, from a Teutonic root signifying a pasture, hence something to be desired among shepherd-people, hence success, profit. Win comes from Anglo-Saxon vnnnan, to fight or struggle, hence to succeed in a struggle. Earn comes from Anglo- Saxon eamian, aUied to German ernte, a harvest. The idea of getting is common to these terms, but the circumstances of the action vary. We acquire by our own efforts; we obtain by the efforts of others as weU as ourselves; we gain or win by striving; we earn by labor. Talents and industry are requisite for acquiring; what we acquire comes grad- ually to us in consequence of the reg- ular exercise of our abilities; in this manner, knowledge, honor, and repu- tation are acquired. Things are 06- tained by aU means, honest or dishon- est ; whatever comes into our possession agreeable to our wishes is obtained; fa- vors and requests are always obtained. Fortime assists in both gaining and win- ning; but particularly in the latter case; a subsistence, a superiority, a victory, or battle, is gained; a game or a prize in the lottery is won. A good ACT 23 constitution and full employment are all that is necessary for earning a live- lihood. Fortunes are acquired after a course of years; they are obtained by inheritance, or gained in trade. What is acquired is soUd, and pro- duces lasting benefit; what is ob- tained may often be injurious to one's health, one's interest, or one's morals: what is gained or vxm is often only a partial advantage, and transitory in its nature; it is gained or won only to be lost; what is earned serves some- times only to supply the necessity of the moment; it is hardly got and quickly spent. Scholars acquire learn- ing, obtain rewards, gain applause, and vrin prizes, which are often hardly earned by the loss of health. Acquire, Attain. — To acquire is a progressive and permanent action. To attain, in Latin attingo, compounded of ad and tango, touch, signifies to touch the goal, to reach the end, and represents a perfect and finished ac- tion. We always go on acquiring; but we stop when we have attained. What is acquired is something got into one's possession; what is attained is the point arrived at. We acquire a language; we attain to a certain degree of perfection. By abilities and perseverance we may acquire a considerable fluency in speaking sev- eral languages; but we can scarcely expect to aUain to the perfection of a native in any foreign language. Ordinary powers coupled with dili- gence will enable a person to acquire whatever is useful; but we cannot attain to superiority without extraor- dinary talents and determined per- severance. Acquirements are always serviceable; attainments always cred- itable. Acquirement, Acquisition. — Two ab- stract nouns, from the same verb, de- noting the thing acquired. Acquire- ment implies the thing acquired for and by ourselves; acquisition, that which is acquired for the benefit of one's self or another. People can expect to make but slender acquire- ments without a considerable share of industry; and without them they will be no acquisition to the com- munity to which they have attached themselves. Acquirement respects rather the exertions employed; ac- quisition the benefit or gain accruing. To learn a language is an acquirement; to gain a class or a degree, an acquisi- tion. The acquirements of literature far exceed in value the acquisitions of fortune. ACQUIT. See Absolve. ACRIMONY, Tartness, Asper- ity, Harshness. These epithets are figuratively employed to denote sharp- ness of feeling corresponding to the quaUty in natural bodies. Acrimony, in Latin acrimonia, from acer, sharp, is the characteristic of garlic, mus- tard, and pepper, that is, a biting sharpness. Tartness, from tart, Anglo- Saxon teart, sharp, from teran, tear, is associated with the idea of tearing as bitter is associated with that of biting. Asperity is derived from the Latin asper, a word of uncertain etymology signifying rough. Harshness is the substantive corresponding to harsh, a Scandinavian word signifying rank, unpleasant to the taste, and denotes especially the sharp, rough taste of unripe fruit. A quick sense produces acrimony; it is too frequent among disputants, who embitter each other's feelings. An acute sensibility, coupled with quick- ness of intellect, produces tartness; it is too frequent among females. Acri- mony is a transient feehng that discov- ers itself by the words; tartness is an habitual irritability that mingles itself with the tone ana looks. An acrimo- nious reply frequently gives rise to much ill-will; a tart reply is often treated with indifference, as indicative of the natural temper, rather than of any vmfriendly feehng. Asperity and harshness respect one's conduct to inferiors; the latter ex- presses a strong degree of the former. Asperity is opposed to mildness and for- bearance; harshness to kindness. A reproof is conveyed with asperity, when the words and looks convey strong dis- pleasure; a treatment is harsh when it wounds the feelings and does violence to the affections. Mistresses some- times chide their servants with asperity; parents sometimes deal harshly with their children. ACT, Do, Make. Act. in Latin tictu^, participle of ago, Greek oyw, drive 24 ACT or impel, signifies literally to move or put in motion. Do, in German Ihun, like the Greek riOiifii, signifies to put or put in order, to bring to pass. Make, Anglo-Saxon macian, corresponds to German machen, and is allied to match. All these terms imply to exert a power in a given form and manner: act, which is the general term, conveys this general idea without any further quali- fication; the other terms convey this idea with modifications. We always act when we do, but we do not always do when we act. To act is applied either to persons or things, as a spring or a lock acts; to do applies in this sense to persons only. To act is also mostly intransitive or reflective, as to act well or ill in this or that manner; to do is always transitive, as to do right or wrong, to do one's duty. One may either acl a part or do one's part, which are essentially different things; to act a part is either really or fictitiously to a4:t in any part; but to do our part is to do that which is allotted to us as our part or duty. To do and to make, in regard to per- sons, are both used in the sense of vol- untarily exerting a power to bring a thing to pass; but do applies to the ordinary business of life or what is done by a given rule, as to do a work, to do justice; make applies to that which is done by a particular contrivancejor for a particular purpose, as to make a pen or a table, etc. What is done once may have been done before, and may be done again; but what is made is at once brought into existence, and, if it be made again, it can only be by imitation. To do and to make, as apphed to things, signify to cause; but the former is used only in the expressions to do good or harm, the latter is ordinarily used, to make room, to make a thing easy, etc. Act, Work, Operate. — To act is to ex- ert a simple power, or by simple means, as a wire acts. Work, Anglo-Saxon wyrcan, like the German wirken, etc., is to exert complex powers, or exert power by a gradual process. A machine vxjrks, but each of its parts is said to act; so beer works, and bread works; acting may be accompanied with no particular effect or change in the body that a^ts, but that which loorks mostly undergoes a change and also produces changes, as medicine, which works in the system. Sometimes act as well as work is taken in the sense of exerting a power upon other bodies and producing changes, as the sun acts on the plants. To work and operate both imply to act, or exert a power in order to bring about some end or purpose; but oper- ate is applied to matters of a general nature in science or morals, as a meas- ure operates, or words may operate on the mind, or reasons may operate on the understanding. To work is mostly ap- plied to famiUar matters and particular objects, as the hand works, the head works, the brain works; operate is al-. ways intransitive. As nouns, action implies either the act of acting or the thing done; work, the act or state of working, or what re- sults from the work, as to go to work or be at work, the work of one's hands; operation, either to the act of operating, as the operation of thought or the operation of vegetation, or the mode of operating, as the operations of time are various. 4 See also Deal. Act, Action, Deed. — The words act, action, and deed, though derived from the preceding verbs, have an obvious distinction in their meaning. Act, in French acte, Latin actum, denotes the thing done. Action, in French action, Latin actio, signifies doing. Act ia 9, single exercise of power, as an act of the will or an act of the mind, the act of walking, speaking, and the like; action, a continued exercise of power, or a state of exercising power, as to be in action, as opposed to rest; the action of walking is agreeable in fine weather. When these words are taken in the sense of the thing done, they admit of a similar distinction. An act is the single thing done, or what is done by a single effort, as that is your act or his act; an action may consist of more acts than one, or embrace the causes and conse- quences of the action, as a bold action, to judge of actions, etc. Hence it is that the term act is more proper than action where it is so defined as to imply what is single and simple, as an act of authority, an act of govern- ment, an act of folly, and the like; but otherwise the word action is to be pre- ACTIVE 25 ferred where the moral conduct or character is in question. We may- enumerate particular acts of a man's life, as illustrjitive of certain traits in his character, or certain circumstances in his hfe; but to speak at large of his actions would be to describe his char- acter. .. Act and deed are both employed for what is done; but act refers to the power exerted, and deed to the work p)erformed; as a voluntary or involun- tary act, a good or bad deed. Act is mostly employed either in an abstract or familiar appUcation; deed is employed for whatever men do in the business of Ufe, particularly in those things which are extraordinary. Acts are either pubUc or private, of individuals or of bodies, as ads of gov- ernment, acts of Parhament; deeds are always private, or what is done by men individually. Acts are in their proper sense infor- mal; but deeds may sometimes be for- mal instruments: when you speak of a thing as a man's act and deed, this is not tautology; it is his act as far as he and no one else acts in it, it is his deed as far as it is that which is done completely or is accomplished. Action, Gesture, Gestictdation, Post- ure, Attitude. — Action, see derivation in preceding group of words; also Battle. Gesture, Low Latin gestura, Latin gestus, participle of gero, carry, signifies the manner of carrying one's body. Gesticulation, in Latin gesticu- latio, comes from gesticuior, to make many gestures. Posture, in French posture, Latin positura, a position, comes from positus, participle of pono, signifying the manner of placing one's self. Attitude, in French attitude, Ital- ian attitudine, is a doublet of aptitude, signifying a propriety in the disposi- tion of one's body. All these terms are applied to the state of the body; the three former in- dicating a state of motion, the two latter a state of rest. Action respects the movements of the body in general; gesture is an action indicative of some particular state of mind; gesticulation IS a species of artificial gesture. Raising the arm is an action; bowing is a gest- ure. Actions may be ungraceful; gest- ures indecent. A suitable action some- times gives great force to the words that are uttered; gestures often supply the place of language between people of different nations. Actions characterize a man as vulgar or well-bred; gestures mark the temper of the mind. There are many actions which it is the object of education to prevent fronji growing into habits; savages express the vehe- ment passions of the mind by vehe- ment gestures on every occasion, even in their amusements. An extravagant or unnatural gesture is termed a gesticur- lation; a sycophant, who wishes to cringe into favor with the great, deals largely in gesticulation to mark his devotion; a buffoon who attempts to imitate the gestures of another will use gesticulation; and the monkey who apes the actions of human beings does so by means of gesticulations. Posture and attitude both imply a mode of placing the body, but the post- ure is either natural or assumed; the attitude is always assumed or repre- sented: natural postures are those in which the body places itself for its own conveniences, as sitting, standing, or lying postures. A posture, when assumed, may be distorted or ridiculous, to suit the hu- mor of the party, as mountebanks put >^ themselves into ridiculous postures; or they may be artfully contrived to im- prove the carriage of the body, as the postures of a dancing-master; and, in graver matters, a person may put him- self in a posture of defence. An attitude is assumed in order to dis- play some grace of the body, or some affection or purpose of the mind, as to stand in a graceful attitude, to represent any one in the attitude of prayer. These terms may be apphed to things personified, with precisely the same distinction. They may also be apphed figuratively to other objects besides the body, as an army assumes a menacing attitude, a critical posture of affairs. Action, Agency. — Aciion is the effect; agency the cause. Action is inherent in the subject; agency is something ex- terior; it is, in fact, putting a thing into action: in this manner the whole world is in action through the agency of the Divine Being. ACTIVE, Diligent, Industrious, Assiduous, Laborious. Active, from 26 ACTIVE the verb to act, implies a propensity to act, to be doing something without re- gard to the nature of the object. Dili- gent, in French diligent, Latin diligens, participle of diligo, to choose or Uke, imphes an attachment to an object, and consequent attention to it. Industri- ous, in French industrievx, Latin indtis- trius, from indu, for in, and struere, to build, make, or do, signifies an inward or thorough inclination to be engaged in some serious work. As- siduous, in Latin assiduus, is com- poundea of ad and siduus, from sedere, to sit, signifying to sit close to a thing. Laborious, in French lahorieux, Latin laboriosus, from labor, signifies the in- clination to labor. We are active if we are only ready to exert our powers, whether to any end or not; we are diligent when we are active for some specific end; we are industrious when no time is left imemployed in some serious pursuit; we are assiduous if we do not leave a thing imtil it is finished; we are laborious when the bodily or mental powers are regularly employed in some hard labors A man may be active without being diligent, since he may employ himself in what is of no im- portance; but he can scarcely be dili- gerU without being active, since dili- gence supposes some degree of ac- tivity in one's application to a useful object. A man may be di%e7i/ without being industrious, for he may diligently employ himself about a particular fa- vorite object without employing him- self constantly in the same way ; and he may be industrious without being dili- gent, since diligence implies a free exer- cise of the mental as well as corporeal powers; but industry apphes princi- pally to manual labor. Activity and diligence are, therefore, commonly the property of lively or strong minds, but industry may be associated with mod- erate talents. A man may be diligent without being assiduous; but he can- not be assiduous without being diligent, for assiduity is a sort of persevering dil- igence. A man may be industrious without being laborious, but not vice versa; for laboriousness is a severer kind of industry. Active, Brisk, Agile, Nimble. — Active, see preceding group. Brisk is of ob- scure origin, possibly Celtic. Agile, in Latin agiXis, comes from the same verb as active, signifying a fitness, a readi- ness to act or move. Nimble comes from Anglo-Saxon niman (German neh- men), to take, implying a capacity "to take hold," to "catch on," as we say to-day. Compare the name Nym, in Henry V , signifying thief. Activity respects one's transactions; briskness one's sports: men are a^^iive in carrying on business; children are brisk in their play. Agility refers to the fight and easy carriage of the body in springing; nimbleness to its quick and gliding movements in rimning. A rope- dancer is agile; a female moves nimbly. Activity results from ardor of mind; briskness from vivacity of feehng: agil- ity is produced by corporeal vigor and habitual strong exertion; nimbleness results from an habitual efifort to move Ughtly. See also Kinetic. Active, Busy, Officious. — Active, same as in the preceding groups. Busy, Anglo-Saxon bysig, signifies to be ac- tively engaged in some work. Officious, in French officieux, Latin offidosus, from offidum, duty or service, signifies a propensity to perform some service or office. Active respects the habit or disposi- tion of the mind; busy and offi/kous, either the disposition of the mind, or the employment of the moment: the former regards every species of employ- ment; the latter only particular kinds of employment. An active person is ever ready to be employed; a person is busy when he is actually employed in any object; he is offixnous when he is employed for others. Active is always taken in a good, or at least an indiffer- ent sense; it is opposed to lazy: busy, as it respects occupation, is mostly in a good sense; it is opposed to being at leisure; as it respects disposition, it is always in a bad sense; offi/yious is sel- dom taken in a good sense; it imphes being busy without discretion. To an active disposition nothing is more irk- some than inaction; but it is not con- cerned to inquire into the utihty of the action. It is better for a person to be busy than quite unemployed; but a busy person wiU employ himself about the concerns of others when he has ACUTE 27 none of his own sufficiently important to engage his attention; an officious person is as unfortunate as he is troublesome; when he strives to serve he has the misfortune to annoy. ACTOR, Agent. These terms vary according to the different senses of the verb from which they are drawn. Actor is used for one who either acts a part, or who represents the actions and characters of others, whether real or feigned. Agent is, in the general sense, an ac- tive or acting being, one possessing and exerting the faculty of action, as a free agent, a moral agent. The agent is prop- erly opposed to the patient in the physical world. Agent is also taken generally for whatever puts in motion. Actor, Player, Performer. — The actor and player both perform on a stage; but the former is said in relation to the part that is acted, the latter to the pro- fession that is followed. We may be actors occasionally, without being play- ers professionally, but we may be players without deserving the name of actors. Those who personate charac- ters for their amusement are actors, but not players; those who do the same for a livelihood are players as well as actors; hence we speak of a company of players, not actors. So, likewise, in the figura- tive sense, whoever acts a part real or fictitious, that is, on the stage of hfe, or the stage of a theatre, is an actor; but he only is a player who performs the fictitious part; hence the former is taken in a bad or good sense, according to circumstances. The player is always taken in a less favorable sense, from the artificiahty which attaches to his profession. Performer signifies, in its most gen- eral sense, one that performs any act or part; but in a limited sense, one who performs a part in a pubUc exhibition, whether as a singer, actor, dancer, or otherwise. ACTUAL, Real, Positive. Act- ual, in French actuel, Latin cuUualis, from actio, a deed, signifies belonging to the thing done. Real, in French reel, Latin realis, from res, signifies belong- ing to the thing as it is. Positive, in French positif, I^atin positivxis, from pono, place or fix, signines the state or quality of being fixed, estabUshed. What is actual has proof of its exist- ence within itself, and may be exposed to the eye; what is real may be satis- factorily proved to exist; and what is positive precludes the necessity of a proof. Actual is opposed to the suppo- sititious, conceived or reported; real to the feigned, imaginary; positive to the uncertain, doubtful. Whatever is the condition of a thing for the time being is the actuxd condition; sorrows are real which flow from a substantial cause; proofs are positive which leave the mind in no uncertainty. The actual state of a nation is not to be ascer- tained by individual instances of pov- erty, or the reverse; there are but few, if any, real objects of compassion among common beggars; many posi- live facts have been related of the de- ception which they have practised. By an actual survey of human hfe, we are alone enabled to form just opinions of mankind; it is but too frequent for men to disguise their real sentiments, although it is not always possible to ob- tain positive evidence of their insin- cerity. See also Objective. ACTUATE, Impel, Induce. Act- uate, from the Latin fLdum, an action, impMes to call into action. Impel, in Latin impello, is compounded of in, toward, and pellere, to drive, signif jdng to drive toward an object. Iniu,ce, in Latin induco, is compounded of in, in, and dxuxre, to lead, signifying to lead into an object. One is actuated by motives, impelled by passions, and induced by reason or inclination. Whatever actuates is the result of reflection; it is a steady and fixed principle: whatever impels is mo- mentary and vehement, and often pre- cludes reflection: whatever induces is not vehement, though often momen- tary. One seldom repents of the thing to which one is actuated; as the prin- ciple, whether good or bad, is not liable to change: but we may frequently be impelled to measures which cause seri- ous repentance: the thing to which we are induced is seldom of suff.cient im- portance to call for repentance. ACUTE, Keen, Shrewd, Sharp. Acute, in French aigu, Latin acuius, associated with acus, a needle, signifies the quality of sharpness and pointed- 28 ACUTENESS ness peculiar to a needle. Keen in Anglo-Saxon cene, is related to the Ger- man kuhn, bold, and signified originally energy and activity of spirit, hence quickness of mind. Shrewd, from the verb shrewen, to curse, beshrew, is from Anglo-Saxon screawa, a shrew- mouse, whose bite was venomous, and is alhed to the word shrew, a scolding woman. It meant maUcious, cimning, sharp, in the double sense — sharp of temper, and sharp of mind and tongue — hence the modem significance. In the natural sense, a fitness to pierce is predominant in the word acute; and that of cutting, or a fit- ness for cutting, in the word keen. The same difference is observable in their figurative acceptation. An acvte understanding is quick at discover- ing truth in the midst of falsehood; it fixes itself on a single point with wonderful celerity: a keen imder- standing cuts or removes away the artificial veil under which the truth Ues hidden from the view: a shrewd understanding is rather quicker at discovering new truths than at distin- guishing truth from falsehood. Acide- ness is requisite in speculative and abstruse discussions; keenness in pene- trating characters and springs of ac- tion; shrewdness in eliciting remarks and new ideas. The acute man de- tects errors, and the keen man false- hoods; the shrewd man exposes fol- Ues. Argimaents may be acute, re- proaches keen, and replies or retorts shrewd. A polemic, or a lawyer, must be acute, a satirist keen, and a wit shrewd. Sharp primarily signifies a thin edge or fine point; also artful, crafty, sub- tle. A pain, ache, or retort in conver- sation may be distressingly sharp. An unscrupulous person is often guilty of sharp practice in deahng with others. See also Sharp. ACUTENESS. See Gumption; Pen- etration. ADAGE. See Axiom. ADAPT. See Fit. ADD, Join, Unite, Coalesce. Add, in Latin addo, compounded of ad and do, to give or put, signifies to put one thing to another. Join, in French joindre, and Latin jungo, is in all prob- ability connected with, if not derived from, the Greek, K(vyeiv sons or things; iniynicaX and hostile to persons or things personal; repugnant to things only. A person is adverse, or a thing is adverse to an object; a p)erson, or what is personal, is either inimical or hostile to an object; one thing is repugnant to another. We are adverse to a proposition, or circumstances are adverse to our advancement; partisans are inimical to the proceedings of government, and hostile to the pos- sessors of power. In respect to per- sons, adverse denotes merely the rela- tion of being opposed; inimical, the spirit of the individual in private mat- ters; and hostile, the situation, con- duct, and temper of individuals or bodies in public matters. Those who are adverse to any imdertaking are not likely to use their endeavors to insure success; traders will be inimical to the introduction of anything that threatens to be injurious to their trade; some persons are hostile to establishments in religion. In respect to things, what is adverse acts to the hindrance or disadvantage 36 ADVERTISE of the thing to which it is opposed; as adverse minds, adverse circumstances. Sickness is adverse to the improvement of youth; what is inimical acts directly to mjury, as writings wiiich are inimical to rehgion, a spirit inimical to learning; what is repugnant is in a state of posi- tive opposition or contrariety, as slavery is repugnant to the nuld spirit of Christianity. Adverse, Averse. — Adverse (see above), signifying turned against or over against, denotes simply opposition of situation. Averse, from a and versus. signifying turned from or away from, denotes an active removal or separa- tion from. Adverse is therefore as ap- phcable to inanimate as to animate objects; averse only to animate objects. When apphed to conscious agents, ad- verse refers to matters of opinion and sentiment ; averse to matters of feehng. One is adverse to that which he thinks wrong; he is averse to that which opposes his inclinations, habits, or interests. Adversity, Distress. — Adversity signi- fies adverse circumstances. Distress, from the Latin distringo, compounded of dis, asunder, and stringo, I pull, signi- fied tearing to pieces, hence the state of a mind disorganized by grief or fear. Adversity respects external circum- stances, distress regards either external circumstances or inward feeUngs. Ad- versity is opposed to prosperity; distress to ease. Adversity is a general condi- tion; distress a particular state. Dis- tress is properly the highest degree of adversity. When a man's affairs go al- together adverse to his washes and hopes, when accidents deprive him of his possessions or blast his prospects, he is said to be in adversity; but when in addition to this he is reduced to a state of want, deprived of friends and all prospect of relief, his situation is that of real distress. Adversity is try- ing, distress is overwhelming. Every man is Uable to adversity, although few are reduced to distress but by their own fault. ADVERTISE, Publish. Advertise, from the Latin adverto, compounded of ad and verto, to turn to, signifies to turn the attention to a thing. Publish, in Latin publico — that is, facere publicum • — signifies to make public. Advertise denotes the means, and publish the end. To advertise is to direct the pubhc attention to any event by means of a printed circular; publish is to make known either by oral or printed communication. We publish by adver- tising, but we do not always advertise when we publish. Mercantile and civil transactions are conducted by means of advertisements. Extraordinary cir- cumstances are speedily published in a neighborhood by circulating from mouth to mouth. See also Announce. ADVICE, Counsel, Instruction. Advice (see Admonish). Counsel, in French conseil, Latin consilium, comes from consilio (compounded of con and a root which probably meant to sit), signified to come together to talk over something; and in an extended sense imphes dehberation, or the thing de- liberated upon, determined, and pre- scribed. Instruction, in French instruc- tion, Latin instructio, building, signified to build up from within, and is used in this hteral sense by Milton: "Instruct me, for Thou knowest," meaning "En- ter into me and bmld up my spirit from within." The end of all the actions imphed by these words is the communication of knowledge, and all of them include the accessory idea of superiority, either of age, station, knowledge, or talent. Ad- vice flows from superior professional knowledge, or an acquaintance with things in general; counsel regards su- perior wisdom, or a superior acquaint- ance with moral principles and prac- tice; instruction respects superior local knowledge in particular transactions. A medical man gives advice to his patient; a father gives counsel to his children; a counsellor gives advice to his chent in points of law; he receives instructions from him in matters of fact. Advice should be prudent and cautious; counsel sage and deUberative; instructions clear and positive. Advice is given on all the concerns of Mfe, important or otherwise; counsel is employed for grave and weighty matters; instruction is used on official occasions. Men of business are best able to give advice in mercantile transactions. In all measures that in- volve our future happiness, it is pru- dent to take the counsel of those who are more experienced than ourselves. AFFAIR 37 An ambassador must not act without instructions from his court. See also Information, ADVISE. See .\dmonish. ADVOCATE. See Defender. AERIAL NAVIGATION. See Aeronautics. AERIAL NAVIGATOR. See Aero- naut. AERIAL PILOT. See Aeronaut. AERONAUT, Aerial Navigator, Aerial Pilot, Aviator, Balloonist. Aeronaut, in French aeronaute, from Latin aer, the air, and naiUa, a sailor, as a general term, any one who navigates the air. Aerial navigator and aerial pilot are terms used to distinguish the one who guides an aircraft from the crew having other duties. Aviator is applied to any one engaged in aerial flights, but is more akin to aerial navigator. Balloonist, strictly an avia- tor who makes ascensions in a balloon or a hghter-than-air craft, usually an elongated or spherical bag inflated with gas — the original flying-machine. AERONAUTICS, Aerostatics, Aerostation, Aviation, Ballooning. Aeronautics, in French aeronautique, the science or art which treats of aerial nav- igation. Aerostatic, in German aerosta- ttk, in French aSrostatiqiie, "standing in the air," and aerostation both relate to air at rest and specifically to the suspen- sion and control of flj-ing-craft in the air. Aviation, from the Latin avis, a bird, apphes both to the science of aerial flight in general and particularly to the use of machines capable of rising and maintaining themselves in the air without the aid of gas or rarefied air. Balloon, allied to bail, meant originally a large spherical bag, and ballooning differs from aviation as here defined in that it applies to a machine deriving its ascending and sustaining power from gas or rarefied air contained in a huge bag. A captive balloon is one used for observation purposes over a Umited area, and is attached by a rope or cable to a holding object on the ground. It was formerly used for scouting in warfare, but has given way to other forms of aircraft. AEROPLANE. See Aircraft. AFFABLE, Courteous. Affable, in Latin affabilis, from af or ad, to, and fart, to speak, signifies ready to speak or be spoken with, and is particularly apphed to persons in a higher condi- tion ; princes and nobles are commonly said to be affable when they converse freely with those not in the same con- dition. Affability is properly confined to ver- bal communications; out courteousness, from the word court, signifying after the manner of a court or courtier, refers to actions and manners; affability flows from the natural temper; courteov,sness from good breeding, or the acquired temper. AFFAIR, Business, Concern. Af- fair, in French affaire, is formed from the phrase d faire, corresponding to English do, etc., in such phrases as "much ado," "a great to do,"' etc. Business, from busy (see Active), sig- nifies the thing that makes or interests a person or with which he is busy or occupied. Concern, in French con- cemer, Latin eoncemo, compounded of con and cemere, to sift, cognate with Greek Kpivuv, whence our words critic, criticism, are derived, signifies the sifting out of things that belong to- gether. An affair is what happens; a business is what busies; a concern is what is felt. An affair is general; it respects one, many, or all: every business and con- cern is . an affair, though not vice versa. Business and concern are personal; business is that which engages the at- tention; concern is that which interests the feelings, prospects, and condition, advantageously or otherwise. An af- fair is important; a business is serious; a concern momentous. The usurpation of power is an affair which interests a nation; the adjusting a difference is a business most suited to the ministers of religion; to make one's f)eace with one's Maker is the concern of every individ- ual. Affairs are administered; btisi- ness is transacted; concerns are man- aged. The affairs of the world are administered by a Divine Providence. Those who are in the practice of the law require peculiar talents to fit them for transacting the complicated busi- ness which perpetually offers itself. Some men are so involved in the affairs of this world as to forget the concerns of the next, which ought to be nearest and dearest to them. 38 AFFECT AFFECT, Concern. Affect, in French affecter, Latin affectum, parti- ciple of afficio, compounded of ad and facere, to do or act, signifies to act upon. Concern, for derivation see under Affair. Things affect us which produce any change in our outward circumstances; they concern us if connected with our circumstances in any shape. What- ever affects must concern; but all that concerns does not affect. The price of com affects the interest of the seller; and therefore it concerns him to keep it up, without regard to the public good or injury. Things affect either persons or things; but they concern persons only. Rain affects the hay or corn; and these matters concern every one more or less. Affect and concern have an analogous meaning likewise when taken for the influence on the mind. We are affected by things when our affections only are awakened by them: we are concerned when our understanding and wishes are engaged. We may be affected either with joy or sorrow: we are concerned only in a painful manner. People of tender sensibility are easily affected: irritable people are concerned about trifles. It is natural for every one to be affected at the recital of mis- fortunes; but there are people of so cold and selfish a character as not to be concerned about anything which does not immediately affect their own persons or property. AFFECT, Assume. Affect, in this sense, derives its origin immediately from the Latin affecto, desire eag- erly, signifying to aim at or aspire after. Assume, in Latin assumo, com- pounded of ad and sumere, to take, signifies to take to one's self. To affect is to use forced efforts to appear to have that which one has not ; to assume is to appropriate to one's self that which one has no right to have. One affects to have fine feelings, and assumes great importance. Affectation springs from the desire of appearing better than we really are; assumption from the thinking ourselves better than we really are. We affect the virtues which we have not; we assume the character which does not belong to us. An affected person is always thinking of others; an assuming person thinks only of himself. The affected man strives to gain applause by appearing to be what he is not ; the assuming man demands respect upon the ground of what he supposes himself to be. Hypocrisy is often the companion of affectation, self-conceit always that of assu7nption. To affect is always taken in a bad sense; but to assMwe may be sometimes an indifferent action at least, if not justifiable. Men always affect that which is supposed to please others, in order to gain their applause; but they sometimes assume a name or an au- thority which is no more than their just right. Affect, Pretend. — Affect, see above. Pretend, in Latin pretendo — that is, prce and tendo — signifies to hold or stretch one thing before another by way of a bhnd. These terms are synonymous only in the bad sense of setting forth to others what is not real: we affect by putting on a false air; we pretend by making a false declaration. Art is employed in affecting; assurance and self - com- placency in pretending. A person af- fects not to hear what it is convenient for him not to answer; he pretends to have forgotten what it is convenient for him not to recollect. One affects the manners of a gentleman, and pretends to gentility of birth. One affects the character and habits of a scholar; one pretends to leaHiing. To affect the quahties which we have not spoils those which we have; to pretend to attainments which we have not made obliges us to have recourse to falsehoods in order to escape detection. See also Thrill. Affected, Disposed. — Affected signifies moved or acted upon by any particular circumstance, as to be affected at any spectacle. Disposed, from dispose, to settle or put in order, signifies settled or determined as to one's purpose; as disposed to do a good turn. Affected likewise signifies to be af- fected with a particular sentiment, which brings it nearer to the sense of disposed in denoting a state of mind, but disposed in this case imphes a settled if not an habitual temper, af- fection a temporary and partial state: AFFIRM 39 subjects are either well or ill affected to their government; people are either well or ill disposed as regards their moral character or principles. See also Namby-pamby. AFFECTING. See Moving. AFFECTION, Love. Affection, from the verb affect, denotes the state of being kindly affected toward a per- son. Love, German liehe, hke the Eng- lish lief, German lieb, dear or pleasing, is connected with the Latin libet, it is pleasing, signifying the state of holding a person dear. These two words are comparable, inasmuch as they denote a sentiment toward any object: they dififer both in the nature of the object and the nature of the sentiment. Affection is private or confined to one or more particular individuals; love is either general or particular: it either em- braces all objects capable of awakening the sentiment, or it is confined to par- ticular objects: in the former case love expresses the sentiment of the Divine Being toward all His creatures, and also that of man to the rest of his fellow-creatures. When applied to particular objects, love is a much warmer sentiment than affection. The latter subsists between persons of the same sex, the former in a particular manner between persons of a different sex. Affection is a tender and durable sentiment, a chastened feehng under the control of the understanding which promises no more pleasure than it gives; love is an ardent sentiment which, as between the sexes, has all the characteristics of a passion, being ex- clusive, restless, and fluctuating. Love may subsist before marriage, but it must terminate in affection in order to insure happiness after marriage. Between the words affection and love there is this further distinction, that the former did not always imply a kindly or favorable sentiment; there may be an ill as well as a good affection: the affections of a people to a government may be various; the affection of a prince may change from favor to dis- favor toward a subject. See also Attachment. Affectionate, Kind, Fond. — Affection- ate, from affection (see above), denotes the quality of having affection. Kind, from the word kind, kindred or family, denotes the quality or feehng engen- dered by the family tie. Fond is the past participle of Middle Enghsh fonnen, to be weak, to act hke a fool. Affectionaie characterizes the feehng; kind has mostly a reference to the ac- tion : affectionate is directed to a partic- ular object; kind to objects generally. Relations are affectionate to one another, persons may be kind to any one, even to mere strangers. So toward animals generally we may be kind, and toward favorite animals affectionate. As epithets, these words observe the same distinction; a mother or a child is affectionate, a master kind; looks, or whatever serve to express affection, are said most appropriately to be affection- ate; offices, or any actions prompted by the general sentiment of kindness, are called kind. Affectionate and kind are always taken in the good sense for a proper sentiment; fondness is an excess of lik- ing for any object, which, whether it be a person or a thing, is more or less reprehensible; children are always /nly or to others; fearful and timorous are applied onljr physically and per- sonally; timid is mostly used in a moral sense. It is the character of the fearful or timorous person to be afraid of what he imagines would hurt himself; it is not necessary for the prospect of danger to exist in order to awaken fear in such a disposition; it is the characteristic of the timid per- son to be afraid of offending or meet- ing with something painful from others; a person of such a disposition is pre- vented from following the dictates of his own mind. Between fearful and timorous there is httle distinction, either in sense or application, except that we say fearful of a thing, not timorous of a thing. AFTER, Behind. After respects order; behind respects position. One runs after a person, or stands behind his chair. After is used either figuratively or literally; behind is used only literally. Men hunt after amusements; misfort- unes come after one another; a garden lies behind a house; a thing is concealed behind a bush. AGE. See Generation; Time. AGED. See Elderly; Gloaming. AGENCY. See Act. AGENT. See Actor; Factor. AGGRAVATE, Irritate, Provoke, Exasperate, Tantalize. Aggravate, in Latin aggravatus, participle of ag- gravo, compounded of the intensive syllable ad and gravo, make heavy, sig- nifies to make very heavy. Irritate, in Latin irritatus, participle of irrito, snarl, is a word of uncertain origin. It may be a frequentative of irrire, to snarl hke a dog, which is possibly an imitative word. Provoke, in French provoquer, Latin provoco, compounded of pro, forth, and voco, call, signifies to challenge or defy. Exasperate, Latin exasperatus, participle of exas- pero, is compounded of the intensive syllable ex and asper, rough, signifying to make things exceedingly rough. Tantalize, in French tantaliser, Greek ravToXiZto, comes from TankUus, a king of Phrygia, who, having offended the gods, was destined, by way of punishment, to stand up to his chin in water, with a tree of fair fruit hanging over his head, both of which, as he attempted to allay his hunger and thirst, fled from his touch. AGITATION 43 All these words, except the first, refer to the feeUngs of the mind, and in fa- mihar discourse that also bears the same signification, but otherwise re- spects the outward circumstances. The crime of robbery is aggravated by any circumstances of cruelty; whatever comes across the feehngs irritates; whatever awakens anger provokes; whatever heightens this anger extraor- dinarily exasperates; whatever raises hopes in order to frustrate them tan- talizes. An appearance of imconcern for the offence and its consequences aggravates the guilt of the offender; a grating, harsh soimd irritates, if long continued and often repeated; angry words provoke, particularly when spok- en with an air of defiance: when to this are added bitter taunts and multi- plied provocatibns, they exasperate; the weather, by its frequent changes, tan- talizes those who depend upon it for amusement. Wicked people aggravate their transgression by violence; sus- ceptible and nervous people are most easily irritated; proud people are quick- ly provoked; hot and fiery people are soonest exasperated; those who wish for much, and wish for it eagerly, are oftenest tantalized. See also Heighten. AGGRESSOR, Assailant. Aggres- sor, from the Latin aggressus, participle of aggredior, compounded oi ag or ad and gradi, to step, signifies one step- ping up to, falling upKjn, or attacking. Assailant comes from assail, in French assaillir, compounded of ad and the Latin salio, to leap upon, and signifies one leaping upon or attacking any one vehemently. Compare the origin of insidt. The characteristic idea of aggression is that of one person going up to an- other in a hostile manner, and by a natural extension of the sense com- mencing an attack: the characteristic idea of assailing is that of one com- mitting an act of violence upon an- other. An aggressor offers to do some injury either by word or deed; an assauant actually conamits some vio- lence: the former commences a dispute; the latter carries it on with a vehement and direct attack. An aggressor is blamable for giving rise to quarrels: an assailant is culp^le for the mischief he does. Were there no aggressors, there would be no disputes; were there no assailants, those disputes would not be serious. An aggressor may be an assailant, or an assailant may be an aggressor, but they are as frequently distinct. AGILE. See Active. AGITATION, Trepidation, Tke» MOR, Emotion. Agitation, in Latin agi- taiio, from agito, a frequentative of ago, act, signifies the state of being- agitated or put into action. Trepidan tion, in Latin trepidatio, from trepidare, to tremble, signifies the condition of trembUng in aU one's Umbs from head to foot. Tremor, from the Latin tremor, signifies originally the same state of trembling. Emotion, in Latin emotio, from emotiis, participle of emoveo, compounded of e, out of, and movere, to move, signifies the state of being moved out of rest or put in motion. Agitation is a violent action back- ward and forward and in different ways. It may be apphed either to the body or the mind; the body may be agitated or thrown into violent and irregular motion, either by external action upon it, or by the operations of grief, terror, or any other passion; the mind is agitated when the thoughts or the feel- ings are put into any violent or irregu- lar motion. Trepidation, like the for- mer, is an irregular motion of the body, but differs both in the manner and cause of the motion; trepidation is the hurried trembhng motion of the Umbs in performing their functions, whence we speak of doing a thing with trepida- tion, or that there is a trepidation in a f)erson'8 manner: in all cases it arises rom a sentiment of fear or alarm. Agitation and trepidation may be both apphed to bodies of men as well as individuals, with a similar distinc- tion. Tremor is a trembhng motion of the body, differing from the two former either in the force or the causes of the action: it is not violent nor confined to any particular part, hke trepidation, and may, hke agitation, arise either from physical or mental causes. There may be a tremor in the whole body, or a trernor in the voice, and the hke. Emotion refers solely to the move- 44 AGONY ments of the mind, and is therefore to be compared only with agitation. Emotion is the movement of a single feeling, varying with the object that awakens it; there may be emotions of pleasure as weU as of pain; agitation may be the movement of one or many feehngSj but those always of the pain- ful kind. Emotions may be strong, but not violent: agitation will always be more or less violent. AGONY. See Distress; Pain. AGREE, Accede, Consent, Com- ply, Acquiesce. Agree, from the Old French phrase d gre, at pleasure, from Latin gratia, signifies to be in a pleasant relation to another, to hke something. Accede, in Latin accedo, ac or ad and cede, go or come, signifies to come toward another. Consent, from consentio, or con, cum, with, to- gether, and sentio, think or feel, signi- fies to think or feel in unison. Com- ply, in French complaire, Latin compleo (for derivation see Compliment), signi- fies to fulfil all expectations, to satisfy the demands of another. Acquiesce, in Latin acquiesco, or ac, ad, to or with, and quiesco, be quiet, signifies rest con- tented with. All of these terms denote the falling in of any one or more persons in any matter that comes before their notice. Agree expresses this general idea with- out any quahfications; all the other terms express different modes of agree- ing. All may agree in the same thing, or one may agree to that which is pro- posed; acceding, complying, and ac- quiescing are the acts of persons in- dividually; consenting is properly the act of numbers, but it is also the act of individuals; one accedes to, complies with, or acquiesces in a thing. Agree- ing is often a casual act not brought about by the parties themselves; the other terms denote positive acts, vary- ing in the motives and circumstances. We accede by becoming a party to a thing: those who accede are on equal terms; one objects to that to which one does not accede; we consent to a thing by authorizing it, we comply with a thing by allowing it; those who con- sent or comply are not on equal terms with those in whose favor the consent is given or compliance made; consent- ing is an act of authority, complying an act of good nature or weakness; one refuses that to which one does not consent, or with which one does not comply; to acquiesce is quietly to ad- mit; it is a passive act, dictated by prudence or duty; one opposes that in which one does not acquiesce. To agree is to be of the same mind in matters of opinion or feehng; it is well for those who act together to be able to agree. The term agree is, however, common- ly used in regard to acting, as well as thinking, in the ordinary transactions of hfe. To accede and the other terms are with very few exceptions employed in practical matters, but sometimes other- wise; to accede is mostly said in regard to that which is in a special manner proposed, if not recommended; as a private individual accedes to a proposi- tion; a plenipotentiary accedes to a treaty. To consent, as far as it is a universal act, is appUed to moral objects; as cus- toms are introduced by the consent of the community; biit as the act of one or more individuals, it is apphed to such practical matters as interest the parties for themselves or others; the parhament consents to the measures of the ministry; a parent consents to the marriage of a child. Equals consent to that in which they have a common in- terest. Complying is used in the sense of yielding to the requests, demands, or wishes of another for the sake of con- formity, and sometimes in the general sense of yielding to the wishes of the community. To acquiesce is applied in the sense of yielding or agreeing to that which is decided upon by others. In this sense we acquiesce in the dispensations of Providence. Agree, Accord, Suit. — Agree is here used in apphcation to things only. Accord, in French accord, from the Latin cars, cordis, heart, signifies hter- ally "heart to heart," in hearty agree- ment. Suit, from the Latin secutus, Earticiple of sequor, follow, signifies to e in a hne, in the order a thing ought to be. An agreement between two things re- quires an entire sameness; an accord- AGREEMENT 45 ance supposes a considerable resem- blance; a suitableness implies an apti- tude to coalesce. Opinions agree, feel- ings accord, and tempers suit. Two statements agree which are in all re- spects ahke; that accords with om- feehngs which produces pleasurable sensations; that suits our taste which we wish to adopt, or, in adopting, gives us pleasure. Where there is no agree- ment in the essentials of any two ac- counts, their authenticity may be greatly questioned : if a representation of anything accords with what has been stated from other quarters, it serves to corroborate it: it is advisable that the ages and stations as well as tem- pers of the parties should be suitable who look forward for happiness in a matrimonial connection. Agree, Coincide, Concur. — Agree is here taken in its apphcation to both persons and things. It is as before the general term. Coincide, from the Latin con, together, and incido, fall, means Uterally "to fall in with." Concur, from con, together, and curro, run, implying a running in the same course, an acting together on the same principles, or modes of agreeing. In respect to persons, they agree either in their general or particular opinions; they coincide and concur only in particular opinions. A person coin- cides in opinion with another in regard to speculative matters, but concurs with another in regard to practical matters; to coincide is only to meet at the same point, but to concur is to go together m the same road or in the same course of conduct. In respect to things, they agree in one, many, or every point, as the ac- counts of different persons, times, modes, and circumstances agree; things coincide or meet at one point, as where two circumstances fall out at the same time; this is a coincidence; things con- cur if they have the same tendency or lead to the same point; several cir- cumstances must sometimes concur to bring about any particular event. The coincidence is mostly accidental, the concurrence depends upon the nature of things. See also Tally. AGREEABLE, Pleasant, Pleas- ing. The first two of these epithets approach so near in sense and apphca- tion that they can with propriety be used indifferently, the one for the other; yet there is an occasional difference which may be clearly defined. The agreeable is that which agrees with or suits the character, temper, and feehngs of a person; the pleasant that which pleases; the pleasing that which is adapted to please. Agreeable expresses a feehng less vivid than pleasant; peo- ple of the soberest and gravest char- acter may talk of passing agreeable hours, or enjoying agreeable society, if those hours were passed agreeably to their turn of mind, or that society suited their taste; but the young and the gay will prefer pleasant society, where vivacity and mirth prevail, suit- able to the tone of their spirits. A man is agreeable who by a soft and easy address contributes to the amusement of others; a man is pleasant who to this softness adds affability and com- municativeness. Pleasing marks a sentiment less vivid and distinctive than either. A pleasing voice has some- thing in it which we hke; an agreeable voice strikes with positive pleasure upon the ear. A pleasing countenance denotes tranquiUity and contentment; it satisfies us when we view it : a pleas- ant countenance bespeaks happiness; it gratifies the beholder, and invites him to look upon it. See also Conformable. AGREEMENT, Contract, Cove- nant, Compact, Bargain. Agreetnent signifies what is agreed to. Contract, in French contrat, from the Latin con- tractus, participle of contraho, draw close together or bind, signifies the thing thus contracted or bound. Covenant, in Old French covenant, from the present participle of convenio, meet together, signifies the point at which several meet, that is, the thing agreed upon by many. Compact, in Latin compactus, participle of conipingo, bind close, signifies the thing to which peo- ple oind themselves close. Bargain comes from Late Latin barcaniare, to change about. Its remote origin is unknown. An agreeinent is general, and applies to transactions of every description, but particularly such as are made be- tween single individuals, in cases where 46 AGRICULTURIST the other terms are not so applicable; a contract is a binding agreement be- tween individuals; a simple agreement may be verbal, but a contract must be written and legally executed : covenant, in the technical sense, is an agreement by deed, but in the general sense a solemn agreement; a compact is an agreement among numbers; a covenant may be a national and pubhc trans- action; a co?npact respects individuals as members of a community, or com- munities with each other who are com- pacted together: a bargain, in its proper sense, is an agreement solely in matters of trade, but applies figuratively in the same sense to other objects. The sim- ple consent of parties constitutes an agreement; certain solemnities are nec- essary to make a contract or covenant vahd; a tacit sense of mutual obhga- tion in all the parties gives virtue to a compact; an assent to stipulated terms of sale may form a bargain. Friends make an agreement to meet at a certain time; two tradesmen enter into a contract to carry on a joint trade; and if it be under hand and seal, the stipulations therein contained are tech- nically called covenants; in the Society of Freemasons, every individual is bound to secrecy by a solemn compact; the trading part of the commimity are continually striking bargains. AGRICULTURIST. See Farmer. AID. See Help; Uphold. AIDING. See Auxiliary. AIM, Object, End, View. Aim is mostly derived from the Latin cestimare, to put a value on, signifying the thing valued, consequently the particular point to which one's efforts are directed, which is held always in view, and to the attainment of which everything is made to bend. Object, from the Latin objectus, participle of 06 and jacio, throw in the way, is more vague; it signifies the thing that hes before us; we piu*- sue it by taking the necessary means to obtain it; it becomes the fruit of our labor. End, Anglo-Saxon ende, a Teu- tonic word meaning termination, is still more general, signifying the thing that ends one's wishes and endeavors; it is the result not only of action, but of combined action; it is the consum- mation of a scheme; we must take the proper measures to arrive at it. The aim is that which the person has in his own mind: it depends upon the character of the individual whether it be good or bad, attainable or otherwise; the object hes in the thing; it is a mat- ter of choice, it depends upon accidei^t as well as design, whether it be worthy or unworthy; the end is that which follows or terminates any course or pro- ceeding; it depends upon the means taken whether the end is arrived at or not. It is the aim of the Christian to Mve peaceably; it is a mark of dul- ness or foUy to act without an object; it is sophistry to suppose that the end will justify the means. Aim and view, from video, to see or look at, are both acts of the mind, but the aim is that which the mind particu- larly sets before itself as a thing to be obtained; the view is, generally speak- ing, whatever the mind sets before it- self, whether by way of opinion or motive; a person's views may be in- terested or disinterested, correct or false. The aim is practical in its opera- tions; the view is a matter rather of contemplation than of practice. See also Endeavor; Tendency; Tenor. Aim, Point, Level. — Aim, signifying to take aim, is to direct one's aim tow- ard a point. Point, Latin punctum, from pungere, to prick (compare pun- gent), signifies to direct the sharp end or point of an implement toward some- thing. Level comes from Old French livel, from Latin libella, a diminutive of libra, a balance, and signified an in- strument for determining that a thing is horizontal. Level, from the adjec- tive level, signifies to put one thing on a level or in a fine with another. Aim expresses more than the other two words, inasmuch as it denotes a di- rection toward some minute point in an object, and the others imply direc- tion toward the whole objects them- selves. We aim at a bird; we point a cannon against a wall; we level a cannon at a wall. Pointing is of course used with most propriety in reference to instruments that have points; it is Ukewise a less decisive action than either aiming or leveling. A stick or a finger may be pointed at a person, merely out of derision; but a blow is leveled or aimed with an express AIRCRAFT 47 intent of committing an act of vio- lence. The same analogy is kept up in their figurative application. The shafts of ridicule are but too often aimed with httle eflFect against the foUies of fashion : remarks which seem merely to point at others, without being expressly ad- dressed to them, have always a bad tendency; it has hitherto been the fate of infidels to level their battery of sneers, declamation, and sophistry against the Christian religion, only to strengthen the conviction of its subhme truths in the minds of mankind at large. Aim, Aspire. — Aim includes efforts as well as views, in obtaining an ob- ject. Aspire, from as or ad, to or after, and spiro, breathe, comprehends views, wishes, and hopes to obtain an object. We aim at a certain proposed point by endeavoring to gain it; we aspire after that which we think ourselves en- titled to, and flatter ourselves with gaining. Many men aim at riches and honor: it is the lot of but few to aspire to a throne. We aim at what is attain- able by ordinary efforts; we aspire after what is great and unusual, and often improper. AIR, Manner. Air, Latin a^r, Greek ai)p, signifies the atmosphere; and thence, figuratively, the envelop>- ing atmosphere of a personality created by appearance, manner, etc. Manner, Old French maniere, allied to the verb manier, to handle, from Latin manus, hand, signifies the way of handling something, hence a way of doing. Air hes in the whole person ; manner is confined to the action or the move- ment of a single hmb. A man has the air of a common person; it discovers it- self in all his manners. An air strikes at the first glance, whether the person be in motion or at rest; the manner can only be seen when the person is in ac- tion; it develops itseli on closer ob- servation. Some people have an air about them which displeases; but their manners afterward win upon those who have a further intercourse with them. An air is indicative of a state of mind; it niay result either from a natural or habitual mode of thinking: a manner is indicative of the education; it is pro- duced by external circumstances. An air is noble or simple, it marks an ele- vation or simplicity of character: a manner is rude, rustic, or awkward, for want of culture, good society, and good example. We assume an air, and affect a manner. See also Appearance. Air, Mien, Look. — Air (see above). Mien is a word of unknown origin, pos- sibly Celtic, adopted into EngUsh from the French. Look signifies properly a mode of looking or appearing (for derivation see Look). The exterior of a person is compre- hended in the sense of all these words. Air depends not only on the counte- nance, but the stature, carriage, and ac- tion : mien respects the whole outward appearance, not excepting the dress: look depends altogether on the face and its changes. Air marks any settled state of the mind: mien denotes any state of the outward circumstances: look any individual movement of the mind. We may judge by a person's air that he has a confident and fear- less mind; we may judge by his sorrow- ful mien that he has substantial cause for sorrow; and by sorrowful looks that he has some partial or temporary cause for sorrow. We talk of doing an3^hing with a particular air; of having a mien; oi giving a look. An innocent man will answer his accusers with an air of composure; a person's whole mien sometimes bespeaks his wretched condition; a look is sometimes given to one who acts in concert by way of intimation. AIRCRAFT, Aeroplane, Balloon, Biplane, Dirigible, Flying-machine, Gyroplane, Helicopter, Hydro- plane, Monoplane, Multiplane, Or- NITHOPTER, TaUBE, TrIPLANE, ZeP- PELIN. Aircraft is a compoimd of French air, Greek ai}p, from a root signif jring to blow, meaning the lower atmosphere, and craft, a nautical term for vessel. The European war which began in 1914 gave a new impetus to the design- ing and construction of aircraft as an offensive weapon. From the mechan- ism originally built for pleasure or sci- entific research there was speedily de- veloped a varietv of apparatus that in operation startled and shocked the world, especially those aeroplanes and the ZeppeUns tnat were constructed to 48 ALACRITY drop bombs on an enemy's territory and to carry rifled cannon with which to fight similar hostile craft. An aeroplane is a heavier-than-air flying-machine with one or more planes or sustaining surfaces; a balloon is a lighter - than - air construction, elon- gated or spherical in shape, made of silk or other fabric, and inflated with gas; a biplane is an aeroplane with two sustaining surfaces; a dirigible is a balloon made to travel in any direction by means of a propeller operated by a motor; a flying-machine is the com- mon but indefinite name of any form of aircraft; a gyroplane is a machine combining the features of an aero- plane and a hehcopter; a helicopter is a machine that derives its ascending power from a fan wheel; a hydroplane is an aeroplane with a body that enables it to ahght on or rise from a water surface; a monoplane is a ma- chine with a single sustaining surface; a multiplane is a machine with two or more sustaining surfaces; an omi- thopter is a machine with movable or flapping planes; a Tavbe is a German bomb-dropping aeroplane; a triplane is an aeroplane with three sustaining surfaces; a Zeppelin is a German dirigible and passenger-carrying ap- paratus constructed on the balloon principle, and used in the European war as a raiding bomb-dropper. ALACRITY. See Alertness. ALARM, Terror, Fright, Con- sternation. Alarm is probably de- rived through French from the ItaUan all' arme, to arms, Latin ad ilia arma, or Low Latin ad illas artnas, to the arms. Terror, in Latin terror, comes from terreo, to cause to tremble. Fright, Anglo-Saxon fyrhto, allied to German fiirchten, is a widely distributed Ger- manic word from a root signifying fear. Consternation, in Latin, constematus, from consterno, strew, scatter on the ground, expresses the mixed emo- tion of terror and amazement which confounds. Alarm springs from any sudden sig- nal that announces the approach of danger. Terror springs from any event or phenomenon that may serve as a prognostic of some catastrophe. It supposes a less distinct view of danger than alarm, and, affords room to the imagination, which commonly magni- fies objects. Alarm therefore makes us run to our defence, and terror disarms us. Fright is a less vivid emotion than either, as it arises from the simple ap- pearance of danger. It is more per- sonal than either alarm or terror; for we may be alarmed or terrified for others, but we are mostly frightened for ourselves. Consternation is stronger than either terror or affright; it springs from the view of some very serious evil, and commonly affects many. Alarm affects the feehngs, terror the under- standing, and fright the senses; con- sternation seizes the whole mind and benumbs the faculties. Cries alarm; horrid spectacles terrify; a tumult frightens; a sudden calamity fills with consternation. One is filled with alarm, seized with terror, overwhelmed with fright or consternation. We are alarmed for what we apprehend ; we are terrified by what we imagine; we are frightened by what we see; consternation may be produced by what we learn. ALERTNESS, Alacrity. Alertness, from ales, a wing, designates corporeal activity or readiness for action. Alac- rity, from acer, sharp, brisk, designates mental activity. We proceed with alertness when the body is in its full vigor; we proceed with alacrity when the mind is in full pursuit of an object. ALIEN. See Stranger. ALIENATE. See Transfer; Wean. ALIENATION. See Abstraction. ALIKE. See Equal. ALL, Whole. AU is a Germanic word signifying everything. Whole, Anglo-Saxon hal, aUied to German heil, and Greek koXoq, excellent, beautiful, and the Enghsh words hale, health, wholesome, etc., signified to be sound, well, without fault or blemish, hence complete, entire. All respects a number of individuals; whole respects a single body with its components: we have not all, if we have not the whole number; we have not the whole, if we have not aU the parts of which it is composed. It is not within the limits of human ca- pacity to take more than a partial sur- vey of all the interesting objects which the whole globe contains. When ap- phed to spiritual objects in a general sense, all is preferred to whole; but ALLIANCE 49 when the object is specific, whole is preferable: thus we say, all hope was lost; but, our whole hope rested in this. All, Every, Each. — All is collective; every single or individual; each, dis- tributive. All and every are universal in their signification; each is restrictive : the former are used in speaking of great numbers; the latter is appHcable to small numbers. All men are not bom with the same talent, either in degree or kind; but every man has a talent pecuhar to himself; a parent divides his property among his children, and gives to each his due share. ALLAY, Soothe, Appease, Miti- gate, Assuage. To allay, Middle Enghsh aleggen, is properly no more than a French doublet of the word alle- viate, derived from Latin ad and levis, hght; hence it means to Ughten a bur- den. Soothe, from Anglo-Saxon soth, true, which appears in the phrases "in sooth," "forsooth," etc., means to assent to something as being true, hence to humor. Appease, in French apaiser, is compounded of ad and pax, peace, signifying to quiet. Mitigate, from mitis, meek, gentle, signifies to make gentle or easy to bear. Assuage, from Old French a (Latin ad) and suavis, sweet, pleasant, cognate with the Eng- hsh sweet (compare the adjective suave), means hterally to sweeten. All these terms indicate a lessening of something painful. In a physical sense an irritating p?in is allayed; a wounded part is soothed by affording ease and comfort. Extreme heat or thirst is allayed; extreme hunger is appeased; a punishment or sentence is mitigated. In a moral sense one allays what is fervid and vehement; one soothes what is distressed or irritated; one appeases what is tumultuous and boisterous; one mitigates the pains of others, or what is rigorous and severe; one assuages grief or afflictions. Nothing is so calculated to allay the fervor of a distempered imagination as prayer and rehgious meditation: rehgion has everything in it which can soothe a woimded con- science by presenting it with the hope of pardon, that can appease the angry passions by giving us a sense of our own sinfulness and need of God's pardon, and that can assuage the bit- terest griefs by affording us the bright- est prospects of future bliss. See also Quell. ALLEGE. See Adduce. ALLEGORY. See Figure; Par- able. ALLEVIATE, Relieve. For the derivation of alleviate see Allay. Relieve, from the Latin relevo, is com- pounded of re and leva, lift up, signi- fying to take away or remove. A pain is alleviated by making it less burdensome; a necessity is relieved by supplying what is wanted. Alleviate respects our internal feeUngs only; relieve, our external circumstances. That alleviates which affords ease and comfort; that relieves which removes the pain. It is no alleviation of sorrow to a feehng mind to reflect that others undergo the same suffering; a change of position is a considerable relief to an invahd, wearied with confinement. Condolence and sympathy tend greatly to alleviate the sufferings of our fellow- creatures; it is an essential part of the Christian's duty to relieve the wants of his indigent neighbor. See also Abate. ALLIANCE, League, Confeder- acy. Alliance, in French alliance, from the Latin alligo, to tie to (compare ligament), signifies the state of being tied. League, in French ligue, comes from the same verb, ligo, bind. Con- federacy or confederation, in Latin con^ federatio, from con and fcedus, an agree- ment, signifies a joining together imder a certain pledge. AJl these terms agree in expressing the union between two or more persons or bodies, but they differ in the nature of the union and the motive for enter- ing into it. Alliance is the most gen- eral term, the other two are rather particular terms; an alliance may be entered into either on pubUc grounds as between states, or on private grounds as between families or individuals; a league or confederacy is entered into upon pubhc grounds or for common in- terests, as a league between nations or states, and a confederacy between smaller powers or between individuals. Alliances are formed for the mutual conveniences of parties, as between states to promote commerce; leagues and confederacies are entered into most- 50 ALL-KNOWING ly for purposes of self-defence or com- mon safety against the attacks of a common enemy; but a league is mostly a solemn act between two or more states and for general purposes of safety; and may, therefore, be both defensive and offensive; a confederacy is mostly the temporary act of several uniting in a season of actual danger to resist a common adversary. Alliance, as regards persons, is always taken in a good sense, and as between families or individuals is mostly matrimonial. League and confederacy are frequently taken in a bad sense; we may speak of a wicked league or an unnatural leagu£ between persons of opposite characters for their own pri- vate purposes, or a league between beasts for savage purposes; there may be a confederacy between persons to resist a lawful demand or to forward any evil design. Alliance, Affinity. — Alliance (see above). Affinity, in Latin affinitas, ■from ad and finis, a border, signifies a contiguity of borders. An alliance is a union artificially formed between persons; an affinity is a relation which flows from that act as far as the alliance is matrimonial; the affinity is properly that which re- sults from it; when an alliance is formed between persons of different sexes, this necessarily creates an affinity between the relatives of the two parties. As respects things, alliance ia used figuratively in the same sense to de- note their union by an artificial tie; as an alliance between church and state; affinity in this case implies a relation between things by reason of their agreement or resemblance to each other; as an affinity of sounds or an affinity of languages. ALL-KNOWING. See Omniscient. ALLOT, Appoint, Destine. Allot is a hybrid word compounded of the Latin ad and the EngHsh word lot, a p>ortion. Appoint, in French ap- pointer, from ad and pungo, participle punctus, signifies to point out or set out in a particular manner for a particular purpose. Destine, in French destiner, Latin destino, compounded of de ana a verb from the root sta, to stand, sig- nifies to place apart for a particular object. The idea of setting apart or selecting is common to these terms; but allot is used only for things, appoint and destine for persons or things. A space of ground is allotted for cultivation, a per- son is appointed as steward or governor; a youth is destined for a particular pro- fession. Allotments and appointments are made for immediate purposes, des- tinations for a future purpose; time may be either allotted, appointed, or destined; but allot respects indefinite portions of time, as to allot a portion of one's time to rehgious meditations; appoint re- spects any particularly defined portion of time, as to appoint an hour of meet- ing; destine implies a future time pur- posely fixed, as the destined hour arrived. A space may be allotted, be- cause space may be divided into por- tions; a particular place is appointed for a particular immediate object, or it is destined by some previous deter- mination; as a person appoints the place where a house shall be built; he destines a house for a particular pur- pose. See also Distribute. ALLOW, Grant, Bestow. Allow (see Abate; Admit). Grant, Old French graunter or creanter, to assure, from Latin stem credent, from credere, to trust, is allied on the one hand to the word guarantee, on the other to such words as credible, credulous, credence, etc. Bestow is compounded of the pre- fix he and the Anglo-Saxon stow, a place, from the root sta, whence stand is also derived, and which is closely aUied to the EngUsh verb stow. Hence to bestow signifies to dispose according to one's wishes and convenience. That is allowed which may be ex- pected, if not directly required; that 18 granted which is desired, if not di- rectly asked for; that is bestowed which is wanted as a niatter of necessity. What is allowed is a gift sometimes stipulated as to time and quantity, but frequently depends upon the will of the giver; what is granted is some- times perfectly gratuitous on the part of the giver, but, when granted, is not always to be taken back; what is be- stowed is occasional, altogether depend- ing on circumstances and disposition of both giver and receiver. Many of the poor are allowed a small sum weekly ALLUDE 51 from the parish. It is as improper to grant a person more than he asks, as it is to ask a person for more than he can grant. Alms are very ill bestowed which only serve to encourage beggary and idleness. A grant comprehends in it something more important than an allowance, and passes between persons in a higher station; what is bestowed is of less value than either. A father allows his son a yearly sum for his casual expenses, or a master allows his servant a maintenance; kings grant I>ensions to their officers; governments grant subsidies to one another; reUef is bzslowed on the indigent. In a figurative application, things are allowed either out of courtesy or com- plaisance; they are granted by way of favor or indulgence; they are bestowed either from necessity or urgent reasons: merit is allowed; a request is granted; attention or applause is bestowed. See also Admit; Consent. Allowance, Stipend, Salary, Wages, Hire, Pay. — All these terms denote a stated sum paid according to certain stipulations. Allowance, from allow (see Admit), signifies the thing allowed. Stipend, in Latin stipendium, from stips, a piece of money, signifies money paid. Salary, in French salaire, Latin solari- um, comes from sal, salt, and meant salt-money, money for salt. (Com- pare the word pin-money for a similar method of designation.) Wages, Old French gage. Low Latin vadium, sig- nifies something paid for labor. Hire expresses the sum for which one is hired, and pay the sum that is to be paid. An allowance is gratuitous; it ceases at the pleasure of the donor; aU the rest are the requital for some supposed service; they cease with the engage- ment made between the parties. A stipend is more fixed and permanent than a salary; and that than wages, hire, or pay; a stipend depends upon the fulfilling of an engagement, rather than on the will of an individual; a salary is a matter of contract between the giver and receiver, and may be increased or diminished at will. An allowance may be given in any form, or at any stated times; a stipend ana salary are paid yearly, or at even por- tions of a year; wages, hire, and pay are estimated by days, weeks, or months, as well as years. An cdlow- ance may be made by, with, and to persons of all ranks; a stipend and salary are assignable only to persons of respectabihty; loages are given to laborers, hire to servants, pay to soldiers or such as are employea under govern- ment. ALL-SEEING. See Ominiscient. ALLUDE, Refer, Hint, Suggest. Allude, in Latin alludo, is compounded of ad and ludo, sport. It means to say anything in a cursory manner. Refer, in Latin refero, signifies to bring back — that is, to bring back a person's recollection to any subject by mention- ing it. Hint, a verb formed from the noun hint, which is a contraction of the participle of a verb hinten, hinted, is aUied to the words hit, hurt, etc., and originally meant taken, touched. To hint is to touch upon something. Su^ gest, in Latin su^gestus, participle of suggero, is compounded of sub ana gero, bring under or near, and signifies to bring forward in an indirect or casual manner. To allude is not so direct as to refer, but it is more clear and positive thaa either hint or suggest. We allude to a circumstance by introducing it into one's discourse; we hint at a person's intentions by darkly insinuating what may possibly happen; we suggest an idea by some poetical expressions rela- tive to it. There are frequent allusions in the Bible to the customs and man- ners of the East. It is necessary to refer to certain passages of a work when we do not expressly copy them. It is sometimes better to be entirely silent upon a subject than to hint at what cannot be fully explained. Many im- provements have owed their origin to some ideas casually suggested in the course of conversation. Allude and refer are always said with regard to things that have fK)sitively happened, and mostly such as are in- different; hint and suggest have mostly a personal relation to things that are precarious. The whole drift of a dis- coiu^e is sometimes unintelligible for want of knowing what is alluded to; although many persons and incidents are referred to with their proper names and dates. It is the part oi the slan- 52 ALLURE derer to hint at things discreditable to another when he does not dare to speak openly; and to suggest doubts of his veracity when he cannot posi- tively charge him with falsehood. See also Glance. ALLURE, Tempt, Seduce, Entice, Decoy. Allure, from the Old French d leurre, a word of possibly Germanic origin, signifying bait, meant to draw to a bait. Tempt, in French tenter, Latin tento, a frequentative of the verb tendere, to stretch, meant to draw out one's will, hence to try the strength of, hence to test. Seduce, in French seduire, Latin seduco, is compounded of se, apart, and duco, lead, signifying to lead any one aside. Entice comes from Old French entider, based on titio, a firebrand. Decoy, from de and Old French coi, earlier coit, from Latin quietus, quiet, still, meant to render still or tame. (Compare the adjective coy.) But it is also influenced by provincial Enghsh coy, fr6m Latin cavea (whence Enghsh cage), a trap for catching wild ducks. We are allured by the appearances of things; we are tempted by the words of persons as well as the appearances of things; we are enticed by persuasions; we are seduced or decoyed by the in- fluence and false arts of others. To allure and tempt are used either in a good or bad sense: entice sometimes in an indifferent, but mostly in a bad sense; seduce and decoy are always in a bad sense. The weather may allure us out-of-doors: the love of pleasures may allure us into indulgences that after- ward cause repentance. We are some- times tempted upon very fair grounds to undertake what turns out unfortu- nately in the end: our passions are our bitterest enemies; the devil uses them as instruments to tempt us to sin. When the wicked entice us to do evil, we should turn a deaf ear to their flat- tering representations: those who know what is right, and are determined to practise it, will not suffer themselves to be enticed into any irregularities. Young men are frequently seduced by the company they keep. Children are decoyed away by the evil-minded, who wish to get them into their possession. The country has its allurements for the contemplative mind; the metropolis is full of temptations. Those who have any evil project to execute will omit no enticement in order to seduce the yoimg and inexperienced from their duty. The practice of decoying children or ignorant people into places of confine- ment was formerly more frequent than at present. Allure does not imply such a power- ful influence as tempt; what allures draws by gentle means; it hes in the nature of the thing that affects: what tempts acts by direct and continued efforts; it presents motives to the mind in order to produce decision; it tries the power of resistance. Entice supposes such a decisive influence on the mind as produces a determination to act; in which respect it differs from the two former terms. Allure and tempt produce actions on the mind, not necessarily followed by any result; for we may be allured or tempted to do a thing, without' necessarily doing the thing; but we cannot be enticed unless we are led to take some step. Seduce and decoy have reference to the out- ward action, as well as the inward movements of the mind which give rise to them; they indicate a drawing aside of the person as well as the mind; it is a misleading by false representa- tion. Prospects are alluring, offers are tempting, words are enticing, charms are seductive. See also Attract; Tweedlb. ALL-WISE. See Omniscient. ALLY, Confederate. Although derived from the preceding terms (see Alliance), these are used only in part of their acceptations. An a% is one who forms an alliance in the po- htical sense; a confederate is one who forms confederacies in general, but more particularly when such con- federacies are unauthorized. WilUam Tell had some few particular friends who were his confederates; but we should use the word with more pro- priety in its worst sense, for an as- sociate in a rebellious faction, as in speaking of any bandit and his con^ federates. ALMANAC. See Calendar. ALONE, Solitary, Lonely. Alone, in Middle Enghsh often written as two words, al one, signifies altogether one, or single; that is, by one's self. Soli- AMBASSADOR 53 tary, in' French solitaire, Latin soli- tarius, from solus, alone, signifies the quality of being alone. Lonely is a aerivative of lone, which is a contrac- tion of all one. Alone marks the state of a person; solitary the quality of a person or thing; lonely has more mel- ancholy connotations than solitary, and may be used to indicate the state of mind of one dwelling alone. A person walks alone, or takes a solitary walk in a lonely place. Whoever hkes to be much alone is of a solitary turn ; wher- ever we can be most and oftenest alone, that is a solitary or lonely place ; people who are forced to dwell alone may be often lonely. ALSO, Likewise, Too. Also, com- pounded of all and so, signifies UteraMy '"otnbiht all in the same manner. Likevnse, compounded of like and toise, or man- ner, signifies in hke manner. Too, a variation of the numeral two, signifies what may be added or joined to an- other thing from its similarity. These adverbial expressions obvious- ly convey the same idea of including or classing certain objects together upon a supposed ground of affinity. Also is a more general term, and has a more comprehensive meaning, as it imphes a sameness in the whole; likevnse is more specific and hmited in its accepta- tion; too is still more hmited than either, and refers only to a single ob- i'ect. "He also was among the num- >er," may convey the idea of totality both as respects the person and the event; "he writes likewise a very fine hand, ' conveys the idea of similar perfection in his writing as in other qualifications; "he said so, too," sig- nifies he said bo in addition to the others; "he said it likewise," would imply that he said the same thing or in the same manner. ALTER. See Change. ALTERCATION. See Differ- ence. ALTERNATE. See Successive. ALTISCOPE. See Periscope. ALWAYS, At all Times, Ever. Always, compounded of all and ways, is the same as, under all circumstances, through all the ways of life, that is, uninterruptedly. At all times means without distinction of time. Ever im- phes for a perpetuity, without end. A man must be always virtuous, that is, whether in adversity or prosperity; and at all times virtuous, that is, in his going out and coming in, his rising up and his lying down, by day and by night; he will then be ever happy, that is, in this life and the life to come. See also Aye. AMASS. See Heap. AMAZE. See Wonder. AMBASSADOR, Envoy, Pleni- potentiary, Deputy. Ambassador is derived through French from Low Latin ambactiis^ by way of Itahan. Ambactus is derived from an" Old Gaul- ish (Celtic) root meaning servant, which also appears in the Anglo-Saxon ' ' , a servant. Envoy, Old French envoyer, to send, from Latin iride, and via, way, meant one sent on a mission. (Compare Voyage.) Plenipotentiary, from the Latin plenus and patens, sig- nifies one invested with full powers. Deputy (for etymology see depute under Assign) meant one deputed, one assigned to a particular mission. Ambassadors, envoys, and plenipo- tentiaries speak and act in the name of their sovereigns, with this difference, that the first is invested with the high- est authority, acting in all cases as the representative; the second appears only as a simple authorized minister acting for another, but not always rep- resenting him: the third is a species of envoy used by courts only on the occasion of concluding peace or making treaties: deputies are not deputed by sovereigns, although they may be de- puted to sovereigns; they have no power to act or speak but in the name of some subordinate community or particular body. The functions of the first three belong to the minister, those of the latter to the agent. An ambassador is a resident in a country during a state of peace; he must maintain the dignity of his court by a suitable degree of splendor: an envoy may be a resident, but he is more commonly employed on particular oc- casions; address in negotiating forms is an essential in his chaxacter: a pleni- potentiary is not so much connected with the court immediately as with persons in the same capacity with him- self; he requires to have integrity, 54 AMBIGUOUS coolness, penetration, loyalty, and patriotism. A deputy has little or no responsibility, and still less intercourse with those to whom he is deputed; he needs no more talent than is sufficient to maintain the respectability of his own character and that of the body to which he belongs. AMBIGUOUS, Equivocal. Am- higuouji, in Latin ambiguv^, from am- higo, compounded of ambo, both, and agere, to act, signifies acting both ways or having two meanings. Equivocal, in French equivoque, Latin equivocus, composed of cequus and vox, signifies a ■word to be appUed equally to two or more different objects. An ambigjiity arises from a too gen- eral form of expression, which leaves the sense of the author indeterminate; an equivocation lies in the power of particular terms used, which admit of a double interpretation, or an appUca- tion to two different things: the am- biguity leaves us in entire incertitude as to what is meant; the equivocation misleads us in the use of a term in the sense which we do not suspect. The ambiguity may be unintentional, arising from the nature both of the words and the things; or it may be employed to withhold information re- specting our views; the equivocation is always intentional, and may be em- ployed for purposes of fraud. The his- tories of heathen nations are full of confusion and ambiguity; the heathen oracles are mostly veiled by some equivocation; of this we have a re- markable instance in the oracle of the Persian mule, by which Croesus was misled. AMENABLE. See Answerable. AMEND, Correct, Emend, Im- prove, Mend, Better. Amend and emend, in Latin emendo, from menda, the fault of a transcriber, signifies to remove faults generally. Mend, which is a contraction of amend, is similar in sense, but different in appUcation. Correct, from cum and regere, to regu- late, signifies to set right in a particular manner. Improve, from probus, good, signifies to make good, as better signifies to make better. To amend, emend, correct, and mend imply the removing of an evil; im- prove and better, the increase of good. Amend, emend, and correct, are all af)- phed to works of the understanding, with this distinction, that amend sig- nifies to remove faults or defects gen- erally, either by adding, taking away, or altering, as to amend a law, to amend a passage in a book; this is the work of the author, or some one acting for him: to emend is to remove particular faults in any hterary work by the alteration of letters or single words; this is the work of the critic : to correct is to remove gross faults, as to correct the press. Amend and correct may be appUed to moral objects with a similar distinction. Mend is employed in respect to any works in the sense of putting that right which either is or has become faulty. It is a term in ordinary use, but may be employed in the higher style. To improve is said either of persons or things which are made better; as to improve the mind, morals, etc.: to better is mostly apphed to the outward condition on familiar occasions. AMENDS. See Compensation; Restoration. AMIABLE, Lovely, Beloved. Amiable, in Latin amabilis, from amare to love, signifies fit to be loved. Lovely, compounded of love and ly, or like, signifies like that which we love, fit to produce love. Beloved signifies having or receiving love. The two first express the fitness of an object to awaken the sentiment of love : the former by spiritual quahties, the latter by personal attractions. One is amiable from the quahties of the heart. So also it is said of things personified. One has a lovely person, or is lovely in one's person. It may be applied to the attractions of other objects besides those of the person. Beloved denotes the state of being loved, or being the object of love, which may arise from being amiable or lovely, or from other causes. Both persons and things may be beloved. AMICABLE, Friendly. Amicable, from amicus, a friend, signifies able or fit for a friend. Friendly signifies like a friend. The word amicus likewise comes from amo, to love, and friend from Anglo-Saxon freogan, to love. Amicable and friendly, therefore, both AMORTIZEMENT 55 denote the tender sentiment of good- will which all men ought to bear one to another; but amicable rather im- pUes a negative sentiment, a freedom from discordance; and friendly a posi- tive feeling of regard, the absence of indifference. We make an amicahle accommodation, and a friendly visit. It is a happy thing when people who have been at variance can amicably adjust all their disputes. Nothing adds more to the charms of society than a friendly correspondence. Ami- cable is always said of persons who have been in connection with each other; friendly may be applied to those who are perfect strangers. Neighbors must always endeavor to live amicably with each other. Travelers should always endeavor to keep up a friendly inter- course with the inhabitants wherever they come. The abstract terms of the preceding qualities admit of no variation but in the signification of friendship, which marks an individual feeling only. To hve amicably, or in amity with all men, is a point of Christian duty, but we cannot live in friendship with aU men, since friendship must be confined to a few: so nations may be in amity, though not on terms of friendship with each other. AMMUNITION, Munitions. These words have been somewhat modified in apphcation since the beginning of the European war. Ammunition was orig- inally merely an army corruption of munition, from Latin munitio (from munire, to fortify with a wall) . During the war, however, the word munitions, used in the plural, has been widely used to designate all the materials for shooting employed in warfare; am- munition has merely kept its meaning of material with which to load a gun which it had before the war, and in popular speech has been largely sup- planted by the more general word munitions. AMNESIA, Bewilderment, For- GETFULNESS. Amnesia comes from the Greek afivtjaia, and impUes the loss of memory for words. The victim is apt to be an apparently aimless wan- derer on the streets, and on being accosted appears to be in a high state of bevnlderment, anxiety, perplexity. While the afiSiction is in an acute stage the victim is unable to recall his or her name, place of residence, occupai- tion, or present intentions. Properly speaking, the word has no genuine synonym. Bewilderment and forgetfulness are general words which may be used to describe the state of mind of one afflicted by amnesia. AMOROUS, Loving, Fond. Amor- ous, from arnor, and the ending, ous, which designates abundance, signifies full of love. Loving signifies the act of loving, that is, continually loving. Fond (for derivation see under affectionate) signifies an extreme or foolish attach- ment. These epithets are all used to mark the excess or distortion of a tender sentiment. Amorous is taken in a criminal sense, loving and fond in a con- temptuous sense; an indiscriminate and dishonorable attachment to the fair sex characterizes the amorous man; an overweening and childish attach- ment to any object marks the loving and fond person. Loving is less dis- honorable than fond: men may be loving; children and brutes may be fond. Those who have not a well- regulated affection for each other will be loving by fits and starts; children and animals who have no control over their appetites will be apt to be fond of those who indulge them. An amor- ous temper should be suppressed; a loving temper should be regulated; a fond temper should be checked. When taken generally, loving and fond may be used in a good or indiffer- ent sense. AMORTIZEMENT, Amortization. The term amortizement, in French amortissement, is derived from amortize, in French amortir, to extinguish, from Latin mortis, death, meaning in a gen- eral sense to make dead or render useless. While amortization specifically means the right of aUenating lands in mort- main, the term has of late come into vogue as synonymous with amortize- ment, especially in European countries burdened with debt. Thus we read that certain revenues, or parts thereof, of a country have been assigned to the amortization or amortizement of the national debt, 56 AMPLE meaning a -payment on account, or the extinction (payment in full), liquidation (partial or full payment), reduction (partial payment), or redemption (fuU payment) of outstanding obligations. AMPLE, ' Spacious, Capacious. Ample is in French ample, Latin am- plus, large, full. Spacious, in French spacievj;, from Latin spatium, allied to Greek ffirdeiv, to draw out, English span — aU from a root spa, to spread or draw out. Capacious, in Latin capax, from capio, to hold, signifies the quality of being able to hold. These epithets convey the analogous ideas of extent in quantity and extent in space. Ample is figuratively em- ployed for whatever is extended in quantity; spacious is hterally used for whatever is extended in space; capa- cious is literally and figuratively em- ployed to express extension in both quantity and space. Stores are ample, room is ample, an allowance is ample; a room, a house, or a garden is spacious; a vessel or hollow of any kind is capa- cious; the soul, the mind, and the heart are capacious. Ample is opposed to scanty, spacious to narrow, capacious to small. What is ample suffices and satisfies; it imposes no constraint: what is spacious is free and open; it does not confine: what is capacious readily receives and contains; it is liberal and generous. Although sciences, arts, philosophy, and lan- guages afford to the mass ©f mankind ample scope for the exercise of their mental powers without recurring to mysterious or fanciful researches, yet this world is hardly spacious enough for the range of the intellectual facul- ties: the capacious minds of some are no less capable of containing than they are disposed for receiving what- ever spiritual good is offered them. See also Plentiful. AMUSE, Divert, Entertain. To amuse, to cause to muse or wonder at, is derived from French d and muser (EngUsh verb muse), Itahan musare, to gape idly about, from muso, a snout, a face. "The image is that of a dog snuffling idly about, and musing which way to take" (Skeat). Cf. muzzle. Divert, in French divertir, Latin di- verto, is comp>ounded of dis, apart, and vertere, to turn aside, signifying to turn the mind aside from an object. Enter- tain, in French erUretenir, compounded of entre, Latin inter, and tenir, Latin tenere, to keep, signifies to keep the mind fixed on a thing. We amuse or entertain by engaging the attention on some present occupa- tion, we divert by drawing the atten- tion from a present object; all this proceeds by means of that pleasure which the object produces, which in the first case is less vivid than in the second, and in the second case is less durable than in the third. Whatever amuses serves to kill time, to lull the faculties and banish reflection; it may be solitary, sedentary, and hfeless; whatever diverts causes mirth and pro- vokes laughter; it will be active, hvely, and tumultuous: whatever erUertains acts on the senses and awakens the understanding; it must be rational, and is mostly social. The bare act of walking and changing place may amuse; the tricks of animals divert; conversation entertains. We sit down to a card-table to be amused; we go to a comedy or pantomime to be diverted; we go to a tragedy to be enter- tained. Children are amused with look- ing at pictures; ignorant people are di- verted with shows; intelligent people are entertained with reading. The dullest and most vacant minds may be amused; the most volatile are diverted; the most reflective are entertained; the Emperor Domitian amused himself with killing flies; the Emperor Nero diverted himself with appearing before his subjects in the characters of the gladiator and charioteer; Socrates entertained himself by discoursing on the day of his execu- tion with his friends on the immor- tality of the soul. Amuse, Beguile. — As amuse denotes the occupation of the mind, so beguile, compounded of the English prefix be and Old Frencli guile (English wile), (for the derivation of which see that key- word), signifying to overreach with guile, ex- presses an effect or consequence of amusement. When amuse and beguile express any species of deception, the former indicates what is effected by persons, and the latter that which is effected by things. The first is a fraud upon the understanding; the second is a fraud upon the memory and con- ANECDOTE 57 sciousness. We are anmsed by a false story; our misfortunes are beguiled by the charms of fine music or fine scenery. To suffer one's self to be armised is an act of weakness; to be beguiled is a relief and a privilege. Credulous people are easily amused by any idle tale, and thus prevented from penetrating the designs of the artful; weary travelers beguile the tedium of the journey by lively conversation. Amusement, Entertainment, Diversion, Sport, Recreation, Pastime. — Amuse- ment signifies here that which serves to amuse. Entertainment, that which serves to entertain. Diversion, that which serves to divert. Sport, that which serves to give sport. Recreation, that which serves to recreate, from re- creatus, participle of recreo, or re and creo, means to create or make ahve again, and was originally used of a recovery from illness. Pastime is that which serves to pass time. The first four of these terms are either apphed to objects which specif- ically serve the purposes of pleasure, or to such objects as may accidentally serve these purposes; the last two terms are emploj'ed only in the latter sense. The distinction between the first three terms is very similar in this as in the preceding case. Amusement is a general term, which comprehends httle more than the common idea of pleasure, whether small or great; en- tertainment is a species of amusement which is always more or less of an in- tellectual nature; diversions and sports are a species of amusements more adapt- ed to the young and the active, par- ticularly the latter: the theatre or the concert is an amusement; fairs and public exhibitions are diversions; games of racing or cricket, hunting, shooting, and the like, are sports. Recreation and pastime are terms of relative import: the former is of use for those who labor; the latter for those who are idle. A recreation must partake more or less of the nature of an amusement, but it is an occupation which owes its pleasure to the relaxa- tion of the mind from severe exertion: in this manner gardening may be a recreation to one who studies; com- pany is recreation to a man of business: the pastime is the amusement of the leisure hour; it may be alternately a diversion, a sport, or a simple amuse- ment, as circumstances require. ANATHEMA. See Malediction. ANATHEMATIZE. See Excom- municate. ANCESTORS. See Forefathers. ANCIENT. See Old. ANCIENTLY. See Formerly. ANECDOTE, Story. An anecdote has but httle incident and no plot; a story (which, hke Latin historia, Eng- hsh history, is derived from Greek lOTopla, which originally referred to something learned by inquiry, being a derivative from a verb signifying to know) may have many incidents and an important catastrophe annexed to it : anecdotes are related of individuals, some of which are of a trifling nature, and others characteristic; stories are generally told to young people of ghosts and visions, which are calcu- lated to act on their fears. An anec- dote is pleasing and pretty; a story is frightful or melancholy; an anecdote always consists of some matter of fact; a story is sometimes founded on that which is real. Anecdotes are related of sorne distinguished persons, displaying their characters or the circumstances of their hves: stories from hfe, however striking and wonderful, will seldom im- press so powerfully as those which are drawn from the world of spirits: anec- dotes serve to amuse men, stories to amuse children. Anecdotes, Memoirs, Chror^icles, An- nals.— Anecdote, Greek avsKSoroc, meant hterally xmpubhshed, not given out, from lie (ex) and SiSiofii, give. Me- moirs, in French memoires, from the word memory, signifies what serves to help the memory. Chronicle, in French chronique, from the Greek xP°^os, time, signifies an account of the times. Annals, from the French annates, from the Latin annus, signifies a detail of what passes in the year. All these terms mark a species of nar- rative, more or less connected, that may serve as materials for a regular history. Anecdotes consist of personal or detached circumstances of a pubUc or private nature, involving one subject or more. Anecdotes may be either moral or political, literary or bio- graphical; they may serve as character- 58 ANGER istics of any individual, or of any par- ticular nation or age. Memoirs may include anecdotes, as far as they are connected with the leading subject on which they treat: memoirs are rather connected than complete; they are a partial narrative respecting an individ- ual, comprehending matter of a public or private nature; they serve as me- morials of what ought not to be for- gotten, and lay the foundation either for a history or a life. Chronicles and annals are altogether of a pubUc nature; and approach the nearest to regular and genuine history. Chronicles register the events as they pass; annals digest them into order, as they occur in the course of successive years. Chronicles are minute as to the exact point of time; annals only pre- serve a general order within the period of a year. Chronicles detail the events of small as well as large communities, as of particular districts and cities; annals detail only the events of nations. Chronicles include domestic incidents, or such things as concern individuals; the word annals, in its proper sense, relates only to such things as affect the great body of the pubhc, but it is frequently employed in an improper sense. Chronicles may be confined to simple matter of fact; annals may enter into the causes and consequences of events. ANGER, Resentment, Wrath, Ire, Indignation. Anger comes from the Latin angere, Greek ayxdv, to strangle, Icelandic angr, grief, sorrow, Danish anger, compunction, etc., from which our words anxious, anxiety, etc., are also derived, and refers to the physi- cal sensations accompanying anger or grief. Resentment, in French ressenti- ment, from resentir, is compounded of re and sentir, signifying to feel again, over and over, or for a continuance. Wrath, Anglo-Saxon ivrath, EngUsh toroth, angry, and ire, Latin ira, are less obviously metaphorical than the preceding, the original roots in both cases having, apparently, the meaning of the present words. Indignation, in French indignation, in Latin indignatio, from indignor, to think or feel un- worthy, marks the strong feehng which base conduct or unworthy treatment awakens in the mind. An impatient agitation against any one who acts contrary to our inclina- tions or opinions is the characteristic of all these terms. Resentment is less vivid than anger, and anger than wrath, ire, or indignation. Anger is a sudden sentiment of displeasure; resentment is a continued anger; vrrath is a height- ened sentiment of anger, which is poetic- ally expressed by the word ire. Anger may be either a selfish or a disinterested passion, it may be provoked by in- juries done to ourselves, or injustice done to others: in this latter sense of strong displeasure God is angry with sinners, and good men may to a cer- tain degree be angry with those under their control who act improperly. Re- sentment is a brooding sentiment alto- gether arising from a sense of personal injury; it is associated with a disUke of the offender, as much as the offence, and is diminished only by the infliction of pain in return; in its rise, progress, and effects, it is alike opposed to the Christian spirit. Wrath and ire are the sentiment of a superior toward an in- ferior, and when provoked by personal injuries discovers itself by haughtiness and a vindictive temper: as a senti- ment of displeasure, tvrath is unjustifi- able between man and man; but the lorath of Grod may be provoked by the persevering impenitence of sinners; the ire of a heathen god, according to the gross views of pagans, was but the ivrath of man associated with greater power: it was altogether uncon- nected with moral displeasure. In- dignation is a sentiment awakened by the unworthy and atrocious conduct of others;" as it is exempt from per- sonality, it is not irreconcilable with the temper of a Christian : a warmth of constitution sometimes gives rise to sallies of anger; but depravity of heart breeds resentment; imbending pride is a great source of wrath; but indignation may flow from a high sense of honor and virtue. See also Displeasure. Anger, C holer. Rage, Fury. — Anger (see above). Cooler, in French colere, Latin cholera, Greek x'^^^P'^i comes from x^^^, bile, of which the EngUsh word gall is a cognate, because the over- flowing of bile was supposed to be the physical accompaniment of anger. ANIMAL 59 Rage, in French rage, from Latin rabies, madness, and rahio, to rave like a mad- man, signifies madness, hence the loss of self-control in extreme anger. Compare the use of mad for angry among children. Fury, derived through French from Latin furia, is from a root signifying to rage, which refers especial- ly to violent physical expression of anger, because one is carried or hur- ried away by the emotion of fury. These words have a progressive force in their significance. Choler expresses something more sudden and virulent than anger; rage is a vehement ebulh- tion of anger; and fury is an excess of rage. Anger may be so stifled as not to discover itself by any outward symptoms; choler is discoverable by the paleness of the visage; rage breaks forth into extravagant expressions and violent distortions; fury takes away the use of the understanding. Anger is an infirmity incident to human nature; it ought, however, to be sup- pressed on all occasions: choler is a malady too physical to be always cor- rected by reflection: rage and fury are distempers of the soul, which nothing but religion and the grace of God can cure. ANGLE. See Corner. ANGRY, Passionate, Hasty. An- gry signifies either having anger, or prone to anger. Passionate signifies prone to passion. Hasty signifies prone to excess of haste from intemperate feeling. Angry denotes either a particular state or a habit of the mind; passionate expresses a habit of the mind ; hastiness is mostly a temporary feehng. An angry man is in a state of anger; a -passionate man is habituaUy prone to be passionate. The angry has less that is vehement and impetuous in it than the passionate; the hasty has some- thing less vehement, but more sudden and abrupt in it than either. The angry man is not always easilv pro- voked, nor ready to retahate; but he often retains his anger until the cause is removed: the passionate man is quickly roused, eager to repay the offence, and speedily appeased by the infliction of pain of which he afterward probably repents: the ha^ty man is very soon offended, but not ready to offend in return; his angry sentiment spends itself in angry words. See also Splenetic. ANGUISH. See Distress; Pain. ANIMADVERSION, Criticism, Stricture. Animadversion, in Latin animadversio, from animadvertere, that is vertere animum ad, signifies to turn the mind to a thing. Criticism, in French critique, Latin criticus, Greek KpiTiKoq, from Kpivuv, to separate, hence to judge, signifies especially judgment foimded on analysis. Stricture, Latin strictura, comes from the verb stringere, to draw tight, to urge, and signifies in Latin the exertion of pressure, oppres- sion, etc. (Compare strict, stringent.) Animadversion includes censure and reproof; criticism implies scrutiny and judgment, whether for or against; and stricture comprehends a partial investi- gation mingled with censure. We ani- madvert on a person's opinions by con- tradicting or correcting them; we criti- cise a person's works by minutely and rationally exposing their imperfections and beauties; we pass strictures on pubhc measures by descanting on them cursorily and censuring them partially. Animadversions are too personal to be impartial, consequently they are sel- dom just; they are mostly resorted to by those who want to build up one system on the ruins of another: criti- cism is one of the most important and honorable departments of hterature; a critic ought justly to weigh the merits and demerits of authors, but of the two his office is rather to blame than to praise; much less injury wiU accrue to the cause of hterature from the severity than from the laxity of criti- cism; strictures are mostly the vehicles of party spleen; like most ephemeral productions, they are too superficial to be entitled to serious notice. See also Censure. ANIMAL, Brute, Beast.| Animal, Latin animal, from anima^ life, which is derived from a root signifying to breathe, indicates a hving thing — i. e., one that breathes. Brute, Latin bru- tus, heavy, dull, was originally used as an adjective withbeast, "a brute beast," and hence developed into a substan- tive. Beast, French bite, from Latin bestia, signified the lower animals, as distinguished from man. 60 ANIMATE Animal is the generic, brute and beast are the specific terms. The animal is the thing that lives and moves. If animal be considered as thinking, will- ing, reflecting, and acting, it is con- fined in its signification to the human species; if it be regarded as Hmited in all the functions which mark intelli- gence and wiU, if it be divested of speech and reason, it belongs to the bride; if animal be considered, moret over, as to its appetites, independent of reason, of its destination, and conse- quent dependence on its mental powers, it descends to the beast. Man and hrvie are opposed. To man an im- mortal soul is assigned; but we are not authorized by Scripture to extend this dignity to the brides. "The brides that perish " is the ordinary mode of distinguishing that part of the ani- mal creation from the superior order of terrestrial beings who are destined to exist in a futiu-e world. Animal, when appMed to man individually, is a term of reproach; the epithets brute and beast are still stronger terms of re- proach, the perversion of the rational faculty being at all times more shock- ing and disgraceful than the absejice of it by nature. ANIMATE, INSPIRE, Enliven, Cheer, Exhilarate. Animate, in Latin animatus, from animus, the mind, and anima, the soul or vital principle, signifies in the proper sense to give life, and in the moral sense to give spirit. The connection between the idea of breathing and that of hfe found in animate (see derivation of animal above) is more obvious in the word in- spire, from in and spirare, breathe into. Enliven means literally to put hfe into. Cheer, Old French chere, is derived from Low Latin cara, a face, Greek Kopa, the head (compare cerebrum, the brain, cerebral, etc.) The original meaning is seen in the phrase "be of good cheer," Mterally put "a good /ace on the matter." It began to signify especially a glad face, and thence de- veloped the verb to gladden, cheer. Exhilarate, in Latin exhilaratus, par- ticiple of exhilaro, from hilaris, Greek iXapog, joyful, signifies to make glad. Animate and inspire imply the com- munication of the vital or mental spark; enliven, cheer, and exhilarate signify ac- tions on the mind or body. To be ani- mated in its physical sense is simply to receive the first spark of animal hfe in however small a degree; for there are animated beings in the world possessing the vital power in an infinite variety of degrees and forms: to be animated in the moral sense is to receive the smallest portion of the sentient or thinking faculty, which is equally varied in thinking beings; the term animation, therefore, taken absolutely, never conveys the idea of receiving any strong degree of either physical or moral feeling. To inspire, on the con- trary, expresses the communication of a strong moral sentiment or passion; hence, to animate with courage is a less forcible expression than to inspire with courage: we hkewise speak of inspiring with emulation or a thirst for knowledge; not of animating with emulation or a thirst for knowledge. To enliven respects the mind; cheer re- lates to the heart; exhilarate regards the spirits, both animal and mental; they all denote an action on the frame by the communication of pleasurable emotions: the mind is enlivened by contemplating the scenes of nature; the imagination is enlivened by reading poetry ; the benevolent heart is cheered by witnessing the happiness of others; the spirits are exhilarated by the con- vivialities of social hfe: conversation enlivens society; the conversation of a kind and considerate friend cheers the drooping spirits in the moments of trouble; unexpected good news is apt to exhilarate the spirits. See also Cheer; Encourage; Hearten. Animation, Ldfe, Vivacity, Spirit. — Animation and life do not differ either in sense or apphcation, but the latter is more in famihar use. They express either the particular or general state of the mind. Vivacity and spirit ex- press only the habitual nature and state of the feehngs. A person of no animation is divested of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature, which is mind; a person of no vivacity is a dull companion; a person of no spirit is unfit to associate with others. A person with animation takes an interest in everything: a vivacious man catches at everything ANSWER 61 that is pleasant and interesting: a spirited man enters into plans, makes great exertions, and disregards diffi- culties. A speaker may address his audience with more or less animation, according to the disposition in which he finds it: a man of a vivacious tem- per diffuses his vivacity into all his words and actions: a man of spirit suits his measures to the exigency of his circumstances. ANIMOSITY. See Enmity. ANNALS. See Anecdotes. ANNEX. See Affix. ANNOTATION. See Remark. ANNOUNCE, Proclaim, Publish. Announce, in Latin annuncio, is com- pounded of an or ad and nuncio, to tell to any one in a particular manner. Proclaim, in Latin proclamo, is com- pounded oi pro and clamo, to cry before, or cry aloud. Publish, in Latin publico, from publicus and populiis, signifies to make public or known to the people at large. The characteristic sense of these words is the making of a thing known to numbers of individuals: a thing is announced in a formal manner to many or few; it is proclaimed to a neigh- borhood, and published to the world. We announce an event that is expected and just at hand; we proclaim an event that requires to be known by all the parties interested; we publish what is supposed hkely to interest all who know it. AnnouncemerUs are made verbally, or by some well-known signal; proclamations are made ver- bally and accompanied by some ap- pointed signal; publications are or- dinarily made through the press, or by oral communication from one individual to another. The arrival of a distinguished person is announced by the ringing of the bells; the proclamation of peace by a herald is accompanied with certain cere- monies calculated to excite notice; the publication of news is the office of the journalist. See also Advertise. ANNOY. See Hectok; Inconven- ience; Worry. ANNUL. See Aboush. ANSWER, Reply, Rejoinder, Re- sponse. Answer, Anglo-Saxon ands- warian, compoimded of and (corre- sponding to Latin ante, Greek avri) and swerian, to swear, means to swear in response to something, to take one's oath concerning the other side of the question. Reply comes from the French repliquer, Latin replico, unfold, signifying to unfold or enlarge upon by way of explanation. Rejoin is coip- pounded of re and jungere, to join, sig- nifying to join or add in return. Re- sponse, in Latin responsus, participle of respondeo, compounded of re and spondeo, promise (compare sponsor), signifies to promise in return, to give sanction to in return. Under all these terms is included the idea of using words in return for other words, or returning r. sound for a sound. An answer is given to a question; a reply is made to an assertion; a re- joinder is made to a reply; a response is made in accordance with the words of another. We answer either for the purpose of affirmation, information, or contradiction; we always reply or re- join, in order to explain or confute; responses are made by way of assent or confirmation. It is impolite not to answer when we are addressed; argu- ments are maintained by the alternate replies and rejoinders of two parties; but such arguments seldom tend to the pleasure and improvement of society: the responses in the Liturgy are pe- cuharly calculated to keep ahve the attention of those who take part in the devotion. An answer may be either spoken or written, or dehvered in any manner; reply and rejoinder are used in personal discourse only; a response may be said or sung, or delivered in a formal man- ner. Animals as well as men may give answers or make responses, though not replies or rejoinders. Answerable, Responsible, Accountable^ AmenabU. — Answerable, from answer, signifies ready or able to answer for. Responsible, from respondeo, to answer, has a similar meaning in its original sense. Accountable, from account, sig- nifies able or ready to give an account. Amenable, from the French amener, to lead, signifies hable to be led or I bound. I Between answerable and responsible 62 ANTAGONIST there is a close alliance in the sense, but some difference in the application. A person is answerable generally in re- spect to what he undertakes to pay or take charge of; he is answerable for his own debts, or for the debts of others to which he has made himself hable; he may also be answerable for things left in his charge : responsible is appUed to higher matters of trust or duty; as an officer is responsible for the conduct of the men who are under him; so to hold a responsible position under gov- ernment; and in an extended sense to be morally responsible — that is, re- sponsible to society as a moral agent. Answerable ana responsible convey the idea of a pledge given for the per- formance of some act, or the fulfil- merit of some engagement, a breach of which subjects the defaulter to loss, punishment, or disgrace: accountable implies simply giving an account or explanation of one's proceedings. The two former have respect to the obhga- tions only: the accountability results from the relation of the parties; a person is accountable to his employer for the manner in which he has con- ducted any business intrusted to him; a child is accountable to his parents for all his actions while he is under their control; and we are all accountable to the Great Judge of all. To be ame- nable is to be accountable as far as laws and regulations bind a person; ona is amenable to the laws of society, or he is amenable to the rules of the house in which he is only an inmate. See also Correspondent. ANTAGONIST. See Enemy. ANTECEDENT, Preceding, Fore- going, Previous, Anterior, Prior, Former. Antecedent, in Latin ante- cedens — that is, ante and cedens, going before. Preceding, in Latin precedens, going before. Foregoing, hterally going before. Previous is in Latin prcevius, that is, prce and via, in the way before. Anterior, the comparative of the Latin in ante, before. Prior, in Latin prior, comparative of primus, first. Former, in English the comparative of first. Antecedent, preceding, foregoing, pre- vious are employed for what goes or happens before : anterior, prior, former, for what is or exists before. Ante- cedent marks priority of order, place. and position, with this peculiar circum- stance, that it denotes the relation of influence, dependence, and connection estabhshed between two objects: thus, in logic the premises are called the antecedent, and the conclusion the con- sequent; in theology or politics, the antecedent is any decree or resolution which influences another decree or action; in mathematics it is that term from which any induction can be drawn to another; in grammar, the antecedent is that which requires a particular regimen from its subsequent. Ante- cedent and preceding both denote pri- ority of time, or the order of events: but the former in a more vague and indeterminate manner than the latter. A preceding event is that which hap- pens immediately before the one of which we are speaking; whereas ante- cedent may have events of circum- stances intervening. An antecedent proposition may be separated from its consequent by other propositions; but a preceding proposition is closely fol- lowed by another. In this sense ante- cedent is opposed to posterior; preceding to succeeding. Preceding respects simply the succes- sion of tir eo and things; but previous denotes the succession of actions and events, with the collateral idea of their connection with an influence upon each other: we speak of the preceding day, or the preceding chapter, merely as the day or chapter that goes before; but when we sp:ak of a previous en- gagement or a previous inquiry, it supposes an engagement preparatory to something that is to follow: previous is opposed to subsequent: foregoing is employed to mark the order of things narrated or stated; as when we speak of the foregoing statement, the fore- going objections, or the foregoing cal- culation, etc.: foregoing is opposed to following. Anterior, prior, and former have all a relative sense, and are used for things that are more before than others: anterior is a technical term to denote forwardness in place or time, but more commonly the former, as in anatomy; the anterior or fore part of the skull, in contradistinction to the posterior part; so hkewise the anterior or fore front of a building, in opposition to the back APOLOGIZE 63 front: jrrior is used in the sense of previous when speaking comparatively of two or more things when it imphes anticipation; a prior claim invaUdates the one that is set up; a prior engage- ment prevents the forming of any other tnat is proposed: former is em- ployed either with regard to times, as former times, in contradistinction to later periods, or with regard to prop- ositions, when the former or first thing mentioned is opposed to the latter or last mentioned. ANTHRAX, Malignant pustule. Splenic fever. Carbuncle. Anthrax, Greek dvOpa^, a carbuncle or coal (com- pare anthracite), is the name for a dis- ease attacking animals, and character- ized by the appearance of maligrMnt boils, or carburides. The various syno- nymes refer to the characteristics of the disease, but do not differ in application. Splenic fever refers to the enlargement of the spleen, caused by the disease. Malignant pustule refers especially to the inflammation and breaking of the boils. Carbuncle in itself does not in- dicate the disease as it is now known; it is the early name apphed to boils in the skin. The disease was long beheved to affect the lower animals only, but late in 1915 several persons in the United States were attacked by it, some with fatal results. The Department of Agriculture placed at the disposal of the attending physicians a remedy it had been using with marked success among cattle, and in one case this proved effective, while in others the appUcation was too late. ANTICIPATE. See Prevent. ANTIPATHY. See Aversion. ANTIQUE. See Old. ANXIETY. See Care; Distress; Worry. ANY. See Some. APARTMENTS. See Lodgings. APATHY. See Indifference. APE. See Imitate. APERTURE. See Opening. APEX. See Zenith. APHORISM. See Anxious. APOLOGIZE, Defend, Justify, Exculpate, Excuse. Plead. Apolo- gize, from the Greek diroXoyia, and diroXoyto^iat, compounded of airo, from or away, and X«yw, speak, signifies to do away by speaking. Defend, in French difenare, is compounded of de and fendo, signifying to keep or ward off. Justify, in French justifier, Latin ju^tifico, is compounded of Jus- tus and facto, signifying to do justice, or to put right. Exculpate, in Latin excidpatus, participle of exculpo, com- pounded of ex and culpa, signifies to get out of a fault. Excuse, in French excuser, Latin excuso, compounded of ex and causa, signifies to get out of any charge, cau^a being a legal term, found in the phrases "to plead one's cause," "make out a case," etc. Plead, in French plaider, is derived from placere, to please, like the words plea, please, placate, etc. There is always some imperfection supposed or real which gives rise to an apology; with regard to persons it presupposes a consciousness of im- propriety, if not of guilt; we apologize for an error by acknowledging ourselves guilty of it: a defence presupposes a consciousness of innocence more or less; we defend ourselves against a charge by proving its fallacy: a justification is founded on the conviction not only of entire innocence, but of strict pro- priety; we justify our conduct against any imputation by proving that it was blameless; exculpation rests on the conviction of innocence with re- gard to the fact : we exculpate ourselves from all blame by proving that we took no part in the transaction: excuse and plea are not grounded on any idea of innocence; they are rather appeals for favor resting on some collateral cir- cumstance which serves to extenuate: a plea is frequently an idle or unfounded excuse, a frivolous attempt to lessen dis- pleasure; we excuse ourselves for a neglect by alleging indisposition; we plead for forgiveness by solicitation and entreaty. An apology mostly respects the con- duct of individuals with regard to each other as equals; it is a voluntary act, springing out of a regard to decorum or the good opinion of others. To avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to apologize for any omission that wears the appearance of neglect. A defence respects matters of higher importance: the violations of laws or pubhc morals, judicial questions decided in a court 64 ^ APOPHTHEGM or matters of opinion which are offered to the decision of the pubhc; no one defends himself but he whose conduct or opinions are called in question. A justification is apphcable to all moral cases in common life, whether of a seri- ous natm-e or otherwise: it is the act of individuals toward each other ac- cording to their different stations: no one can demand a jiistifixxUion from another without a sufficient authority, and no one will attempt to justify him- self to another whose authority he does not acknowledge: men justify themselves either on principles of hon- or or from the less creditable motive of concealing their imperfections from the observation and censure of others. An exculpation is the act of an inferior; it respects the violations of duty tow- ard the superior; it is dictated by necessity, and seldom the offspring of any higher motive than the desire to screen one's self from punishment: exculpation regards offences only of commission; excuse is employed for those of omission as well as com- mission: we excuse ourselves oftener for what we have not done than for what we have done: it is the act of persons in all stations, and arises from various motives, dishonorable or other- wise: a person may often have sub- stantial reasons to excuse himself from doing a thing or for not having done it; an excuse may Ukewise sometimes be the refuge of idleness and selfish- ness. To plead is properly a judicial act, and extended in its sense to the ordinary concerns of life; it is mostly employed for the benefit of others rather than ourselves. Excuse and plea, which are mostly employed in an unfavorable sense, are to apology, defence, and exculpation as the means to an end: an apology is lame when, instead of an honest con- fession of an unintentional error, an idle attempt is made at justification; a defence is poor when it does not contain siifficient to invahdate the charge; a justification is nugatory when it appUes to conduct altogether wrong; aja excuse or a plea is frivolous or idle which turns upon some falsehood, misrepre- sentation, or irrelevant point. APOPHTHEGM or Apothegm. "See Axiom. APOSTATE. See Recreant. APPALL. See Dismay. APPAREL, Attire, Array. Ap- parel comes from Old French apareiller, from Latin ad, to, and Medieval Latin pariculus, from par, equal, meaning to put together things that are alike, to arrange, hence to arrange the dress. Attire comes from Old French atirier, from ad, to, and Old French tire or tiere, a row (compare our word tier), possibly of Teutonic origin; it means to place in rows, hence to arrange. Array comes from Latin ad and Teu- tonic rede, ready; and meant at first to get ready. These terms are all apphcable to dress or exterior decoration. Apparel is the dress of every one; attire is the dress of the great; array is the dress of particular persons on particular occasions: it is the first ebject of every man to provide himself with apparel suitable to his station; but the desire of shining forth in gaudy aitire is the property of httle minds: in festivals and solemn occasions it may be proper for those who are to be conspicuous to set themselves out with a comely array. Apparel and attire respect the quahty and fashion of the thing; but array has regard to the disposition of the things with their neatness and decorum: ap- parel may be costly or mean; aitire may be gay or shabby; but array will never be otherwise than neat or comely. APPARENT, Visible, Clear, Plain, Obvious, Evident, Manifest. Apparent, in Latin apparens, participle of appareo, to appear, signifies the quahty of appearing. Visible, in Latin visibilis, from visus, participle of video, to see, signifies capable of being seen. Clear is in French dair, German, Swe- dish, etc., klar, Latin darus. Plain, in Latin planus, even, signifies what is so smooth and unencumbered that it can be seen. Obvious in Latin obvius, com- poimded of 06 and via, signifies the quahty of lying in one's way or before one's eyes. Evident, in French evident, Latin evidens, means something clearly seen or known, from e or ex, oid, and video, see. The intensive force of e in this case is similar to that of the prepositions or adverb in Enghsh phrases hke "see one's way out ' of APPEASE 65 difficulty, "to see through" something, etc. Manifest, in French manifeste, Latin manifesliis, compwunded of ma- nus, the hand, and festus, possibly from fendo. to strike, signifies the quality of being so near that it can be laid hold of by the hand. These words agree in expressingvari- ous degrees in the capabiUty of seeing; but visible is the only one used purely in a physical sense; apparent, clear, plain, and obvious are used physically and morally; evident and manifest sole- ly in a moral acceptation. That which is simply an object of sight is visible; that which presents itself to our view in any form, real or otherwise, is ap- parent; the stars themselves are visible to us; but their size is apparent. Visible is applied to that which mere- ly admits of being seen; apparent and the other terms denote not only what is to be seen, but what is easily to be seen: they are all applied as epithets to objects of mental discernment; what is apparent strikes the view; what is clear is to be seen in all its parts and in its prop>er colors: it is opposed to that which is obscure; what is plain is seen by a plain understanding: it requires no deep reflection or severe study; it is opposed to what is intri- cate: what is obviotis presents itself readily to the mind of every one; it is seen at the first glance, and is op- posed to that which is abstruse: what is evident is seen forcibly, and leaves no hesitation on the mind; it is op- posed to that which is dubious; mani- fest is a greater degree of the evident; it strikes on the imderstanding and forces conviction; it is opposed to that which is dark. A thing is apparent upon the face of it: a case is clear; it is decided on immediately: a truth is plain; it is involved in no perplexity; it is not multifarious in its bearings: a falsehood is plain; it admits of no question: a reason is obvious; it flows out of the nature of the case: a proof is evident; it requires no discussion, there is nothing m it that clashes or contradicts; the guilt or innocence of a person is evident when everything serves to strengthen the conclusion: a contra- diction or absurdity is manifest which is felt by aU as soon as .'t is perceived. APPARITION. See Vision. 5 APPEAR. See Look; See; Seem; Transpire. APPEARANCE, AiR, Aspect. Ap- pearance signifies the thing that ap- pears or the manner of appearing. Air (see Air). Aspect, in Latin aspec- tus, from aspicio, from ad (to) and specere, look, cognate with EngUsh spy, signifies the thing that is looked upon or seen. Appearance is the generic, the rest are specific terms. The whol 2 external form, figure, or colors, whatever is visible to the eye, is its appearance; air is a particular appearance of any object as far as it is indicative of its quahty or conditicm; an air of wretch- edness or poverty: aspect is the partial appearance of a body as it presents one of its sides to view; a gloomy or cheer- ful aspect. It is not safe to judge of either persons or things altogether by appearances; the appearance and real- ity are often at variance: the appear- ance of the sun is that of a moving body, but astronomers assert that it has no motion round the earth: there are particular towns, habitations, or rooms which have always an air of comfort, or the contrary: this is a sort of appearance the most to be relied on: poUticians of a certain stamp are always busy in judging for the future from the aspect of affairs; but their predictions, hke those of astrologers who judge from the aspect of the heavens, frequently turn out to the discredit of the prophet. See also Air; Show. APPEASE, Calm, Pacify, Quiet, Still. For derivation of appease see Allay. Calm comes from Late Latin cauma, the heat of the sun, Greek Kavfia, modified by Latin calere, to grow hot, and signified rest during the day. Pacify, in Latin pacifico, com- pounded 01 pax and facia, signifies to make peaceable . Quie t , in French quiet, Latin quietus, from quies, rest, signifies to put to rest. Still, from Anglo-Saxon stiUan, to remain in a stall, is aUied with the German stellen, to place, and signifies to stop all movement, to place at rest. To appease is to remove great agita- tion; to calm is to bring into a tranquil state. The wind is appeased, the sea is calmed. With regard to persons, it is 66 APPELLATION necessary to appease those who are in transports of passion, and to calm those who are in trouble, anxiety, or appre- hension. Appease respects matters of force or violence, calm those of inquie- tude and distress: one is appeased by a submissive behavior, and calmed by the removal of danger. Pacify corre- sponds to appease, and quiet to calm; in sense they are the same, but in ap- phcation they differ; appease and calm are used only in reference to objects of importance; pacify and quiet to those of a more familiar nature: the uneasy humors of a child are pacified or its groundless fears are quieted. Still is a loftier expression than any of the former terms; serving mostly for the grave or poetic style: it is an onoma- topseia for restraining or putting to silence that which is noisy and boister- ous. See also Allay; Mollify. APPELLATION. See Name. APPLAUD. See Praise. APPLAUSE, Acclamation. Ajh plause, from the Latin applaudo, signi- fies, Uterally, to clap or stamp the feet to a thing. Acclamation, from acclamo, signifies a crying out to a thing. These terms express a pubhc dem- onstration; the former by means of a noise with the hands or feet; the latter by means of shouts and cries: the former being employed as a testi- mony of approbation; the latter as a sanction, or an indication of respect. An actor looks for applause; a speaker looks for acclamation. What a man does calls forth applause, but the p)er- son himself is mostly received with acclamxitions. At the hustings popular speeches meet with applause, and favorite members are greeted with loud acclamations. APPLICATION. See Attend. APPLY. See Added; Address. APPOINT, Order, Prescribe, Or- dain. Appoint (see Allot). Order, in French ordre, Latin ordino, to ar- range, dispose, ordo, order, signifies to place in regular position. Prescribe, in Latin prescribo, compounded of prce, before, and scnbere, to write, sigiufies to draw a line for a person. Ordain is a variation of order. To appoint is either the act of an equal or superior: we appoint a meet- ing with any one at a given time and place; a king appoints his ministers. To order is the act of one invested with partial authority: a customer orders a commodity from his tradesman: a master gives his orders to his servant. To prescribe is the act of one who is superior by virtue of his knowledge : a physician prescribes for his patient. To ordain is an act emanating from the highest authority: kings and coimcils ordain;, but their ordinances must be conformable to what is ordained by the Divine Being. Appointments are made for the convenience of individuals or communities; but they may be altered or annulled at the pleasure of the contracting parties. Orders are dictated by the superior only, but they presuppose a discretionary obligation on the part of the individual to whom they are given. Prescriptions are bind- ing on none but such as voluntarily ad- mit their authority; but ordinances leave no choice to those on whom they are imposed to accept or reject them: the ordinances of man are not less bind- ing than those of God, so long as they do not expressly contradict the divine law. Appointments are' kept, orders execut- ed or obeyed, prescriptions followed, or- dinances submitted to. It is a point of pohteness or honor, if not of direct moral obligation, to keep the appoint- ments which we have made. Interest will lead men to execute the orders which they receive in the course of business: duty obhges them to obey the orders of their superiors. It is a nice matter to prescribe to another without hurting his pride; this prin- ciple leads men often to regard the counsels of their best friends as pre- scriptions; with children it is an un- questionable duty to follow the pre- scriptions of those whose age, station, or experience authorizes them to pre- scribe. God has ordained all things for our good; it rests with ourselves to submit to His ordinances and be happy. See also Constitute. APPORTION. See Distribute. APPRAISE, Appreciate, Esti- mate, Esteem. Appraise and appre- ciate, both from appretio and appreti* atus, participle of apprecio, compoimded of ad and pretium, a price, signify to set APPREHEND 67 a price or value on a thing. Estimate comes from estimattts, participle of estimo, to value. To esteem is a varia- tion of estimate. Appraise and appreciate are used in precisely the same sense for setting a value on anything according to relative circumstanees; but the one is used in the proper, and the other in the figura- tive sense: a sworn appraiser appraises goods according to the condition of the articles and their salable property; the characters of men are appreciated by others when their good and bad quah- ties are justly put in a balance. To estimate a thing is to get the sum of its value by calculation; to esteem anything is to judge its actual and in- trinsic value. Estimate is used either in a proper or a figiirative acceptation; esteem only in a moral sense: the ex- pense of an imdertaking, losses by fire, gains by trade, are estimated at a cer- tain sum; the estimate may be too high or too low: the moral worth of men is often estimated above or below the reaUty, according to the particular bias of the estimator; but there are individ- uals of such an imquestionable worth that they need only to be known in order to be esteemed. APPRECIATE. See Appraise. APPREHEND, Conceive, Sup- pose, Imagine. To apprehend, from the Latin ad and prehervdo, I lay hold of, signifies to take. Conceive, from the Latin con and capio, to take together — that is, to put together in the mind. Suppose, from the Latin suppono, to put one thing in the place of another. Imagine, from imago, to have an image or figure of anything in the mind. To apprehend is simply to take an idea into the mind; thus we may ap- prehend any object that we hear or see: to conceive is to form an idea in the mind, as to conceive the idea of doing anything, to conceive a design. Apprehending is the first effort of the thinking faculty: conceiwin^ is the act of a more matured understanding; the former belongs to children as well as growTi persons, the latter more properly •to grown persons. Apprehending is performed by the help of the senses; we may be quick or dull of aj)prehen- sion. Conceiving is performeu by re- flection and combination: we may conceive properly or improperly. That of which we can have no sensi- ble impression is not to be apprehended, that which is above the reach of our thought is not to be conceived. To apprehend and to conceive are ap- plied only to reality, to suppose and imagine are appUed to things which may exist only in the imagination; but the former being drawn from that which is real may be probable or im- probable according to circumstances; the latter being the peculiar act of the imagination, more commonly exists in the imagination only. These terms are all employed to de- note one's opinion or belief in regard to ordinary matters with a like distinction. Apprehend expresses the weakest kind of behef, the having the least idea of the presence of a thing. A man is said to conceive that on which he forms a direct opinion. What one supposes may admit of a doubt; it is frequently only conject- ural. What one imagines may be alto- gether improbable or impossible, and that which cannot be imagined may be too improbable to admit of being believed. Apprehend, Fear, Dread. — Appre- hend signifies to have an idea of danger in one's mind, without necessarily im- plying any sentiment of fear. Fear, Angl(>Saxon faer, a sudden peril or danger, referred originally to the peril of travelling, and is allied to faran, modern /are, meaning to travel. Dread, Anglo-Saxon drcedan, to be afraid, ex- presses the highest degree of fear. What is jwssible may be apprehended; we may apprehend a change in the weather, or that an accident will take place by the way. What is probable may be feared; we may fear the con- sequences of a person's resentment. Not only the evil which is nigh, but that which is exceeding great, pro- duces dread. Apprehend is said only of things. Fear and dread are also applied to per- sons with the Uke distinction: fear is a salutary sentiment; it is the senti- ment of a child toward a parent or instructor: dread, as toward a fellow- creature, is produced by harshness and \ 68 APPREHENSION oppression, but in regard to our Maker is produced by the consciousness of guilt. APPREHENSION. See Wobry. APPRISE. See Inform. APPRISED. See Aware. APPROACH, Access, Admittance. Approach, Old French aprochier, from Latin prope, near, signifies near to — that is, coming near to. Access, in Latin accessus, from ac or ad, and cedere, to go, is, prop>erly, going to. Ad- mittance (see Admit). Approach signifies the coming near or toward an object, and consequently is an unfinished act, but access and ad- mittance are finished acts; access is the coming to — that is, as close to an object as is needful; and admittance is the coming into any place or into the presence or society of any person. Approach expresses simply the act of drawing near, but access and admittance comprehend, in their signification, the liberty and power of coming to or into: an appr'oach may be quick or slow, an access easy or difiicult, an admittance free or exclusive. Approach may sometimes be taken for a road or way of approach, which brings it nearer in sense to the other terms, as the approaches to a bridge or a town. Access is used only in its prop)er sense for the act of persons ; approach and ad- mittance are employed figuratively, as the approach of winter, age, etc., or the approach to immortality, in the sense of coming near to it in simiUtude, the admittance of immoral thoughts into the mind. Approach, Approximate. — Approach (see preceding use). Approximate, coxn- pound of ap and proximus, to come nearest or next, signifies either to draw near or bring near. To approach is intransitive only; a person approaches an object. To approximate is both transitive and intransitive; a person approximates two objects to each other. To approach denotes simply the mov- ing of an object toward another, but to approximate denotes the gradual mov- ing of two objects toward each other: that which approaches may come into immediate conjunction; but bodies may approximate for some time before tbey form a junction, or may never form a junction. An equivocation ap- proaches to a lie. Minds approximate by long intercourse. APPROBATION. See Assent; Consent. APPROPRIATE, Usurp, Arro- gate, Assume, Ascribe. Appropriate, in French approprier, compounded of ad and propriatus, participle of pro- priare, an old verb, and proprius, proper or own (compare proper), signifies to make one's own. Usurp, in French v,surper, Latin usurpo, from ilsu rapere, to seize for one's own use, signifies to make use of as one's own. Arrogate, in Latin arrogatus, participle of arrogo, signifies to ask or claim for one's self. Assume, in French assumer, Latin assumo, comp>ounded of as or ad and sutno, to take, signifies to take to one's self. Ascribe, in Latin ascribo, com- pounded of ad and scribo, write, signi- fies here to write down to one's own account. The idea of taking something to one's self by an act of one's own is common to all these terms. To appropriate is to take to one's self with or without right; to usurp is to take to one's self by violence or in violation of right. Appropriating is applied in its proper sense to goods in possession; v,surping is properly appHed to p>ower, titles, rights. Individuals appropriate what- ever comes to their hands which they use as their own; they usurp power when they exercise the functions of gov- ernment without a legitimate sanction. These words may be applied in the same sense to moral or spiritual objects. Arrogate, assume, and ascribe denote the taking to one's self, but do not, hke appropriate and usurp, imply taking from another. Arrogate is a more vio- lent action than assume, and assume than ascribe. Arrogate and assume are employed either in the proper or figura- tive sense, ascribe only in the figurative sense. We arrogate distinctions, hon- ors, titles; we assume names, rights, and privileges. In the moral sense we arrogate pre-eminence, assume impor- tance, ascribe merit. To arrogate is a species of moral usurpation; it is always accompained with haughtiness and contempt for others: that is arrogated to one's self to which one has not the smallest title: an arrogant temper is ARCHITECT 69 one of the most odious features in the human character; it is a compound of folly and insolence. To assume is a species of moral appropriation; its objects are of a less serious nature than those of arrogating, and it does less vio- lence to moral propriety: we may as- sume in trifles, we arrogate only in im- portant matters. To ascribe is oftener an act of vanity than of injustice: many men may be entitled to the merit which they ascribe to themselves; but by this very act they lessen the merit of their best actions. Arrogating as an action, or arrogance as a disposition, is always taken in a bad sense: the former is always dic- tated by the most preposterous pride; the latter is associated with every un- worthy quality. Assumption as an action varies in its character according to circumstances; it may be either good, bad, or indifferent: it is justi- fiable in certain exigencies to assume a command where there is no one else able to direct; it is often a matter of indifference what name a person assumes who does so only in conform- ity to the will of another; but it is always bad to assume a name as a mask to impose upon others. As a disposition assumption is always bad, but stiU not to the same degree as arrogance. An arrogant man renders himself intolerable to society: an as- suming man makes himself offensive: arrogance is the characteristic of men; assumption is {jecuhar to youths: an arrogant man can be humbled only by silent contempt; an assuming youth must be checked by the voice of au- thority. See also Monopouze; Nab; Pe- culiar. APPROVE. See Ratify. APPROXIMATE. See Approach. APT. See Fit; Ready. APTITUDE. See Knack. ARBITER. See Judge. ARBITRARY. See Absolute. ARBITRATE, Adjust, Decide, De- termine, Mediate, Settle. Arbitrate (for derivation see Judge) means to decide as an outsider, an impartial judge. Adjust (not derived from jus- tice, but from ad and juxta. next to) meant originally to put side by side, to put something into a proper relation to something else. Decide is derived from de and OBdere, to cut, and means to cut off, hence to end. Determine comes from Latin de and terminare, from ter- minus, hmit, and meant to decide the hmits of something. Mediate, from Latin medium, middle, meant to act as a go-between. Settle meant to cause to rest, from Anglo-Saxon setl, seat (compare the noun settle, a seat). It received the sjjecial sense of to es- tabhsh peace between two combat- ants, from an association with the Anglo-Saxon sceht, the end of a suit, allied to the verb sacan, to contend, which appears in forsake. Of these terms mediate and arbitrate refer es- pecially to the difficulties that arise between states or between other or- ganized groups of individuals. To mediate involves an action prior to arbitration, for it is based upon a tender of the "good offices" of a neu- tral nation to others in a dispute or war. In case it is accepted the medi^ ating nation may become the arbitrator or the dispute may be submitted to another form of arbitration — that is, 'final decision concerning the justice of the case by an impartial court. For an. analysis of the difference between decide and determine see the article on decide. Decide and determine refer to purely intellectual operations. One may decide or determine the rights of a case without proceeding to adjust the difficulties or to settle the disturb- ance. Adjust and settle imply active participation. Adjust and settle differ mainly in the connotations suggested by their derivations. We adjust matters where the trouble is due to a lack of mutual understanding between two con- fficting parties. We settle a disturbance where conflicting claims cannot be ad- justed by superior force or authority. ARBITRATOR. See Judge; Paci- fist. ARCHITECT, Builder. Architect, from architecture, in Latin architectusy from architectura, Greek ap\iTkKTii>v. compounded of dpyoQ, the chief, ana r«xv»?, art or contrivance, signifies the chief of contrivers. Builder, from the verb to build, denotes the person con- cerned in buildings, who causes the structure of houses, either by his money or his personal service. 70 ARCHIVE An architect is an artist, employed only to form the plans for large build- ings; a builder is a simple tradesman, or even workman, who builds common dweUing-houses. ARCHIVE. See Record. ARDENT. See Hot; Sanguine. ARDOR. See Fervor; Zeal. ARDUOUS. See Hard. ARGUE, Dispute, Debate. Argue comes from Latin arguere, to make clear. Dispute, in PYench dispuier, Latin dispute, compounded of dis and p^Uo, signifies to think differently; in an extended sense, to assert a different opinion. Debate, in French debattre, compounded of the intensive syllable de and battre, to beat or fight, signifies to contend for and against. To argv£ is to defend one's self; to dispute, to oppose another; to debate, to dispute in a formal manner. To argu£ on a subject is to explain the rea- sons or proofs in support of an asser- tion; to argue with a person is to de- fend a position against him: to dispute a thing is to advance objections against a position; to dispute with a person is to start objections against his positions, to attempt to refute them: a debate is a disputation held by many. To argu^ does not necessarily suppose a convic- tion on the part of the arguer that what he defends is true, nor a real difference of opinion in his opponent; for some men have such an itching propensity for an argument that they will attempt to prove what nobody denies: to dis- pute always supposes an opposition to some person, but not a sincere opposi- tion to the thing; for we may dispute that which we do not deny, for the sake of holding a dispute with one who is of different sentiments: to debate presupposes a multitude of clashing or opposing opinions. Men of many words argue for the sake of talking: men of ready tongues dispute for the sake of victory: in parliament men often debate for the sake of opposing the ruhng party, or from any other motive than the love of truth. Argue, Evince, Prove. — Argue (see above). Evince, in Latin evinco, com- pounded of vinco, to prove, or make out, and e, forth, signifies to bring to fight, to make to appear clear. Prove, in French prouvsr, in Latin probo, from probus, good, signifies to make good or to make to appear good. These terms in general convey the idea of evidence, but with gradations: argu£ denotes the smallest, and prove the highest degree. To argu£ is to serve as an indication amounting to probability; to evince denotes an indi- cation so clear as to remove doubt; to prove marks an evidence so positive as to produce conviction. It argues a want of candor in any man to conceal cir- cumstances in his statement which are in any wise calculated to affect the sub- ject in question : the tenor of a person's conversation may evince the refinement of his mind and the purity of his taste: when we see men sacrificing their peace of mind and even their integrity of character to ambition it proves to us how important it is even in early life to check this natural and in some measure laudable, but still insinuating and dangerous, passion. Argument, Reason, Proof. — Argu- ment, from argu£, signifies either the thing that argues, or that which is brought forward in arguing. Reason, in French raison, Latin ratio, from ratus, participle of reor, think, signifies the faculty of mind which draws conclu- sions. Proof, like prove, is derived ultimately from Latin probus, good, ex- cellent, and means that which tests and reveals the excellence of something. An argument serves for defence; a reason for justification; a proof for con- viction. Arguments are adduced in support of a hypothesis or proposition; reasons are assigned in matters of be- hef and practice; proofs are collected to ascertain a fact. Arguments are either strong or weak: reasons soUd or futile; proofs clear ana positive, or vague and indefinite. We confute an argument, overpower a rea- son, and invahdate a proof. Whoever wished to defend Christianity will be in no want of arguments; the beHever need never be at a loss to give a reason for the hope that is in him; out through- out the whole of Divine Revelation there is no circumstance that is substantiated with such irrefragable proofs as the resurrection of our Saviour. ARISE, or Rise, Mount, Ascend, Climb, Scale. Arise or rise, derived ARISE 71 from a root signifying to move, found in river, rivulet, etc., means specifically to move in an upward direction. As- cend is derived from ad, to, and scandere, to climb, from a root found in scandal (originally a stumbling-block), and means to climb to something. Climb means to ascend by grasping, and is derived from a Germanic root signify- ing to grasp, found in clip, cleave, clamber, etc. Scale is derived from Latin scala (from the same root found in ascend), that by which one ascends, and means to rise by a ladder. The idea of going upward is common to all these terms; arise is used only in the sense of simply getting up, but rise is employed to express a continued mo- tion upward: a person arises from his seat or his bed; a bird rises in the air; the silver of the barometer rises; the first three of these terms convey a gra- dation in their sense; to arise or rise denotes a motion to a less elevated height than to mx)unt, and to mount that which is less elevated than ascend; a person rises from his seat, mounts a hill, and ascends a mountain. Arise and rise are intransitive only; the rest are likewise transitive: we rise from a point, we mount and ascend to a point, or we mount and ascend something: an air-balloon rises when it first leaves the groimd; it mounts higher and higher until it is o,ut of sight; but if it ascends too high it endangers the life of the aerial adventurer. Climb and scale ex- press a species of rising: to climb is to rise step by step by clinging to a cer- tain body; to scale is to rise by an escalade, or species of ladder, em- ployed in mounting the walls of forti- fied towns: trees and mountains are climbed; walls are scaled. Arise or Rise, Proceed, Issue, Spring, Flow, Emanate. — To arise (see above). Proceed, in Latin procedo, that is, pro and cecfere, to go, signifies to go forth. Issu£ is French issue, participle of issir (from ex, out of, and ire, to go. Spring, in German springen, signifies to leap forth. Flow, Anglo-Saxon flovxm, is derived from a Germanic root allied to the Latin pluit, it rains, and the Greek irXweiv, to float. It has no connection with the Latin fiuere, to flow. Emanate, in Latin emanatus, participle of eiTiano, from ex. out, and tnanare, to flow, means to flow out. The idea of one object coming out of another is expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the circumstances of the action. What comes up out of a body and rises into existence is said to arise, as the mist which arises out of the sea: what comes forth as an effect, or comes forth in a particular manner, is said to proceed; thus the fight pro- ceeds from a certain quarter of the heavens, or from a certain part of a house: what comes out from a small apertm-e is said to issue; thus perspira- tion issues through the pores of the skin; water issues sometimes from the sides of rocks; what comes out in a sudden or quick manner, or comes from some remote soiu-ce, is said to spririg; thus blood springs from an artery which is pricked; water springs up out of the earth : what comes out in quantities or in a stream is said to flow; thus blood fl/)ws from a wound: to emanate is a species of flx)wirig by a natural opera- tion, when bodies send forth, or seem to send forth, particles of their own composition from themselves; thus fight emanates from the sun. This distinction in the signification of these terms is kept up in their moral acceptation, where the idea of one thing originating from another is com- mon to them aU; but in this case arise is a general term, which simply implies the coming into existence; proceed con- veys also the idea of a progressive movement into existence. Every ob- ject, therefore, may be said to arise out of whatever produces it; but it pro- ceeds from it only when it is gradually produced: evils are continu^y aristrw^ m human society for which there is no specific remedy: in compficated dis- orders it is not always possible to say- precisely from what the complaint of the patient proceeds. Issue is seldom used but in application to sensible ob- jects: yet we may say, in conformity to the original meaning, that words issxie from the mouth: the idea of the distant soiu-ce or origin is kept up in the moral appUcation of the term spring, when we say that actions spring from a generous or corrupt principle: the idea of a quantity and a stream is preserved in the moral use of the terms 72 ARMISTICE flow and emanate; but the former may be said of that which is not inherent in the body; the latter respects that only which forms a component part of the body: God is the spring whence all our blessings flow; all authority emanates from God, who is the supreme source of all things; theologians, when speaking of God, say that the Son emanates from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, and that grace fl^ws upon us in- cessantly from the inexhaustible treas- ures of Divine mercy. ARMISTICE. See Truce. ARMS, Weapons. Arms, from the Latin arma, hterally fittings, equip- ments, from the root signifying to join or lashion found in art, arm (a part of the human body), etc., is now properly used for instruments of offence, and never otherwise except by a poetic hcense of arms for armor; but weapon, from a widespread Germanic root, may be used either for an instrument of offence or defence. We say fire-arms, but not fire-weapons; and weapons of- fensive or defensive, not arms offensive or defensive. Arms, likewise, agree- ably to its origin, is employed for that only which is purposely made to be an instrument of offence; weapon, accord- ing to its extended and indefinite appli- cation, is employed for whatever may be accidentally used for this purpose: guns and swords are always arms; stones, brick-bats, and pitchforks, and also the tongue or words, may be oc- casionally weapons. ARMY, Host. An army is an or- ganized body of armed men; a host, from hostis, an enemy, is properly a body of hostile men. An army is a limited body; a /ios< may be unhmited, and is therefore generally conside. xi a very large body. The word army applies only to that which has been formed by the rules of art for purposes of war: host has been extended in its apphcation not only to bodies, whether of men or angels, that were assembled for pur- poses of offence, but also in the figu- rative sense to whatever rises up to assail. ARRAIGN. See Accuse. ARRANGE. See Class; Dispose. ARRAY. See Apparel. ARRIVE. See Come. ARROGANCE, Presumption. Ar- rogance, in French arrogance, Latin arrogantia, signifies the disposition to arrogate (see Appropriate). Presump- tion, from presume, Latin praesumo, compounded of prce, before, and sumere, itself compounded from svb and emere, to buy, and meaning to put or take, signifies the disposition to put one's self forward. Arrogance is the act of the great; presumption that of the Uttle: the ar- rogant man takes upon himself to be above others; the presumptv^v^ man strives to be on a level with those who are above him. Arrogance is com- monly coupled with haughtiness; pre- sumption with meanness: men arro- gantly demand as a right the homage which has perhaps before been volun- tarily granted; the creature presumptu- ously arraigns the conduct of the Crea- tor, and murmurs against the dis- pensations of His providence. See also Assumption; Haughtiness. ARROGATE. See Appropriate. ART, Cunning, Deceit. Art, in Latin ars, from a root ar, to join (see arms), allied to Greek apnog, fit, exact, signifies Hterally the "putting of two and two together." Cunning is derived from Anglo-Saxon cunnan, to know, and therefore corresponds exact- ly to the colloquial adjective knowing, in such phrases as "a knowing look," "a knowing child," etc. Deceit, in Latin deceptum, participle of decipio, or de and capio, signifies to take by sur- prise or unawares. Art imphes a disposition of the mind to use circumvention or artificial means to attain an end: cunning marks the disposition to practise disguise in the prosecution of a plan: deceit leads to the practice of dissimulation and gross falsehood, for the sake of gratifying a desire. Art is the property of a hvely mind; cunning, of a thoughtful and knowing mind; deceit, of an ignorant, low, and weak mind. Art is practised often in self-defence; as a practice, therefore, it is even sometimes justi- fiable, although not as a disposition: cunning has always self in view; the cunning man seeks his gratification without regard to others; deceit is often practised to the express injury of an- ARTIFICE 73* other: the deceitfvl man adopts base means for base ends. Animals prac- tise art when opposed to their superiors in strength; but they are not artful, as they have not that versatihty of power which they can habitually exercise to their own advantage hke human beings; animals may be cunning, inasmuch as they can by contrivance and conceal- ment seek to obtain the object of their desire, but no animal is deceitful except man; the wickedest and stupidest of men have the power and the will of deceiving and practising falsehood upon others which is unknown to the brutes. See also Business. Artful, Artificial, Fictitunis. — Artful, compounded of art and full, marks the quality of being full of art. Artificial, in Latin artifictalis, from ars and facio, to do, signifies done with art. Fictitious, in Latin fictitius, from fingere to feign (compare article on feign), signifies the quality of being feigned. Artful respects what is done with art or design; artificial what is done by the exercise of workmanship; fictitious what is made out of the mind. Artful and artificial are used either for natural or moral objects; fictitious always for those that are moral: artful is opposite to what is artless, artificial to what is natural, fictitious to what is real: the ringlets of a lady's hair are disposed in an artful manner; the hair itself may be artificial; a tale is artful which is told in a way to gain credit; man- ners are artificial which do not seem to suit the person adopting them; a story is fictitious which has no foimda- tion whatever in truth and is the in- vention of the narrator. Children sometimes tell their stories so artfully as to impose on the most penetrating and experienced. Those who have no character of their own are induced to take an artificial character in order to put themselves on a level with their associates. Beggars deal in fictitious tales of distress in order to excite com- passion. See also Scheming. ARTICLE, Condition, Term. Ar- ticle, in French article, Latin articiUus, a joint or a part of a member. Condi- tion is usually believed to be derived from the Latin condere, to build. Skeat declares that this is incorrect. The Latin conditio is derived from con and a root found in dicere, to speak, mean- ing to point out. Term is derived from Latin terminus, Greek Tepfia, from the root meaning to cross over. These words agree in their applica- tion to matters of compact, or under- standing between man and man. Arti- cle and condition are used in both num- bers: terms only in the plural in this sense: the former may be used for any point individually; the latter for all the points collectively: article is employed for all matters which are drawn out in specific articles or points; as the articles of an indenture, of a capitulation, or an agreement. Con- dition respects any point that is ad- mitted as a ground of obhgation or engagement: it is used for the general transactions of men, in which they reciprocally bind themselves to return certain equivalents. The word terms is employed in regard to mercantile transactions; as the terms of any bar- gain, the terms of any agreement, the terms on which anything is bought or sold. Articles are mostly voluntary; they are admitted by mutual agree- ment: conditions are frequently com- pulsory, sometimes hard; they are submitted to from pohcy or necessity; terms are dictated by interest or equity; they are fair or unfair according to the temper of the parties; they are submitted or agreed to. ARTICULATE. See Utter. ARTIFICE, Trick, Finesse, Strat- agem. Artifice, from French artifice, Latin artifex, an artificer, and artem facio, to execute an art, signifies the performance of an art. Trick is de- rived from Dutch and originally meant a clever contrivance. Finesse, a word directly imported from France, with all the meaning attached to it which is characteristic of the nation itself, means properly fineness; the word fin in French is derived from Latin finitus, meaning well finished. Stratagem, in French stratagbme, from the Greek arpariiyTifta and arpdrTtyeu), tO lead an army, signifies by distinction to head them in carrying on any scheme. All these terms denote the exercise of an art calculated to mislead others. Artifice is the generic term, the rest are 74 ARTIFICES, specific: the former has likewise a par- ticular use and acceptation distinct from the others; it expresses a ready display of art for the purpose of extri- cating one's self from a difficulty, or securing to one's self an advantage. Trick includes in it more of design to gain something for one's self, or to act secretly to the inconvenience of others: it is rather a cheat on the senses than the understanding. Finesse is a species of artifice in which art and cunning are combined in the management of a cause: it is a mixture of invention, falsehood, and concealment. Strata- gem is a display of art in plotting and contriving, a disguised mode of ob- taining an end. Females who are not guarded by fixed principles of virtue and uprightness are apt to practise artifices upon their husbands. Men without honor, or an honorable means of hving, are apt to practise various tricks to impose upon others to their own advantage: every trade, there- fore, is said to have its tricks; and pro- fessions are not entirely clear from this stigma, which has been brought upon them by unworthy members. Diplo- matic persons have most frequent re- •course to finesse. Mihtary operations are sometimes considerably forwarded fcy weU-concerted and well-timed strat- agems to siu-prise the enemy. An artifix:e may be perfectly innocent when it serves to afford a friend an unexpected pleasure. A trick is child- ish which only serves to deceive or amuse children. Stratagems are allow- able not in war only; the writer of a novel or a play may sometimes adopt a successful stratagem to cause the reader a surprise. Finesse is never justifiable; it carries with it too much of concealment and disingenuousness to be practised but for selfish and un- worthy purposes. ARTIFICER. See Artist. ARTIFICIAL. See Artful; The- atrical, ARTISAN. See Artist. ARTIST, Artisan, Artificer, Me- chanic. Artist is the practicer of the fine arts (for derivation see Art) ; arti^ san the practicer of the vulgar arts. Artificer comes from ars and facio, one who does or makes according to art. Mechanic, from Greek fiTjxaviKr], a machine, a device, signifies one who works with machines. The artist ranks higher than the arti- san, the former requires intellectual re- , finement, the latter nothing but to know the common practice of art. The musician, painter, and sculptor are artists; the carpenter, the sign-painter, and the blacksmith are artisans. The artificer is an intermediate term be- tween the artist and the artisan; manu- facturers are artificers; and, in an ex- tended sense, any one who makes a thing by his contrivance is an artificer. The mechanic is that species of artisan who works at arts purely mechanical, in distinction from those which contribute to the completion and embeUishment of any objects; on this ground a shoe- maker is a mechanic, but a common painter is a simple artisan. ARTLESS. See Naive. AS. See Both. ASCEND. See Arise. ASCENDANCY. See Influence. ASCETIC, Austere, Rigid, Stern. Ascetic in French a^cetigue, from dffKHv, to work, exercise, appUed, hterally, to the practice of an art, hence to an athlete, and, by exten- sion, to the discipline practised by an athlete. In the schools of the stoics, the term that imphed this disciphne practised by the wrestlers was em- ployed to designate the practice of mastering the desires and passions or of severe virtue, and in this sense it passed into the language of the early Christians: on this basis the modem meaning of a person unduly rigid or aiistere was derived. Austere is derived from Latin au- sterus, harsh, sour, tart, from Greek avcrrnpoQ, making the tongue dry, harsh, bitter. It signifies a manner, a temperament, and does not so dis- tinctly imply the mastering of the physical appetites as does the word ascetic. Similarly stem, from Anglo- Saxon styme, of harsh mind, refers to a kind of temper. Austerity suggests both the habits of fife indicated in asceticism and the kind of nature sug- gested by sternness. A man may be stem and, at the same time, be the opposite of ascetic. Rigid, from Latin rigidus (whence rigorous is also derived ASK 75 by way of French), comes from the Latin rigere, to be stiff or straight. It refers both to the property of physical things and, figuratively, to a certain habit of mind or of life. Stem refers to a kind of emotional temperament; rigid suggests an intellectual habit, an unbending mind, whence certain char- acteristics of temper and habits of living might develop. ASCRIBE, Impute, Attribute. To ascribe signifies here generally to write or set down in one's own mind to a per- son (see Appropriate) — that is, to assign anything in one's estimate as the possession or the property of an- other, as to ascribe honor or power. To impute, from im or in and puto, think, is to form an estimate of a person; as to impute a thing to a per- son's folly. To attribute, from ad and tribuo, bestow, is to assign a thing as a cause; as to attribute the loss of a vessel to the violence of the storm. What is ascribed and imputed is most- ly of a personal nature, either to honor or dishonor; ascribe more frequently for the former, impute for the latter. In the doxology of the church ritual, all honor, might, majesty, dominion, and power are ascribed to the three per- sons in the Holy Trinity; men of right minds cannot bear the slightest im- putation on their honor, nor virtuous women the shghtest imputation on their chastity. Ascribe may, however, sometimes be employed in an unfavorable sense, and impute in a favorable sense. We may ascribe imperfection as well as perfec- tion, and impute good as weU as bad "motives. To ascribe may also denote to assign a cause, which brings it nearer in sense to attribute; but the former always re- fers to some characteristic of the f)er- son, and the latter, although apphed to personal qualities, conveys no personal reflection. To ascribe is alwavs to assign to some individual person; but to attribute may either refer to no persons, or to none individually. Milton ascribes the first useof artillery to the devil: the Letters of Junius have been ascribed succes- sively to many as the author; the death of many persons may be attributed to intemperance. ASEPTIC, Germless, Non-putre- fying. Aseptic, a comjjound of the Greek wrrjirToc (from a privative and trriTrriKoc, putrefying) and the Enghsh suffix ic, signifies that which is not liable to putrefaction, or that which is germless or free from septic matter, or any substance that produces or pro- motes putrefaction; in the substantive form, asepsis, the absence of toxinous or pathogenic bacteria which poison the blood. From the original Greek term we have septicaemia, an acute dis- ease resembling pyaemia in its general characteristics, supposed to be caused by the introduction into the blood of putrid matter from the surface of a wound or ulcer, the putrefaction now being known, through the antiseptic researches of Pasteur and Lister, to be a fermentative change due to the presence of certain micro-organisms in the blood. Antiseptic surgery is the operation of introducing antiseptic solutions into a wound whence the poisonous matter has been carried into the blood, or where the wound has not been prompt- ly treated by antisepsis, or the ex- clusion of microbes or bacteria from wounds and open sores, ASK, Beg, Request. Ask, in Anglo- Saxon ascian, is derived fr®m a Ger- manic root signifying to wish. Beg is derived, by a somewhat comphcated process, from a frequentative of bid, and meant to bid often, to ask again and again. Request, in Latin requisitus, participle of requiro, is compounded of re and quoerere, to seek or look after, with indications of desire to possess. The expression of a wish to some one to have something is the common idea comprehended in these terms. As this is the simple signification of ask, it is the generic term; the other two are spe- cific; we ask in begging and requesting, but not tdce versa. Asking is pecuhar to no rank or station* in consequence of our mutual dependence on each other, it is requisite for every man to ask something of another: the master asks of the servant, the servant asks of the master; the parent asks of the child, the child asks of the parent. Begging marks a degree of dependence which is pecuhar to inferiors in station; we ask for matters of indifference; we beg 76 ASK *hat which we think is of importance: A child asks a favor of his parent; a poor man begs the assistance of one who is able to afford it: that is asked for which is easily granted; that is begged which is with difficulty obtained. To a^k, therefore, requires no effort, but to beg is to ask with importunity: those who by merely asking find them- selves unable to obtain what they wish, will have recourse to begging. As ask sometimes imphes a demand, and beg a vehemence of desire or strong degree of necessity, politeness has adopted another phrase, which conveys neither the imperiousness of the one nor the urgency of the other; this is the word request. Asking carries with it an air of superiority; begging that of sub- mission; requesting has the air of in- dependence and equality. Asking bor- ders too nearly on an infringement of personal Uberty; begging imposes a constraint by making an appeal to the feelings; requests leave the hberty of granting or refusing unencumbered. It is the character of impertinent peo- ple to ask without considering the cir- cumstances and situation of the person asked; they seem ready to take with- out permission that which is asked, if it be not granted: selfish and greedy people beg with importunity, and in a tone that admits of no refusal; men of good breeding tender their requests with moderation and discretion; they request nothing but what they are cer- tain can be conveniently comphed with. Ask is altogether excluded from po- lite hfe, although beg is not. We may beg a person's acceptance of anything; we may beg him to favor or honor us with his company; but we can never talk of asking a person's acceptance, or asking him to do us an honor. Beg in such cases indicates a condescen- sion which is sometimes not unbecom- ing, but on ordinary occasions request is with more propriety substituted in its place. Ask, or Ask For, Claim, Demand. — Ask (see above) . Claim, in Old French daimer, Latin clamo, to cry after, sig- nifies to express an imperious wish for. Demand, in French demander, is de- rived from Old French de and mander, >to order from the hands of another (from manus, hand), and hence to ask for that which has been intrusted. Ask, in the sense of beg, is confined to the expression of wishes on the part of the asker, without involving any obli- gation on the part of the person asked; all granted in this case is voluntary, or comphed with as a favor; but ask for, in the sense here taken, is involuntary, and springs from the forms and dis- tinctions of society. Ask is here, as before, generic or specific; claim and demand are specific: in its specific sense it conveys a less peremptory sense than either claim or demand. To ask for denotes simply the expressed wish to have what is considered as due; to claim, is to assert a right or to make it known; to demand is to insist on having, without the Uberty of a re- fusal. Asking respects obligation in general, great or small; claim respects obhgations of importance. Asking for supposes a right not questionable; claim supposes a right hitherto unac- knowledged; demand supposes either a disputed right or the absence of all right, and the simple determination to have: a tradesman asks for what is owed to him as circumstances may re- quire; a person claims the property he has lost ; people are sometimes pleased to make demands the legaUty of which cannot be proved. What is lent must be asked for when it is wanted; what- ever has been lost and is found must be recovered by a claim; whatever a self- ish person wants he strives to obtain by a demand, whether just or unjust. Ask, Inquire, Question, Interrogate. — Ask (see above). Inquire, Latin in- quiro, compounded of in and qvxEro, signifies to search after. Question, in French questionner, signifies to put a question, from the Latin qucestio and qvxBTo, to seek or search, to look into. Interrogate, Latin interrogatu^, parti- ciple of interrogo, compounded of inter and rogo, signifies to ask. We perform all these actions in order to get information: but we ask for gen- eral purposes of convenience; we in- quire from motives of curiosity; we question and interrogate from motives of discretion. To ask respects simply one thing; to inquire resp)ect8 one or many subjects; to question and inlerrcH gate is to ask repeatedly, and in the ASSAILANT 77 fatter case more authoritatively than in the former. Indifferent people ask of each other whatever they wish to know: learners inquire the reasons of things which are new to them: masters question their servants, or parents their children, when they wish to ascertain the real state of any case: magistrates interrogate criminals when they are brought before them. It is very un- civil not to answer whatever is asked even by the meanest person: it is proper to satisfy every inquiry, so as to remove doubt: questions are some- times so impertinent that they cannot with propriety be answered: interroga- tions from unauthorized persons are Uttle better than insults. ASKEW. See Wry. ASPECT. See Appearance. ASPERITY, See Acrimony. ASPERSE, Detract, Defame, Slander, Calumniate. Asperse, in Latin aspersv^, participle of aspergere, to sprinkle, allied to English sprinkle, signifies in a moral sense to stain with spots. Detract, in Latin detractus, par- ticiple of detraho, compounded of de and traho, to draw from, signifies to take from another that which is his due, or which he desires to retain; particularly to take from the merit of an action. Defame, in Latin defamo, compounded of the privative de and fama, from root fari, to speak, meaning reputation — that which others say about us — signifies to deprive of repu- tation. Slander, Middle English sclan- dre, is a doublet of scandal (see Dis- credit), derived from Greek through Latin and French. Calumniate is de- rived from Latin calumnia, from caluere, to deceive. All these terms denote an effort made to injure the character or estimation by some representation. Asperse and de- tract mark an indirect representation; defame, slander, and calumniate, a posi- tive assertion. To asperse is to fix a moral stain on a character; to detract is to lessen its merits and excellences. Aspersions always imply something bad, real or supposed; detractions are always founded on some supposed good in the object that is detracted; to defame is openly to advance some serious charge against the character; to slan- der is to expose the faults of another in his absence; to ccUumniate is to com- municate secretly, or otherwise, false circumstances to the injury of another. If I speak slightingly of my neighbor, and insinuate anything against the purity of his principles or the rectitude of his conduct, I asperse him: if he be a charitable man, and I ascribe his charities to a selfish motive, or other- wise take away from the merit of his conduct, I am guilty of detraction; if I pubhsh anything openly that injures his reputation, I am a defamer; if I communicate to others the reports that are in circulation to his disadvan- tage, I am a slanderer; if I fabricate anything myself and spread it abroad, I am a calumniator. ASPHYXIA, Syncope, Suffoca- tion. Asphyxia, in French asphyxie, is from Latin asphyxia, Greek aaipvKia the latter a compoimd of d, without, and a(j)vKtQ, the pulse, signifies, liter- ally, a pulseless condition, the tempo- rary or permanent cessation of the motions or throbbings of the heart, as in hanging, drowning, and suffoca- tion, due to an interruption of the passage of the blood in the body which keeps it from its connection with the atmosphere by respiration, and so pre- vents a sufficiently free exchange of carbonic acid for oxygen. In its mild form we have syncope, from mry and KOTTTitv, to cut. This is a fainting brought on by a sudden fright, illness, or a more than ordinarily disturbing spectacle. In its most severe or fatal form it becomes suffocation, the effect of a stoppage of respiration. The usual treatment of asphyxia has recently been supplemented, with marked success, by the invention of the pulmotor, an apparatus designed to resuscitate victims of poisoning by gases and noxious fumes, electric shocks, suspended animation from any cause, drowning, attempted suicide, collapse in narcosis, and other mis- haps, by forcing oxygen into the lun^. Many of the large gas com- pames now keep pulmotors on hand to send out in cases of accidental or in- tentional asphjTciation by illuminating gas. ASPIRE. See Aim. ASSAIL. See Attack. ASSAILANT. See Aggressor. 78 ASSASSINATE ASSASSINATE. See Kill. ASSAULT. See Attack. ASSAY. See Test. ASSEMBLAGE. See Assembly. ASSEMBLE, Mustek, Collect. Assemble is derived through French from Low Latin assimulare, from ad, to, and ^mul, together, from a root which also appears in similar, sam£, etc. Muster comes from Latin mon- strari, to show, and means specifically a review of troops. Collect is derived from Latin con, together, and legere, to gather, from the root which also appears in college, colleague, etc. Assemble is said of persons only; miis- ter and collect of persons or things. To assemble is to bring together by a call or invitation; to muster is to bring to- gether by an act of authority, or a par- ticular effort, into one point of view at one time and from one quarter; to collect is to bring together at different times and from different quarters: the parliament is assembled; soldiers are mustered every day in order to as- certain their numbers; an army is collected in preparation for war; a king assembles his council in order to con- sult with them on public measures; a general musters his forces before he un- dertakes an expedition, and collects more troops if he finds himself too weak. Collect is used for everything which can be brought together in numbers; mtister is used figuratively for bringing together, for an immediate purpose, whatever is in one's possession: books, coins, curiosities, and the hke are col- lected; a person's resources, his strength, courage, resolution, etc., are mustered; some persons have a pleasure in collect- ing all the pieces of antiquity which faU in their way; on a trying occasion it is necessary to muster all the forti- tude of which we are master. Assemble, Convene, Convoke. — Assem- ble (see above). Convene, in Latin con- venio, signifies to come or bring to- gether. Convoke, in Latin convoco, signifies to call together. The idea of collecting many persons into one place, for a specific purpose, is common to all these terms. Assemble conveys this sense without any addi- tion; convene and convoke include Uke- wise some collateral idea: people are assembled, therefore, whenever they are convened or convoked, but not vice versa. Assembling is mostly by the wish of one; convening by that of sev- eral: a crowd is assembled by an in- dividual in the streets; a meeting is convened at the desire of a certain num- ber of persons: people are assembled either on public or private business; they are always convened on a pubhc occasion. A king assembles his parha- ment; a particular individual assem- bles his friends; the inhabitants of a district are convened. There is nothing imperative on the part of those that assemble or convene, and nothing bind- ing on those assembled or convened; one assembles or convenes by invitation or request; one attends to the notice or not, at pleasure. Convoke, on the other hand, is an act of authority; it is the call of one who has the authority to give the call; it is heeded by those who feel themselves bound to attend. Assembly, Assemblage, Group, Col- lection.— Assembly, assernblage, are col- lective terms derived from the verb as- semble. Group comes through French from Italian groppo, which among painters signifies an assemblage of fig- ures in one place. Collection expresses the act of collecting, or the body collected. Assembly respects persons only; as- semblage, things only; group and col- lection, persons or things: an assembly is any number either brought together or coming together of themselves; an assemblage is any number of things standing together; a group is come together by accident or put together by design; a collection is mostly put or brought together by design. A gen- eral alarm will cause an assembly to disperse; an agreeable assemblage of rural objects, whether in nature or in representation, constitutes a landscape: a painting will sometimes consist only of a group of figures; but if they be well chosen it wiU sometimes produce a wonderful effect: a collection of evil- minded persons ought to be immedi- ately dispersed by the authority of the magistrate. In a large assembly you may sometimes observe a singular as- semblage of characters, countenances, and figures: when people come to- gether in great numbers on any occa- sion, they will often form themselves ASSENT 79 into distinct groups; the collection of scarce books and curious editions has become a passion, which is ridiculed under the title of BibUomania. Assembly, Company, Meeting, Con- gregation, Parliament, Diet, Congress, Convention, Synod, Convocation, Coun- cil.— An assembly (see Assembly) is simply the assernbling together of any number of persons: this idea is com- mon to all the rest of these terms, which differ in the object, mode, and other collateral circumstances of the action. Company, a body hnked to- gether (see Accompany), is an assembly for purposes of amusement. Meeting, z body met together, is an assembly for general pm-poses of business. Con- gregation, a body flocked or gathered to- gether, from the Latin grex, a flock, is an assembly brought together from con- geniaUty of sentiment and community of purpose. Parliament is derived through French parler, and a sufBx from Latin parabola, Greek irapa^oXri, a speech in which two things are compared. (Compare parable.) Diet, from Greek Siatra, a mode of life, has the same etymology as the word diet applied to the mode of life in re- spect to food. The pecuhar sense in which it is here used is due to a con- fusion of it in the popular mind with the Latin dies, day, especially a day set apart for pubUc business; and so it came to mean an assembly which conducted public business. Congress, from the Latin congredior, to march in a body, is an assembly coming to- gether in a formal manner from distant parts for special purposes. Convention, from the Latin convenio, come together, is an assembly coming together in an in- formal and promiscuous manner from a neighboring quarter. Synod, in Greek 0VV060C, compounded of miv and 066c, signifies Uterally going the same road, and has been employed to signify an assernbly for consultation on matters of religion. Convocation is an assembly convoked for an especial purpose. Coun- cil is an assembly for consultation either on civil or on ecclesiastical affairs. An assembly is, in its restricted sense, pubUc, and imder certain regulations; a company is private, and confined to friends and acquaintances; a meeting is either public or private; a congrega- tion is always public. Meetings are held by all who have any common concern to arrange; congregations consist of those who piu^ue the same objects particularly in matters of religion, al- though extended in its application to other matters: all these different kinds of assemblies are formed by individuals in their private capacity; the other terms designate assemblies that come to- gether for national purposes, with the exception of the word convention, which may be either domestic or poUtical. A parliament and diet are popular assem- blies under a monarchical form of government; congress and convention are assemblies under a repubhcan gov- ernment : of the first description is the parliament of England, the diets of Prussia and Finland assembled by the reigning prince to deUberate on the affairs of the nation. Of the latter description is the congress of the IJnited States of America and the national convention of France; but there is this difference observable between a con- gress and a convention, that the former consists of deputies or delegates from higher authorities — that is, from inde- pendent governments already estab- Ushed; but a convention is a self-con- stituted assembly, which has no power but what it assumes to itself. A synod ar.d convocation are in rehgious matters what a diet and convention are in civil matters: the former exists only under an episcopal form of government;, the latter may exist imder any form of church disciphne, even where the, au- thority lies in the whole body of the ministry. A council is more impor- tant than all other species of assembly; it consists of persons invested with the highest authority, who, in their con- sultations, do not so much transact ordinary concerns as arrange the forms and fashions of things. Religious councils used to determine matters of faith and disciphne; poUtical councils frame laws and determine the fate of empires. ASSENT, Consent, Approbation, Concurrence. Assent, in Latin as- sentio, is compounded of as or ad and sentio, to think, signifying to bring one's mind or judgment to a thing. Consent (see Accede). Approbation, in Latin approbatio, is compounded of ad 80 ASSERT and probo, to prove, signifying to make a thing out good. Concurrence (see Agree). Assent respects matters of judgment; consent respects matters of conduct. We assent to what we admit to be true; we consent to what we allow to be done. Assent may be given to anything, whether positively proposed by another or not, but consent supposes that what is consented to is proposed by some other person. Some men give their hasty assent to propositions which they do not f uUy understand, and their hasty consent to measures which are very injudicious. It is the part of the true believer not merely to assent to the Christian doctrines, but to make them the rule of his life: those who consent to a bad action are partakers in the gmlt of it. Assent and consent may sometimes be both applied to matters of judgment or abstract propositions, but in that case assent is the act of an individual, con- sent is the act of many individuals: one assents to that which is offered to his notice; some things are admitted by the common consent of mankind. Approbation is a species of assent, concurrence of consent. To approve is not merely to assent to a thing as right, but to determine upon it posi- tively to be so; the word assent is ap>- plied therefore most properly to specu- lative matters, or matters of inference or deduction; approbation to practical matters or matters of conduct, as to give one's assent to a proposition in EucUd, to express one's approbation of a particular measure. Concurrence is properly the consent of many: consent may pass between two individuals, namely, the party proposing and the party to whom the thing is proposed; but concurrence is always given by numbers: consent may be given by a party who has no per- sonal interest in the thing consented to; concurrence is given by those who have a common interest in the thing pro- posed : consent therefore passes between persons individually, concurrence be- tween communities or between men collectively. Assent is given by equals or inferiors; it is opposed to contradiction or denial: consent is given by superiors, or those who have the power of preventing; it is opposed to refusal: approbation is given by equals or superiors, or those who have the power to withhold it; it is opposed to disapprobation: con- currence is given by equals; it is op- posed to opposition or rejection. ASSERT, Maintain, Vindicate. Assert (see Affirm). Maintain, in French maintenir, from the Latin manVrS and teneo, signifies to hold by the hand — that is, closely and firmly. Vindicate, in Latin vindicatv^, parti- ciple of vindico (vin, a root signifying to wish, to claim, allied to venerate, Venus, etc., and dicere), signifies to express a wish or claim for ourselves or others. To CLssert is to declare a thing as our own; to maintain is to abide by what we have so declared; to vindicate is to stand up for that which concerns our- selves or others. We assert anything to be true; we maintain it by adducing proofs, facts, or arguments; we vindi- cate our own conduct or that of an- other when it is called in question. We assert boldly or impudently; we maintain steadily or obstinately; we vindicate resolutely or insolently. A right or claim is asserted which is avowed to belong to any one; it is maintained when attempts are made to prove its justice or regain its pos- session; the cause of the asserter or maintainer is vindicated by another. Innocence is asserted by a positive declaration; it is maintained by re- peated assertions and the support of testimony; it is vindicated through the interference of another. The most guilty persons do not hesitate to assert their innocence with the hope of in- spiring credit; and some will persist in maintaining it even after their guilt has been pronounced; but the really innocent man wiU never want a friend to vindicate him when his honor or his reputation is at stake. Assertions which are made hastily and incon- siderately are seldom long maintained without exposing a person to ridicule; those who attempt to vindicate a bad cause expose themselves to as much reproach as if the cause were their own. ASSESSMENT. See Tax. ASSEVERATE. See Affirm. ASSIDUOUS. See Active. ASSOCIATE 81 ASSIGN. See Adduce; Distrib- ute. ASSIGNEE, Administrator. As- signee, in French assigne, from the Latin assigno (ad, to, and signum, seal), signifies one to whom something is formally given over, either in trust or for his own use and enjoyment. An assignee in deed is one appointed by a person; an assignee in law is one ap- pointed by a court or other competent authority; an assignee in hankrwptcy is one to whom a bankrupt's estate is assigned and in whom it is vested for the benefit of his creditors. The last is the most familiar apph- cation of the term. In his capacity as an administrator of another per- son's property (from Latin ad and min- istrare, to serve, administer signifying pubhc service appUed in this case to a specific function) an assignee, after ac- cepting the trust, is not at hberty to assign the property back again to the assignor. It is his duty to act as a faithful trustee for all concerned. He is to take immediate possession of all the property and effects and valuable interests of every kind of the insolvent, and demand and take any necessary ^teps to collect all outstanding debts. If he sells property of the insolvent he cannot buy it himself. Acting in the discharge of the ordinary duties of an Administrator, an assignee is person- ally hable only for want of ordinary skUl and care. See administer imder Minister for further definition of the function of administrator in general. ASSIMILABLE, Absorb able. Con- formable, Convertible. Assimila- ble, in French the same form, from assimilate, derived from ad and similis, to make hke, signifies that which is capable of being made like another thing, or changeid into its own sub- stance. As an adjective^ it implies that which may be made in some par- ticulars to resemble another thing; and as a substantive, that which is capable of being so changed. In the sense of mixing together, or merging, either of persons or sub- stances, we have the main act of bringing some one or some thing into conformity or agreement with other persons or things, of converting, changing, or incorporating some one or some thing with others . A subst ance may be readily absorbable (from ab and sorbere, to sup up, Greek po<(>Uiv) by an- other when the first will De so conform- able to the second that both become one substance, and each of the two sepa- rately is convertible into a single sub- stance as if individually homogeneous. Persons of hke temperament and taste are assimilable in association with others of like quahties; citizens are made conformable to the law by penal- ties for being otherwise; sound securi- ties are readily convertible into cash when desired; certain kinds of food and drink are assimilable, or capable of being united or mixed in the stomach without causing distress. Hence, in all of these terms we have the sense of a complete and agreeable union of separate things in a single body, because each constituent in it- self possesses the quahties of the others. ASSIST. See Help. ASSISTANT. See Accommodator; Coadjutor. ASSISTING. See Auxiliary. ASSOCIATE, Companion. Asso- ciate, in Latin assodatus, participle of associo, is derived from ad and socius, a companion, hterally a follower (aUied to sequor, I follow). Companion, from company (for derivation see Accom- pany), signifies one that bears com- pany. Associates are habitually together: companions are only occasionally in company. As our habits are formed from our associates, we ought to be particular in our choice of them: as our companions contribute much to our enjoyments, we ought to choose such as are suitable to ourselves. Many men may be admitted as com- panions who would not altogether be fit as associates. An associate may take part with us in some business, and share with us in the labor: a companion takes part with ua in some concern, and shares with us in the pleasure or the pain. Association, Society, Company, Part- nership.— All these terms denote a, union of several persons into one body. Association is general, the rest are specific. Whenever we habitually or frequently meet together for some com- mon object, it is an association. Asso- 82 ASSUAGE dations are therefore political, religious, commercial, and literary. A society is an association for some specific pur- pose, moral or religious, civil or politi- cal. A company is an association of many for the purpose of trade. A -partnership is an association of a few for the same object . Whenever association is used in dis- tinction from the others, it denotes that which is partial in its object and temporary in its duration. It is found- ed on imity of sentiment as well as imity of object; but it is mostly un- organized, and kept together only by the spirit which gives rise to it. A society requires nothing but unity of object which is permanent in its nat- ure; it is well organized, and com- monly set on foot to promote the cause of humanity, literature, or re- ligion. No coimtry can boast such numerous and excellent societies, wheth- er of a charitable, a rehgious, or a ht- erary description, as England. Com- panies are brought together for the piupose of interest, and are dissolved when that object ceases to exist: their duration depends on the contingencies oU profit and loss. The South Sea Company, which was foimded on an idle speculation, was formed for the ruin of many, and dispersed almost as soon as it was formed. Partnerships are altogether of an individual and private natiu-e. As they are without organization and system, they are more precarious than any other asso- ciation. Their duration depends not only on the chances of trade, but the compatibihty of individuals to co- operate in a close point of union. They are often begim rashly and end ruinously. Association, Combination. — Associa- tion (see the preceding). Combination, from the Latin combino, or con and binus, signifies tying two into one. An association is something less binding than a combination; associa- tions are formed for purposes of con- venience; combinations are formed to serve either the interests or passions of men. The word association is there- fore always taken in a good or an in- different sense; combination in an in- different or baa sense. An association is pubhc; it embraces all classes of men: a combination is often private,, and includes only a particular descrip- tion of persons. Associations are formed for some general purpose; combina- tions are frequently formed for par- ticular purposes which respect the in- terest of the few to the injury of many. Associations are formed by good citizens; combinations by dis- contented mechanics, or low persons in general. When used for things, association is a natm-al action; combination an arbi- trary action. Things associate of them- selves, but combinations are formed either by design or accident. Nothing will associate but what harmonizes; things the most opposite in their natiu-e may be combined together. We associate persons with places, or events with names; discordant properties are combined in the same body. With the name of one's birthplace are associated pleasurable recollections; virtue and vice are so combined in the same char- acter as to form a contrast. The association of ideas is a remarkable phenomenon of the human mind, but it can never be admitted as solving any difficulty respecting the structure and composition of the soul; the combina- tion of letters forms syllables, and that of syllables forms words. ASSUAGE. See Allay. ASSUME. See Affect; Appro- priate. ASSUMPTION, Presumption, Ar- rogance. Assumption, the act of as- suming (see Appropriate) . Presump- tion, from presume, in Latin prcesumo, from prce, before, and sumo, to take, signifies to take beforehand, to take for granted. Arrogance (see Appro- priate). Assumption is a person's taking upon himself to act a part which does not belong to him. Presumption is the taking a place which does not belong to him. Assumption has to do with one's general conduct; presumption re- lates to matters of right and prece- dence. A person may be guilty of assumption by giving commands when he ought to receive them, or by speak- ing when he ought to be silent: he is giulty of presumption in taking a seat which is not fit for him. Assumption arises from self-conceit and self-suf- ASTRONOMY 83 ficiency, -presumption from self-im- portance. Assumption and presump- tion both denote a taking to one's self merely, arrogance claiming from others. A person is guilty of assumption and presumption for his own gratification only, without any direct intentional offence to others; but a man cannot be arrogant, be guilty of arrogance, without direct offence to others. The arrogant man exacts deference and homage from others; his demands are as extravagant as his mode of making them is offensive. Children are apt to be assuming, low people to be pre- suming; persons among the higher orders, inflated with pride and Dad passions, are apt to be arrogant. ASSURANCE, Confidence. As- surance implies either the act of mak- ing another sure (see Affirm), or of being sure one's self. Confidence im- pUes simply the act of the mind in confiding, which is equivalent to a feeling. Assurance, as an action, is to con- fidence as the means to the end. We give a person an assurance in order to inspire him with confidence. Assur- ance and confidence, as a sentiment in ourselves, may respect either that which is external of us, or that which belongs to ourselves; in the first case they are both taken in an indifferent sense: but the feeling of assurance is much stronger than that of confidence, and apphes to objects that interest the feehngs; whereas confidence ap- plies only to such objects as exercise the understanding: thus we have an assurance of a hfe to come; an assur- ance of a blessed immortality: we have a confidence in a person's integrity. As respects ourselves exclusively, as- surance is employed to designate either an occasional feeling or a habit of the mind; confidence, an occasional feeling mostly; assurance, therefore, in this sense, may be used indifferently, but in general it has a bad acceptation: confidence has an indifferent or a good sense. Assurance is a self-possession of the mind, arising from the conviction that all in ourselves is right; confidence is that self-possession only in particular cases, and grounded on the reliance we have in our abilities or our char- acter. The man of assurance never loses himself imder any circumstances, however trying; he is calm and easy when another is abashed and con- founded: the man who has confidence will generally have it in cases that war- rant him to trust to himself. A har utters falsehoods with an air of assur- ance, in order the more effectually to gain behef ; conscious innocence enables a person to speak with confidence when interrogated. Assurance shows itself in the behavior, confidence in the con- duct. Young people are apt to assert everything with a tone of assurance; no man should imdertake anything without a confidence in himself. Assurance, Impudence. — Assurance (see above). Impudence hterally im- plies shamelessness, from in, a negative prefix, and pudere, to feel shame. They are so closely allied, to each other that assurance is distinguished from impudence more in the manner than the spirit; for impudence has a gross- ness attached to it which does not be- long to assurance. Vulgar people are impudent, because they have assurance to break through all the forms of so- ciety; but those who are more culti- vated wiU have their assurance con- trolled by its decencies and refine- ments. ASSURE. See Affirm. ASTERN. See Abaft. ASTONISH. See Wonder. ASTRONOMY, Astrology. As- tronomy is compounded of the Greek dffrpov, cognate with English star, and voftog, law, and signifies the laws of the stars, or a knowledge of their laws. Astrology, from aSrpov and y6\os, sig- nifies a reasoning on the stars. The astronomer studies the course and movement of the stars; the as- trologer reasons on their influence. The former observes the state of the heav- ens, marks the order of time, the eclipses, and the revolutions which arise out of the established laws of motion in the immense universe: the latter predicts events, draws horoscopes, and announces all the vicissitudes of rain and snow, heat and cold, etc. The astronomer calculates and seldom errs, as his calculations are built on fixed rules and actual observations; the astrologer deals in conjectures, and his 84 ASYLUM imagination often deceives him. The astronomer explains what he knows, and merits the esteem of the learned; the astrologer hazards what he thinks, and seeks to please. ASYLUM, Refuge, Shelter, Re- treat. Asylum, in Latin asylum, in Greek detulance of pride and self-conceit, that stills the noise and giddy mirth of the young, and com- municates to all around a sobriety of mien and aspect. A grievous offender is seldom without dread; his guilty con- science pictures everything as the in- strument of vengeance, and every p>er- son as pronouncing his merited sen- tence. The solemn stillness of the tomb will inspire awe, even in the breast of him who has no dread of death. Children should be early taught to have a certain degree of reverence for the Bible as a book, in distinction from all other books. AWKWARD, Clumsy. Awkward is composed of an English suffix ward, added to a Scandinavian word, and originally signified transversely or "in a backhanded manner." Clumsy' comes through Middle English clumsed, be- numbed, from the Scandinavian — clumsy being therefore the manner or action characteristic of benumbed hands. These epithets denote what is con- trary to rule and order, in form or man- ner. Awkward respects outward de- portment; clumsy tne shape and make of the object: a person has an awkward gait, is clumsy in his whole person. Awkwardness is the consequence of bad education; clumsiness is mostly a natu- 7 ral defect. Young recruits are awkward in marching and clumsy in their manual exercise. They may be both employed figura- tively m the same sense, and sometimes in relation to the same objects: when speaking of awkward contrivances, or dumsy contrivances, the latter ex- presses the idea more strongly than the former. Awkward, Cross, UrUovoard, Crooked, Froward, Perverse. — Awkward (see above). Cross, from the noun cross, implies the quahty of being transverse, hence contrary, like the arms of a cross. Untoward signifies the reverse of toward. Crooked signifies the qual- ity of resembling a crook, a Scandina- vian word meaning hook, angle, etc. Froward is composed of an EngUsh suffix added to a Scandinavian word — fro for English from — and means in the contrary direction. Perverse, Latin perversus, participle of perverto, com- poimded of per and verto, signifies turned aside. Awkward, cross, untoward, and crooked are used as epithets in relation to the events of life or the disposition of the mind; froward and perverse respect only the disposition of the mind. Awkward circumstances are apt to embarrass; cross circumstances to pain; crooked and untoward circum- stances to defeat. What is crooked springs from a perverted judgment; what is untoward is independent oi human control. In our intercourse with the world there are always httle awkward incidents arising which a per- son's good sense and good nature will enable him to pass over without dis- turbing the hannony of society. It is the lot of every one in his passage through life to meet with cross acci- dents that are calculated to ruffle the temper, but he proves himself to be the wisest whose serenity is not so easily disturbed. A crooked pohcy ob- structs the prosperity of individuals, as well as of states. Many men are des- tined to meet with severe trials in the frustration of their dearest hopes, by numberless untoward events wmch call forth" the exercise of patience; in this case the Christian can prove to himself and others the infinite value of his faith and doctrine. 98 AWRY When used with regard to the dis- f)osition of the mind, awkward expresses ess thsiD.fr award, and froward less than perverse. Awkwardness is an habitual frailty of temper; it includes certain weaknesses and particularities, per- tinaciously adhered to: crossness is a partial irritation resulting from the state of the humors, physical and men- tal. Frowardness and perversity lie in the will : ixfroward temper is capricious ; it wills or wills not to please itself with- out regard to others. Perversity hes deeE>er; taking root in the heart, it as- sumes the shape of mahgnity; a per- verse temper is really wicked; it likes or dislikes by the rule of contradiction to another's will. Untowardness hes in the principles; it rtins counter to the wishes and counsels of another. An awkward temper is connected with self- suflBciency; it shelters itself imder the sanction of what is apparently reason- able; it requires management and in- dulgence in dealing with it. Crossness and frowardness are pecuhar to children; indiscriminate indulgence of the rising will engenders those diseases of the mind which, if fostered too long in the breast, become incorrigible by any- thing but a powerful sense of rehgion. Perversity is, however, but too com- monly the result of a vicious habit, which embitters the happiness of all who have the misfortune of coming in coUision with it. Untowardness is also another fruit of these evil tem- pers. A froward child becomes an un- toward youth, who turns a deaf ear to all the admonitions of an afflicted parent. AWRY. See Bent. AXIOM, Maxim, Aphorism, Apoph- thegm (old form; modern Apothegm), Saying, Adage, Proverb, Byword, Saw. Axiom, in French axiome, Latin axioma, comes from the Greek a^twTra, worth, signifying the thing valued. Maxim, in French maxima, in Latin maxima for maxima sentiarum, the most important opinion. Aphorism, from Greek ddtyna, from diro, from, and (pGiyyeaOai, to utter, to speak pointedly, signifies a pointed saying. Saying signifies hterally what is said — that is, said habitually. Adage, in Latin adagium, comes from Latin ad, to, to the point, and a stem signifying to say. Proverb, in French proverbe, Latin proverbium, compounded of pro, pubhcly, and verbum, a saying, signifies a common saying. Byword signifies a word by-the-by, or by-the-way, in the course of conversation. Saw comes from Anglo-Saxon sagu, a saying, from the verb to say in its older form.j A given sentiment conveyed in a spe- cific sentence, or form of expression, ia the common idea included in the signifi- cation of these terms. The axiom is a truth of the first value; a self-evident proposition which is the basis of other truths. A maxim is a truth of the first moral importance for all practical pur- poses. An aphorism is a truth set apart for its pointedness and excellence. Apothegm is, in respect to the an- cients, what saying is in regard to the moderns; it is a pointed sentiment pro- nounced by an individual and adopted by others. Adage and proverb are vul- gar sayings, the former among the an- cients, the latter among the moderns. The byword is a casual saying originat- ing in some local circumstance. The saw, which is a barbarous corruption of saying, is the saying formerly current among the ignorant. Axioms are in science what maxims are in morals; self-evidence is an es- sential characteristic in both; the axiom presents itself in so simple and unde- niable a form to the xmderstanding as to exclude doubt and the necessity for reasoning. The maxim, though not so definite in its expression as the axiom, is at the same time equally parallel to the mind of man, and of such general ap>- pUcation that it is acknowledged by all moral agents who are susceptible of moral truth; it comes home to the common sense of all mankind. " Things that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other" — "Two bodies caimot occupy the same space at the same time," are axioms in mathe- matics and metaphysics. "Virtue is the true source of happiness" — "The happiness of man is the end of civil government," are axioms in ethics and pohtics. "To err is human, to forgive divine" — "When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we leave them," are among the number of maxims. Be- AYE tween axioms and maxims there is this obvious difference to be observed: that the former are unchangeable both in matter and manner and admit of httle or no increase in number; but the latter may vary with the circumstances of human Ufe, and admit of considerable extension. An aphorism is a speculative principle either in science or morals, which is pre- sented in a few words to the imderstand- ing; it is the substance of a doctrine, and many aphorisms niay contain the abstract of a science. Of this descrip- tion are the aphorisTns of Hippocrates, and those of Lavater in physiognomy. Sayings and apothegms differ from the preceding, inasmuch as they always carry the mind back to the person spesddng; there is always one who says when there is a saying or an apothegm, and both acquire a value as much from the person who utters them as from the thing that is uttered: when Leonidas was asked why brave men prefer honor to life, his answer became an apothegm; namely, that " they hold life by fortune, and honor by virtue": of this descrip- tion are the apothegms comprised by Plutarch, the sayings of Franklin's Poor Richard, or those of Dr. Johnson: they are happy effusions of the mind which men are fond of treasuring. The adage and proverb are habitual as well as general sayings, not repeated as the sayings of one, but of all; not adopt- ed for the sake of the person, but for the sake of the thing; and they have been used in all ages for the purpose of con- veying the sense of mankind on ordi- nary subjects. The adage of former times is the proverb of the present time: if there be any difference between them, it hes in this, that the former are the fruit of knowledge and long experience, the latter of vulgar observations; the adage is therefore more refined than the proverb. Adversity is our best teacher, according to the Greek adage, "What hiu-ts us instructs us." "Old birds are not to be caught with chaff" is a vulgar proverb. Bywords rarely contain any impor- tant sentiment; they mostly consist of famihar similes, nicknames, and the like, as the Cambridge, byword of "Hobson's choice," signifying that or none: the name of Nazarene was a byword among the Jews for a Christian. A saw is vulgar in form and vulgar in matter: it is the partial saying of particular neighborhoods, originating in ignorance and superstition: of this description are the sayings which attrib- ute particular properties to animals or to plants, termed old women's sayings. AYE, Ay. Aye and ay are words frequently confused — so often confused, indeed, that the distinction between them is not clearlv maintained even in good writing; but the distinction exists. Aye, pronounced like /, seems to have been originally a different form from ay; it means yes, and is still used in poetry and in old-fashioned and humble colloquial speech, for yes — as well as in the parliamentary pro- cedure of voting. Ay, which rhymes with day, gay, etc., from a Teutonic root meaning age, eternity, means ever, always, and continually. It should not be spelled or pronounced hke aye. 100 BABBLE B BABBLE, Chatter, Chat, Prattle, Prate. Babble is allied to German bappeln, Dutch babbelen, French babiller, etc. The suffix le is frequentative, and the verb means to keep on saying ba, ha, syllables imitative of a child trying to talk. Chatter and chM are imitative words. Prate, aUied to Dutch prat, talk. Low German praten, etc., is pos- sibly an imitative word. Prattle is the frequentative of prate and means to keep on prating. All these terms mark a superfluous or improper use of speech : babble and chat- ter are onomatopceias drawn from the noise or action of speaking; babbling de- notes rapidity of speech, which renders it uninteUigible; hence the term is ap- plied to all who make use of many words to no purpose: chatter is an imitation of the noise of speech properly applied to magpies or parrots, and figuratively to a corresponding vicious mode of speech in human beings. The vice of babbling is most commonly attached to men, that of chattering to women : the babbler talks much to impress others with his self- importance; the chatterer is actuated by self-conceit and a desire to display her volubility: the former cares not whether he is understood; the latter cares not if she be but heard. CAoiitn^ is both harm- less and respectable; the winter's fire- side invites neighbors to assemble and chat away many an hour which might otherwise hang heavy on hand, or be spent less inoffensively; chatting is the practice of adults; prattling and prating that of children, the one innocently, the other impertinently; the prattling of babes has an interest for every feeling mind, but for parents it is one of their highest enjoyments; prating, on the contrary, is the consequence of igno- rance and childish assumption: a, prattler has all the unaffected gayety of an un- contaminated mind; a prater is for- ward, obtrusive, and ridiculous. BACCALAUREATE, Bachelor. Baccalaureate is a term of uncertain derivation. Baccalaureate and bachelor are derived from the same Latin word, baccalaureus, the one directly, the other through the medium of French. Bacca- laureus meant "cowherd," from bacca, cow; thence it became the term ap- phed to any young man. Bachelor in the Middle Ages signified a yoxmg knight, one not old enough to display his own banner, and still fighting under the standard of another. In modern times it has been specialized to mean, on the one hand, an unmarried man, on the other, the recipient of the first degree at a university — the degree of Bachelor of Arts. The term bacca- laureate has been similarly speciahzed to refer to the type of academic initia- tion into mature life that corresponds in modern times to the military initia- tion of the young bachelor at arms. Baccalaureate refers to the ceremony of receiving the bachelor's degree, and, in America, it refers especially to the fare- well sermon preached to students on the Sunday preceding their graduation, which is called the baccalaureate ser- mon. BACK, Backward, Behind. Back and backward are used only as adverbs: behind, either as an adverb or a prepo- sition— ^to go back or backward, to go behind, or behind the wall. Back de- notes the situation of being and the direction of going; backward simply the manner of going; a person stands back who does not wish to be in the way; he goes backward when he does not wish to turn his back to an object. Back marks simply the situation of a place, behind the situation of one object with regard to another: a person stands back who stands in the hack part of any place; he stands behind who has any one in front of him : the back is opposed to the front, behind, to before. See also Aback; Aft; Averse. BACKSLIDER. See Recreant. BAD, Wicked, Evil. Bad is formed from Anglo-Saxon boeddel, a hermaph- rodite, an effeminate man, hence a worthless fellow — thence had, worth- less. Wicked, Anglo-Saxon wikke, evil, i is derived from the substantive wikke, BAFFLE 101 a witch. Wicked means bewitched, possessed of an evil spirit. Bad re- spects moral and physical qualities in general; wicked, only moral quahties. EvU, Anglo-Saxon ^el, comes from a widely distributed Germanic root, the ultimate origin of which is unknown. Evil, in its full extent, comprehends both badness and wickedness. Whatever offends the taste and senti- ments of a rational being is bad; food is bad when it disagrees with the constitu- tion; the air is bad which has anything in it disagreeable to the senses or hurt- ful to the body; books are bad which only inflame the imagination or the passions. Whatever is wicked offends the moral principles of a rational agent : any violation of the law is wicked, as law is the support of human society; an act of injustice or cruelty is wiched, as it opposes the will of God and the feel- ings of humanity. EvU is either moral or natural, and may be appUed to every object that is contrary to good; but the term is employed only for that which is in the highest degree bad or wicked. When used in relation to persons, both refer to the morals, but bad is more general than wicked; a bad man is one who is generally wanting in the per- formance of his duty; a wicked man is one who is chargeable with actual vio- lations of the law, human or divine; such a one has an evil mind. A bad character is the consequence of im- moral conduct; but no man has the character of being wicked who has not been guilty of some known and fla- grant vices: the inclinations of the best are evil at certain times. BADGE. See Mark. BADLY, III. Badly means in the manner of bad (see above). lU is a Scandinavian word, not a contraction of the word which appears in Anglo- Saxon as yfel, in Modern Enghsh as evil. These terms are both employed to modify the actions or quahties of things, but badly is always annexed to the ac- tion, and iU to the quahty: as to do anything badly, the thing is badly done, an iZZ-judged scheme, an iZZ-contrivea measure, an iW-disposed person. BAFFLE, Defeat, Disconcert, Confound. Baffle is a Scotch word of doubtful origin meaning originally to disgrace or vilify. Compare French beffl^r, and Middle High German beffen, to scold. It may be of imitative origin, Uke the slang biff, meaning to slap. Defeat, in French defait, participle of defaire, is derived from dis, apart, and facere, to do, and signifies to imdo. Disconcert is compounded of the priva- tive dis and concert, signifying to throw out of concert or harmony, to put into disorder. Confound, in French corif fondre, is compounded of con and fundere, to pour, and signifies to melt or mix together in general disorder. When apphed to the derangement of the mind or rational faculties, baffle and defeat respect the powers of argiunent; disconcert and confound, the thoughts and feehngs: baffle expresses less than defeat; disconcert less than confound; a person is baffled in argument who is for the time discomposed and silenced by the superior address of his opponent; he is defeated in argument if his opp)0- nent has altogether the advantage of him in strength of reasoning and just- ness of sentiment: a person is discon- certed who loses his presence of mind for a moment, or has his feelings any way discomposed; he is confounded when the powers of thought and consciousness become torpid or vanish. A superior command of language or a particular degree of effrontery will frequently enable a person to baffle one who is advocating the cause of truth: igno- rance of the subject, or a want of ability, may occasion a man to be defeated by his adversary, even when he is supporting a good cause: assurance is requisite to prevent any one from being disconcerted who is suddenly detected in any dis- graceful proceedings: hardened effron- tery sometimes keeps the daring viUain from being confounded by any events, however awful. When appUed to the derangement of plans, baffle expresses less than defeat, defeat less than confound, and disconcert less than all. Obstinacy, perseverance, skill, or art baffles; superior force de- feats; awkward circumstances discon^ cert; the visitation of Grod confounds. When wicked men strive to obtain their ends, it is a happy thing if their adver» saries have sufficient skiU and address to baffle all their arts, and sufficient power to defeat all their projects; but 102 BALANCE sometimes when our best endeavors fail in our own behalf, the devices of men are confounded by the interposi- tion of Heaven. It frequently happens, even in the common transactions of life, that the best schemes are disconcerted by the trivial casualties of wind and weather. The obstinacy of a disorder may baffle the skill of the physician; the imprudence of the patient may defeat the object of his prescriptions; the unexpected arrival of a superior may disconcert the imauthorized plan of those who are subordinate; the miraculous destruction of his army confounded the project of the king of Assyria. BALANCE. See Counterpoise; BALDERDASH. See Twaddle. BALL. See Globe. BALLCXDN. See Aircraft. BALLOONIST. See Aeronaut. BAN, Curse, Denounce, Forbid, Prohibit. These terms represent various types and degrees of social and spiritual ostracism. Ban, in An- glo-Saxon bannan, is a Germanic word which has entered most of the Romance languages and appears in the word abandon, derived in English from a French phrase. In ancient German law a ban was a sentence of outlawry pronounced against one who had es- caped from justice or refused to sub- mit to trial; the ban of the empire was a penalty imposed on refractory princes and even on cities, in Ger- many. Ban implies a formal forbid- ding or prohibiting. To curse, An- glo-Saxon cursian, is to attempt to cut souls off from all sources of spiritual life and health. It is a spiritual ban, as it were, and corre- sponds in the world of the spirit to the poUtical outlawry suggested by the word ban. Denounce, from Latin de, fully, and nuntiare, to make a formal statement, suggests a public criticism or accusation which might lead to a ban, but which, in itself, does not imply that the person de- nounced is forbidden to enjoy any of his natural rights or prohibited from doing what he pleases. Forbidden, Anglo-Saxon forbeodan, from for, a privative prefix, and beodan, to bid, means to bid a person not to do some- thing. It does not imply formal and public action, as does the word ban. Prohibit, from Latin prohibere, pro and habere, means to keep another from doing something, and implies an ex- ertion of some force besides the purely verbal one exjjended in forbid- ding. It does not imply formal and public action. i. BAND, Company, Crew, Gang. Crew, is from crue, a shortened form of accrue, a reinforcement, from Old French accroistre, to increase, from Latin accrescere. Gang, from Anglo- Saxon gangen, to go, signifies a group of individuals who go together. All these terms denote a small asso- ciation for a particular object: a band is an association where men are boimd together by some strong obligation, whether taken in a good or bad sense, as a band of soldiers, a band of robbers. A company marks an association for convenience, without any particular obligation, as a company of travellers, a company of stroUing players. Crew marks an association collected together by some external power, or by coin- cidence of plan and motive: in the former case it is used for a ship's crew; in the latter and bad sense of the word it is employed for any num- ber of evil-minded persons met to- gether from different quarters and co- operating for some bad purpose. Gang is used in a bad sense for an associa- tion of thieves, murderers, and depre- dators in general; or in a technical sense for those who work together. See also Chain. BANE, Pest, Ruin. Bane is de- rived from Anglo-Saxon bana, a mur- derer, from a root found in Icelandic bani, death, Gothic banja, a wound, Greek (povog, murder, etc. Pest, from Latin pestis, originally meant a deadly disease. Ruin, Latin ruina, is de- rived from ruere, to fall down. Mil- ton uses ruin with special reference to its etymology to mean something rushing down, falling headlong. These terms borrow their figurative signification from three of the greatest evils in the world: namely, poison, plague, and destruction. Bane is said of things only; pest of persons only: whatever produces a deadly corruption is the bane; whoever is as obnoxious aa BAEE 103 the plague is a pesl; luxxiry is the bane of civil society; gaming is the bane of all youth; sycophants are the pests of so- ciety. Ruin comprehends more than either bane or pest, these latter being comparatively partial mischiefs, but ruin extends to every part of that which it affects. BANISH, Exile, Expel. Banish, in French bannair, German bannen, signi- fies to put out of a commimity by a ban or civil interdict, which was formerly either ecclesiastical or civil. Exile, in French exHer, from the Lsdin exilium, banishment, and exul, an exile, com- p<)unded of extra and solum, the soil, signifies to put away from one's native soil or country. Expel, in Latin expello, compounded of ex and peUere, to drive, sigmfies to drive out. The idea of exclusion, or of a coercive removal from a place, is common to these terms: banishment includes the re- moval from any place, or the prohibi- tion of access to any place, where one has been or whither one is in the habit of going; exile signifies the removal from one's home; to exile, therefore, is to banish, but to banish is not always to exUe; the Tarquins were banished from Rome never to return; Coriolanus was exiled, or driven from his home. Banishment follows from a decree of justice; exile either by the necessity of circumstances or an order of authority : banishment is a disgraceful punishment infhcted by tribimaJs upon deUnquents; exile is a disgrace incurred without dis- honor: exile removes us from our coun- try; banishment drives us from it igno- miniously: it was the custom in Russia to banish offenders to Siberia; Ovid was exiled by an order of Augustus. Banish- ment is an action, a compulsory exercise of power over another, which must be submitted to; exile is a state into which we may go voluntarily; many Romans chose to go into exUe rather than await the judgment of the people, by whom they might have been ban- ished. Banishment and expulsion both mark a disgraceful and coercive ex- clusion, but banishment is authoritative; it is a public act of government: ex- pulsion is simply coercive; it is the act of a private individual or a small com- munity. Banishment always supposes a removal to a distant spot, to another landj expulsion never reaches beyond a particular house or society: expulsion from the university, or any pubhe school, is the necessary consequence of discovering a refractory temper or a propensity to insubordination. Banishment and expulsion are like- wise used in a figurative sense, although exile is not: in this sense, banishment marks a distant and entire removal; expulsion a violent removal: we banish that which it is not prudent to retain; we expel that which is noxious. Hopes are banished from the mind when every prospect of success has disappeared; fears are banished when they are alto- gether groundless; envy, hatred, and every evil passion should be expelled from the mind as disturbers of its peace: harmony and good-humor are best pro- moted by banishing from conversation all subjects of difference in religion and politics; good morals require that every unseemly word should be expelled. See also Proscribe. BANKRUPTCY. See Insolvency. BANQUET. See Feast. BANTER. See Deride. BAR. See Tribunal. BARBAROUS. See Cruel. BARE, Naked, Uncovered. Bare and naked are both Anglo-Saxon words — the one being in Anglo-Saxon beer, the other nacod. For the deiavation of uncover see Cover. Bare marks the condition of being without a particular covering; naked that of being without any covering; bare is therefore often substituted for naked, to a certain degree: we speak of bareheaded, barefoot, to expose the bare arm; but a figure is naked, or the body is naked. When applied to other objects, bare conveys the idea of a particular want; naked of a general want: as the bare ground, bare waUs, a bare house, where the idea of want in a certain particular is strongly conveyed ; but naked walls, naked fields, a naked appearance, denote the absence of covering that is usual or general: bare in this sense is frequently followed by the object that is wanted; naked is mostly employed as an ad- junct: a tree is bare of leaves: this constitutes it a naked tree. They preserve the same analogy in their figurative appUcation: a bare 104 BAREFACED sufficiency is that which scarcely suf- fices; the naked truth is that which has nothing about it to intercept the view of it from the mind. Naked and uncovered bear a strong resemblance to each other; to be naked is, in fact, to have the body uncovered, but many things are uncovered which are not naked; nothing is said to be naked but what in the nature of things, or according to the usages of men, ought to be covered; everything is uncovered from which the covering is removed. According to ovu" natural sentiments of decency or our acquired sentiments of propriety, we expect to see the naked body covered with cloth- ing: the naked tree covered with leaves; the naked walls covered with paper or paint; and the naked country covered with verdure or habitations: on the other hand, plants are left uncovered to receive the benefit of the sun or rain; furniture or articles of use or necessity are left uncovered to suit the conven- ience of the user; or a person may be uncovered, in the sense of bareheaded, on certain occasions; so in the moral apphcation, what is naked is without the ordinary or necessary appendage; what is uncovered is simply without any covering. Bare, Scanty, Destitide. — Bare (see above^. Scanty is derived from scant, a Scandinavian word, from a root found in Icelandic skamt, short, brief, and in the somewhat colloquial verb scamp, in the phrase "to scamp work," etc. Destitute, in Latin destitutus, par- ticiple of destituo, compounded of de, privative, and statuo, appoint or pro- vide for, signifies improvided for or wanting. All these terms denote the absence or privation of some necessary. Bare and scanty have a relative -sense : bare re- spects what serves for ourselves; scanty that which is provided by others. A subsistence is bare; a supply is scanty. An imprudent person will estimate as a bare competence what would supply an economist with superfluities. A hungry person will consider as a scanty allow- ance what would more than suffice for a moderate eater. Bare is said of those things which belong to our corporeal sustenance; ■destitule is said generally of what- ever one wants. A person is bare of clothes or money; he is destitute of friends, of resources, or of comforts. Bare, Mere. — Bare (see above). Mere is derived from Latin merus, pure, un- mixed, used especially of wine. Bare is used in a positive sense; mere, negatively. The bare recital of some events brings tears. The mere circum- stance of receiving favors ought not to bind any person to the opinions of an- other. The bare idea of being in the company of a murderer is apt to awaken horror in the mind. The mere attendance at a place of worship is the smallest part of a Christian's duty. BAREFACED. See Glaring.' BARGAIN. See Agreement; But. BARTER. See Change; Ex- change. BASE, Vile, Mean. For the origin of base see Abase. Vile is deriyed - from Latin vilis, of small price, cheap, worthless. Mean, Anglo-Saxon moene, usually foimd in gemcene, German gemein, instead of in its simple form, signifies common; hence low, ordi- nary, of Httle value, etc. Base is a stronger term than vUe, and vile than mean. Base marks a high de- gree of moral turpitude: vile and mean denote in different degrees the want of all that can be valued or esteemed. What is base excites our abhorrence, what is vile provokes ' disgust, what is mean awakens contempt. Base is of>- posed to magnanimous, vile to noble, mean to generous. Ingratitude is base; it does violence to the best affections of our nature: flattery is vile; it vio- lates truth in the grossest manner for the lowest purposes of gain: com- phances are 7nean which are deroga- tory to the rank, dignity, or respon- / sibihty of the individual. The more elevated a person's rank, the greater is his baseness who abuses his influence to the injury of those who repose con- fidence in him. The lower the rank of the individual and the more atrocious his conduct, the viler is his character. The more respectable the station of the person and the more extended his wealth, the greater is his meanness when he descends to practices fitted only for his inferiors. The school- master of Falerii was guilty of the basest treachery in surrendering his helpless BE 105 charge to the enemy: the Roman gen- eral, therefore, with true nobleness of mind, treated him as a vile malefactor. Sycophants are in the habit of prac- tising every mean artifice to obtain favor. BASHFUL. See Modest. BASIS. See Foundation. BATTLE, Combat, Engagement, Action. Battle, in French bataille, comes from the Latin batuere, to beat, signifying a beating. Combat signifies literaUy a battle, one with the other, from can, with, and batuere. Engage- ment signified binding with a pledge, fighting under a pledge to defend some one or some cause, from French en and gage, a pledge — a word of Teutonic origin. Action signifies the state of acting and being acted upon by the way of fighting. Battle is a general term; combat, en- gagement, and action are particular terms, having a modified signification. Battle, as an act of fighting, may be applied to what takes place either be- tween bodies or individuals, as the battles between the Carthaginians and the Romans, or between Caesar and Pompey; combat apphes only to what takes place between individuals, as the combat between the Horatii ana the Curiatii. Battle is taken for that which is premeditated and prepared, as battles between armies always are; combats are frequently accidental, if not unexpected, as the combats of Her- cules or the combat between Menelaus and Paris. Battle and combat are taken for the act of fighting generally; engagement and action are seldom used in any other acceptation. Battle in this case is taken without any qualification of time, circumstances, or manner, as armed for battle, wager of battle, and the hke; combat refers to the aet of individuals fighting with one another: to challenge to single combat; the combat was ob- stinate and bloody: engagement and action, which are properly abstract and general terms to denote engaging and acting, but here Umited to the act of fighting, have always a reference to something actually passing or de- scribed as passing, and are therefore confined to descriptions, as in describ- ing what passes during the engagement or action, or the number of engage- ments or actions, in which an individual is present or takes a part. It is re- ported of the Grerman women that whenever their husbands went to battle they used to go into the thickest of the combat to carry them provisions or dress their wounds; and that some- times they would take part in the engagement. BE, Exist, Subsist. Be, with its inflections, is to be traced through the Northern languages to an original Aryan root signifying to five, to exist. Exist, in French exister, Latin existo, compounded of e or ex and sisto, signifies to "stand out" against the fortunes of life, hence simply to five, to keep on living. From this derivation of the latter verb arises the distinction in the use of the two words. The former is applicable either to the accidents of things or to the substances of things themselves; the latter only to substances or things that stand or exist of themselves. We say of quaUties, of forms, of actions, of arrangement, of movement, and of everv different relation, whether real, ideal, or qualificative, that they are; we say of matter, of spirit, of body, and of all substances, that they exist. Man is man, and will be man under all circumstances and changes of life: he exists under every known climate and variety of heat or cold in the atmosphere. Being and existence as nouns have this further distinction, that the former is employed not only to designate the abstract action of being, but is meta- phorically employed for the sensible ob- ject that is; the latter is confined alto- gether to the abstract sense. Hence we speak of human beings; beings ani- mate or inanimate; the Supreme Being: but of the existence of a God; existence of innumerable worlds; the existence of evil. Being may in some cases be indiffer- ently employed for existence, particu- larly in the grave style: when speaking of animate objects, as the being of a God; our frail being; and when quali- fied in a compound form is preferable, as our well-being. Subsist is properly a species of ea^ isting; from the Latin pref>ositive sub^ \ 106 BEAM signifying for a time, it denotes tempo- rary or partial existence. Everything exists by the creative and preservative power of the Almighty; that which sid)sists depends for its existence upon the chances and changes of Mfe. To exist, therefore, designates simply the event of being or existing; to subsist conveys the accessory ideas of the mode and duration of existing. Man exists while the vital or spiritual part of him remains; he subsists by what he obtains to support hfe. Friendships exist in the world, notwithstanding the prevalence of selfishness; but they cannot subsist for any length of time between individuals in whom this base temper prevails. Be, Become, Grow. — Be (see above). Become signifies to come to be — that is, to be in course of time. Grow comes from Anglo-Saxon growan, to produce green shoots, and is allied to green. Be is positive; become is relative: a person is what he is without regard to what he was; he becomes that which he was not before. We judge of a man by what he is, but we cannot judge of him as to what he will become; this year he is immoral and irreligious, but by the force of reflection on himself he may be- come the contrary in another year. To become includes no idea of the mode or circumstance of its becoming; to grow is to become by a gradual process: a man may become a good man from a vicious one, in consequence of a sudden action on his mind; but he grows in wisdom and virtue by means of an increase in knowledge and experience. BEAM. See Gleam; Ray. BEAR, Yield. Bear, Anglo-Saxon beran, is allied to Latin ferre, Greek ^ipuv, to carry, hence to bring forth that which has been carried and nourished within a hving organism or a life-giving substance. Yield (see Afford). Bear conveys the idea of creating within itself; yield, that of giving from itself. Animals bear their young, in- animate objects yield their produce. An apple-tree bears apples; the earth yields fruits. Bear marks properly the natural power of bringing forth some- thing of its own kind; yield is said of the result or quantum brought forth: shrubs bear leaves, flowers, or berries, according to their natural properties; flowers yield seeds plentifully or other- wise, as they are favored by circum- stances. Bear, Carry, Convey, Transport. — Carry comes immediately from Latin carrus, a four-wheeled vehicle, and hence meant to bear about in a car. Convey is derived from con, with, and via, way, and means to bear with one on the way. Transport, in French transporter, Latin transporto, com- pounded of trans, over, and portare, to carry, signifies to carry to a distance. To bear is simply to take the weight of any substance upon one's self, or to have the object about one: to carry is to remove a body from the spot where it was: we always bear in carry- ing, but we do not always carry when we bear. Both may be appMed to things as well as persons: whatever receives the weight of anything bears it; whatever is caused to move with anything carries it. That which can- not be easily borne must be burdensome to carry; in extremely hot weather it is sometimes irksome to bear the weight even of one's clothing: Virgil praises the pious .^neas for having carried his father on his shoulders in order to save him from the sacking of Troy. Weak people or weak things are not fit to bear heavy burdens: lazy people pre- fer to be carried rather than to carry anything. To bear is said either of persons or inanimate things; to carry, in its proper apphcation, is said of persons only. To bear supposes the bearer for the most part to be stationary, but it may be apphed to one who is in motion, as the bearer of a letter. In p>oetry it is mostly used in such connection for carry. To carry always supp>oses the carrier to be in motion, and that which is car- ried may either be about his person or resting on something, as to carry a thing in one's hand, or to carry it in a basket. Bear and carry preserve this dis- tinction in their figurative or moral application; bear is applied to that which for the most part remains with the person or thing bearing; carry to that which passes by means of the person; thus to bear or carry a name: BEAT 107 to bear a name is to have it without re- gard to time or place; to carry a name is to carry it down to posterity. So to bear a burden, to carry weight, author- ity, conviction, etc.; to bear a stamp, to carry a mark to one's grave. Convey and transport are species of carrying. Carry in its particular sense is employed either for personal exer- tions or actions performed by the help of other means; convey ana transport are employed for such actions as are performed not by immediate personal intervention or exertion: a porter car- ries goods on his knot {i. e., shoulder- pad); goods are conveyed in a wagon; they are transported in a vessel. Convey expresses simply the mode of removing; transport annexes to this the idea of the place and the distance. Merchants get the goods conveyed into their ware- houses which they have had trans- ported from distant countries. Pedes- trians take no more with them than what they can conveniently carry; could armies do the same, one of the greatest obstacles to the indulgence of human ambition would be removed; for many an incursion into a peaceful country is defeated for the want of means to convey provisions sufficient for such numbers; and when moun- tains or deserts are to be traversed, another great difficulty presents itself in the transportation of artillery. Bear, Suffer, Endure, Support. — To bear (see above). Suffer, in Latin suffero, compounded of s^lb, under, and ferre, to bear, signifies to "bear up imder" — an expression frequently heard in English, which, like several others cited in this book, literally translates the Latin word. Endure, from Latin duriis, hard, lasting, sig- nifies to harden one's self under trouble. Support, from sziA and portare, to carry, has the same meaning as suffer, as far as its etymology is concerned. The idea of receiving the weight or pressure of any object is common to these terms, which differ only in the circumstances of the action. To bear is the general term taken in the proper sense without any quahfication; the other terms denote different modes of bearing. To bear may be said of that which is not painful, as to bear a bur- den, in the indifferent sense; so hke- wise the term to support, as to support a person who is falling; but for the most part these, as well as the other two terms, are taken in the bad sense. In this case to bear and to suffer are both involuntary acts as far as they relate to evils imposed upon us with- out our wiU; but bear is also voluntary, inasmuch as it denotes the manner of receiving the evil, so as to diminish the sense of it; ana suffer is purely pas- sive and involuntary. We are born to suffer — hence the necessity for us to learn to bear all the numerous and diversified evils which to us are ob- noxious. To bear is apphed either to ordinary or extraordinary evils, and is either a temporary or a permanent act of the resolution; to endure is applied only to great evils requiring strong and lasting resolution: we bear disappoint- ments and crosses; we endure hunger, cold, tortures, and provocations. The first object of education should be to accustom children to bear contradic- tions and crosses, that they may after- ward be enabled to endure every trial. To bear and endure signify to receive becomingly the weight of what befalls ourselves; to support signifies to bear either our own or another's evils, for we may either support ourselves or be supported by others, but in this former case we bear not so much from the resolution to bear as from the motives which are presented to the mind; a person supports himself in the hour of trial by the condolence of friends, but still more by the power of religion. The words suffer and endure are said only of persons and personal matters: to bear and support are said also of things; the former in respect to things of any weight, lai^^e or small; the latter in respect to things of great weight, as the beams are cut according to the weight they have to bear; a building is supported by pillars. See also Brook; Undergo; Waft. BEAST. See Animal. BEAT, Strike, Hit. Beat is de- rived from Anglo-Saxon beatan, from a Teutonic root signifying to push. The resemblance to Latm batuere, French baitre, is merely accidental. Strike is derived from a Teutonic root meaning to give blows to. Hit is a 108 BEATIFICATION Scandinavian word meaning to light on, to attain to, hence to strike, and is allied to hint. For a similar relation between the idea of hghting upon and striking see the slang expression "He lit into me." To heat is to redouble blows; to strike is to give one single blow; but the bare touching in consequence of an effort constitutes hitting. We never heat but with design, nor hit without an aim, but we may strike by accident. Beating was formerly resorted to as almost the only mode of punishment. He who brandishes a stick heedlessly may strike another to his serious in- jury. Hitting is the object of the marksman. Beat, Defeat, Overpower, Rout, Over- throw.— Beat is here figuratively em- ployed in the sense of the former sec- tion. Defeat, from the French defaire, imphes to undo, and overpower to have the power over any one. To roiU is derived from rupta, broken, from Latin rumpere, to break, and overthrow, to throw over or upside down. Beat respects personal contests be- tween individuals or parties; defeat, rout, overpower, and overthrow are em- ployed mostly for contests between numbers. A general is beaten in im- portant engagements; he is defeated and may be routed in partial attacks; he is overpowered by numbers, and over- thrown in set engagements. To beat is an indefinite term expressive of no particular degree: the being beaien may be attended with greater or less dam- age. To be defeated is a specific dis- advantage, it is a failure in a par- ticular object of more or less impor- tance. To be overpowered is a positive loss; it is a loss of the power of acting, which may be of longer or shorter duration; to be routed is a temporary disadvantage; a rout alters the route or course of proceeding, but does not disable: to be overthrown is the great- est of all mischiefs, and is apphcable only to great armies and great con- cerns: an overthrow commonly decides a contest. Beat is a term which reflects more or less dishonor on the general or the army, or on both: defeat is an indifferent term ; the best generals may sometimes be defeated by circumstances which are above human control; over- powering is coupled with no particular honor to the winner nor disgrace to the loser; superior power is oftener the result of good fortune than of skill. The bravest and finest troops may be overpowered in cases which exceed hu- man power: a rout is always disgrace- ful, particularly to the army; it always arises from want of firmness: an over- throw is fatal rather than dishonorable ; it excites pity rather than contempt. BEATIFICATION, Canonization. These acts emanate from the pontifical authority, by which the Pope declares a person, whose Ufe had been exem- plary and accompanied with miracles, as entitled to enjoy eternal happiness after his death, and determines in con- sequence the sort of worship which should be paid to him. In the act of beatification (beare, to make blessed) the Pope pronounces only as a private per- son, and uses his own authority only in granting to certain persons, or to a reUgious order, the privilege of paying a particular worship to a beatified ob- ject. In the act of canonization, the Pope speaks as a judge after a judicial examination on the state, and decides the sort of worship which ought to be paid by the whole church. BEAU. See Gallant, BEAUTIFUL, Fine, Handsome, Pretty. Beautiful, or fuU of beauty, in French beauie, comes from beau, belle, in Latin beUvs, fair. Fine is derived from finitus, the past participle of finire, to finish, and meant finished, pohshed, finely wrought, hence, on the one hand, dehcate, small; on the other hand, im- pressive, comely, the very opposite of dehcate. Handsome originally meant dexterous, handy, and hence well formed, comely, good-looking. Pretty comes from Anglo-Saxon proetig, de- ceitful, tricky, etc.; its ultimate origin and meaning are uncertain. It may have developed its present meaning through the same psychological process that has turned words hke cunning, cute, etc., into endearing descriptive epithets. Of these epithets, which denote what is pleasing to the eye, heautiftd conveys the strongest meaning; it marks the possession of that in its fullest extent of which the other terms denote the possession in part only. Fineness, BECOMING 109 handsomeness, and prettiness are to beauty as parts to a whole. When taken in relation to persons, a woman is beauiifid who in feature and com- plexion possesses a grand assemblage of graces; a woman is fine who with a striking figure unites shapm and symmetry; a woman is handsome who has good features, and preUy if with symmetry of feature be united deli- cacy. The beauiifid is determined by fixed rules; it admits of no excess or , defect; it comprehends regularity, proportion, and a due distribution of color, and every particular which can engage the attention : the fine must be coupled with a certain grandeur of figure; it is incompatible with that which is small; a little woman can never be fine; the handsome is a general assemblage of what is agreeable; it is marked by no particular characteris- tic but the absence of all deformity: prettiness is always coupled with sim- plicity; it is incompatible with that which is large; a tall woman . with masculine features cannot be pretty. Beauty is peculiarly a female perfection ; in the male sex it is rather a defect; a man can scarcely be beautifid with- out losing his manly characteristics — boldness and energy of mind, strength and robustness of Umb; but though a man may not be beauiifid or pretty, he may be fine or handsome. When said in relation to other ob- jects, beautiful, fine, pretty have a strong analogy. With respect to the objects of nature, the beautiful is dis- played in the works of creation, and wherever it appears it is marked by elegance, variety, harmony, propor- tion, but, above all, that softness which is peculiar to female beauty; the fine, on the contrary, is associated with the grand, and the pretty with the simple: the sky presents either a beautifid as- pect or a fine aspect, but not a pretty aspect. A rural scene is beautiful when it unites richness and diversity of natural objects with superior cultiva- tion; it is fine when it presents the bolder and more impressive features of nature, consisting of rocks and moun- tains; it is pretty when, divested of all that is extraordinary, it presents a smiling view of nature in the gay attire of shrubs, and many-colored flowers, and verdant meadows, and luxuriant fields. Beautifid, fine, and pretty are appUed indifferently to works of nature and art; handsome mostly to those of art only: a beautifid picture, a firie draw- ing, a pretty cap, and handsome furni- ture. In the moral application beatUiful sentiments have much in them to in- terest the affections as well as the understanding; they make a vivid im- pression: fine sentiments mark an elevated mind and a loftiness of con- ception; they occupy the understand- ing and afford scope for reflection; they make a strong impression: pretty ideas are but pleasing associations or combinations that only amuse for the time being, without producing any lasting impression. We may speak of a beautiful poem, although not a beauti- ful tragedy; but a fine tragedy, and a pretty comedy. Imagery may be beau^ tifvl and fine, but seldom pretty. Handsome conveys the idea not only of that which is agreeable in appear- ance, but also that which is agreeable to the understanding and the moral feelings from its fitness and propriety; it is therefore apphed with this col- lateral meaning to moral circumstances and actions, as a handsome present, a handsome apology. ' BECOME. See Be. BECOMING, Decent, Seemly, Frr, Suitable. Becoming comes from An- glo-Saxon becuynan, to arrive, happen; hence to happen to fit. Decent, in French decent, in Latin decens, parti- ciple of decere, to beseem, is allied to decus, an ornament, honor, fame, etc. Seemly is derived from a root which appears in same, similar, etc., and ly, meaning hke; it means literally "same Uke," just like, hence suitable, fitting, etc. Fit is a Scandinavian word meaning to knit together, to draw laces together, etc. Suitable, from suit, sig- nifies able to suii; and suit, in French suite, Latin secuta, comes from sequor, to follow, signifying to follow. What is becoming respects the man- ner of being in society such as it ought; as to person, time, and place. Decency regards the manner of displajing one's self so as to be approved and respected. Seemliness is very similar in sense to de- 110 BEDEW ■cency, but is confined to such things as immediately strike the observer. Fit- ness and suitableness relate to the dis- position, arrangement, and order of either being or doing, according to persons, things, or circumstances. The becoming consists of an exterior that is pleasing to the view: decency involves moral propriety; it is regulated by the fixed rules of good-breeding: seemliness is decency in the minor morals or in one's behavior; fitness is regulated by local circumstances, and suitableness by the established customs and usages of society. The dress of a woman is becoming that renders her person more agreeable to the eye; it is decent if it in no wise offends modesty; it is un- seemly if it in any wise violates pro- priety; it is ^ if it be what the occasion requires; it is suitable if it be accoid- ing to the rank and character of the wearer. What is becoming varies for every individual; the age, the com- plexion, the stature, and the habits of the person must be consulted in order to obtain thw appearance which is be- coming; what becomes a young female, or one of fair complexion, may not become one who is further advanced in life, or who has dark features: de- <:ency and seemliness are one and the same for all; all civilized nations have eration: to 6egrin one's play; to commence the pursuit: to begin to write; to commence the letter. To commence and en^ wpon are as closely allied in sense as the former words; they differ principally in apph- cation: to commence seems rather to denote the making an experiment; to enter upon, that of first doing what has not been tried before; we commence an imdertaking; we enter upon an employ- ment: speculating people are very ready to commence schemes; consid- erate people are always averse to enter- ing upon any office until they feel themselves fully adequate to discharge its duties. BEGINNING. See Origin. BEGUILE. See Amuse. BEHAVE. See Deal. BEHAVIOR, Conduct, Carriage, Deportment, Demeanor. Behavior, from Anglo-Saxon behcebban, composed of the prefix be and the verb which now appears as have, signifies to have one's self, or have self-possession. Conduct, in Latin conductv^, participle of conduco, compounded of con and ducere, to lead along, signifies, ht- erally, leading one's self along, act- ing as a guide to one's self. Car- riage, the abstract of carry (see Bear), signifies the act of carrying one's body, or one's self. Deportment from Latin de, from, and portare, to carry, means, literally, what is expressed in our colloquial expression, "He carried it off well." Demeanor is a coined word from Middle Enghsh demenen, to demean or behave, which comes through Old French from Late Latin rninare^ to drive cattle, to conduct, signifying to conduct others, then to conduct one's self, to control or guard one's own action. Behainor respects corporeal or mental actions; conduct, mental actions; car- riage, deportment, and demeanor are different species of behauior. Behainor respects all actions exposed to the notice of others; conduct, the general line of a person's moral proceedings: we speak of a person's behavior at table or in company, in a ball-room, in the street, or in pubhc; of his conduct in the man- agement of his private concerns, in the direction of his family, or in his differ- ent relations with his fellow-creatures. Behavior applies to the minor morals of society; conduct, to those of the first moment : in our intercourse with others we may adopt a civil or pohte, a rude or boisterous behavior; in our serious transactions we may adopt a peaceable, discreet, or prudent, a rash, dangerous, or mischievous conduct. The behavior of young people in society is of particu- lar importance; it should, above all things, be marked with propriety in the presence of superiors and elders: the youth who does not learn betimes a seemly behavior in company will scarcely know how to condu/A himself judiciously on any future occasion. Carriage respects simply the manner of carrying the body; deportment in- cludes both the action and the car- riage of the body in performing the action: demeanor respects only the moral character or tendency of the ac- tion; deportment is said only of those exterior actions that have an immedi- ate reference to others; demeanor, of the general behavior as it relates to the circumstances and situation of the individual : the carriage is that part of behavior which is of the first im- portance to attend to in young persons. A carriage should neither be haughty nor servile; to be graceful, it ought to have a due mixture of dignity and condescension: the deportment of a man should be suited to his station; a humble deportment is becoming in inferiors; a stately and forbidding de- portment is very unbecoming in su- Eeriors: the demeanor of a man should e suited to his situation; the suitable demeanor of a judge on the bench, or of a clergyman in the pulpit, or when performing his clerical functions, adds much to the dignity and solemnity of the office itself. The carriage marks the birth and education: an awkward carriage stamps a man as vulgar: a graceful carriage evinces refinement and culture. The deportment marks either the habitual or the existing temper of BEND 113 the mind: whoever is really impressed with the solemnity and importance of .public worship will evince his im- pressions by a gravity of deportment: the demeanor is most commonly used to denote the present temper of the mind; as a modest demeanor is particularly suitable for one who is in the presence of the person whom he has offended. BEHIND. See Aback; Abaft; After. BEHOLD. See Look. BEHOLDER. See Looker-on. BELIEF, Credit, Trust, Faith. In belief the be stands for an earlier ge which appears in the German glavben, originally ge-lavhen, to believe. The root is the same as that which aj>- pears in the adjective lief, dear, and the Latin Ubet, it pleases, and, in this case, signifies the pleasure or assent of the mind. Credit is derived from the Latin credere, to believe, which also gives rise to the words credidous, credible, creed, etc. Trust is a Ger- manic word (German ersons are entitled to our credit; but people repose a trust in others, or have a faith m others. Our belief or unbelief is not always regulated by our reasoning faculties or the truth of things: we often believe, from pre- sumption, ignorance, or passion, things to be true which are very false. With the bulk of mankind assurance goes further than anything else in obtaining credit; gross falsehoods, pronounced with confidence, will be credited sooner than plain truths told in an unvarnished style. There are no disappointments more severe than those which we feel on finding that we have trusted to men of base principles. Ignorant j)eople have commonly a more imphcit faith in any nostrum recommended to them by persons of their own class than in the prescriptions of professional men regu- larly educated. Belief, trust, and faith have a religious application, which credit has not. Be- lief is simply an act of the understand- ing; trust and faith are active moving principles of the mind. Belief does not extend beyond an assent of the mind to any given proposition; trust and faith impel to action. Belief is to trust and faith as cause to effect : there may be belief without either trust or faiXh; but there can be no trust or faith with- out belief ; we believe that there is a God who is the creator and preserver of all His creatures; we therefore trust in Him for His protection of ourselves: we believe that Jesus Christ died for the sins of men; we have, therefore, faith in his redeeming grace to save us from our sins. Belief is common to all rehgions: trust is pecuhar to the believers in Di- vine revelation: faith is employed by distinction for the Christian faith. Belief is purely speculative; and trust and faith are operative: the former operates on the mind, the latter on the outward conduct. Trust in God serves to dispel all anxious concern about the future. Theorists substitute belief for faith; enthusiasts mistake passion for faith. True faith must be grounded on a right belief and accon^ panied with a right practice. BELIEVE. See Think. BELOVED. See Amiable. BELOW. See Under. BELT. See Zone. BEMOAN. See Bewail. BENCH. See Tribunal. BEND, Bent. Bend and bent are both derived from a root found in the English bind, Anglo-Saxon bindan, Ice- landic benda, to stretch, strain. Bend means to strain a bow by fastening the band or string, hence to curve it (Skeat). Both abstract nouns from 114 BENEATH the verb to bend; the one to express its proper, and the other its moral appli- cation: a stick has a bend; the mind has a bent. A bend in anything that should be straight is a defect; a bent of the inchnation that is not sanctioned by religion is detrimental to a per- son's moral character and peace of mind. For a vicious bend in a natural body there are various remedies; but nothing will cure a corrupt bent of the will except religion. See also Deflect; Knuckle; Lean; TUKN. BENEATH. See Under. BENEFACTION, Donation. Ben- efaction, from the Latin benefado, sig- nifies the thing well done, or done for the good of others. Donation, from dono, to give or present, signifies the sum presented. Both these terms denote an act of charity, but the former comprehends more than the latter: a benefaction comprehends acts of personal service in general toward the indigent; donation respects simply the act of giving and the thing given. Benefactions are for pri- vate use; donations are for public ser- vice. A benefactor to the poor does not confine himself to the distribution of money; he enters into all their ne- cessities, consults their individual cases, and suits his benefactions to their exi- gencies; his influence, his counsel, his purse, and his property are employed for their good: his donations form the smallest part of the good which he does. Beneficent, Bountifvl or Bounteotts, Munificent, Generous, Liberal. — Benef- icent comes from benefado (see above) . Bountiful signifies full of bounty or goodness, from the French bonte, Latin bonitas. Munificent, in Latin munifictis, from munus, present, gift, and facio, signifies the disposition to make presents. Generous, from Latin generosus, meant originally of high blood, of noble extraction, and conse- quently of a noble character. Liberal, in French liberal, Latin liberalis, from liber, free, signifies the quality of be- ing like a freeman in distinction from a bondman, and, by a natural associa- tion, being of a free disposition, ready to communicate. Beneficent respects everything done for the good of others: bounty, munifi- cence, and generosity are species of beneficence; liberality is a quaUfication of all. The first two denote modes of action: the last three either modes of action or modes of sentiment. The sincere well-wisher to his fellow-creat- ures is beneficent according to his means; he is bountifvl in providing for the comfort and happiness of others; he is munificent in dispensing favors; he is generous in imparting his property; he is liberal in aU he does. Beneficence and bounty are characteristics of the Deity as well as of His creatures: munificence, generosity, and liberality are mere human quahties. Beneficence and bounty ere the pecuhar characteristics of the Deity: with Him the will and the act of doing good are commen- sm-ate only with His power; He was beneficent to us as our Creator, and con- tinues His beneficence to us by His daily preservation and protection; to some, however, He has been more bountiful than to others, by providing them with an unequal share of the good things of this fife. The beneficence of man is regulated by the bounty of Providence: to whom much is given, from him much will be required. Instructed by His word, and illumined by that spark of benevolence which was infused into their souls with the breath of fife, good men are ready to believe that they are but stewards of aU God's gifts, holden for the use of such as are less bountifully provided. They will desire, as far as their powers extend, to imitate this feature of the Deity by bettering with their beneficent counsel and assistance the condition of all who require it and by gladdening the hearts of many with their bountiful provisions. Princes are munificent, friends are generous, patrons liberal. Munificence is measured by the quaUty and quan- tity of the thing bestowed; generosity by the extent of the sacrifice made; liberality by the warmth and freedom of the spirit discovered. A monarch displays his munificence in the presents which he sends by his ambassadors to another monarch. A generous man wiU waive his claims, however powerful they may be, when the accommodation or rehef of another is in question. A liberal spirit does not stop to inquire BENEFIT 115 the reason for giving, but gives when the occasion offers. Munificence naay spring either from ostentation or a becoming sense of dignity; generosity may spring either from a generous temper or an easy unconcern about property; liberality of conduct is dic- tated by nothing but a warm heart and an expanded mind. Munificence is confined simply to giving, but we may be generous in assisting, and liberal in rewarding. BENEFIT, Favor, Kindness, Civ- ility.— Benefit signifies here that which is done to benefit (see Advantage). Favor, in French faveur, Liatin favor and favere, to bear good-will, signifies the act flowing from good-will. Kindness signifies an action that is kind (see Affectionate). Civility signifies that which is civil. The idea of an action gratuitously performed for the advantage of an- other is common to these terms. Benefits and favors are granted by su- Eeriors; kindnesses and civilities pass etween equals. Benefits serve to re- lieve actual wants: the power of con- ferring and the necessity of receiving them constitute the relative difference in station between the giver and the receiver: favors tend to promote the interest or convenience; the power of giving and the advantage of receiving are dependent on local circumstances, more than on difference of station. Kindnesses and civilities serve to afford mutual accommodation by a reciproc- ity of kind offices on the many and various occasions which offer in human hfe: they are not so important as either benefits or favors, but they carry a charm with them which is not pos- sessed by the former. Kindnesses are more endearing than civilities, and pass mostly between those who are known to each other: civilities may pass be- tween strangers. Benefits tend to draw those closer to one another who by station of life are set at the greatest distance from each other: Section is engendered in him who benefits, and devoted Attachment in him who is benefited: favors increase obligation be- yond its due limits; if they are not asked and granted with discretion, they may produce servility on the one hand and haughtiness on the other. Kindnesses are the offspring and parent of affection; they convert our multi- phed wants into so many enjoyments: civilities are the sweets which we gather on the way as we pass along the journey of hfe. Benefit, Service, Good Office. — Benefit (see above). Service (see Advantage). Office, in French office, Latin officium, duty, from officio, perhaps from opi (opus), work, and facere, to do, signifies the doing of one's work, the fulfilling of a duty or obUgation. These terms, hke the former, agree in denoting some action performed for the good of another, but they differ in the principle on which the action is performed. A benefit is perfectly gratuitous, it produces an obUgation; a service is not altogether gratuitous; it is that at least which may be ex- pected, though it cannot be demanded: a good office is between the two; it is in part gratuitous, and in part such as one may reasonably expect. Benefits flow from superiors, or those who are in a situation to do good, and service from inferiors or equals: but good offices are performed by equals only. Princes confer benefits on their subjects; sub- jects perform services for their princes; neighbors do good offices for one an- other. Benefits are sometimes the re- ward of services; good offices produce a return from the receiver. Benefits con- sist of such things as serve to reheve the difficulties or advance the interests of the receiver: services consist in those acts which tend to lessen the trouble, or increase the ease and convenience, of the person served: good offices con- sist in the employ of one's credit, in- fluence, and mediation for the advan- tage of another; it is a species of voluntary service. It is a great benefit to assist an embarrassed tradesman out of his difficulty: it is a great service for a soldier to save the hfe of his commander, or for a friend to open the eyes of another to see his danger: it is a good office for any one to interpose his mediation to settle disputes and heal divisions. It is possible to be loaded with benefits so as to affect one's independence of character. Services are sometimes a source of dissatisfac- tion and disappointment when they do not meet with the remuneration or re- 116 BENEVOLENCE turn which they are supposed to de- serve. Good offices tend to nothing but the increase of good-will. Those who perform them are too independent to expect a return, and those who receive them are too sensible of their value not to seek an opportunity for making a return. Politically, they are tendered by a neutral nation to another or others in time of trouble. See also Advantage; Good. BENEVOLENCE, Beneficence. Benevolence is hteraUy well wiUing. Beneficence is HteraUy weU doing. The former consists of intention, the latter of action: the former is the cause, the latter the result. Benevolence may exist without henefixxnce, but beneficence always supposes benevolence; a man is not said to be beneficent who does good from sinister views. The benevolent man enjoys but half his happiness if he cannot be beneficent; yet there will still remain to him an ample store of enjoyment in the contemplation of others' happiness; that man who is gratified only with that happiness which he himself is the instrument of producing is not entitled to the name of benevolent. As benevolence is an af- fair of the heart, and beneficence of the outward conduct, the former is con- fined to no station, no rank, no degree of education or power: the poor may be benevolent as well as the rich, the unlearned as the learned, the weak as well as the strong: the latter, on the contrary, is controlled by outward cir- cumstances, and is therefore principally confined to the rich, the powerful, the wise, and the learned. Benevolence, Benignity, Humanity, Kindness, Tenderness. — Benevolence (see above). Benignity, in Latin benignitas, from bene and gigno, beget, signifies the quahty or disposition for producing good. Humanity, in French humanity, Latin humanitas, from humanv^ and homx), man signifies the quahty of be- longing to a man, or having what is common to man. Kindness, from kind (see Affectionate). Tenderness, irora tender, is in Latin tener, aUied to tenuis, thin — hence soft, gentle, mild, etc. Benevolence hes in the will, benignity in the disposition or frame of mind; humanity hes in the heart; kindness and tenderness in the affections: benev- olence indicates a general good-will to all mankind; benignity particular good- ness or kindness of disposition; hur manity is a general tone of feehng; kind- ness and tenderness are particular modes of feehng. Benevolence consists in the wish or intention to do good; it is con- fined to no station or object: the benevolent man may be rich or poor, and his benevolence will be exerted wherever there is an opportunity of doing good; benignity is mostly asso- ciated with the power of doing good, and is actually exerted or displayed in the actions or looks. Benevolence in its fullest sense is the sum of moral excel- lence, and comprehends every other virtue; when taken in this acceptation, benignity, humanity, kindness, and tenderness are but modes of benevolence. Benevolence and benignity tend to the communicating of happiness; humanity is concerned in the removal of evil. Benevolence is common to the Creator and His creatures; it differs only in degree; the former has the knowledge and power as well as the will to do good; man often has the will to do good, without having the power to carry it into effect. Benignity is as- cribed to the stars, to Heaven, or to princes; ignorant and superstitious people are apt to ascribe their good fortune to the benign influence of the stars rather than to the gracious dis- pensations of Providence. Humanity belongs to man only; it is his peculiar characteristic, and ought at all times to be his boast; when he throws off this, his distinguishing badge, he loses everything valuable in him; it is a virtue that is indispensable in his pres- ent suffering condition: humanity is as universal in its apphcation as benevo- lence; wherever there is distress, hu- manity fhes to its rehef . Kindness and tenderness are partial modes of affec- tion, confined to those who know or are related to one another; we are kind to friends and acquaintances, tender toward those who are near and dear: kindness is a mode of affection most fitted for social beings; it is what every one can show, and every one is pleased to receive: tenderness is a state of feel- ing that is occasionally acceptable: the young and the weak demand tenderness^ from those who stand in the closest con* BEREAVE 117 nection with them, but this feeling may be carried to an excess, so as to injure the object on which it is fixed. BENIGNITY. See Benevolence. BENT, Curved, Crooked, Awry. For bent see the derivation of bend. Curved is derived from Latin curviis, allied to circus, and means bent so as to form the arc of a circle. Aitm/ is derived from Anglo-Saxon wrigian, to turn, whence voriggle is also derived. Crooked (see Awkward). Bent is here the generic term, all the rest are but modes of the bent; what is bent is opposed to that which is straight; things may therefore be bent to any degree, but when curved they are bent only to a small degree; when crook- ed they are berU, to a great degree: a stick is bent any way; it is curved by being bent one specific way; it is crooked by being bent different ways. Things may be bent by accident or de- sign; they are curved by design or ac- cording to some rule; they are crooked by accident or in violation of some rule: a stick is bent by the force of the hand; a line is curved so as to make a mathe- matical figiire; it is crooked so as to lose all figure: awry marks a species of crookedness, but crooked is apphed as an epithet, and avory is employed to characterize the action; hence we speak of a crooked thing and of sitting or standing awry. Bent, Bias, Inclination, Prepos- session.— Bent (see above). Bias, in French biais, at first signified a slope; its origin is unknown. Inclination, in -French inclination, Latin inclinatio, from inclino, Greek kXivw, signifies a leaning toward. Prepossession, com- poimded of pre and possession, signifies the taking possession of the mind pre- viously or beforehand. All these terms denote a proponderat- ing influence on the mind. Bent is ap- phed to the will, affection, and power in general: bias solely to the judgment: inclination and prepossession, to the state of the feehngs. The bent includes the general state of the mind, and the object on which it fixes a regard: bias, the particular influential power which sways the judging faculty: the one is absolutely considered with regard to itself; the other relatively to its results and the object it acts upon. Bent is sometimes, with regard to bias, as cause is to effect ; we may frequently trace in the particular bent of a person's likes and dislikes the principal bias which determines his opinions. Inclination is a faint kind of bent; prepossession is a weak species of bias; an inclination is a state of something — namely, a state of the feehngs: prepossession is an act- ual something — namely, the thing that We may discover the bent of a per- son's mind in his gay or serious mo- ments, in his occupations, and in his pleasures; in some persons it is so strong that scarcely an action passes which is not more or less influenced by it, and even the exterior of a man will be under its control; ia all disputed matters the support of a party will op- erate more or less to bias the minds of men for or against particular men or particular measures; when we are at- tached to the part that espouses the cause of rehgion and good order, this bias is in some measure commendable and salutary; a mind without inclina- tion would be a blank, and where in- clination is there is the groundwork for prepossession. Strong minds will be strongly bent and labor under a strong bias; but there is no mind so weak and powerless as not to have its in- clinations, and none so perfect as to be without its prepossessions; the mind that has virtuous inclinations will be prepossessed in favor of everything that leans to virtue's side: it were well for mankind were this the only prepos- session; but in the present mixture of truth and error it is necessary to guard against prepossessions as danger- ous anticipations of the judgment: if their object be not perfectly pure, or their force be not quaUfied by the re- strictive powers of the judgment, much evil springs from their abuse. See also Bend; Turn. BENUMBED. See Numb. BEQUEATH- See Devise. BEREAVE, Deprive, Strip. Be- reave, in Anglo-Saxon bereafian, is com- pounded of the verbal prefix be and a root found also in rob, rove, etc., which suggests the idea of taking by violence. Deprive, compoimded of de and prive, French priver, Latin privo, from privus, private, signifies to cause a thing to be 118 BESEECH no longer a man's own. Strip is a Ger- manic word meaning to tear ofif, to make bare. To bereave expresses more than de- prive, but less than strip, which denotes a total and violent bereavement; one is bereaved of children, deprived of pleas- ures, and stripped of property: we are bereaved of that on which we set most value; the act of bereaving does vio- lence to our inclination: we are deprived of the ordinary comforts and con- veniences of life; they cease to be ours: we are stripped of the things which we most want; we are thereby rendered, as it were, naked. Deprivations are preparatory to bereavements; if we can- not bear the one patiently, we may ex- pect to sink under the other: common prudence should teach us to look with unconcern on our deprivations: Chris- tian faith should enable us to consider every bereavement as a step to perfec- tion; that when stripped of all worldly goods we may be invested with those more exalted and lasting honors which await the faithful disciple of Christ. Bereave and deprive are applied only to persons, strip may be figuratively applied to things. BESEECH. See Beg. BESET. See Besiege. BESIDES, Moreover. Besides — that is, by the side, next to — marks simply the connection which subsists between what goes before and what follows. Moreover — that is, more than aU else — marks the addition of some- thing particular to what has already been said. Thus, in enumerating the good quahties of an individual, we may say "he is, besides, of a peaceable dis- position." On concluding any sub- ject of question, we may introduce a further cause by a moreover. "More- over, we must not forget the claims of those who wiU suffer by such a change." Besides, Except. — Besides, which is here taken as a preposition, expresses the idea of addition. Except expresses that of exclusion. There were many there besides ourselves; no one except ourselves will be admitted. BESIEGE, Beset, Encompass, In- vest. Besiege, a compound of the Anglo-Saxon be by, and the Old French siege, a seat, signifies, as a transitive, to surround any place with soldiers, as a city or town, in order to take pos- session of it by force; hteraUy, to sit down before a place with the view of capturing it; and, figuratively, to sur- round a person or place, as excited de- positors making a rim on a bank, a crowd pressing the gate-keepers at a game of baseball or football between favorite players. To beset a person or place is to sur- round him or it with or without hostile intent, to press upon him or it on aU sides, and, as applied to a city or for- tification, to entangle it with obstruc- tions, to prevent those within from escaping. To encompass, from Latin cum, with, and passus, pace or step, whence compass, a route that comes together and joins itself — a circular object — ^means to encircle, Uke a body of troops between hostile forces or placed about an objective point, so as to cut off means of communication, rehef, or retreat; and to invest is to blockade, beleaguer, take possession of the out- skirts of a place or army with forces, so as to intercept succor by men or provisions. These terms are all used here in a miUtary sense, and indicate movements intended to force the surrender of an army, a fortification, a strategic point, or a city by, literally, sitting down and waiting. For applications to other purposes see the articles on Invest and Surround. BESPEAK, Betoken, Engage, So- licit. Bespeak, a compound of the Anglo-Saxon be, by, and sprecan, to speak, German besprechen, signifies to speak for or on behalf of a person or thing beforehand, in advance, as to engage an article ahead of the time when it will be wanted. For the derivation of engage see engagement under Battle, engage always being suggestive of a pledge, however it is used. To betoken is to point out something in the future that is hkely to occur from things or conditions known now, to foreshow a result from present indications, to pre- dict or prognosticate, as indications to- night betoken a fair day to-morrow. We engage now to buy or do a thing or go somewhere at a future time, pledge or bind a future undertaking by a contract or oath, promise or assume now an obhgation for a future trans- BICKER 119 action, and we solicit to-day a favor, benefit, or other advantage from an- other that we expect to obtain some other day when it is needed. For the derivation of solicit see Beg. BESTOW. See Allow; Confer; Give. BETIMJ£S, See Soon. BETOKEN. See Augur; Bespeak. BETROTH. See Espouse. BETTER. See Amend. BEWAIL, Bemoan, Lament, For the derivation of bewail see wail. Bemoan is derived from the verbal pre- fix be and Anglo-Saxon nusnan, to mean, intend. Moan in Middle EngUsh means both a communication and a complaint; its significance is no doubt influenced by the accidental effect of the sound, which makes it seem hke an onomatopcetic word. Lament is formed with the suffix m^ntum from the base la, meaning to utter a cry (Latin lamentum). All these terms mark an expression of pain by some external sign. Bewail is not so strong as bemoan, but stronger than lament; bewail and bemoan are expressions of unrestrained grief or anguish: a wretched mother bewails the loss of her child; a person in deep dis- tress bemoans his hard fate: lamenta- tion may arise from simple sorrow or even imaginary grievances: a sensual- ist laments the disappointment of some expected gratification. Bewail and be- moan are always indecorous if not sin- ful expressions of grief which are in- consistent with the profession of a Christian; they are common among the uncultivated, who have not a prop>- er principle to restrain the intemper- ance of their feehngs. There is noth- ing temporal which is so dear to any one that he ought to bewail its loss; nor any condition of things so dis- tressing or desoerate as to make a man bemoan his lot. Lamentations are sometimes allowable; the miseries of others, or our own infirmities and sins, may justly be lamented, BEWILDER. See Abash. BEWILDERMENT. See Amnesia. BEWITCHED. See Spellbound. BEYOND. See Above; Out; Yon- der. BIAS, Prepossession, Prudence. Bias, prepossession (see Bent). Prej- udice, in French prejtidice, Latin prce- jvdidum, compounded of prce, before, and judicium, judgment, signifies a judgnient beforehand — that is, before examination. Bias marks the state of the mind, as leaning to this or that side, so as to determine one's feeUngs or opinions generally; prepossession denotes the previous occupation of the mind with some particular idea or feeUng, so as to preclude the admission of any other; prejudice is a prejudging or predeter- mining a matter without knowing its merits. We may be biased for or against; we are always prepossessed in favor and mostly prejudiced against; the feelings have mostly to do with the bias and prepossession, and the imder- standing or judgment with the prej- udice. Bias and prepossession suppose a something real, whether good or otherwise, which determines the in- chnation of the mind, but prejudice sup- poses a something unreal or false, which misleads the judgment: bi/is and pre- possession may therefore be taken in an indifferent, if not a good sense; prej- udice always in a bad sense: interest or personal affection may bias, but not so as to pervert either the integrity or judgment; prepossessions may be formed of persons at first sight, but they may be harmless, even although they may not be perfectly correct ; pry'vdices prevent the right exercise of the under- standing, and consequently favor the cause of falsehood, as when a person has a prejudice against another, which leads him to misinterpret his actions. See also Bent. BICKER, Contend, Dispute, Quarrel. Bicker is derived from a Celtic source, and is probably allied to peck and the word beak, that with which a bird pecks. Bikere in Middle English meant a skirmish. In Scot- tish speech it means to fight by throw- ing stones, to indulge in strife or con- tention by word of mouth. Contend is derived from Latin contendere, from con, against, and tendere, to stretch; it means to stretch against, to exert one's strength against. To contend is to strive physically or verbally with another, to vie with or against another, to engage in more or less protracted disputes, to take part 120 BID in a debate by opposing another in speech, to support an opinion or state- ment against another. To dispute is to attempt to maintain by argument an opinion different from one that has been advanced by another, to call in question or deny the correctness or justness of any statement or con- clusion. For a critical comparison of the cognate terms contend, contest, and dispute see the article on the former term. A quarrel, in French querelle, an altercation, from the Latin querela, a complaint, is, hterally, an angry dis- pute, an open variance between parties, a ground or reason of dispute, some- thing that gives right to angry reprisal. It is the result of a breach of friendship or concord between persons or nations, a falling out or disagreement between parties, and may lead to a war be- tween nations, or a judicial settlement of the questions in dispute, or a com- mon brawl or petty fight between individuals. The term quarrel is fur- ther considered in connection with dif- ference, dispute, and altercation in the article on Difference. BID. See Call; Offer. BIG. See Great. BIGrOT. See Devotee. BIKE. See Cycle. BILL. See Account. BILLOW. See Wave. BIND, Tie. Bind is a Germanic word, allied to bundle, bend, etc. Tie is a Germanic word from the root also found in tug, so that to tie is to tug or draw things tightly together. The species of fastening denoted by these two words differ both in manner and degree. Binding is performed by circumvolution round a body; tying, by involution within itself. Some bodies are bound without being tied; others are tied without being bound: a wounded leg is bound, but not tied; a string is tied, but not bound; a ribbon may sometimes be bound round the head, and tied under the chin. Bind- ing, therefore, serves to keep several things in a compact form together; tying may serve to prevent one single body separating from another: a criminal is bound hand and foot; he is tied to a stake. Binding and tying hke- wise differ in degree; binding serves to produce adhesion in all the parts of a body; tying only to produce contact in a single part: thus, when the hair is bound, it is almost enclosed in an envelope: when it is tied with a string, the ends are left to hang loose. A similar distinction is preserved in the figurative use of the terms. A bond of union is applicable to a large body with many component parts; a tie of affection marks an adhesion between individual minds. Bind, Oblige, Engage. — Bind (see above). Oblige, in French obliger, Latin obligo, compoimded of ob, to, and ligo, signifies to tie up. Engage, in French engager, compounded of en or in and gage, a pledge, signifies to bind by means of a pledge. Bind is more forcible and coercive than oblige; oblige than engage. We are bound by an oath, obliged by cir- cumstances, and engaged by promises. Conscience binds, prudence or neces- sity obliges, honor and principle engage. A parent is bound no less by the law of his conscience than by those of the community to which he belongs to provide for his helpless offspring. Politeness obliges men of the world to preserve a friendly exterior toward those for whom they have no regard. When we are engaged in the service of our king and country, we cannot shrink from our duty without exposing our- selves to the infamy of all the world. We bind a man by a fear of what may befall him; we oblige him by some im- mediate urgent motive; we engage him by alluring offers and the prospect of gain. A debtor is bound to pay by virtue of a written instrument in law; he is obliged to pay in consequence of the importunate demands of the creditor; he is engaged to pay in con- sequence of a promise given. A bond is the strictest deed in law; an obliga- tion binds under pain of a pecxmiary loss; an engagement is mostly verbal, and rests entirely on the rectitude of the parties. See also Ratify, BIPLANE. See Aircraft. BISHOPRIC, Diocese. Bishopric is derived from bishop, and the Anglo- Saxon rice, meaning dominion, realm. Bishop comes from Greek ivioKovoQ, overseer, whence episcopal is directly. BLAME 121 taken over into English. Diocese, in Greek SioiKr\aiQ, compounded of Sia and oAt«(o, administer throughout, sig- nifies the district within which a gov- ernment is administered. Both these words describe the extent of an episcopal jurisdiction; the first with relation to the person who offi- ciates, the second with relation to the charge. There may, therefore, be a bishopric either where there are many- dioceses or no diocese; but according to the import of the term, there is properly no diocese where there is no oishopric. When the jurisdiction is merely titular, as in countries where the Cathohc rehgion is not recognized, it is a bishopric, but not a diocese. On the other hand, the bishopric of Rome, or that of an archbishop, comprehends all the dioceses of the subordinate bishops. Hence it arises that when we speak of the ecclesiastical distribu- tion of a coimtry, we term the divisions bishoprics; but when we speak of the actual office, we term it a diocese. Eng- land is divided into a certain number of bishoprics, not dioceses. Every bishop visits his diocese, not his bish- opric, at stated intervals. BITE. See Nip. BLAME, Censure, Condemn, Re- prove, Reproach, Upbraid, Blame, Old French blasvier, is derived from Latin blasphemare, Greek fiXaaprtfiiiv, to speak ill, whence the word blaspheme, to speak ill of things sacred, is di- rectly taken. Censure (see Accuse). Condemn, in Latin condemno, from con and damnum, loss or damage, signifies hterally to inflict a penalty or to punish by a sentence. Re- prove, from the Latin reprobo, signi- fies the contrary of probo, approve. Reproach, derived through French, from Latin repropriare and proprius, near, signifies to cast back upon or against another. Upbraid comes from Anglo-Saxon up and bregdan, to braid or weave, and also to pull, draw. The original sense of upbraid was probably to lay hands on, hence to attack, to lay to some one's charge. The expression of an unfavorable opinion of a person or thing is the com- mon idea in the signification of these terms. To blame is simply to ascribe a fault to; to censure is to express dis- approbation: the former is less per- sonal than the latter. The thing more than the person is blamed; the person more than the thing is censured. The action or conduct of a person in any particular may be blamed, without re- flecting on the individual; but the p)er- son is directly censured for that which is faulty in himself. Venial or unquestionable faults, or even things that are in themselves amiable, may be the subject of blame, but positive faults are the subject of censure. A person may be blamed for his good-nature and censured for his negUgence. Persons are blamed in general or qual- ified terms, but are censured in terms more or less harsh. Condemn, like blame, though said of personal matters, has more reference to the thing than the person; but that which is condemned is of a more serious nature, and produces a stronger and more unfavorable expression of dis- pleasure or disapprobation, than that which is blamed. Blame and condemn do not neces- sarily require to be expressed in words, but censure must always be conveyed in direct terms. Reprove is even more personal than censure. A reproof passes from one in- dividual to another, or to a certain number of individuals; censure may be pubhc or general. Censure is frequently provoked by ill-nature or some worse feeUng, or dictated by ignorance, as the censures of the vulgar. Reproaching and upbraiding are as much the acts of individuals as reprov- ing, but the former denote the expres- sion of personal feelings, and may be just or unjust; the latter is presumed to be divested of all personal feelings. Reproaches are frequently dictated by resentment or self-interest, upbraid- ings by contempt or wounded feeUngs. Blame, condemn, reproach, and up- braid are apphed to ourselves with the same distinction. Reproof ajid censure are most properly addressed to others: in the following example, censure, as applied to one's self, is not so suitable as blame or condemn. See also Find Fault. 122 BLASPHEMB Blameless, Irreproachable, Unblem- ished, Unspotted, or Spotless. — Blame- less signifies literally void of blame. Irreproachable, that is, not able to be reproached. Unblemished, that is, with- out blemish. Unspotted, that is, with- out spot (see Blemish). Blameless is less than irreproachable; what is blameless is simply free from blame, but that which is irreproachable cannot be blamed, or have any reproach attached to it. It is good to say of a man that he leads a blameless life, but it is a high encomium to say that he leads an irreproachable hfe: the former is but the negative praise of one who is known only for his harmlessness; the latter is the positive commendation of a man who is well known for his in- tegrity in the different relations of society. Unblemished and unspotted are apph- eable to many objects besides that of personal conduct; and when apphed to this, their original meaning sufficiently points out their use in distinction from the former two. We may say of a man that he has an irreproachable or an unblemished reputation, and unspotted or spotless purity of hfe. BLASPHEME. See Swear. BLAZE. See Flame. BLEMISH, Stain, Spot, Speck, Flaw. Blemish is derived through French, possibly from Icelandic blamen, the livid color of a wound, cognate with Enghsh blue. Stain comes from Old French desteindre, from Latin dis, apart, and tingere, to color, and means to discolor. Spot means hterally a thing spat out, hence a wet blot. Speck has a similar origin. Flaw is a Scandinavian word and originally sig- nified a crack or break. In the proper sense blemish is the generic, the rest specific : a stain, a spot, speck, and flaw are blemishes, but there are likewise many blemishes which are neither stains, spots, specks, nor fluws. Whatever takes off from the seemli- ness of appearance is a blemish. In works of art the sUghtest dimness of color or want of proportion is a blem- ish. A stain or spot sufficiently char- acterizes itself as that which is super- fluous and out of its place. A speck is a small spot; and a flaw, which is con- fined to hard substances, mostly con- sists of a faulty indenture on the outer surface. A blemish tarnishes: a stain spoils; a sp^. speck, or flaw disfigures. A blemish is rectified, a stain wiped out, a spot or speck removed. All these terms are employed figura- tively. Even an imputation of what is improper in our moral conduct is a blemish on our rejiutation : the faihngs of a good man are so many spots or specks in the bright hemisphere of his virtue: there are some vices which affix a stain on the character of nations, as well as of the individuals who are guilty of them. In proportion to the excellence or purity of a thing, so is any flaw the more easily to be dis- cerned. Blemish, Defect, Fault. — Blemish (see above). Defect is derived from the past participle of deficere, Latin, from de and facere, and means undone, some- thing not made or made in the wrong way. Fault, French faillir, is derived from Latin fallere, to deceive, and sig- nifies that which is wanting in truth and propriety. Blemish respects the exterior of an object: defect consists in the want of some specific propriety in an object; fault conveys the idea not only of some- thing wrong, but also of its relation to the author. There is a blemish in fine china; a defect in the springs of a clock; and a fault in the contrivance. An ac- cident may cause a blemish in a fine painting; the course of nature may occasion a defect in a person's speech; but the carelessness of the workman is evinced by the faults in the workman- ship. A blemish may be easier remedied than a defect is corrected or a faidt repaired. BLEND. See Mix. BLIND. See Cloak. BLOCKADE. See Surround. BLOCKHEAD. See Ninny. BLONDE, Golden, Flaxen, Fair, Xanthous. AH these words indicate a type of fair hair and coloring opposed to brunette or dark. Blonde, a word of unknown origin which appears in Medieval Latin and French, signified "a colour midway between golden and hght chestnut" (Littre). Golden sig- nifies of the color of gold; flaxen of the color of flax, which is fighter than gold and not so bright. Fair is extended BLOW 123 from its meaning of beautiful to indi- cate the coloring considered most beau- tiful— i. e., the blonde coloring, and is, next to blonde, the word most gen- erally apphed to signify, not the hair alone, but the whole coloring. Xan- thous, Greek, ZavQoq, yellow is the ethnological term indicating the blonde races. BLOODTHIRSTY. See Sangui- nary. BLOODY. See Sanguinary. BLOT, Expunge, Rase, or Erase, Efface, Cancel, Obliterate. Blot, signifying a spot, is derived from Old French blotte, a clot of earth, probably of Teutonic origin. Expunge, in Latin expunge, compounded of ex and pun- gere, to prick, signifies to put out by pricking with any sharp instrument. Erase, in Latin erasus, participle of erado-—tha,t is, e and rado found in abrade, to scratch out. Eface, from ex, out, and fades, face, means to re- move the face of something. Cancel, in French canceller, Latin cancello, from cancelli, lattice-work, signifies to strike out with cross-lines. Obliterate, in Latin obliteratus, participle of oblitero, compounded of ob and litera, letter, sig- nifies to cover over letters. All these terms obviously refer to characters that are impressed on bodies; the first three apply in the proper sense only to that which is written with the hand, and bespeak the manner in which the action is per- formed. Letters are blotted out, so that they cannot be seen again; they are expunged, so as to signify that they cannot stand for anything; they are erased, so that the space may be re- occupied with writing. The last three are extended in their application to other characters formed on other sub- stances: efface is general, and does not designate either the manner or the object: inscriptions on stone may be effaced, which are rubbed off so as not to be visible: cancel is principally con- fined to written or printed characters; they are cancelled by striking through them with the pen; in this manner leaves or pages of a book are cancelled which are no longer to be reckoned: obliterate is said of all characters, but without defining the mode in which they are put out; letters are obliterated which are in any way made illegible. Efface apphes to images, or the repre- sentations of things; in this manner the likeness of a person may be effaced from a statue; cancel resp>ects the sub- ject which is written or printed; ob- literate respects the single letters which constitute words. Efface is the conse- quence of some direct action on the thing which is effaced; in this man- ner writing may be effaced from a wall by the action of the elements: cancel is the act of a person, and al- ways the fruit of design: obliterate is the fruit of accident and circumstances in general; time itself may obliterate characters on a wall or on pap)er. The metaphorical use of these terms is easily deducible from the preceding explanation; what is figuratively de- scribed as written in a book may be said to be blotted; thus our sins are blotted out of the book by the atoning blood of Christ: when the contents of a book are in part rejected, they are aptly described as being expunged; in this manner the freethinking sects ex- punge everything from the Bible which does not suit their purpose, or they expunge from their creed what does not humor their passions. When the memory is represented as having characters impressed, they are said to be erased when they are, as it were, di- rectly taken out and occupied by others; in this manner, the recollec- tion of what a child has learned is easily erased by play; and with equal propriety sorrows may be said to efface the recollection of a person's image from the mind. From the idea of striking out or cancelling a debt in an account-book, a debt of gratitude, or an obUgation, is said to oe cancelled. As the hneaments of the face corre- sponded to written characters, we may say that all traces of his former great- ness are obliterated. BLOW, Stroke. Blow is a word of obscure history from a Teutonic root meaning to strike. Stroke, from the word strike, is a substantive allied to the verb strike, and denotes the act of striking. Blow is used abstractedly to denote the effect of violence; stroke is em- ployed relatively to the person pro- ducing that effect. A blow may be 124 BLUNDER received by the carelessness of the receiver or by a pure accident; but strokes are dealt out according to the design of the giver. Children are al- ways in the way of getting blows in the course of their play, and of receiving strokes by way of chastisement. A blow may be given with the hand, or with any flat substance; a stroke is rather a long-drawn blow given with a long instrument, like a stick. Blows may be given with the flat part of a sword, and strokes with a stick. Blow is seldom used but in the proper sense; stroke sometimes figuratively, as a stroke of death or a stroke of fortime. See also Knock. BLUNDER. See Errok.. BLUNT. See Obtuse. BLUSTER. See Gasconade. BOAST. See Glory. BODILY. See Corporal. BODY, Corpse, Carcass. Body, Anglo-Saxon bodig, is derived from the root meaning to bind, and signifies that which confines the fife or spirit. It is here taken in the special sense of dead body. Corpse, from Latin corpus, body, represents the same kind of specialization — the general word for body being hmited to the body in a single state. Carcass has been intro- duced through French from Italian carcassa, a kind of shell, the dead body being an empty shell. The word is ultimately derived from Persian. Body is applicable either to men or brutes, corpse to men only, and carcass to brutes only, unless when taken in a contemptuous sense. When speaking of any particular person who is de- ceased, we should use the simple term body; the body was sidfered to He too long unburied: when designating its condition as lifeless, the term corpse is preferable: he was taken up as a corpse; when designating the body as a lifeless lump separated from the soul, it may be characterized (though contemptuously) as a carcass; the fowls devour the carcass. BOISTEROUS. See Violent. BOLD, Fearless, Intrepid, Un- daunted. fioW (see Audacity). Fear- less signifies without fear (see Appre- hend). Intrepid, compounded of in, privative, and trepidiis, trembhng, marks the total absence of fear. C7n- daunted is the opposite of daunted, daunt being derived from the Latin verb domitare, to tame, aUied to Eng- lish tame. Boldness is a positive characteristic of the spirit; fearlessness is a negative state of the mind, that is, simply an absence of fear. A person may be bold through fearlessness, but he may be fearless without being bold; he may be fearless where there is no appre- hension of danger or no cause for apprehension, but he is bold only when he is conscious or apprehen- sive of danger, and prepared to en- counter it. A man may be fearless in a state of inaction; he is bold only in action, or when in a frame of mind for action. Intrepidity is properly a mode of fear- lessness, undauntedness a mode of bold- ness in the highest degree, displayed only on extraordinary occasions; he is intrepid who has no fear where the most fearless might tremble; he is undaunted whose spirit is unabated by that which would make the stoutest heart yield. Intrepidity may be shown either in the bare contemplation of dangers or in the actual encountering of dangers in opposing resistance to force. Undauntedness is the opposing actual resistance to a force which is calculated to strike with awe. See also Daring; Stalwart; Strenuous. BOLDNESS, See Audacity. BOMBASTIC. See High-flown; Turgid. BONDAGE. See Servitude; Thraldom. BOOTY, Spoil, Prey. Booty comes through Old French butin, from Low German, signifying prey. Spoil is derived from Latin spolium, meaning skin stripped off, referring to the stripping off of the dress of a slain warrior. Prey is derived from Latin proeda, that which is taken or carried off. Booty and spoil are used as military terms in attacks on an enemy, prey in cases of particular violence. The sol- dier gets his booty, the combatant his spoils, the carnivorous animal his prey. Booty respects what is of personal ser- vice to the captor; spoils, whatever BORDER 125 serves to designate his triumph; jn-ey includes whatever gratifies the appetite and is to be consumed. When a town is taken, soldiers are too busy in the work of destruction and mischief to carry away much booty; in every battle the arms and personal property of the slain enemy are the lawiful spoils of the victor; the hawk pounces on his prey and carries it up to his nest. Greedi- ness stimulates to take booty; ambition produces an eagerness for spoils; a ferocious appetite impels to a search for prey. Among the ancients the prisoners of war who were made slaves constituted a part of their booty; and even in later periods such a captm-e was good booty when ransom was paid for those who could Mberate themselves. Among some savages the head or hmb of an enemy constituted part of their spoils. Among cannibals the prisoners of war are the prey of the conquerors. Booty and prey are often used in an extended and figurative sense. Plun- derers obtain a rich booty; the diUgent bee returns loaded with his booty. It is necessary that animals should be- come a prey to man, in order that man may not become a prey to them; everything in natm-e becomes a prey to another thing, which in its turn falls a vrey to something else. All is changea but order. Man is a prey to the diseases of his body or his mind, and after death to the worms. BORDER, Edge, Rim or Brim, Brink, Margin, Verge. Border, in French bord or bordure, Teutonic bord, is probably connected with bret, board, signifying a strip in shape like a board. Edge comes from Anglo-Saxon ecg, border; and rim from Anglo-Saxon rima, which has the same meaning. Brim is a Middle Enghsh word which does not app>ear in Anglo-Saxon, though it has Teutonic parallels. Brink comes from the Scandinavian. Margin is de- rived from Latin margo, a border or brink, cognate with Enghsh mark, a boundary. Verge, French t}erge, from Latin virga, at first signified a rod, wand, or hoop; from the sense of rod it came to mean hoop (a bent rod — ^bent to form a circle), a ring, hence rim or edge. Of these terms, border is the least definite point; edge the most so; rim and brink are species of edge; warain and verge are species of border. A bor- der is a stripe, an edge is a line. The border hes at a certain distance from the edge; the edge is the exterior ter- mination of the surface of any sub- stance. Whatever is wide enough to admit of any space round its circum- ference may have a border, whatever comes to a narrow extended surface has an edge. Many things may have both a border and an edge; of this de- scription are caps, gowns, carpets, and the like; others have a border, but no edge, as lands; and others have an edge, but no border, as a knife or a table. A rim is the edge of any vessel; and brim is the exterior edge of a cup; a brink is the edge of any precipice or deep place; a margin is the border of a book or a piece of water; a verge is the extreme border of a place. Border, Boundary, Frontier, Confine, Precinct. — Border (see above). Boun- dary, from Old French bonne, a limit, Low Latin bodina, is derived from a Celtic word signifying hmit, and is alUed to bourne. Frontier, French frontikre, from the Latin frons, a fore- head, signifies the fore part, or the commencement of anything. Confine, in Latin confinis, compoimded of con or cum and finis, an end, signifies an end next to an end. Precinct, in Latin prcecindum, participle of prcecingo — that is, prce and cingere, to enclose — signifies any enclosed place. Border, boundary, frontier, and corif fines are all apphed to countries or tracts of land: the border is the outer edge or tract of land that runs along a country; it is mostly apphed to coun- tries running on a fine with each other, as the borerformea by means of a blow; rack- ing by that of a violent concussion or straining; but rending and tearing are the consequences of a pull or a sudden snatch. Anything of wood or stone is broken; anything of a complicated structure, with hinges and joints, is racked; cloth is rent, paper is torn. Rend is sometimes used for what is done by design; a tear is always faulty. Cloth is sometimes rent rather than cut 130 BREAK when it is wanted to be divided; but when it is torn it is injured. To tear is also used in the sense not only of divid- ing by violence that which ought to re- main whole, but by separating one ob- ject from another; as to tear anything off or out, etc. In the moral or figurative applica- tion, break denotes in general a division or separation more or less violent of that which ought to be united or bound ; as to break a tie, to break an engagement or promise. To rack is a continued ac- tion; as to rack the feelings, to place them in a violent state of tension. To rend is figuratively applied in the same sense as in the proper application, to denote a sudden division of what has been before whole; as to rend the heart, to have it pierced or divided, as it were, with grief; so likewise to rend the air with shouts. To tear is metaphorically separating objects from one another "which are united; as to tear one's self from the company of a friend. Break, Bruise, Squeeze, Pound, Crush. — Break (see above). Bruise, Anglo- 'Saxon brysan in the compound to-bry- san, to bruise, is also found in Old French bruiser, to break. It may be a Celtic word. Squeeze, Late Middle English queisan, is derived from ex, and Anglo-Saxon cwiesan, to crush. Pound, from Anglo-Saxon punian, to pound, is allied to Dutch puin, rubbish, hash, or "a cyment of stones," and Low German pun, chips of stones. Crush, Old French crusir, to crack or break, is derived from a Teutonic root sig- nifying to gnash with the teeth. Break always implies the separation of the component parts of a body; bruise denotes simply the destroying the continuity of the parts. Hard, brittle substances, as glass, are broken; soft, pulpy substances, as flesh or fruits, are bruised. The operation of bruising is performed either by a violent blow or by pressure; that of squeezing by compression only. Metals, particular- ly lead and silver, may be bruised; fruits may be either bruised or squeezed. In this latter sense bruise apphes to the harder substances, or indicates a vio- lent compression; squeeze is used for .soft substances or a gentle compression. The kernels of nuts are bruised; oranges or apples are squeezed. To pound is properly to bruise in a mortar, so as to produce a separation of parts; to cru^h is the most violent and de- structive of all operations, which amounts to the total dispersion of all the parts of a body. What is broken may be made whole again; what is bruised or squeezed may be restored to its former tone and consistency; what is pounded is only reduced to smaller parts for convenience; but what is crushed is destroyed. When the wheel of a carriage passes over any body that yields to its weight, it crushes it to powder. In the figurative sense, cru^h marks a total annihilation: if a conspiracy be not crushed in the bud, it will prove fatal to the power which has suffered it to grow. Break, Burst, Crack, Split. — Break (see preceding). Burst, Anglo-Saxon berstan, is a Teutonic word signifying to break asunder. Crack, Anglo-Saxon cracian, to crack, is apparently an imita- tive word representing a sudden break- ing asunder. Split is apparently bor- rowed from Middle Dutch splitten; it signifies a form of breaking. Break is the general term, denoting any separation or coming apart with more or less force; the rest are par- ticular modes, varied either in the circumstances of the action or the ob- ject acted upon. To break does not specify any particular manner or form of action; what is broken may be broken in two or more pieces, broken short or lengthwise, and the like: to burst is to break suddenly and with violence, frequently also with noise. Everything that is exposed to exter- nal violence, particularly hard sub- stances, are said to be broken; but hol- low bodies, or such as are exposed to tension, are properly said to burst. In the sense of making way or open- ing the same distinction is preserved. To crack and split are modes of breaking lengthwise: the former in ap- phcation to hard or brittle objects, as clay, or the things made of clay; the latter in appUcation to wood, or that which is made of wood. Breaking fre- quently causes an entire separation of the component parts so as to destroy the things; cracking and splitting are but partial separations. BRIGHTNESS 131 BREAKER. See Wave. BREED, Engender. Breed sig- nifies to produce or cherish a brood, a Teutonic word from a root meaning heat or warmth, breed being suggestive of fostering warmth. Engender, from Latin in, in, and generare, from gener, stem of genus, race, means to produce a race. These terms are properly employed for the act of procreation. To breed is to bring into existence by a slow opera- tion: to engender is to be the author or prime cause of existence. So, in the metaphorical sense, frequent quar- rels are apt to breed hatred and ani- mosity: the leveling and inconsistent conduct of the higher classes ia the present age serves to engender a spirit of insubordination and assumption in the inferior order. Whatever breeds acts gradually; whatever engenders produces immediately as cause and effect. Uncleanliness breeds diseases of the body; want of occupation breeds those of the mind; playing at chance games engenders a love of money. See also Race. BREEDING. See Education. BREEZE, Gale, Blast, Gust, Storm, Tempest, Hurricane. All these words express the action of the wind, in different degrees and under dif- ferent circumstances. Breeze, in ItaUan brezza, is in all probability an onomato- poeia for that kind of wind peculiar to Southern climates. Gale is a Scandi- navian word possibly allied to Danish gal, furious, and derived from the root found in Modem English yeU. Blast, Anglo-Saxon bloBst, signifies a blowing. Gnst is allied to the verb gush, signify- ing a wind which gushes out, a sudden blast. Storm is a Germanic word from the root whence stir is also derived, and signifies a great stirring up of the elements. Tempest, in Latin tempestas, or tempus, a time or season, describes that season or sort of weather which is most remarkable, but at the same time most frequent, in Southern climates. Hurricane has been introduced by the Spaniards into European languages from the Caribbee Islands, where it describes that species of tempestuxms wind most frequent in tropical climates. A breeze is gentle; a gale is brisk, but steady; we have breezes in a calm summer's day; the mariner has favor- able gales, which keep the sails on the stretch. A bla^t is impetuous: the ex- halations of a trumpet, the breath of bellows, the sweep of a violent wind, are blasts. A gust is sudden and vehe- ment; gusts of wind are sometimes so violent as to sweep everything before them while they last. Storm, tempest, and hurricane include other particulars besides wind. A storm throws the whole atmosphere into commotion; it is a war of the elements, in which wind, rain, hail, and the hke conspire to disturb the heavens. Tempest is a species of storm which has also thunder and lightning to add to the confusion. Hurricane is a species of storm which exceeds all the rest in violence and duration. Chist, storm, and tempest, which are appliea figuratively, preserve their dis- tinction in this sense. The passions are exposed to gusts and storms, to sudden bursts, or violent and continued agitations; the soul is exposed to tem- pests when agitated with violent and contending emotions. BRIEF. See Laconic; Short. BRIGHT. See Clear; Orient. BRIGHTNESS, Lustre, Splendor, Brilliancy. Brightness, from Anglo- Saxon beorht, shining, is allied to Greek (popKoc, white. Lustre is derived from Late Latin lustrum, a window, Italian Ivstro, "a lustre, a glasse, a shining" (Florio), which comes ultimately from Latin lucere, to shine. Splendor, in French splmdeur, is derived from Latin splendor, from splendere, to shine. Brill- iancy, from French briller, to shine, comes from the Latin of the Middle Ages beryUus, a crystal. Brightness is the generic, the rest are specific terms: there cannot be lustre, splendor, and brilliancy without bright- ness; but there may be brightness where these do not exist. These terms rise in sense; lustre rises on brightness, splendor on lustre, and brilliancy on splendor. Brightness and lustre are ap- plied properly to natural lights; splen- dor and brilliancy have been more com- monly applied to that which is artifi- cial or unusual: there is always more or less brightness in the sun or moon; there is an occasional lustre in all the heavenly bodies when they shine in 132 BRILLIANCY their unclouded brightness; there is splendor in the eruptions of flame from a volcano or an immense conflagration; there is brilliancy in a collection of dia- monds. There may be both splendor and brilliancy in an illumination: the splendor arises from the mass and rich- ness of light; the brilliancy from the variety and brightness of the lights and colors. Brightness may be obscured, lustre may be tarnished, splendor ana brilliancy diminished. The analogy is closely preserved in the figurative apphcation. Brightness attaches to the moral character of men in ordinary cases, l-ustre attaches to extraordinary instances of virtue and greatness, splendor and brilliancy attach to the achievements of men. Our Savioiw is strikingly represented to us as the brightness of his Father's glory and the express image of His person. The himaanity of the English m the hour of conquest adds a liistre to their victories, which are either splendid or brilliant, according to the number and natiu-e of the circum- stances which render them remarkable. BRILLIANCY. See Brightness; Radiance. BRILLIANT. See Gorgeous. BRIM. See Bor-DCR. BRING, Fktch, Carry. Bring, Anglo-Saxor. bringan, is a widely dis- tributed Germanic word. Fetch, Anglo- Saxon feccan, to fetch, is alhed to feet, a pace, a step, and Latin pes, a foot; and meant to go to get something. Carry (see Bear; Carry). To bring is simply to take with one's self from the place where one is; to fetch is to go &-st to a place and then bring a thing; to fetch, therefore, is a species of bringing; whatever is near at hand is brought; whatever is at a distance must be /ete/ierf; the porter at an inn brings a parcel, a servant who is sent for it fetches it. Bring always respects motion toward the place in which the speaker resides; fetch, ' a motion both to and from; carry, al- ways a motion directly from the place or at a distance from the place. A servant brings the parcel home which his master has sent him to fetch; he carries a parcel from home. A carrier carries parcels to and from a place, but he does not bring parcels to and from any place. Bring is an action performed at the option of the agent; fetch and carry are mostly done at the command of another. Hence the old proverb, "He who will fetch will carry," to mark the character of the gossip and tale-bearer, who reports what he hears from two persons in order to please both parties. BRINK. See Border. BRISK. See Action. BRITTLE. See Fragile. BROAD. See Large. BROIL. See Quarrel. BROOK, Bear, Endure, Stand. Brook is derived from Anglo-Saxon bruxxm, to enjoy. For the derivations of bear and endure, see Bear. For the derivation of stand see that key-word. The term applies generally to the atti- tude of a person toward others. We bear with the company or actions of another whom we may dishke, from the impulse of politeness or pohcy, with conditions that are uncongenial because they are forced upon us or are ima voidable by us; we endure, or put up with, people, conditions, and ob- jects because we are obliged to do so, or because it would not be convenient or prudent for us to do otherwise: and for similar reasons we permit or allow things to be said or done that are dis- tasteful. The term stand, colloquially, has a very intimate relation to brook, as we say we will brook no delay, in- terference, postponement, and the hke, in matters that concern ua closely, implying that we will not stand, per- mit, or put up with any such actions. BRUISE. See Break. BRUTAL. See Heartless. BRUTE. See Animal. BUD. See Germ; Sprout. BUFFOON. See Fool. BUILD, Erect, Construct. Build, Anglo-Saxon byldan, is allied to bold, a house, Icelandic bol, a house, etc., and signifies the making of a house. Erect, in French eriger, Latin erectv^, participle of erigere, means to set up straight. Construct, in Latin construc- tu^, participle of construo, compounded of con, together, and struere, to pile or put, signifies to build by piling stones one on top of another, etc. The word build by distinction ex- presses the purpose of the action; erect BUSINESS 133 indicates the mode of the action; con- struct indicates contrivance in the action. What is huilt is employed for the purpose of receiving, retaining, or confining; what is erected is placed in an elevated situation; what is con- structed is put together with ingenuity. All that is huilt may be said to be erected or constructed; but all that is erected or constructed is not said to be built; likewise what is erected is mostly constructed, though not vice versa. We build from necessity; we erect for orna- ment; we construct for utihty and con- venience. Houses are built, monu- ments erected, machines are constructed. See also Found. BUILDER, See Akchitect, BULK. See Size. BULKY, Massive. Bulky denotes having bulk, from a root signifying to swell, which appears in bowl, bulge, belly, etc. It is a Scandinavian word. Massive, in French massif, from mass, signifies having a mass or being like a mass, which is in the Grerman masse, Latin massa, Greek fia^a, dough, from liaaauv, to knead, signifying made into a soUd substance. Whatever is bulky has a prominence of figure; what is Tnassive has compact- ness of matter. The bulky, therefore, though larger in size, is not so weighty as the massive. HoUow bodies fre- quently have buik; none but sohd bodies can be massive. A vessel is bulky in its form; lead, silver, and_gold are massive. BULLY. See Hector. BUNGLE, Botch, Mismanage, Spoil. Bungle, a word of imitative origin, signifies in ordinary language to do anything clumsily, to mismanage, or execute badly an affair through ignorance, clumsiness, or awkward- ness. Botch, a word of imitative origin allied to paich, a piece of work, means to put together carelessly, as a patch on anything, or a part of any work so finished that it looks worse than the rest or unbecoming to it. Spoil means to render useless, to disfigure beyond recognition, to mar, damage, or ruin anything, or by careless work to cause an object to deteriorate in appearance or value. BUOYANT. See Sanguine. BURDEN. See Freight; Weight. BURDENSOME. See Heavy. BURIAL, Interment, Sepulture. Burial, allied to bury, Anglo-Saxon byrigan, is derived from heorgan, to hide, and means to hide in the ground. Interment, from inter, compounded of in, and terra, signifies the putting into the ground. Sepulture, in French sepul- ture, Latin sejndtura, is derived from sepelire, to bury. Under burial is comprehended simply the purpose of the action; under inter- ment and sepulture, the manner as well as the motive of the action. We bury in order to conceal; interment and sepulture are accompanied with relig- ious ceremonies. Bury is confined to no object or place; we bury whatever we deposit in the earth, and wherever we please; but interment and sepulture respect only the bodies of the deceased when deposited in a sacred place. Burial requires that the object be con- cealed under ground; interment may be used for depositing in vaults. Self- murderers were formerly buried in the highways; Christians in general are buried in the churchyard; but the kin^ of England were formerly interred m Westminster Abbey. Burial is a term in famihar use; interment serves fre- quently as a more elegant expression; sepulture is an abstract term confined to particular cases, as in speaking of the rites and privileges of sepulture. BURIAL-GROUND. See Necrop- olis. BURLESQUE. See Caricatube; Travesty; Wit. BURNING. See Hot. BURST. See Break. BUSINESS, Occupation, Employ- ment, Engagement, Avocation. Busi- ness signifies that which makes busy (see Active). Occupation, from Latin occupare, compounded of ob, near, and capere, to take, signifies that which serves or takes possession of a person or thing .to the exclusion of other things. Employment, in French emploi, is de- rived from Latin implico (whence im- plicate), signifying to enfold, employ- ment being that which enfolds one, shuts one off from other activities; compare the phrase "wrapped up in his work" for a similar metaphor. Engagement (see Attract). Avocation, in Latin cufocatio, from a, away, and 134 BUSINESS vocare, to call, signifies the thing that calls off from another thing. Business occupies all a person's thoughts as well as his time and pow- ers; occupation and employment occupy only his time and strength: the first is mostly regular, it is the object of our choice; the second is casual, it de- pends on the will of another. Engage- ment is a partial employment, avoca- tion a particular engagement: an engage- ment prevents us from doing anything else; an avocation calls oflf or prevents us from doing what we wish. Every tradesman has a business, on the dill- gent prosecution of which depends his success in life; every mechanic has his daily occupation, by which he main- tains his family; every laborer has an employment which is fixed for him. Business and occupation always sup- pose a serious object. Bu^ness is something more urgent and important than occupation: a man of indepen- dent fortune has no occasion to pursue business, but as a rational agent he will not be contented to be without an occupation. Employment, engagement, and avoca- tion leave the object undefined. An employment may be a mere diversion of the thought and a wasting of the hours in some idle pursuit; a child may have its employment, which may be its play in distinction from its bu^- ness: an engagement may have no high- er object than that of pleasure; the idlest people have often the most en- gagements; the gratification of curiosity and the love of social pleasiu-e supply them wth an abundance of engage- ments. Avocations have seldom a di- rect trifling object, although it may sometimes be of a subordinate nature, and generally irrelevant: numerous avocations are not desirable; every man should have a fixed pursuit, as the business of his life, to which the princi- pal part of his time should be devoted: avocations, therefore, of a serious nature are apt to divide the time and attention to a hurtful degree. A person who is busy has much to attend to, and attends to it closely: a person who is occupied has a full share of business without any pressure; he is opposed to one who is idle: a per- son who is employed has the present mo- ment filled up; he is not in a state of inaction: the person who is engaged is not at hberty to be otherwise employed; his time is not his own; he is opposed to one at leisure. Business, Trade, Profession, Art. — Business (see above). Trade signifies that which employs the time by way of trade. Profession signifies that which one professes to do. Art signifies that which is followed in the way of the arts. These words are synonymous in the sense of a calling for the purpose of a Uvelihood: bu^ness is general, trade and profession are particular; all trade is bvMness, but all bvMness is not trade. Buying and selling of merchandise ia inseparable from trade; but the exer- cise of one's knowledge and exp>eri- ence for purposes of gain constitutes a buMness: when learning or particular skill is required, it is a profession; and when there is a peculiar exercise of art, it is an art; every shopkeeper and retail dealer carries on a trade; brokers, manufacturers, bankers, and others carry on buMness; clergymen, medical or military men foUow a profession; musicians and painters follow an art. Bu^ness, Office, Duiy. — Bu^ness (see above). Offi^ (see Benefit). Duly signifies what is due or owing one, based on French du, Latin debitum, participle of debere, to owe. Business is that which engages the time, talents, and interest of a man; it is what a man proposes to himself: office is that which a man is called upon to do for another; it is consequently prescribed by others: duty is that which duty prescribes: one follows btisiness, fills or discharges an offi^x, and per- forms or discharges a duly. As busi- ness is the concern of the individual, and duty is his duty, these terms prop- erly apply to private matters as the business or duties of fife: offi/:e, on the other hand, being that which is done for the benefit or by the direction of others, is properly apphed to pubUc matters. But the terms may be so qualified that the former may be apphed to pub- he, and the latter to private matters. Business and office are frequently ap- phed to that part which a man ia called to perform; in which sense busi- BUY 135 ness and office come still nearer to the term dtUy; what belongs to a person to do or see done, that is projjerly his business: a person is bound, either by the nature of his engagements or by private and personal engagements or f)rivate and personal motives, to per- orm a service for another, as the office of a prime minister, the office of a friend; that is his office. Duty in this apphca- tion expresses a stronger obhgation than either of the other terms; where the service is enjoined by law, or com- manded by the person, that is a duty, as the clerical duties, the duiy of a soldier. See also Affair. BUSTLE, Tumult, Uproar. Bustle is a Scandinavian word, a frequentative of the Norwegian bu^ta, to be violent, and related to Icelandic btistla, to splash about like a fish, and to English boast, boisterous, etc. Tumult, Latin tumiiltus, is derived from Latin tumere, to swell, surge up, whence tumor is also derived. Uproar is derived from Dutch op, up, and roeren, to excite, stir, move, and signified originally a stirring up: but its meaning has been influenced by its similarity to EngUsh roar. Bustle has most of hurry in it ; tumult most of disorder and coniusion; uproar most of noise: the hurried movements of one, or many, cause a bustle; the disorderly struggles of many constitute a tumult; the loud elevation of many opposing voices produces an uproar. Bustle is frequently not the effect of design, but the natural consequence of many persons coming together; tumuU commonly arises from a general effervescence in the minds of a multi- tude; uproar is the consequence either of general anger or mirth. A crowded street will always be in a bustle; con- tested elections are always accompanied with a great tumult; drinking-parties make a considerable uproar, in the in- dulgence of their intemperate mirth. BUSY. See Active. BUT, Except. As a conjunction but implies something more to supply, unless, yet, nevertheless, than, ana otherwise than, and is used where a second sentence or clause is in opposi- tion to the one preceding it, to arrest an inference which the first sentence or clause would otherwise have sug- gested. As an adverb, it inlphes only; as a proposition, technically, a term of separation or exclusion, it signifies excepting; as an interjection it ex- presses surprise or dissent; as a sub- stantive, a hindrance or impediment, also the outer room of a house of two or more apartments where the inner room is entered from the other. In logic, bui is the connecting word which introduces the minor term of a syllo- gism; in mathematics, it denotes what is assumed or proved. As a coniunction but is a synonyme of yet. Yet denotes a stronger degree of opposition than but. As a preposition but is a synonyme of except. There is little difference in meaning between-the two prepositions. Except is somewhat clearer and more emphatic, and may be used to introduce not merely a noun but a noun clause. BUTCHERY. See Carnage. BUTT. See Mark. BUY, Purchase, Bargain, Cheap- en. Buy is derived from Anglo-Saxon bycgan, to buy. Purchase comes from Old French pour (Latin pro) and chacer, to chase, and signifies to hunt for eagerly. Bargain is derived from Late Latin barcaniare, to change about, to chaffer; its remoter origin is unknown. Cheapen, from Anglo-Saxon ceap, price, meant to price, and then to seek to obtain for a small price. Buy and purchase have a strong re- semblance to each other, both in sense and application; but the latter is a term of more refinement than the former: buy may always be substituted for purchase without impropriety; but purchase would be sometimes ridicu- lous in the familiar application of buy: the necessaries of life are bought; luxxiries are purchased. The character- istic idea of buying is that of expending money according to a certain rule and for a particular purpose; that of purchasing is the procurmg the thing by any means; some things, therefore, may more properly be said to be pur- chased than bought, as to purchase friends, ease, and the hke. Buying implies simply the exchange of one's money for a commodity; bar- gaining and cheapening have likewise respect to the price: to bargain is to make a specific agreement as to the 136 BYGONE price; to cheapen is not only to lower the price asked, but to deal in such things as are cheap: trade is supported by buyers; bargainers and cheapeners are not acceptable customers: mean people are prone to bargaining, poor people are obliged to cheapen. BYGONE, Past. Bygone, a com- poimd of the Enghsh by, near, from, after, and gone, departed, moved, as an adjective implies gone by, passed or past, and as a substantive, things that have disappeared, passed away, be- come lost to sight and, in a sense, to memory. From this we have the famil- iar phrase let bygones be bygones, imply- ing let the past be forgotten, doubtless from the old form, bygones suld be by- ganes, the past should not be brought up against one. As an adjective bygone does not reaUy differ in meaning from past. But past is a prosaic word; it merely indicates a fact or a condition. Bygone has a pensive, poetic, slightly archaic quality. BYWORD. See Axiom. CALCULATE 137 CABAL. See CoMBmATioN, CAJOLE. See Coax. CALAMITOUS. See Infelicttous. CALAMITY, Disaster, Misfort- une, Mischance, Mishap. Calamity comes from Latin calamitas, misfort- une; its ultimate origin is unknown. Disaster, in French disastre, is com- poundea of the privative des or dis and astre, in Latin astrum, a star, signify- ing what comes from the adverse in- fluence rf the stars. Misfortune, mis- chanQe, and mishap naturally express what comes amiss by fortime or chance. The idea of a painful event is com- mon to all these terms, but they differ in the degree of impatience. A calami- ty \a a, great disaster or misfortune; a misfortune, a great mischance or mishap: whatever is attended with destruction is a calamity; whatever is accompanied with a loss of property, or the depriva- tion of health, is a misfortune; what- ever diminishes the beauty or utihty of objects is a mischance or mishap: the devastation of a country by hurricanes or earthquakes, and the desolation of its inhabitants by famine or plague, are great calamities; the overturning of a carriage, and the fracture of a liinb, are disasters; losses in trade are misfort- unes; the spoiling of a book is, to a greater or less extent, a mischance or mishap. A calamity seldom arises from the direct agency of man; the elements, or the natural course of things, are mostly concerned in producing this source of misery to men; the rest may be ascribed to chance, as distinguished from design: disasters mostly arise from some specific known cause, either the carelessness of persons or the un- fitness of things for their use; as they generally serve to derange some pre- concerted scheme or undertaking, they seem as if they were produced by some secret influence: mis/or^wne is frequent- ly assignable to no specific cause; it is the bad fortune of an individual; a fink in the chain of his destiny; an evil in- dependent of himself, as distinguished from a fault : mischance and mishap are misfortunes of comparatively 80 trivial a nature that it would not be worth while to inquire into their cause or to dwell upon their consequences. A calamity is dreadful, a disaster melan- choly, a misfortune grievous or heavy, a mischance or mishap shght or trivial. CALCULATE, Reckon, Compute, Count. Calctdate, in Latin calcidatus, participle of calcido, comes from cal- culus, Greek KoXti, a pebble; because the Greeks gave their votes, and the Romans made out their accounts, by httle stones; hence it denotes the action itself of reckoning. Reckon is derived from Anglo-Saxon gerecnian, to explain, from reccan to rule, order, direct, ana refers to an orderly process of thought — to the directing and ordering of one's thoughts or plans. Compute, in French computer, Latin computo, compoimded of com and puio, signifies to put together in one's mind. Count, in French comp- ter, is but a contraction of computer. These words indicate the means by which we arrive at a certain result in regard to quantity. To calculate is the generic term; the rest denote modes of calculating.- to calculate denotes an^ numerical operation in general, but is particularly applicable to the abstract science of figures; the astronomer cal- culates the motions of the heavenly bodies; the mathematician makes alge- braic calculations: to reckon is to enu- merate and set down things in detail; reckoning is apphcable to the ordinary business of fife: tradesmen keep their accounts by reckoning; children learn to reckon by various simple processes. Calctdation is therefore the science, reckoning the practical art of enumerat- ing. To compute is to come at the result by calculation; it is a sort of numerical estimate drawn from different sources: historians and chronologists compute the times of particular events bv com- paring them with those of other Known events. An almanac is made by cal- cukUion, computation, and reckoning. The rising and setting of the heavenly 138 CALENDAR bodies are calculated; from given as- tronomical tables is computed the mo- ment on which any celestial phenom- enon may return; and by reckoning are determined the days on which hohdays, or other periodical events, fall. To count is as much as to take ac- count of, and when used as a mode of calculation it signifies the same as to reckon one by one; as to count one by one, to count the hours or minutes. These words are all employed in ap- phcation to moral objects, to denote the estimate which the mind takes of tilings. To calculate is to look to fut- lu-e events and their probable conse- quences; we calculate on a gain, on an undertaking, or any enterprise: to compute is to look to that which is past and what results from any past event, as to compute a loss, or the amount of any mischief done: to reckon is either to look at that which is present, and to set an estimate upon it; as to reckon a thing cheap; or to look to that which is future as something desirable, as to reckon on a promised pleasure. To count is to look on the thing that is present, and to set a value upon it ac- cording to circumstances, as to count a thing for nothing. A spirit of calcu- lation arises from the cupidity engen- dered by trade; it narrows the mind to the mere prospect of accumulation and self-interest. Compulations are inac- curate that are not founded upon exact niunerical calculations. Inconsiderate people are apt to reckon on things that are very imcertain, and then lay up to themselves a store of disappointments. Those who have experienced the in- stabiUty of human affairs will never calculate on an hour's enjoyment be- yond the moment of existence. It is difficult to compute the loss which an army sustains upon being defeated, especially if it be obliged to make a long retreat. Those who know the human heart will never reckon on the assistance of professed friends in the hour of adversity. Men often count their hves as nothong in the prosecution of a favorite scheme. CALENDAR, Almanac, Ephem- ERis. Calendar, Latin calendarium, was originally an account book kept by money-changers, so called because in- terest was due on the first of the month, which was termed the Calendce. Almanac is a word of unknown origin which appears in Latin in the thirteenth century, and shortly after that in most of the Romance languages. It may be derived from an Arabic root signifying to reckon. Ephemeris, in Greek eft/ii- epic, from tin and nfiipa, the day, im- plies that which happens by the day. These terms denote a date-book, but the calendar is a book which registers events under every month : the almanac is a book which registers times, or the divisions of the year: and an ephemeris is a book which registers the planetary movements every day. An almanac may be a calendar and an ephemeris may be both an almanac and a calendar; but every almanac is not a calendar, nor every calendar an almanac. The Gar- dener's Calendar is not an almanac, and the sheet almanacs are seldom calendars: hkewise the Nautical Ephem- eris may serve as an almanac, al- though not as a calendar. CALL, Cry, Exclaim. CaM is a word of Scandinavian origin, and sig- nifies simply the raising of the voice. Cry, French crier, Itahan gridare, is derived from Latin quiritare, to shriek or lament, originally signifying to im- plore the aid of the Quirites, or Roman citizens. Exclaim is derived from the Latin ex and clamare, to cry out; both denote a raising the voice louder than a simple call. Call is used on all ordi- nary occasions in order to draw a per- son to a spot, or for any other purpose, when one wishes to be heard; to cry is to call loudly on particular occasions: a call draws attention; a cry awakens alarm. To cry is for general purposes of con- venience, as the cry of the hunter, or the cries of persons to or among num- bers; to exclaim is an expression of some particular feeling. See also Alarm; Name. Call, Invite, Bid, Summon.— CaU, in its abstract and original sense, signifies simply to give an expression of the voice. Bid is derived from Anglo- Saxon beodan, to command. Invite comes from Latin invitus, unwiUing, the unwilling person being one who must be especially requested or invited to do something. Summon is derived CALM 139 from Latin submoneo, from svb and monere, to warn, and signifies to give special notice. The idea of signifying one's wish to another to do anything is included in all these terms. In the act of calling, any sounds may be used; we may caU by simply raising the voice; inviting may be a direct or indirect act; we may invite by looks or signs as well as by words, by writing as well as by speaking. To bid and summon require the ex- press use of words; the former is always directly addressed to the person, the latter may be conveyed by an indirect channel. As the action of calling requires no articulate sounds, it may be properly apphed to animals; as sheep call their young. So likewise to inanimate objects when made to sound by way of signal or for the purpose of calling. So hkewise invite may be said not only of unconscious, but spiritual agents. Calling is the act of persons of all ranks, superiors, inferiors, or equals; it may therefore be either a command, a demand, or a simple request. Parents and children, masters and servants, call to each other as the occasion requires. Bidding is always the act of a su- perior by way of command or entreaty. Inviting is an act of courtesy or kind- ness between equals. To summ^m is an act of authority, as to summon witnesses. When these words are employed in the sense of causing any one to come to a place, call and summon are most nearly aUied, as are also bid and invite. In this case to call is an act of discre- tion on ordinary occasions, and per- formed in an ordinaiy manner; as to caU a meeting, to call together, to call home: to summon is a formal act, and more or less imperative according to the occasion; as to summon a jury. Bidding and inviting, though acts of kindn^, are distingiiished as before according to the condition of the per- son; bid is properly the act of a su- perior, and invite of an equal, or one entitled to the courtesies of life. These terms may all be used in the figurative apphcation with a similar distinction in sense. Things personi- fied may be said to call, summon, bid, invite. Things personified may also be said to be called, invited, bidden, or sumn moned. CALLING. See Vocation. CALLOUS. See Hard. CALM, Composed, Collected. Calm (see Appease). Composed, from the verb compose, marks the state of being composed; and collected, frorn^ collect, the state of being collected. These terms agree in expressing a state; but calm respects the state of the feelings, composed the state of the thoughts and feehngs, and collected the state of the thoughts more particularly. Calmness is peculiarly requisite in sea- sons of distress, and amidst scenes of horror: composure, in moments of trial, disorder, and tumult: collectedness, in moments of danger. Calmness is the companion of fortitude; no one whose spirits are easily disturbed can have strength to bear misfortune: com- posure is an attendant upon clear- ness of understanding; no one can ex- press himself with perspicuity whose thoughts are any way deranged: col- lectedness is requisite for a determined promptitude of action; no one can be expected to act promptly who cannot think fijcedly. It would argue a want of all feeling to be calm on some oc- casions, when the best affections of our nature are put to a severe trial. Com- posedness of mind associated with the detection of guilt evinces a hardened conscience and an insensibility to shame. Collectedness of mind has con- tributed in no small degree to the pres- ervation of some persons' lives in moments of the most imminent peril. See also Abate; Peace; Quell; Unruffled. Calm, Placid, Serene. — Calm (see above). Placid, in Latin placidus, from vlaceo, please, signifies the state of Being pleasedj or free from uneasiness. Serene is derived from Latin serenus, bright, clear. Calm and serene are applied to the elements; placid only to the mind. Calmness respects only the state of the winds, serenity that of the air and heavens; the weather is calm when it is free from agitation: it is serene when 140 CALUMNIATE free from noise and vapor. Calm re- spects the total absence of all perturba- tion; -placid, the ease and contentment of the mind; serene, clearness and com- posure of the mind. As in the natural world a particular agitation of the wind is succeeded by a calniy so in the mind of man, when an unusual effervescence has been pro- duced, it commonly subsides into a calm; placidity and serenity have more that is even and regular in them; they are positively what they are. Calm is a temporary state of the feehngs; placid and serene are habits of the mind. We speak of a calm state, but a placid and serene temper. Placidity is more of a natural gift; serenity is acquired: people with not very ardent desires or warmth of feeling will evince placidity; they are pleased with all that passes inwardly or outwardly: nothing con- tributes so much to serenity of mind as a pervading sense of God's good providence, which checks all im- patience, softens down every asperity of humor, and gives a steady current to the feelings. CALUMNIATE. See Asperse. CAMOUFLAGE, Disguise, Mask. Camouflage is a bit of trench slang which bids fair to become a natu- raUzed English word. It is said to have been originally applied to the ac- tor's make-up, and is derived through French camoufler, to disguise, from Latin caput, head, and Low Latin muffulare, to muffle. It referred to the covering of the head or disguising of the features in such a way as to es- cape recognition. It is now applied to the art of concealing or disguising guns, trenches, etc., in such a way that they appear to the enemy to be innocuous features of the natural scenery. In meaning camouflage does not really differ from disguise; in most instances disguise may be substituted for it. But it is a much fresher and more picturesque term, and carries with it a definite suggestion of the romance and adventure of warfare. Mask is a word which also has the fimdamental meaning of disguise, and suggests an image similar to that originally implied by camouflage. But it has not the vividness and timeliness of the new word CAN, May. Can, in the Northern languages konnen, etc., is derived, most probably, from kennen, to know, from the natural intimacy which sub- sists between knowledge and power. May is in German nwgen, to desire or wish, its present meaning having developed from the connections be- tween wishing and compljang with a wish. Can denotes possibility, may Uberty and probability: he who has sound limbs can walk; but he may not walk in places which are prohibited. CANCEL. See Abolish; Blot. CANDID, Open, Sincere. Candid, Latin candidu^, from candere, to shine, signifies to be pure as truth itself. Open, Anglo-Saxon ofen, is possibly al- hed to up, and may have signified, the lifting up of the tent door. Sincere comes from Latin sincerus, pure, un- affected. Candor arises from a conscious purity of intentions; openness, from a warmth of feeling and love of communication; sincerity, from a love of truth. Candor obliges us to acknowledge even that which may make against ourselves; it is disinterested: openness impels us to utter whatever passes in the mind; it is unguarded: sincerity prevents us from speaking what we do not think; it is positive. A can- did man will have no reserve when openness is necessary; an open man cannot maintain a reserve at any time; a sincere man will maintain a reserve only as far as it is con- sistent with truth. Candor wins much upon those who come in connec- tion with it; it removes misunder- standings and obviates differences; the want of it occasions suspicion and discontent. Openness gains as many enemies as friends; it requires to be well regulated not to be offen- sive; there is no mind so pure and disciplined that all the thoughts and feelings which it gives birth to may or ought to be made public. Sincerity is an indispensable virtue; the want of it is always mischievous, frequently fatal. See also Frank. CANONIZATION. See Beatifica- tion. CAPABLE. See Able. CARBUNCLE 141 CAPACIOUS. See Able; Ample. CAPACITY, Capaciousness. Cecific act done in a specific manner. For the same reason casting is ap- plied to what is done by a process of nature, as animals cast their young, or cast their coats, or to what is acted on by unconscious agents; as a ship or a person is cast on a shore. Throwing is not merely an act of di- rect purpose, but frequently of a violent or offensive purpose; as to throw stones or dust at a person, to throw down the gauntlet. So to cast a glance may be simply to direct the eye to an object, but to throw an angry look is the result of anger. The word cast, from the generality of its meaning, is prop>erly employea in the higher style of writmg, and in ref- erence to higher subjects: when throw is used in respect to any but familiar subjects, it is taken figuratively; as to throw a veil over a matter, to throw light upon a subject. When apphed to similar objects, they preserve the same distinction; throwing requires a greater effort or more vio- lence than casting, as to cast away prej- udices, to throw off habits, etc. To hurl is a violent species of throw- ing, employed only on extraordinary occasions. Sometimes it denotes the vehemence of the agent: but still oftener the magnitude of the object or the extremity of the occasion. The giants, who made war against heaven, are feigned to have been hurled by the thunderbolts of Jupiter down to the earth. Cast, Turn, Description. — Cast, from the verb to cast (see above), signifies that which is cast, and here, by an ex- tension of the sense, the form in which it is cast. Turn, from the verb to turn, signifies also the act of turning or the manner of being turned. De- scription signifies the act of describing, or the thing which is to be described. What is cast is artificial; what turns is natural: the former is the act of some foreign agent; the latter is the act of the subject itself: hence cast, as applicable to persons, respects that which they are made by circumstances; turn, that which they are by them- selves: thus there are religious castes in India, that is, men cast in a certain form of religion; and men of a particu- lar moral cast, that is, such as are ca^t in a particular mould as respects their thinking and acting: so in like manner men of a particular turn, that is, as respects their inclinations and tastes. The cast is that which marks a man to others; the turn is that which may be known only to a man's self; the description is that by which he is described or made known to others. CASUAL. See Accidental; Oc- casional. CASUALTY. See Accident. CATALCX5UE. See List. CATEGORICAL, Unqualified, Positive. Categorical is derived from Greek icarayopia, an accusation, and is in logic an unconditional statement, one which does not depend upon a hypothesis or any modifying qualifica- tion. Hence the word has Been ex- tended to mean in general an unquali- fied or positive statement. These two adjectives, though synonymous here, have different original meanings. Un- qualified comes from Latin qualis, how much, and means not questioning or indicating how much — not modified in accordance with any possible stand- ard of measurement. Positive, from positu^, the past participle of ponere, means placed, ready to stand, un- movable. CAUCUS, Private MEETiNa. In this case caucus represents a species of the genus indicated in the words private meeting. Caucus is a purely American term, possibly of Ajnerican Indian origin, from the Algonkin katch-kavMisu, a counsellor. It has, strictly speaking, no real synonymes. The term applies chiefly to political gatherings, or pri- 146 CAU3E vate meetings of representatives of a party, faction, or interest, called to consider a situation and to plan a pro- gramme for action. A caucus by different political parties is generally held prior to an election, at which candidates for office are selected and arrangements perfected for the ensuing campaign. Members of the Congress, of State legislatures, of mimicipal bodies, and even of smaller organizations, meet in caucus prior to the opening sessions, or when deemed necessary, at any time during a session. Members who are entitled to attend a caverns and, from dissatis- faction or other cause fail to do so, are said to holt the caucus — that is, they won't be boimd to any action on which the caucus has decided. CAUSE, Reason, Motive. Cause is supposed to signify originally the same as case; it means, however, now, by distinction, the case or thing hap- pening before another as its cause. Reason, in French raison, Latin ratio, from ratus, participle of reor, to think, signifies the thing thought, estimated, or valued in the mind. Motive, in French motif, from the Latin motus, participle of movere, to move, signifies the thing that brings into action. Cause respects the order and con- nection of things; reason, the move- ments and operations of the mind; motives, the movements of the mind and body. Cause is properly the generic term; reason and motive are specific: every reason or motive is a cause, but every cause is not a reason or motive. Cause is said of all inanimate objects; reason and motive, of rational agents: whatever happens in the world hap- pens from some cause mediate or im- mediate; the primary or first cause of all is God : whatever opinions men hold, they ought to be able to assign a sub- stantial reason for them; and for what- ever they do, they ought to have a suflScient motive. As the cause gives birth to the effect, 80 does the reason give birth to the conclusion, and the motive gives birth to the action. Between cause and ef- fect there is a necessary connection: whatever in the natural world is ca- pable of giving birth to another thing 18 an adequate cause; but in the moral world there is not a necessary connec- tion between reasons and their results, or motives and their actions; the state of the agent's mind is not always such as to be acted upon according to the nature of things ^ every adequate rea- son will not be followed by its natm-al conclusion, for every man wiU not beheve who has reasons to believe, nor yield to the reasons that would lead to a right belief; and every motive will not be accompanied with its corre- sponding action, for every man will not act who has a motive for acting, nor act in the manner in which his motives ought to dictate. Cause, Occasion, Create. — To cause, from the substantive cause, naturally signifies to be the cause of. Occasion, from the noim occasion, signifies to be the occasion of. Create is, in Latin, creatus, participle of creare, to make. What is caused seems to follow natu- rally; what is occasioned follows in- cidentally; or what occasions may be incidental, but necessary: what is created receives its existence arbitrarily. A woimd causes pain; accidents occa- sion delay; busybodies create mischief. The misfortunes of children cause great affliction to their parents; business occasions a person's late attendance at a place; disputes and misunderstand- ings create animosity and ill-will. The cause of a person's misfortune may often be traced to his own misconduct: the improper behavior of one person may occasion another to ask for an ex- planation: jealousies are created in the minds of relatives by an imnecessary reserve and distance. CAUTION. See Admonish; Ca- veat. CAUTIOUS, Wary, Circumspect. For cauiious see CAREFtrL. Wary, Anglo-Saxon wcer, is allied to ward, guard, etc., and to the Greek 6pda>, I see. Circumspect, from circumspicio, look about, signifies literally looking on all sides. The idea of using great care for the preventing of evil is com- mon to these terms, but they vary in the degree and object of the care. Cauiious expresses less than wary: we must be cautious on aU occasions where there is danger, but we must be wary where there is great danger. A trades- man must be cautious in his dealings CELEBRATE 147 with all men, but he must be wary when he has to deal with designing men. Cautious and wary are used in refer- ence to practical matters, or the com- mon matters of business, where the senses or bodily powers are more exer- cised than the mind : circumspect is used in reference to matters of theory or contemplation, when the mind is prin- cipally employed. A traveler must be cautious in passing along a road that is not familiar to him; he must be wary in passing over sUppery and dan- gerous places. A man must be circum- spect when he transacts business of particular importance and delicacy. Hence it is that cautious and wary may be said of the brute creation; circum- spect only of rational beings. CAVEAT, Caution, Warning. Caveat, in Latin the same form, im- plying let him beware, from cavere, to beware, signifies, in law, a judicial warning or caution, an intimation to stay proceedings, an intimation or notice by a party interested in an ap- proaching procedure to the proper officer, to prevent the latter from tak- ing any action without an intimation or notice being given to the said party to enable him to appear and object. A caveat is commonly filed with the proper officer against the probating of a will by an interested party to enable him to contest it or file objections against its probate. Until the caveat is withdrawn by the person who filed it^ the probating process is halted. Hence caveat represents a species of the genus indicated in caution (from the same Latin verb, caveo), and warning (allied to wary). Of these two words warning is a stronger word than caution. We caution others against something which may prove annoying or incon- venient; we warn them against some- thing really dangerous. CAVIL. See Censure. CAVITY. See Opening. CEASE, Leave Off, DiscoNTiNxrE. Cease, in French cesser, Latin cessare, a frequentative of cedere, to yield, sig- nifies to give up or put an end to. Leave, from Anglo-Saxon leaf, per- mission^ is derived from the same root found m the adjective lief, dear or pleasing. Discontinue, with the priva- tive dis, expresses the opposite of continue. To cease is neuter; to leave off and discontinue are active: we cease from doing a thing; we leave off or discon- tinue a thing. Cease is used either for particular actions or general habits: leave off more usually and properly for particular actions; discontinue for gen- eral habits. A restless, sjwiled child never ceases crying until it has ob- tained what it wants; it is a mark of impatience not to cease lamenting when one is in pain. A laborer leaves off his work at any given hour. A dehcate person discontinues his visits when they are foimd not to be agreeable. It should be our first endeavor to cease to do evil. It is never good to leave off working while there is anything to do and time to do it in. The discontinu- ing a good practice without adequate grounds evinces great instabihty of character. CEDE. See Give Up. CELEBRATE, Commemorate. Cele- brate, in Latin celebraius, participle of celebrare, from celeber, populous, signi- fies to gather a big assembly for some festive purpose. Commemorate, in Latin commemoratus, particijjle of coin- memoro, compounded of com or cum and memoro, to keep in mind, signifies to keep in the memory of a number. Commemorate is a species of celebrat- ing; we always commemorate when we celebrate, but not vice versa. Everything is celebrated which is distinguished by any marks of attention, without regard to the time of the event, whether pres- ent or past; but nothing is commemo- rated but what has been past. A mar- riage or a birthday is celebrated; the an- niversary of any national event is com- memaraied. Celebrating is not Umited to any species of events or circum- stances; whatever interests any num- ber of persons is celebrated: commemorat- ing is confined to whatever is thought of sufficient importance to be borne in mind, whether of a public or private nature. The election of a favorite member is celebrated by those who have contributed to his success: a remark- able preservation, whether national or individual, sometimes demands some signal act of commemoration. Celebrating is a festive as well as so- 148 CELEBRATED cial act; it may be sometimes serious, but it is mostly mingled with more or less of gayety and mirth : commemorat- ing is a solemn act; it may be some- times festive and social, but it is al- ways mingled with what is serious, and may be altogether solitary; it is suited to the occasion, and calculated to re- vive in the mind suitable impressions of what is just. The birthday of our sovereign is always celebrated by his people with such marks of honor and congratulation as are due from sub- jects to a prince: the providential es- cape of our nation from destruction by the Gunp)owder Plot is annually com- memorated by a public act of devotion, as also by popular demonstrations of joy. The Jews celebrate their feast of the Passover: as Christians, we com- memorate the sufferings and death of our Saviour by partaking of the Lord's Supper. CELEBRATED. See Famous. CELERITY. See Quickness. CELESTIAL, Heavenly. Celestial and heavenly derive their difference in signification from their different origin : they both Uterally imply belonging to heaven; but the former, from the Latin caelum, signifies belonging to the heaven of heathens; the latter, which has its origin among behevers in the true God, has acquired a superior sense, in regard to heaven as the habita- tion of the Almighty. This distinction is pretty faithfully observed in their application: celestial is apphed mostly in the natural sense of the heavens; heavenly is employed more commonly in a spiritual sense. Hence we speak of the celestial globe as distinguished from the terrestrial; of the celestial bodies; of Olympus, as the celestial abode of Jupiter; of the celestial deities. But, on the other hand, of the heav- enly habitation, of heavenly joys or bhss, of heavenly spirits, and the like. See also Ethereal. CEMETERY. See Necropolis. CENSOR, Critic, Examiner. In- spector. These terms all signify an official whose duty it is to see docu- ments, publications, pubUc perform- ances, etc., and to pass judgment up)on them. But examiner and in- spector emphasize the act of seeing; csnsor and critic that of judging. Examiner (for the derivation of exam- ine see Discuss) is a stronger word than inspector. Examine means to in- spect with particular care, with the in- tention of passing a judgment. Simi- larly critic is a milder and more general term than censor (from Latin censere, to rate). To censor is not merely to judge, but to abolish that which proves to be contrary to the censor's judgment. These terms differ also in their apphcations. Censor is applied particularly to the examining and judging of literary material — letters and cables in time of war, books, newspapers, etc. — and of artistic pub- he productions. A rigorous censorship of mail, etc., was maintained in all belligerent countries during the Euro- pean war. The term inspector is ap- phed to various pubUc officials whose duty it is to detect any violation of the laws — health - inspectors, milk-wspec- tors, customs-inspectors, etc. The terms critic and examiner are less fre- quently used to refer to public officials. CENSURE, Animadvert, Criti- cise. Censwre (see Accuse). Animad- vert and criticise (see Animadversion). To censure expresses less than to animadvert or criticise; one may always censure when one animadverts or criti- cises. To censure and animadvert are both personal, the one direct, the other indirect ; criticism is directed to things, and not to persons only. Censuring consists in finding some fault, real or supposed: it refers mostly to the con- duct of individuals. Animadvert con- sists in suggesting some error or im- propriety; it refers mostly to matters of opinion and dispute; criticism con- sists in minutely examining the in- trinsic characteristics and appreciating the merits of each individually or the whole collectively; it refers to matters of science and learning. To censure requires no more than simple assertion ; its justice or propriety often rests on the authority of the individual: ani- madversions require to be accompanied with reasons; those who animadvert on the proceedings or opinions of others must state some grounds for their ob- jections. Criticism is altogether argu- mentative and illustrative; it takes nothing for granted, it analyzes and decomposes, it compares and combines. CESSATION 149 it asserts and supports the assertions. The office of the censurer is the easiest and least honorable of the three; it may be assumed by ignorance and im- pertinence, it may be performed for the purpose of indulging an angry or imperious temper. The task of animad- verting is delicate; it may be resorted to for the indulgence of an overween- ing self-conceit. The office of a critic is both arduous and honorable; it can- not be filled by any one incompetent for the charge without exposing his arrogance and folly to merited con- tempt. See also Blame; Lash. Censure, Carp, Cavil. — Censure (see above). Carp, a Scandinavian word, appears in Middle Enghsh with the meaning of to talk (in Icelandic it meant to boast). The present sinister sense is apparently due to a confusion with Latin carpere, to pluck. Cavil, in French caviller, Latin caviUor, from cavilla, a taunt, and caw^, hollow, sig- nifies to be imsound or imsubstantial in speech. To censure respects positive errors; to carp and cavil have regard to what is trivial or imaginary: the former is employed for errors in persons; the latter for supposed defects in things. Censures are frequently necessary from those who have the authority to use them; a good father will censure his children when their conduct is censur- able. Carping and cavilling are resorted to only to indulge ill-nature or self- conceit: whoever owes another a grudge will be most disposed to carp at all he does, in order to lessen him in the esteem of others: those who contend more for victory than truth will be apt to cavil when they are at a loss for fair argument: party poUticians carp at the measures of administration; in- fidels ccurU at the evidences of Chris- tianity, because they are determined to disbelieve. CEREMONIAL. See Formal. CEREMONIOUS. See Formal; THEATRIC.'i.L. CEREMONY. See Etiquette; Form. CERTAIN, Sure, Secure. Cer- tain, in French certain, Latin certus, comes from cemere, to discriminate. Sure and secure are variations of the same word, in French sHr, German sicker, Latin securus; this is com- pounded of se (sine), apart, and cura, care, signifying without care, requiring no care. Certain and sure have regard to a per- son's convictions; secure to his interests or condition: one is certain from actual knowledge or from a behef in others; one is sure from a reUance upon others; one is secure when free from danger. We can be certain of nothing future but death; we may be sure that God will fulfil His promises in His own way; we may be secure against any loss or mischief if we use proper precautions. In respect to things the distinction is similar: facts, principles, and rules are certain which are certainly known and admitted: rules, methods, guides, etc., are sure which guard against error and may be depended upon; a place may be secure which serves to secure or preserve with certainty from mischief or danger. See also Infallible; Tangible. CERTAINLY. See Aye. CESSATION, Stop, Intermission, Cessation, from the verb to cease, marks the condition of leaving off. Stop, from to stop, marks that of being stopped or prevented from going on. Rest, from to rest, marks the state of being quiet; and intermission, from intermit, marks that of ceasing occasionally. To cease respects the course of things; whatever does not go on has ceased; things cease of themselves: stop re- spects some external action or in- fluence; nothing stops but what is sup- posed to be stopped or hindered by another: rest is a species of cessation that regards labor or exertion; what- ever does not move or exert itself is at rest: intermission is a species of cessation only for a time or at certain interv'als. That which ceases or stops is supposed to be at an end; rest or intermission supposes a renewal. A cessation of hostilities is at all times desirable; to put a stop to evil practices is sometimes the most difficult and dangerous of all undertakings: rest after fatigue is indispensable, for labor without intermission exhausts the frame. The rain ceases, a person or a ball stops running, the laborer rests from his toil, a fever is intermittent. 150 CHAFE There is nothing in the world which does not cease to exist at one point or another: death stops every one sooner or later in his career: whoever is vexed with the cares of getting riches will find no rest for his mind or body; he will labor without intermission often- times only to heap troubles on him- self. CHAFE. See Rub. CHAGRIN. See Vexation. CHAIN, Fetter, Band, Shackle. Chain, in French chaine, Latin catena, signifies that which takes or holds. Fetter, Anglo-Saxon fetor, meant a shackle for the foot, and is aUied to the word foot, feet. Band, from bind, signifies that which binds. Shackle, Aflglo-Saxon sceactd, bond, fetter, was originally a loose band which shook when the captive moved, shackle being from the same root as shake. All these terms designate the instru- ment by which animals or men are con- fined. Chain is general and indefinite; all the rest are species of chains: but there are many chains which do not come under the other names; a chain is indefinite as to its make; it is made generally of iron rings, but of differ- ent sizes and shapes: fetters are larger; they consist of many stout chains: hands are in general anything which confines the body or the Umbs; they may be either chains or even cords: shackle is that species of chain which goes on the legs to confine them; male- factors of the worst order have fetters on different parts of their bodies, and shackles on their legs. These terms may all be used figiira- tively. The substantive chain is ap- phed generally to whatever confines like a chain, and the verb to chain sig- nifies to confine as with a chain: thus the mind is chained to rules, according to the opinions of the freethinkers, when men adhere strictly to rule and order: the noun fetter is seldom used except in the proper sense, but the verb to fetter signifies to control or prevent the proper exercise of the mind, as to be fettered by systems. Band, in the figurative sense, is applied, particularly in p>oetry, to everything which is supposed to serve the purpose of a band; thus love is said to have its silken bands. Shackle, whether as a substantive or a verb, retains the idea of impeding the progress of a person, not in his body only, but also in his mind and in his moral conduct; thus a man who commences life with a bor- rowed capital is shackled in his com- mercial concerns by the interest he has to pay and the obligations he has to discharge. CHALLENGE. See Brave. CHAMPION. See Combatant. CHANCE, Fortune, Fate. Chance (see Accident) is here considered as the cause of what falls out. Fortune, in French fortune, Latin fortuna, comes from /ors, chance, aUied to f err e, to bear — ^fortune being that which is brought to one, borne in upon the sufferer. Fate, in Latin fatum, from fatum, par- ticiple of fari, to speak or decree, sig- nifies that which is decreed, or the power of decreeing. These terms have served at all times as cloaks for human ignorance; and before mankind was favored by the light of Divine Revelation they had an imaginary importance which has now happily vanished. Believers in Di- vine Providence no longer conceive the events of the world as left to them- selves, or as under the control of any unintelligent or unconscious agent, but ascribe the whole to an overruling mind, which, though invisible to the bodily eye, is clearly to be traced by the intellectual eye wherever we turn ourselves. In conformity, however, to the preconceived notions attached to these words, we now employ them in regard to the agency of secondary causes. But how far a Christian may use them, without disparagement to the majesty of the Divine Being, it is not so much my business to inquire as to define their ordinary acceptation. In this ordinary sense chance is the generic, fortune and fate are sp)ecifie terms: dkance applies to all things, per- sonal or otherwise; fortune a,nd fate are mostly said of that which is personal. Chance neither forms, orders, nor de- signs; neither knowledge nor intention is attributed to it; its events are un- certain and variable: fortune forms plans and designs, but without choice; we attribute to it an intention without CHANGE 151 discernment; it is said to be blind: Jale forms plans and chains of causes; intention, knowledge, and power are attributed to it; its views are fixed, its results decisive. A person goes as (Quince directs him when he has no express object to determine his choice one way or other; his fortune favors him if without any expectation he gets the thing he wishes; his fate wiUs it if he reaches the desired point contrary to what he intended. Men's success in their imdertakings depends oftener on chance than on their abihty; we are ever ready to ascribe to ourselves what we owe to our good fortune; it is the faie of some men to fail in everything they undertake. When speaking of trivial matters this language is unques- tionably innocent, and any objection to its use must spring from an over- scrupulous conscience. If I suflTer my horse to direct me in the road I take to London, I may fairly attribute it to chance if I take the right instead of the left; and if in consequence I meet with an agreeable companion by the way, I shall not hesitate to call it my good fortune; and if, in spite of any previous intention to the contrary, I should be led to take the same road repeatedly, and as often meet with an agreeable companion, I shall immedi- ately sa^ that it is my fate to meet with an agreeable companion whenever I go to London. See also Happen. Chance, Probability. — Chance (see above). Probability, in French prob- abilite, Latin probabilitas, from prob- abUis and probare, to prove, signifies the quaUty of being able to be proved or made good. These terms are both employed in forming an estimate of future events; but the chance is either for or against, the probability is always for a thing. Chance is but a degree of probability; there may in this latter case be a chance where there is no probability. A chance affords a p>ossibility; many chances are requisite to constitute a probability. What has been once may, under simi- lar circumstances, be again; for that there is a chance; what has fallen to one man may fall to another; so far he has a chance in his favor; but in all the chances of life there will be no prob- ability of success where a man does not unite industry with integrity. Chance cannot be calculated up>on; it is apt to produce disappointment; prob- ability justifies hope; it is sanctioned by experience. Chance, Hazard. — Chance (see above). Hazard comes from Spanish azar, an unlucky throw at dice, pos- sibly allied to Arabian cd zahr, but the ultimate origin is doubtful. Both these terms are employed to mark the course of future events, which is not discernible by the human eye. With the Deity there is neither chance nor hazard; His plans are the result of omniscience: but the designs and actions of men are all dependent on chance or hazard. Chance may be fa- vorable or unfavorable, more common- ly the former: hazard is always im- favorable; it is properly a species of chance. There is a chance either of gaining or losing; there is a hazard of losing. In most speculations the chance of succeeding scarcely outweighs the hazard of losing. CHANGE, Alter, Vary. Change, in French changer, is probably derived from the Middle Latin carrMo, ex- change, signifying to take one thing for another. Alter , from the Latin alter, another, signifies to make a thing otherwise. Vary, in Latin vario, make various, from variu^, doubtful. ^ We change a thing by putting an- other in its place; we alter a thing by making it different from what it was before; we vary it by altering it in dif- ferent manners and at different times. We change our clothes whenever we put on others: the tailor alters clothes which are found not to fit; and he varies the fashion of making them when- ever he makes new. A man changes his habits, alters his conduct, and varies his manner of speaking and thinking, according to circumstances. A thing is changed without altering its kind; it is altered without destroying its identi- ty; and it is varied without destroying the similarity. We change our hab- itation, but it still remains a habita- tion; we alter our house, but it still re- mains the same house; we vary the manner of painting and decoration, but it may strongly resemble the manner in which it has been before executed. 152 CHANGE Change, Exchange, Barter, Substitute. — Change (see preceding). Exchange is compounded of e or ex and changer, sig- nifjong to change in the place of an- other. Barter is supposed to come from the French barater, to cheat or begmle, the ultimate origin of which is doubt- ful. Substitute, in French substitut, Latin stibstitutus, from sub, instead of, and sUiiuere, to place, signifies to place one thing in the room of another. The idea of putting one person or thing in the place of another is com- mon to all these terms, which varies in the maimer and the object. Charige is the generic, the rest are specific terms: whatever is exchanged, bartered, or substituted is changed, but not vice versa. To change in respect to persons is to take one for another, without re- gard to whether they are alike or dif- ferent, as a king changes his ministers; to exchange is to take one person in return for another who is in like con- dition, as prisoners are exchanged in time of war. In respect to things, to change is to take anything new or fresh, whether alike or different. Clothes may be changed, or books may be changed, or things may be changed for others quite different; to exchange is to take one thing for another, that is, either of the same kind or equivalent in value, as to exchange one commodity for another, one house, or one piece of land, for another. To change may often be the result of caprice, but to exchange is always an act either of discretion or necessity. To barter is a species of exchanging, namely, the giving of any commodity for others of the same or a different kind; it is confined properly to what passes by way of commerce, as, in deahng with savages, to barter toys or knives for provisions. To substitute is to put one person in the place of another for the purpose of doing any service or fiUing any office, as to substitute one for another who has been drawn for the militia. In the moral application these terms bear the same analogy to each other, with this difference, that the word bar- ter is taken in a bad sense. A person changes his opinions; but a proneness to such changes evinces a want of firmness in the character. A good king at his death exchanges a temporal for an eternal crown. The mercenary trader barters his conscience for paltry pelf. Men of dogmatical tempers sub- stitute assertion for proof, and abuse for argument. Change, Variation, Vicissitude. — Chg,nge and variation (see preceding). Vicissitude, in French vicissitude, Latin \ vidssUudo, from vicissim, by turns, sig- nifies changing alternately. Change is, both to vicissitude and variation, as the genus to the species. Every variation or vicissitude is a change, but every change is not a varia- tion or vicissitude. Change consists simply in ceasing to be the same: variation consists in being different at different times; vicissitude, in being alternately or reciprocally different and the same. All created things are liable to change; old things pass away, all things become new: the himaors of men, like the elements, are exposed to perpetual variations: human affairs, like the seasons, are subject to frequent vicissitudes. Changes in societies or famihes are seldom attended with any good effect. Variations in the state of the atmosphere are indicated by the barometer or thermometer. Vicissi- tudes of a painful nature are less dan- gerous than those which elevate men to an unusual state of grandeur. By the former they are brought to a sense of themselves, by the latter they are carried beyond themselves. Changeable, Mutable, Variable, In- constant, Fickle, Versatile. — Changeable, ready to change. Mutable, from the Latin mutare, to change, is the same as changeable. Variable means hable to vary. Inconstant, compounded of the privative in and constant, in Latin con- stans, from con and stare, to stand to- gether or remain the same, signifies not remaining the same for any long con- tinuance. Fickle, Anglo-Saxon ficol, is allied to foecne, deceitful, and facen, fraud. Versatile, in Latin versatilis, from verto, to turn, signifies easy to be turned. Changeable is said of persons or things; mutable is said of things only: human beings are changeable, human affairs are mutable. Changeable respects the sentiments CHARM 153 and opinions of the mind; variable, the state of the feelings; inconstant, the affections; fickle, the inchnations and attachments; versatile, the apphcation of the talents. A changeable person rejects what he has once embraced in order to take up something new; a variable person likes and dislikes al- ternately the same thing; an incon- stant person Ukes nothing long; a fiMe person Ukes many things suc- cessively or at the same time; a ver- satile person has a talent for what- ever he Ukes. Changeableness arises from a want of fixed principles; vari- ableness, from a predominance of humor; inconstancy, from a selfish and unieeling temper; fickleness, from a Ughtness of mind; versatility, from a flexibiUty of mind. Men are the most changeable emdinconstant; women are the most variable and fickle: the former offend from an indifference for objects in general or a dimin- ished attachment for any object in particular; the latter from an exces- sive warmth of feeling that is easily biassed and ready to seize new ob- jects. People who are changeable in their views and plans are particularly imfit for the government of a state; those who are variable in their humors are unsuitable as masters; people of an inconstant character ought to be shunned as lovers; those of a fickle dis- position ought not to be chosen as friends. Changeable, variable, inconstant, and fickle, as appUed to persons, are taken in the bad sense; but versatility is a natural gift which may be employed advantageously. CHANNEL, See Trench. CHAPERON, Attendant, Guide. Of these terms attendant is the general word : guide and chaperon indicate par- ticular kinds of attendants. For the meaning and derivation of attendant see Accompany. A chaperon, French chaperon, Italian capperone, the wearer of a hooded cape, signifies a woman who accompanies a young girl in pub- lic places to guide her, and protect her from annoyance. The term guide is appUed to attendants whose function it is to point out the way to others — such as mountain-^tdes, guides in large museums or pubUc gaUeries, etc. CHARACTER, Letter. Character comes from the Greek x".'>««^^P» sig- nifying an impression or mark, from xapdaativ, to imprint or stamp. Letter is derived from Latin littera, a letter. Character is to letter as the genus to the species: every letter is a character; but every character is not a letter. Character is any written or printed mark that serves to designate some- thing; a letter is a species of character which is the constituent part of a word. Shorthand and hieroglyphics consist of characters, but not of letters. Character is employed figuratively, but letter is not, A grateful person has the favors which are conferred upon him written in indeUble characters upon his heart. Character, Reputation. — From the natural sense of a stamp or mark. Character (see above) is figuratively employed for the moral mark which distinguishes one man from another. Reputation, from the French reputer, Latin reputare, to think, signifies what is thought of a i>er8on. Character lies in the man; it is the mark of what he is; it shows itself on all occasions: reputation depends upon others; it is what they think of him. A character is given particularly: a reputation is formed generally. In- dividuals give a character of another from personal knowledge: public opin- ion constitutes the reputation. Char- acter has always some foundation; it is a positive description of something: reputation has more of conjecture in it; its source is hearsay. It is possible for a man to have a fair reputation who has not in reaUty a good character, although men of really good character are not Ukely to have a bad reputation. CHARACTERIZE. See Name. CHARGE. See Accuse; Attack; Care; Cost; Office. Charm, Enchant, Fascinate, En- rapture, Captivate. Charm (see At- traction). Enchant, Yrerxch. enchanter, is derived from Latin in, in, and can- tare, to sing, whence iruuintcUion is also derived. It signified to sing to an- other until the music entered in/o the hearer, as it were, and had some magical or hypnotic effect upon his soul. Fascinate is derived from Latin fascinum, a speU. Enrapture, com- 164 CHARMED pounded of en and rapture, signifies to put into a rapture; and rapture, from the Latin rapio, to seize or carry away, signifies the state of being carried away; whence to enrapture signifies to put into that state. Captivate, in Latin captivatv^, participle of captivo, from capere, to take, signifies to take, as it were, prisoner. To charm expresses a less powerful effect than to enchant; a charm is sim- ply a magical verse used by magicians and sorcerers: incantation or enchant- ment is the use not only of verses, but of any mysterious ceremonies, to pro- duce a given effect. To charm and en- chant in this sense denotes an opera- tion by means of words or motions; to fascinate denotes an operation by means of the eyes or tongue: the two former are less powerful acts than the latter: the superstitious have always had re- course to charms or enchantments, for the piu-pose of allaying the passions of love or hatred; the Greeks believed that the malignant influence passed hy fascination from the eyes or tongues of envious persons, which infected the ambient air, and through that mediimi penetrated and corrupted the bodies of animals and other things. Charms and enchantments are performed by per- sons; fascinations are performed by animals: the former have always some supposed good in view; the latter have always a mischievous tendency: there are persons who pretend to charm away the toothache, or other pains of the body: some serpents are said to have a fascinating power in their eyes by which they can kill the animals on which they have fixed them. To charm, enchant, and fascinate are taken in the improper sense to denote moral as well as natural operations; enrapture and captivate have a moral ap- plication only, in reference to those things which act more on the imagina- tion or the moral feeUngs than on the senses. To charm in this case is to act as a charm; to enchant, to act by enchantment; and to fascinate, to act by the power of fascination; all which, as in the former case, denote a secret or involimtary influence. To enrapt- ure and captivate, on the other hand, denote a direct but irresistible influence. To charm, enchant, and enrapture, when applied to the same objects, rise in their sense; to enchant expresses a stronger effect than to charm, and to enrapture than to enchant. Music ordinarily charms, delightful music charms a delicate ear: the finest music only is calculated to enrapture, or the finest ears to be enraptured. Beauty or fine scenery may in the same manner charm, enchant, or en- rapture, according to the circumstances of the case. To fascinate and captivate are, accord- ing to their original import, oftener used in a bad sense than a good one: we may sometimes speak indifferently of fascinating manners or a captivating address; but for the most part what fascinates and captivates acts on the passions to the injury of the imder- standing: a bad woman may have more power to fascinate than a modest woman, and flowery language may captivate when plain speech would not be heeded. See also Grace; Pleasitre. CHARMED. See SPELLBOU^rD. CHARMING. See Delightful. CHARMS. See Attractigns. CHASE. See Hunt. CHASM. See Breach. CHASTEN, Chastise. Chasten, chastise, both come through the French chdtier, from the Latin castigare, to make pure. Chasten has most regard to the end, chastise to the means; the former is an act of the Deity, the latter a human action: God chastens His faithful peo- ple, to cleanse them from their trans- gressions; parents chastise their chil- dren, to prevent the repetition of faults: afflictions are the means which God adopts for chastening those whom He wishes to make more obedient to his will; stripes are the means by which offenders are chastised. CHASTITY, Continence. Chasti- ty, in French chastite, Latin castitas, comes from castus, pure, and the He- brew kedish, sacred. Continence, in French continence, Latin continentia, from continens and contineo, signifies the act of keeping one's self within bounds. These two terms are equally em- ployed in relation to the pleasures of sense : both are virtues, but sufficiently distinct in their characteristics. CHECK 15-5 Chastity prescribes rules for the in- dulgence of these pleasures; continence altogether interdicts their use. Chastity extends its views to whatever may bear the smallest relation to the object which it proposes to regulate; it con- trols the thoughts, words, looks, at- titudes, food, dress, company, and, in short, the whole mode of hving: con- tinence simply confines itself to the privation of the pleasures themselves; it is possible, therefore, to be chaste without being continent, and continent without being chaste. Chastity is suited to all times, ages, and conditions; con- tinence belongs only to a state of celi- bacy; the Christian religion enjoins chastity as a positive duty on all its followers; the Romish religion enjoins continence on its clerical members. See also Virtuous. CHATTELS. See Goods. CHATTER. See Babble; Jabber. CHEAPEN. See Buy. CHEAT, Defraud, Trick. Cheat comes from escheat, Middle English eschete. Old French eschete, rent, that which falls to the landlord, from ex, out, and cadere, to fall. As Skeat says, the lords of the manor or the escheaters "were often cheats in our sense, hence the verb." Defraud, from de and fraud, is either to practise fraud or get from a person by fraud. Trick, Norman French trigue, is prob- ably influenced by Dutch trik, a puU, a stroke, a touch; the development of meaning is a little uncertain. These terms convey the idea of prac- tising deception, but in different ways. One cheats by direct and gross false- hood or artifice; one defravds by a set- tled plan or contrivance; one tricks by a sudden invention. Cheating and tricking are resorted to in the common dealings of men; both may be equally low in their ends, but not equally base in their means. Tricking requires Ingenuity, which is not wanted in the practice of cheating. Defrauding ap- Elies to the more serious concerns of fe, and for the most part involves a breach of confidence, as to defraud one's creditors. Cheating has respect to the delusion practised on the person, and may therefore be applied to whatever pro- duces the delusion. Defrauding re- spects the thing wrongfully got, and may therefore be applied to persons, animals, or things which may suffer from fraud: as to defraud the state, the revenue, or animals of their food. Tricking properly passes only be- tween men in their dealings with one another. See also Juggle. CHECK, Curb, C9NTROL. All these terms express a species of restraining. Check and curb derive their meaning from natural objects. To check, in French chece (from the Persian word for king found in shah, king), in reference to the movement in the game of cheas by which the king is prevented moving, implies generally to impede the course. Curb, from Latin curvare, to bend, refers to the binding of the horse's neck by pull- ing on the bit. To check is properly applied to bodies in motion, but curb may be appMed to those which are at rest or in motion: a horse with a tender mouth is easily checked with a touch of the bridle; a young horse re- quires to be curbed. To check and to curb have also a moral apphcation; to control, con- tracted from counter-roll, or to keep one roll or account against another, has only a moral application. To check is, as before, an act of much less restraint than to curb. Every feeling, however good, may sometimes require to be checked; the passions, or will, require to be curbed. To check is appUed to individual acts, frequently to the act or circum- stance of the moment, as to check the forwardness of youth; to curb and con- trol, to the general conduct; the former in respect to bodies of men as well as individuals; the latter in respect to individuals, as to curb a people by laws, to control youth until they are enabled to act for themselves. The act of checking is applied to one's self; a person may check himself when he is going to speak: to curb and control are properly apphed to the acts of others. Check, Chide, Reprimand, Reprove, Rebuke. — Check (see above). Chide is a word peculiar to English. It is not found in any other language. Repri- mand is derived from the gerundive of 156 CHEER Latin reprimere, to repress, and so in- dicates something that ought to be repressed, hence the attempt to repress it by an expression of opinion. Re- prove, in French reprouver, Latin re- probo, is compounded of the privative syllable re and probo, signifying to find the contrary of good, that is, to find bad, to blame. Rebuke is derived from Old French bitsche, a log, and meant originally to lop, to cut back. The idea of expressing one's disap- probation of a person's conduct is common to all these terms. A person is checked that he may not continue to do what is offensive; he is chidden for what he has done, that he may not repeat it: impertinent and forward people require to be checked, that they may not become intolerable; thought- less people are chidden when they give hm"tful proofs of their carelessness. People are checked by actions and looks as well as words; they are chidden by words only: a timid person is easily checked: the want even of due encour- agement will serve to damp his reso- lution: the young are perpetually fall- ing into irregularities which require to be chidden. To chide marks a stronger degree of displeasure than reprimand, and repri- mand than reprove or rebuke; a person may chide or reprimand in anger, he reproves and rebukes with coolness: great offences call forth chidings; omissions or mistakes occasion or re- quire a reprimand: irregularities of conduct give rise to reproof; and im- proprieties of behavior demand rebuke. Chiding and reprimanding are em- ployed for offences against the indi- vidual, and in cases where the greatest disparity exists in the station of the parties; a child is chidden by his parent; a servant is reprimanded by his master. Reproving and rebuking have less to do with the relation or station of the parties than with the nature of the offence: wisdom, age, and experience, or a spiritual mission, give authority to reprove or rebuke those whose conduct has violated any law, human or divine: the prophet Nathan reproved King David for his heinous offences against his Maker; our Saviour rebuked Peter for his presimiptuous mode of speech. See also Snub. Check, Stop. — Check, as before, sig- nifies to impede the course of a body in motion, that is, to cause it to move slowly; to stop (see Cessation) is to cause it not to move at all: the growth of a plant is checked when it does not grow so fast as usual; its growth is stopped when it ceases alto- gether to grow: the water of a river is stopped by a dam; the rapidity of its course is checked by the intervention of rocks and sands. These words admit of a similar dis- tinction when applied to the conduct or condition of men and things: if an evil be checked, it is diminished in ex- tent; if it be stopped, it is altogether put an end to; so a person may be checked in his career, or stopped in his career, with the like distinction. CHEER, Encourage, Comfort. Cheer (see Animate). Encourage, com- pounded of en and courage, signifies to inspire with courage. Comfort is com- pounded of com or cum, and fortis, strong, signifying to invigorate or strengthen. To cheer regards the spirits; to en- courage, the resolution: the sad require to be cheered; the timid to be encour- aged. Mirthful company is suited to cheer those who labor imder any de- pression; the prospect of success en- courages those who have any object to obtain. To cheer and comfort have both re- gard to the spirits, but the latter dif- fers in degree and manner: to cheer expresses more than to comfort, the forrner signifying to produce a lively sentiment, the latter to lessen or re- move a painful one: we are cheered in the moments of despondency, whether from real or imaginary causes; we are comforted in the hour of distress. Cheering may be effected either by the direct effort of others or by any- thing passing outward or inward; a discourse or voice cheers, a prospect or a reflection cheers: comforting is often properly effected by external objects, whether personal or otherwise. Cheer- ing is purely a mental operation, but comforting may act on the body as well as on the mind. See also Animate; Hearten. Cheerful, Merry, Sprightly, Gay. — Cheerful signifies full of cheer, or of CHIEF 157 that which cheers. Merry, Anglo ! Saxon myrge, meant originally "lasting a short time," fragile, evanescent; hence that which makes the time pass quickly. Sprightly should be spelled spritely, from sprite, Old French esprit, a spirit (Latin spiritus), or the spirit. It signifies full of life, animated. Sprightly is contracted from spiritedly. Gay is from Old High German wahi, fine, beautiful. Cheerful marks an unruffled flow of spirits; with mirth there is more of tu- mult and noise; with sprightliness there is more buoyancy; gayety compre- hends mirth and indulgence. A cheer- ful person smiles; a merry person laughs; a sprightly person dances; a gay person takes his pleasure. The cheerful countenance is permanently so; it marks the contentment of the heart and its freedom from pain: the merry face will often look sad; a trifle will turn mirth into sorrow: the sprightliness of youth is often suc- ceeded by the Hstlessness of bodily in- firmity or the gloom of despondency: gayety is as transitory as the pleasures upon which it subsists; it is often fol- lowed by sullenness and discontent. Cheerfulness is a habitual state of the mind; mirth is an occasional elevation of the spirits; sprightliness lies in the temperature and flow of the blood; gayety depends altogether on external circumstances. Religion is the best promoter of cheerfulness; it makes its possessor pleased with himself and all around him; company and wine are but too often the only promoters of mirth; youth and health will naturally be attended with sprightliness; a suc- cession of pleasures, an exemption from care, and the banishment of thought will keep gayety ahve. Sprightliness and mirth are seldom employed but in the proper sense as respects persons; but cheerful and gay are extended to different objects which affect the senses or the mind: cheerful objects are such as cheer the spirits; gay objects please or delight the senses; as a cheerful prospect, a cheer- ful room, gay attire, a gay scene, gay colors, etc. See also Glad; Optimistic; San- guine. CHERISH. See Foster; Nourish. CHICANERY, Pettifoggery. Chi- canery and pettifoggery are both words of obscure origin meaning the abuse of legal forms — trickery, sophistry, and subterfuge in conducting a case. Petti- foggery comes from pettifogger, a legal practitioner of inferior status who gets up or conducts petty cases. Apart from this suggestion of particular at- torneys of rascaUy practices in the de- velopment of the word pettifoggery, in- stead of the general habit of quibbling and caviUing in law-courts suggested in chicanery, there is really no difference between the words, and they can be used interchangeably. Chicane was ap)- pUed long ago to the game of pall-mall, then to a dispute arising in that game, and latterly to sharp practice, especial- ly in law-suits. CHIDE. See Check. CHIEF, Principal, Main. Chief, in French chef, from the Latin caput, the head, signifies belonging to the uppermost part. Principal, in French principal, Latin principalis, comes from princeps, a chief or prince, signifying belonging to a prince. Main, from the Scandinavian, Icelandic Tnegn, strong, signifies to a great degree. Chief respects order and rank; prin- cipal has regard to importance and re- spectability; main, to degree or quan- tity. We speak of a chief clerk; a commander in chief; the chief person in a city; but the principal people in a city; the principal circumstances in a narrative, and the main object. The chief cities, as mentioned by geog- raphers, are those which are classed in the first rank; the principal cities gen- erally include those which are the most considerable for wealth and population; these, however, are not always techni- cally comprehended under the name of chief cities: the main end of men's exertions is the acquirement of wealth. See also Cardinal. Chief, Leader, Chieftain, Head. — Chief and chieftain signify him who is chief. Leader, from to lead, and head, from the head, sufficiently designate their own signification. Chief respects precedency in civil matters; leader regards the direction of enterprises: chieftain is a species of leader; and head is the superior in gen- eral concerns. Among savages the 158 CHIEFLY (Mef of every tribe is a despotic prince within his own district, acting or di- recting in particular cases. Factions and parties in a state, like savage tribes, must have their leaders, to whom they are blindly devoted and by whom they are instigated to every desperate proceeding. Robbers have their chief- tains, who plan and direct everything, having an unlimited power over the band. The heads of famihes were, in the primitive ages, the chiefs, who in conjunction regulated the affairs of state. Chiefs have a permanent power, which may descend by inheritance, to branches of the same famihes: leaders and chieftains have a deputed power with which they are invested as the time and occasion require: heads have a natural power springing out of the nature of their birth, raiik, talents, and situation; it is not hereditary, but successive. Chiefs ought to have su- periority of birth combined with talents for ruling; leaders and chieftains require a bold and enterprising spirit; heads should have talents for directing. See also Supreme. CHIEFLY. See Especially. CHILDISH. Infantine. Childish is in the manner of an infant. What children do is frequently sim- ple or foohsh; what infants do is com- monly pretty and engaging; therefore childish is taken in the bad, and infan- tine in the good sense. Childish man- ners are very offensive in those who have ceased, according to their years, to be children; the infantine actions of some children evince a simphcity of character. CHILL, Cold. Chill and cold are but variations of the same word, in German kalt, etc. Chill expresses less than cold; that is to say, it expresses a degree of cold. The weather is often chilly in summer, but it is cold in winter. We speak of taking the chUl off water when the cold is in part removed; and of a chill running through the frame when the cold begins to penetrate the frame that is in a state of warmth. CHIMERICAL. See Utopiak. CHOICE. See Option. CHOKE. See Suffocate. CHOLER. See Anger. CHOOSE, Prefer. Choose, Anglo- Saxon cedsan, is allied to Latin gustare^ to taste, Greek ytoofiai, I taste. Prefer^ in French 'preferer, Latin -prcefero, com- pounded of prce and ferre, to take be- fore, signifies to take one thing rather than another. To choose is to prefer as the genua to the species: we always choose in -preferring, but we do not always prefer in choosing. To choose is to take one thing from among others; to prefer is to take one thing before or rather than another. We sometimes choose from the bare necessity of choosing; but we never prefer without making a positive and voluntary choice. When we choose from a specific mo- tive, the. acts of choosing and preferring differ in ithe nature of the motive. The former is absolute, the latter relative. We choose a thing for what it is, or what we esteem it to be of itself; we prefer a thing for what it has, or what we suppose it has, superior to another. Utihty or convenience are grounds for choosing; comparative merit occasions the preference: we choose something that is good, and are contented with it until we see something better which we prefer. We calculate and pause in choosing; we decide in preferring; the judgment determines in making the choice; the will or the affections de- termine in giving the preference. We choose things from an estimate of their merits or their fitness for the purpose proposed; we prefer them from their accordance with our tastes, habits, and pursuits. Books are chosen by those who wish to read; romances and works of fiction are preferred by general read- ers; learned works by the scholar. One who wants instruction chooses a master, but he will mostly prefer a teacher whom he knows to a perfect stranger. Our choice is good or bad according to our knowledge; our pref- erence is just or unjust according as it is sanctioned by reason or otherwise. Our choice may oe directed by our own experience or that of others; our preference must be guided by our own feehngs. We make our choice; we give our preference: the first is the settled purpose of the mind, it fixes on the ob- ject; the latter is the inchning of the will, it yields to the object. Choosing must be employed in all CIRCLE 159 the important concerns of life; pre- ferring is admissible in subordinate matters only. There is but one thing that is right, and that ought to be chosen when it is discovered : there are many indifferent things that may suit our tastes and inclinations; these we are at Uberty to prefer. But to prefer what we ought not to choose is to make our reason bend to our will. The path of Hfe should be chosen; but the path to be taken in a walk may be preferred. It is advisable for a youth in the choice of a profession to consult what he pre- fers, as he has the greatest chance of succeeding when he can combine his pleasure with his duty. A friend should be chosen: a companion may be preferred. A wife should be chosen; but unfortunately lovers are most apt to give a preference in a matter where a good or bad choice may determine one's happiness or misery for life. A wise prince is careful in the choice of his ministers; but a weak prince has mostly favorites whom he prefers. Choose, Pick, Select. — To choose is here, as in the foregoing article, a gen- eral and indefinite term, signifying to take one out of two or more. To pick is allied to peck. In Middle English pikken, to pick, and pekken, to peck, are equivalent words. They are de- rived from pic, a sharp point, and sig- nify to take anything up with a beak or a pointed thing; hence to take things one by one. Select, in Latin selectiis, from seligo, or se, apart, and lego, to gather, signifies properly to set apart. We may choose whatever comes in our way without regard to the num- ber of the objects to be chosen from, but we pick or select out of a niunber only; as to pick or select books from a li- brary: we may pick one or many out of a number, but we mostly select a number. Choosing is not always an act of particular design or discrimina- tion; but to pick and select signify to choose with care, the latter with still greater care than the former. What is picked and selected is always the best of its kind; but the former is commonly something of a physical nature, the lat- ter of a moral or intellectual description. Soldiers are sometimes picked to form a particular regiment; pieces are selected in prose or verse for general purposes. Choose, Elect. — Choose (see above). Elect, in Latin electus, participle of eligo, is compoimded of e and lego, signifying to gather or take out from. Both these terms are employed in regard to persons appointed to an office; the former in a general, the latter in a particular sense. Choosing is the act either of one man or of many; election is always that of a number; it is performed by the con- currence of many voices. A prince chooses his ministers; the constituents elect members of parhament. A per- son is chosen to serve the office of sheriff; he is elected by the corpora- tion to be mayor. Choosing is an act of authority; it binds the person chosen: election is a voluntary act; the elected has the power of refusal. People are obhged to serve in some offices when they are chosen, although they would gladly be exempt. The circumstances of being elected is an honor after which they eagerly aspire, and for the attainment of wluch they risk their property and use the most strenuous exertions. To elect may sometimes be extended in its application to persons or things for general purposes, which brings it nearer to the word choose; but election in this case signifies the choosing one out of two or more specific objects; as where one has several friends and makes his election of one to be his constant companion, or a person makes his election where he has several al- ternatives set before him. CHRONICLES. See Anecdotes. CHURCH, See Temple. CIPHER. See Zero. CIRCLE, Sphere, Orb, Globe. Circle comes from Latin circtUus, a diminutive of circus, a ring. Sphere is derived from Latin sphcera, a trans- literation of Greek vBaipa, a ball. Orb is derived from Latin orbis, a round disk or ring. Globe comes from Latin globus, a ball. Rotundity of figure is the common idea expressed by these termsj but the circle is that figure which is repre- sented on a plane superficies; the others are figures represented by sohds. We draw a circle by means of compasses; the sphere is a round body, conceived 160 CIRCUIT to be formed according to the rules of geometry by the circumvolution of a circle round about its diameter; hence the whole frame of the world is de- nominated a sphere. An orb is any body which describes a circle; hence the heavenly bodies are termed orbs: a globe is any soUd body the surface of which is in every part equidistant from the centre; of this description is the terrestrial globe. A circle may be applied in the im- proper sense to any round figure which IS formed or supposed to be formed by circumscribing a space; simple ro- tundity constitutes a circle: in this manner a circle may be formed by real objects, as persons, or by moral ob- jects, as pleasures. To the idea of circle is annexed that of extent around, in the signification of a sphere, as a sphere of activity, whether applied in the philosophical sense to natural bodies or in the moral sense to men. Hollowness, as well as rotundity, be- longs to an orb; hence we speak of the orb of a wheel. Of a globe, solidity is the peculiar characteristic; hence any ball, Uke the ball of the earth, may be represented as a globe. CIRCUIT, Tour, Round. Circuit, in French circuit, Latin circuitvs, parti- ciple of circumeo, signifies either the act of going roimd or the extent gone. Tour is derived from Latin tomum (ace), Greek TopvoQ, a lathe. Round comes from Latin rotundu^, indicating the motion of a wheel, from rota, wheel. A circuit is made for a specific end of a serious kind; a tour is always made for pleasure; a round, like a circuit, is employed in matters of business, but of a more famihar and ordinary kind. A judge goes his circuit at particular periods of time: gentlemen, in times of peace, consider it as an essential part of their education to make what 18 termed the grand tour: tradesmen have certain rounds, which they take on certain days. We speak of making the circuit of a place; of taking a tour in a given country; and going a particu- lar round. A circuit is wide or narrow; a tour and a round are great or httle. A circuit is prescribed as to extent ; a tour is optional; a round is prescribed or otherwise. Circuit is seldom used but in a specific sense; tour is seldom employed but in regard to traveJUng; round may be taken figiu-atively, as when we speak of going one's round of pleasm-e. CIRCULATE. See Spread. CIRCUMSCRIBE, Inclose. Cir- cumscribe, from the Latin circum, about, and scribere, to write, marks simply the surrounding with a line. Inclose, from the Latin inclusus, par- ticiple of includo, based on in and claudere, to shut, marks a species of confinement. The extent of any place is drawn out to the eye by a circumscription; its ex- tent is hmited to a given point by an inclosure. A garden is circumscribed by any ditch, Hne, or posts that serve as its boundaries; it is inclosed by wall or fence. An inclosure may serve to cir- cumscribe; but that which circum- scribes is frequently imaginary, and wiU not serve to inclose. See also Bound. CIRCUMSPECT. See Cautigus. CIRCUMSTANCE, Situation. Circumstance, in Latin circumstantia, from circum and sto, signifies what stands about a thing, or belongs to it as its accident. Situation, in French sitvntion, comes from the Latin situs, a place. Circumstance is to sittuition as a part to a whole: many circumstances con- stitute a situation: a situation is an aggregate of circumstances. A person is said to be in circumstances of af" fluence who has an abundance of every- thing essential for his comfort; he is in an easy situation when nothing exists to create uneasiness. Circumstance re- spects that which externally affects us; situation is employed both for the out- ward circumstances and the inward feelings. The success of any under- taking depends greatly on the circum- stances under which it is begun; the particular sittuition of a person's mind will give a cast to his words or actions. Circumstances are critical, a sittuition is dangerous. Circumstance, Incident, Fact. — Cir- cumstance is, as before, a general term. Incident, in Latin incidens, participle of incido, or in and cadere, to fall, sig- nifying what falls upon or to another thing, and fact, in Latin foetus, parti- CITE 161 ciple of facere, to do, signifying the thing done, are species of circumstances. Incidenl is what happens; foLct is what is done; circumstance is not only what happens and is done, but whatever is or belongs to a thing. To every- thing are annexed circumstances, either of time, place, age, color, or other col- lateral appendages, which changes its nature. Everything that moves and operates is exposed to incidents; ef- fects are produced, results follow, and changes are brought about; these are incidents: whatever moves and op- erates does, and what it produces is done or is the fact: when the artificer performs any work of art, it depends not only on his skill, but on the excel- lence of his tools, the time he employs, the particular frame of his mind, the place where he works, with a variety of other circumstances, whether he wiU succeed in producing anything master- ly. Newspapers abound with the vari- ous incidents which occur in the animal or the vegetable world, some of which are surprising and singular; they hke- wise contain a number of facts which serve to present a melancholy picture of human depravity. Circumstance is as often employed with regard to the operations or prop- erties of things, in which case it is most analogous to incident and fact; it may then be employed for the whole affair, or any part of it whatever that can be distinctly considered. Incidents and facts eitner are circumstances or have circumstances belonging to them. A remarkably abimdant crop in any par- ticular part of a field is for the agri- culturist a singular circumstance or in- cident; this may be rendered more sm-- prising if associated with imusual steriUty in other parts of the same field. A robbery may either be a fact or a circumstance; its atrocity may be aggravated by the murder of the in- jured parties, the savageness of the per- petrators, and a variety of circum- stances. Circumstance comprehends in its signification whatever may be said or thought of anything; incident carries with it the idea of whatever may befall or be said to befall any- thing; fact includes in it nothing but what really is or is done. A narrative, therefore, may contain many circum- 11 stances and incidents without any fact, when what is related is either fictitious or not positively known to have hap- pened: it is necessary for a novel or play to contain much incident, but not facts, in order to render it inter- esting; history should contain nothing but facts, as authenticity is its chief merit. Circumstantial, Particular, Minute. — Circumstantial, from circumstance, sig- nifies consisting of circumstances. Par- ticular comes from Latin particula, a double diminutive of partem (ace), part; hence a very httle part. Minuie, in French minute, Latin minviv^, par- ticiple of minuere, to diminish, signifies diminished or reduced to a very small point. Circumstantial expresses less than particular, and that less than minute. A circumstantial account contains all leading events; a particular account includes every event and movement, however trivial; a minute account omits nothing as to person, time, place, figure, form, and every other trivial circumstance connected with the events. A narrative may be circumstantial, par- ticular, or minute; an inquiry, in- vestigation, or description may be minuie. An event or occurrence may be particular, a circumstance or par- ticular may be minute. CITE, Quote. Cite is derived from Latin citare, a frequentative of ciere, to arouse (compare excite, incite, etc.). As applied to persons it means to arouse, to summon; it was figuratively apphed to things in a similar sense. To cite a passage in a book or an in- stance in history meant to summon it to bear witness. Quate is derived from Latin quotare, to mark off into chap- ters or verses for reference, from quotus, how much (compare quota); from the significance to mark off it came to mean the repeating of the words marked off. To cite is employed for persons or things; to quote for things only: au- thors are cited, passages from their works are quoted: we cite only by au- thority; we quote for general purposes of convenience. Historians ought to cite their authority in order to strength- en their evidence and inspire con- fidence; controversiahsts must ouote 162 CIVIL the objectionable passages in those works which they wish to confute: it is prudent to cite no one whose au- thority is questionable; it is super- fluous to quote anything that can be easily perused in the original. Cite, Summon. — The idea of calhng a person authoritatively to appear is common to these terms. Cite is used in a general sense, summon in a particu- lar and technical sense: a person may be cited to appear before his superior; he is summoned to appear before a coiul: the station of the individual gives authority to the act of citing; the law itself gives authority to that of summoning. When cite is used in a legal sense, it is mostly employed for witnesses, and summon for every oc- casion: a person is cited to give evi- dence; he is summoned to answer a charge. Cite is seldomer used in the legal sense than in that of calHng by name, in which general acceptation it is employed with regard to authors, as specified in the preceding article, and in some few other connections: the legal is the ordinary sense of summon; it may, however, be extended in its apphcation to a mihtary summons of a fortified town, or to any call for which there may be occasion; as when we speak of the summons which is given to attend the death-bed of a friend; or, figuratively, death is said to summon mortals from this world. CIVIL, Polite. Civil, in French civil, Latin civilis, from civis, a citizen, si^ifies belonging to or becoming a citizen. Polite, in French poli, Latin politus, participle of polire, to polish, signifies properly polished. These two epithets are employed to denote different modes of acting in social intercourse : polite expresses more than civil; it is possible to be civil with- out being polite: politeness supposes civility and something in addition. Civility is confined to no rank, age, condition, or country; all have an op- portunity with equal propriety of being civil, but not so with politeness; that requires a certain degree of equahty, at least the equahty of education; it would be contradictory for masters and servants, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, to be polite to one another. Civility is a Christian duty; there are times when every man ought to be civil to his neighbor: politeness is rather a voluntary devotion of our- selves to others: among the inferior orders civility is indispensable; an uncivil person in a subordinate station is an obnoxious member of society: among the higher orders politeness is often a substitute; and, where the form and spirit are combined, it super- sedes the necessity of civility: politeness is the sweetener of human society; it gives a charm to everything that is said and done. Civility is contented with pleasing when the occasion offers: politeness seeks the opportunity to please; it prevents the necessity of asking by anticipating the wishes; it is full of dehcate attentions, and is an active benevolence in the minor con- cerns of life. Civil is therefore most properly appHed to what passes from and to persons of inferior condition; as the peasantry are very civil. Or it may be applied to the ordinary transactions of life without distinc- tion of rank. Polite is applied to those who are in a condition to have good-breeding. Civility is rather a negative than a positive quahty, implying the ab- sence of rudeness. Politeness requires positive and pecuhar properties of the head and heart, natural and acquired. To be civil, therefore, is the least that any one can be to another if he do not wish to offend; but politeness, where it is real, is as strong an indication of kindness in the outward behavior as the occasion calls for. The term civil may be apphed figu- ratively, but politeness is a characteris- tic of real persons only. See also Temporal. Civil, Obliging, Complaisant. — Civil is more general than obliging, which signifies ready to obhge. One is al- ways civil when one is obliging, but not always obliging when one is civil. Civil apphes to words or manner as well as to the action; obliging, to the action only. As civil is indefinite in its meaning, so it is indiscriminate in its apphcation; obliging, on the othei* hand, is confined to what passes be~ tween particular persons or under par- ticular circumstances. Strangers may be civil, and persons may frequently CLASS 163- be civil who from their situation may be exi>ected to be otherwise; one friend is obliging to another. Citdl and obliging both imply a de- sire to do a kmdness; but complai- sant, which is a variation of com- placent, from complaceo, to be highly pleased, signifies the desire of receiv- ing pleasure, which is a refined mode of doing a kindness. Civility, Ijdng very much in the man- ner, may be put on, and complaisance, implying a concern to please by being pleased, may be bad if it lead one to consult the humors of others to the sacrifice of duty or propriety. CIVILITY. See Benefit. CIVILIZATION. See Cultivation. CLAIM. See Ask; Pretension; Right. CLAMOR. See Noise. CLAMOROUS. See Loud. CLANDESTINE, Secret. Clan- destine, in Latin clandestinus, comes from clam, secretly. Secret, in French secret, Latin secretus, participle of secemere, to separate, signifies remote from observation. Clandestine expresses more than secret. To do a thing clandestinely is to elude observation;, to do a thing secretly is to do it without the knowl- edge of any one: what is clandestine is unallowed, which is not necessarily the case with what is secret. With the clandestine must be a mixture of art; with secrecy caution and man- agement are requisite: a clandestine marriage is effected by a studied plan to escape notice; a secret marriage is conducted by the forbearance of all communication ; conspirators have many clandestine proceedings and secret meetings: an unfaithful servant clan- destinely conveys away his master's property from his premises; a thief secretly takes a purse from the pocket of a bystander. CLASP, Hug, Embrace. Clasp is a word confined to EngUsh. It first appears in the fourteenth century; it means to fasten bv two interlocking parts. HtLg may be a Scandinavian word related to Icelandic hugga, to soothe; hugna, to please. Embrace, in French enArasser, is compounded of en and bras, arm, Latin brachia, arms, signifying to take or lock in one's arms. All these terms are employed to ex- press the act of inclosing another in one's arms: cla^p marks this action when it is performed with the warmth of true affection; hug is a ludicrous sort of clasping, which is the conse- quence of ignorance or extravagant feeling; embrace is simply a mode of ordinary salutation: a parent will clasp his long-lost child in his arms on their re-meeting; a peasant in the excess of his raptures would throw his body, as well as his arms, over the object of his joy, and stine with hugging him whom he meant to embrace; in the Continental parts of Europe embracing between males, as well as females, is universal on meeting after a long absence, or on taking leave for a length of time; embraces are sometimes given in England between near rela- tives, but in no other case. Clasp and embrace may be appUed to other objects besides persons in the same sense. CLASS, Order, Rank, Degree. Class is derived from Latin classis, a faction, a division, a fleet. Order, Latin ordo, is allied to Latin ordiri, to begin, from oriri, to rise. Rank, Old French reng, comes from Old High German hrinc, a ring of men. Degree, in French degre, comes from the Latin gradus, a stop. Class is more general than order; de- gree is more specific than rank. Class and order are said of the persons wha are distinguished; rank and degree of the distinction itself: men belong to- a certain cUiss or order; they hold a certain rank; they are of a certain degree: among the Romans all the citizens were distinctly divided into classes according to their property; but in the modern constitution of so- ciety classes are distinguished from one another on general, moral, or civil grounds; there are reputable or dis- reputable classes; the laboring doss, the class of merchants, mechanics, etc.; order has a more particular significa- tion; it is founded upon some positive civil privilege or distinction: the gen- eral orders are divided into higher, low- er, and middle, arising from the unequal distribution of wealth and f>ower; the- E articular orders are those of the no- iUty, of the clergy, of freemasonry,, 164 CLASSIC and the like: rank distinguishes one individual from another; it is pecul- iarly applied to the nobihty and the gentry, although every man in the community holds a certain rank in relation to those who are above or below him: degree, like rank, is ap- plicable to the individual, but only in particular cases; literary and scien- tific degrees are conferred upon su- perior merit in different departments of science; there are likewise degrees in the same rank, whence we sjjeak of men of high and low degree. Class, Arrange, Range. — To class, from the noun class, signifies to put in a class. Arrange and range both come from the Old French rangier, from reng. Old High German hrinc, a ring, a row — arrange being formed by the addition of Latin ad (to) to the French verb. The general qualities and attributes of things are to be considered in class- ing; their fitness to stand by each other must be considered in arranging; their capacity for forming a line is the only thing to be attended to in rang- ing. Classification serves the purposes either of public policy or science; ar- ranging is a matter of convenience to the individual himself; ranging is a matter of convenience for others: men are classed into different bodies accord- ing to some certain standard of prop- erty, power, education, occupation, etc.; furnitm-e is arranged in a room according as it answers in color, shade, convenience of situation, etc.; men are ranged in order whenever they make a procession. All these words require more or less exercise of the intellectual faculty, but classing is a more abstract and comprehensive act than either ar- ranging or ranging. All objects, ex- ternal or internal, may admit of classi- fication, according to their similitudes and differences; but arranging and ranging are particular acts employed in regard to familiar objects, and the order in which they ought to be placed. Ideas are classed by the logician into simple and complex, abstract and con- crete; an individual arranges his own ideas in his mind : words are classed by the grammarian into different parts of speech: words are arranged by the writer in a sentence, so as to be suit- able. To arrange is a more complex proceeding than simply to range; a merchant or tradesman arranges his affairs when they are got into confusion, but a shopkeeper ranges his goods in such maimer as best to set them out to view. These words are applied figuratively in the same sense. CLASSIC. See Academic. CLEAN, CleaI'JLY, Pure. Clean and cleanly come from Anglo-Saxon claene, pure, bright, which in German developed the special sense of httle — German klein. Pure, in French pur, Latin purus. Clean expresses a freedom from dirt or soil; cleanly the disposition or habit of being clean. A person who keeps himself clean is cleanly; a cleanly ser- vant takes care to keep other things clean. Clean is employed either in the proper or the figurative sense; pure, mostly in the moral sense: the hands should be dean; the heart should be pure; it is the first requisite of good writing that it should be clean; it is of the first importance for the morals of youth to be kept pure. CLEANSE, See Sawctify. CLEAR, Lucid, Bright, Vivid. Clear, see Absolve. Lucid, in Latin lucidu^, from lucere, to shine, and lux, light, signifies having light.' Bright, see Brightness. Viind, Latin vividus, from vivere, to hve, signifies being in a state of life. These epithets mark a gradation in their sense; the idea of fight is com- mon to them, but clear expresses less than lucid, lucid than bright, and bright less than vivid; a mere freedom from stain or dulness constitutes the clear- ness; the return of light, and conse- quent removal of darkness, constitutes lucidity; brightness supposes a certain strength of light ; vividness a freshness combined with the strength, and even a degree of brilliancy: a sky is clear that is divested of clouds: the atmos- phere is lucid in the day, but not in the night; the sun shines bright when it is unobstructed by anything in the atmosphere; lightning sometimes pre- sents a vivid redness, and sometimes a vivid paleness: the light of the stars may be clear, and sometimes bright, ' but never vivid; the fight of the sun is CLEMENCY 165 rather bright than dear or vivid; the hght of the moon is either clear, bright, or vivid. These epithets may with equal propriety be apphed to color as well as to light: a clear color is un- mixed with any other; a bright color has something striking and strong in it; a vivid color something hvely and fresh in it. In their moral apphcation they pre- serve a similar distinction: a con- science is said to be clear when it is free from every stain or spot; a de- ranged understanding may have lucid intervals; a bright intellect throws light on everything around it; a vivid imagination glows with every image that nature presents. See also Apparent; Diaphanotjs; Euphonious; Fair. Clearly, Distinctly. — That is seen clearly of which one has a dear view independent of anything else; that is seen distinctly which is seen so as to distinguish it from other objects. We see the moon clearly whenever it shines, but we cannot see the spots in the moon distinctly without the help of glasses. What we see distinctly must be seen clearly, but a thing may be seen clearly without being seen distinctly. A want of light, or the intervention of other objects, prevents us from seeing clearly; distance, or a defect in the sight, pre- vents us from seeing distinctly. Old men often see clearly, but not distinctly; they perceive large or luminous objects at a distance, but they cannot distin- guish such small objects as the char- acters of a book without the help of convex glasses; short-sighted persons, on the contrary, see near objects dis- tinctly, but they have no clear vision of distant ones, unless they are viewed through concave glasses. Clearness, Perspicuity. — Clearness, from clear, is here used figuratively to mark the degree of light by which one sees things distinctly. Perspicuity, in French perspicuity, Latin perspicuitas, from perspicuus and perspicere, to look through, signifies the quality of being able to be seen through. These epithets denote qualities equal- ly requisite to render a discourse in- telligible, but each has its peculiar character. Clearness respects our ideas and springs from the distinction of the things themselves that are discussed: perspicuity respects the mode of ex- pressing the ideas, and springs from the good qualities of style. It requires a dear head to be able to see a subject in all its bearings and relations; to distinguish all the niceties and shades of difference between things that bear a strong resemblance, and to separate it from all irrelevant objects that in- termingle themselves with it. But whatever may be our clearness of con- ception, it is requisite, if we would communicate our conceptions to others, that we should observe a purity in our mode of diction, that we should be particular in the choice of our terms, careful in the disposition of them, and accurate in the construction of our sentences; that is perspicuity which, as it is the first, so, according to Quintilian, it is the most important part of composition. Clearness of intellect is a natural gift; perspicuity is an acquired art: although intimately connected with each other, yet it is possible to have clearness without perspicuity, and per- ppicuity without clearness. People of quick capacities will have clear ideas on the subjects that offer themselves to their notice, but for want of educa- tion they may often use improper or ambiguous phrases; or by errors of construction render their phraseology the reverse of perspicuous: on the other hand, it is in the power of some to express themselves perspicuously on subjects far above their comprehen- sion, from a certain facility which they acquire of catching up suitable modes of expression. The study of the classics and mathematics is most fitted for the improvement of clear- ness; the study of grammar, and the observance of good models, will serve most effectually for the acquirement of perspicuity. CLEAVE. See Stick. CLEFT. See Jagged. CLEMENCY, Lenity, Mercy. Clemency is in Latin dementia, signify*- ing mildness. Lenity is in Latin lenilas, from lenis, soft. Mercy is derived Irom Latin merceg, pay, which has developed into words of curiously diverse mean- ings — mercenary, merchant, French merci, thanks, etc. In this connection 166 CLERGYMAN it signifies that which brings a reward in heaven, and is influenced by the Latin misericordia, pitiful of heart. All these terms agree in denoting the disposition or act of forbearing to in- flict pain by the exercise of power. Clemency and lenity are employed only toward offenders; mercy toward aU who are in trouble, whether from their own fault or any other cause. Clem- ency lies in the disposition; lenity and mercy, in the act; the former as re- 8i>ects superiors in general, the latter in regard to those who are invested with civil power: a monarch displays his clemency by showing mercy; a master shows lenity by not inflicting pimishment where it is deserved. Clemency is arbitrary on the part of the dispenser, flowing from his will, inde- Eendent of the object on whom it is estowed: lenity and mercy are dis- cretionary, they always have regard to the object and the nature of the offence or misfortunes; lenity, there- fore, often serves the purposes of dis- ciphne, and mercy those of justice, by forgiveness instead of punishment; but clemency sometimes defeats its end by forbearing to pimish where it is need- ful. A nuld master, who shows clem- ency to a faithless servant by not bringing him to justice, often throws a worthless wretch upon the pubUc to commit more atrocious depredations. A well-timed lenity sometimes recalls an offender to himself, and brings him back to good order. Upon this prin- ciple the English constitution has wise- ly left in the hands of the monarch the discretionary power of showing mercy in aU cases that do not demand the utmost rigor of the law. CLERGYMAN, Parson, Priest, Minister. Clergyman is derived from Latin clericus, from Greek ic\»jp«'(c6c, icX^poc, a lot); in Late Greek it sig- nifies the consecrated members of a Christian society, whose lot or portion "is in the Lord." Parson is derived from Latin -persona, a person of rank, and meant a person of rank in a Chris- tian society. Priest comes from the Greek irpta^vTEpoQ, signifying An elder who holds the sacerdotal office. Min- ister, in Latin minister, a servant, from minor, less or inferior, signifies fiterally one who performs a subordinate office. It acquired a special significance be- cause of the Christian emphasis upon humility. The Pope called himself the "servant of the servants of Jesus Christ." The word clergyman apples to such as are regularly bred according to the forms of the national refigion, and ap- plies to none else. In this sense we speak of the English, the French, and Scotch clergy without distinction. A parson is a species of clergyman who ranks the highest in the three orders of inferior clergy, that is, parson, vicar, and cm-ate; the parson being a techni- cal term for the rector, or he who holds the living: in its technical sense it has now acquired a definite use, but in general conversation it is become al- most a nickname. The word clergy- man is always substituted for parson in polite society. When priest re- spects the Christian reUgion it is a species of clergyman, that is, one who is ordained to officiate at the altar in distinction from the deacon, who is only an assistant to the priest. But the term priest has likewise an extended meaning in reference to such as hold the sacerdotal character in any form of refigion, as the priests of the Jews, or those of the Greeks, Romans, Indians, and the like. A minister is one who actually or habitually officiates. Clergy- men are therefore not always strictly ministers, nor are all ministers clergy- men. If a clergyman delegates his func- tions altogether he is not a minister; nor is he who presides over a dissenting congregation a clergyman. In the former case, however, it would be in- vidious to deprive the clergyman of the name of minister of the G<)spel, but in the latter case it is a misuse of the term clergyman to apply it to any minister who does not officiate accord- ing to the form of an estabfished religion. CLEVER, Skilful, Expert, Dex- terous, Adroit. Clever, Middle Eng- fish diver, ready to seize, is alfied to Middle EngUsh diver, a claw. Skilful comes from skill, a Scandinavian word which meant originally intelUgent, dis- cerning. Expert, in French expert, Latin expertiis, participle of experior, to search or try, signifies searched and tried. Dexterous, in Latin dexter, sig- CLOAK 167 nifies the quality of doing rightly, as vdth the right hand. Adroit is derived from the French phrase d droit, from Latin ad (to)and directum, right, justice, uUimately from regere, to order or rule. Cleverness is mental power employed in the ordinary concerns of life: a per- son is clever in business. Skill is both a mental and corporeal power, exerted in mechanical operations and practical sciences: a physician, a lawyer, or an artist is skilful: one may have a skill in divination, or a skill in painting. Expertness and dexterity require more corporeal than mental p)ower exerted in minor arts and amusements: one is ex-pert at throwing the quoit: dexterous in the management of horses. Adroit- ness is altogether a corporeal talent, employed only as occasion may require:' one is adroit at eluding the blows aimed by an adversary. Cleverness is rather a natural gift; skill is cleverness im- E roved by practice and extended nowledge; expertness is the effect of long practice; dexterity arises from habit combined with agility; adroit- ness is a species of dexterity arising from a natural agility. A person is chver at drawing who shows a taste for it, and executes it well without much instruc- tion: he is skilful in drawing if he un- derstands it both in theory and prac- tice; he is expert in the use of the bow if he can use it with expedition and effect; he is dexterous at any game when he goes through the manoeuvres with celerity and an imerring hand; he is adroit if, by a quick, sudden, and well- directed movement of his body, he effects the object he has in view. CLEVERNESS. See Gumption. CLIMACTERIC, Critical, Dan- gerous. These words all suggest a time of suspense, when some misfort- une may be about to fall. Of the three words climacteric is the most sp>ecific. Climacteric, from the Greek KKifiaKTrip, a roimd or step of a ladder, pertains to one of the supposed critical and dangerous steps or periods in hu- man hfe, in which some great change is by some believed to take place in the human constitution. The num- bers 7 and 9 are thought by many to mark the years of age when such steps or periods are reached, and when dan- gerous attacks of sickness may be expected. The most critical period of all, according to beUef, and known as the grand climacteric, is within the 63d year, that is 7x9, of a man's Lfe, when his constitution is said to decline rapidly, involving him in criti- cal illness till the year has passed and old age begins. Critical (see Critical) and danger- ous (see Danger) are less limited in their application. Dangerous is a stronger word than critical. Critical suggests the possibih'ty of misfortune; dangerous the probability. CLIMB, See Arise. CLOAK, Mask, Blind, Veil. These are figurative terms, expressive of dif- ferent modes of intentionally keeping something from the view of others. They are borrowed from those famihar objects which serve similar purposes in common life. Cloak and mask express figuratively and properly more than blind or veil. The two former keep the whole object out of sight; the two latter only partially intercept the view. In this figurative sense they are all em- ployed for a bad purpose. The doak, the mask, and the hlivd serve to deceive others; the veil serves to deceive one's self. The whole or any part of a char- acter may be concealed by a blind; a part, though not the whole, may be con- cealed by a mask. A blind is not only employed to conceal the character, but the conduct or proceedings. We carry a doak and a mask about with us; but a blind is something external. The doak, as the external garment, is the most convenient of all coverings for entirely keeping concealed what we do not wish to be seen; a good out- ward deportment serves as a doak to conceal a bad character. A mask hides only the face; a mask, therefore, serves to conceal only as much as words and looks can effect. A blind is intended to shut out the light and prevent ob- servation; whatever, therefore, con- ceals the real truth, and prevents sus- picion by a false exterior, is a blind. A veil prevents a person from seeing as weU as being seen ; whatever, therefore, obscures the mental sight acts as a veil to the mind's eye. Religion is unfortu- nately the object which may serve to doak the worst of purposes and the worst of characters: its importance in 168 CLOG the eyes of all men makes it the most effectual passport to their countenance and sanction; and its external obser- vances render it the most convenient mode of presenting a false profession to the eyes of the world: those, there- fore, who set an undue value on the ceremonial part of rehgion do but encourage this most heinous of all sins, by suffering themselves to be imposed upon by a cloak of rehgious hypocrisy. False friends always wear a mask; they cover a malignant heart under the smiles and endearments of friendship. Illicit traders mostly make use of some blind to facilitate the carrying on their nefarious practices. Am»ng the vari- ous arts resorted to in the metropolis by the needy and profligate, none is so bad as that which is made to be a blind for the practice of debauchery. Prejudice and passion are the ordinary veils which obscure the judgment and prevent it from distinguishing the truth. CLOG, Load, Encumber. Clog in Middle English means the wooden sole of a shoe; hence a hindrance. For the derivation of load see Freight. Encumber is from French encombrer, Latin in and Late Latin combrus, an obstacle. Clog is figuratively employed for whatever impedes the motion or action of a thing, drawn from the familiar object which is used to impede the motion of animals: load is used for whatever occasions an excess of weight or materials. A wheel is clogged, or a machine is clogged; a fire may be loaded with coals, or a picture with coloring. The stomach and memory may be either clogged or loaded: in the former case by the introduction of improper food, and in the second case by the introduction of an improper quantity. A memory that is clogged becomes con- fused, and confounds one thing with another; that which is loaded loses the impression of one object by the intro- duction of another. Clog and encum- ber have the common signification of interrupting or troubling by means of something irrelevant. Whatever is clogged has scarcely the liberty of mov- ing at all; whatever is encumbered moves and acts, but with difficulty. When the roots of plants are clogged with mould, or any improper substance, their growth is almest stopped; weeds and noxious plants are encumbrances in the ground where flowers should grow. CLOISTER, Convent, Monastery. Cloister, Latin claustrum, means literal- ly an enclosure, and signifies a certain close place in a convent, or an en- closure of houses for canons, or, in gen- eral, a religious house. Convent, from the Latin conventv^, a meeting, and convenire, to come together, signifies a religious assembly. Monastery, in French monastere, signifies a habita- tion for monks, from the Greek fiovoc, alone. The proper idea of cloister is that of seclusion; the proper idea of convent is that of community; the proper idea of a monastery is that of solitude. One is shut up in a cloister, put into a convent, and retires to a monastery. Whoever wishes to take an absolute leave of the world shuts himself up in a cloister; whoever wishes to attach himself to a community that has renounced all commerce with the world goes into a convent; whoever wishes to shun all hu- man intercoiu*se retires to a monastery. In the cloister our liberty is sacrificed; in the convent our worldly habits are renounced, and, those of a regular rehg- ious community being adopted, we sub- mit to the yoke of established orders: in a monastery we impose a sort of voluntary exile upon ourselves; we five with the view of living only to God. In the ancient and true monas- teries the members divided their time between contemplation and labor; but as population increased and towns multiphed monasteries were, properly speaking, succeeded by convents. In ordinary discourse cloister is employed in an absolute and indefinite manner: we speak of the cloister to designate a monastic state; as entering a cloister; burying one's self in a cloister; penances and mortifications are practised in a cloister. It is not the same thing when we speak of the cloister of the Benedic- tines and of their monastery; or the cloister of the Capuchins and their convent. CLOSE, CoMPAC?r. Close is from the French clos, and Latin clau^us, the participle of claudere, to shut. Compact COADJUTOR 169 is derived from Latin compactus, cum, together, and pangere, to fasten, to fit, and signifies fitted, close, form. Proximity is expressed by both these terms; the former in a general and the latter in a restricted sense. Two bodies may be close to each other, but a body is compact with regard to itself. Contact is not essential to con- stitute closeness; but a perfect ad- hesion of all the parts of a body is essential to produce compactness. Lines are dose to each other that are separated but by a small space; things are rolled together in a com- pact form that are brought within the smallest possible space. Close, Near, Nigh. — Close (see above). Near is the comparative of nigh. Close is more definite than near: houses stand close to each other which are almost joined; men stand close when they touch each other; objects are near which are within sight; per- sons are near each other when they can converse together. Near and nigh, which are but variations of each other in etymology, admit of httle or no difference in their use; the former, however, is the most general. People hve near each other who are in the same street; they live close to each other when their houses are adjoining. Close is annexed as an adjective; near is employed only as an adverb or prep- osition. We speak of dose ranks or close fines; but not near ranks or near lines. See also End; Sequel. Close, Shut.— Close (see above). Shut, Anglo-Saxon scyttan^ meant originally to fasten a door with a bolt, and is allied to shoot. We still say " shoot the bolt" (Skeat). To close signifies simply to put dose together; shut to stop or prevent ad- mittance; closing is therefore a partial shuUing, and shutting a complete dos- ing; as to close a door or window is to put it partially to, as distinguished from shutting it, i. e., shutting it dose. The eyes are shui by closing the eye- lids, and the mouth is shui oy closing the lips; and by the figure of metonvmy to close may therefore often be substi- tuted for shut: as to dose the eyes, to dose the mouth, particularly in poetry. There is, hewever, a further distinc- tion between these two words: to close properly denotes the bringing anything close, and may, therefore, be applied to anv opening or cavity which may thus be filled up or covered over for a permanency; as to dose a wound, to dose the entrance to any place; but shuUing implies merely an occasional stoppage of an entrance by that which is movable: whatever is shui may be opened in this sense; not only a door, a book, or a box may be shut, but also the ears may be shui. In familiar language it is usual to speak of closing a scene, for putting an end to it; but in poetry the term shut may without impropriety be used in the same sense. See also Blockade. Close, Conclude, Finish. — To close is to bring toward an end; to condude, from con and daudere, to shut, i. e., to shut together, signifies to bring actually to an end; finish, in Latin fi,nio and finis, an end, signifies also Uterally to bring to an end. The idea of putting an end to a thing is common to these terms, but they differ in the circumstances of t*he action. To close is the most indefinite of the three. We may close at any point by simply ceasing to have any more to do with it; but we condude in a definite anc?" positive manner. Want of time may compel us to dose a letter before we have said all we wish to say; a letter is commonly concluded with expressions of kindness or courtesy. Whatevet admits of being discontinued is properly said to be closed; as to close a pro- cession, entertainment, and the like. Whatever is brought to the last or the desired point is properly said to be con- eluded; as to condude a speech, a nar- rative, a business, and the like. To conclude is to bring to an end by determination; to finish is to bring to an end by completion: what is settled by arrangement and delibera- tion is properly conduded; what is begun on a certain plan is said to be finished. CLOWN. See Countryman. CLOY. See Satisfy. CLUE. See Key. CLUMSY. See Awkward. CLUTCH. See Nab. COADJUTOR, Assistant. Coadju- 170 COALESCE tor, compounded of von and adjvior, a helper, signifies a fellow-laborer. As- sistant signifies properly one that assists or takes a part. A coadjutor is more noble than an assistant: the latter is mostly in a sub- ordinate station, but the former is an equal; the latter performs menial of- fices in the minor concerns of life, and a subordinate part at all times; the former labors conjointly in some con- cern of common interest and great im- portance. An assistant is engaged for a compensation; a coadjutor is a volun- tary fellow-laborer. In every public concern where the purposes of charity or reUgion are to be promoted coadju- tors often effect more than the original promoters: in the medical and scho- lastic professions assistants are indis- pensable to relieve the pressure of business. Coadjuiors ought to be zeal- ous and unanimous; assistants ought to be assiduous and faithful. COALESCE. See Add. COALITION. See Union. COARSE, Rough, Ritde. Coarse was formerly course, and developed as an adjective from the phrase in course, to denote anything of ordinary char- acter. Rou^h comes from Anglo-Saxon Tuh, rough, hairy. Rude is derived from Latin rudis, raw, rough. These epithets are equally appKed to what is not polished by art. In the proper sense coarse refers to the com- position and materials of bodies, as coarse bread, coarse meat, coarse cloth; rough respects the surface of bodies, as rough wood and rou^h skin; rude respects the make or fashion of things, as a rude bark, a rude utensil. Coarse is opposed to fine, rough to smooth, rude to polished. In the figurative application they are distinguished in a similar manner: coarse language is used by persons of naturallv coarse feeUng; rough lan- guage, by those whose tempers are either naturally or occasionally rough; rude language, by those who are igno- rant of any better. See also Gross. COAX, Wheedle, Cajole, Fawn. Coax is a comparatively recent word of uncertain origin. Dr. Johnson. 1755-73, describes it as "a low word." The original meaning seems to have been to make a cokes of, from cokes, a simpleton, a dupe. Wheedle may be derived from Anglo-Saxon woedlian, to beg, originally to be poor, from wcedl, poverty. Cajole meant formerly to chatter like a jay. It may be of imita- tive origin. Faum is derived from Anglo-Saxon fahnian, to rejoice, from foegen, fain, glad, ana means to rejoice servilely, hence to cringe. The idea of using mean arts to turn people to one's selfish piu-poses is com- mon to all these terms: coax has some- thing childish in it; wheedle and cajole that which is knavish ;/aicn that which is servile. The act of coaxing consists of vu-gent entreaty and whining sup- pUcation; the act of wheedling consists of smooth and winning entreaty; cajoling consists mostlj' of trickery and stratagem, disguised imder a soft ad- dress and insinuating manners; the act of fawning consists of supphcant grimace and antics, such as character- ize the httle animal from which it de- rives its name: children coax their parents in order to obtain their wishes; the greedy and covetous wheedle those of any easy temper; knaves cajole the simple and unsuspecting; parasites fawn upon those who have the power to contribute to their gratifications: coaxing is mostly resorted to by in- feriors toward those on whom they are dependent; wheedling and cajoling are low practices confined to the baser sort of men with one another; fawning, though not less mean and disgraceful than the above-mentioned vices, is commonly practised only in the higher walks, where men of base character, though not mean education, come in connection with the great. COERCE, Restrain. Coerce, in Latin coerceo, that is, con and crceo, from area, a chest, signifies to drive into conformity, with the under meaning of enclosing. Restrain is a variation of restrict (see Bind). Coercion is a species of restraint: we always restrain or intend to restrain when we coerce; but we do not always coerce when we restrain; coercion al- ways comprehends the idea of force; restraint, that of simply keeping under or back: coercion is always an external application; restraint either external or internal: a person is coerced by others COLOR 171 only; he may be restrained by himself as well as others. Coercion acts by a direct appUcation: it opposes force to resistance: restraint acts indirectly to the prevention of an act: the law re- strains all men in their actions more or less; it coerces those who attempt to violate it; the unruly will is coerced; the improper will is restrained. Coer- cion is exercised; restraint is imposed: punishment, threats, or any actual exercise of authority, coerces; fear, shame, or a remonstrance from others, restrains. COEVAL, Contemporary. Coeval, from the Latin oevum, an age, signifies of the same age. Contemporary, from tempus, signifies of the same time. An age is a specifically long space of time; a time is indefinite; hence the application of the terms to things in the first case and to persons in the second: the dispersion of mankind and the confusion of languages were coeval with the building of the tower of Babel; Addison was contemporary with Swift and Pope. COGENT, Forcible, Strong. Co- gent, from the Latin cogere, to comp)el; and forcible, from the verb to force (see Compel), have equally the sense of acting by force. Strong is here figu- ratively employed for that species of strength which is connected with the mind (for derivation see Strong). Cogency applies to reasons individ- ually considered; force and strength, to moaes of reasoning or expression: cogent reasons impel to decisive con- duct; strong conviction is produced by forcible reasoning conveyed in strong language: changes of any kind are so seldom attended with benefit to so- ciety that a legislator will be cautious not to adopt them without the most cogent reasons; the imf>ortant truths of Christianity cannot be presented from the pulpit too forcibly to the minds of men. Accuracy and strength are seldom associated in the same mind; those who accustom themselves to strong language are not very scrupu- lous about the correctness of their assertions. COINCIDE. See Agree; Tally. COLD. See Chill; Cool. COLLEAGUE, Partner. Col- league, in French collogue, Latin col- lega, compounded of ligare, to bind, signifies united in the same work. Partner, from Latin partem (ace), part, whence our word part is derived, signifies one having a part or share. Colleague is more noble than partner: men in the highest offices are colleagues; tradesmen, mechanics, and subordinate persons are partners: every Roman consul had a colleague; every work- m<'m had commonly a partner. Col- league is used only with regard to com- munity of office; partner is most gen- erally used with regard to community of interest: whenever two persons are employed to act together on the same business they stand in the relation of colleagues to each other; whenever two persons unite their endeavors either in trade or in games, or the business of hfe, they are denominated partners: ministers, judges, commissioners, and plenipotentiaries are colleagues; bank- ers, chess-players, card-players, and the like, have partners. COLLECT. See Assemble; Gar- ner. COLLECTED. See Calm. COLLECTION. See Assembly. COLLOQUY. See Conversation. COLOR, Dye, Tinge, Stain. To color, in Latin color, signifies to put color on or give color to a thing. To dye, in Anglo-Saxon deagian, signifies to imbue with a colo7. To tinge, in Latin tingo, and Greek rsyytiv, to sprinkle, signifies to touch lightly with a color. Stain, in French deteindre, comes from Latin dis, apart, and tingere, color, signifies to put a color on in a bad manner, or give a bad color. To color, which is the most indefinite of these terms, is employed technically for putting a color on a thing; as to color a drawing. But to color, in the general sense of giving color, may be appUed to phys- ical objects; as to cohr the cheeKs. More commonly, however, to moral objects, as to color a description with the introduction of strong figures, strong facts, or strong descriptions, etc. To dye is a process of art, as in the dyeing of cloth, but the term is applied to objects generally in the sense of imbuing with any substance so as to change the color. 172 COMBAT To tinge may be applied to ordinary objects; as to tinge a painting with blue by way of intermixing colors; but it is most appropriately used in po- etry. To stain is used in its proper sense when applied to common objects; as to stain a painting by putting blue in- stead of red, or to stain anything by giving it an unnatural color. Whence it has also a moral appUca- tion in the sense of taking away the purity from a thing; as to stain the reputation or character. Color, Hue, Tint. — Hue and tint, from tinge, are but modes of color; the former of which expresses a faint or blended color; the latter a shade of color. Between the colors of black and brown, as of all other leading colors, there are various hu^s and tints, by the due intermixture of which natural ob- jects are rendered beautiful. Colorable, Specious, Ostensible, PlauM- ble. Feasible.— -Colorable, from to color or tinge, expresses the quality of being able to give a fair appearance. Specious, from the Latin species, appearance, from the root spec, to see, signifies the quaUty of looking as it ought. Os- tensible, from the Latin ostendere, to stretch before the eyes, signifies the quahty of being able or fit to be shown or seen. Plausible, from plaudo, to clap or make a noise, signifies some- thing deserving of applause or approval. Feasible, from the French faire, and Latin facere, to do, signifies literally doable, and denotes seemingly practi- cable. The first three of these words are figures of speech drawn from what natiu-ally pleases the eye; plausible is drawn from what pleases the ear: feasible takes its signification from what meets the judgment or conviction. What is colorable has an aspect or face upon it that lulls suspicion and affords satisfaction; what is specious has a fair outside when contrasted with that which it may possibly conceal; what is ostensible is that which presents such an appearance as may serve for an in- dication of something real: what is plausible is that which meets the un- derstanding merely through the ear; that which is feasible recommends itself from its intrinsic value rather than from any representation given of it. A pretence is colorable when it has the color of truth impressed upon it; it is specious when its fallacy is easily dis- cernible through the thin guise it wears; a motive is ostensible which is the one soonest to be discovered; an excuse is plau^ble when the well-con- nected narrative of the maker im- presses a beUef of its justice: a plan is feasible which recommends itself aa fit to be put in execution. COMBAT, Oppose. Combat, from the French combattre, from Latin con, together, and batuere, to beat, to fight together, is used figm-atively in the same sense with regard to matters of opinion. Oppose, through French op- poser, from Latin ob and Late Latin pansare, for pono, to place one's self in the way, signifies to set one's self against another. Combat is properly a species of op- posing; one always opposes in combat- ing, though not vice versa. To com- bat is used in regard to speculative matters; oppose in regard to private and personal concerns. A person's positions are combated, his interests or his measures are opposed. The Christian combats the erroneous doc- trines of the infidel with no other weapon than that of argument: the sophist opposes Christianity with ridi- cule and misrepresentation. The most laudable use to which knowledge can be converted is to combat error wher- ever it presents itself; but there are too many, particularly in the present day, who employ the httle pittance of knowledge which they have collected to no better pm-pose than to oppose everything that is good, and excite the same spirit of opposition in others. See also Battle; Conflict. COMBATANT, Champion. Com- batant, from to combat, marks any one that engages in a combat. Champion, French champion, signifies originally a soldier or fighter, from the Latin cam- pus, a field, especially a field of battle. A combatant fights for himself and for victory; a champion fights either for another or in another^ cause. The word combatant has always relation to some actual engagement; champion may be employed for one ready to be ' engaged or in the habit of being en- COMFORT 173 /gaged. The combatants in the Olympic games used to contend for a prize; the Roman gladiators were combatants who fought for their hves: when knight- errantry was in fashion there were champions of all descriptions, cham- pions in behalf of distressed females, champions in behalf of the injured and oppressed, or champions in behalf of aggrieved princes. The mere act of fighting constitutes a combatant; the act of standing up in another's defence at a personal risk constitutes the cham- pion. Animals have their combats, and consequently are combatants; but they are seldom champions. There may be champions for causes as well as persons, and for bad as well as good causes; as champions for hberty, for infidehty, and for Christianity. COMBINATION, Cabal, Plot, Conspiracy. Combination (see Asso- ciation). Cabal, in French cabale, comes from the Hebrew kabala, signify- ing a secret science pretended to by the Jewish rabbi, whence it is apphed to any association that has a pretended secret. Plot, in French complot, is a word of unknown origin. Plot in the sense of plan may have developed from plot, a small portion, to plot being to lay out in portions; from this familiar significance of the word may have developed its sinister meaning. Conspiraq/, in French conspiration, from con and spirare, to breathe to- gether, signifies the having one spirit. An association for a bad purpose is the idea common to all these terms, and pecuhar to combination. A combination may be either secret or open, but secrecy forms a necessary part in the signification of the other terms; a cabal is secret as to its end; a plot and con- spiracy are secret both as to the means and the end. Combination is the close adherence of many for their mutual defence in obtaining their demands or resisting the claims of others. A cabal is the intrigue of a party or faction, formed by cunning practices in order to give a turn to the course of things to their own advantage: the natural and riding idea in cabal is that of as- sembling a number and manoeuvring secretly with address. A plot is a clan- destine union of some persons for the purpose of mischief: the ruling idea in a plot is that of a comphcated enterprise formed in secret, by two or more per- sons. A conspiraq^ is a general inteUi- Sence among persons united to effect some serious change: the ruling and natural idea in this word is that of unanimity and concert in the prosecu- tion of a plan. Combination, Cabal, Junto.— A special term apphed to a combination or cabal for political purposes is found in the word junto, from Spanish junta (Latin jungere, to join), signifying a secret council or assembly, a select body of men combined secretly to effect some pohtical aim. The form junta refers specifically to the Grand Council of the State of Spain, and was adopted in 1895 by the Cuban insurgents to designate the representation of their cause in foreign countries. The form junto is appUcable to any secret gath- ering of men of a political character. It does not have the sinister signifi- cance of cabal, but, hke cabal, it adds the idea of secrecy to that of combina- tion. See also Association. COMBINE. See Connect; Merge. COMBINED. See Synthetic. COME, Arrive. Come is general; arrive is particular. Persons or things come; persons only, or what is personified, arrives. To come specifies neither time nor manner; arrival is employed with regard to some particular period or circumstance. The coming of our Saviour was pre- dicted by the prophets; the arrival of a messenger is expected at a certain hour. We know that evils must com^, but we do wisely not to meet them by anticipation; the arrival of a ves- sel in the haven, after a long and dangerous voyage, is a circumstance of general interest in the neighbor- hood where it happens. COMELY. See Becoming. COMFORT, Pleasure. Comfort (see Cheer). Pleasure, from to please, signifies what pleases. Comfort describes a state of quiet enjoyment, a freedom from trouble, pain, or disquiet. It is apphed also to the relief or strength afforded in time of weakness, oppression, or danger. The grand feature in comfort is sub- stantiality; in that of pleasure is 174 COMICAL warmth. Pleasure is quickly suc- ceeded by pain; it is the lot of hu- manity that to every pleasure there should be an alloy: comfort is that por- tion of pleasure which seems to he exempt from this disadvantage; it is the most durable sort of pleasure. Comfort must be sought for at home; pleasure is pursued abroad : comfort de- pends upon a thousand nameless trifles which daily arise; it is the rehef of a pain, the heightening of a gratification, the supply of a want, or the removal of an inconvenience. Pleasure is the com- panion of luxury and abimdance: it dwells in the palaces of the rich and the abodes of the voluptuary. Comfort is less than pleasure in the detail; it is more than pleasure in the aggregate. See also Cheer; Console; Hearten. COMICAL. See Laughable. COMMAND, Order, Injunction, Precept. Command is compounded of con, together, and mandare, or dare in manus, to give into the hand, signifying to give or appoint as a task. Order, in the extended sense of regularity, imphes what is done in the way of order or for the sake of regularity. Injunction comes from in and jungo, which signi- fies hterally to join or bring close to; figuratively, to impress on the mind. Enjoin is derived from the same Latin word. Precept, in French precepte, Latin prceceptum, participle of prcedpio, compounded of prce and capere, to take before, signifies the thing proposed to the mind. A command is an exercise of power or authority; it is imperative and must be obeyed: an order serves to direct; it is instructive and must be executed. Command is properly the act of a superior or of one possessing power: order has more respect to the office than to the person. A sovereign issues his cojnmands: orders may be given by a subordinate or by a body; as orders in coimcU, or orders of a coiu*t. A command may be divine or given from heaven; an order or injunction is given by men only. Order is apphed to the conamon con- cerns of hfe; injunction and precept to the moral conduct or duties of men. Injunction imposes a duty by virtue of the authority which enjoins: the -precept lays down or teaches such du- ties as already exist. See also Praise. COMMANDING, Imperative, Im- perious, Authoritative. Command- ing signifies having the force of a com- mand (see above). Imperative, from Latin imperare, is derived from Latin in, and parare, to prepare, hence to order, arrange, command. Imperious, also from imperare, signifies in the way of, or hke a command. Authorita- tive signifies having authority, or in the way of authority (for the deriva- tion of which see Influence). Commanding is either good or bad, according to circumstances; a com- manding voice is necessary for one who has to command; but a commanding air is offensive when it is affected : im- perative is apphed to things, and used in an indifferent sense; imperious is used for persons or things in the bad sense: any direction is imperative which comes in the shape of a com- mand, and circumstances are hkewise imperative which act with the force of a command : persons are iynperiou^ who exercise their power oppressively; in this manner xmderhngs in ofiice are im- perioiis; necessity is imperious when it leaves us no choice in our conduct. Authoritative is mostly applied to per- sons or things personal in the good sense only; magistrates are called upon to assume an authoritative air when they meet with any resistance. COMMEMORATE. See Cele- brate. COMMENCE. See Begin. COMMENDABLE. See Laudable. COMMENSURATE. See Propor- tionate. COMMENT. See Remark. COMMENTARY. See Remark. COMMERCE. See Intercourse; Trade. COMMERCIAL. See Mercantile. COMMISERATION. See Sympa- thy. COMMISSION, Authorize, Em- power. Commission, from Latin cum, with, and mittere, to send, signifies the act of sending some one with authority, or putting into the hands of another. To authorize signifies to give authority; to empower, to put in possession of power. COMMON 176 The idea of transferring some busi- ness to another is common to these terms; the circumstances under which this is performed constitute the differ- ence. We commission in ordinary cases ; we authorize and empower in extraor- dinary cases. We commission in mat- ters where our own will and convenience are concerned; we authorize in matters where om* personal auihority is requi- site; and we empower in matters where the auihority of the law is required. A commission is given by the bare com- munication of one's wishes; we av^ thorize by a positive and formal decla- ration to that intent; we empower by the transfer of some legal document. A person is commissioned to make a purchase; he is authorized to communi- cate what has been confided to him; he is empowered to receive money. Com- missioning passes mostly between equals; the performance of cowmisstons is an act of civihty; authorizing and empowering are as often directed to inferiors; they are frequently acts of justice and neecssity. Friends give one another commissions; servants and subordinate persons are sometimes au- thorized to act in the name of their employers; magistrates empower the officers of justice to apprehend indi- viduals or enter houses. We are com- missioned by persons only; we are authorized sometimes by circumstances; we are empowered by law. COMMIT. See Consign; Per- petuate. COMMODIOUS, Convenient. Commodious, from the Latin commodus, or con and modus, according to the measure and degree required. Con- venient, from the Latin conveniens, par- ticiple of con and venire, to come togeth- er^ signifies that which comes together with something else as it ought. The commodious is a species of the convenienL namely, that which men contrive for their convenience. Com- modious is therefore mostly applied to that which contributes to the bodily ease and comfort, convenient to what- ever suits the purposes of men in their various transactions: a house, a chair, or a place is commodious; a time, an opportunity, a season, or the arrival of a person is convenient. What is commodious is rendered so by design; what is convenient is so from the nature of the thing: in this sense arguments may be termed com- modious which favor a person's ruhng propensity or passion. COMMODITY, Goods, Merchan- dise, Ware. These terms agree in expressing articles of trade under vari- ous circumstances. Commodity, in Latin commoditas, signifies in its ab- stract sense convenience, and in an ex- tended apphcation anything that is convenient or fit for use. This being also salable, the word has been ap- plied to things that are sold. Goods, from Anglo-Saxon god, fit, which de- notes the thing that is good, has derived its use from the same analogy in its sense. Merchandise, from Latin merx, pay, Greek fidpirrHv, to seize, signifies salable things. (Compare the deri- vation of mercy under the key-word Clemency.) Ware, Anglo^axon waru, originally meant valuables, being alhed to waru, signifying protection, guard, custody, etc. Commodity is employed only for ar- ticles of the first necessity; it is the source of comfort and object of indus- try: goods is apphed to everything be- longing to tradesmen for which there is a stipulated value; they are sold retail, and are the proper objects of trade: merchandise apphes to what be- longs to merchants; it is the object of commerce: wares are manufactured, and may be either goods or merchan- dise; a country has its commodities, a shopkeeper his goods, a merchant his mercharidise, a manufacturer his wares. COMMON, Vulgar, Ordinary, Mean. Common, in French commun, Latin communis, from con and munus, the joint office or property of many, has regard to the multitude of objects. Vulgar, in French vulgaire, Latin vul- garis, from vulgus, the people, has re- gard to the number and quaJity of the persons. Ordinary, in French ordi- naire, Latin ordinarius, from ordo, the order or regular practice, has regard to the r«)etition or disposition of things. Mean is derived from Anglo- Saxon maene, which usually appears in the word gemcene, common (German gemein); its meaning has been in- fluenced by Latin medius, moderate, and by the EngUsh mean, the middle 176 COMMON-CARRIER place, derived from that Latin word. Familiar use renders things common, vulgar, and ordinary; but what is mean is so of itself: the common, vulgar, and ordinary are therefore frequently, though not always, mean; and, on the contrary, what is mean is not always common, vulgar, or ordinary; conse- quently in the primitive sense of these words the first three are not strictly synonymous with the last: monsters are common in Africa; vulgar reports are httle to be relied on; it is an ordi- nary practice for men to make light of their word. In the figiirative sense in which they convey the idea of low value they are synonymous with mean; what is to be seen, heard, and enjoyed by every- body is common and naturally of little value, since the worth of objects fre- quently depends upon their scarcity and the difficulty of obtaining them. What is pecuMar to common people is vvlgar and consequently worse than common; it is supposed to belong to those who are ignorant and depraved in taste as well as in morals: what is done and seen ordinarily may be done and seen easily; it requires no abiUties or mental acquirements; it has nothing striking in it, it excites no interest: what is mean is even be- low that which is ordinary; there is something defective in it. Common is opposed to rare and refined; vulgar, to poMte and cultivated; ordinary, to the distinguished; mean, to the noble: a common mind busies itself with com- mxm objects; vulgar habits are easily contracted from a shght intercourse with vulgar people; an ordinary per- son is seldom associated with eleva- tion of character; and a mean appear- ance is a certain mark of a degraded condition if not of a degraded mind. See also Public. Commonly, Generally, Frequently, Usually. — Commonly, in the form of common (see above). Generally, from general, and the Latin genus, the kind, respects a whole body in distinction to an individual. Frequently, horn frequent, Latin frequens, is derived from a lost Latin verb, frequere, to cram, and signi- fies, properly, in a crowding manner. Usually, from Latin usualis, from usus, use, signifies according to use or custom. What is commonly done is an action common to all; what is generally done is the action of the greatest part; what is frequently done is either the action of many or an action many times re- peated by the same person; what is usually done is done regularly by one or many. Commonly is opposed to rarely; generally and frequently, to occasionally or seldom; usually, to casually: men commonly judge of others by them- selves; those who judge by the mere exterior are generally deceived; but notwithstanding every precaution one is /regwen^Zz/ exposed to gross frauds; a man of business usu^ly repairs to his counting-house every day at a certain hour. COMMON - CARRIER, Shipper, Transporter. Common-carrier is one of two conspicuous legal and commer- cial terms applied to a person or com- pany engaged in the business of carry- ing goods from one place to another for the general pubhc and for pay; the other term oeing private-carrier, one who carries only for a particular customer and not for the general pubhc, and who incurs no respon- sibihty beyond that of ordinary diligence. A common-carrier by land may be a railroad corporation, express company, stage-coach proprietor, a truckman, teamster, or porter, and a common- carrier by water may be a steamship company, the master or owner of other ships and vessels engaged in transpor- tation of goods, a lighterman, canal- boatman, ferryman, and others em- ployed in like manner. A shipper is one who puts goods on board the ship; and is extended to lefer to any one whose business it is to put goods on some means of con- veyance for transportation to another place. The transporter (from Latin trans, across, and portare, to carry) is, strictly speaking, the person who carries the goods from one spot to an- other. A common-carrier in America is a pubhc transporter, and as such is bound by strict legal obUgations de- fined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. COMMONWEALTH. See State. COMMOTION.DiSTUEBANCE. Com- motion, compounded of cum, together, COMPANION 177 and movere, signifying properly a mo- tion of several together, expresses more than disturbance, which denotes the state of being disturbed (see Trouble). When appUed to physical objects, com- motion denotes the violent motion of several objects or of the several parts of any individual thing; disturbance denotes any motion or noise which puts a thing out of its natural state. We speak of the commotion of the elements, or the stillness of the night being dis- turbed by the rustling of the leaves. In respect to men or animals, com- motion and disturbance may be either inward or outward with a hke distinc- tion in their signification. A commotion supposes a motion of all the feeUngs; a disturbance of the mind may amount to no more than an interruption of the quiet to an indefinite degree. So in regard to external circum- stances: a commotion in pubhc is occa- sioned by extraordinary circimastances, and is accompanied with unusual bustle and movement ; whatever inter- rupts the peace of a neighborhood is a disturbance: political events occasion a commotion; drunkenness is a common cause of disturbances in the streets or in famihes. COMMUNICATE, Impabt. To communicate, from the Latin communis, common, signifies to make common, or give a joint possession or enjoyment: to impart, from in and part, signifies to give in part or make partaker. Both these words denote the giving some part of what one has in his power or possession; but the former is more general and indefinite in its significa- tion and application than the latter. A thing may be communicated directly or indirectly, and to any number of per- sons; as to communicate inteUigence by signal or otherwise. Impart is a direct action that passes between individuals; as to impart instruction. What is communicated may be a mat- ter of interest to the person communi- cating or otherwise; out what is im- parted is commonly and properly that which interests both parties. A man may communiccUe the secrets of another as well as his own ; he imparts his senti- ments and feelings to a friend. Communion, Converse. — Communion, from commune and common, signifies the act of making conmion. Converse, from Latin con and versari, to dwell, from vertere, to turn, signifies the inter- course of those dwelling together. Both these terms imply a conamuni- cation between minds; but the for- mer may take place without corporeal agency, the latter never does; spirits hold communion with one another; p)eo- ple hold converse. For the same reason a man may hold communion with, him- self; he holds converse always with another. See also Lord's Supper. COMMUNISM. See Socialism. COMMUNITY, Society. Both these terms are employed for a body of rational beings. Community, from com- munitas and communis, common, sig- nifies abstractly the state of being common, and in an extended sense those who are in a state of common posses- sion. Society, in Latin societas, from sociu^, a companion, signifies the state of being companions, or those who are in that state. Community in anything constitutes a community; a common interest, a com- mon language, a common government, is the basis of that community which is formed by any number of individuals; the coming together of many and keep- ing together under given laws and for given purposes constitutes a society; so- cieties are either pubhc or private, ac- cording to the purpose: friends form societies for pleasure, indifferent per- sons form societies for business. The term community is therefore appropri- ately apphed to indefinite numbers, and society in cases where the number is restricted by the nature of the union. The term community may likewise be apphed to a small body, and in some cases be indifferently used for society; but as it always retains its generality of meaning, the term society is more proper where the idea of a close union, a tie, or obligation is to be expressed; as, every member of the community is equally interested; every member of the society is bound to contribute. See also Public. COMMUTE. See Exchange. COMPACT. See Agreement; Close. COMPANION. See Accompani- ment; Associate. 178 COMPANY COMPANY. See Assembly; Asso- ciation; Band; Society; Troop. COMPARISON, Contrast. Com- jMrison, Latin comparo, or con, to- gether, and par, equal, signifies the putting together of equals. Contrast, in French contraster, Latin contrasto, or contra, against, and stare, to stand, sig- nifies the placing one thing opposite to another. Likeness in the quality and differ- ence in the degree are requisite for a comparison; hkeness in the degree and opposition in the quality are requisite ~:for a contrast: things of the same color are compared; those of an opposite color are contrasted: a comparison is made between two shades of red: a contrast between black and white. Com- parison is of a practical utihty, it serves to ascertain the true relation of objects; contrast is of utility among poets, it serves to heighten the effect of opposite qualities: things are large or small by comparison; they are magnified or diminished in one's mind by contrast: the value of a coin is best learned by comparing it with another of the same metal; the generosity of one person is most strongly felt when contrasted with the meanness of another. See also Simile. COMPASSION. See Pmr; Sympa- thy. COMPATIBLE, Consistent. Com- patible, compounded of com or cum, •vnth, and pati, to suffer, signifies a fitness to be suffered together. Con- sistent, in Latin consistens, participle of consisto, compounded of con and sistere, to cause to stand, to please, signifies the fitness to be placed together. Compatibility has principally a refer- ence to plans and measures; consistency, to character, conduct, and station. Everything is compatible with a plan which does not interrupt its prosecu- tion; everything is consistent with a ■ person's station by which it is neither degraded nor elevated. It is not com- patible with the good discipline of a school to allow of foreign interference; it is not consistent with the elevated and dignified character of a clergyman to engage in the ordinary pursuits of other men. COMPEL, Force, Oblige, Neces- sitate. All these terms denote the apphcation of force either on the body or the mind in order to influence the conduct. To compel, from the Latin con and pello, drive, signifying to drive to a specific point, denotes rather moral than physical force; but to force, from Latin fors, strong, signify- ing to effect by force, is properly ap- plied to the use of physical force or a violent degree of moral force. A man may be compelled to walk if he have no means of riding; he may be forced to go at the will of another. These terms may, therefore, be ap- plied to the same objects to denote different degrees of force. Compel expresses a direct and power- ful force on the will which leaves no choice. Oblige, from ob and ligare, to bind, signifying to bind or Keep down to a particular point, expresses only an indirect influence, which may be resisted or yielded at discretion; we are compelled to do that which is re- pugnant to our will and our feelings; that which one is obliged to do may have the assent of the judgment if not of the will. Wants compel men to do many things which are incon- sistent with their station and painful to their feelings. Honor and religion oblige men scrupulously to observe their word one to another. Compel, force, and oblige are mostly the acts of persons in the proper sense. Necessitate, which signifies to lay under a necessity, is properly the act of things. We are necessitated by circumstances, or by anything which puts it out of our power to do otherwise. Compel, Impel, Constrain, Restrain. — To compel and impel are both de- rived from the verb pello, to drive; the former, by the force of the preposition com, is to drive to any particular action or for a given purpose; but the latter, from the preposition im or in, into, is to force into action generally. A per- son, therefore, is compelled by outward circumstances, but he is impelled from within: he is compelled by another to go farther than he wished, he is im- pelled by curiosity to go farther than he intended. Constrain and restrain are from stringere, to bind or obhge. The former, by force of the con or com, to force in a particular manner or for a particular purpose; the latter COMPENSATION 179 by the re, back or again, is to keep back from anything. To constrain, like to corn-pel, is to force to act; to restrain. to prevent from acting. Constrain ana compel differ only in the degree of force used, constrain signif jdng a less degree of force than compel. A person who is compelled has no choice whatever left to him; but when he is only constrained he may do it or not at discretion. Constraint is put on the actions or movements of the body only, restraint on the movements of both Dody and mind: a person who is in a state of constraint shows his want of freedom in the awkwardness of his movements; he who is in a state of restraint may be imable to move at all. Constraint arises from that which is inherent in the person, restraint is imposed upon him. See also Consthaint. COMPENDIUM. See Abridg- ment. COMPENSATION, Amends, Sat- isfaction, Recompense, Remunera- tion, Requital, Reward. All these terms imply some return or equivalent for something else, good or bad. Com- pensation, from cum and pendere, to weigh, signifies literally what is weighed with or against something else, hence paid for another thing. Amends, from amend, signifies that which amends or makes good. Satisfaction, that which satisfies or makes up some- thing wanted. Recompense, from pen- sum, participle of pendo, that which pays back. Remuneration, from muntis, a gift or reward, that which is given back by way of reward. Requital, from to quit, that which acquits in return. The first three of these terms denote a return or equivalent for something amiss or wanting; the last three a return for some good. A compensation is a return for a loss or damage sustained; justice requires that it should be ec^ual in value, al- though not alike in kind. Amends is a return for anything that is faulty in ourselves or toward others. A person may make amends for idle- ness at one time by double portion of diligence at another. A man may make another amends for any hardship done to him by showing him some extra favor another way. Satisfaction is that which satisfies the individual requiring it; it is given for personal injuries, and may be made either by a slight return or otherwise, according to the disposition of the person to be satisfied. As regards man and man, affronts are often unreal, and the satisfaction demanded is still oftener absurd and unchristian-like. As re- gards man and his Maker, satisfaction is for our offences, which Divine Jus- tice demands and Divine Mercy ac- cepts. Compensation and amends may both denote a simple equivalent without any reference to that which is personal. A compensation in this case may be an advantage one way to counterbalance a disadvantage another way. Or it may be the putting one desirable thing of equal value in the place of another. An amends supplies a defect by some- thing superabundant in another part. Compensation is sometimes taken for a payinent or some indefinite return for a service or good done: this brings it nearer in sense to the words recom- pense and remuneration, with this dif- ference, that the compensation is given for bodily labor, or inferior services; recompense and remuneration, for that which is done by persons in a sujjerior condition. The time and strength of a poor man ought not to be used with- out his receiving a compensation. A recompense is a voluntary return for a voluntary service; it is made from a generous feeling, and derives its value not so much from the magnitude of the service or return as from the intentions of the parties toward each other; and it is received not so much as a matter of right as of courtesy: there are a thousand acts of civility performed by others which may be entitled to some recompense. Remuneration is not so voluntary as recompense, but it is equally indefinite, • being estimated rather according to the condition of the person and the dignity of the service than its positive worth. Authors often receive a re- muneration for their works according to the reputation they have previously acquired, and not according to the real merit of the work. Requital is the return o/ a kindness, the making it is an act of gratitude. 180 COMPETENT Reward, from ward, and the Ger- man wdhren, to see, signifies properly a looking back upon — i. e., a return that has respect to something else. A re- ward conveys no idea of an obhgation on the part of the person making it; whoever rewards acts optionally. It is the conduct which produces the re- ward, and consequently this term, un- like all the others, denotes a return for either good or evU. Whatever accrues to a man and the consequences of his conduct, be it good or bad, is a reward. The reward of industry is ease and content. When a deceiver is caught in his own snare, he meets with the reward which should always attend deceit. A compensation, recompense, requital, and reward may be a bad as well as a good return. That which ill supphes the thing wanted is a bad compensa- tion; honor is but a poor compensation for the loss of health. That which does not answer one's ex- pectations is a bad recompense; there are many things which people pursue with much eagerness that do not recom- pense the trouble bestowed upon them. When evil is returned for good, that is a bad requital, and, as a proof of in- gratitude, woimds the feehngs. Those who befriend the wicked may expect to be ill requited. A reward may be a bad return when it is inadequate to the merits of the person. COMPETENT, Fitted, Qualified. Competent, from con, together, and petere, to seek, signifies suitable (Uter- ally, seeking that which belongs to one). Fitted, fTomfit (see Becoming). Qualified, participle of qualify, from the Latin qualis, how much, and facere, to make, signifies made as much as it ought to be, measured up to a stand- ard. Competency mostly respects the men- tal endowments and attainments; fit- ness, the disposition and character; qualification the artificial acquirements or natural quaUties. A person is com- petent to undertake an office; fiited or qualified to fill a situation. Famihar- ity with any subject aided by strong mental endowments gives competency: suitable habits and temper constitute the fiiness: acquaintance with the business to be done, and expertness in the mode of performing it, constitute the qunlifi/Mion: none should pretend to give their opinions on serious sub- jects who are not competent judges; none but lawyers are competent to de- cide in cases of law; none but medical men are competent to prescribe medi- cines: none but divines of sound learn- ing, as weU as piety, to determine on doctrinal questions: men of sedentary and studious habits, with a serious temper, are most fitted to be clergymen: and those who have the most learning and acquaintance with the Holy Script- ures are the best qualifi£d for the im- portant and sacred office of instructing the people. Many are quxilified for managing the concerns of others who would not be competent to manage a concern for themselves. Many who are fitted, from their turn of mind, for any particular charge may be unfortu- nately incompetent for want of the requisite qualifications. COMPETITION, Emulation, Ri- valry. Competition, from the Latin competo, compounded of con and peto, signifies to sue or seek together, to seek for the same object. Emulation comes from Latin cemulus, which means striv- ing to be equal. Rivalry, from the Latin rivu^, the bank of a stream, sig- nifies the undivided or common en- joyment of any stream, which in olden times was a natural source of discord and led to rivalry Competition is properly an act, emula- tion is a f eehng or temper of mind which incites to action, and emulation, there- fore, frequently furnishes the motive for competition; the bare action of seek- ing the same object constitutes the competition; the desire of exceUing is the principal characteristic in emula- tion. Competition, therefore, apphes to matters either of interest or honor where more than one person strive to gain a particular object, as competi- tion for the purchase of a commodity or for a prize. Emulation is confined to matters that admit of superiority and distinction. Rivalry resembles emulation as far as it has most respect to the feehng, and competition as far as it has respect to the action. But competition and emula- tion have for the most part a laudable COMPLAIN 181 object, and proceed in the attainment of it by honest means; rivalry has al- ways a selfish object, and is often but Uttle scrupulous in the choice of the means: a cmnpetitor may be unfair, but a rival is very rarely generous. There are competitors for office, or com- petitors at pubUc games, and rivals for the favor of others. When emulation degenerates into a desire for petty distinctions it is akin to rivalry. Competitors must always come in close coUision^ as they seek for the same individual thing; but rivals may act at a distance, as they only work toward the same point: there may be rivalry between states which vie with one an- other in greatness or power, but there cannot properly be competition. CO^EPLAIN, Lament, Regret. Complain, French complaindre or plain- dre, Latin plango, to beat the breast as a sign of grief. Lament (see Bewail). Regret comes through French from Latin re and a Scandinavian verb foimd in Anglo-Saxon grcetan, to bewail. Complaint marks most of dissatisfac- tion; lamentation, most of grief; regret, most of pain. Complaint is expressed verbally; lamentation, either by words or signs; regret may be felt without being expressed. Complaint is made of personal grievances; lamentation and regret may be made on account of others as well as ourselves. We complain of our ill health, of our inconveniences, or of troublesome circumstances; we lament our inabihty to serve another; we regret the absence of one whom we love. Selfish people have the most to complain of, as they demand most of others and are most hable to be dis- appointed; anxious people are the most hable to lament, as they feel everything strongly; the best-regulated mind may have occasion to regret some circumstances which give pain to the tender affections of the heart. We may complain without any cause, and lament beyond what the cause re- quires; but regret is always founded on some real cause, and never exceeds in measure. Complain, Murmur, Repine. — Com- plain (see above). Murmur is a word of imitative origin, from Latin murmur, Sanskrit marmara, the rustling sound of the wind; hence a low complaining. Repine is compoimded of re and pine, from Anglo-Saxon pin, pain, Latin poena, punishment, and Greek irotvi], penalty, signifying to think on with pain. The idea of expressing displeasure or dissatisfaction of what is done by others is common to these terms. Complaint is not so loud as murmuring, but more so than repining. We complain or murmur by some audible method; we may repine secretly. Complaints are always addressed to some one; mur- murs and repinings are often addressed only to one's self. Complaints ard made of whatever creates xmeasiness, without regard to the som-ce from which they flow; murmurings are a species of complaints made only of that which is done by others for our inconvenience; when used in relation to persons, com- plaint is the act of a superior, or of one who has a right to express his dis-" satisfaction; murmuring, that of an inferior, or one who is subject to an- other. When the conduct of another offends, it calls for complaint; when a superior aggrieves by the imposition of what is burdensome, it occasions mur- muring on the part of the aggrieved. Complain and murmur may some- times signify to be dissatisfied simply, without implying any direct expression which brings them nearer to the word repine; in this case complain expresses a less violent dissatisfaction than mur- mur, and both more than repine, which implies what is deep-seated. With this distinction they may all be employed to denote the dissatisfaction produced by events that inevitably happen. Men may be said to complain, 7nurmur, or repine at their lot. Complaint, Accusation. — Complaint (see preceding term). Accusation (see Accuse). Both these terms are em- ployed in regard to the conduct of others, but a complaint is mostly made in matters that personally affect the complainant; an accusation is made of matters in general, but especially those of a moral nature. A complaint is made for the sake of obtaining redress: an accusation is made for the sake of ascertaining a fact or bringing to punishment. A complaint may be frivolous, an accusation false. People 182 COMPLAISANCE in subordinate stations should be care- ful to give no cause for complaint: the most guarded conduct will not protect any person from the unjust acctisations of the malevolent. COMPLAISANCE, Deference, Condescension. Complaisance, from the present participle of French com- plaire (Latin complacere, please), signi- fiestheactof complying with, or pleasing others. Deference, in French deference, from the Latin defero, to bear down, marks the inclination to defer, or acquiesce in the sentiments of another in preference to one's own. Condescen- sion, from Latin con, with, and de- scendere, to descend, means the de- scending from one's own height to comply with the wishes of others. The necessities, the conveniences, the accommodations and allurements of so- ciety, of familiarity, and of intimacy lead to complaisance: it makes sac- rifices to the wishes, tastes, comforts, enjoyments, and personal feelings of others. Age, rank, dignity, and per- sonal merit call for deference: it en- joins comphance with respect to our opinions, judgments, pretensions, and designs. The infirmities, the wants, the defects and foibles of others call for condescension: it relaxes the rigor of authority and removes the distinc- tion of rank or station. Complaisance is the act of an equal; deference, that of an inferior; condescension, that of a superior. Complaisance is due from one well-bred person to another; defer- ence is due to aU superiors in age, knowl- edge, or station whom one approaches; condescension is due from all superiors to such as are dependent on them for comfort and enjoyrnent. All these quaUties spring from a refinement of humanity; but complaisance has most of genuine kindness in its nature; deference, most of respectful submission; condescension, most of easy indulgence. COMPLAISANT. See Civil; CouR- TEOtrs. COMPLETE, Perfect, Finished. Complete, in French complet, Latin com- fletus, participle of complere, to fill up, signifies the quality of being filled, or having aU that is necessary. Perfect, in Latin perfectus, participle of perfwere, from per, through, and facere, to do, fiignifies the state of being done thor- oughly. Finished, from finish (see Close), marks the state of being finished. That is complete which has no de- ficiency: that is perfect which has posi- tive excellence; and that is finished which has no omission in it. That to which anything can be added is incom- plete; when it can be improved, it is imperfect; when more labor ought to be bestowed upon it, it is unfinished. A thing is complete in all its parts; perfect as to the beauty and design of the construction; and finished as it comes from the hand of the workman and answers his intention. A set of books is not complete when a volume is wanting: there is nothing in the proper sense perfect which is the work of man, but the term is used relatively for whatever makes the greatest ap- proach to perfection: a finished per- formance evinces care and diligence on the part of the workman. These terms admit of the same distinction when apphed to moral or intellectual objects. See also Whole. Complete, Finish, Terminate. — We complete, that is, make complete, what is undertaken by continuing to labor at it. We finish what is begun in a state of forwardness by putting the last hand to it. We terminate what ought not to last by bringing it to a close, from terminus, a term, a boun- dary, signifying to set bounds to a thing. The characteristic idea of completing is that of making a thing altogether what it ought to be; that of finishing the doing all that is intended to be done toward a thing; and that of terminating, simply putting an end to a thing. Com- pleting has properly relation to perma- nent works only, whether mechanical or intellectual; we desire a thing to be completed from a curiosity to see it in its entire state. To finish is employed for passing occupations; we wish a thing finished from an anxiety to pro- ceed to something else, or a dislike to the thing in which we are engaged. Terminating respects space or time: a view may be terminated, a Mfe may be terminated, or that to which one may put a term, as to terminate a dispute. Light minds undertake many things COMPLY 183 without completing any. Children and unsteady people set about many things without finishing any. Litigious peo- ple terminate one dispute only to com- mence another. COMPLETELY. See Qotte. COMPLETION. See Consumma- tion. COMPLEX. See Compotjnd. COMPLEXITY, Complication, In- tricacy. Complexity and complication, in French complication, compounded of con, with, and plectere, to plait, allied to plicare, to twine, signifies a plaiting together of two different things — an interweaving. Intricacy, Latin intri- catio and intrico, compounded of in and tricos, perplexities, signifies a state of entanglement. Complexity expresses the abstract quality or state; complication the act: they both convey less than intricacy; intricate is that which is very compli- cated. Comvlexity arises from a mul- titude of objects and the nature of these objects; complication, from an involvement of objects; ana intricacy, ffom a winding and confused involu- tion. What is complex must be de- composed; what is complicated must be developed; what is intricate must be unraveled. A proposition is com- plex, affairs are complicated; the law 18 intricate. The complexity of a sub- ject often deters young persons from appUcation to their business. There is nothing embarrasses a physician more than a complication of disorders, where the remedy for one impedes the cure for the other. Some affairs are in- volved in such a degree of intricaq/ as to exhaust the patience and persever- ance of the most laborious. COMPLIMENT. See Adulate. COMPLY, Conform, Yield, Sub- mit. Comply (see Agree). Conform, compounded of con and formare, signi- fies to put into the same form. Yield (see Agree). Submit, in Latin svb- mitto, compoimded of sub, imder, and mittere, to send, signifies to put under, that is to say, to put one's self under another person. Compliance and con- formity are volimtary; yielding and submission are involimtary. Compli- ance is an act of the incUnation; con- formity an act of the judgment: com- pliance is altogether optional; we com- ply with a thing or not, at pleasure; conformity is binding on the conscience; it relates to matters in which there is a right and a wrong. Compliance with the fashions and customs of those we live with is a nattiral propensity of the human mind that may oe mostly in- dulged without impropriety; conjormity in religious matters, though not to be enforced by human law, is not on that account less binding on the consciences of every member of the community; the violation of this duty on trivial grounds - involves in it that of more than one breach of the moral law. Compliance and conformity are pro- duced by no external action on the mind; they flow spon^neously from the will and understanding: yielding is altogether the result of foreign agency. We comply with a wish as soon as it is known; it accords with our feelings so to do: we yield to the entreaties of others; it is the effect of persuasion, a constraint upon or at least a direction of the inclination. We conform to the regulations of a com- munity, it is a matter of discretion; we yield to the superior judgment of an- other, we have no choice or alternative. We comply cheerfully; we conform willingly; we yield reluctantly. A cheerful compliance with the requests of a friend is the sincerest proof of friendship: the wisest and most learned of men have ever been the readiest to conform to the general sense of the com- munity in which they hve: the har- mony of social hfe is frequently dis- turbed by the reluctance which mea have to yield to one another. To yield is to give way to another, either with one's will, judgment, or outward conduct; submission is the giving up of one s self altogether; it is the substitution of another's will for one's own. Yielding is partial; we may yield in one case or in one action, though not in another: submission is general; it includes a system of con- duct. We yield when we do not resist; this may sometimes be the act of a superior: we submit only by adopting the meas- ures and conduct proposed to us; this always is the act of an inferior. Yield' ing may be produced by means more or less gentle, by enticing or insinuat- 184 COMPOSE ing arts, or by the force of argument; submission is made only to power or positive force: one yields after a struggle; one submits without resist- ance: we yield to ourselves or others; we svbmit to others only: it is a weak- ness to yield either to the suggestions of others or our own inclinations to do that which ©ur judgments condemn; it is a folly to submit to the caprice of any one where there is not a moral obligation: it is obstinacy not to yield when one's adversary has the advan- tage; it is sinful not to svbmit to con- stituted authorities. See also Agree. Compliant, Yielding, Submissive. — These epithets from the preceding verbs serve to designate a propensity to the respective actions, which may be excessive or otherwise. A compliant temper complies with every wish of another, good or bad: a yielding tem- per leans to every opinion, right or wrong; a submissive temper submits to every demand, just or unjust. A com- plaint person may want command of feeling; a yielding person may want fixedness of principle; a submissive person may want resolution: a too complaint disposition will be imposed upon by the selfish and unreasonable; a too yielding disposition is most unfit for commanding; a too subrnissive dis- position exposes a person to the exac- tions of tyranny. COMPOSE, Settle. Compose is derived through French from Greek vavmc, a pause. "One of the most remarkable facts of French etymology is the extraordinary substitution where- by Late Latin pausare, from Greek, coming to mean to cause to rest, usurped the place of Latin ponere, with which it had no etymological connec- tion at all; so that the compounds of pausare (compau^are, French composer, for example) usurped the place of the compounds of Latin ponere, hke com- ponere, throughout" (Skeat). Settle is derived from Anglo-Saxon setlan, to fix, from sell, a seat. Modem EngUsh settle, a seat. We compose that which has been dis- jointed and separated by bringing it together again; we settle that which has been disturbed and put in motion by making it rest: we compose our thoughts when they have been de- ranged and thrown into confusion: we settle our mind when it has been fluctuating and distracted by contend- ing desires; the mind must be composed before we can think justly; it must be settled before we can act consistently. Differences are composed where there are jarring and discord; it is effected by concihation, differences are settled when they are brought to a final ar- rangement by consultation or other- wise. In this manner a person may be said to compose himself, his thoughts, his dress, and the like; to settle matters, points, questions, etc. It is a good thing to comppse differences between friends; it is not always easy to settle questions where either party is ob- stinate. See also Compound; Form. Composed, Sedate. — Composed signi- fies the state or quality of being in order, or free from confusion or per- turbation; it is applied either to the mind or to the air, manner, or car- riage. Sedate, in Latin sedatus, from Latin sedare, to make calm, causativ* of sedere, to sit (compare sedative), sig- nifies properly the quality of being settled (see Compose), i. e., free from irregular motion, and is apphed either to the carriage or the temper. Com- posed is opposite to ruffled or hurried, and is a temporary state; sedate is opposed to buoyant or volatile, and is a permanent habit of the mind or body. A person may be composed or his car- riage may be composed in moments of excitement. Young people are rarely sedate. See also Calm; Synthetic. COMPOUND, Complex. Com- pound comes from the present of cotiv- ponere, to place together. Complex (see Complexity). The compound consists of similar and whole bodies put together; the complex consists of various parts linked to- gether: adhesion is sufficient to con- stitute a compound; involution is req- uisite for the complex; we distinguiaa the whole that forms the compound; we separate the parts that form the complex; what is compound may con- sist only of two; what is complex con- sists always of several. Compound and complex are both commonly opposed CONCEAL 185 to the simple; but the former may be opposed to the single, and the latter to the simple: words are compounded, sentences are complex. Compound, Compose. — Compound and compose (see Compose). Compound is used in the physical sense only; com- pose in the proper or the moral sense; words are compounded by making two or more into one; sentences are com- posed by putting words together so as to make sense: a medicine is com- pounded of many ingredients; society is composed of various classes. COMPREHEND. See Comprise; Conceive. COMPREHENSIVE, Extensive. Comprehensive, from comprehend, in Latin comprchendo, from con, together, and prehendere, to take, signifies the quality of putting together. Extensive, from extend, in Latin extendo, or ex and tendere, to stretch out, signifies the qual- ity of reaching to a distance. Comprehensive respects quantity, ex- tensive regards space: that is compre- hensive which extends into a wide field : a comprehensive view of a subject in- cludes all branches of it; an extensive view of a subject enters into minute details: the comprehensive is associated with the concise; the extensive with the diffuse: it requires a capacious mind to take a comprehensive survey of any subject; it is possible for a superficial thinker to enter very extensively into some parts, while he passes over others. Comprehensive is employed only with regard to intellectual ob- jects; extensive is used both in the prop)er or the improper sense: the sig- nification of a word is comprehensive, or the powers of the mind are com- prehensive: a plain is extensive, or a field of inquiry is extensive. COMPRISE, Comprehend, Em- brace, Contain, Include. Comprise, through the French compris, participle of comprendre, comes from the same source as comprehend. Embrace (see Clasp). Contain, in French contenir, Latin coniineo, compounded of con and teneo, signifies to hold together within one place. Include, in Latin includo, compounded of in and cludo or daudo, signifies to shut in or within a given space. Comprise, comprehend, and embrace have regard to the aggregate value, auantity, or extent; include, to the in- i vidua! things which form the whole; contain, either to the aggregate or to the individual, being in fact a term of more ordinary apphcation than any of the others. Comprise and contain are used either in the proper or the figurative sense; comprehend, embrace, and include in the figuratiye sense only: a stock comprises a variety of articles; a hbrary comprises a variety of books; the whole is comprised within a small compass; rules comprehend a nimaber of particulars; laws compre- hend a number of cases; countries com- prehend a certain number of districts or divisions; terms comprehend a cer- tain meaning: a discourse embraces a variety of topics; a plan, project, scheme, or system embraces a variety of objects; a house contains one, two, or more persons; a city contains a number of houses; a book contains much useful matter; a society contains very many individuals; it includes none but of a certain class; or it includes some of every class. COMPULSION. See Constraint. COMPUNCTION. See Repent- ance. COMPUTE. See Calculate; Es- timate. CONCEAL, Dissemble, Disguise. Conceal is compounded of Latin con and celare, to hide. Dissemble, in French dissimider, compounded of dis, negative prefix, and similis, like, signifies to make a thing appear unlike what it is. Disguise, in French deguiser, com- pounded of the privative dis or de and guise, in Old High German ivise, a manner or fashion, signifies to take a form opposite to the reality. To conceal is simply to abstain from making known what we wish to keep secret; to dissemble and disguise sig- nify to conceal by assuming some false appearance: we conceal facts; we dis- semble feehngs ; we disguise sentiments. Caution only is requisite in concealing: it may be effected by simple silence: art and address must be employed in dissembling; it mingles falsehood with all its proceedings; labor and cimning are requisite in disguising; it has nothing but falsehood in all its move- ments. The concealer watches over 186 CONCEDE himself that he may not be betrayed into any indiscreet communication; the dissembler has an eye to others, so as to prevent them from discovering the state of his heart; disguise assumes altogether a different face from reahty, and rests secure under this shelter. It is sufficient to conceal from those who either cannot or will not see; it is necessary to dissemble with those who can see without being shown; but it is necessary to disguise from those who are anxious to discover and use every means to penetrate the veil that inter- cepts their sight. Conceal, Hide, Secrete. — Conceal (see above). Hide, Anglo-Saxon hydan, is aUied to Greek kevQhv, to cover or put out of sight. Secrete, in Latin se- cretus, participle of secemo, or se, apart, and cernere, to separate, means to take away and hide in a place apart. Concealing has simply the idea of not letting come to observation; hiding, that of putting under cover; secreting, that of setting at a distance or in un- frequented places: whatever is not seen is concealed, but whatever is hid- den or secreted is intentionally put out of sight: a person conceals himself be- hind a hedge; he hides his treasures in the earth; he secretes what he has stolen under his cloak. Conceal is more gen- eral than either hide or secrete: all things are concealed which are hidden or secreted, but they are not always hidden or secreted when they are con- cealed: both mental and corporeal ob- jects are concealed; corporeal objects mostly, and sometimes mental ones, are hidden; corporeal objects only are secreted: we conceal in the mind what- ever we do not make known: that is hidden which may not be discovered or cannot be discerned; that is secreted which may not be seen. Facts are concealed, truths are hidden, goods are secreted. Children should never at- tempt to conceal from their parents or teachers any error they have com- mitted when called upon for an ac- knowledgment; we are told in Script- m-e, for our consolation, that nothing is hidden which shall not be revealed; people seldom wish to secrete anything but with the intention of concealing it from those who have a right to demand it back. Concealment, Secrecy. — Concealment is itself an action; secrecy, from se- cret, is the quality of an action: ccnv- cealment may respect the state of things; secrecy the conduct of persons; things may be concealed so as to be known to no one; but secrecy sup>- poses some person to whom the thing concealed is known. Concealment has to do with what concerns others; se- crecy, with that which concerns our- selves: what is concealed is kept from the observation of others; what is secret is known only to ourselves: there may frequently be concealment with- out secrecy, although there cannot be secrecy without concealment: conceal- ment is frequently practised to the detriment of others; secrecy is always adopted for our own advantage or gratification: concealment is essential in the commission of crimes; secrecy in the execution of schemes: many crimes are committed with impunity when the perpetrators are protected by conceal- ment; the best - concerted plans are often frustrated for want of observing secrecy. See also Camouflage. CONCEDE. See Give Up. CONCEIT, Fancy. Conceit comes immediately from the Latin ccmceptus, participle of concipere, from con, to- gether, and capere, take, and means to take and put together, to conceive or form in the mind. Fancy, in French phantasie. Latin phantasia, Greek ipdvraffia, from ^ai/rd^w, make appear, and (pnivut, appear. These terms equally express the working of the imagination in its dis- torted state; but conceit denotes a much greater degree of distortion than fancy: our conceits are preposterous; what we fancy is unreal or only apparent. Con- ceit applies only to internal objects: it is mental in the operation and the result; it is a species of invention :/anct/ is apphed to external objects, or what- ever acts on the senses: nervous peo- ple are subject to strange conceits; timid people fancy they hear sounds or see objects in the dark which awaken terror. Those who are apt to conceit oftener conceit that which is painful than otherwise; conceiting either that they are always in danger of dying, or that all the world is their enemy. CONCEIVE 187 There are, however, insane people who conceit themselves to be kings and queens: and some, indeed, who are not called insane, who conceit themselves very learned while they know nothing, or very wise and clever while they are exposing themselves to perpetual ridi- cule for their folly, or very handsome while the world calls them plain, or very peaceable while they are always quarrelling with their neighbors, or very humble while they are tenaciously stickhng for their own: it would be well if such conceits afforded a harmless pleasure to their authors, but imfortu- nately they only render them more offensive and disgusting than they would otherwise be. Those who are apt to fancy never fancy anything to please themselves; they fancy that things are too long or too short, too thick or too thin, too cold or too hot, with a thousand other fancies equally trivial in their nature, thereby prov- ing that the shghtest aberration of the mind is a serious evil, and productive of evil. When taken in reference to intel- lectual objects, conceit is always in a bad sense; but fancy may be employed in a good sense. See also Pride, CONCEITED, See Opinionated, CONCEIVE, Understand, Com- prehend. Conceive has the same deri- vation as conceit. Understand signifies to stand under, or near to the mind. Comprehend, in Latin comprehendo, compoimded of con, together, and pre- hendere, to sieze, signifies to seize or embrace within the mind. These terms indicate the intellectual operations of forming ideas, that is, ideas of the complex kind, in distinction from the simple ideas formed by the act of perception. Conception is the sim- plest operation of the three; when we conceive we may have but one idea; when we understand or comprehend we have all the ideas which the subject is capable of presenting. We cannot wn- derstand or comprehend without con- ceiving; but we may often conceive that which we neither understand nor com- prehend. That which we cannot conceive is to us nothing; but the conception of it gives it an existence, at least in pur minds; but understanding and comprehending is not essential to the belief of a thing's existence. So long as we have reasons sufficient to con- ceive a thing as possible or probable, it is not necessary either to under- stand or comprehend it in order to authorize our behef. The mysteries of our holy religion are objects of con- ception, but not of comprehension. We conceive that a thing may be done with- out understanding how it is done; we conceive that a thing may exist without comprehending the nature of its exist- ence. We conceive clearly, understand fully, comprehend minutely. Conceiving is a species of invention; it is the fruit of the mind'a operation within itself. Understanding and com- prehension arc employed solely on ex- ternal objects; we understand and com- vrehend that which actually exists Defore us and presents itself to our observation. Conceiving is the office of the imagination aa well as the judg- ment; understanding and comprehen- sion are the office of the reasoning facul- ties exclusively. Conceiving is employed with regard to matters of taste, to arrangements, designs, and projects; understanding is employed on familiar objects which present themselves in the ordinary dis- course and business of men; compre- hending respects principles, lessons, and speculative knowledge in general. The artist conceives a design, and he who will execute it must understand it; the poet conceives that which is grand and sublime, and he who will enjoy the perusal of his conceptions must have refinement of mind, and capacity to comprehend, the grand and sublime. The builder conceives plans, the scholar understands languages, the metaphysi- cian attempts to explain many things which are not to be comprehended. See also Apprehend. Conception, Notion. — Conception, from conceive, signifies the thing con- ceived. Notion, in French notion, Latin notio, from notv^, the participle of noscere, to know, signifies the thing known. Conception is the mind's own work, what it pictures to itself from the ex- ercise of its own powers; notion is the representation of objects as they are drawn from observation. Conceptions 188 CONCERN are the fruit of the understanding and imagination; notions are the result of experience and information. Concep- tions are formed; notions are enter- tained. Conceptions are either grand or mean, gross or sublime; either clear or indistinct, crude or distinct; notions are either true or false, just or absurd. Intellectual culture serves to elevate men's conceptions; the extension of knowledge serves to correct and refine their notions. Some heathen philosophers had an indistinct conception of the Deity, whose attributes and character are un- folded to us in His revelation: the ignorant have often false notions of their duty and obligations to their su- periors. The unenlightened express \ their gross and crude conceptions of a Superior Being by some material and visible object: the vulgar notion of ghosts and spirits is not entirely ban- ished from the most cultivated parts of any country. See also Perception. CONCERN. See Affair; Affect; Care; Interest. CONCERT, Contrive, Manage. Concert is derived from Latin conceriare, from con, together, and certare, to strive, and signified to strive together, to vie. Contrive comes from Old French controver, to find together. Manage, in French menager, comes from Latin manus, hand, and means to control with the hand. There is a secret imderstanding in concerting; invention in contriving; execution in managing. There is most- ly contrivance and managing in concert- ing; but there is not always concerting in contrivance or management. Meas- ures are concerted; schemes are con- trived; affairs are managed. Two parties at least are requisite in con- certing, one is sufficient for contriving and managing. Concerting is always , employed in all secret transactions; contrivance and management are used indifferefttly. Robbers who have de- termined on any scheme of plunder concert together the means of carrying their project into execution; they con- trive various devices to elude the vigi- lance of the police; they manage every- thing in the dark. Those who are debarred the opportunity of seeing one another unrestrainedly concert meas- ures for meeting privately. The inge- nuity of a person is frequently displayed in the contrivances by which he strives to help himself out of his troubles. Whenever there are many parties in- terested in a concern, it is never so well managed as when it is in the hands of one individual suitably qualified. CONCILIATE, Reconcile. Con- ciliate, in Latin conciliatus, and recon- cile, in Latin reconcilio, both come from condliare, to bring together, whence council is also derived, and denote an achieving of unity and harmony. Conciliate and reconcile are both em- ployed in the sense of uniting men's affections, but under different circum- stances. The conciliator gets the good- will and affections for himself; the rec- onciler unites the affections of two persons to each other. The conciliator may either gain new affections or re- gain those which are lost ; the reconciler alwayc either renews affections which have been once lost or fixes them where they ought to be fixed. The best means of conciliating esteem is by reconciling all that are at variance. Conciliate is mostly employed for men in public stations; reconcile is indif- ferently employed for those in public or private stations. Men in power have sometimes the happy opportunity of conciliating the good-will of those who are most averse to their authority, and thus reconciling them to measures which would otherwise be odious. Kindness and condescension serve to conciliate; a friendly influence, or a well-timed exercise of authority, is often successfully exerted in recon- ciling. Conciliate is mostly employed in the sense of bringing persons into unison with each other who have been at variance; but reconcile may be employed to denote the bringing a person into unison or acquiescence with that which would be naturally disagreeable. CONCISE. See Laconic; Short. CONCLUDE. See Close; De- cide. CONCLUSION, Inference, De- duction. Conclusion, from Latin con- clvdere, compounded of con, together, and claudere, close, signifies the closing CONDITION 189 up of all argumeixts axid reasoning. Inference, from infer, in Latin infero, signifies what is brought in. Deduc- tion, from Latin deducere, compounded of de, from, and ducere, lead, to bring out, signifies the bringing or drawing one conclusion from another. A conclusion is full and decisive; an inference is partial and indecisive: a conclusion leaves the mind in no doubt or hesitation; it puts a stop to all further reasoning: inferences are special conclusions from particular circum- stances; they serve as Unks in the chain of reasoning. Conclusion in the technical sense is the concluding prop- osition of a syllogism, drawn from the two others, which are called the premises. Conclusions are drawn from real facts; inferences are drawn from the appearances of things; deductions only from arguments or assertions. Con- clusions are practical, inferences ratio- cinative, deductions are final. We conclude from a person's conduct or declarations what he intends to do or leave undone; we infer from the ap- pearance of the clouds or the thick- ness of the atmosphere that there will be a heavy fall of rain or snow; we deduce, from a combination of facts, inferences, and assertions, that a story is fabricated. Hasty conclusions be- tray a want of judgment or of firm- ness of mind: contrary inferences are frequently drawn from the same cir- cumstances to serve the pm-pose of party and support a favorite position; the deductions in such cases are not unfrequently true when the inferences are false. Conclusive, Decisive, Convincing. — Conclusive appUes either to practical or argumentative matters; decisive, to what is practical only; convincing, to what is argumentative only. It is necessary to be conclusive when we deliberate, and decisive when we com- mand. What is conclusive puts an end to all discussions and determines the judgment: what is decisive puts an end to all wavering and determines the will. Negotiators have sometimes an interest in not speaking conclusively; commanders can never retain their authority without speaking decisively. Conclusive, when comnared to convinc- ing, is general; the latter is particular: an argument is convincing, a chain of reasoning conclusive. There may be much that is convincing where there is nothing conclusive: a proof may be convincing of a particular circumstance, but conclusive evidence will bear upon the main question. See also Final. CONCOMITANT. See Accom- paniment. CONCORD, Harmony. Concord, in French Concorde, Latin concordia, is compounded from con, together, and cors, heart, having the same heart and mind. Harmony, in French harmonic, Latin harmonia, Greek apfiovia, from apuoQ, a joining, signifies the state of fitting or suiting. The idea of union is common to both these terms, but imder different cir- cumstances. Concord is generally em- ployed for the union of wills and affections; harmony respects the apti- tude of minds to coalesce. There may be concord without harmony, and har- mony without concord. Persons may hve in concord who axe at a distance from one another; but harmony is mostly employed for those who are in close connection and obhged to co- operate. Concord should never be broken by relations under any circum- stances; harmony is indispensable in aU members of a family that dwell together. Interest will sometimes stand in the way of brotherly concord; a love of rule and a dogmatical tem- per will sometimes disturb the har- mony of a family. These terms are both applied to music, the one in a particular, the other in a general sense; there is con- cord between two or more single sounds, and harmony in any number or aggre- gate of sounds. Harmony may be used in the sense of adaptation to things generally. See also Union. CONCUR. See Agree. CONCURRENCE. See Assent. CONCUSSION. See Shock. CONDEMN. See Blame; Pro- scribe; Reprobate; Sentence. CONDESCENSION. See Com- plaisance. CONDITION, Station. Condition, 190 CONDITIONAL in French condition, Latin conditio, from con, together, and dicere, to talk, signifies the agreement arrived at as a result of talking a matter over — some- thing granted as a prerequisite to granting something else. Station, in French station, Latin stalio, from stare, to stand, signifies a standing place or point. Condition has most relation to cir- cumstances, education, birth, and the like; station refers rather to the rank, occupation, or mode of life which is marked out. Riches suddenly ac- quired are calculated to make a man forget his original condition and to render him negligent of the duties of his station. The condition of men in reaUty is often so different from what it appears that it is extremely diffi- cult to form an estimate of what they are or what they have been. It is the folly of the present day that every man is unwiUing to keep the station which has been assigned to him by Providence: the rage for equality de- stroys every just distinction in society; the low aspire to be, in appearance at least, equal with their superiors; and those in elevated stations do not hesi- tate to put themselves on a level with their inferiors. See also Article; Estate; Situa- tion. CONDITIONAL. See Pro- visional. CONDOLENCE. See Sympathy. CONDUCE, Contribute. Conduce, Latin conduco, compounded of con and duco, signifies to bring together for one end. Contribute, in Latin contri- butus, participle of contribuo, com- pounded of con and tribvere, to divide and assign, signifies to bestow for the same end. To conduce signifies to serve the full purpose; to contribute signifies only to serve a secondary purpose: the former is always taken in a good sense, the lat- ter in a bad or good sense. Exercise conduces to the health; it contributes to give vigor to the frame. Nothing con- dv/xs more to the well-being of any community than a spirit of subordina- tion among all ranks and classes. A want of fiinnness and vigilance in the government or magistrates contribuies greatlv to the spread of disaffection and rebellion. Schemes of ambition never conduce to tranquilhty of mind. A single failure may contribute sometimes to involve a person in perpetual trouble. CONDUCT, Manage, Direct. Conduct, in Latin conductu^, participle of conduco, signifies to lead in some par- ticular manner or for some special pur- pose. To manage (see Care; Charge). To direct, in Latin directum, participle of dirigo, or dis, apart, and regere, to rule, signifies to regulate distinctly or put each in its right place. Conducting requires most wisdom and knowledge; managing most action; direction most authority. A lawyer conducts the cause intrusted to him; a steward manages the mercantile con- cerns for his employer; a superintend- ent directs the movements of all the subordinate agents. Conducting is al- ways apphed to affairs of the first> im- portance: management is a term of famOiar use to characterize a famihar employment: direction makes up in authority what it wants in impor- tance; it falls but httle short of the word conduct. A conductor conceives, plans, arranges, and disposes; a man- ager acts or executes; a director com- mands. It is necessary to conduct with wis- dom; to manage with dihgence, atten- tion, and skill; to direct with promp- titude, precision, and clearness. A minister of state requires peculiar talents to conduct with success the vari- ous and comphcated concerns which are connected with his office; he must exercise much skill in managing the various characters and clashing in- terests with which he becomes con- nected; and possess much influence to direct the multipUed operations by which the grand machine of govern- ment is kept in motion. When a gen- eral undertakes to conduct a campaign, he will intrust the managemeni of minor concerns to persons on whom he can rely; but he will direct in person whatever is Hkely to have any serious influence on his success. See also Behavior; Lead. CONFEDERACY. See Alliance. CONFEDERATE, Accomplice. Confederate (see Ally) and accomplice (see Abettor) both imply a partner in CONFIDE 191 some proceeding, bu,^- they differ as to the nature of the proceeding: in the former case it may be lawful or im- lawful; in the latter unlawful only. In this latter sense a confederate is a partner in a plot or secret association: an accomplice is a partner in some active violation of the laws. Guy Fawkes re- tained his resolution, till the last ex- tremity, not to reveal the names of his confederates: it is the common refuge of all robbers and desperate characters to betray their accomplices in order to screen themselves from ptmishment. CONFER, Bestow. Confer, in French conferer, Latin confero, com- poimded of con and fero, signifies to bring something toward a person or place it upon him. Bestow is com- poimded of be, a verbal prefix, and An- glo-Saxon stow, a place, and signifies to put in a place. Conferring is an act of authority; bestowing that of charity or generosity. Princes and men in power confer; people in a private sta- tion bestow. Honors, dignities, privi- leges, and rank are the things conferred; favors, kindnesses, and pecuniary rehef are the things bestowed. Merit, favor, interest, caprice, or intrigue give rise to conferring; necessity, sohcitation, and private affection lead to bestowing. In the moral appUcation, what is corv- f erred or bestowed is presumed to be de- served, but with the distinction that the one is gratuitous, the other involuntary. CONFERENCE. See Conversa- tion. CONFESS. See Acknowledge. CONFIDE, Trust. Confide, m Latin confido (or cum, with, and fidere, to trust), signifying to be united by trust with another, is to trust (see Be- lief) as the species to the genus: we always trust when we confide, but not vice versa. Confidence is an extraor- dinary trust, but tru^t is always ordi- nary unless the term be otherwise quaUfied. Confidence involves commu- nication of a man's mind to another, but trust is confined to matters of action. Confidence may be sometimes Hmited in its appUcation, as confidence in the integrity or secrecy of a man; but trust is in its signification hmited to matters of personal interest. A breach ol trust evinces a want of that common pnnciple which keeps human society together; but a breach of confidence betrays a more than ordinary share of baseness and depravity. Confident, Dogmatical, Positive. — Confident, from confide, marks the tem- per of confiding in one's self. Dogmati- cal, from Greek Soyfia (English dogma), an opinion, signifies the temper of deal- ing in imquahfied assertions. Positive, in Latin positivus, from posiius, signifies fixed to a point. The first two of these words denote an habitual or permanent state of mind; the last either a partial or an habitual temper. There is much of confidence in dogmatism and positivity, but it expresses more than either. Confidence implies a general reUance on one s abihties in whatever we under- take; dogmatism imphes a rehance on the truth of our opinions; positivity, a rehance on the truth of our assertions. A confident man is always ready to act, as he is sure of succeeding; a dogmati- cal man is always ready to speak, as he is sure of being heard; a positive man is determined to maintain what he has asserted, as he is convinced that he has made no mistake. Confidence is opposed to diffidence; dogmatism, to scepticism; positivity, to hesitation. A confident man mostly fails for want of using the necessary means to insure success; a dogmatical man is mostly in error, because he substitutes his own partial opinions for such as are established; a positive man is mostly deceived, because he trusts more to his own senses and memory than he ought. Self-knowledge is the most effectual cure for self-confidence; an acquaintance with men and things tends to lessen dogmatism; the experi- ence of one's self having been deceived, and the observation that others are perpetually Uable to be deceived, ought to check the folly of being positive as to any event or circumstance that is East. Confidence is oftener ejqiressed y actions than words; dogmatism and positivity always by words; the former denotes only the temper of the speaker, but the latter may influence the temper of others; a positive assertion may not only denote the state of the person's mind who makes it, but also may serve to make another positive. See also Sanquine, 192 CONFINE CONFINE. See Border; Bound; Intern. CONFINED. See Contracted. CONFINEMENT, Imprisonment, Captivity. Confinement (see Bound). Imprisonment, compounded of Latin in axid prensionem (ace), a seizure, French prison, from pris, participle of prendre, Latin prehendere, to take, sig- nifies the act or state of being taken or laid hold of. Captivity, in French captivite, Latin captivitas, from capere, to take, signifies likewise the state of being, or being kept, in possession by another. Confinement is the generic, the other two are specific terms. Confinement and imprisonment both imply the abridgment of one's personal freedom, but the former specifies no cause, w^hich the latter does. We may be confined in a room by ill health or confined in any place by way of pimish- ment; but we are never imprisoned but in some specific place appointed for the confinement of offenders, and always for some supposed offence. We are captives by the rights of war when we fall into the hands of the enemy. Confinement does not specify the degree or manner as the other terms do; it may even extend to the restricting the body of its free movements; while im- prisonment simply confines the person within a certain extent of ground or the walls of a prison; and captivity leaves a person at liberty to range within a whole coimtry or district. Confinement is so general a term as to be apphed to animals and even inanimate objects; imprisonment and captivity are applied in the proper sense to persons only, but they admit of a figurative apphcation. Poor stray ani- mals, which are found trespassing on unlawful ground, are doomed to a wretched confinement, rendered still more hard and intolerable by the want of food: the confinement of plants within too narrow a space will stop their growth for want of air. There is many a poor captive in a cage who, like Sterne's starling, would say, if it could, "I want to get out." CONFIRM, Corroborate. To con^ firm, in Latin confirmo, or con and fir- mare, to make firm, signifies to make firm in a special manner. Corroborate, from Latin robur, strength, whence our adjective robust is derived, signifies to give additional strength. The idea of strengthening is common to these terms, but under different cir- cumstances; confirm is used generally, corroborate only in particular instances. What confirms serves to confirm the mind; what corroborates gives weight to the thing. An opinion or a story is confirmed; an evidence or the repre- sentation of a person is corroborated. What confirms removes all doubt ; what corroborates only gives more strength than the thing had before. When the truth of a thing is confirmed, nothing more is necessary: the testimony of a person may be so little credited that it may want much corroboration. Confirm, Establish. — Confirm (see above). Establish, from Latin stabUis, EngUsh stable, from stare, to stand, sig- nifies to make stable, or able to stand. The idea of strengthening is common to these as to the former terms, but with a different apphcation: to confirm is appUed to what is partial, if not temporary; to establish to that which is permanent and of importance, as to confirm a report, to establish a reputa- tion, to confirm a treaty or aUiance, to establish a trade or government. So in respect to the mind and its op- erations: a behef, opinion, suspicion, or resolution is confirmed; principles, faith, hopes, etc., are established. See also Ratify. CONFLICT, Combat, Contest, Confiict, in Latin conflicttis, participle of confligo, compounded of con and fligere, to flip or strike, signifies to strike against each other. Combat (see Battle). Contest, in French contester, Latin contestor, compounded of con and testor, from testes, a witness (com- pare English testify), signifies to call or set witness against witness. A striving for the mastery is the common idea in the signification of these terms, which is varied in the man- ner and spirit of the action. A conflict has more of violence in it than a combat, and a combat than a contest. A conflict supposes a violent collision, a meeting of force against force; a combat sup- poses a contending together in fighting or battle. A conflict may be the un- premeditated meeting of one or more CONFUSION 193 persons in a violent or hostile manner; a combat is frequently a concerted en- gagement between two or more par- ticular individuals, as a sudden and vio- lent conflict ensued upon their coming up; they engaged in single combat. Conflict is apphed to whatever comes in violent coUision, whether animate or inanimate, as the conflicts of wild beasts or of the elements; combat is ap- phed to animals as well as men, partic- ularly where there is a trial of skill or strength, as the combats of the gladi- ators either with one another or with beasts; contest is applied only to men. Conflict and contest are properly ap- phed to moral objects, and combat sometimes figuratively so, and aU with a like distinction; violent passions pro- duce conflicts in the mind; there may be a combat between reason and any particular passion; there may be a contest for honors as well as posts of honor; reason will seldom come off victorious in the combat with ambition. CONFORM. See Comply. CONFORMABLE, Agreeable, SxHTABLE. Conformable signifies able to conform (see Comply), that is, having a sameness of form. Agreeable signifies the quality of being able to agree. Suitable signifies able to suit (see Agree). Conformable is employed for matters of obligation; agreeable, for matters of choice; suitable, for matters of propriety and discretion: what is conformable ac- cords with some prescribed form or given rule of others; what is agreeable accords with the feelings, tempers, or judgments of ourselves or others; what IS suitable accords with outward cir- cimistances: it is the business of those who act for others to act con- formably to their directions; it is the part of a friend to act agreeably to the wishes of a friend; it is the part of every man to act suitably to his station. The decisions of a judge must be strict- ly conformable to the letter of the law; he is seldom at hberty to consult gen- eral views of equity: the decision of a partisan is always agreeable to the tem- per of his party: the style of a writer should be suitable to his subject. See also Assimilable. CONFORMATION. See Form. CONFOUND, Confuse. Confound 13 and confute are both derived from dif- ferent parts of the same verb, namely, confundo, and its participle confu^u^, signifying to pour or mix together with- out design that which ought to be dis- tinct. Confound has an active sen.se; con^ fuse a neuter or reflective sense: a person confounds one thing with an- other; objects become confuted, or a person confutes himself: it is a common error among ignorant people to am- found names, and among children to have their ideas confuted on commenc- ing a new study. The present age is distinguished by nothing so much as by confounding all distinctions, which is a great source of confusion in men's intercourse with one another, both in pubhc and private life. Confute is sometimes used transitive- ly in the sense of causing confuMon, as to confuse an account; but in this case it is as much distinguished from con- found as in the other case. A person confounds one account with the other when he takes them to be both the same; but he confuses any particular account when he mingles different items under one head or brings the same item under different heads. See also Abash; Baffle; Mrs. CONFRONT, Face. ConfrorO, from the Latin frons, a forehead, impUes to set face to face; and face. from Latin fades, Enghsh face, sig- nifies to set the face toward any ob- ject. The former of these terms is always employed for two or more persons with regard to one another; the latter for a single individual with regard to objects in general. Wit- nesses are confronted; a person faces danger, or faces an enemy : when peo- ple give contrary evidence, it is some- times necessary, in extra-judicial mat- ters, to confront them in order to arrive at the truth; the best evidence which a man can give of his courage is to evince his readiness for facing his enemy whenever the occasion re- quires. CONFUSE. See Abash; Con- found. CONFUSED. See Indistinct. CONFUSION, Disorder. Confu- sion signifies the state of being con- founded or confused (see Confound). 194 CONFUTE Disorder, compounded of dis, privative, and Latin ordo, English order, signifies the reverse of order. Confusion is to disorder as the species to the genus: confusion supposes the absence of all order; disorder the de- rangement of order where it exists, or is supposed to exist: there is always disorder in confusion, but not always confusion in disorder. The greater the multitude the more they are Uable to fall into confusion if they do not act in perfect concert, as in the case of a routed army or a tumultuous mob. Where there is the greatest order, the smallest circumstance is apt to produce disorder, the consequences of which will be more or less serious. See also Jumble. CONFUTE, Refute, Disprove, Oppugn. Confute and refute, in Latin confuto and refuto, are compounded of con, against, re privative, and a verb stem futa, which is probably from the same root as Latin fundere, to pour out, overthrow, and is allied to Enghsh fviile, Latin futilis, etc. Disprove, com- poimded of dis, privative, and probare, to prove, signifies to prove the con- trary. Oppugn comes from Latin op- pugnare, to fight against. To confute respects what is argu- mentative; refute, what is practical and personal; disprove, whatever is repre- sented or related; oppugn, what is held or maintained. An argument is con- futed by proving its fallacy; a charge is refuted by proving the innocence of the party charged; an assertion is dis- proved by proving that it is incorrect; a doctrine is oppugned by a course of reasoning. Paradoxes may be easily refuted; calumnies may be easily re- futed; the marvellous and incredible stories of travellers may be easily dis- proved; heresies and sceptical notions ought to be oppugned. The pernicious doctrines of sceptics, though often corv- futed, are as often advanced with the same degree of assurance by the free- thinking, and I might say the un- thinking, few who imbibe their spirit: it is the emplojTnent of MbeUists to deal out their malicious aspersions against the objects of their maUgnity in a manner so loose and indirect as to preclude the possibility of refutation: it would be a fruitless and unthank- ful task to attempt to disprove all the statements wluch are circulated ih a common newspaper. It is the duty of the ministers of the Gospel to oppugn all doctrines that militate against the estabhshed faith of Chris- tians. CONGRATULATE. See Feuci- TATE. CONGREGATION. See Assem- ble. CONGRESS. See Assemble. CONJECTURE, Supposition, Sur- mise. Conjecture, in French conjec- ture, Latin conjectura, from con, to- gether, and jacere, to throw, signifies the thing put together or framed in the mind without design or founda- tion. Supposition, in French supposi- tion, from Latin supponere, com- pounded of sub, in place of, and ponere, to place, signifies to put one's thoughts in place of reality. Surmise is compounded of Old French sur, Latin super, above, and met- tre (Latin mittere), to put; it very nearly corresponds in its original meaning to the modem slang "put it over." All these terms convey an idea of something in the mind independent of the reality; but conjecture is founded less on rational inference than supposi- tion; and surmise less than either: any circumstance, however trivial, may give rise to a conjecture; some reasons are requisite to produce a supposition; a particular state of feeling or train of thinking may of itself create a surmise. Although the same epithets are gener- ally applicable to all these terms, yet we may with propriety say that a corv- jecture is idle, a supposition false, a surmise fanciful. Conjectures are em- ployed on events, their causes, conse- quences, and contingencies: supposi- tion, on speculative points; surmise, on personal concerns. The secret meas- ures of government give rise to various conjectures: all the suppositions which are formed respecting comets seem at present to fall short of the truth: the behavior of a person will often occasion a surmise respecting his intentions and proceedings, let them be ever so dis- guised. Antiquarians and etymologists deal much in conjectures; they have ample scope afforded them for asserting (CONNECT 195 what can be neither proved nor denied: religionists are pleased to build many suppositions of a doctrinal nature on the Scriptures, or, more properly, on their own partial and forced interpre- tations of the Scriptures: it is the part of prudence, as well as justice, not to express any surmises which we may entertain, either as to the character or conduct of others, which may not redoimd to their credit. See also Guess. CONJUNCTURE, Crisis. Con- juncture, in Latin conjunciura, from con, together, and jungere, to join, signifies the joining together of circumstances. Crisis, in Latin crisis, Greek Kpimc, from Kpivuv, to separate, signified a judgment founded upon analysis; hence simply a judgment, or anything which decides, or turns the scale. Both these terms are employed to express a period of time marked by the state of affairs. A conjuncture is a joining or combination of correspond- mg circumstances tending toward the same end: a crisis is the high- wrought state of any affair which immediately E recedes a change: a conjuncture may e favorable, a crisis alarming. An able statesman- seizes the conjuncture which promises to suit his purpose, for the introduction of a favorite measure : the abiUties, firmness, and perseverance of Alfred the Great, at one important crisis of his reign, saved England from destruction. CONJURE. See Juggle. CONNECT, Combine, Unite. Ccm- nect, Latin connecto, compounded of con and nectc, signifies to knit together. Combine (see Association). Unite (see Add). The idea of being put together is common to these terms, but with dif- ferent degrees of proximity. Connected is more remote than combined, and this than united. What is connected and combined remains distinct, but what is united loses aU individuality. Things the most dissimilar may be connected or combined; things of the same kind only can be united. Things or persons are connected more or less remotely by some common property or circum- stance that serves as a tie; they are combined by a species of juncture; they are united by a coalition : houses are connected by means of a common pas- sage; the armies of two nations are combined; two armies of the same nation are united. Trade, marriage, or general intercourse create a connec- tion between individuals; co-operation and similarity of tendency are grounds for combination; entire accordance leads to a union. It is dangerous to be connected with the wicked in any way; our reputation, if not our morals, must be the sufferers thereby. The most obnoxious members of society are those in whom wealth, talents, influence, and a lawless ambition are combined. United is an epithet that should apply to nations and families; the same obedience to laws should regulate every man who lives under the same govern- ment; the same heart should animate every breast; the same spirit should dictate every action of every member in the community who has a common interest in the preservation of the whole. Connection, Relation. — Connection (see above). Relation, from relate, in Latin relatus, participle of refero, to bring back, signifies carrying back to some point. These words are applied to two or more things to denote the manner in which they stand in regard to one an- other. A connection denotes that which binds two objects, or the situation of being so bound by some tie; but rela- tion denotes the situation of two or more objects in regard to one another, yet without defining what it is; a con- nection is therefore a species of relation, but a relation may be something which does not amount to a connection. Families are connected with each other by the ties of blood or marriage; per- sons are connected with each other in the way of trade or business; objects stand in a certain relation to each other, as persons stand in the relation of giver and receiver; or of debtor and creditor; there is a connection between Church and State, or between moraUty and religion; men stand in the relation of creatures to their Creator. The word relation is sometimes taken in a limited sense for one connected by family ties, which denotes something nearer in that case than connection; as when speaking of a man's relations, 196 CONQUER or of a person being related to another, or to leave one's property to one's rela- tions. See also Intercourse. CONQUER, Vanquish, Subdue, Overcome, Surmount. Conqicer, in French conquerir, Latin conquiro, com- pounded of con and qucerere, to search ■ after diUgently, signifies in an extended sense to obtain by searching. Van- quish is in French vaincre, Latin vin- cere. Subdue, Latin suhdere, signifies to give or put under. Overcome sig- nifies to come over or get the mas- tery over one. Surmount, in French surmonter, compounded of sur (Latin super), above, and monter (from Latin montem, hill), to climb a hill, or simply to cHmb, signifies to rise above any one. The leading idea in the word conquer is that of getting; the leading idea in vanquish and subdue is that of getting the better of, the former partially, the latter thoroughly, so as to prevent any future resistance: a country is con- quered; an enemy is vanquished; in the field of battle a people is subdued. Conquer may sometimes also signify to get the better of, but in that case it does not define the mode or extent of the action; we may conquer another in any contest and in any manner; but we vanquish and subdue persons only by force, and mostly by force of arms. When overcome is appMed to persons it has precisely the same indefinite and general meaning as conquer. But overcome, as weU as conquer, sub- due, and vanquish, are applied also to moral objects, and surmount has for the most part no other application. To conquer is said of the person himself, his likes, disUkes, and feehngs gener- ally; subdue of what relates either to the person himself or some other per- son, as to subdue the wiU or the passions. What is conquered makes less resistance and requires less force than what is subdued. It is likewise not so thorough- ly subjugated or destroyed. We may conquer an aversion at one time which may return at another time; if the will be subdued in childhood, it will not prevail in riper years. To vanquish is applied figuratively to particular objects as in the proper sense. To overcome is apphed to objections, scruples, prejudices, difficulties, and the like; surmount, to difficulties, obstacles, impediments, etc. What is overcome requires less exertion than that which is surmounted. We may overcome by patience or forbearance; but deter- mination, or the application of more or less force, is necessary in surmounting obstacles. Conqueror, Victor. — These terms, though derived from the preceding verbs, have, notwithstanding, char- acteristics peculiar to themselves. A conqueror is always supposed to add something to his possessions; a victor gains nothing but the superiority: there is no conquest where there is not something gotten; there is no victory where there is no contest : all conquerors are not victors, nor all victors conquerors: those who take possession of other men's lands by force of arms make a conquest; those who excel in any trial of skiU are the victors. Monarchs when they wage a successful war are mostly conquerors; combatants who compel their adversaries to yield are victors. CONQUEST. See Triumph CONSANGUINITY. See Kindred. CONSCIENTIOUS. Scrupulous. Conscientious, ultimately from Latin con, intensive prefix, and scire, to know, signifies the possession of moral intel- hgence, the perception of right and wrong. Scrupulous, from scruple, sig- nifies the quahty of having scruples. Scruple, in Latin scrupulus, signifies a little hard stone, which in walking gives pain. Conscientious is to scruptdous as a whole to a part. A conscientious man is so altogether; a scruptdous man may have only particular scruples: the one is therefore always taken in a good sense; and the other at least in an in- different, if not a bad sense. A corir- scientious man does nothing to offend his conscience; but a scrupulous man has often his scruples on triffing or minor points; the Pharisees were scrupulous without being conscientious: we must therefore strive to be con/- scientious without being over-scr?*-, pidous. CONSCIENTIOUSLY. See Ethi- cal. CONSCIOUS. See Aware; Feel. CONSECRATE. See Dedicate; Sanctify. CONSEQUENCE 197 CONSENT, Permit, Allow. Con- sent (see Agree). Permit and allow (see Admit). The idea of determining the con- duct of others by some authorized act of one's own is common to these terms, but under various circumstances. They express either the act of an equal or a superior. As the act of an equal we consent to that in which we have a common interest with others: we per- mit or allow what is for the accommoda- tion of others: we allow by abstaining to oppose; we permit by a direct ex- pression of our will; contracts are formed by the consent of the parties who are interested. The proprietor of an estate permits his friends to sport on his grounds; he allows of a passage through his premises. It is sometimes prudent to consent, complaisant to permit, good-natured or weak to allow. Consent respects matters of serious importance; permit and allow regard those of an indifferent nature: a parent consents to the establishment of his children; he permits them to read certain books; he allows them to con- verse with him familiarly. We must pause before we give our consent; it is an express sanction to the conduct of others; it involves our own judgment and the future interests of those who are under our control. This is not always so necessary in permitting and allowing; they are partial actions, which require no more than the bare exercise of authority, and involve no other consequence than the temporary Eleasure of the parties concerned. Pub- c measures are permitted and allowed, but never consented to. The law per- mits or allows; or the person who is authorized permits or allows. Permit in this case retains its positive sense; allow, its negative sense, as before. Government permits individuals to fit out privateers in time of war: when magistrates are not vigilant, many things will be done which are not allowed. A judge is not permitted to pass any sen- tence but what is strictly conformable to law: every man who is accused is allowed to plead his own cause, or in- trust it to another, as he thinks fit. These terms are similarly distin- {;uished in the moral application. See also AssE^r^. CONSEQUENCE, Effect, Result, Issue, Event. Consequence, in French. consequence, Latin consequentia, from consequor, follow, signifies that which follows in connection with something else. Effect is the thing effected (see Accomplished). Residt, in French resulte, Latin residto, or resvltus and resilire, to rebound, signifies that which, springs or bounds back from another thing. Issite is that which issues or flows out (see Arise). Event, in Latin eventus, participle of evenio, from e, forth, and venire, to come, is that which comes forth. All these terms are employed to de- note that which follows something else; they vary according to the different circumstances under which they follow,, or the manner of their following. A consequence is that which follows of itself, without any quahfication or re- striction; an effect is that which is effected or produced, or which follows from the connection between the thing effecting, as a cause, and the thing effected. In the nature of things causes will have effects, and for every effect there wiU be a cause, although it may not be visible. Consequences, on the other hand, are either casual or natural; they are not always to be calculated upon. Effect applies to physical or moral objects; consequences to moral objects only: diseases are the effects of intemperance; the loss of char- acter is the general consequence of an irregular life. Consequences follow either from the actions of men or from things where there is no direct agency or design; re- sults foUow from the actions or efforts of men: consequences are good or bad; results are favorable or unfavorable. We endeavor to avert consequences and to produce results. Not to foresee the consequences which are foreseen by others evinces a more than ordinary share of indiscretion and infatuation. To calculate on a favorable result from an ill-judged or ill-executed enterprise only proves a consistent bhndness in the projector. A consequence may be particular or follow from a part; a result is general, following from a whole: there may be many consequences from the same thing, and out one result only. 198 CONSEQUENTLY As results follow from actions or ef- forts, there is this further distinction; that in regard to intellectual operations results may be drawn by the act of the mind, as the results of reasoning or calculation. Consequences may be intermediate or final; issue and event are always final: the former is that which flows from particular efforts; the latter from com- phcated undertakings where chance may interpose to bring about that which happens; hence we speak of the issue of a negotiation or a battle, and the event of a war. The fate of a nation sometimes hangs on the issue of a battle. The measxires of government are often unjustly praised or blamed according to the event. See also Importance. CONSEQUENTLY. See Natukal- lt; Therefore. CONSERVE. See Husband. CONSIDER, Reflect. Consider is derived from Latin con, together, and sidu^, star, signifying to contem- plate the stars, then simply to con- template or think. Reflect, in Latin reflecto, compounded of re and flecto, bend, signifies to turn back or upon itself. The operation of thought is ex- pressed by these two words, but it varies in the circumstances of the action. Consideration is employed for practical purposes; reflection for mat- ters of speculation or moral improve- ment. Common objects call for con- sideration; the workings of the mind itself, or objects purely spiritual, oc- cupy reflection. It is necessary to con- sider what is proper to be done before we take any step; it is consistent with our natures, as rational beings, to reflect on what we are, what we ought to be, and what we shall be. Without con- sideration we shall naturally commit the most flagrant errors; without reflection we shall never understand our duty to our Maker, our neighbor, and ourselves. Consider, Regard. — To consider sig- nifies to take a view of a thing in the mind which is the result of thought. To regard (see Care) is properly to look back upon or to look at with con- cern. There is more caution or thought in considering, more personal interest in regarding. To consider is to bear in mind all that prudence or propriety suggests; to regard is to bear in mind all that our wishes or interests suggest. It is most usual to consider the means or matters in detail, and to regard the end or object at large: a man will consider whether a thing is good or bad, proper or improper, out of the regard which he has for his reputation, his honor, his conscience, and the like. Where he has no consideration he can- not possibly have a regard, but he may have a regard where considerations are not necessary. A want of considera- tion as to the circumstances and ca- pacity of another may lead one to form a wrong judgment of his conduct. A want of regard for the person himself may lead one to be regardless of his corofort and convenience. So, in apphcation to things not ex- pressly connected with one's interests or inchnations, to consider is to look at things simply as they are; to regard is to look at them with a certain de- gree of interest. Consideration, Reason. — Considera- tion, or that which enters into a per- son's consideration, has a reference to the person considering. Reason (see Cause), or that which influences the reason, is taken absolutely. Consideror- tions are therefore, for the most part, partial, as affecting particular interests, or dependent on particular circum- stances. Reasons, on the contrary, may be general, and vary according to the subject. The consideration influences particu- lar actions; the reason determines a line of conduct: no consideration of profits should induce a person to forfeit his word; the reasons which men assign for their conduct are often as absurd as they are false. In matters of argument, the con- sideration is that which one offers to the consideration of another; the reason is that which hes in the nature of the thing. CONSIGN, Commit, Intrust. Con- sign, in French consigner, Latin con- signo, compoimded of con and signare, to seal, signifies to seal for a specific purpose, also to deposit. Commit, in French commettre, Latin committo, com- pounded of con, together, and mittere, to send or put, signifies to put into a CONSTANCY 199 person's hands. Intrust signifies to put in trust. The idea of transferring from one's self to the care of another is common to these terms, differing in the nature and object of the action. To consign is a more formal act, a more absolute giving from ourselves to another, than to commit: a merchant consigns his goods to another to dispose of them for his advantage; he commits the manage- ment of his business to his clerk: a child is consigned to another, for him to take the whole charge of his educa- tion, maintenance, and the Hke; but when he is committed to the charge of another, it is mostly with hmitations. To intrust refers to the degree of trust or confidence which is reposed in the individual; a child may be in- trusted to the care of a servant for a short time; a person may be intrusted with the property or secrets of another; or individuals may be intrusted with power. In the figurative application, to con- sign is to dehver over so as to become the prop>erty of another thing; to commit is to give over for the purpose of taking charge of. Death consigns many to an untimely grave; a writer commits his thoughts to the press. Consign may thus be used in the sense of assign, and commit in the sense of trusting at all hazards. CONSISTENT. See Compatible; Consonant. CONSOLE, Solace, Comfort. Con- sole and solace are derived from the same source, in French consoler, Latin consolari, to comfort. Comfort (see Comfort). Console and solace denote the reliev- ing of pain; comfort marks the com- munication of positive pleasure. We console others with words; we console or solace ourselves with reflections; we comfort by words or deeds. Console is used on more important occasions than solace. We console our friends when they meet with afflictions; we solace ourselves when we meet with disas- ters; we comfort those who stand in need of comfort. The greatest consolation which we can enjoy on the death of our friends is derived from the hope that they have exchanged a state of imperfection and sorrow for one that is full of pure and immixed fehcity. It is no small solace to us, in the midst of all our troubles, to consider that they are not so bad that they might not have been worse. The comforts which a person enjoys may be con- siderably enhanced by the comparison with what he has formerly suffered. CONSONANT, Accordant, Con- sistent. Consonant, from the Latin consonans, participle of con, together, and sonare, to sound, signifies to sound, or be, in unison or harmony. Accord- ant, from accord, signifies the quaUty of according (for derivation see accord under the key-word Agree). Con- sistent, from the Latin consistens, par- ticiple of consisto, from con, together, and sistere, to place, signifies the quaUty of being able to stand in unison to- gether. Consonant is employed in matters of representation; accordant, in matters of opinion or sentiment; consistent, in mat- ters of conduct. A particular passage is consonant with the whole tenor of the Scriptures; a particular accoimt is accordant with all one hears and sees on a subject; a person's conduct is not always consistent with his station. Con- sonant is opposed to dissonant; ac- cordant, to discordant; consistent, to inconsistent. Consonance is not so positive a thing as either accordance or consistency, which respects real events, circumstances, and actions. Conso- nance may serve to prove the truth of a thing, but dissonance does not prove its falsehood imtil it amounts to direct discordance or inconsistency. There is a dissonance in the accounts given by the four Evangehsts of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of aU collusion and imposture, since there is neither discordance nor inconsistency in what thev have related or omitted. CONSPICUOUS. See Distin- guished; Prominent. CONSPIRACY. See Combination. CONSTANCY, Stabiuty, Steadi- ness, Firmness. Constancy, in French Constance, Latin constantia, from con- stans and consto, compounded of con and stare, to stand by or close to a thing, signifies the quahty of adhering to the thing that has been once chosen. Stability, in French stabilite, Latin sta- bilitas, from stabilis and stare, to stand. 200 CONSTANT signifies the quality of being able to stand. Steadiness, the quality of being steady, is derived from Anglo-Saxon stede, a place, foimd in words like home- stead, instead, etc. Steady signifies standing in one place. Firm comes from Latin firrnus, unmoved. Constancy respects the affections; stability, the opinions; steadiness, the action or the motives of action; firm- ness, the purpose or resolution. Con- stancy prevents from changing, and furnishes the mind with resources against weariness or disgust of the same object; it preserves and supports an attachment imder every change of circumstances; stability prevents from varying; it bears up the mind against the movements of levity or curiosity, which a diversity of objects might produce; steadiness prevents from de- viating; it enables the mind to bear up against the influence of humor, which temperament or outward cir- cumstances might produce; it fixes on one course, and keeps to it: firmness prevents from yielding; it gives the mind strength against all the attacks to which it may be exposed; it makes a resistance, and comes off triimaphant. Constancy among lovers and friends is the favorite theme of poets; the word has, however, afforded but few origi- nals from which they could copy their pictures: they have mostly described what is desirable rather than what is real. Stability of character is essential for those who are to command, for how can they govern others who cannot govern their own thoughts? Steadi- ness of deportment is a great recom- mendation to those who have to obey: how can any one perform his part well who suffers himself to be perpetually interrupted? Firmness of character is indispensable in the support of prin- ciples: there are many occasions in which this part of a man's character is likely to be put to a severe test. Con- stancy is opposed to fickleness; stability, to changeableness; steadiness, to flighti- ness; firmness, to pUancy. CONSTANT. See Continued; Durable; Unswerving. CONSTERNATION. See Alarm. CONSTITUENT. See Element- ary. CONSTITUTE, Appoint, Depute. Constitute, in Latin constitidus, parti- ciple of constituto, that is, con, to- gether, and statue, place, signifies here to put or place for a specific pur- pose. .4 ppoin/. (see Appoint). Depute, in French depuier, Latin deputo, com- poimded of de, from, and puiare, to esteem or assign, signifies to assign a certain office to a person. The act of choosing some person or persons for an office is comprehended under aU these terms: constitvie is a more solemn act than appoint, and this than depute: to constitute is the act of a body; to appoint and depute, either of a body or an individual: a com- munity constitutes any one their leader; a monarch appoints his ministers; an assembly deputes some of its members. To constitute imphes the act of making as well as choosing; the oflSce as well as the person is new: in appointing, the person, but not the office, is new. A person may be constituted arbiter or judge as circumstances may require; a successor is appointed, but not con- stituted. Whoever is constituted is invested with supreme authority derived from the highest sources of power; whoever is appointed derives his authority from the authority of others, and has con- sequently but hmited power: no indi- vidual can appoint another with au- thority equal to his own: whoever is deputed has private and not pubhc authority; his office is partial, often confined to the particular transaction of an individual, or a body of indi- viduals. According to the Romish re- ligion, the Pope is constituted supreme head of the Christian Church through- out the whole world; governors are appointed to distant provinces; per- sons are deputed to present petitions or make representations to govern- ment. See also Form. CONSTITUTION- See Frame. CONSTRAIN. See Compel. CONSTRAINT, Compulsion. Con- straint, from constrain, Latin constringo, compounded of con, together, and stringere, to draw tight, signifies the act of straining or tying together. Compulsion signifies the act of com- peUing. (See Compel.) There is much of binding in con- CX)NTACT 201 straint; of violenee in compulsion: constraint prevents from acting agree- ably to the wUl; compulsion forces to act contrary to the will: a soldier in the ranks moves with much constraint, and is often subject to much compul- sion to make him move as is desired. Constraint may arise from outward cir- cimastances; compulsion is always pro- duced by some active agent: the forms of civil society lay a proper constraint upon the behavior of men, so as to render them agreeable to one another; the arm of the civU power must ever be ready to compel those who will not submit without compulsion: in the moments of relaxation, the actions of children should be as free from con- straint as possible; those who know and wish to do what is right will always be ready to discharge their duty with- out compulsion. Constraint, Restraint. — Constraint (see above). Restraint (see Coerce). Constraint respects the movements of the body only; restraint, those of the mind and the outward actions: when they both refer to the outward actions, we say a person's behavior is con- strained; his feelings are restrained: he is constrained to act or not to act, or to act in a certain manner; he is restrained from acting at all, or he may be re- strained from feehng: the conduct is constrained by certain prescribed rules, by discipline and order; it is restrained by particular motives: whoever learns a mechanical exercise is constrained to move his body in a certain direction; the fear of detection often restrains persons from the comm'ission of vices more than any sense of their enormity. CONSTRUCT. See Build. CONSULT, Deliberate. ConsuU, in French consulter, Latin consulto, is a frequentative of consulo, signifying to counsel together (see Advice). The root of consvio is uncertain; it may be aUied to sedere, to sit. Deliberate, in French deliberer, Latin delibero, compounded of de and libra, a balance, signifies to weigh as in a balance. Consultations always require two per- sons at least; deliberations may be car- ried on either with a man's self or with numbers: an individual may consult with one or many; assemblies com- monly deliberate: advice and informa- tion are given and received in consulUi- tions; doubts, difficulties, and objec- tions are started and removed in de- liberations. We communicate and hear when we consult; we pause and hesitate when we deliberate: those who have to co-operate must frequently consult together; those who have serious meas- ures to decide upon must coolly delib- erate. CONSUME. See Destroy. CONSUMMATION, Completion. Consummation, Latin consummatio, com- pounded of con, together, and summa, the top, the sum, from supmus (su- perlative of words whose comparative is super, above), signifying the very top, means the summing or winding up of the whole — the putting a final period to any concern. Completion signifies either the act of completing or the state of being completed (see Com- plete). The arrival at a conclusion is com- prehended in both these terms, but they differ principally in application; wishes are consummated; plans are completed: we often flatter ourselves that the completion of all our plans will be the consummation of all our wishes, and thus expose ourselves to grievous disappointments As epithets, consummate and complete admit of a similar distinction. Con- summate is said of that which rises absolutely to the highest possible de- gree, as consummate wisdom, or con- summate f eh city: complete is said of that which is so relatively; a thing may be complete which fully answers the purpose. CONSUMPTION. See Decay. CONTACT, Touch. Contact, in Latin contactu^, participle of contingo, compounded of con and tangere, to touch together, is distinguished from the simple word touch (derived through French toucher from a Teutonic root aUied with Anglo-Saxon teon, to pull or draw, and Latin ducere, to lead), not so much in sense as in grammatical construction; the former expressing a state, and referring to two bodies actually in that state; the latter, on the other hand, implying the abstract act of touching: we speak of things coining or being in contact, but not of the contact instead of the touch of a 202 CONTAGIOJT thing: the poison which comes from the poison-tree is so powerful in its nature that it is not necessary to come in contact with it in order to feel its bane- ful influence; some insects are armed with stings so inconceivably sharp that the smallest touch possible is sufficient to produce a puncture in the flesh. CONTAGION, Infection. Both these terms imply the power of com- municating something bad, but con- tagion, from the Latin con, and tag, from tango, to come in contact, pro- ceeds from a simple touch; and infec- tion, from the Latin inficio, or in, in, and facere, to make, proceeds by re- ceiving something inwardly or having it infused. We consider contagion as to the manner of spreading from one body to another; we consider infection as to the act of its working itself into the system. Whatever acts by con- tagion acts immediately by direct per- gonal contact; whatever acts by infec- 4wn acts gradually and indirectly, or through the medium of a third body, as clothes, or the air when infected. The word contagion is, therefore, properly applied only to particular 'dfeeases, but infection may be apphed to every disease which is communi- cable from one subject to another. Whatever, therefore, is contagious ia also infectious, but not vice versa. So, in application to other things be- sides diseases, contagion is employed to denote that species of communication which is effected by a direct action on the senses. Infection is employed to denote the communication which takes place by the gradual process of being infected with anything. So, in the moral application, what- ever is outward acts by contagion, as to shun the contagion of bad example or bad manners. Whatever acts inwardly acts by infection, as to shun the infec- tion of bad principles. Contagious, Epidemical, Pestilential. — Contagious signifies having or caus- ing contagion. Epidemical, in Latin epidemicus (Greek iirlSr)fioQ, that is, liri and SrinoQ, among the people), sig- nifies universally spread. Pestilential, from the Latin pestis, the plague, sig- nifies having the plague, or a similar disorder. The caniagums applies to that wMeh is capable of being caught, and ought not, therefore, to be touched; the epidemical, to that which is already caught or circulated, and requires, therefore, to be stopped; the pestilentiaty to that which may breed an evU, and is, therefore, to be removed: diseases are contagious or epidemical; the air or breath is pestilential. They may aU be appUed morally or figm-atively in the same sense. We en- deavor to shun a contagious disorder, that it may not come near us; we en- deavor to piu"ify a pestilential air, that it may not be inhaled to our injury; we endeavor to provide against epi- demical disorders, that they may not spread any farther. Vicious example is contagious; certain follies or vices of fashion are epidemical in almost every age; the breath of infidelity is pestilential. CONTAIN, Hold. Contain (see Comprise). Hold is derived from Anglo-Saxon healdan, which apjiears in some form in most of the Teutonic languages with the significance that it now has in EngUsh. These terms agree in sense, but dif- fer in application; the former is by comparison noble, the latter is ignoble in its use: hold is employed only for the material contents of hoUow bodies; contain is employed for moral or spirit- ual contents: in familiar discourse a cask is said to hold, but in more polished language it is said to contain a certain number of gallons. A coach holds or contains a given number of persons; a room holds a given quantity of furni- ture; a house or city contains its in- habitants. CONTAMINATE, Defile, Pol- lute, Taint, Corrupt. Contaminate has the same derivation as contagion; it comes from Latin contaminare, from the prefix con, together, and the root tag, touch. Defile is compounded of Latin de, from, and Anglo-Saxon fylan, to make foul, from fui. Modern English foul. Pollute is derived from Latin pol, allied to Old Latin por, toward, and lu£re, to wash, allied to lave, and meant originally to wash over, hke a flooded river. Taint, in French teint, participle of teindre, in Latin tingere, to dye or stain. Corrupt, CONTEMN 203 in Latin corruptns, participle of cor- rumpo, compounded of con, together, and rumpere, to break, signifies to break to pieces. Contaminate is not so strong an ex- pression as defile or pollute; but it is stronger than taint: these terms are used in the sense of injuring purity: corrupt has the idea of destroying it. Whatever is impure contaminates; what is gross and vile in the natural sense defiles, and in the moral sense pollvies; what is contagious or in- fectious corrupts; and what is cor- rupted may taint other things. Im- proper conversation or reading con- laminates the mind of youth; lewdness and obscenity defile the body and pol- lute the mind; loose company corrupts the morals; the coming in contact with a corrupted body is sufficient to give a taint. If young people be admitted to a promiscuous intercourse with so- ciety, they must unavoidably witness objects that are calculated to contami- nate their thoughts, if not their in- clinations. They are thrown in the way of seeing the lips of females defiled with the grossest indecencies, and hearing or seeing things which cannot be heard or seen without polluting the soul: it cannot be surprising if after this their principles are found to be corrupted before they have reached the age of maturity. CONTEMN, Despise, Scorn, Dis- dain. Contemn comes from Latin contemnere, compounded of con, in- tensive prefix, and temnere, to despise. Despise, in Latin despicio, compounded of de, from, and specere, to look, sig- nifies to look down upon, which is a strong mark of contempt. Scorn, from Old French escomer, meant originally to deprive of horns (Latin ex, from, and comu, horn), hence to humiliate or dishonor. It has been influenced by the Old High German scernon, to de- ride. Disdain is compounded of dis, privative, and Old French degnier, from Latin dignare, to think worthy; accordingly it means to think un- worthy. The above elycidations sufficiently evince the feeling toward others which gives birth to all these actions. But the feehng of contempt is not quite so strong as that of despising, nor that of despising so strong as those of scorning and disdaining, the latter of which ex- presses the strongest sentiment of all. Persons are contemned for their moral quahties; they are despised on account of their outward circumstances, their characters, or their endowments. Su- periors may be contemned; inferiors only, or those who degrade themselves, are despised. Contempt, as applied to persons, is not incompatible with a Christian temper when justly provoked by their character; but despising is dis- tinctly forbidden and seldom war- ranted. Yet it is not so much our business to contemn others as to con- temn that which is contemptible; but we are not equally at liberty to despise the person, or anything belonging to the person, of another. Whatever springs from the free-will of another may be a subject of contempt, but the casualties of fortune or the gifts of Providence, which are alike independent of per- sonal merit, should never expose a per- son to be despised. We may, however, contemn a person for his impotent malice, or despise him for his meanness. Persons are not scorned or disdained, but they may be treated with scorn or disdain; they are both improp)er ex- pressions of contempt or despite: scorn marks the sentiment of a little, vain mind: disdain of a haughty and per- verted one. A beautiful woman looks with scorn on her whom she despises for the want of this natural gift. The wealthy man treats with disdain him whom he despises for his poverty. In speaking of thing;s independently of others, or as immediately connected with ourselves, all these terms may be sometimes employed in a good or an indifferent sense. When we contemn a mean action, and scorn to conceal by falsehood what we are called upon to acknowledge, we act the part of the gentleman as well as the Christian; but it is inconsistent with our infirm and dependent condition that we should feel inclined to despise anything that falls in our way; much less are we at liberty to disdain to do any- thing which our station requires; we ought to think nothing unworthy of us, nothing degrading to us, but that which is inconsistent with the will of God: there are, however, too many 204 CONTEMPLATE who aflFect to despise small favors as not reaching their fancied deserts, and others who disdain to receive any favors at all, from mistaken notions about de- pendence and obhgation. CONTEMPLATE, Meditate, Muse. Contemplate, from Latin con- templari, was used at first of the ob- servations and meditations of the augurs, and was derived from templum, English temple, the consecrated place open to the sky, where the augurs made their observations. Meditate, in Latin meditatiis, participle of meditor, from Greek fiidofiai, I attend to, meant to devote the thoughts to something. For the derivation of miise see Amuse. Different species of reflection are marked by these terms. We contem- plate what is present or before our eyes; we meditate on what is past or absent. The heavens and all the works of the Creator are objects of contemplation; the ways of Providence are fit subjects for meditation. One muses on events or circumstances which have been just passing. We may contemplate and meditate for the future, but never 7nuse. In this case the two former terms' have the sense of contriving or purposing: what is contemplated to be done is thought of more indistinctly than when it is meditated to be done: many things are bad in contemplation which are never seriously meditated upon: between con- templating and meditating there is oftener a greater distance than between meditating and executing. Meditating is a permanent and seri- ous action; musing is partial and un- important: meditation is a rehgious duty, it cannot be neglected without injury to a person's spiritual improve- ment; musing is a temporary employ- ment of the mind on the ordinary con- cerns of life, as they happen to excite an interest for the time. Contempla- tive and musing, as epithets, have a strong analogy to each other. Con- templative is a habit of the mind; mur- ing is a particular state of the mind. A person may have a contemplative turn, or be in a musing mood. CONTEMPORANEOUS. See Syn- CHKONOUS. CONTEMPORARY. See Coeval. CONTEMPTIBLE. Contemptu- ous. These terms are very frequently, though very erroneously, confounded in common discourse. Contemptible is apphed to the thing deserving contempt; contemptuous, to that which is ex- pressive of contempt. Persons, or what is done by persons, may be either con- temptible or contemptuous. A produc- tion is contemptible; a sneer or look is contemptuous. Contemptible, Despicable, Pitiful. — Contemptible is not so strong as des- picable or pitiful. A person may be contemptible for his vanity or weakness; but he is despicable for his servility and baseness of character; he is pitiful for his want of manliness and becoming spirit. A he is at all times contemp- tible; it is despicable when it is told for purposes of gain or private interest; it is pitiful when accompanied with indications of unmanly fear. It is contemptible to take credit to one's self for the good action one had not per- formed; it is despicable to charge an- other with the faults which we our- selves have committed; it is pitiful to offend others, and then attempt to screen ourselves from their resentment under any shelter which offers. It is contemptible for a man in a superior station to borrow of his inferiors; it is despicable in him to forfeit his word; it is pitiful in him to attempt to con- ceal anything by artifice. Contemptuous, Scornful, Disdainful. — These epithets rise in sense by a regular gradation. Contemptuous is general, and apphed to whatever can express contempt: scornful and dis- dainful are particular; they apply only to outward marks: one is contemptuous who is scornful or disdainful, but not vice versa. Words, actions, and looks are contemptuous: looks, sneers, and gestures are scornful and disdainful. Contemptuous expressions are always unjustifiable; whatever may be the contempt which a person's conduct de- serves, it is unbecoming in another to give him any indications of the senti- ment he feels. Scornful and disdainful smiles are resorted to by the weakest or the worst of mankind. CONTEND, Contest, Dispute. Contend, from tendo, stretch, and con- tra, against, signifies to strive against. Contest, from con, against, and testor, CONTENTMENT 205 from testis, a witness, signifying to call to witness against; and disptUe, from dis and puto, signifying to think di- versely, are modes of contending. To contend is simply to exert a force against a force; to contest is to struggle together for an object. To contend and contest may be both appUed to that which is claimed and striven for; but contending is the act of the individual without reference to others, where success depends upon personal efforts or prowess, as when one contends at games. To contest is to set up rival pretensions to be de- termined by the suffrage of others, as to contest an election, to contest a prize. Opinions may likewise be both con- tended and contested, with this distinc- tion, that to contend is to maintain any opinion; to contest is to maintain different opinions: the person is said to contend and the thing to be con- tested. To dispute, according to its original meaning, applies to opinions only, and is distinguished from contend in this, that the latter signifies to maintain one's own opinion, and the former to call in question the opinion of another. In respect to matters of personal in- terest, contend and ' dispvte are em- ployed with a like distinction, the former to denote striving for something desired by one's self, the latter to call in question something relating to others, as to contend for a victory, to dispute a person's right; and when the idea of striving for a thing in dispute is to be expressed, this word may be employed indifferently with contend for, as to dispute or contend for a prize. Contention, contest, and dispute, as nouns, admit of a further distinction. Contention is always of a personal nature, whether as regards interests or opinions, and is always accompanied with more or less ill feeling. Contests may be as personal as con- tentions, but the objects in a contest being higher, and the contesting parties coming less into direct collision, there is less ill feeling produced. As differences of opinion have a ten- dency to create ill feehng, disputes are rarely conducted without acrimony; but sometimes there may be disputes for that which is honorable, where there is no personal animosity. See also Bicker; Strive. CONTENTION. See Dissension; Strt w^ CONTENTMENT, Satispactign. Contentment, in French contentement, from content, in Latin contentus, par- ticiple of contenere, to contain or hold, signifies the keeping one's self to a thing. Satisfaction, in Latin satis- factio, compounded of satis, enough, and facere, to do, signifies the making or having enough. Contentment Ues in ourselves: satis- faction is derived from external objects. One is contented when one wishes for no more: one is satisfied when one has obtained all one wishes. The contented man has always enough; the satisfied man has only enough for the time being. The contented man will not be dissatisfied; but he who looks for satisfaction will never be contented. Contentment is the absence of pain; satisfaction is positive pleasure. Con- tentment is accompanied with the en- joyment of what one has; satisfaction is often quickly followed with the alloy of wanting more. A contented man can never be miserable; a satisfied man can scarcely be long happy. Content- ment is a permanent and habitual state of mind; it is the restriction of all our thoughts, views, and desires within the compass of present possession and enjoyment: satisfaction is a partial and turbulent state of the feelings, which awakens rather than deadens desire. Contentment is suited to our present condition; it accommodates itself to the vicissitudes of human life; satisfaction belongs to no created being; one satisfied desire engenders another that demands satisfaction. Contentment is within the reach of the poor man, to whom it is a continual feast; but satisfaction has never been procured by wealth, however enormous, or ambition, however boundless ana successfid. We should therefore look for the contented man where there are the fewest means of being satisfied. Our duty bids us be contented; our de- sires ask to be satisfied: but our duty is associated with our happiness; our desires are the sources of our misery. When taken in a partial application 206 CONTEST to particular objects, there are cases in which we ought not to be contented, and where we may with propriety look for permanent satisfaction. We cannot be contented to do less than oiu- duty requires; we may justly be satisfied with the consciousness of having done our duty. CONTEST. See Conflict; Con- tend. CONTIGUOUS. See Adjacent. CONTINENCE. See Chastity. CONTINGENCY. See Accident. CONTINGENT. See Accidental; Provisional. CONTINUAL, Perpetual, Con- stant. Continual, in French continuel, Latin continuus, from continere, to hold or keep together, signifies keeping to- gether without intermission. Perpet- tuxl, in French perpetiiel, Latin per- petvxilis, from perpeto, compounded of per, meaning thoroughly, and petere, to seek, to seek thoroughly, signifies going on everywhere and at all times. Con- stant (see Constancy). What is continual admits of no in- terruption: what is perpetual admits of no termination. There may be an end to that which is continual, and there may be intervals in that which is perpetual. Rains are continual in the tropical cKmates at certain seasons: complaints among the lower orders are perpetual, but they are frequently without foundation. There is a con- tinual passing and repassing in the streets of the metropohs during the day; the world and ail that it contains are subject to perpetual change. Constant, like continual, admits of no interruption, and it also admits of no change; what is continual may not al- ways continue in the same state, but what is constant remains in the same state: continual is therefore applied to that which is expected to cease, and constant to that which ought to last. A nervous person may fancy he hears continual noises. It will be the con- stant endeavor of a peaceable man to live peaceably. Continual may sometimes have a moral appU cation; as when we say, contentment is a continual feast; to have a continual enjoyment in any- thing: constant is properly applied to moral objects. Continual, Continued. — Continual and continued both mark length of duration, but the former admits of a certain degree of interruption, which the latter does not. What is continual may have frequent pauses; what is continued ceases only to terminate. Rains are continual which are frequent- ly repeated; so noises in a tumultuous street ase continual: the bass in music is said to be continued; the mirth of a drunken party is one continue noise. Continual interruptions abate the vigor of appHcation and create disgust: in countries situated near the poles, there is one continued darkness for the space of five or six months, during which time the inhabitants are obliged to leave the place. Continual respects the duration of actions only; continued is hkewise ap- pUed to the extent or course of things: rumors are continual; talking, walking, running, and the like, are continual; but a fine, a series, a scene, or a stream of water is continued. Continuance, Continuation, Duration. — Continuance, from the intransitive verb to continue, denotes the state of continuing or being carried on further. Continuation, from the transitive verb continue, denotes the act of continuing or carrying on further. The continu- ance is said of that which itself con- tinues; the continuation, of that which is continued by some other agency: as the continuance of the rain; the con- tinuation of a history, work, line, etc. As the species is said to be continued, the word continuation is most properly apphed in this case. Continuance and duration are both employed for the time of continuing; things may be of long continuance or of long duration; but continuance is used only with regard to the action; duration with regard to the thing and its exist- ence. Whatever is occasionally done, and soon to be ended, is not for a con- tinuance; whatever is made, and soon destroyed, is not of long duration: there are many excellent institutions in Eng- land which promise to be of no less co7i- tinuance than utihty. Duration is with us a relative term; things are of long or short duration by comparison : the dura- tion of the world, and all sublunary ob- jects, is nothing in regard to eternity. CONTINUAL 207 Continuation, Continuity. — Continua- tion signifies either the act of continu- ing, as to undertake the continuation or continuing of a history; or the thing continued; as to reaid the con^ tinuation of a history — ^that is, the history continued. Continuity denotes the quality of bodies holding together without inter- ruption; there are bodies of so little continuity that they will crumble to pieces on the slightest touch. Continue, Remain, Stay. — Continue (see Continxtal). Remain, in Latin re- maneo, is compounded of re, behind, and manere, to stay, and signifies to stay behind. Stay is derived through French from Middle Dutch stade, which is allied to English stead, in steadfast, steady, etc., signifying place; it means to remain in one place. The idea of keeping to an object is common to these terms. To continue is associated with a state of action; to remain, with a state of rest: we are said to continue to speak, walk, or do anything, to continite in action or motion; to remain stationary, or in a position. So likewise in application to the out- ward condition or the state of mind, continue denotes that which is active and positive; remain, that which is quiescent and tranquil; to continue in a course or in a belief; to continue steadfast: to remain in doubt. The same distinction exists between these words when things are the sub- jects: a war continues; a stone remains in the place where it is put. Continue is frequently taken abso- lutely for continuing in action; re- main, from the particle re, has a rela- tive signification to something else: the sickness or the rain continues; I will use my utmost endeavors as long as health remains. Continue and remain are used in re- spect of place; stay is used in that of connection only. Continue is indefinite in its application and signification; as to contintie in town or in the country: to remain is an involuntary act; as a soldier remains at his post, or a person remmns in prison: stay is a voluntary- act; as to stay at a friend's or with a friend. Continue, Persevere, Persist, Pursue, ProseciUe. — Continue (see above). Per- severe, in French pers4v^er, Latin per- severare, compounded of per, through, and severus, strict and steiady, signifies to be steady throughout or to the end. Persist, in French persister, Latin per- sisto, is compounded of per, through, and sistere, to put, and corresponds to the modem phrase "to put it through." Pursue and prosecute, in French pour- suivre, come from the Latin prosequor and its participle prosecvius, signifying to follow after or keep on with. The idea of not setting aside is com- mon to these terms, which is the sense of continue without any qualification; the other terms, which are all sp>ecies of continuing, include likewise some col- lateral idea which distinguishes them from the first, as well as from one another. Continue is comparable with persevere and persist in the neuter sense, with pursue and prosecute in the active sense. To continue is simply to do as one has done hitherto; to persevere is to continue without wishing to change or from a positive desire to attain an object; to persist is to con- i tinue from a determination or will not to cease. The act of continuing, there- fore, specifies no characteristic of the agent; that of persevering or persisting marks a direct temper of mind; the former is always used in a good sense, the latter in an indifferent or bad sense. We continue from habit or casualty; we persevere from reflection and the exer- cise of oiu" judgment; we persist from attachment. It is not the most exalted virtue to continue in a good course merely because we have been in the habit of so doing: what is done from habit merely, without any fixed prin- ciple, is always exposed to change from the influence of passion or evil counsel; there is real virtue in the act of per- severance, without which many of our best intentions would remain unful- filled and our best plans would be de- feated: those who do not persevere can do no essential good; and those who do persevere often effect what has ap- p)eared to be impracticable; of this truth the discoverer of America is a remarkable proof, who, in spite of every mortification, rebuff, and disap- pointment, persevered in calling the at- tention of monarchs to his project, 208 CONTINUITY until he at length obtained the assist- ance requisite for effecting the dis- covery of a new world. The Romans have not observed this distinction between perseverare and per- sistere; for they say, "In errore persever- are:'^ Cicero. "Ad ultimum persever- are:" LiVY. "In eadem impudenti^ persistere:" Livy. "In proposito per- sisiere:" Cicero. Probably in imita- tion of them, examples are to be foimd in English writers of the use of persevere in the bad sense, and of persist in the good sense; but the distinction is now invariably observed. Persevere is em- ployed only in matters of some mo- ment, in things of sufficient importance to demand a steady purpose of the mind; persist may be employed in that which is trifling, if not bad: a learner perseveres in his studies, in order to arrive at the necessary degree of im- provement; a child persists in making a request until he has obtained the object of his desire: there is always wisdom in perseverance, even though unsuccessful; there is mostly folly, caprice, or obstinacy in persistence: how different the man who perseveres in the cultivation of his talents from him who only persists in maintaining falsehoods or supporting errors! Continue, when compared with perse- vere or persist, is always coupled with modes of action: but in comparison with pursue or prosecute, it is always followed by some object: we continue to do, persevere or persist in doing some- thing: but we continue, pursue, or prosecute some object which we wish to bring to perfection by additional labor. Continue is equally indefinite as in the former case; pursue and prose- cute both comprehend collateral ideas respecting the disposition of the agent and the nature of the object: to con- tinue is to go on with a thing as it has been begun; to pursue and prosecute is to continue by some prescribed rule, or in some particular manner: a work is continued; a plan, measure, or line of conduct is pursued; an undertaking or a design is prosecuted: we may con- tinue the work of another in order to supply a deficiency: we may pursue a plan that emanates either from our- selves or another; we prosecute our own work only in order to obtain some pecuhar object: continue, therefore, expresses less than pursue, and this less than prosecute: the history of England has been continued down to the present period by different writers; Smollett has pursued the same plan as Hume in the continuation of his history; Captain Cook prosecuted his work of discovery in three several voyages. To continue is itself altogether an indiffer- ent action; to pursue and prosecute are commendable actions; the latter still more than the former: it is a mark of great instabihty not to continue any- thing that we begin; it betrays a great want of prudence and discernment not to pursue some plan on every occasion which requires method; it is the char- acteristic of a persevering mind to prose- cute whatever it has deemed worthy to enter upon. CONTINUITY, See CoNTiNtTA- TION. CONTRABAND, Forbidden, Pro^ HiBiTED. Contraband is derived through . Spanish and ItaUan from Latin contra, against, and Italian bando, Late Latin bannum, a word of Teutonic origin found in abandon, ban, etc. It means UteraUy a ban against something, and refers to a special kind of for- bidding or prohibitirig. McCuUoch, in the "Commercial Dictionary," gives the following succinct definition of the perplexing phrase contraband of war: "When two nations are engaged in war, if there be any foreign article or articles necessary for the defence or subsistence of either of them, and without which it would be difficult for it to carry on the contest, the other may legitimately exert every means in its power to prevent its opponent being supphed with such article or articles." Such goods are called contraband of war. After forbidding the importation of such goods by a legal proclamation, a nation may use every means to pro- hibit the enemy from obtaining the con- traband articles. For a fmlher defini- tion of the difference between forbid and prohibit see Ban and Forbid. CONTRACT. See Abridge; Agree- ment. CONTRACTED, Confined, Nar- row. These words agree in denoting CONTRIVE 209 a limited space; but contracted, from contraho, draw together, signifying drawn into a smaller compass than it might otherwise be in, and confined (see Bound), signifying brought within unusually small bounds, are said of that which is made or becomes so by circimnstances. Narrow comes from Anglo-Saxon nearu, closely drawn. A limb is said to be contracted which is drawn up by disease; a situation is confined which has not the necessary or usual degree of open space; a road or a room is narrow. These terms are figuratively applied to moral objects with the same dis- tinction: the mind is contracted by education or habit; a person's views are confined by reason of his ignorance; people have for the most part a tem- per narrow by nature. CONTRADICT, Deny, Oppose. Contradict, from the Latin contra, against, and dictum, speech, signifies a speech against a speech. Deny is de- rived from Latin de and negare, to say "no," from the negative particle ne, and signifies to say "no." Oppose comes from Latin ob, in the way of, and French poser (see Compose), and signifies to place in the way of. To contradict, as the origin of the word sufficiently denotes, is to set up one assertion against another, but it does not necessarily imply an inten- tional act. The contradiction may lie in the force of the terms, whence logicians call those propositions con- iradictory which in all their terms are directly opposed to each other: as, "AU men are liars"; "No men are liars. " A person may contradict himself, or two witnesses may contradict each other who have had no co&munica- tion. To deny is to assert the falsehood of another's assertion, and is therefore a direct and personal act; as to deny any one's statement. Contradictions may be given at the pleasure or for the convenience of the parties; denials are made in support either of truth or falsehood, in matters of fact or matters of opinion. One contradicts in direct terms by as- serting something contrary; one denies by advancing arguments or suggesting doubts or difficulties. These terms may therefore both be used in reference to disputations. We may deny the truth of a position by contradicting the assertions that are advanced in its support. Contradiction and denial are com- monly performed by words only; op- position, by any kind of action or mode of expression. We may therefore sometimes oppose by contradiction, al- though not properly by denial; con- tradicting and opposing being both volimtary acts, denying frequently a matter of necessity or for self-de- fence. CONTRARY. See Adverse; Hete- rogeneous. CONTRAST. See Comparison. CONTRIBUTE. See Conduce; Minister. CONTRIBUTION. See Tax. CONTRITION. See Repentance. CONTRIVE, Devise, Invent. Con- trive in Old French controver, com- poimded of Latin con, together, and a stressed stem of Old French trover, to find, signifies to fiind out by putting together. Devise, compounded of de and Latin visus, seen, signifies to show or present to the mina. Invent, in Latin inventus, participle of invenire, com- poundeu of in, in, and venire, to come, signifies to come or bring into the mind. Contriving requires less exercise of the thoughts than devising: we contrive on familiar and common occasions: we devise in seasons of difficulty ana trial. A contrivance is simple and ob- vious to a plain imderstanding: a de- vice is complex and far-fetched; it requires a ready conception and a degree of art. Contrivances serve to supply a deficiency or increase a con- vemence; devices are employed to ex- tricate from danger, to remove an evil, or forward a scheme: the history of Robinson Crusoe derives considerable interest from the relation of the vari- ous contrivances by which he provided himself with the first articles of neces- sity and comfort; the history of rob- bers and adventurers is full of the various devices by which they endeavor to carry on their projects of plunder or eludie the vigilance of their pur- suers. To contrive and devise do not express so much as to invent: we contrive and 210 CONTRIVING detrise in small matters; we invent in those of greater moment. Contriving and devising respect the manner of doing things; inventing comprehends the action and the thing itself; the former are but the new fashioning of things that already exist; the latter is, as it were, the creation of something new: to contrive and devise are inten- tional actions, the result of a specific effort; invention naturally arises from the exertion of an inherent power: we require thought and combination to contrive or devise; ingenuity is the faculty which is exerted in inventing. A device is often employed for bad and fraudulent pm-poses; contrivances mostly serve the innocent purposes of hfe; inventions are mostly good, unless they are stories invented, which are always false. See also Concert. CONTRIVING, See Scheming. CONTROL. See Check. CONTROVERT, Dispute. Con- trovert, compounded of the Latin contra, against, and vertere, to turn, signifies to turn against another in discourse, or direct one's self against another. Dis- pute (see Argue). To controvert has regard to specula- tive points; to dispute respects matters of fact: there is more of opposition in controversy; more of doubt in disputing: a sophist controverts; a sceptic disputes: the plainest and sublimest truths of the Gospel have been all controverted in their turn by the self-sufficient inquirer: the authenticity of the Bible itself has been disputed by some few individuals : the existence of a God by still fewer. Controversy is worse than an unprofit- able task; instead of eliciting truth, it does but expose the failings of the parties engaged: disputing is not so personal, and consequently not so ob- jectionable: we never controvert any point without seriously and decidedly intending to oppose the notions of another; we may sometimes dispute a point for the sake of friendly argument or the desire of information : theologians and politicians are the greatest con- troversialists: it is the business of men in general to dispute whatever ought not to be taken for granted. CONTUMACIOUS. See Obsti- nate. CONTUMACY, Rebellion. Con- tumacy, from the Latin contumax, com- poimded of contra, against, and tumere, to swell, signifies the swelMng one's self up by way of resistance. Rebellion, in Latin rebellio, compounded of re, in re- turn, and helium, war, signifies carry- ing on war against those to whom we owe, and have before paid, a lawful subjection. Resistance to lawful authority is the common idea included in the significa- tion of both these terms, but contumacy does not express so much as rebellion: the contumacious resist only occasion- ally; the rebel resists systematically: the contumacious stand only on certain points, and oppose the individual; the rebel sets himself up against the au- thority itself: the contumacious thwart and contradict, they never resort to open violence: the rebel acts only by main force; contumacy shelters itself imder the plea of equity and justice; rebellion sets all law and order at defiance. CONTUMELY. See Reproach. CONVENE. See Assembij:. ■ CONVENIENT, Suitable. Coto- venient (see Commodious). Suitable (see Conformable). Convenient regards the circumstances of the individual; suitable respects the estabhshed opinions of mankind, and is closely connected with moral propriety : nothing is convenient which does not favor one's purpose: nothing is suitable which does not suit the person, place, and thing: whoever has anything to ask of another must take a convenient opportunity in order to insure success; his address on such an occasion would be very unsuitable if he affected to claim as a right what he ought to sohcit as a favor. CONVENT. See Cloister. CONVENTION, Agreement, Com- pact, Treaty. Convention, in French the same form, from Latin con, to- gether, and venire, to come, in the diplomatic sense in which it is here used signifies literally an agreement as distinguished from an assembly of a political character. In international disputes or warfare it has frequently been the custom for the disputants to seek a peaceable solution of the trouble between them, the first step CONVERT 211 being a meeting of mutual delegates to ascertain what demands and conces- sions are likely to be made. This meeting may formulate terms, which are usually of a tentative char- acter, and afterward plenipotentiaries are appointed to negotiate a formal agreement, compact, and sometimes a treaty itself. The final engagement becomes effective only on its ratification by each disputant. The plenipoten- tiaries, instructed on general lines by their respective governments, give and take, and their agreement is almost always accepted as binding by their governments. See also AssEirBLY. CONVERSABLE. See Facetious. CONVERSANT, Familiar. Con- versant, from con, together, and versari, to dwell, signifies dweUing together, hence famihar with, consequently be- coming acquainted. Familiar, from the Latin familiaris, to be of the same family, signifies the closest connection. An acquaintance' with things is im- plied in both these terms, but the latter expresses something more particular than the former. A person is conver- sant in matters that come frequently before his notice; he is familiar with such as form the daily routine of his business: one who is not a professed lawyer may be conversant with the questions of law which occur on ordi- nary occasions; but one who is skilled in his profession will be familiar with all cases which may possibly be em- ployed in support of a cause: it is ad- visable to be conversant with the ways of the world; but to be familiar with the greater part of them would not re- dound to one's credit or advantage. Conversation, Dialogue, Conference, Colloquy. — Conversation denotes the act of holding converse (see Communion). Dialogue, in French dialogue, Latin dia- logus, Greek haXoyoQ, compounded of Sia and Xoyoc, signifies a speech be- tween two. Conference, from the Latin con, together, and ferre, to bring, sig- nifies consulting together on subjects. Colloquy, in Latin colloquium, from con, together, and loquor, speak, signifies the art of talking together. A conversation is always something actually held between two or more per- sons; a dialogue is mostly fictitious, and written as if spoken : any number of persons may take part in a conver- sation, but a dialogue always refers to the two persons who are expressly en- gaged: a conversation may be desultory; a dialogue is formal, in which there will always be reply and rejoinder: a con- versation may be carried on by any signs besides words, which are ad- dressed personally to the individual present; a dialogue must always con- sist of express words : a prince holds fre- quent conversations with his ministers on affairs of state; Cicero wrote dia- logues on the nature of the gods, and many later writers have adopted the dialogue form as a vehicle for conveying their sentiments: a conference is a spe- cies of conversation; a colloquy is a species of dialogue: a conversation is in- definite as to the subject or the parties engaged in it : a conference is confined to particular subjects and descriptions of persons: a conversation is mostly oc- casional: a conference is always spe- cifically appointed: a conversation is mostly on indifferent matters; a con- ference is mostly on national or public concerns: we have a conversation as friends; we have a conference as min- isters of state. The dialogue naturally limits the number to two; the colloquy is indefinite as to number: there may be dialogues, therefore, which are not colloquies; but every colloquy may be denominated a dialogue. CONVERSE See Communion; Speak. CONVERT, Peoselyte. Convert, from the Lectin converto, signifies changed to something in conformity with the views of another. Proselyte, from the Greek Trpoc, to, and yXvOov, second aorist of tpxofiai, I come, sig- nifies come over to the side of another. Convert is more extensive in its sense and application than vroselyte: convert in its fuU Sense includes every change of opinion, without respect to the sub- ject; proselyte, in its original applica- tion, denoted changes only from one religious belief to another: there are many converts to particular doctrines of Christianity, ana proselytes from the Pagan, Jewish, or Mohammedan to the Christian faith; but the word prose- lyte has since acquired an application which distinguishes it from convert. 212 CONVERTIBLE Conversion is a more volxintary act than proselytism; it emanates entirely from the mind of the agent, indepen- dently of foreign influence; it extends not merely to the abstract or specula- tive opinions of the individual, but to the whole current of his feelings and spring of his actions: it is the conver- sion of the heart and soul. Proselytism, is an outward act, which need not ex- tend beyond the conformity of one's words and actions to a certain rule: convert is therefore always taken in a good sense; it bears on the face of it the stamp of sincerity: proselyte is a term of more ambiguous meaning; the proselyte is often the creature and tool of a party: there may be many proselytes where there are no converts. The conversion of a sinner is the work of God's grace, either by His special interpo.sition or by the ordinary in- fluence of His Holy Word on the heart : partisans are always anxious to make proselytes to their own party. CONVERTIBLE. See Assimilate. CONVEY. See Beah; Waft. CONVICT, Detect. Convict, from the Latin convictus, participle of con- vince, I make manifest, signifies to make guilt clear. Detect, from the Latin delectus, participle of detego, com- pounded of the privative de and tegere, to cover, signifies to uncover or lay open guilt. A person is convicted by means of evi- dence; he is detected by means of ocular demonstration. One is convicted of having been the perpetrator of some evil deed; one is detected in the very act of committing the deed. What- ever serves to prove the guilt of an- other is said to convict, whether the conviction be by others or by one's self: a man may be convicted in his own mind, as well as in the opinion of others, before a public tribunal or by private individuals; detection is con- fined to the act of the individual, which is laid open to others. See also Criminal. Convict, Convince, Persuade. — To con- vict is to satisfy a person of another's guilt or error. To convince is to satis- fy the person himself of the truth or falsehood of a thing. A person may be convicted of heresy, if it be provea to the satisfaction of others; he may be convinced that the opinion which he has held is heretical. So a person may be convicted who is involuntarily convinced of his error, but he is convinced if he is made sensible of his error without any force on his own mind. One is convicted only of that which is false or bad, but one is convinced of that which is true as well as that which is false. The noun con- viction is used in both the senses of convict and convince. What convinces binds; what per- suades attracts. We are convinced by arguments; it is the understanding which determines : we are persuaded by entreaties and personal influence; it is the imagination or wiU which decides. Our conviction respects solely matters of belief or faith; our persuasion re- spects matters of belief or practice: we are convinced that a thing is true or false; we are persuaded that it is either right or wrong, advantageous or the contrary. A person wiU have half effected a thing who is convinced that it is in his power to effect it; he will be easily persuaded to do that which favors his own interests. Conviction respects our most impor- tant duties; persuasion is applied to matters of indifference, or of temporary personal interest. The first step to true repentance is a thorough convic- tion of the enormity of sin. The cure of people's maladies is sometimes pro- moted to a surprising degree by their persuasion of the efficacy of the remedy. As conviction is the effect of substan- tial evidence, it is solid and permanent in its nature; it cannot be so easily changed and deceived: persuasion, de- pending on our feelings, is influenced by external objects, and exposed to various changes; it may vary both in the degree and in the object. Convic- tion answers in our minds to positive certainty; persuasion answers to prob- abiUty. We ought to be convinced of the propriety of avoiding everything which can interfere with the good order of society; we may be persuaded of the truth of a person's narrative or not, according to the representation made to us; we may be persuaded to pursue any study or lay it aside. CONVINCING. See Conclusive. CONVIVIAL, Social. Convivial, in COPY J13 Latin conviviaUs, from con, together, and vivere, to live, signifies being enter- tained together. Social, from socius, a companion, signifies pertaining to company. The prominent idea in convivial is that of sensual indulgelice; the promi- nent idea in social is that of enjoyment from an intercourse with society. Con- vivial is a species of the social, it is the social in matters of festivity. What is convivial is social, but what is social is something more; the former is ex- celled by the latter as much as the body is excelled by the mind. We speak of convivial meetings, convivial enjoy- ments, or the convivial board; but social intercourse, social pleasure, social amusements, and the hke. CONVOCATION. See Assemble. CONVOKE. See Assemble. COOL, Cold, Frigid. In the nat- ural sense, cool is simply the absence of warmth; cold and frigid are positively contrary to warmth; the former in regard to objects in general, the latter to moral objects : in the figurative sense the analogy is strictly preserved. Cool is used as it respects the passions and the affections; cold only with regard to the affections; frigid only in regard to the inclinations. With regard to the passions, cool designates a freedom from agitation, which is a desirable quahty. Coolness in a time of danger, and coolness in an argument, are alike conamendable. As cool and cold respect the affections, the cool is opposed to the friendly, the cold to the warm- hearted, the frigid to the animated; the former is but a degree of the latter. A reception is said to be cool, an embrace to be cold, a sentiment frigid. Coolness is an enemy to social enjoyments; cold- ness is an enemy to affection; fri^ridity destroys aJl force of character. Cool- ness is engendered by circumstances; it supposes the previous existence of warmth; coldness hes often in the tem- perament, or is engendered by habit; it is always something vicious; frigidity is occasional, and is always a defect. Trifling differences produce coolness sometimes between the best friends: trade sometimas engenders a cold, cal- culating temper in some minds: those who are remarkable for apathy will often express themselves with frigid indifference on the most important subjects. See also Dispassionate. COPIOUS. See Plentiful. COPIOUSLY. See Largely. COPY, Transcribe. Copy is de- rived from the Latin copia, abundance, and signifies to create an abundance of some article by duphcating it or copy- ing. Transcribe, in Latin transcribo, that is, trans, over, and scribere, to write, signifies hteraUy to write over from something else, to make to pass over in writing from one paper or sub- stance to the other. To copy respects the matter; to transcribe respects simply the act of writing. What is copied must be taken immediately from the original, with which it must exactly correspond; what is transcribed may be taken from the copy, but not necessarily in an entire state. Things are copied for the sake of getting the contents; they are often transcribed for the sake of clearness and fair writing. A copier should be very exact; a transcriber should be a good writer. Lawyers copy deeds, and have them afterward frequently transcribed as occasion requires. See also Suitable. Copy, Model, Pattern, Specimen. — Copy, from the verb to copy, marks either the thing from which we copy or the thing copied. Model, in French modkle, Latin modulus, a little mode or measure, signifies the thing that serves as a measure or that is made after a measure. Pattern, which is a variation of patron, from the Latin patrontcs, whence Enghsh patron is derived, sig- nifies the thing that directs. Speci- men, in Latin specimen, from specere, to behold, signifies what is looked at for the purpose of forming one's judgment by it. A copy and a model imply either that which is copied or taken from some- thing, as when we speak of a copy in distinction from an original, and of making a model of anythmg. Or they imply that from which any- thing is copied or taken, as to follow a copy, to choose a model. The term copy is apphed to that which is delineated, as writings or fHctures, which must be taken faith- ully and literally; the model, to that 214 COQUETTE which may be represented in wood or stone, and which serves as a guide. In application to other objects, a copy may be either that which is made or done in imitation, or it may be that which is imitated. A model is that which may be used as a guide or rule. Pattern and specimen serve, hke the model, to guide or regulate, but differ in the nature of the objects; the pattern regards solely the outward form or color of anything that is made or manufactured, as the pattern of a car- pet; a person fixes on having a thing according to a certain pattern; the specimen is any portion of a material which serves to show the quahty of that of which it forms a part, as the specimen of a printed work; the value of things is estimated by the specimen. In the moral application pattern re- spects the whole conduct or behavior which may deserve imitation; specimen only the detached parts by which a judgment may be formed of the whole: the female who devotes her whole time and attention to the management of her family and the education of her offspring is a pattern to those of her sex who depute the whole concern to others. A person gives but an unfort- unate specimen of his boasted sincerity who is foimd guilty of an evasion. COQUETTE, Flirt, Jilt. Coquette is in French the feminine form of coquet, a Uttle cock, and signified a proud and strutting little creature, hence a woman who seeks admiration and attention. Flirt is an imitative word which originally meant to jerk lightly away, hence to tease, mock, gibe. Jilt IS a diminutive of Jill, a firl's name, contracted from Latin uHana, and frequently found in old rhymes and proverbs — "Every Jack must have his Jill," "Jack and Jill went up the hiU," etc. Of these words the more recent term, flirt, has partly replaced the older words, coquette and jilt. Flirt is a more vulgar term than coquette. There is something of a fine lady in the coquette. The flirt uses the natural arts of an ordinary girl; the coquette is the product of a refined and sophisticated society. The coquette has more daintiness and apparently more reserve than the flirt, but she may be more heartless and less innocent. Jilt is a word which formerly was much more commonly employed than at present ; now it survives mainly in the verb to jilt, to break one's engagement. The older distinction between coquette and jilt is expressed by Crabb as follows: Coquetry is contented with employing Mttle arts to excite notice; jilting extends to the violation of truth and honor, in order to awaken a pas- sion which it afterward disappoints. Vanity is the mainspring by which coquettes and jiUs are impelled to ac- tion; but the former indulges her propensity mostly at her own ex- pense only, while the latter does no less injury to the peace of others than she does to her own reputation. The coquette makes a traffic of her own charms by seeking a multitude of ad- mirers; the jilt sports with the sacred passion of love, and barters it for the gratification of any selfish propensity. Coquetry is a fault which should be guarded against by every female as a snare to her own happiness; jilting is a vice which cannot be practised with- out some depravity of the heart. CORDIAL. See Hearty. CORNER, Angle. Comer comes from Latin comu, signifying a horn or projection. Angle, in Latin angulus, comes in aU probability from dyKvXog, the elbow. Comer properly implies the outer ex- treme point of any solid body; angle, on the contrary, the inner extremity pro- duced by the meeting of two right lines or plane surfaces. When speaking, therefore, of sohd bodies, comer and angle may be both employed; but in regard to simple right fines, or plane surfaces, the word angle only is ap- plicable; in the former case a comer is produced by the meeting of the dif- ferent parts of a body, whether in- wardly or outwardly; but an angle is produced by the meeting of two bodies; inwardly one house has many comers; two houses, or two walls at least, are requisite to make an angle. CORPORAL, Corporeal, Bodily. Corporal, corporeal, and bodily, as their origin bespeaks, have all relation to the same object, the body; but the two former are employed to signify relating or appertaining to the body. CORRECT 215 the latter to denote containing or form- ing part of the body. Hence we saj corporal punishment, bodily vigor or strength, corporeal substances; the Godhead bodily, the corporeal frame, bodily exertion. Corporal is only em- ployed for the animal frame in its proper sense; corporeal is used for animal substance in an extended sense; hence we speak of corporal sufferance and corporeal agents. Corporeal is dis- tinguished from spiritual; bodily from mental. It is impossible to represent spiritual beings any other way than imder a corporeal form; bodily pains, however severe, are frequently over- powered by mental pleasures. Corporeal, Material. — Corporeal is properly a species of material; what- ever is corporeal is material, but not vice versd. Corporeal respects animated bodies; material is used for everything which can act on the senses, animate or inanimate. The world contains cor- poreal beings, and consists of maierial substances. See also Tangible. Corpident, Stout, Liisty. — Corpvlent, from corpus, the body, signifies having fulness of body. Stout, Anglo-Saxon stolt, is allied to German stolz, proud, and possibly to Latin stultus, foolhardy; it signifies strength and self-assertion resulting from a large physical frame; hence, in some cases, the large physique itself. Ltisty, in Grerman, etc., Itcstig, merry, cheerful, implies here a vigorous state of body. Corpident respects the fleshy state of the body; stout respects also the state of the muscles and bones: corptdence is therefore an incidental property; stout- ness is a natural property: corpulence may come upon us accordmg to circum- stances; stoutness is the natural make of the body which is born with us. Corpulence and lustiness are both oc- casioned by the state of the health; but the former may arise from disease, the latter is always the consequence of good health: corpulence consists of an undue proportion of fat; lustiness con- sists of a due and full proportion of all the soUds in the body. CORRECT, Rectify, Reform. Cor- rect (see Amend) is more definite in its meaning, and more general in its ap- plication, than rectify, which, from rectus and facio, signifies simply to make right or as it should be. To correct is an act of necessity or discretion; to rectify, an act of discre- tion only. What is corrected is sub- stantially faulty; what is rectified may be faulty by accident or from inadver- tence. Faults in the execution are corrected; mistakes are rectified. To reform, from re, again, and for- mare, to form, signifies to form again, or put into a new form; it expresses, therefore, more than correct, which re- moves that which is faulty in a thing without altering the thing itself. Cor- rection may produce only a partial change, but what is reformed assumes a new form and becomes a new thing. They are employed also in respect to public matters with a like distinction: abuses are corrected, the state is re- formed. Correct, Accurate. — Correct is equiva- lent to corrected, or set to rights. Ac- curate, from Latin ad, to, and cura, care, signifies done with care, or by the application of care. Correct ap- plies to that which is done according to rules which either a man prescribes to himself or are prescribed for him; accurate, to that which is done by ap- plication of the mind or attention to an object: the result in both cases will be nearly the same — namely, that the thing will be as it ought or is intended to be, but there is a shade of difference in the meaning and apphcation. What is done by the exercise of the judgment is said to be correct, as a correct style, a correct writer, a correct way of think- ing; what is done by the effort of the individual is more properly accurate, as accurate observations, an accurate sur- vey, and the like. When appUed to the same objects, correct is negative, it is opposed to in- correct or faulty; accurate is positive, it is opposed to inaccurate or loose: it is sufficient to be free from fault to be correct; it must contain every mi- nute particular to be accurate: informa- tion IS correct which contains nothing but facts; it is accurate when it con- tains all the details of dates, persons, and circumstances given accurately. Correction, Discipline, Punishment. — As correction and discipline have com- monly required punishment to render 216 CORRECTNESS them eflBcacious, custom has affixed to them a strong resemblance in their appUcation, although they are dis- tinguished from each other by obvious marks of difference. The prominent idea in correction is that of making right what has been wrong. In discipline, from the Latin disciplina and discere, to learn, the leading idea is that of in- structing or regulating. In punish- ment, from the Latin punio, and the Greek voivi}, penalty, the leading idea is that of inflicting pain as a penalty for wrong-doing. We remove an evil by correction; we prevent it by discipline. Correction ex- tends no further than to the correcting of particular faults; but discipline serves to train, guide, and instruct generally. When correction and discipline are taken in the sense of punishment, they mean punishment for the purpose of correction and discipline: punishment, on the other hand, means the infhction of pain as the consequence of any particular conduct. Correction and dis- cipline are personal acts, and mostly acts of authority. A parent inflicts correction, a master exercises discipline: punishment may either be inflicted by persons or result from things: the want of proper discipline may be pun- ished by insubordination. CORRECTNESS. See Justness. CORRESPOND. See Tally. CORRESPONDENT, Answer- able, Suitable. Correspondent, from Latin cum, together, and respondere, to answer, signifies to answer in unison or in uniformity. Answerable and suitable, from answer and suit, mark the quaUty or capacity of answering or suiting. Correspondent supposes a greater agreement than answerable, and answerable requires a greater agree- ment than suitable. Things that cor- respond must be alike in size, shape, color, and in every minute particular; those that answer must be fitted for the same purpose; those that suit must have nothing disproportionate or dis- cordant. In the artificial dispositions of furniture, or all matters of art and orna- ment, it is of considerable importance to have some things made to correspond, so that they be placed in suitable direc- tions to answer to each other. In the moral apphcation, actions are said not to correspond ^\ith professions; the success of an undertaking does not answer the expectations; particular measures do not suit the purpose of individuals. It iU corresponds with a profession of friendship to refuse as- sistance to a friend in the time of need ; wild schemes undertaken without thought will never answer the expecta- tions of the projectors; it never suits the purpose of the selfish and greedy to contribute to the rehef of the neces- sitous. CORROBORATE. See Confirm; Ratify. CORRUPT. See Attaint; Con- taminate; Debauch; Rot. CORRUPTION, See Depravity. COSMOS, Earth, Universe, World. These words all indicate the world in which we five, but they differ considerably in their apphcation and connotations. Cosmos, from Greek KOfffiog, order, ornament, was so called by Pythagoras or his disciples from its "perfect order and arrangement." Cos- mos corresponds very nearly to uni- verse (from Latin unu^, and vertere, meaning turned into one, combined into a whole), with the additional sug- gestion of harmonious system. Uni- verse refers to the whole infinite extent of hfe and form; cosmos to the whole orderly scheme of things as they are. World and earth are Anglo-Saxon terms. World, from wer, man, and eld, age, meant originally a lifetime, a course of life, and age; and referred to the whole of the present creation, which was thought of as having been brought into existence at a particular time, and doomed to extinction at some future time. It is a more extensive word than earth, but less extensive than universe or cosmos. Earth, Anglo- Saxon eorth, signifies the ground under our feet — as distinguished from the heavens above — and now refers to the particular globe on which we live. COST, Expense, Price, Charge. Cost is derived through Old French cos- ter, from Latin con, together, and stare, to stand, and signified, hterally, to sup- port, and, in an extended sense, what is given for support. Expense is com- pounded of ex and Latin pensu^, par- ticiple of pendere, to weigh, signifying COUNTENANCE 217 the thing paid or given out. Price, from the Latin pretium, price, signifies the thing given for what is' bought. Charge, from Latin carricare, to load a car, signifies the thing laid on as a bur- den in return for something received. The cost is what a thing costs, or what is to be laid out for it; the expense is that which a jjerson actually lays out; the price is that which a thing may fetch or which it may be worth; the charge is that which a person or thing is charged with. As a cost commonly comprehends an expense, the terms are on various occasions used indifferently for each other: we speak of counting the cost or counting the expense of doing anything; at a great cost or at a great expense: on the other hand, of doing a thing to one's cost, of growing wise at other people's expense. The cost and the price have respect to the thing and its supposed value; the expense and the charge depend on the option of the persons. The cost of a thing must precede the price, and the ex- pense must succeed the charge: we can never set a price on anything until we have ascertained what it has cost us; nor can we know or defray the ex- pense imtii the charge be made. There may, however, frequently be a price where there is no cost, and vice versd: there may also be an expense where there is no charge; but there cannot be a charge without an expense: what costs nothing sometimes fetches a high price, and other things cannot obtain a price equal to the first cost. Expenses vary with modes of hving and men's de- sires; whoever wants much, or wants that which is not easily obtained, will have many expenses to defray; when the charges are exorbitant, the expenses must necessarily bear a proportion. Between the epithets costly and ex- pensive there is the same distinction. Whatever is costly is natiu^ally expen- sive, but not vice versd. Articles of furniture, of luxiuy, or indulgence are costly, either from their variety or their intrinsic value; everything is expensive which is attended with much expense, whether of httle or great value. Jewels are costly; travelling is expensive. The costly treasiu"es of the East are imported into Europe for the gratification of those who cannot be contented with the produce of their native soil: those who indulge themselves in such expen- sive pleasures often lay up in store for themselves much sorrow and repent- ance in the time to come. In the moral acceptation, the attain- ment of an object is said to cost much pains; a thing is persisted in at the ex- pense of health, of honor, or of hfe. The sacrifice of a man's quiet is the price which he must pay for the gratification of his ambition. COSTLY. See Valuable. / COUNCIL. See Assemble. COUNSEL. See Advice. COUNT. See Calculate; Reckon. COUNTENANCE, Sanction, Sup- port. Countenance comes from Latin con, together, and tenere, to hold to- gether, to control, referring to the per- sonal demeanor, hence to the face. To countenance means to keep in countenance. Sanction, in French sanc- tion, Latin sanctio, from sanctum, sa- cred, signifies to ratify a decree or ordi- nance; in an extended sense, to make anything binding. Support, in French supporter, Latin supporto, compounded of suh and porto, to bear, signifies to bear from underneath, to bear up. Persons are countenanced; things are sanctioned; persons or things are sup- ported: persons are countenanced m their proceedings by the apparent ap- probation of others; measures are sanctioned by the consent or approba- tion of others who have due authority; measures or persons are supported by every means which may forward the object. There is most of encourage- ment in countenancing; it consists of some outward demonstration of regard or good-will toward the person: there is most of authority in sanctioning; it is the lending of a name, an authority, or an influence, in order to strengthen and confirm the thing: there is most of assistance and co-operation in sup' port; it is the employment of means to an end. Superiors only can coun- tenance or sanction; persons in all con- ditions may support: those who omn- tenance evil-doers give a sanction to their evil deeds; those who support either an individual or a cause ought to be satisfied that they are entitled to support. See also Face. 218 COUNTERFEIT COUNTERFEIT. See Imitate; Spurious. COUNTERPOISE, Balance, Poise, Weigh. These terms all indicate methods of weighing. Counterpoise is derived from Latin contra, against, and pensare, to weigh, and signifies to ipeigh one thing against another. Poise is derived from pensare, also; it signi- fies to weigh, and refers especially to the adjusting of one part of a balance to the other. Balance comes through Italian from hUanx, Latin, from his, double, and lanx, a dish or platter, and refers to a pair of scales with two plates suspended from a cross-bar. Weigh, Anglo-Saxon wegan, to carry or bear, meant at first to move in any direction; then to lift up, then to lift up two things, balancing one against the other. Hence these words have practically the same mean- ing, but differ in the vividness with which they suggest the actual per- formance of weighing — balance and counterpoise being more suggestive in this respect than poise and weigh. The substantives corresponding to these words have figurative meanings which differ somewhat more vividly. Poise and balance are both applied to a kind of self-control, which enables its possessor to remain quiet and rea- sonable, and uninfluenced either by outward events or violent emotion. Poise, in this sense, is a general attri- bute; balance is applied to specific cases in which poise has been displayed. We say that a lady has poise, meaning that she is almost uniformly unriiffled and self-controlled — that she resembles a pair of scales in which the weight on one side exactly corresponds to the weight on the other. We say that a man kept his balance, when we mean that in a particular instance he did not let himself be absolutely con- trolled by only one feehng or one con- sideration. Weight has a figurative meaning of another sort; it corre- sponds to heaviness, and signifies that which weighs heavily. A man of weight is a man who can bring much force or influence to bear upon a situation. COUNTRY. See Land. COUNTRYMAN, Peasant, Swain, Hind, Rustic, Clown. Countryman, that is, a man of the country, or one belonging to the country, is the general term applicable to all inhabiting the country, in distinction from a towns- man. Peasant, from Old French pais (French pays), the country, sig- nified originally the inhabitant of a pagu^ (Latin) village— ^jc^ms being the word whence pagan is also derived. Peasant is employed in the same sense for any countryman among the inhabi- tants of the Continent, and is in con- sequence used in poetry or the grave style for a countryman. Swain, in Anglo-Saxon swan, signified literally a swineherd, but it has acquired, from its use in poetry, the higher significa- tion of a shepherd, or husbandman. Hind is derived from Anglo-Saxon hina, a domestic, and hiwen, a family; com- pare the relation of Latin famulus, ser- vant, to the word family. It signified a servant in the household. Rustic, from rws, the country, signifies one born and bred in the country. Clown is a Scandinavian word meaning a clumsy, boorish fellow, allied to clump. All these terms are employed as epithets tp persons, and principally to such as five in the country: the terms countryman and peasant are taken in an indifferent sense, and may compre- hend persons of different descriptions; they designate nothing more than habitual residence in the country: the other terms are employed for the lower orders of countrymen, but with col- lateral ideas favorable or unfavorable annexed to them: swain, hind, both convey the idea of innocence in a humble station, and are therefore al- ways employed in poetry in a good sense: the rustic and clown both con- vey the idea of that uncouth rudeness and ignorance which is in reality foimd among the lowest orders of countrymen. COUPLE, Pair, Brace. Couple comes from Latin con, together, and Old Latin apere, to join, preserved in aptu^, Enghsh apt. It signifies things joined together; and as two things are with most convenience bound to- gether, it has by custom been confined to this number. Pair, in French paire, Latin par, equal, signifies things that are equal, which can with propriety be said only of two things with regard to each other. Brace, from the French bras, arm, signifies things locked to- COURSE 219 gether after the maimer of the folded arms, which on that account are con- fined to the number of two. From the above illustration of these terms, it is clear that the number of two, which is included in all of them, is, with regard to the first, entirely arbitrary; that with regard to the second it arises from the nature of the junction; and with regard to the third it arises altogether from the nature of the objects; couples and braces are made by coupling and bracing; pairs are either so of themselves or are made so by others: couples and braces always require a junction in order to make them complete; pairs require similarity only to make them what they are: couples are joined by a foreign tie; even the being in com- pany is sufficient to make a couple; braces are produced by a close junction, or what is supposed to be so, which requires them to go together. Couple is applied to objects generally. Pair is apphed to things that natural- ly go in pairs. Brace is applied to particular things, either themselves joined together or serving to join others together; as birds that are shot and are usually linked together are termed a brace; whence in poetry the term is applied to animals or other objects in a close state of junction. Couple is apphed to persons of differ- ent sex who are bound to each other by the ties of affection or by the marriage tie. Pair is also apphed to persons simi- larly situated, but refers more to the moral tie from similarity of feeling: whence the newly married couple is in ordinary discoiu"se called the happy pair. Pair is apphed to persons in no other connection, and brace never ex- cept in the burlesque style. COURAGE, Fortitude, Resolu- tion. Courage (see Bravery). Forti- tude, in French fortitude, Latin forti- tudo, is the abstract noun from fortis, strong. Resolution, from Latin re, again, and solvere, to loose, signifies to divide something into its component parts; hence to decide; and marks the act of resolving, or the state of being resolved. Courage respects action, fortitude re- spects passion: a man has courage to meet danger, and fortitude to endure pain. Courage is that power of the mind which bears up against the evil that is in prosp>ect; fortitude is that power which endures the pain that is felt: the man of courage goes with the same coolness to the mouth of the cannon as the man of fortitude imder- goes the amputation of a limb. Hora- tius Codes displayed his courage in defending a bridge against the whole army of the Etruscans: Caius Mutius displayed no less fortitude when he thrust his hand into the fire in the pres- ence of King Porsena, and awed him as much by his language as his action. Courage seems to oe more of a manly virtue; fortitude is more distinguishable as a feminine virtue: the former is at least most adapted to the male sex who are called upon to act, and the latter to the females, who are obhged to endure: a man without courage would be as ill prepared to discharge his duty in his intercourse with the world as a woman without fortitude would be to support herself imder the compHcated trials of body and mind with which she is hable to be as- sailed. Resohdion is a minor species of cour- age, or it is courage in the minor con- cerns of hfe: courage comprehends under it a spirit to advance; resolution simply marks the will not to recede: we require courage to bear down all the obstacles which oppose themselves to us; we require resolution not to yield to the first difficulties that offer. COURSE, Race, Passage. Course, from currere, to nm, signifies either the act of running or the space run over. Race comes from Scandinavian ras, a running, and signifies the sanae act. Passage, Latin passus, a step, signifies either the act of stepping, or the space passed over. Course and race as acts imply the act of walking or running; passage, the a«t of passing or going generally: as swift in the course, to win the race, to be lost in the passage. The course in this case may be the act of one alone; the race is always the act of one in competition with others. In the sense of the space gone over, 220 COURT course is to be compared with passage in the proper apphcation, and with race in the improper. The course is the direction taken or chosen by any ob- ject, and apphes to persons or things personified; as a person pursues a course. Passage is the way either through or over an object, and apphes only to in- animate objects. Course, in the moral apphcation, sig- nifies the direction taken in the business of hfe; as to pursue a right or wrong course. The race is that course of life which a person is supposed to run with others toward a certain object. It is used mostly in the spiritual sense. See also Route; Series; Way. COURT. See Homage; Tribunal. COURTEOUS, Complaisant, Courtly. Courteous, from court, de- notes properly belonging to a court, and, by a natural extension of the sense, suitable to a court. Cotnplaisant (see Complaisance). Courteous in one respect compre- hends in it more than complaisant; it includes the manner as well as the action; it is, properly speaking, pol- ished complaisance: on the other hand, complaisance includes more of the dis- position in it than courteou^sness; it has less of the polish, but more of the reahty of kindness. Courteousness dis- plays itself in the address and man- ners; complaisance, in direct good of- fices: courteousness is practised be- tween strangers; complaisance, among friends. Bee also Affable; Well-bred. Courtly, though derived from the same word as courteous, is in some de- gree opposed to it in point of sense; it denotes a likeness to a court, but not a likeness which is favorable: courtly is to courteous as the form to the reahty; the courtly consists of the exterior only, the latter of the exterior combined with the spirit; the former, therefore, seems to convey the idea of insincerity when contrasted with the latter, which must necessarily suppose the contrary : a courtly demeanor, or a courtier-like demeanor, may be suitable on certain occasions; but a courteous demeanor is always desirable. Courtly may hkewise be employed in relation to things, as belonging to a court; but courteous has always respect to persons: we may speak of a courtly style, or courtly grandeur; but we al- ways speak of courteous behavior, courteous language, and the like. COVENANT. See Agreement. COVER, Hide. Cover, in French couvrir, Italian coprire, Latin cooperio, is compounded of con, intensive, and operio, to conceal, and signifies to conceal thoroughly. Hide (see Con- ceal). Cover is to hide as the means to the end: we commonly hide by covering; but we may easily cover without hiding, as also hide without covering. The ruhng idea in the word cover is that of throwing or putting something over a body : in the word hide is that of keep- ing carefully to one's self, from the observation of others. In most civil- ized countries it is common to cover the head: in the Eastern countries females commonly wear veils to hide the face. Cover sometimes, particularly in the moral application, signifies to conceal; but in that case it denotes the manner of conceahng, namely, by overspread- ing; but hide denotes either the inten- tion or desire to conceal or the coij- ceahng what ought not to be seen. Cover, Shelter, Screen. — Cover prop- erly denotes what serves as a cover, in the hteral sense of the verb from which it is derived (see above). Shelter comes from Anglo-Saxon scild- truma, hterally shield-troop, a band of men with shields set to guard a place; hence any protection. Screen is de- rived through French from Teutonic schranne, a railing or a grate. Cover is hterally apphed to many particular things which are employed in covering; but in the general sense which makes it analogous to the other terms it includes the idea of concealing: shelter comprehends that of protecting from some immediate or impending evil: screen includes that of warding off some trouble. A cover always sup- poses something which can extend over the whole surface of a body; a shelter or a screen may merely interpose to a sufficient extent to serve the intended purpose. Mihtary operations are some- times carried on under cover of the CREDIT 221 night; a bay is a convenient shelter for vessels against the violence of the winds; a chair may be used as a screen to prevent the violent action of the heat or the external air. In the moral sense, a fair reputation is sometimes made the cover for the commission of gross irregularities in secret. When a person feels himself unable to withstand the attacks of his enemies, he seeks a shelter imder the sanction and authority of a great name. Bad men sometimes use wealth and power to screen them from the punish- ment which is due to their ofiFences. COVERING. See Tegument. COVET. See Desire. COVETOUSNESS, Cupidity, AvAEiCE. Covetotisness, from covet, and Latin cupere, to desire, signifies having a desire. Cupidity is a more immediate derivative from the Latin, signifying the same thing. Avarice (see Ava- ricious). All these terms are employed to ex- press an iUicit desire after objects of gratification; but covetousness is appUed to property in general, or to whatever is valuable; cupidity and avarice, only to money or possessions. A child may display its covetousness in regard to the playthings which fall in its way; a man shows his cupidity in regard to the gains that fall in his way; we should, therefore, be careful to check a covetous disposition in early life, lest it show itself in the more hateful char- acter of cupidity in advanced years. Covetousness is the natm-al disposition for having or getting; cupidity is the acquired disposition. As the love of appropriation is an innate characteris- tic in man, that of accumulatiag or wanting to accumulate, which con- stitutes covetousness, will show itseK, in some persons, among the first indica- tions of character: where the prospect of amassing great wealth is set before a man, as in the case of a governor of a distant province, it will evince great virtue in him if his cupidity be not excited. The covetous man seeks to add to what he has; the avaricious man only strives to retain what he has: the covetous man sacrifices others to in- dulge himself; the avaricurus man will sometimes sacrifice himself to indulge others; for generosity, which is op- posed to covetousness, is sometimes as- sociated with avarice. COWARD. See Recreant. COWER. See Quail. CRACK. See Break. CRAFTY. See Cunning. CRAVE. See Beg; Yearn. CREATE. See Cause; Make. CREDIT, Favor, Influence. Credit, from the Latin creditus, par- ticiple of credere, to beUeve or trust, marks the state of being believed or trusted. Favor, from the Latin favere, to befriend or please, marks an agree- able or pleasant state of feeling toward an object. Influence, in French irir- fluence, Latin influentia, from in, in, and fluere, to flow, marks the state or power of acting upon any object so as to direct or move it. These terms mark the state we stand in with regard to others as flowing out of their sentiments toward ourselves: credit arises out of esteem :/ai;or, out of good-will or affection; influence, out of either credit or favor, or external cir- cumstances: credit depends altogether on personal merit, real or supposed: favor may depend on the caprice of him who bestows it. The credU which we have with others is marked by their confidence in our judgment; by their disposition to submit to our de- cisions; by their rehance on our ve- racity or assent to our opinions: the favor we have with others is marked by their readiness to comply with our wishes, their subserviency to our views, attachment to our society: men or talent are ambitious to gain credit with their sovereigns by the superiority of their counsel: weak men or men of ordinary powers are contented with being the favorites of princes and en- joying their patronage and protection. Credit redounds to the honor of the individual, and stimulates him to noble exertions; it is beneficial in its results to all mankind, individually or collectively: favor redounds to the personal advantage, the selfish gratifi- cation of the individual; it is apt to inflame pride and provoke jealousy. Credit and favor are the gifts of others; influence is a possession which we derive from circumstances: there will always be influence where there is credit or favor, but it may exist inde- 222 CREED pendently of either: we have credit and favor for ourselves; we exert in- fluence over others: credit and favor serve one's own purposes; influence is employed in directing others: weak people easily give their credit, or bestow their favor, by which an influence is gained over them to bend them to the will of others; the influence itself may be good or bad, according to the views of the person by whom it is exerted. See also Belief; Name. CREED. See Faith. CREMATION, Incineration. Cre- mation, in Latin crematio through cre- matus from cremare, to bum, and in- cineration, in Low Latin incineratio from incinerare, to reduce to ashes, both refer to the method of disposing of the dead by burning, instead of earth burial. Cremation is the more com- mon term in the United States. CREW. See Band. CRIME, Vice, Sin. Crime, in Latin crimen, Greek Kpivtiv, to judge, signifies a sentence, or punishment; and also the cause of the sentence or punishment, in which latter sense it is here taken. Vice, in Latin vilium, a blemish, signifies that which destroys the perfection of something. Sin, Anglo-Saxon synn, is allied to one form of the verb to he (Latin sum, sunt, etc.). "Language regards the guilty man as the man who it was" (Curttds). A crime is a social offence; a vice is a personal ofifence: every action which does injury to others, either individual- ly or collectively, is a crime; that which does injury to oiU"selves is a vice. Crime consists in a violation of human laws; vice, in a violation of the moral law; sin, in a violation of the divine law: sin, therefore, comprehends both crime ana vice; but there are many sins which are not crimes nor vices: crimes are tried before a human court, and pum'shed agreeably to the sentence of the judge; vices and sins are brought before the tribimal of the conscience; the former are punished in this world, the latter will be punished in the world to come, by the sentence of the Almighty: treason is one of the most atrocious crimes; drimkenness one of the most dreadful vices; rehgious hypocrisy one of the most heinous sins. Crime, Misdemeanor. — Crime (see above). Misdemeanor signifies Hterally a wrong demeanor. The former of these terms is to the latter as the genus to the species: a misdemeanor is in the technical sense a minor crime. Housebreaking is under aU circumstances a crime; but shop- Hfting or pilfering amounts only to a misdemeanor. Corporal punishments are most commonly annexed to crimes; pecuniary punishments frequently to misdemeanors. In the vulgar use of these terms, misdemeanor is moreover distingiiished from crime by not al- ways signifying a violation of public law, but only of private morals; in which sense the former term impUes what is done against the state, and the latter that which offends individuals or small communities. Criminal, Guilty. — Criminal, from crime, signifies belonging or relating to a crime. Guilty, from guilt (in Anglo- Saxon gylt, a trespass and a fine for trespass, possibly allied to geldan, to pay, whence our word yield is derived), signifies having guilt. Criminal respects the character of the offence; guilty respects the fact of committing the offence. The criminal- ity of a person is estimated by all the circumstances of his conduct which present themselves to observation; his guilt requires to be proved by evidence. The criminality is not a matter of in- quiry, but of judgment; the guilt is often doubtful, if not positively con- cealed. The higher the rank of a per- son the greater his criminality if he does not observe an upright and irre- proachable conduct: where a number of individuals are concerned in any unlawful proceeding, the difficulty of attaching the guilt to the real offender is greatly increased. Criminal may be apphed as an epi- thet either to the person or that which is personal: guilty is properly applied only to the person : a person, or his ac- tions, looks, thought, intentions, may be criminal: the person himself is guilty of whatever he actually commits. What is criminal is against good morals: but a person may be guilty of trivial errors in indifferent matters. Criminal, Culprit, Malefactor, Felon, Convict. — All these terms are employed CRITICAL 223 for a public offender; but the first con- veys no more than this general idea; while the others comprehend some accessory idea in their signification. Criminal is a general term, and the rest are properly species of criminals. Culprit comes from Anglo-French cul (for Latin ctdpa, fault) and prest, ready to prove it, signifying that the clerk of the crcwn was ready to prove the indictment. Malefactor, compoimded of the Latin terms male and factor, sig- nifies an evil-doer — that is, one who does evil, in distinction from him who does good. Felon is derived from Late Latin felonem (accusative), a traitor, alhed to fell, meaning cruel, dire. Con- vict, in Latin convictus, participle of convinco, to convince or prove, sig- nifies one proved or foimd guilty. When we wish to speak in general of those who by offences against the laws or regulations of society have exposed themselves to punishment, we denomi- nate them criminals: when we con- sider them as already brought before a tribunal, we call them culprits: when we consider them in regard to the moral tiupitude of their character, as the pro- moters of evil rather than of goodj we entitle them malefactors: when we consider them as offending by the grosser violations of the law, they are termed felons: when we consider them as already under the sentence of the law, we denominate them convicts. The punishments inflicted on criminals vary according to the nature of their crimes and the spirit of the laws by which they are judged: a guilty con- science will give a man the air of a cul- prit in the presence of those who have no authority to be either his accusers or judges; it gratified the mahce of the Jews to cause our blessed Saviour to be crucified between two malefactors: it is an imiwrtant regulation in the internal economy of a prison to have felons kept distinct from one another, particularly if their crimes are of an atrocious nature: it has not unfre- quently happened that, when the sentence of the law has placed convicts in the lowest state of degradation, their characters have xmdergone so entire a reformation as to enable them to attain a higher pitch of elevation than they had ever enjoyed before. CRINGE. See Knuckle. CRISIS. See Conjuncture. CRITERION, Standard. Criterion, in Greek icpirr)piov, from icpivEiv, to judge, signifies the mark or rule by which one may judge. Standard sigm- fied originally an ensign, a flag fixed on a large standing-pole, and is derived from extendere, to extend, though in- fluenced by the verb stand. The pole bearing the flag came to faidicate a standard of measurement, symbolizing the ideals of the people whom it repre- sented, and the action expected of them. The criterion is employed only in matters of judgment; the standard is used in the oroinary concerns of life. The former serves for determining the characters and quahties of things; the latter for defining quantity and meas- ure. The language and manners of a person are the best criterion for form- ing an estimate of his station and edu- cation. In order to produce a uni- formity in the mercantile transactions of mankind one with another, it is the custom of governments to fix a certain standard for the regulation of coins, weights, and measures. The word standard may likewise be used figuratively in the same sense. The Bible is a standard of excellence, both in morals and religion, which can- not be too closely followed. It is im- possible to have the same standard in the arts and sciences, because all our performances fall short of perfection and will admit of improvement. See also Shibboleth; Test. CRITICAL, Crucial, Important, Vital. These words all suggest a state of imcertainty, or something necessary to decide the welfare or success of a person or a project. Critical, from the Greek Kpivuv, to judge, and crucial, from Latin crux, a cross, referring to the cross placed at the fork in a road to point the way, have a similar mean- ing. A critical moment is a moment in which the decision hangs in the balance. A crucial instance is the instance on which the decision def>ends. The use of crucial is partly influenced by its rela- tion to crux, which also suggests an instrument oi torture — so that the word has a certain intensity of meaning that critical docs not have. It has also a 224 CRITICISE more limited and specific application. Important, from in, in, and portare, to bring, is a more general word. It sig- nifies, literally, "bringing in" much, having weighty results; it does not suggest the mating of a decision. Vital (from vita, life) means essential to the life of something. See also Censor; Climacteric. CRITICISE. See Censure. CRITICISM. See Animadversion. CROOKED. See Awkward; Bent; Wry. CROSS. See Awkward; Cap- tious; Querulous. CROTCHET. See Vagary. CROWD, See Multitude. . CRUCIAL. See Critical. CRUEL, Inhuman, Barbarous, Brutal, Savage. Cruel, from the Latin crudelis and crudus, raw, rough, or imtutored; inhuman, compounded of the privative in and human, signifying not human; barbarous, from the Greek fidpjidpoQ, foreigner, in imitation of the sound of a strange language — "bar, bar" — aU these mark a degree of bad feeling which is imcontrolled by culture or refinement. Brutal, signifying like the brute (see Animal), and savage, from Old French salvage, from Latin silva, woods, signifying a dweller in the woods — these mark a still stronger de- gree of this bad passion. Cruel is the most familiar and the least powerful epithet of all these terms; it designates the ordinary propensity which, if not overpowered by a better principle, will invariably show itself by the desire of inflicting positive pain on others, or abridging their comfort: inhuman and barbarous are higher de- grees of cruelty; brutal and savage rise so much in degree above the rest as almost to partake of another nature. A child gives early symptoms of his natural cruelty by his ill-treatment of animals; but we do not speak of his inhumanity, because this is a term con- fined to men, and more properly to their treatment of their own species, although extended in its sense to their treatment of the brutes: barbarity is but too common among children and per- sons of riper years. A person is cruel who neglects the creature he should protect and take care of: he is inhuman if he withhold from him the common marks of tenderness or kindness which are to be expected from one human being to another; he is barbarous if he find amusement in inflicting pain; he is brutal or savage according to the cir- cumstances of aggravation which ac- company the act of torturing. See also Hard-hearted; Heart- less. CRUSH. See Break; Overwhelm; Quell. CRUTCH. See Staff. CRY, Weep. An outward indica-- tion of pain is expressed by both these terms, but cry (see Call) comprehends an audible expression accompanied with tears or otherwise. Weep, Anglo- Saxon wepan, signified originally to make an outcry; it now refers to the silent shedding of tears. Cryirig arises from an impatience in suffering cor- poreal pains; children and weak people commonly cry: weeping is occasioned by mental grief; the wisest and best of men will not disdain sometimes to weep. Crying is as selfish as it is weak; it serves to relieve the pain of the in- dividual to the aimoyance of the hearer; weeping, when called forth by others' sorrows, is an infirmity which no man could wish to be without: as an ex- pression of generous sympathy, it af- fords essential rehef to the sufferer. Cry, Scream, Shriek. — To cry indi- cates the utterance of an articulate or an inarticulate sound. Scream is a Scandinavian word meaning to cr]/ aloud. Shriek is an imitative word, like screech, which tries to represent by its sound a certain kind of cry. Crying is an ordinary mode of loud utterance resorted to on common occasions; one cries in order to be heard: screaming is an intemperate mode of crying, re- sorted to from an impatient desire to be heard or from a vehemence of feel- ing. People scream to deaf people from the mistaken idea of making themselves heard; whereas a distinct articulation win always be more efficacious. It is frequently necessary to cry when we cannot render ourselves audible by any other means; but it is never neces- sary nor proper to scream. Shriek may be compared with cry and scream as expressions of pain; in this case to shriek is more than to cry, and less than to scream. They both signify to crif CUNNING 225 with a violent eflfort. We may cry from the shghtest pain or inconven- ience; but one shrieks or screams only on occasions of great agony, either cor- poreal or mental. A child cries when it has hurt its finger; it shrieks in the moment of terror at the sight of a frightful object, or screams imtil some one comes to its assistance. See also Wail. CUFF. See Knock. CULPABLE, Faulty. Culpable, in Latin culpabilis, comes from culpa, a fault or blame, signifying worthy of blame, fit to be blamed. Faulty, from favit, is ultimately derived from Latin fallere, to deceive. We are culpable from the commission of one fault; we are faulty from the number of faults: culpable is a relative term; faulty is absolute: we are culpa- ble with regard to a superior whose in- tentions we have not fulfilled; we are faulty whenever we commit any faults. A master pronounces his servant as culpable for not having attended to his commands; an indifferent person pro- nounces another as faulty whose faults have come under his notice. It is pos- sible, therefore, to be faulty without being culpable, but not vice versd. CULPRIT. See Criminal. CULTIVATED. See Well-bred. CULTIVATION, Culture, Civ- ilization, Refinement. Cultivation is derived from Latin cultu^, from colere, to till, and denotes the act of cultivat- ing, or state of being cultivated. Cult- ure, from cultu^, signifies the state only of being cultivated. Civilization signi- fies the act of civilizing, or state of being civilized, from civis, a citizen, one who lives with others on comfortable terms in a city or state. Refinement denotes the act of refining, or the state of being refined. Cultivation is with more propriety applied to the thing that grows; cult- ure to that in which it grows. The cultivation of flowers will not repay the labor unless the soU be prepared by proper culture. In the same manner, when speaking figuratively, we say the cultivation of any art or science : the cultivation of one's taste or inclination may be said to contribute to one's own skill or the perfection of the thing it- self; but the mind requires culture pre- 15 viously to this particular exertion of the powers. Civilization is the first stage of cul^ tivation; refinement is the last; we civilize savages by divesting them of their rudeness and giving them a knowledge of such arts as are requisite for civil society; we cultivate people in general by caUing forth their powers into action and independent exertion; we refine them by the introduction of the liberal arts. The introduction of Christianity has been the best means of civilizing the rudest nations. The cultivation of the mind in serious pur- suits tends to refine the sentiments without debilitating the character; but the cultivation of the liberal arts may be pursued to a vicious extent, so as to introduce an excessive refinernerU of feehng that is incompatible with real manhness. Cultivation, Tillage, Husbandry. — Cultivation has a much more compre- hensive meaning than either tillage or husbandry. Tillage comes from Anglo- Saxon tilian, to labor, from til, bene- ficial, and signifies to make land use- ful. It is a mode of cultivation that extends no further than the preparation of the ground for the reception of the seed; cultivation includes the whole process by which the produce of the earth is brought to maturity. We may till without cultivating; but we cannot cultivate, as far as respects the soil, without tillage. Husbandry (see Hus- band) is more extensive in its meaning than tillage, but not so extensive as cultivation. Tillage respects the act only of tilling the ground; husbandry is employed for the ofl5ce of cultivating for domestic purposes. A cultivator is a general term, defined only by the object that is cultivated, as the cultivator of the grape or the ohve; a tiller is a laborer in the soil that performs the office for another: a husbandman is a humble species of cultivator who him- self performs the whole office of cultivat- ing the ground for domestic purposes. CULTURE. See Cultivation. CUNNING, Crafty, Subtle, Sly, Wily. Cwnntn^ (sccArt). Crafty ^g- nifies having crajft, from Anglo-Saxon crceft, German kraft, meaning power or energy, hence, specifically, power of mind; hence, in a stiU more specific 226 CUPIDITY sense, a particular kind of skiU. (Compare the development of keen, from Anglo-Saxon cene, German kuhn, bold.) Subtle, in French subtil, and Latin svbtilis, thin, from sub and tela, a thread drawn to be fine; hence in the figiu-ative senise in which it is here taken, fine or acute in thought. Sly is a Scandinavian word originally mean- ing handy, dexterous, possibly allied to slay. Wily, full of wiles, may be derived from Anglo-Saxon wiglian, to practise sorcery. All these epithets agree in expressing an aptitude to employ peculiar and se- cret means to the attainment of an end; they differ principally in the secrecy of the means or the degree of circiun- vention that is employed. The cun- ning man shows his dexterity simply in concealing; this requires little more than reservedness and taciturnity: the crafty man goes further; he shapes his words and actions so as to luU sus- picion; hence it is that a child may be cunning, but an old man will be crafty: a subtle man has more acute- ness of invention than either, and all his schemes are hidden by a veil that is impenetrable to common observa- tion: the cunning man looks only to the concealment of an immediate ob- ject; the crafty and subtle man has a remote object to conceal: thus men are cunning in their ordinary concerns; poUticians are crafty or subtle: but the former are more so as to the end, and the latter as to the means. A man is cunning and crafty by deeds; he is subtle mostly by means of words alone, or words and actions combined. Sly- ness is a vulgar kind of cunning; the sly man goes cautiously and silently to work. Wiliness is a species of cun- ning or craft, appUcable only to cases of attack or defence. See also Art. CUPIDITY. See Covetottsness. CURB. See Check. CURE, Heal, Remedy. Cure, in Latin euro, signifies to take care of, that is, by distinction, to take care of that which requires particular care, in order to remove an evil. Heal signi- fies to make whole that which is un- sound. Remedy, in Latin remedium, is compounded of re and medere, to heal. The particle re is here an intensive. To cure is employed for what is out of order; to heal, for that which is broken: diseases are cured, wounds are healed; the former is a complex, the latter is a simple process. Whatever requires to be cured is wrong in the system; it requires many and various apphcations internally and externally: whatever requires to be healed is oc- casioned externally by violence, and requires external apphcations. In a state of refinement men have the great- est number of disorders to be cured; in a savage state there is more occasion for the healing art. Cure is used as properly in the moral as the natural sense; heal in the moral sense is altogether figurative. The dis- orders of the mind are cured with greater difficulty than those of the body. The breaches which have been made in the affections of relatives tow- ard each other can be healed by nothing but a Christian spirit of forbearance and forgiveness. To remedy, in the sense of applying remedies, has a moral apphcation, in which it accords most with cure. Evils are either cured or remedied, but the former are of a much more serious nature than the latter. The evils in society require to be cured; an omission, a deficiency, or a mischief requires to be remedied. When bad habits become inveterate, they are put out of the reach of cure. It is an exercise for the ingenuity of man to attempt to remedy the various troubles and incon- veniences which are daily occm-ring. Cure, Remedy. — Cure denotes either the act of curing or the thing that cures. Remedy is mostly employed for the thing that remedies. In the former sense the remedy is to the cure as the means to the end; a cure is performed by the application of a remedy. That is incurable for which no remedy can be found; but a cure is sometimes per- formed without the apphcation of any specific remedy. The cure is complete when the evil is entirely removed; the remedy is sure which by proper apphca- tion never fails of effecting the cure. The cure of disordws depends upon the skill of the physician and the state of the patient; the efficacy of remedies depends upon their suitable choice and apphcation: but a cure may be de- CURSORY 227 feated, or a remedy made of no avail, by a variety of circumstances inde- pendent of either. A cure is sometimes employed for the thing that cures, which brings it nearer in sense to the word remedy, the former being applied to great matters, the latter to small. Quacks always hold forth their nostrums as infallible cures, not for one, but for every sort of dis- order; experience has, however, fatally proved that the remedy in most cases IS worse than the disease. CURING. See Sanitary. CURIOUS, Inquisitive, Prying. Curious, in French curieux, Latin curi- 08US, from cura, care, signifying full of care. Inquisitive, in Latin inquist- tv^, from inquirere, to inquire or search into, signifies a disposition to in- vestigate thoroughly. Prying, from Tpry, IS derived from Old French 'prier, to pillage, from Late Latin predare, to prey upon, hence to search out prey, or simply to search out. The disposition to interest one's self in matters not of immediate concern is the idea common to all these terms. Curiosity is directed to all objects that can gratify the inclination, taste, or understanding; inquisitiveness, to such things only as satisfy the understand- ing. The curious person interests him- self in all the works of nature and art; he is curious to try effects and examine causes: the inquisitive person endeavors to add to his store of knowledge. Curiosity employs every means which falls in its way in order to procure gratification; the curious man uses his own powers or those of others to serve his purpose: inquisitiveness is indulged only by means of verbal inquiry; the inquisitive person collects all from others. A traveller is curious who examines everything for himself; he is inquisitive when he minutely ques- tions others. Inquisitiveness is there- fore to curiosity as a means to an end; whoever is curious will naturally be inquisitive, but he who is inquisitive may be so either from curiosity or from other motives. Curious and inquisitive may both be used in a bad sense; prying is never used otherwise than in a bad sense. Inquisitive, as in the former case, is a mode of curiosity, and prying is a species of eager curiosity. A curious person takes unallowed means of learn- ing that which he ought not to wish to know; an inquisitive person puts many impertinent and troublesome questions: a prying temper is unceas- ing in its endeavors to get acquainted with the secrets of others. Curiosity is a fault most frequent among fe- males; inquisitiveness is most general among children; a prying temper be- longs only to people of low character. A well-disciplined mind checks the first risings of idle curiosity: children should be taught early to suppress an inquisi- tive temp>er, which may so easily be- come burdensome to others: those who are of a prying temper are insensible to everything but the desire of unveil- ing what lies hidden; such a disposi- tion is often engendered by the un- hcensed indulgence of curiosity in early life, which becomes a sort of passion in riper years. CURRENT. See Stream. CURSE. See Ban; Malediction; Swear. CURSORY, Hasty, Slight, Des- ultory. Cursory, from the Latin curro, signifies run over or done in running. Hasty signifies done in haste, from Ajaglo-Saxon tmst, violence. Slight meant originally even or flat; then plain, smooth, simple, trivial. Desul- tory, from desilo, to leap, signifies leaped over. Cursory _ inchides both hasty and slight; it includes hasty inasmuch as it expresses a quick motion; it includes slight inasmuch as it conveys the idea of a partial action: a view may be either cursory or hasty, as the former is taken by design, the latter from care- lessness: a view may be either cursory or slight; but the former is not so im- perfect as the latter: an author will take a cursory view of those points which are not necessarily connected with his subject; an author who takes a hasty view of a subject will mislead by his errors; he who takes a slight view will disapix)int by the shallow- ness of his information. Between cur- sory and desultory there is the same dif- ference as between running and leaping: we run in a line, but we leap from one part to another; so remarks that are cursory have still more or less connec- 228 CURTAIL tion, but remarks t'nat are desultory are without any coherence. CURTAIL. See Abridge. CURVED. See Bent. CUSTODY. See Keeping. CUSTOM, Habit. Custom, in French coMume, from Latin consue- tudinem, based on Latin consuetum, par- ticiple of consu£scere, to accustom. Habit, in French habit, Latin hahitudo, from habere, to have, marks the state of having or holding. Custom is a frequent repetition of the same act; habit, the effect of such repe- tition: the custom of rising early in the morning is conducive to the health, and may in a short time become such a habit as to render it no less agreeable than it is useful. Custom supposes an act of the will; habit implies an in- voluntary movement: custom is fol- lowed; a habit is acquired. Custom is applicable to bodies of men; habit is confined to the individual; every nation has ctistoms peculiar to it- self; and every individual has habits pecuUar to his age, station, and circum- stances. Customary and habitual, the epithets derived from these words admit of a similar distinction: the customary ac- tion is that which is repeated after the manner of a custom; the habitual action is that which is done by the force of habit. See also Tax; Usage. Custom, Fashion, Manner, Practice. — Customs, fashions, and manners are all employed for communities of men; cus- tom respects established and general modes of action: fashion, in French fagon, from factio, a making or doing, regards partial and transitory modes of making or doing things: manner, in the Umited sense in which it is here taken, signifies the manner or mode of men's living or behaving in their social inter- course. Custom is authoritative; it stands in the place of law and regulates the con- duct of men in the most important con- cerns of life: fashion is arbitrary and capricious, it decides in matters of trifling import: manners are rational; they are the expressions of moral feel- ings. Customs have most force in a simple state of society; fashions rule most where luxury has made the great- est progress; mnnners are most dis- tinguishable in a civiUzed state of society. Customs are in their nature as unchangeable as fashions are vari- able; manners depend on cultivation and collateral circumstances; customs die away or are abohshed; fashions pass away and new ones take their place; manners are altered either for the better or the worse. Practice, in Latin practica, Greek TTpaKTiKT), from irpdffativ, to do, signifies actual doing or the thing done, that is, by distinction, the regularly doing, or the thing regularly done, in which sense it is most analogous to custom; but the former simply conveys the idea of actual performance; the latter in- cludes also the accessory idea of repe- tition at stated periods: a practice may be defined as frequent or unfrequent, regular or irregular; but a custom does not require to be quahfied by any such epithets: it may be the practice of a person to do acts of charity, as the occasion requires; but, when he uniformly does a particular act of charity at any given period of the year, it is properly denominated his cvstom. Both practice and custom are general or particular, but the former is abso- lute, the latter relative: a practice may be adopted by a number of persons without reference to one another; but a custom is always followed either by imitation or prescription: the practice of gaming has always been followed by the vicious part of society; but it is to be hoped for the honor of man that it will never become a custom. CUT. See Nip; Trench. CUTTING. See Trenchant. CYCLE, Bicycle, Tricycle, Hy- drocycle. Motorcycle, Tandem, So- ciable. Cycle, from the Greek kvkXoq, a circle, in the sense of a vehicle, is a shortened term for a variety of con- structions, outgrowths of the old French velocipede and dandy-horse of two and three wheels. The bicycle and tricycle, as their names denote, are supplied with two and three wheels respectively; the hydrocycle is an adaptation for use on a water surface; the motorcycle is a bicycle propelled by an electric motor or other contrivance instead of by CYNICAL 229 pedals on the front wheel, a form of cycle much used by the police; a tandem has two wheels farther sepa- rated than the ordinary bicycle, with seats for two persons, one in the rear of the driver; and the sociable is one of several names apphed to a tricycle having a more or less fancy rear seat for a second person, a form also used for light delivery vehicles. Bike is a new slang term given by both professional and amateur wheel- men to their machines. CYNICAL. See Misanthropical. 230 DABBLE D DABBLE, Dip, Splash. Dabble exactly agrees in form and sense with Dutch dabbelen. Dip comes from Anglo-Saxon dyppan. Splash is formed by adding s, French es, Latin ex, to plash (from a Teutonic root meaning to strike) for added emphasis. Dip means to immerse in water and then to withdraw the immersed object quickly — indicating a hght, decided, comparatively noiseless action. Splash means to dip in such a way as to fling the water about and make considerable noise. Dabble means to keep dipping lightly, making each time a httle splash. It indicates a purposeless ac- tion; dip indicates an action not lack- ing in purpose, but in continuity and endurance. DAILY, Diurnal. Daily, from day and like, signifies after the manner or in the time of the day, day being de- rived from a Teutonic root signifying to bum, day being the bright, hot time, as opposed to night. Diurnal, from dies, day, signifies belonging to the day. Daily is the colloquial term which is apphcable to whatever passes in the day-time; diurnal is the scientific term, which applies to what passes within or belongs to the astronomical day: the physician makes daily visits to his patients; the earth is said by astrono- mers to have a diurnal motion on its own axis. DAINTY, Delicacy. These terms, which are in vogue among epicures, have some shades of difference not al- together undeserving of notice. Dainty, through French from Latin dignitatem, worthy, is applied to that which is of worth or value — of course only to such things as have a superior value in the estimation of epicures, and consequently conveys a more posi- tive meaning than delicacy; inasmuch as a dainty may be that which is ex- tremely delicate, a delicacy is some- times a species of dainty; but there are many delicacies which are altogether suited to the most delicate appetite that are neither costly nor rare, two quahties which are almost inseparable from a dainty: those who indulge themselves freely in dainties and deli- cacies scarcely know what it is to eat with an appetite; but those who are temperate in their use of the enjoy- ments of life will be enabled to derive pleasure from ordinary food. DALLY, Toy. Dally comes from Old French dalier, to converse, to pass one's time in light social converse. Toy is derived from Dutch tuig, tools, utensils. A toy is a device to give amusement, a plaything for chilch-en, especially. To toy is to treat as a plaything — as a matter of no conse- quence; to amuse one's self as with a game. Dally and toy have substan- tially- the same meaning, indicating frivolous or playful self-indulgence. Such difference as there is is that suggested by their derivation — dally emphasizing a certain lightness and frivolousness, toy a more positive play- ing with something. Both words are used to refer to amorous caresses with the sUght difference in meaning above suggested. Dally means also to delay, to put off by trifling, and toy a pur- poseless handling, as when we say "He toyed with his watch-chain." DAMAGE. See Injury; Loss; Scathe. DAMPNESS. See Moisture. DAMSEL. See Virgin. DANGER, Peril, Hazard. Dan- ger, Old French dongier, from Late Latin dominum, power, from Late Latin domnus, lord — one who has ab- solute authority. Peril is derived from Latin periculum, from the verb periri, to try, Greek rrupa, an attempt. Hazard (see Chance). The idea of chance or uncertainty is common to all these terms; but the two former may sometimes be foreseen and calculated upon; the latter is pure- ly contingent. Dangers are far and near, ordinary and extraordinary: they meet us if we do not go in search of them; perils are always distant and extraordinary: we must go out of our course to expose ourselves to them; in the quiet walk of life, as in the most DARK 231 busy and tumultuous, it is the lot of man to be siurounded by danger; the mariner, and the traveller who goes in search of unknown countries, put them- selves in the way of undergoing ■perils both by sea and land. Danger and 'peril are applied to p)osi- tive evils; hazard respects the possi- bilities of good as well as of evil. When we are involved in danger we are in a situation to lose what we wish to re- tain; when we run the hazard of a battle we may either win or lose. The same distinction exists between the epithets that are derived from these terms. It is dangerous for a youth to act without the advice of his friends; it is perilous for a traveler to explore the wilds of Africa; it is hazardous for a merchant to speculate in time of war: experiments in matters of poUcy or government are always dangerous; a journey through deserts that are in- fested with beasts of prey is perilous; a mihtary expedition conducted with inadequate means is hazardous. DANGEROUS. See Climacteric. DARE. See Brave. DARING, Bold. Daring signifies having the spirit to dare. Bold (see Audacity). These terms may both be taken in a bad sense, but daring much oftener than bold; in either case daring ex- presses much more than bold: he who is daring provokes resistance and courts danger; but the bold man is contented to overcome the resistance that is of- fered to him: a man may be bold in the use of words only, he must be daring in actions : he is bold in the defence of truth ; he is daring in mihtary enterprise. See also Stalwart. DARK, Obscure, Dim, Mysteri- ous. Dark, Anglo-Saxon deorc, is con- nected with Old High German tarchan- jan, to hide. Obscure comes from Latin obscurus, from 06, over, and scurus, covered. Dim comes from Anglo- Saxon dim, and is allied to Swedish dimma, a fog or haze. Darkness expresses more than ob- scurity; the former denotes the total privation of hght; the latter only the diminution of hght. Dark is opposed to hght; obscure to bright; what is dark is altogether hidden; what is obscure is not to be seen distinctly or without an effort. Darkness may be used either in a nat- ural or moral sense; obscurity only in the latter; in which case the former conveys a more unfavorable idea: dark- ness serves to cover that which ought not to be hidden; obscurity intercepts our view of that which we would wish to see: the former is the consequence of design; the latter of neglect or acci- dent: the letter sent by the con- spirator in the gunpowder plot to his friend was dark; all passages in ancient writers which allude to circumstances no longer known must necessarily be obscure; a comer may be said to be dark or obscure, but the former is used hterally and the latter figuratively; the owl is obliged from the weakness of its visual organs to seek the darkest corners in the daytime; men of dis- torted minds often seek obscure comers only from disappointed ambition. Dim expresses a degree of darkness, but it is employed more in relation to the person seemg than to the object seen. The eyes are said to grow dim, or the sight dim. The light is said to be dim by which things are but dimly seen. Mysterious denotes a species of the dark, in relation to the actions of men; where a veil is intentionally thrown over any object so as to render it as incomprehensible as that which is sacred. Dark is an epithet taken al- ways in the bad sense, but mysterious is always in an indifferent sense. We are told in the Sacred Writings that men love darkness rather than hght, because their deeds are evil. What- ever, therefore, is dark in the ways of men is naturally presumed to be evil; but things may be mysterious in the events of human life without the ex- press intention of an individual to render them so. The sp)eeches of an assassin and conspirator will be dark; any intricate affair, which involves the characters and conduct of men may be mysterious. The same distinction exists between these terms when ap- pUed to the ways of Providence, which are said to be sometimes dark, inas- much as they present a cloudy aspect; and mostly mysterious, inasmuch as they are past finding out. See ^so Opaque. 232 DART DART. See Shoot. DASH. See Sally. DASTARD. See RECREA>rT. DATE. See Time. DAUB. See Smear. DAUNT. See Dismay; Overawe. DAY OF REST. See Sabbath. DAZZLING. See Gorgeous. DEAD. See Lifeless. DEADLY, Mortal, Fatal. Deadly or dead-like signifies like death itself in its effects. Mortal, in Latin mor- talis, signifies belonging to death. Fatal, in Latin fatalis, signifies accord- ing to fate. Deadly is applied to what is pro- ductive of death; mortal to what ter- minates in or is liable to death; fatal appUes not only to death, but every- thing which may be of great mischief. A poison is deadly; a wound or a wounded part is mortal; a step in walking, or a step in one's conduct, may be fatal. Things only are deadly; creatures are mortal. Hatred is deadly; whatever has life is mxyrtal. There may be remedies sometimes to counteract that which is deadly; but that which is mortal is past all cure; and that which is fatal cannot be retrieved. DEAL, Quantity, Portion. Deal, Anglo-Saxon dcel, a part, and German then, from doelen, theilen, etc., to di- vide, signifies literally the thing di- vided or taken off. Qtuintity, in Latin quantitas, comes from qvxintus, signi- fying how much. Portion comes from Latin portio, allied to parare, to pre- pare, signifying a part prepared. Deal always denotes something great, and cannot be coupled with any epi- thet that does not express much: qtuintity is a term of relative import; it either marks indefinitely the how much or so much of a thing, or may be defined by some epithet to express much or httle: portion is of itself altogether indefinite, and admits of being qualified by any epithet to express much or httle: deal is a term confined to familiar use, and sometimes substituted for quantity, and sometimes for portion. It is common to speak of a deal or a quantity of paper, a great deal or a great quantity of money; hkewise of a great deal or a great portion of pleasm-e, a great deal or a great portion of wealth: and in some cases d£al is more usual than either quantity or portion, as a deal of heat, a deal of rain, a deal of frost, a deal of noise, and the hke; but it is admissible only in the famihar style. Portion is employed only for part of that which is detached from the whole; qvxintity may sometimes be employed for a number of wholes. We may speak of a large or a small quantity of books; a large or a small quantity of plants or herbs; but a large or small portion of food, a large or small portion of color. Deal, Act, Behave, Trade. — In an ex- tended sense, deal relates to a business transaction, and also implies to behave well or iU, to act or practise, and one's conduct or behavior toward others. In business concerns a deal may be an ordinary buying and selling of a com- modity, more generally a bargain re- sulting from dickering between inter- ested parties, a trade or exchange of one commodity for another, or a trans- action more or less discreditable to those engaged in it. As apphed to persons, we have poht- ical deals, the trading of supposed or actual influence for votes, the dis- position of a pubhc measure accord- ing to the wishes of certain interested parties, as opposed to the authors and promoters of the measure, the side- tracking, pigeonholing, or defeat of a legislative biU as payment for services rendered in other directions, and the hke. We say deal gently with the err- ing, meaning to ax:t kindly toward them; that was an unfriendly deal, a questionable, unfortunate, or indis- creet transaction; to deal with, to trade with or be a customer of another: to deal by, to treat weU or iU; to deal out, to distribute or give in small quantities, doles; to deal the cards, to give each player the proper number; and a great deal, meaning very much, a large quantity. DEALING. See Trade. DEARTH. See Scarcity. DEATH, Departure, Decease, Demise, Passing Over. Death signi- fies the act of dying. Departure signi- fies the act of departing. Decease, from the Latin de, away, and cedere, to go, signifies the act of going away. De- mise, from demittere, to lay down, sig- nifies literally resigning possession. DEBILITY 233 Death is a general or a particular term; it marks, in the abstract sense, the extinction of hfe, and is apphcable to men or animals, to one or many. Departure, decease, and demise are par- ticular expressions suited only to the condition of human beings. We speak of death in reference to what happens before or at the time; we speak of the death of men generally, or of the death of individuals; we speak of the circum- stances of death, its causes and effects. Departure is a Christian term which carries with it an idea of a passage from one Ufe to another. Death of it- self has always something terrific in it; but the Gospel has divested it of its terrors: the hour of departure, there- fore, for a Christian, is often the haj)- piest period of his mortal existence. Decease presents only the idea of leaving life to the survivors. It is either a technical term in law for death or it is used in common discourse for the falling off from the number of the hving. Property is in perpetual oc- cupancy; at the decease of one possessor it passes into the hands of another. Demise signifies properly a putting off, and in this acceptation the putting off of mortahty; it is therefore appro- priately used for princes, to denote that they at the same time put off or resign an earthly crown. As an epithet, dead is used collective- ly; departed is used with a noun only; deceased, generally without a noun, to denote one or more, according to the connection. There is a respect due to the dead which cannot be violated without offence to the living. It is a pleasant reflection to conceive of de- parted spirits as taking an interest in the concerns of those whom they have left. AU the marks on the body of the deceased indicated that he had met with his death by some violence. Passing over is the term used by Christian Scientists for dying. DEBAR. See Deprive. DEBASE. See Abase. DEBATE, Deliberate. These terms equally mark the acts of pausing or withholding the decision, whether apphcable to one or many. To debate (see Argue) supposes always a con- trariety of opinion; to deliberate (see Consult) supposes simply the weigh- ing or estimating the value of the opinion that is offered. Where many persons have the hberty of offering their opiaions, it is natural to expect that there will be debating; when any subject offers that is complicated and questionable, it calls for mature delib- eration. It is lamentable when pas- sion gets such an ascendancy in the mind of any one as to make him debate which course of conduct he shall pur- sue between virtue and vice; the want of deliberation, whether in private or pubhc transactions, is a more fruitful source of mischief than almost any other. DEBAUCH, Seduce, Pollute. These words all indicate the act of enticing or corrupting, or both. De- bau^h comes from French debaucher, to mar, seduce, mislead, probably of Teutonic origin. Seduce comes from Latin se, apart, and dvxxre, to lead, and means to lead astray, to entice into reprehensible action. Pollute comes from Old Latin por or pol, toward, and luere, to wash, referring to the overflowing of a river; hence it came to mean to defile — as the wash- ing over of the turbid flood destroys the cleanness and beauty of the shores. Debauch is the strongest of these three words and the most specific in its ap- phcation. It includes the idea of se- ducing or leading astray and of pol^ luting, and connotes unrestrained sen- sual indulgence. Debauch has always a moral application; pollute may have either a moral or physical application. Seduce suggests trickery and per- suasion in attaining an unhallowed end; debauch suggests violence and moral ruin. DEBILITATE. See Weaken. DEBILITY, Infirmity, Imbecilitt. Debility comes from Latin debilis, weak. Infirmity, in Latin infirmitas, from in^ firmus, or in, privative, and firmus, strong, signifies the absence of strength. Imbecility comes from Latin imbecUius, weak. AU these terms denote a species of weakness, but the former two, particu- larly the first, respect that which is either physical or mental. Debility is constitutional or otherwise; imbecility is always constitutional; infirmity is accidental, and results from sickness 234 DEBT or a decay of the frame. Debility may be either general or local; infirmity is always local; imbecility always general. Debility prevents the active perform- ance of the ordinary fmictions of natxire; it is a deficiency in the mus- cular power of the body: infirmity is a partial want of power which interferes with, but does not necessarily destroy, the activity: imbecility Ues in the whole frame, and renders it almost entirely powerless. Young people are fre- quently troubled with debilities in their ankles or legs, of which they are never cured. Old age is most exposed to infirmities; but there is no age at which hmnan beings are exempt from infirmity of some kmd or another. The imbecility natural to youth, both in body and mind, would make them will- ing to rest on the strength of their elders if they were not too often mis- led by a mischievous confidence in their own strength. DEBT, Due. Debt and dm, in French dii, are both derived from the Latin debere, to owe. Debt is used only as a substantive; dti£ either as a substantive or an adjective. As a substantive, debt is commonly appUed to that which is owing from the person spoken of; due is always applied to that which is owing to the person: to pay one's debts, and receive one's dite. So in the moral application to pay the debt of nature, that is, what is due or owing to nature; to give every man his due. DECAY, Decline, Consumption. Decay, in French dechoir, from the Latin decado, signifies hteraUy to fall off or away. Decline, from the Latin declino, or de, away, and clino, a root meaning to lean, signifies to turn away or lean aside. The direction ex- pressed by both these actions is very similar; it is a downward movement, but decay expresses more than decline. What is decayed is fallen or gone; what declines leads toward a fall, or is going; when apphed, therefore, to the same objects, a decline is properly the com- mencement of a decay. The health may experience a decline at any period of Ufe from a variety of causes, but it naturally experiences a decay in old age. Consumption, in general, imphes a rapid decay. By decay things lose their perfection, their greatness, and their consistency; by decline they lose their strength, their vigor, and their lustre; by consumption they lose their existence. Decay brings to ruin; decline leads to an end or expiration. There are some things to which decay is peculiar, and some things to which decline is pecuhar, and other things to which both decay and decline i^elong. The corruption to which material sub- stances are particularly exposed is termed decay: the close of fife, when health and strength begin to fall away, is termed the decline: the decay of states in the moral world takes place by the same process as the decay of fabrics in the natural world ; the decline of empires, from their state of eleva- tion and splendor, is a natural figure drawn from the decline of the setting Sim. Consumption is seldom applied to anything but animal bodies except figuratively. See also Degenerate; Perish. DECEASE. See Death. DECEIT, Deception. Deceit and deception are both associated with the verb deceive, from, decipere, to take away, and both imply the act of de- ceiving; with this difference, that the deceit is practised fr<"/m an expressly bad motive, but deception may be from either bad or indifferent motives. A person is therefore said to be guilty of deceit who has sought to deceive another for his own purposes; but deceptions may be practised in a diversity of ways, and from a diversity of motives. Deceit is always a personal act, and if there be an habitual propensity to deceiving, the deceit is then a char- acteristic of the person; a deceiver is full of deceit. Deception frequently de- notes the state of being deceived; it is the effect of any agency, whether from accident or from design. Deceit is ap- phed to cases where the understanding is intentionally deceived; but there may be a deception on the senses as well as on the understanding. Deceitful and deceptive are employed with this distinction: a person is said to be deceitful, and a thmg deceptive. See also Sophistry. Deceit, Duplicity, Double-dealing. — Deceit (see above). Duplicity signifies DECEIVE 235 dovbleness in dealing, the same as double-dealing. The former two may be applied either to habitual or par- ticular actions, the latter only to par- ticular actions. There may be much deceit or duplicity in a person's char- acter or in his proceedings; there is double-dealing only where dealing goes forward. The deceit may be more or less veiled; the duplicity lies very deep, and is always studied whenever it is put into practice. Duplicity, in reference to actions, is mostly employed for a course of conduct; double-dealing is but another term for duplicity on particular occasions. Children of re- served characters are frequently prone to deceit, which grows mto consum- mate duplicity in riper years: the wealthy are often exposed to much duplicity when they choose their fa- vorites among the low and ignorant. Deceit, Fraud, Guile. — Deceit is allied to fraud in reference to actions; to guile in reference to the character. Deceit is here, as in the preceding article, indeterminate when compared with fraud, which is a specific mode of deceiving; deceit is practised only in private transactions; fraud is practised toward bodies as well as individuals, in public as weU as private: a child practises deceit toward its parents; frauds are practised upon government, on the pubhc at large, or on tradesmen: deceit involves the violation of moral law, fraud that of the criminal law. A servant may deceive his master as to the time of his coming or going, but he defrauds him of his property if he obtains it by any false means. Deceit as a characteristic is indefinite in magnitude; guile marks a strong dep-ee of moral turpitude in the in- dividual. The former is displayed in petty concerns: the latter, which con- tammates the whole character, displays itself in inextricable windings and turn- ings that are suggested in a peculiar manner by the author of all evil. Deceitful is an epithet commonly and lightly applied to persons in general; but guileless is applied to characters which are the most diametrically op- j)Osed to, and at the greatest possible distance from, that which is false. See also Art. DECEITFUL. See Fallacious. DECEIVE, Delude, Impose Upon. Deceive, in French decevoir, Latin de~ dpere, compounded of de, privative, and capere, to take, signifies to take wrong. Delude, in Latin delude, compounded of de and ludere, signifies to play upon or to mislead by a trick. Impose comes from Latin in, on, and French poser, from Latin pausare. Falsehood is the leading feature in all these terms; they vary, however, in the circumstances of the action. To deceive is the most general of the three; it signifies simply to produce va fake conviction; the other terms are prop- erly species of deceiving, including ac- cessory ideas. Deception may be prac- tised in various degrees; deluding is al- ways something positive, and consider- able in degree. Every false impression produced by external objects, whether in trifles or important matters, is a deception; but deluMon is confined to errors in matters of opinion. We may be deceived in the color or the distance of an object: we are deluded in what regards our principles or moral con- duct. A deception does not always suppose a fault on the part of the person de- ceived, but a delvMon does. A person is sometimes deceived in cases where deception is ima voidable; he is deluded through a voluntary blindness of the understanding: artful people are some- times capable of deceiving so as not even to excite suspicion; their plaus- ible tales justify the credit that is given to them: when the ignorant en- ter into nice questions of politics or religion, it is their ordinary fate to be dehided. Deception is practised by an individ- ual on himself or others; a delusion is commonly practised on one's self; an imposition is always practised on another. Men deceive others from a variety of motives; they always irn- pose upon them for purposes of gain or the gratification of ambition. Men deceive themselves with false pretexts and false confidence; they delude them- selves with vain hopes and wishes. Deceiver, Impostor. — Between the words deceiver and impostor there is a similar distinction. A deceiver is any one who practises any sort of decep- tion; but an impostor is a deceiver wha 236 DECENCY studiously deceives by putting on a false appearance. The deceiver prac- tises deception on individuals or the public; the impostor most commonly on the pubUc at large. The false friend and the faithless lover are de- ceivers; the assumed nobleman who practises frauds under his disguise, and the pretended prince who lays claim to a crown to which he was never born, are impostors. DECENCY, Decorum. Though decency and decorum are both derived from the same word (see Becoming), they have acquired a distinction in their sense and application. Decency respects a man's conduct; decorum his behavior: a person conducts himself with decency: he behaves with de- corum. Indecency is a vice; it is the violation of public or private morals: indecorum is a fault; it offends the feelings of those who witness it. Nothing but a depraved mind can lead to indecent practices; indiscretion and thoughtlessness may sometimes give rise to that which is indecorous. Decency enjoins upon all relatives, according to the proximity of their relationship, to show certain marks of respect to the memory of the dead: regard for the feehngs of others enjoins a certain outward decorum upon every one who attends a funeral. DECENT. See Becoming. DECEPTION. See Deceit. DECIDE, Determine, Conclude. Decide, from the Latin decido, com- pounded of de, from, and ccedere, to cut, signifies to cut off or cut short a, business. For the derivation of de- termine see Arbitrate. Conclude (see Close). The idea of bringing a thing to an end is common in the signification of all these words; but to decide expresses more promptitude than to determine: we may decide instantaneously, but we must take more or less time to de- termine; we may decide any single point either by an act of external force or by a sudden act of the mind; but, in de- termining any question, its extent, limits, and every circumstance must be taken into consideration; deter- mining is therefore an act of delibera- tion. To decide is an act of greater authority: a parent decides for a child. but subordinates sometimes determine in the absence of their employers. Points of law are decided by the judge, points of fact are determined by the jury. To decide is therefore properly applied to all matters of dispute where more or less power or force is required to bring it to an end; to determine, to all matters of conduct which may more easily be brought to an end. To determine and decide are applied to practical matters; to conclude to speculative as well as practical mat- ters, as to decide the fate of persons, to determine anything that interests one, to conclude that a thing is right or wrong, just or unjust, and the like. In respect to practical matters, to determine is either said of that which is subordinate or it is a partial act of the mind; to conclude is said of the grand result; it is a complete act of the mind. Many things may be de- termined on which are either never put into execution or remain long unexe- cuted; but that which is concluded on is mostly followed by immediate ac- tion. To conclude is properly to come to a final determination. Decided, Determined, Resolute. — A man who is decided remains in no doubt: he who is determined is un- influenced by the doubts or questions of others: he who is resolute (see De- termined) is uninfluenced by the con- sequences of his actions. A decided character is at aU times essential for a prince or a minister, but particularly so in an unsettled period; a determined character is essential for a commander or any one who has to exercise au- thority; a resolute character is essen- tial for one who is engaged in danger- ous enterprises. Pericles was a man of a decided temper, which was well fitted to direct the affairs of govern- ment in a season of turbulence and dis- quietude: Titus Manlius Torquatua displayed himself to be a man of a determined character when he put to death his victorious son for a breach of military disciphne. Brutus, the murderer of Csesar, was a man of a resolute temjjer. Decided, Decisive. — Decided marks that which is actually decided: decisive, that which appertains to decision. DECLARE 237 Decided is employed for persons or things; decisive only for things. A person's aversion or attachment is de- cided; a sentence, a judgment, or a victory is decisive. A man of a decided character always adopts decisive meas- ures. It is right to be decidedly averse to everything which is immoral: we should be cautious not to pronounce decisively on any point where we are not perfectly clear and well grounded in our opinion. In every popular com- motion it is the duty of a good subject to take a decided part in favor of law and order: such is the nature of law that if it were not decisive it would be of no value. Decision, Jitdgment, Sentence. — De- cision signifies literally the act of de- ciding, or the thing decided upon. Judgment signifies the act of judging or determining in general. Sentence, in Latin senteniia, from sentire, to think, signifies the opinion held or main- tained. These terms, though very different in their original meaning, are now em- ployed so that the two latter are species of the former: a final conclusion of any business is comprehended in them all; but decision conveys none of the collateral ideas which are expressed by judgment and sentence: a decision has no respect to the agent; it may be said of one or many; it may be the decision of the court, of the nation, of the pub- lic, of a particular body of men, or of a private individual; but a judgment is given in a public court or among private individuals: a sentence is passed in a court of law or at the bar of the public. A decision specifies none of the circumstances of the action: it may be a legal or an arbitrary decision; it may be a decision according to one's caprice or after mature deliberation: a judgment is always passed either in a court of law, and consequently by vir- tue of authority, or it is passed by an individual by the authority of his own judgment: a sentence is passed either by the authority of law or at the dis- cretion of an individual or of the pubUc. A decision is given; it is that which decides, and, by putting an end to all dispute and doubt, enables a person to act. A judament is formed; it re- spects the guilt or innocence, the moral excellence or defects, of a person or thing; it enables a person to think. A sentence is pronounced or passed; it respects all matters generallj^, and de- termines what are the sentiments of those by whom it is pronounced. Some points are of so complicated a nature that no decision can be given uf>on them ; some are of so high a nature that they can be decided only by the highest authority; men are forbidden by the Christian reUgion to be severe in their judgments upon one another; the works of an author must sometimes await the sentence of impartial posterity before their value can be duly appreciated. DECISIVE. See Conclusive; De- cided. DECLAIM, Inveigh. Declaim, in Latin declamo, that is, de and clamo, signifies Uterallv to cry aloud in a set form of words. Inveigh (see AjBtrsE; Invective). The sense in which these words agree is that of using the language of dis- pleasure against any person or thing: declaim is used generally, inveigh par- ticularly: public men and pubUc meas- ures are subjects for the declaimer; private individuals afford subjects for inveighing against: the former is under the influence of particular opinions or prejudices; the latter is the fruit of personal resentment or displeasure: pohticians declaim against the conduct of those in power or the state of the nation; they inveigh against individuals who have offended them, A declaimer is noisy; he is a man of words; he makes long and loud speeches: an inveigher is virulent and personal; he enters into private details, and often indulges his malignant feelings under an affected regard for morahty. DECLARE, Publish, Proclaim. Declare, in Latin declaro^ comjxiunded of de and clams, clear, signifies literal- ly to make clear or show plainly to a person. Publish (see Announce). Pro- claim, in Latin ■proclamo, compounded of T^o and clamo, signifies to cry before or m the ears of others. The idea of making known is com- mon to all these terms: this is simply the signification of declare, but the other two include accessory ideas. The word declare does not express any 238 DECLINE particulax mode or circumstance of making known, as is implied by the others: we may declare pubhcly or privately: we publish and proclaim only in a public manner: we may declare by word of mouth or by writing; we publish or proclaim by any means that will render the thing most generally known. In declaring, the leading idea is that of speaking out that which passes in the mind; in publishing, the leading idea is that of making public or conamon; in proclaiming, the lead- ing idea is that of crying aloud; we may, therefore, often declare by pub- lishing and proclaiming: a declaration is a personal act; it concerns the person declaring, or him to whom it is declared; its truth or falsehood depends upon the veracity of the speaker: a publication is of general interest; the truth or falsehood of it does not always rest with the publisher: a proclamation is altogether a public act, in which no one's veracity is implicated. Facts and opinions are declared; events and circimastances are published; the meas- vu"es of government are proclaimed: it is folly for a man to declare anything to be true which he is not certain to be so, and wickedness in him to declare that to be true which he knows to be false: whoever publishes all he hears will be in great danger of publishing many falsehoods; whatever is pro- claimed is supposed to be of sufficient importance to deserve the notice of all who may hear or read. A declaraiion is always a personal act, whether relating to public or pri- vate matters: a publication and a proc- lamation may be both indirect actions made by any channel the fittest to make a wide communication. In cases of war or peace, princes are expected to declare themselves on one side or the other; in the political world intelligence is quickly published through the medi- imi of the pubUc papers; in private life domestic occurrences are published with equal celerity through the medi- vaa of tale-bearers; proclaiming is not confined to political matters: whatever is made known after the manner of a proclamation is said to be proclaimed: joyful news is proclaimed, and where Erivate matters which ought not to be nown are published to the world peo- ple are said to proclaim their own shame. See also Discover; Express; Pro- fess. DECLINE. See Decay; Degener- ate; Refuse. DECORATE. See Adorn; Gar- nish. DECORATED, See Ornate. DECORUM. See Decency; Eti- quette. DECOY. See Allure; Tweedle. DECREASE. See Abate. DECREE, Edict, Proclamation. Decree, in French decret, Latin decretus, from decemere, to give judgment or pass sentence, signifies the sentence or reso- lution that is passed. Edict, in Latin edidus, from edico, to say out, signifies the thing spoken out or sent forth. Proclamation (see Declare). A decree is a more solemn and delib- erative act than an edict; on the other hand, an edict is more authoritative than a decree. A decree is the decision of one or many; an edict speaks the will of an individual: councils and senates, as well as princes, make de- crees; despotic rulers issue edicts. De- crees are passed for the regulation of public and private matters; they are made known as occasion requires, but are not always pubhc; edicts and proc- lamations contain the commands of the sovereign authority, and are direct- ly addressed by the prince to his peo- ple. An edict is peculiar to a despotic government; a proclamation is com- mon to a monarchical and aristocratic form of government: the ukase in Russia was a species of edict, by which the emperor made known his will to his people; the king of England com- municates to his subjects the deter- minations of himself and his council by means of a proclamation. The term decree is appUed figurative- ly; the other terms are used, for the most part, in their proper sense only. See also Ordinance. DECRY. See Disparage. DEDICATE, Devote, Consecrate, Hallow. Dedicate, in Latin dedicatus, participle from de and dicare, signifies to set apart by a promise. Devote, in Latin d^votu^, participle from devoveo, signifies to vow for an express purpose. Consecrate, in Latin consecratus, from DEED 239 consecro, or con and sacrare, signifies to make sacred by a special act. Hallow, from Anglo-Saxon halig, holy, signifies to make holy. There is something more solemn in the act of dedicating than in that of devoting; but less so than in that of consecrating. To dedicate and devote may be employed in both temporal and spiritual matters; to consecrate and hallow only in the spiritual sense: we may dedicate or devote anything that is at our disposal to the service of some object; but the former is employed mostly in regard to superiors, and the latter to persons without distinction of rank: we dedicate a house to the ser- vice of Grod; or we devote our time to the benefit of our friends or the rehef of the poor: we may dedicate or devote ourselves to an object; but the former always imphes a solemn setting apart springing from a sense of duty; the latter an entire application of one's self from zeal and affection; in this manner he who dedicates himself to God abstracts himself from every ob- ject which is not immediately connected with the service of God; he who de- votes himself to the ministry pursues it as the first object of his attention and regard. To consecrate is a species of formal dedication by virtue of a re- hgious observance; it is apphcable mostly to places and things connected with rehgious works: hallow is a species of informal consecration apphed to the same objects: the church is consecrated; particular days are hallowed. DEDUCE. See Derive. DEDUCT, Subtract. Deduct, from the Latin dedudus, participle of de- ducere, to lead away, and subtract, from subtractum, participle of svbtrahere, to draw away, have both the sense of taking from, but the former is used in a general, and the latter in a techni- cal sense. He who makes an estimate is obUged to deduct; he who makes a calculation is obUgeid to subtract. The tradesman deducts what has been paid from what remains due; the account- ant subtracts small sums from the gross amount. Deduction, Abatement. — Both these words imply a taking off from some- thing, but the deduction is made at the discretion of the person deducting; while the abatement is made for the convenience or at the desire of the person for whom it is made. A person may make a deduction in an account for various reasons, but he makes an abcUement in a demand when it is objected to as excessive; so an abate- ment may be made in a calculation when it is supposed to be higher than it ought to be. See also Conclusion. DEED, Exploit, Achievement, Feat. Deed, allied to do, expresses the thing done. Exploit, in French exploit, was most probably changed from expli- catus, signifying the thing unfolded or displayed. Achievement comes from French d chef, to a head, meaning something brought to a head or fin- ished. Feat, in French fait, Latin factum, from facio, signifies the thing done. The first three words rise progres- sively on one another: deeds, compared with the others, is employed for that which is ordinary or extraordinary; ex- ploit and achievement are used only for the extraordinary; the latter in a high- , er sense than the former. Deeds must ' always be characterized as good or bad, magnanimous or atrocious, and the like, except in poetry, when the term becomes elevated. Exploit and achievement do not neces- sarily require such epithets; they are always taken in the proper sense for something great. Exploit, when com- pared with achievement, is a term used in plain prose; it designates not so much what is great 'as what is real: achievement is most adapted to f>oetry and romance; an exploit is properly a single act, and refers to the efforts of the individual performing it ; an achieve- ment may involve many acts and cir- cumstances; in the execution it refers us to the point gained, as also to the difficulties of gaining it. An exploit marks only personal bravery in action: an achievement denotes elevation of character in every respect, grandeur of design, promptitude in execution, and valor in action. An exploit may be executed by the design and at the will of another; a common soldier or an army may perform exploits. An achievement is designed and executed by the achiever: Hercules is distin- 240 DEEM guished for his achievements; and in the same manner we speak of the achievements of knights-errant or of great commanders. Feat approaches nearest to exploit in signification; the former marks skill, and the latter resolution. The feats of chivalry displayed in jousts and tourna- ments were in former times as much esteemed as warlike exploits. Exploit and feat are often used in de- rision, to mark the absence of skill or bravery in the actions of individuals. The soldier who affects to be foremost in situations where there is no danger cannot be more properly derided than by terming his action an exploit; he who prides himself on the display of skill in the performance of a paltry trick may be laughed at for having performed a feat. The same words may also be applied in an indiffer- ent sense to famihar objects, as the exploits of a freebooter, or feats of horsemanship. See also Act. DEEM. See Think. DEFACE, Disfigure, Deform. Deface, disfigure, and deform signify hterally to spoil the face, figure, and form. Deface expresses more than either deform or disfigure. To deface is an act of destruction; it is the actual destruction of that which has before existed: to disfigure is either an act of destruction or an erroneous execution, which takes away the figure : to d'^form is altogether an imperfect execution, which renders the form what it should not be. A thing is defaced by design; it is disfigured either by design or acci- dent; it is deformed either by an error or by the nature of the thing. Persons only deface; persons or things disfigure; things are most commonly deformed of themselves. That may be defaced, the face or external surface of which may be injured or destroyed; that may be disfigured or deformed, the figure or form of which is imperfect or may be rendered imperfect. A fine painting or piece of writing is defaced which is torn or besmeared with dirt: a fine building is disfigured by any want of S3anmetry in its parts: a building is deformed that is made contrary to all form. A statue may be defaced, dis- figured, and deformed: it is defaced when any violence is done to the face or any outward part of the body; it is dis- figured by the loss of a limb; it is de- formed if made contrary to the perfect form of the person or thing to be repre- sented. Inanimate objects are mostly defaced or disfigured, but seldom de- formed; animate objects are either dis- figured or deformed, but seldomer de- faced. A person may disfigure himself by his dress; he is deformed by the hand of nature. DEFAME. See Asperse. DEFEAT, Foil, Disappoint, Frus- trate. Z)e/ea/ (see Beat). Foil comes from Late Latin fullare, to full cloth, a method of cleaning. It originally meant to trample on, then to defeat by less obvious physical action. Frus- trate, in Latin frustratus, from frustra, vain, signifies to make vain. Disap- point, from the privative dis and the verb appoint, signifies literally to do away with what has been appointed. Defeat and foil are both applied to matters of enterprise; but that may be defeated which is only planned, and that is foiled which is in the act of oeing executed. What is rejected is defeated: what is aimed at or purposed is frus- trated: what is calculated on is disap- pointed. The best concerted schemes may sometimes be easily defeated: where art is employed against sim- plicity, the latter may be easily foiled: when we aim at what is above our reach, we must be frustrated in our en- deavors: when our expectations are ex- travagant, it seems t6 follow, of course, that they will be disappointed. Design or accident may tend to defeat, design only to foil, accident only to frustrate or disappoint. The superior force of the enemy, or a combination of un- toward events which are above the control of the commander, will serve to defeat the best concerted plans of the best generals: men of upright minds can seldom foil the deep-laid schemes of knaves: when we see the perver- sity of men is Uable to frustrate the kind intentions of others in their be- half, it is wiser to leave them to their folly: the cross accidents of human fife are a fruitful source of disappointment to those who suffer themselves to be affected by them. See also Baffle. DEFEND 241 DEFECT. See Blemish; Imper- fection. DEFECTION, Revolt. Defection, from the Latin de, negative, and facere, to do, signifies literally an undoing. Revolt comes from French re and the verb volvere, to roU, meaning to roll back, to overturn, to turn against. Defection is a general, revolt a specific term, that is, it denotes a species of defection. Defection is applicable to any person or thing to which we are bound by any obhgation; revolt is ap- plicable only to the government to which one is bound. There may be a defection from reUgion, or any cause that is held sacred: a revolt is only against a monarch or the supreme authority. Defection does not designate the mode of the action; it may be quietly made or otherwise: a revolt is an act of violence, and always attended with violence. The defection may be the act of one; a revolt is properly the act of many. A general may be guilty of a defection who leaves the party to which he has hitherto adhered; a nation or a community may commit an act of revolt by shaking off the au- thority under which they have hved. A defection, being mostly the act of an individual, or one part of a community against the whole, is mostly a culpa- ble act; but a revolt may be a justifi- able measure when one nation revolts against another, imder whose power it has been brought by force of arms: the Roman people were guilty of a defection when they left the senate and retired to Mount Aventine; the Ger- mans frequently attempted to recover their hberty by revolting against the Romans. DEFECTIVE, Deficient. Defec- tive expresses the quality or property of having a defect (see Blemish) ; deficient is employed with regard to the thing itself that is wanting. A book may be defective in consequence of some leaves being deficient; a child may de defective because of some mental de- ficiency. A deficiency is therefore often what constitutes a defect. Many things, however, may be defective without hav- ing any deficiency, and vice versd. Whatever is misshapen, and fails either in beauty or utiUty, is defective; that which is wanted to make a thing com- plete is deficient. It is a defect in the eye when it is so constructed that things are not seen at their proper dis- tances; there is a deficiency in a trades- man's accounts when one side falls short of the other. That which is de- fective is most likely to be permanent: but a deficiency may be only occasional and easily rectified. DEFEND, Protect, Vindicate. Defend (see Apologize). Protect, in Latin protectum, participle of protegeref compounded of pro, before, and tegere, to cover, signifies to put anything be- fore a person as a covering. Vindicate (see Assert). Defend is a general term; it defines nothing with regard to the degree and manner of the action: protect is a par- ticular and positive term, expressing an action of some considerable im- portance. Persons may defend others without distinction of rank or station: none but superiors or persons having power can protect others. Defence is an occasional action; protection is a permanent action. A person may be defended in any particular case of actual danger or difficulty; he is protected from what may happen as well as what does happen. Defence respects the evil that threatens; protection involves the supply of necessities and the af- fording comforts. Defence requires some active exer- tion either of body or mind; protection may consist only of the extension of power in behalf of any particular in- dividual. A defence is successful or unsuccessful; a protection, weak or strong. A soldier defends his country; a counsellor defends his chent; a prince protects his suDJects. In a figurative and extended sense things may either defend or protect with a similar distinction: a coat de- fends us from the inclemencies of the weather; houses are a protection not only against the changes of the seasons, but al»o against the violence of men. To vindicate is a species of defence only in the moral sense of the word. Acts of importance are defended: those of trifling import are commonly vin- dicated. Cicero defended Milo against the charge of muraer, in which he was impUcat^ by the death of Clodius; a 242 DEFER child or a servant vindicates himself when any blame is attached to him. Defence is employed either in matters of opinion or conduct; vindicate only in matters of conduct. Some opinions are too absurd to be openly defended; he who vindicates the conduct of an- other should be fully satisfied of the in- nocence of the person whom he defends. See also Espouse; Garnish; Guard. Defendant, Defender. — The defend- ant defends himself; the defender de- fends another. We are defendants when any charge is brought against us which we wish to refute: we are defenders when we undertake to rebut or refute the charge brought against any person or thing. Defender, Advocate, Pleader. — ^A de- fender exerts himself in favor of one who wants support: an advocate, from the Latin ad, to, and vocare, to call, signifies one who is called to speak in favor of another; he exerts himself in favor of any cause that offers: a 'pleader, from -plea or excuse, signifies him who pleads in behalf of one who is accused or in distress. A defender attempts to keep off a threatened in- jury by rebutting the attack of an- other: an advocate states that which is to the advantage of the person or thing advocated; a pleader throws in pleas and extenuations; he blends en- treaty with argument. Oppressed or accused persons and disputed opinions require defenders; that which falls in with the humors of men will always have advocates; the unfortunate and the guilty require pleaders. An official, known as the public de- fender, has been appointed recently in a number of cities in the United States, to defend in courts persons unable to pay lawyers' fees. The term pleader is used sometimes like that of defender, in the general sense. Valeria and Volumnia, the mother and wife of Coriolanus, were Eowerful and successful pleaders in be- alf of the Roman repubhc. Defensible, Defensive. — Defensible is employed for the thing that is to be defended; defensive, for the thing that defends. An opinion or a line of con- duct is defensible; a weapon or a mili- tary operation is defensive. The de- fensible is opposed to the indefensible; and the defensive to the offensive. It is the height of folly to attempt to defend that which is indefensible; it is some- times prudent to act on the defensive when we are not in a condition to commence the offensive. DEFER. See Delay. DEFERENCE. See Complai- sance. DEFICIENT. See Defective; Fail. DEFILE. See Contaminate. DEFINITE, Positive. Definite, in Latin definitum, participle of definire, compounded of de and finis, signifies that which is bounded by a fine or limit. Positive, in Latin positivus, from ponere, to place, signifies that which is placed or fixed. Definite signifies that which is de- fined, or has the limits drawn or marked out; positive that which is placed or fixed in a particular manner: definite is said of things as they pre- sent themselves or are presented to the mind, as a definite idea, a definite pro- posal; positive is said of a person's temper of mind; a person is positive as to his opinions, or an assurance is positive which serves to make one posi- tive. In respect to a man's self, his views ought to be definite to prevent him from being misled, but he ought not to be positive in matters that admit of doubt. In respect to others, the more definite the instructions which are given the less danger there is of mistake; the more positive the infor- mation communicated the greater the rehance which is placed upon it. DEFINITION, Explanation. A definition is properly a species of ex- planation. The former is used scientif- ically, the latter on ordinary occasions; the former is confined to words, the latter is employed for words or things. A definition is correct or precise; an explanation is general or ample. The definition of a word defines or limits the extent of its signification; it is the rule for the scholar in the use of any word: the explanation of a word may include both definition and illustra- tion: the former admits of no more words than will include the leading features in the meaning of any term; the latter admits of an unlimited scope for diffuseness on the part of the ex- plainer. DELAY 248 DEFLECT, Bend, Diverge, Swerve. Deflect is the Latin term; bend, the Anglo-Saxon word. Bend, Anglo-Saxon hendan, allied to hand, bind, etc., means to curve as a bow is curved when the string is fastened. Deflect, from de, from, and fl^ctere^ to bend, means to bend from the straight course, especially to turn to one side. Diverge, from Latin dis, apart, and vergere, to bend, is the intransitive corresponding to the transitive deflect. We deflect another's course; we diverge from that which we have marked out for oiuselves. Bend is a more general word than deflect or diverge. It indi- cates the physical act of bending, and suggests any kind of departure from the condition of straightness. Deflect suggests a turning from a straight line contrary to all apparent intention or purpose. Swerve, Anglo-Saxon sweorfan, suggests a very sudden turning, a jerky and impremeditated movement, em- phasizing the idea of action contrary to apparent pm-pose, barely suggested in deflect. All these words may be iised either with the physical or with a moral appUcation. DEFORM. See Deface. DEFORMED. See Wry. DEFRAUD. See Cheat. DEFY. See Brave. DEGENERATE, Deteriorate. Degenerate signifies to fall from race or kind, to lose ancestral quality, from Latin degenerare, compounded of de, from, and the stem of gemis, race. Deteriorate comes from Latin deteriorare, to grow worse, from the comparative of an obsolete adjective connected with de, down. Both these words mean to grow worse, but de- generate adds to the idea contained in deteriorate a definite indication that the deterioration is a departure from the standard of the individual's race or natural endowment. It is there- fore more specific in its impUcations. DEGRADE. See Abase; Dis- parage; Humble. DEGREE. See Class. DEITY, Divinity. Deity, from deus, a god, signifies a divine person. Divin- ity, from divinus, signifies the divine essence or jx)wer; the deities of the heathens had httle of divinity in them; the divinity of our Saviour is a fundamental article in the Christian faith. DEJECTION, Depression, Mel- ancholy. Dejection, from dejicere, to cast down, and depression, from de- vrimere, to press or sink down, have both regard to the state of the animal spirits. Melancholy, from the Greek /itXayxoXta, black bile, originally re- ferred to the state of the humors in general, or of the particular humor called the bile. Dejection and depression are occasion- al, and depend on outward circum- stances; melancholy is permanent, and hes in the constitution. Depression is but a degree of dejection: shght cir- cumstances may occasion a depression; distressing events occasion a dejection: the death of a near and dear relative may be expected to produce dejection in persons of the greatest equanimity; Uvely tempers are most liable to «W5- pressions; melancholy is a disease which nothing but clear views of religion can possibly correct. DELAY, Defer, Postpone, Pro- crastinate, Prolong, Protract, Re- tard. Delay, compounded of de and lay, signifies to lay or keep back. Defer, compounded of de and ferre, to brmg, signifies to put off. Postpone, com- pounded of post and the Latin ponere, to place, signifies to' place behind or after. Procrastinate, from pro, for, and eras, to-morrow, signifies to put off until to-morrow. Prolong signifies to lengthen out the time, and protract to draw out the time. Retard, from re, intensive, and tardum, slow, to make a thing go slowly. To delay is simply not to commence action; to defer and postpone are to fix its commencement at a more distant period: we may delay a thing for days, nourSj and minutes; we defer or post- pone it for months or weeks. Delays mostly arise from the fault of the per- son delaying; they are seldom reason- able or advantageous: deferring and postponing are discretionary acts, which are justified by the circumstances; indolent people are most prone to delay; when a plan is not maturely digested, it is prudent to defer its exe- cution xmtil everything is in an entire state of preparation. Procrastination is a culpaole delay arising solely from 244 DELEGATE the fault of the procrastinator: it is the part of a dilatory man to pro- crastinate that which it is both his in- terest and duty to perform. We delay the execution of a thing; we prolong or protract the continuation of a thing; we retard the termination of a thing: we may rfeZay answering a letter, prolong a contest, protract a lawsuit, and retard a publication. Delay, Laches, Moratorium. — Laches and moratorium are two special ap- phcations of the idea of delay. They are not synonymous with each other at all, but they are connected through the general idea expressed in the key -word. Laches is a legal term (from Latin laxus, loose), signifying inexcusable delay in meeting the terms of a contract, or taking up and pay- ing a promissory note. Moratorium, on the other hand, signifies a delay panted by a government, corpora- tion, or other large body to persons to delay making payment of their obhgations beyond the time of their maturity. DELEGATE, Depute; Delegate, Deputy. Delegate, in Latin delegatus, from delegare, signifies to send on a mis- sion; depute comes from depuiare, to assign a business to. To delegate is ap- phed to the power or office which is given; depute to the person employed. Parents delegate their office to the in- structor; persons are deputed to act for others. As nouns, delegate and deputy are ap- phed only to persons. The delegate is the person commissioned, who is bound to act according to his commission; the depviy is the person depuied, who acts in the place of another, but may act according to his own discretion or otherwise, as circumstances require. A delegate is mostly chosen in pubhc matters and on particular occasions: as delegates sent from a besieged town to the camp of the besiegers; deputies are those who are deputed to act officially and regularly for others, as deputies sent to any pubhc assembly. DELIBERATE. See Consent; Debate; Thoughtful. DELICACY. See Dainty. DELICATE. See Fine. DELIGHT. See Pleasure. DELIGHTFUL, Charming. De- lightful is apphed either to material or spiritual objects; charming, mostly to objects of sense. When they both de- note the pleasure of the sense, delight- ful is not so strong an expression aa charming: but the latter rises to a degree that carries the senses away captive. Of music we should rather say that it was charming than delightful, as it acts on the senses in so powerful a manner; on the other hand, we should with more propriety speak of a delightful employment to relieve dis- tress, or a delightful spectacle to see a family hving together in love and har- mony. DELINEATE, Sketch. Delineate, in Latin delineatiis, participle of de- lineare, from de, down, and linea, line, means hteraUy to put down fines on paper. Sketch, Dutch and Itafian schizzo, a first rough draft, comes from Latin schedium, a thing made hastily, from Greek axiSioc, hastily. Both these terms are properly em- ployed in the art of drawing, and figu- ratively apphed to moral subjects to express a species of descriptions: a delineation expresses something more than a sketch; the former conveying not merely the general outlines or more prominent features, but also as much of the details as would serve to form a whole; the latter, however, seldom contains more than some broaa touches by which an imperfect idea of the sub- ject is conveyed. A delineation, there- fore, may be characterized as accurate, and a sketch as hasty or imperfect: an attentive observer who has passed some years in a country may be en- abled to give an accurate delineaiion of the laws, customs, manners, and character of its inhabitants; a traveller who merely passes through can give only a hasty sketch from what passes before his eyes. DELINQUENT. See Offender. DELIVER, Rescue, Save. Deliver, in French delivrer, from the Latin de, and liberare, from liber, free, signifies to make free. Rescue comes from Late Latin rescuiere, from re, again, and excutere, to drive. Save signifies hteral- ly to make safe, from Latin salvu^, safe. The idea of taking or keeping from any evil is common to these terms; but DEMOLISH 245 to deliver and rescue signify most prop- erly to take, and save to keep from evil. To deliver is a general term, not defin- ing either the mode or object of the action. One may be delivered from any evil, whether great or small, and in any manner: to rescue is to deliver from a great impending danger or immediate evil; as to rescue from the hands of rob- bers or from the jaws of a wild beast. One is delivered mostly by some ac- tive effort; but we may be saved either by active or passive means. A person is delivered from the hands of an enemy by force or stratagem: he saves his life by flying. See also Fill; Give Up. Deliverance, Delivery. — Both words are drawn from the same verb (see above) to express its different senses ^of taking from or giving to: the former denotes the taking something from one's self; the latter implies giving something to another. To wish for a deliverance from that which is hurtful or painful is to a certain extent jus- tifiable: the careful delivery of prop- erty into the hands of the owner will be the first object of concern with a faithful agent. See also Salvation. DELUDE. See Deceive. DELUGE. See Overflow. DELUSION, Illusion. Both these words, being derived from the Latin ludere, to play, are applied to such matters as act upon the imagination; but delude, by the force of the preposi- tion de, signifies to carry away from the right line, to cause to deviate into error; while illude, from the preposition il, im, in or upon, signifies simply to act on the imagination. The former is therefore taken in a bad sense, but the latter in an indifferent sense. A deranged person falls into different kinds of delusions: as when he fancies himself poor while he is very rich, or that every one who comes in his way is looking at him, or having evil de- signs against him, and the like; but there may be optical iUuMons, when an object is made to appear brighter or larger than it really is. See also Fallacy; Hallucination. DEMAND, Require. Demand (see Ask). Require, in Latin requiro, com- pounded of re, again, and qucerere, to seek, signifies to seek for or to seek to get back. We demand that which is owing and ought to be given; we require that which we wish and expect to have done. A demand is more positive than a requisition; the former prop>erly ad- mits of no question; the latter is Uable to be both questioned and refused: the creditor makes a demand on the debtor; the master requires a certain portion of duty from his servant: it is unjust to demand of a person what he has no right to give; it is unreasonable to re- quire of him what it is not in his power to do. A thing is commonly demanded in express words; it is required by im- phcation : a person demands admittance when it is not voluntarily granted; he requires respectful deportment from those who are subordinate to him. In the figurative appUcation the same sense is preserved: things of urgency and moment demand immediate atten- tion; difficult matters require a steady attention. See also Ask. DEMEANOR. See Behavioe. DEMISE. See Death. DEMOLISH, Raze, Dismantle, Destroy. The throwing down what has been built up is the common idea included in all these terms. Demolish, from the Latin demolior, and mole&, a mass or structure, signifies to decom- pound what has been fabricated into a mass. Raze, like erase (see Blot), signifies the making smooth or even with the ground. Dismantle, in French dimanteler, signifies to deprive a thing of its mantle or guard. Destroy, from the Latin destruo, compounded of the privative de and struo, to build, sig- nifies properly to pull down. A fabric ia'demolished h^ scattering all its component parts; it is mostly an unlicensed act of caprice; it is razed by way of punishment, as a mark of public vengeance; a fortress is dis- mantled from motives of prudence, in order to render it defenceless; places are destroyed by various means and from various motives, that they may not exist any longer. Individuals may demolish; public authority causes an edifice to he razed with the ground; a general orders towers to be dismantled and fortifications to be destroyed. 246 DEMON DEMON. See Devil. DEMONSTRATE. See Prove. DEMONSTRATIVE. See Cate- gorical. DEMUR, Hesitate, Pause. De- mur, in French demeurer, Latin de- morari, signifies to keep back. Hesi- tate, in Latin hcesitatum, participle of hoRsito, a frequentative from haereo, sig- nifies to stick or remain a long time back. Paiise, in Latin pausa, from the Greek Traww, cease, signifies to make a stand. The idea of stopping is common to these terms, to which signification is added some distinct collateral idea for each: we demur from doubt or difficul- ty; we hesitate from an undecided state of mind; we pause from circvma- stances. Demurring is a matter of prudence, it is always grounded on some reason; hesitating is rather a matter of feeling and is oftener faulty than otherwise: when a proposition appears to be unjust, we demur in sup- ptorting it, on the ground of its injus- tice; when a request of a dubious nature is made to us, we hesitate in complying with it : prudent people are most apt to demur; but people of a wavering temper are apt to hesitate: demurring may be often unnecessary, but it is seldom injurious; hesitating is mostly injurious when it is not neces- sary. Demurring and hesitating are both employed as acts of the mind; pau^ng is an external action: we demur and hesitate in determining; we pause in speaking or doing anything. Demur, Doubt, Hesitation, Objection. — Demur (see above). Doubt, in Latin dubito, from dux), two, and itu^, past participle of ire, to go, signifies to go two ways. Hesitation ^(see above). Objection, from objicio, or ob, in the way, and jacere, to throw, to throw in the way, signifies what is thrown in the way so as to stop our progress. Demurs often occur in matters of dehberation; doubt in regard to mat- ters of fact; hesitation in matters of ordinary conduct; and objections in matters of common consideration. Ar- tabanes made many demurs to the pro- posed invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Doubts have been suggested respect- ing the veracity of Herodotus as a his- torian. It is not proper to ask that which can- not be granted without hesitation; and it is not the part of an amiable disposi- tion to make a hesitation in complying with a reasonable request. There are but few things which we either attempt to do or recommend to others that are not liable to some kind of an objection. A demur stops the adjustment of any plan or the determination of any ques- tion. A doubt interrupts the progress of the mind in coming to a state of satisfaction and certainty. The last two words are both applied to abstract questions, or such as are of general interest. Hesitation and objec- tion are more individual and private in their nature. Hesitation hes mostly in the state of the will; objection is rather the offspring of the understanding. A hesitation interferes with the action; an objection affects the measure or the mode of action. DENOMINATION. See Name. DENOTE, Signify. Denote, in Latin denoto or noto, from notum, par- ticiple of nosco, signifies to cause to know. Signify, from the Latin signum, a sign, a,nd facere, to make, is to become or be made a sign or guide for the un- derstanding. Denote is employed with regard to things and their characters; signify, with regard to the thoughts or move- ments. A letter or character may be made to denote any number, as words are made to signify the intentions and wishes of the person. Among the an- cient Egyptians hieroglyphics were very much employed to denote certain moral qualities; in many cases looks or ac- tions will signify more than words. De- vices and emblems of different descrip- tions, drawn either from fabulous his- tory or the natural world, are Kkewise now employed to denote particular cir- cumstances or quahties: the cornu- copia dendtes plenty; the beehive de- notes industry; the dove denotes meek- ness, and the lamb gentleness: he who wiU not take the trouble to signify his wishes otherwise than by nods or signs must expect to be frequently misun- derstood. DENOUNCE. See Ban; Excom- municate; Proscribe. DEPONENT 247 DENSE. See Thick. DENTICULATED. See Jagged. DENY, Refuse. Deny, in Latin de, from, and negare, to say no, from ne, not, signifies to cay no to a thing. Reftise, in Latin refusics, from re and fundere, to poiu* or cast, signifies to throw off from one. To deny respects matters of fact or knowledge; to refuse, matters of wish or request. We deny what immediately relates to ourselves; we refuse what re- lates to another. We dmy as to the past; we refuse as to the future: we deny om* participation in that which has been; we refuse our participation in that which may be: to deny must al- ways be expressly verbal; a refusal may sometimes be signified by actions or looks as well as words. A denial affects our veracity; a refusal affects our good-natiu*e. But to deny signifies in this case sim- ply to withhold; and refuse signifies to cast off from one, which is a more posi- tive act: to deny one's self a pleasiu-e is simply to abstain from it; but to refuse' one s food is to cast it from one with a positive indisposition. What is denied may be denied by circumstances or by Providence; and it may be denied to one, many, or all; but what is refused is refused by and to particular individ- uals. See also Contradict; Disavow. DEPART. See Go. DEPARTED, See Bygone. DEPARTURE. See Death; Exit. DEPENDENCE, Reliance. De- pendence, from depend, from Latin de, from, and pendere, to hang, signifies, literally, to rest one's weight by hang- ing from that which is held. Rely, compounded of re and lie, signifies like- wise to rest one's weight by lying or hanging back from the object held. Dependence is the general term; reli- ance is a species of dependence: we de- pend either on persons or things; we rely on persons only: dependence serves for that which is immediate or remote; reliance serves for the future only. We depend upon a person for that which we are obliged to receive or led to expect from him: we rely upon a person for that which he has given us reason to expect from him. Dependence is an outward condition or the state of ex- ternal circumstances; reliance is a state of the feehngs with regard to others. We depend upon God for all that we have or shall have; we rely upon the word of man for that which he has promised to perform. We may depend up>on a person's coming from a variety of causes; but we rely upon it only in reference to his avowed in- tention. DEPICT. See Paint. DEPLORE, Lament. Deplore comes from Latin deplorare, from de, intensive, and plorare, to weep. Lament, see Bewail. Deplore is a much stronger expres- sion than lament; the former caUs forth tears from the bitterness of the heart; the latter excites a cry from the warmth of feehng. Deploring indicates de- spair; to lament marks only pain or distress. Among the poor we have deplorable instances of pnjverty, igno- rance, vice, and wretchedness com- bined; among the higher classes we have often lamenthble instances of extrava- gance and consequent ruin. A field of battle or a city overthrown by an earth- quake is a spectacle truly deplorable: it is lamentable to see beggars putting on all the disguises of wretchedness in or- der to obtain by deceit what they might earn by honest industry. The condi- tion of a dying man suffering under the agonies of an awakened conscience is deplorable; the situation of the relative or friend' who witnesses the agony, without being able to afford consola- tion to the sufferer, is truly lamentable. See also Wail. DEPONENT, Evidence, Witness. Deponent, from deponere, to lay down or set forth, signifies he who declares or substantiates anything. The evidence, from evident, is that which makes evi- dent; and the witness, from the Anglo- Saxon witan, to know, signifies he who makes known. All these words are properly appUed to judicial proceedings, where the de- ponent deposes generally to facts either in causes or otherwise: the evidence con- sists either of persons or things, which are brought before the court for the purpose of making a doubtful matter clear; the witness is always a person who bears witness to any fact for or against another. 248 DEPORTMENT Evidence is applied to moral objects, in the proper sense, and witness in the figurative application. DEPORTMENT. See Behavior. DEPOSE. See Swear. DEPOSIT, Pledge, Security. De- posit is a general term, from the Latin depositus, participle of deponere, signi- fying to lay down, or put into the hands of another. Pledge comes through French from Old Low German plegan, to promise. Security, the substantive corresponding to secure, comes from Latin se, privative, and cura, care, signifying free from care. The term deposit has most regard to the confidence we place in another; pledge has most regard to the security we give for ourselves; security is a species of pledge. A deposit is always voluntarily placed in the hands of an indifferent person; a pledge and se- curity are required from the parties who are interested. A person may make a deposit for purposes of charity or convenience; he gives a pledge or security for a temporary accommoda- tion or the reUef of a necessity. Money is deposited in the hands of a friend in order to execute a commission: a pledge is given as an equivalent for that which has been received: a security is given by way of security for the per- formance of some agreement. A de- posit must consist of something mov- able, as money, papers, or jewels, which can be deposited or placed in the hands of another. It may sometimes serve as a pledge or security where it is intepded to bind the party depositing to anything. A pledge may, properly speaking, be anything which serves to pledge or bind a person by motives of interest, affection, or honor; it may consist of anything which is given to another for that purpose. A security is whatever makes a person secure against a loss, and in the ordinary ac- ceptation consists of any instrument or written document which legally binds a person. In this sense, the person who binds himself for another becomes a security. These words are all applied in this sense to moral objects. See also Garner. DEPRAVITY, Depravation, Cor- EUPTioN. Depravity, from the Latin pravitas and pravus, crooked or not straight, marks the quahty of being crooked. Depravation, in Latin de- pravatio, signifies a making crooked, or not as it should be. Corruption, in Latin corruptio, corrumpo, from rum- pere, to break, marks the disunion and decomposition of the parts of anything. All these terms are appMed to ob- jects which are contrary to the order of Providence, but the term depravity characterizes the thing as it is; the terms depravation and corruption desig- nate the making or causing it to be so; depravity, therefore, excludes the idea of any cause; depravation always carries us to the cause- or external agency: hence we may speak of depravity as natural, but we speak of depravation as the result of circumstance: there is a depramty in man which nothing but the grace of God can correct; the in- troduction of obscenity on the stage tends greatly to the depravation of morals; bad company tends to the cor- ruption of a yoimg man's morals. Depravity or depravation implies crookedness or a distortion from the regular course; corruption impMes a dissolution, as it were, in the compo- nent parts of bodies. Cicero says (2 De Finihv^) that depravity is apphcable only to the mind and heart; but we say a depraved taste, and depraved humors in regard to the body. A de- praved taste loathes common food, and longs for that which is imnatural and hurtful. Corruption is the natm-al proc- ess by which material substances are disorganized. In the figurative apn pUcation of these terms they preserve the same signification. Depravity is characterized by being directly op- posed to order and an established sys- tem of things; corruption marks the vitiation or spoiling of things, and the ferment that leads to destruction. De- pravity turns things out of their ordi- nary course; corruption destroys their essential quahties. Depravity is a vi- cious state of things, in which all is deranged and perverted: corruption is a vicious state of things, in which aU is suUied and polluted. That which is depraved loses its proper manner of acting and existing; that which is cor- rupted loses its virtue and essence. That is a depraved state of morals in DEPRIVE 249 which the gross vices axe openly prac- tised in defiance of all decorum: that is a corrupt state of society in which vice has secretly insinuated itself into all the principles and habits of men, and concealed its deformity under the fair semblance of virtue and honor. The manners of savages are most hkely to be depraved; those of civihzed nations to be corrupt, when luxiu-y and refine- ment are risen to an excessive pitch. Cannibal nations present us with the picture of human depravity; the Roman nation, during the time of the em- perors, affords us an example of almost universal corruption. From the above observations it is clear that depravity is best apphed to those objects to which common usage has annexed the epithets of right, regu- lar, fine, etc.; and corruption, to those which may be characterized by the epithets of sound, pure, innocent, or good. Hence we prefer to say depravity of mind and corruption of heart; de- pravity of principle and corruption of sentiment or feeling: a, depraved char- acter; a corrupt example; a corrupt influence. In reference to the arts or belles-let- tres we say either depravity or corrup- tion of taste, because taste has its rules, is hable to be disordered, is or is not conformable to natural order, is regular or irregular; and, on the other hand, it may be so intermingled with sentiments and feelings foreign to its own native purity as to give it justly the title of corrupt. The last thing worthy of no- tice respecting the two words depravity and corruption is that the former is used for man in his moral capacity, but the latter for man in a pohtical capac- ity: hence we speak of human deparvity, but the corruption of government. DEPRECIATE. See Disparage. DEPREDATION, Robbery. Dep- redation, in Latin deproedatio, from prceda, a prey, conveys the idea of tak- ing by way of prey. Rob is aUied to Anglo-Saxon reaf, the root found in bereave, and robe, i. e., that stripped from the slain; it signified to strip, despoil, take away. Both these words denote the taking what belongs to an- other, but differ in the circumstances of the action. Depredation is not so lawless an act as robbery; it may be excused, if not justified, by the laws of war or the hostile situation of parties to each other. The borderers on the confines of England and Scotland used to conmait depredations on each other. Robbery is in direct violation of every law, it is committed only by those who set all laws at defiance. Depredations may be committed in any manner short of direct violence; those who commit depredations do so mostly in the absence of those on whom they are committed : robberies are commonly committed on the persons, and mostly accompanied with violence. Depredation taken ab- solutely refers us to that which the depredator gains or gets to himself bv the act ; robbery refers us to that which the person loses who is robbed: the one goes away loaded with his plunder, the other goes away stripped of that which is most valuable to lum. In the extended appUcation of these words this distinction is kept up: birds commit depredations on cornfields, bees rob flowers of their honey. DEPRESSED. See Hypochondri- acal. DEPRESSION. See Dejection. DEPRIVATION. See Spoliation. DEPRIVE, Debar, Abridge. De- prive, from de, from, and Latin privus, one's own, signifies to make not one's own what one has or expects to have. Debar, from de and bar, signifies to prevent by means of a bar. Abridge (see Abridge). Deprive conveys the idea of either taking away that which one has or withholding that which one may have; debar conveys the idea only of with- holding; abridge conveys that also of taking away. Depriving is a coercive measure; debar and abridge are merely acts of authority. We are deprived of that which is of the first necessity; we are debarred of privileges, enjoyments, opportunities, etc.; we are abridged of comforts, pleasures, conveniences, etc. Criminals are deprived of their hberty; their friends are in extraordinary cases debarred the privilege of seeing them; thus men are often abridged of their comforts in consequence of their own faults. Deprivations and debarring some- times arise from things as well as per- sons; abridging is always the volun- tary act of conscious agents. ReUgioa 250 DEPTH teaches men to be resigned under the severest deprivations; it is painful to be debarred the society of those we love, or to abridge others of any advantage which they have been in the habit of enjoying. When used as reflective verbs they preserve the same analogy in their sig- nification. An extravagant person de- prives himself of the power of doing good. A person may debar himself of any pleasure from particular motives of prudence. A miser abridges himself of every enjoyment in order to gratify his ruling passion. See also Bereave. DEPTH, Profundity. Depth comes from Anglo-Saxon deop, and contains the same root as that found in dip, dive, etc. Profundity, from profound, in Latin profundus, compounded of pro, far, and fundus, the bottom, signifies remoteness from the lower surface of anything. These terms do not differ merely in their derivation; but depth is indefinite in its signification; and profundity is a positive and considerable degree of depth. Moreover, the word depth is ap- plied to objects in general; profundity is confined in its application to moral objects: thus we speak of the depth of the sea, or the depth of a person's learn- ing, but his profundity of thought. DEPUTE. See Constitution; Delegate. DEPUTY. See Ambassador. DERANGE. See Disorder. DERANGEMENT, Insanity, Lu- nacy, Madness, Mania. Derangement, from the verb to derange, implies the first stage of disordered intellect. In- sanity, or unsoundness, from in, nega- tive, and Latin sanus, whole, impUes positive disease, which is more or less permanent. Lunacy is a violent sort of insanity, which was supposed to be influ- enced by the moon, and is derived from Latin luna, the moon. Cf. Shake- speare's "moon -struck calf. "Mad- ness, aUied to Anglo-Saxon gemcedan, to drive mad, from a root meaning severe- ly injured, and mania, Latin mania, Greek fiavia, mental excitement, al- lied to fievoc, mind, both imply in- sanity in its most furious and con- firmed stage. Deranged persons may sometimes be perfectly sensible about everything but particular subjects. Insane persons are sometimes entirely restored. Lunatics have their lucid in- tervals, and maniacs their intervals of repose. Derangement may sometimes be applied to the temporary confusion of a disturbed mind which is not in fuU possession of all its faculties: mad- ness may sometimes be the result of violently inflamed passions: and mania may be apphed to any vehement at- tachment which takes possession of the mind. DERIDE, Mock, Ridicule, Rally, Banter. Deride and ridicule are both derived from Latin ridere, to smile at. Mock comes from Late Latin mvccare, to blow the nose (compare mucus), indicating a scoffing, coarse gesture. Rally is alhed to rail, perhaps; its real origin is unknown. The origin of banter is also obscure. Strong expressions of contempt are designated by all these terms. Deri- sion and mockery evince themselves by the outward actions in general; ridi- cule consists more in words than ac- tions; rallying and bantering almost entirely in words. Deride is not so strong a term as mock, but much stronger than ridicule. There is always a mixture of hostility in derision and mockery, but ridicule is frequently un- accompanied with any personal feeMng of displeasure. Derision is often deep, not loud; it discovers itself in sup>- pressed laughter, contemptuous sneers or gesticulations, and cutting ex- pressions: mockery is mostly noisy and outrageous; it breaks forth in insulting buffoonery and is sometimes accom- panied with personal violence: the former consists of real but contemptu- ous laughter; the latter often of af- fected laughter and grimace. Derision and mockery are always personal; ridi- cule may be directed to things as well as persons. Derision and mockery are a direct attack on the individual, the latter stiU more so than the former; ridicule is as often used in writing as in personal intercourse. Rally and banter, like derision and mockery, are altogether personal acts, in which application they are very analo- gous to ridicule. Ridicule is the most general term of the three; we often rally and banter by ridiculing. There DESERT 251 is more exposure in ridiculing, reproof in rallying, and provocation in banter- ing. A person may be ridiculed on ac- count of his eccentricities; he is rallied for his defects; he is bantered for acci- dental circumstances: the former two actions are often justified by some substantial reason; the last is an ac- tion as puerile as it is unjust, it is a contemptible species of mockery. Self-conceit and extravagant follies are oftentimes best corrected by good- natured ridicule; a man may deserve sometimes to be rallied for his want of resolution; those who are of an ill- natured turn of mind will banter others for their misfortunes, or their personal defects, rather than not say something to their annoyance. DERIVE, Trace, Deduce. Derive, from the Latin de and rivus, a river, signifies to draw, after the manner of water, from a source. Trace, Middle French tracer, is drawn ultimately from Latin tracttis, the past participle of trahere, to draw or drag; and origi- nally signified the mark left by drawing something across the smface, or the act of making such a mark. Deduce, in Latin de, from, and ducere, to lead, signifies to bring from. The idea of drawing one thing from another is included in aU the actions designated by these terms. The act of deriving is immediate and direct; that of tracing a gradual process; that of deducting a ratiocinative process. We discover causes and sources by deriva- tion; we discover the course, progress, and commencement of things by trac- ing; we discover the groimds and rea- sons of things by deduction. A person derives his name from a given source; he traces his family up to a given period; principles or powers are de- duced from circumstances or observa- tions. The Trojans derived the name of their city from Tros, a king of Phrygia; they traced the line of their kings up to Dardanus. DEROGATE. See Disparage. DESCRIBE. See Relate. DESCRIPTION. See AccotiNT; Cast. DESCRY. See Find. DESECRATING. See Sacrile- gious. DESERT, Merit, Worth. Desert, from deserve, in Latin deservio, signifies to do service or to be serviceable. Merit, in Latin meritus, participle of mereor, comes from the Greek /itpoc, a share, because he who merits anything has a right to share in it. Worth, in German werth, seems to come from a root found in Latin vereri, to respect. Desert is taken for that which is good or bad; vfierit for that which is good only. We deserve praise or blame: we merit a reward. Desert consists in the action, work, or service performed; merit has regard to the character of the agent or the nature of the action. A person does not deserve a recompense until he has performed some service; he does not merit approbation if he have not done his part well. Deserve is a term of ordinary import; merU applies to objects of greater moment: the former includes matters of p>ersonal and physical gratification; the latter those altogether of an intellectual nature. Criminals cannot always be punished according to their deserts; a noble mind is not contented with barely obtaining, it seeks to merit what it obtains. The idea of value, which is prominent in the signification of the term merit, renders it closely allied to that of worth. Merit is that on which mankind set a value; it is sought for on account of the honor or advantages it brings: worth is that which is absolutely valu- able; it must be sought for on its own account. From these words are derived the epithets deserved and merited, in relation to what we receive from others; and deserving, meritorious, worthy, and worth, in regard to what we possess in ourselves: a treatment is deserved or undeserved; reproofs are merited or un- merited: the harsh treatment of a mas- ter is easier to be borne when it is undeserved than when it is deserved; the reproaches of a friend are very severe when unmerited. A laborer is deserving on account of his industry; an artist is meritorious on account of his professional abilities; a citizen is worthy on account of his be- nevolence and uprightness. The first person deserves to be well paid and en- couraged; the second merits the ap- plause which is bestowed on him; the 252 DESIGN third is worthy of confidence and esteem from all men. Between worthy and worth there is this difference, that the former is said of intrinsic and moral quahties, the latter of extrinsic ones: a worthy man possesses that which calls for the esteem of others; but a man is worth the property which he can call his own: so in like manner a subject may be worthy the attention of a writer, or a thing may not be worth the while to consider. See also Abandon; Solitary. DESIGN, Purpose, Intend, Mean. Design, from the Latin de, down, and signare, to make a sign, signifies to mark out as with a pen or pencil. Purpose, Hke propose, comes through French from the Latin pro and pan- sare, signifying to set before one's mind as an object of pursuit. Intend, in Latin in, to, and tendere, to stretch, signifies the bending of the mind toward an object. Mean, in Anglo-Saxon nioenen, German meinen, is probably connected with the word mind, sig- nifying to have in the mind. Design and purpose are terms of higher import than intend and mean, which are in familiar use; the latter still more so than the former. A design embraces many objects; a purpose con- sists of only one: the former supposes something studied and methodical, it requires reflection; the latter supposes something fixed and determinate, it requires resolution. A design is attain- able; a purpose is steady. We speak of the design as it regards the thing con- ceived; we speak of the purpose as it regards the temper of the person. Men of a sanguine or aspiring character are apt to form designs which cannot be carried into execution; whoever wishes to keep true to his purpose must not listen to many counsellors. A purpose is the thing proposed or set before the mind; an intention is the thing to which the mind bends or in- clines: purpose and intend differ, there- foie, both in the nature of the action and the object; we purpose seriously; we intend vaguely: we set about that which we purpose; we may delay that which we have only intended: the execu- tion of one's purpose rests mostly with one's self; the fulfilment of an intention depends upon circumstances: a man of a resolute temper is not to be diverted from his purpose by trifling objects: we may be disappointed in our intentions by a variety of unforeseen but uncon- trollable events. Purpose is always ap- phed to some proximate or definite object; intend, to that which is indefi- nite or remote. Mean, which is a term altogether of colloquial use, differs but httle from intend, except that it is used for matters requiring but httle thought; to mean is simply to have in the mind, to intend is to stretch with the mind to a thing. Design and purpose are taken some- times in the abstract sense; intend and mean, always in connection with the agent who intends or means: we see a design in the whole creation which leads us to reflect on the wisdom and good- ness of the Creator; whenever we see anything done, we are led to inquire the purpose for which it is done; or are de- sirous of knowing the intention of the gerson in so doing: things are said to e done with a design, in opposition to that which happens by chance; they are said to be done for a purpose in reference to the immediate purpose which is expected to result from them. Design, when not expressly qualified by a contrary epithet, is used in a bad sense in connection with a particular agent; purpose, intention, and meaning, taken absolutely, have an indifferent sense: a designing person is full of latent and interested designs; there is nothing so good that it may not be made to serve the purposes of those who are bad; the intentions of a man must always he taken into the account when we are forming an estimate of Ms ac- tions: ignorant people frequently mean much better than they do. Design, Plan, Scheme, Project. — De- sign (see preceding). Plan, in French plan, comes from Latin planum, smooth or even, signifying a drawing on a flat surface, a preliminary drawing of some- thing to be constructed. Scheme, in Latin schema, Greek (rxiifia, a form or figm-e, signifies the thing drawn out in the mind. Project, in Latin projedus, from projicio, compounded of pro and jacio, signifies to cast or put forth some- thing, hence to propose. Arrangement is the idea common to those terms: the design includes the DESIST 253 thing that is to be brought about; the plan includes the means by which it is to be brought about: a design was formed in the time of James I. for over- turning the government of the country; the plan by which this was to have been reaUzed consisted in placing gimpowder under the Parharaent House and blow- ing up the assembly. A design is to be estimated according to its intrinsic worth; a plan is to be estimated ac- cording to its relative value, or fitness for the design: a design is noble or wicked, a plan is practicable; every foimder of a charitable institution may be supposed to have a good design; but he may adopt an erroneous plan for obtaining the end proposed. Scheme and project respect both the end and the means, which makes them analogous to design and plan: the de- sign stimulates to action; the plan de- termines the mode of action; the scheme and project consist most in spec- ulation: the design and plan are equally practical, and suited to the ordinary and immediate circumstances of life; the scheme and project are contrived or conceived for extraordinary or rare oc- casions: no man takes any step without a design; a general forms the plan of his campaign; adventurous men are al- ways forming schemes for gaining money; ambitious monarchs are full of projects for increasing their dominions. Scheme and project differ priucipally in the magnitude of the objects to which they are apphed, the former being much less vast and extensive than the latter: a scheme may be formed by an individual for attaining any trifUng advantage; projects are mostly con- ceived in matters of great moment in- volving deep interests. DESIGNATE. See Name. DESIGNING. See Scheming. DESIRE, Wish, Long For, Hanker After, Covet. Desire, in Latin de- sidero, is a word of obscure origin; it may be aUied to sidus^ star, like con- Mder, which see. Wish is derived from a Germanic root which is derived from the Aryan root whence the word win, and Latin ven, in Veniis, venerate, etc., are also drawn. Long comes from Anglo-Saxon langian, to crave or desire. Hanker signifies to hang on an object with one's mind. Covet (see Covetous). Desire is imperious, it demands grati- fication; wish is less vehement, it con- sists of a strong inclination; longing is an impatient and continued species of desire; hankering is a desire for that which is set out of one's reach; coveting is a desire for that which belongs to an- other, or what it is in his power to grant : we desire or long for that which is near at hand or within view; we ■wish for and covet that which is more remote or less distinctly seen; we hanker after that which has been once enjoyed: a discontented person wishes for more than he has; he who is in a strange land longs to see his native country; vicious men hanker after the pleasures which are denied them; am- bitious men covet honors, avaricious men covet riches. Desires ought to be moderated, tvishes to be hmited, long- ings, hankerings, and covetings to be suppressed: imcontrolled desire's be- come the greatest torments; imbound- ed wishes are the bane of all happiness; ardent longings are mostly irrational and not entitled to indulgence; covet- ing is expressly prohibited by the Divine law. Desire, as it regards others, is not less imperative than when it respects ourselves; it lays an obhgation on the person to whom it is expressed: a wish is gentle and imassuming; it appeals to the good-nature of another: we act by the desire of a superior or of one who has a right to ask; we act accord- ing to the wishes of an equal, or of one who can only request: the desire of a parent will amount to a command in the mind of a dutiful child: his wishes will be anticipated by the warmth of affection. See also Beg; Yearn. DESIST, Leave Off. Desist, from the Latin desistere^ signifies to take one's self off. Desist is apphed to actions good, indifferent, or offensive to some person; leave off, to actions that are indiiTerent; the former is voluntary or involuntary, the latter voluntary: we are frequently obliged to desist; but we leave off at our option: it is prudent to desist from using our endeavors when we find them meffectual; it is natural for a person to leave off when he sees no further occasion to continue his labor: he who annoys another 254 DESOLATE must be made to desist; he who does not wish to offend will leave off when requested. DESOLATE. See Solitary. , DESOLATION. See Ravage. DESPAIR, Desperation, Despond- ency. Despair, desperation, from the French desespoir, compounded of the privative de and the Latin spes, hope, signifies the absence or the annihila- tion of all hope. Despondency, from despond, in Latin desporideo, compound- ed of the privative de and spondere, to promise, signifies hterally to deprive in a solemn manner, or cut off from every gleam of hope. Despair is a state of mind produced by the view of external circumstances; desperation and despondency may be the fruit of the imagination; the former, therefore, always rests on some ground, the latter are sometimes ideal: despair hes mostly in reflection; desperation and despondency in the feelings: the former marks a state of vehement and impatient feeling, the latter that of fallen and mournful feeUng. De- spair is often the forerunner of des- peration and despondency, but it is not necessarily accompanied with ef- fects so powerful: the strongest mind may have occasion to despair when circumstances warrant the sentiment; men of an impetuous character are apt to rim into a state of despera- tion; a weak mind fuU of morbid sen- sibility is most hable to faU into despondency. Despair interrupts or checks exertion; desperation impels greater exertions; despondency unfits for exertion: when a physician de- spairs of making a cure, he lays aside the apphcation of remedies; when a soldier sees nothing but death or dis- grace before him, he is driven to des- peration, and redoubles his efforts; when a tradesman sees before him nothing but failure for the present and want for the future he may sink into despondency: despair is justifiable as far as it is a rational calculation into futurity from present appearances; desperation may arise from extraordi- nary circumstances or the action of strong passions; in the former case it is imavoidable, and may serve to rescue from great distress; in the latter case it is mostly attended with fatal consequences: despondency is a disease of the mind, which nothing but a firm trust in the goodness of Providence can obviate. Desperate, Hopeless. — Desperate (see above) is apphcable to persons or things; hopeless to things only: a per- son makes a desperate effort; he under- takes a hopeless task. Desperate, when applied to things, expresses more than hopeless; the latter marks the absence of hope as to the attainment of good, the former marks the absence of hope as to the removal of an evil: a person who is in a desperate condition is over- whelmed with actual trouble for the present and the prospect of its con- tinuance for the future; he whose case is hopeless is without the prospect of effecting the end he has in view: gamesters are frequently brought into desperate situations when bereft of everything that might possibly serve to hghten the burdens of their mis- fortunes: it is a hopeless undertaking to endeavor to reclaim men who have plunged themselves deep into the labyrinths of vice. See also Deter. DESPICABLE. See Contemp- tible. DESPISE. See Contemn. DESPOIL. See Sack. DESPONDENCY. See Despair. DESPONDING. See Pessimistic. DESPOTIC. See Absolute. DESTINE. See Allot. DESTINY, Fate, Lot, Doom. Des- tiny, from destine (see Appoint) signi- fies either the power that destines or the thing destined. Fate (see Chance).- Lot, Anglo-Saxon hlot, signifies a ticket, die, or any other thing by which the casual distribution of things is deter- mined; and, in an extended sense, it expresses the portion thus assigned by chance. Doom comes from a Teutonic root meaning that which is put up or set up — irrevocably decreed and estab- hshed. All these terms are employed with regard to human events which are not under one's control: among the heathens destiny and fate were consid- ered as deities, who each in his way could direct human affairs and were both superior even to Jupiter himself: the Destinies, or Parcae, as they were DESTRUCTION 255 termed, presided only over life and death; but Fate was employed in rul- ing the general affairs of men. Since revelation has instructed mankind in the natiu-e and attributes of the true God, those blind powers are now not acknowledged to exist in the over- ruling providence of an all-wise and an all-good Being; the terms destiny and fate, therefore, have now only a relative sense as to what happens without the will or control of man. Destiny is used in regard to one's station and walk in Ufe; fate, in regard to what one suffers; lot, in regard to what one gets or possesses; and doom to the final destiny which terminates unhappily and depends mostly upon the will of another: destiny is marked out; fate is fixed; a lot is assigned; a doom is passed. It is the destiny of some men to be always changing their plan of hfe; it is but too frequently the faie of authors to labor for the benefit of mankind and to reap noth- ing for themselves but poverty and neglect; it is the lot of but very few to enjoy what they themselves con- sider a competency; a man sometimes seals his own doom by his imprudence or vices. Destiny, Destination. — Both destiny and destination are used for the thing destined; but the former is said in re- lation to a man's important concerns, the latter only of particular circum- stances; in which sense it may like- wise be employed for the act of des- tining. Destiny is the point or line marked out in the walk of life; destina- tion is the place fixed upon in particu- lar: as every man has his peculiar destiny, so every traveller has his particular destination. Destiny is alto- gether set above himian control; no man can determine, though he may influence, the destiny of another: destination is, however, the specific act of an individual, either for himself or another: we leave the destiny of a man to develop itself; but we may inquire about his own destination or that of his children: it is a consohng reflection that the destinies of short-sighted mor- tals hke ourselves are in the hands of One who both can and will overrule them to our advantage if we place full reliance in Him; in the destination of children for their several professions or / callings, it is of importance to consult their particular turn of mind as well as inclination. DESTITUTE. See Bare; For- saken. DESTROY, Consume, Waste. De- stroy, in Latin destruo, from de, priva- tive, and struere, to build, is to undo that which has been built or done. Consume, in French consumer, Latin consumo, i. e., con or cum, together, and sumere, to take, signifies to take away altogether. Waste comes from Latin vastus, desolate, English vxiste, and signifies to make desolate. To destroy is to reduce to nothing that which has been artificially raised or formed; as to destroy a town or a house: to consume is to use up; as to consume food, or to consume articles of manufacture: to destroy is an immedi- ate act mostly of violence; consume is a gradual and natural process, as oil is consumed in a lamp. To destroy is always taken in the bad sense for putting an end to that which one wishes to preserve; consume is also taken in a similar sense, but with the above distinction as to the mode of the action: as a hurricane destroys the crops; rust consumes iron: to wa^te is to consume by a misuse; as to waste pro- visions by throwing them away or suf- fering them to spoil; or to fall away or lose its substance, as the body wastes from disease. In the figurative application they are used with precisely the same distinc- tion: happiness or peace is destroyed; time is consumed in an indifferent sense: time or strength is wasted in the baa sense. See also Demolish. DESTROYER. See Undersea- craft. DESTRUCTION, Ruin. Destruc- tion, from destroy, and the Latin destruo, signifies literally to unbuild that which is raised up. Ruin, from the Latin ruere, to fall, signifies that which is fallen into pieces. Destruction is an act of immediate violence; ruin is a gradual process; a thing is destroyed by some external ac- tion upon it; a thmg falls to ruin of itself: we witness destruction wherever war or the adverse elements rage; we 256 DESULTORY witness ruin whenever the works of man are exposed to the effects of time; nevertheless, if destruction be more forcible and rapid, ruin is, on the other hand, more sure and complete: what is destroyed may be rebuilt or replaced; but what is ruined is mostly lost forever, it is past recovery: when houses or towns are destroyed, fresh ones rise up in their place; but when commerce is ruined it seldom returns to its old course. Destruction admits of various degrees; ruin is something positive and general. The property of a man may be destroyed to a greater or less extent without necessarily involving his ruin. The ruin of a whole family is often- times the consequence of destruction by fire. Health is destroyed by violent ex- ercises or some other active cause; it is ruined by a course of imprudent con- duct. The happiness of a family is de- stroyed by broils and discord; the morals of a young man are ruined by a con- tinued intercourse with vicious com- panions. Both words are used figuratively with the same distinction. The destruction of both body and soul is the conse- quence of sin; the ruin of a man, whether in his temporal or spiritual concerns, is inevitable if he foUow the dictates of misguided passion. Destructive, Ruinous, Pernicious. — Destructive signifies producing destruc- tion. Ruinous signifies either having or causing ruin. Pernicious, from the Latin pemicies, or per, intensive, and stem neci of nex, slaughter, signifies causing violent and total dissolution. Destructive and ruinous, as the epi- thets of the preceding terms, have a similar distinction in their sense and application; fire and sword are destruc- tive things; a poison is destructive: con- sequences are ruinous; a condition or state is ruinous; intestine commotions are ruinous to the prosperity of a state. Pernicious approaches nearer to de- structive than to ruinous; both the former imply a tendency to produce dis- solution, which may be more or less gradual; but the latter refers us to the result itself, to the dissolution as already having taken place: hence we speak of the instrument or cause as being de- structive or pernicious, and the action, event, or result as ruinous: destructive is applied in the most extended sense to every object which has been created or supposed to be so ; pernicious is applica- ble only to such objects as act only in a Umited way: sin is equally destructive to both body and soul; certain food is pernicious to the body; certain books are pernicious to the mind. See also Spoliation. DESULTORY. See Cursory. DETACH. See Segregate; Sepa- rate; Wean. DETAIN. See Hold. DETECT, Discover. Detect, from the Latin de, privative, and tegere, to cover, and discover, from the privative dis and cover, both originally signify to deprive of a covering; see Cover. Detect is always taken in a bad sense: discover in an indifferent sense. A per- son is detected in what he wishes to con- ceal; a person or a thing is discovered that has unintentionally lain concealed. Thieves are detected in picking pockets; a lost child is discovered in a wood or in some place of security. Detection is the act of the moment; it relates to that which is passing: a discovery is either a gradual or an immediate act, and may be made of that which has long since passed. A plot is detected by any one who communicates what he has seen and heard; many murders have been discovered after a lapse of years by ways the most extraordiiiary. See also Convict. DETER, Discourage, Dishearten. Deter, in Latin deterreo, compounded of de and terrere, signifies to frighten away from a thing. Discourage and dis- hearten, by the privative dis, signify to deprive of courage or heart. One is deterred from commencing anything; one is discouraged or disheartened from proceeding. A variety of motives may deter any one from an undertaking; but a person is discouraged or dis- heartened mostly by the want of suc- cess or the hopelessness of the case. The prudent and the fearful are ahke easily to be deterred; impatient people are most apt to be discouraged; faint- hearted people are easily disheartened. The foolhardy and the obdurate are the least easily deterred from their ob- ject; the persevering will not suffer themselves to be discouraged by par- ticular failures; the resolute and self- DEVIL 257 confident will not be disheartened by trifling difficulties. DETERIORATE. See Degenerate. DETERMINE, Resolve. To deter- mine (see Decide) is more especially an act of the judgment; to resolve (see Courage) is an act of the will: we determine how or what we shall do; this requires examination and choice: we resolve that we will do what we have determined upon; this requires a firm spirit. Our determinations should be prudent, that they may not cause re- pentance; our resolutions should be fixed, in order to prevent variation. There can be no co-operation with a man who is undetermined; it will be dangerous to co-operate with a man who is irresolute. In the ordinary con- cerns of Ufe we have frequent occasions to determine without resolving; in the discharge of our moral duties, or the performance of any office, we have oc- casion to resolve without determining. A master determines to dismiss his ser- vant ; the servant resolves on becoming more diligent. Personal convenience or necessity gives rise to the determina- tion; a sense of duty, honor, fidelity, and the Uke gives birth to the resolution. A traveller determines to take a certain route; a learner resolves to conquer every difficulty in the acquirement of learning. Humor or change of cir- cumstances occasions a person to alter his determination; timidity, fear, or defect in principle occasions the resolu- tion to waver. Children are not capa- ble of determining; and their best resolutions fall before the gratification of the moment. In matters of knowledge, to deter- mine is to fix the mind, or to cause it to rest in a certain opinion; to resolve is to lay open what is obscure, to clear the mind from doubt and hesitation. We determine points of question; we resolve difficulties. It is more difficult to determine in matters of rank or precedence than in cases where the solid and real interests of men are concerned; it is the business of the teacher to resolve the difficulties which are proposed by the scholar. Every point is not proved which is deter- mined, nor is every difficulty resolved which is answered. See also Decide; Fix. 17 DETERMINED. See Unswerv- ing. DETEST. See Abhor; Hate DETESTABLE. See Abominable. DETRACT. See Asperse; Dis- parage. DETRIMENT. See Disadvantage; Loss. DEVASTATE. See Sack. DEVASTATION. See Ravage. DEVELOP. See Unfold. DEVELOPMENT. See EvoLpTioN. DEVIATE, Wander, Swerve, Stray. Deviate, from devious, and the Latin de vid, signifies, hterallv, to run out of the way. Wander is a fre- quentative of u>end and is connected with Anglo-Saxon windan, to wind; it meant originally to keep winding in and out — indicating a purposeless going. For the derivation of swerve see Deflect. Stray comes from Old French estraier, to wander out into the streets, from Latin strata, street, whence our word street is derived. Deviate always supposes a direct path which is departea from; wander includes no such idea. The act of deviating is commonly faulty, that of wandering is different: they may fre- quently exchange significations; the former being justifiable by necessity, and the latter arising from an un- steadiness of mind. Deviate is mostly used in the moral acceptation; wander may be used in either sense. A per- son deviates from any plan or rule laid down; he wanders from the subject in which he is engaged. As no rule can be laid down which will not admit of an exception, it is impossible but the wisest will find it necessary in their moral conduct to deviate occasionally; yet every wanton deviation from an established practice evinces a cul- pable temper on the part of the de- viator. Those who wander into the regions of metaphysics are in great danger of losing themselves; it is with them as with most wanderers, that they spend their time at best but idly. See also Digress. DEVIL, Demon. Demi, in Anglo- Saxon deofal^ French diable, etc., is connected with the Greek ^jd/3oXoc, from ^to/3dX\nv, to traduce, literally to throw something at another (cf . the slang phrase to "sbng inud" for mean- 258 DEVISE ing to slander). It signifies properly a calumniator, and is always taken in the bad sense for the spirit which in- cites to evil and tempts men through the medium of their evil passion. Demon, in Latin dcBmon, Greek Sal/iwv, a being of divine nature, is taken either in a bad sense or good sense for the power that acts within us and con- trols our actions. Since the devil is represented as the father of all wicked- ness, associations have been connected with the name that render its pronun- ciation in familiar discourse offensive to the chastened ear; it is therefore used in the grave style only. Among Jews and Christians the term demon is always taken in a bad sense for an evil spirit generally; but the Greeks and Romans understood by the word dcemon any genius or spirit, but par- ticularly the good spirit or guardian angel who was supposed to accompany a man from his birth. Socrates pro- fessed to be always under the direction of such a daemon, who is alluded to very much by the ancients in their writings and on their medals; hence it is that in figurative language the word may still be used in a good sense. In general, the word is taken for an evil spirit, as the demon of discord. DEVISE, Bequeath. Devise, com- pounded of de and vistis, participle of videre, to see or show, signifies to point out specifically. Beqtieath comes from Anglo-Saxon becwethan, from cwethan, to say (whence quoth), and means to give over to a person by say- ing or by word of mouth. In the technical sense, to devise is to give lands by a will duly attested ac- cording to law; to bequeath is to give personality after one's death by a less formal instrument; whence the term bequeath may also be used figura- tively, as to bequeath one's name to posterity. DEVOID. See Empty. DEVOTE. See Addict: Dedicate; Sanctify. DEVOTEE. See Enthusiast. DEVOUT. See Holy. DEXTERITY. See Ability; Knack. DEXTEROUS. See Clever. DIABOLIC, Devilish, Fiendish, Satanic. These words all mean re- sembling the devil or the powers of evil, and differ very little in meaning. Devilish and diabolical both come ultimately from Greek oid(3oXoQ, devil, literally slanderer, hater. Fiendish comes from Anglo-Saxon feond, an enemy, from feogan, to hate. Satanic comes originally from the Hebrew designation of the "Prince of the Powers of Darkness," which meant "Adversary." All the words signify the highest degree of wickedness and maUciousness, characteristic of the op)- ponent of all good. Though devilish and diabolical have the same derivation, devilish has been so largely and care- lessly used in colloquial speech to sig- nify anjiihing unpleasant that it has somewhat lost its force and dignity; diabolical expresses more definitely the idea of resemblance to the devil with special reference to mahcious skill and ingenuity. Fiendish has the same meaning with special emphasis on malignity and cruelty. Satanic means characteristic of Satan, the prince of devils, and sometimes has special refer- ence to size and daring in malignant action, or to Satan's distinguishing characteristic of pride. However, the words are really well-nigh inter- changeable. DIALECT. See Language. DIALOGUE. See Conversation. DIAPHANOUS, Clear, Pellucid, Translucent. Diaphanous, in French diaphane, from the Greek SuKpdvriQ, that a compovmd of Sid, through, and (paivuv, to show, pertains to that which permits hght to pass through or has the quality of transmitting light. Clear and pellucid apply to substances, as air and water, when free from any- thing that would obstruct a view through them; but diaphanous implies a translucent quality in distinction from a transparent one. A substance is trans- lucent that permits rays of light to pass through it without rendering the form or color of objects on the other side distinguishable; hence so nearly opaque that objects are scarcely, if at all, visible through it; while transparent applies to a substance that can be seen through clearly or allows hght to pass through without diminution. A diaphanous substance, therefore, is translvAxnt or only partially transparent. Translvcency implies that property of DICTION 259 certain minerals, as well as other sub- stances, which permits Ught to pass through them, but in a subdued degree. Diaphanous has been of late especially appUed to semi-transparent textures such as lace and chiffon. There is nothing in the history of the word to support such a limitation of its mean- ing, but this is its most frequent ap- phcation. A veil is diaphanous; a piece of smoked glass for viewing the sun and spectacles worn by people motoring or exposed to strong light are translucent; window-glass is trans- parent. DICTATE, Prescribe. Dictate, from the Latin dictatus and dictum, a word, signifies to make a word for an- other; and prescribe literally signifies to write down for another (see Ap- point), in which sense the former of these terms is used technically for a principal who gets his secretary to write down his words as he utters them; and the latter for a physician who writes down for his patient what he ^shes him to take as a remedy. They are used figuratively for a sjjecies of comisel given by a sup>erior; to dictate is, however, a greater exercise of authority than to prescribe. To dictate amounts even to more than to command; it signifies commanding with a tone of unwarrantable authority, or still oftener a species of commanding by those who have no right to com- mand: it is therefore mostly taken in a bad sense. To prescribe partakes altogether of the nature of counsel, and nothing of command; it serves as a rule to the person prescribed, and is justified by the superior wisdom and knowledge of the person prescribing; it is therefore always taken in an in- different or a good sense. He who dictates speaks with an adventitious authority; he who prescribes has the sanction of reason. To dictate impUes an entire subserviency in the person dictated to; to prescribe carries its own weight with it in the nature of the thing prescribed. Upstarts are ready to dictate even to their superiors on every occasion that offers; modest peo- {)le are often fearful of giving advice est they should be suspected of pre- scribing. Dictate, Suggestion. — Dictate signifies the thing dictated, and has an imp)era- tive sense, as in the former case. V Suggestion signifies the thing sriggested, and conveys the idea of its being pro- posed secretly or in a gentle manner. • These terms are both applied with this distinction to acts of the mind. When conscience, reason, or passion presents anything forcibly to the mind, it is called a dictate; when anything enters the mind in a casual manner, it is called a suggestion. The dictate is obeyed or yielded to; the suggestion is followed or listened to. It is the part of a Christian at all times to obey the dictates of reason. He who yields to the dictates of passion renounces the character of a rational being. It is the characteristic of a weak mind to follow the suggestions of envy. Dictate is employed only for what passes inwardly; suggestion may be used for any action on the mind by ex- ternal objects. No man will err es- sentially in the ordinary affairs of life who is guided by the dictates of plain sense. It is the lot of sinful mortals to be drawn to evil by the suggestions of Satan as well as their own evil in- cUnations. DICTION, Style, Phrase, Phrase- ology. Diction, from the Latin dictio, saying, is put for the mode of expressing ourselves. Style comes from the Latin stylus, the bodkin with which the Latins wrote and corrected what they had written on their waxen tablets; whence the word has been used for the manner of writing in general. Phrase, in Greek ippamc, from ^po^tiv, to speak; and phraseology, from <(>pdaii:, and \070t, both signify the manner of speaking. Diction expresses much less than style: the former is apphcable to the firat efforts of learners in composition; the latter only to the original produc- tions of a matured mind. Errors in grammar, false construction, a con- fused disposition of words, or an im- proper application of them constitutes Dad diction; but the niceties, the elegancies, the peculiarities, and the beauties of composition which mark the genius and talent of the writer are what is comprehended under the name of style. Diction is a general term, applicable alike to a single sen- tence or a connected composition; styl» 260 DICTIONARY is used in regard to a regular piece of composition. As diction is a term of inferior import, it is of course mostly confined to ordinary subjects, and style to the productions of authors. We should speak of a person's diction in his private correspondence, but of his style in his literary works. Diction re- quires only to be pure and clear; style may Ukewise be terse, pohshed, elegant, florid, poetic, sober, and the like. Diction is said mostly in regard to what is written; phrase and phraseology are said as often of what is spoken as what is written; as that a person has adopted a strange phrase or phraseology. The former respects single words; the latter comprehends a succession of phrases. DICTIONARY, Encyclopedia. Dictionary, Late Latin dictionarium, from the Latin dictum, a saying or word, is a register of words. Encyclo- paedia, from the Greek iyKVKkoTraiSda, or Iv, in, KvicXog, a circle, and Traideia, learning, signifies a book containing the whole circle of knowledge. The definition of words, with their various changes, modifications, uses, acceptations, and applications, are the proper subjects of a dictionary; the nature and properties of things, with their construction, uses, powers, etc., are the proper subjects of an eri- cyclopoedia. A general acquaintance with all arts and sciences as far as respects the use of technical terms, and a perfect acquaintance with the classical writers in the language, are essential for the composition of a dic- tionary; an entire acquaintance with all the minutiae of every art and science is requisite for the composition of an encyclopcedia. A single individual may qualify himself for the task of writing a dictionary; but the universaUty and diversity of knowledge contained in an encyclopcedia render it necessarily the work of many. The term dictionary has been extended in its appUcation to any work alphabetically arranged, as biographical, medical, botanical dic- tionaries, and the Uke, but still pre- serving this distinction, that a dic- tionary always contains only a general or partial illustration of the subject Eroposed, while an encyclopcedia em- races the whole circuit of science. Dictionary, Lexicon, Vocabulary, Glos- sary, Nomenclature. — Dictionary is a general term; lexicon, from Xlytiv, to say; vocabulary, from vox, a word; glossary, from gloss, to explain, from ■vKQaaa, the tongue; and nomenclature, irom nomen, are all species of the dic- tionary. Lexicon is a species of dictionary ap- propriately applied to the dead lan- guages. A Greek or Hebrew lexicon is distinguished from a dictionary of the French or English language. A vo- cabulary is a partial kind of dictionary, which may comprehend a simple list of words, with or without explanation, arranged in order or otherwise. A glossary is an explanatory vocabulary, which commonly serves to explain the obsolete terms employed in any old author. A nomenclature is literally a Ust of names, and in particular a ref- erence to proper names. DIDACTIC, Pedagogic. Didactic, in Greek SiSuktikoc, from SiSaaKsiv, to teach, cognate with the Latin doceo, in French didactique, signifies, specifically, whatever pertains to teaching, con- veying instruction, or containing pre- cepts or rules. In the plural and sub- stantive form the term implies the science of teaching, the best methods of systematic instruction. Didactic poe- try is a kind which aims, or seems to aim, at instruction, making pleas- ure entirely subservient to this. The "Georgics" of Virgil have been the model according to which such poems have generally been composed. Peda- gogic has in recent years become a more conspicuous term than didactic, because of the great advance in edu- cational methods. The term is from the Greek iraiSayojyog, compounded of Traig, or ttmS-, a child, and aywyog, leading, and originally applied to a slave who led his master's children to school and places of amusement while they were too young to go alone, and, in exceptional instances, such peda- gogues acted also as teachers. Latter- ly the term pedagogue came to be used in contempt or ridicule to designate a pedant or a supercilious instructor. Now pedagogy, the science of teach- ing, has become conspicuous among the learned arts, and has its special col- leges with degree-granting privileges, DIFFER 261 besides the many state and municipal normal schools. DIE, Expire, Pass Over. Die is a Scandinavian word from a Teutonic base whence dead, death, etc., are also derived. Expire, from ex, out, and spirare, to breathe, means giving up the breath of life. There are beings, such as trees and plants, which are said to hve, al- though they have not breath; these die, but do not expire; there are other beings which absorb and emit air, but do not hve; such as the flame of a lamp which does not die, but it expires. By a natural metaphor, the time of being is put for the life of objects; and hence we speak of the date expiring, the term expiring, and the hke; and as life is applied figm-atively to moral objects, so may death to objects not having physical hfe. To pass over is the Christian Science equivalent for to die. See also Perish. DIET. See Assembly; Food. DIFFER, Vary, Disagree, Dis- sent. Differ, in Latin differo, or dis, apart, and ferre, to bear, signifies to make into two. Vary (see Change). Disagree is Uterally not to agree. Dis- sent, in Latin dissentio, or dis and sentire, to think or feel, signifies to think or feel apart or differently. Differ, vary, and disagree are applica- ble either to persons or things; dissent to persons only. First as to persons: to differ is the most general and indefi- nite term, the rest are but modes of dif- ference: we may differ from any cause, or in any degree, we vary only in small matters: thus persons may differ or vary in their statements. There must be two at least to differ, and there may be an indefinite number: one may vary, or an indefinite number may vary; thus two or more may differ in an account which they give; one person may vary at different times in the account which he gives. To differ may be either in fact or matters of speculation; to dis- agree, mostly in matters of practice or personal interest; to dissent, mostly in matters of speculation or opinion. Phi- losophers may differ in accounting for any phenomenon; pohticians may dif- fer as to the conduct of public affairs; people may disagree who have to act to- gether; a person may dissent from any opinion which is offered or prescribed. Differences may occasion discordant feeling or otherwise, according to the nature of the difference. Differences in regard to claims or matters of interest are rarely unaccompanied with some asperity. Disagreements, variances, and dissensions are always accompanied with more or less ill-humor or ill-feeUng. Disagreements between those who ought to agree and to co-operate are mostly occasioned by opposing passions; vari- ance is said of whatever disturbs the harmony of those who ought to Uve in love and harmony. Dissensions arise not merely from diversity of opinion, but also from diversity of interest, and always produce much acrimony of feeling. They arise mostly among bodies of men. In regard to things, differ is said of two things with respect to each other; vary of one thing in respect to itself: thus two tempers differ from each other, and a person s temper varies from time to time. Things differ in their essences, they vary in their accidents; thus the genera and species of things differ from each other, and the individuals of each species vary: differ is said of eveiything promiscuously, but disagree is only said of such things as might agree; thus two trees differ from each other by the course of things, but two numbers disagree which are intended to agree. Difference, Variety, Diversity, Med- ley.— Difference signifies the cause or the act of differing. Variety, from various or vary, in Latin varius, differ- ent, signifies a continual difference. Diversity, in Latin diversitas, comes from diverto, compoimded of dis, apart, and vertere, to turn, and signifies to turn asunder. Medley has the same derivation as middle, for which see intermeddle under Intercede. Difference and variety seem to lie in the things themselves; diversity and medley are created either by accident or design; a difference may lie in two objects only; a variety cannot exist without an assemblage: a difference is discovered by means of a comparison which the mind forms of objects to pre- vent confusion; variety strikes on the mind and pleases the imagination with many agreeable images; it is opfKJsed 262 DIFFER to dull uniformity: the acute observer traces differences, however minute, in the objects of his research, and by this means is enabled to class them under their general or particular heads; nat- ure affords such an infinite variety in everything which exists that if we do not perceive it the fault is in ourselves. Diversity arises from an assemblage of objects natm-ally contrasted; a med- ley is produced by an assemblage of objects so ill suited as to produce a ludicrous effect. Diversity exists in the tastes or opinions of men; a medley is produced by the concurrence of such tastes or opinions as can in no wise coalesce. A diversity of sounds heard at a suitable distance in the stillness of the evening will have an agreeable ef- fect on the ear; a medley of noises, whether heard near or at a distance, must always be harsh and offensive. Difference, Distinction. — Difference lies in the thing; distinction is the act of the person: the former is, therefore, to the latter as the cause to the effect; the distinction rests on the difference: those are equally bad logicians who make a distinction without a difference, or who make no distinction where there is a difference. Sometimes distinction is put for the ground of distinction, which brings it nearer in sense to difference, in which case the former is a species of the latter : a difference is either external or internal : a distinction is always external, the for- mer lies in the thing, the latter is de- signedly made: we have differences in character and distinctions in dress; the difference between profession and prac- tice, though very considerable, is often lost sight of by the professors of Chris- tianity; in the sight of God there is no rank or distinction that will screen a man from the consequences of unre- pented sins. Difference, Dispute, Altercation, Qiiar- rel. — Difference (see Differ). Dispute (see Argue). Altercation, in Latin alter- catio, from alter, the other of two peo- ple, signifies to dispute in tiuns, first one speaking and then the other — suggesting also a decided difference of opinion. Quarrel, in French querelle, from the Latin queri, to complain, sig- nifies having a complaint against an- other. All these terms are here taken in the general sense of a difference on some personal question; the term difference is here as general and indefinite as in the former case: a difference, as distin- guished from the others, is generally of a less serious and personal kind; a dispute consists not only of angry words, but much ill blood and imkind offices; an altercation is a wordy dispute, in which difference of opinion is drawn out into a multitude of words on all sides; quarrel is the most serious of all differences, which leads to every species of violence; a difference may sometimes arise from a misunderstanding, which may be easily rectified; differences sel- dom grow to disputes but by the fault of both parties; altercations arise most- ly from pertinacious adherence to, and obstinate defence of, one's opinions; quarrels mostly spring from injuries real or supposed : differences subsist be- tween men in an individual or pubhc capacity; they may be carried on in a direct or indirect manner; disputes and altercations are mostly conducted in a direct manner between individuals; quarrels may arise between nations or individuals, and be carried on by acts of offence directly or indirectly. Different, Distinct, Separate. — Differ- ent (see Differ). Distinct, in Latin distinctu^, participle of distinguo, and separate (see Abstract for both). Difference is opposed to similitude; there is no difference between objects absolutely aUke : distinctness is opposed to identity; there can be no distinction where there is only one and the same being: separation is opposed to unity; there can be no separation between objects that coalesce or adhere: things may be different and not distinct, or distinct and not different: different is said altogether of the internal proper- ties of things; distinci is said of things as objects of vision, or as they appear either to the eye or to the mind : when two or more things are seen only as one they may be different, but they are not distinct; but whatever is seen as two or more things, each complete in itself, is distinct, although it may not be different: two roads are said to be different which run in different direc- tions, but they may not be distinct when seen on a map : on the other hand, DIFFICULTIES 263 two roads are said to be distinct when they are observed as two roads to run in the same direction, but they need not in any particular to be different: two stars of different magnitudes may, in certain directions, appear as one, m which case they are different but not distinct; two books on the same sub- ject, and by the same author, but not written in continuation of each other, are distinct books, but not different. What is separate must in its nature be generally distinct; but everything is not separate which is distinct: when houses are separate they are obviously distinct; but they may frequently be distinct when they are not positively separated: the distinct is marked out by some external sign which determines its beginning and its end; the separate is that which is set apart and to be seen by itself: distinct is a term used only in determining the singularity or pluraUty of objects; the separate only in regard to their proximity to or dis- tance from each other: we speak of having a distinct household, but of Uving in separate apartments; of di- viding one's subject into distinct heads, or of making things into separate parcels: the body and soul are differ- ent, inasmuch as they have different properties; they are distinct, inasmuch as they have marks by which they may be distinguished, and at death they will be separate. Different, Several, Divers, Sundry, Various. — All these terms are employed to mark a niunber, but different is the most indefinite of all these terms, as its office is rather to define the quality than the number, and is equally apn pli cable to few and many; it is op- posed to singularity, but the other terms are employed p>ositively to ex- press many. Several, from to sever, signifies split or made into many; they may be either different or alike: there may be several different things, or sev- eral things aJike; but we need not say several divers things, for the word divers signifies properly many different. Sun- dry, from Ajiglo-Saxon adverb sundor, apart, signifies many things scattered or at a distance, whether as it regards time or space. Varums expresses not only a greater nxunber, but a greater diversity than all the rest. The same thing often affects differ- ent persons differently: an individual may be affected several times in the same way; or particular persons may be affected at sundry times and in divers manners; the ways in which men are affectea are so various as not to admit of enumeration; it is not so much to understand different languages as to understand several different lan- guages; divers modes have been suggest- ed and tried for the good education of youth, but most are of too theoretical a nature to admit of being reduced successfully to practice; an incorrect writer omits sundry articles that be- long to a statement; we need not wonder at the misery which is intro- duced into famiUes by extravagance and luxury when we notice the in- finitely various alliu-ements for spend- ing money which are held out to the young and the thoughtless. Different, Unlike. — Different is posi- tive, unlike is negative: we look at what is different, and draw a com- parison; but that which is unlike needs no comparison: a thing is said to be different from every other thing, or unlike to anything seen before; which latter mode of expression obviously conveys less to the mind than the former. DIFFICULT. See Hard; Hercu- lean; Knotty' . DIFFICULTIES, Embarrass- ments, Troubles. These terms are all applicable to a p>erson's concerns in Ufe; but difficulties relate to the difficulty of conducting a business; embarrass- ments relate to the confusion attending a state of debt; and trouble to the pain which is the natural consequence of not fulfilling engagements or answer- ing demands. Of the three, the term difficulties expresses the least, and that of troubles the most. A young man on his entrance into the world will unavoidably experience difficulties if not provided with ample means in the outset. But let his means be ever so ample, if he have not prudence and talents fitted for business he will hard- ly keep himself free from embarrass- ments, which are the greatest troubles that can arise to disturb the peace of a man's mind. Difficulty, Obstacle, Impediment, — • 264 DIFFIDENCE Difficulty, in Latin difficultas, and diffi- eilis, compounded of the privative dis and facilis, easy, from Jacere, to do, sig- nifies not easy to be done. Obstacle, in Latin obstaculum, from oh, in the way, and stare, to stand, signifies the thing that stands in the way between a per- son and the object he has in view. Impediment, in Latin impedimentum, from impedio, compounded of in, in, and pedes, feet, signifies something that entangles the feet. All these terms include in their sig- nification that which interferes either with the actions or views of men: the difficulty hes most in the natm-e and circumstances of the thiag itself; the obstacle and impediment consist of that which is external or foreign: a difficulty interferes with the completion of any work; an obstacle interferes with the attainment of any end; an impediment interrupts the progress and prevents the execution of one's wishes: a diffi- culty embarrasses, it suspends the powers of acting or deciding; an ob- stacle opposes itself, it is properly met in the way, and intervenes between us and our object; an impediment shackles and puts a stop to our proceedings: we speak of encountering a difficulty, sur- mounting an obstacle, and removing an impediment: the disposition of the mind often occasions more difficulties in negotiations than the subjects them- selves; the eloquence of Demosthenes was the greatest obstacle which Philip of Macedon experienced in his poUtical career; ignorance of the language is the greatest impediment which a for- eigner experiences in the pursuit of any object out of his own country. See also Objection. DIFFIDENCE. See Distrust. DIFFIDENT. See Modest. DIFFUSE, Prolix. Both mark de- fects of style opposed to brevity. Dif- fuse, in Latin diffu^us, participle of diffundere, to pour out or spread wide, marks the quality of being extended in space. Prolix comes from Latin pro, beyond, and liquere, to flow (whence liquid, liquor, etc.), and means flowing beyond bounds, overflowing. The diffuse is properly opposed to the Erecise; the prolix to the concise or iconic. A diffuse writer is fond of amplification, he abounds in epithets, tropes, figures, and illustrations; the prolix writer is fond of circumlocution, minute details, and trifling particulars. l3iffvseness is a fault only in degree and according to circumstances; prolixity is a positive fault at all times. The former leads to the use of words un- necessarily; the latter to the use of phrases, as well as words, that are al- together useless: the diffuse style has too much of repetition : the prolix style abounds in tautology. Diffuseness often arises from an exuberance of imagina- tion; prolixity from the want of imag- ination; on the other hand, the former may be coupled with great superficiality and the latter with great soUdity. Modem writers have fallen into the error of diffuseness. Lord Clarendon and many English writers preceding him are chargeable with prolixity. See also Spread. DIGEST. See Abridgment; Dis- pose. DIGNIFIED. See Magisterial. DIGNITY. See Honor; Pride. DIGRESS, Deviate. Both in the original and the accepted sense, these words express going out of the ordi- nary course; but digress is used only in particular, and deviate in general cases. We digress only in a narrative, whether written or spoken; we deviate in actions as well as in words, in our conduct as well as in writings. Digress is mostly taken in a good or indifferent sense, deviate in an indifferent or bad sense. Although frequent digressions are faulty, yet occasionally it is neces- sary to digress for the purpose of ex- planation ; every deviation is bad which is not sanctioned by the necessity of circumstances. DILATE, Expand. Dilate, in Latin dilato, from dis, apart, and latus, wide, that is, to make very wide. Expand, in Latin expando, compounded of ex and pandere, to spread, to appear or show, signifying to set forth or lay open to view by spreading out. The idea of drawing anything out so as to occupy a greater space is common to these terms in opposition to contract- ing. A bladder dilates on the admis- sion of air, or the heart dilates with joy; knowledge expands the mind, or a per- son's views expand with circumstances. DIRECT 265 DILATORY. See Slow. DILIGENT, Expeditious, Prompt. All these terms mark the quality of quickness in a commendable degree. Diligent, from dUigere, to love, marks the interest one takes in doing some- thing; he is diligent who loses no time, who keeps close to the work from in- clination. Expeditious comes from the Latin expedio, from ex, out, and pes, pedis, foot, which meant originally to fet one's foot out, to set off with speed, [e who is expeditiotis applies himself to no other thing that offers; he finishes everything in its turn. Prompt, from the Latin promo, to draw out or make ready, marks one's desire to get ready; he is prompt who sets about a thing without delay, so as to make it ready. Idleness, dilatoriness, and slowness are the three defects opposed to these three qualities. The diligent man goes to his work willingly, and applies to it assiduously; the expeditious man gets it finished quickly; the prompt man sets about it reaculy and gets it finished immediately. It is necessair to be diligent in the concerns which belong to us, to be expeditious in any business that requires to h% terminated, to be prompt in the execution of orders that are given to us. See also Active; Seduious. DIM. See Dark. DIMINISH. See Abate. DIMINUTIVE. See Little. DICX:esE. See Bishopric. DIP. See Dabble. DIPLOMACY. See Tact. DIRECT, Regulate, Dispose. We direct for the instruction of individuals; we regulate for the good order or con- venience of many. To direct is personal, it supposes au- thority; to regulate is general, it sup- poses superior information. An officer directs the movements of his men in military operations; the steward or master of the ceremonies regulates the whole concerns of an entertainment: the director is often a man in power; the regulator is always the man of business; the latter is frequently em- ployed to act under the former. To direct is always used with regard to others; to regulate, frequently with regard to ourselves. One person di- rects another according to his bet- ters judgment: he regulates his own conduct by principles or circum- stances. But sometimes the word direct is taken in the sense of giving a direction to an object, and it is then distinguished from regulate, which signifies to deter- mine the measure and other circum- stances. To dispose, from Latin dis, and French poser, for derivation of which see Compose, signifying to put apart for a particular purpose, supposes superior power like direct, and su- perior wisdom like regulate; whence the term has been applied to the Al- mighty, who is styled the Supreme Dis- poser of events, and by the poets to the heathen deities. See also Conduct; Straight. Direction, Address, Superscription. — Direction marks that which directs. Address is that which addresses. Superscription, from super, above, and scribere, to write, signifies that which is written over. Although these terms may be used Eromiscuously for one another, yet they ave a peculiarity of signification by which their proper use is defined: a direction may serve to direct to places as well as to persons: an address is never used but in direct application to the person: a superscription has more respect to the thing than the person. A direction may be written or verbal; an address in this sense is always writ- ten; a superscription must not only be written, but either on or over some other thing: a direction is given to such as go in search of persons and places; it ought to be clear and particular: an address is put either on a card and a letter or in a book; it ought to be suit- able to the station and situation of the person addressed: a superscription is placed at the head of other writings, or over tombs and pillars; it ought to be appropriate. Direction, Order. — Direction (see Direct). Order (see Command). Direction contains most of instruc- tion in it ; order, most of authority . Di- rections should be followed, orders obeyed. It is necessary to direct those who are unable to act for themselves: it is necessary to order those whose 26a DIRIGIBLE business it is to execute the orders. Directions given to servants and chil- dren must be clear, simple, and precise; orders to tradespeople may be partic- ular or general. Directions extend to the moral conduct of others, as well as the ordinary concerns of life; orders are confined to the personal conven- ience of the individual. A parent di- rects a child as to his behavior in com- pany, or as to his conduct when he enters life; a teacher directs his pupil in the choice of books, or in the dis- tribution of his studies: the master gives orders to his attendants to be in waiting for him at a certain hour; or he gives orders to his tradesmen to provide what is necessary. See also Key. Directly, Immediately, Instantly, In- stantaneously.— Directly signifies in a direct or straight manner. Immediately signifies without any medium or in- tervention. Instantly and instanta- neously, from instant, signifies in an instant. Directly is most applicable to the ac- tions of men; immediately and instant- ly to either actions or events. Directly refers to the interruptions which may intentionally delay the commence- ment of any work; immediately in gen- eral refers to the space of time that intervenes. A diligent person goes di- rectly to his work; he suffers nothing to draw him aside: good news is immedi- ately spread abroad upon its arrival; nothing intervenes to retard it. Im- mediaiely and instantly, or instanta- neously, both mark a quick succession of events, but the latter in a much stronger degree than the former. Immediately is negative; it expresses simply that nothing intervenes; instantly is posi- tive, signifying the very existing mo- ment in which the thing happens. A person who is of a wilUng disposition goes or runs immediately to the assist- ance of another; but the ardor of af- fection impels him to fly instantly to his rehef, as he sees the danger. A sur- geon does not proceed directly to dress a wound: he first examines it in order to ascertain its nature: men of hvely minds immediately see the source of their own errors: people of delicate feelings are instantly alive to the slightest breach of decorum. A covu-se of proceeding is direct, the consequences are immediate, and the effects in- stantaneous. DIRIGIBLE. See Aircraft. DIRTY. See Squalid. DISABILITY. See Inability. DISADVANTAGE, Injury, Hurt, Detriment, Prejudice. Disadvan- tage impUes the absence of an advan- tage, which see. Injury, in Latin in- juria, from in, not, and jus, juris, right, properly signifies what is contrary to right or justice, but extends in its sense to every loss or deficiency which is occasioned. Hurt, Middle EngUsh hurten, from Old French hurter, meant to strike or dash against, hence to in- jure. Detriment, in Latin detrimentum, from detritum and deterrere, to wear away, signifies the effect of being worn out. Prejudice, in the improper sense of the word (see Bias), implies the ill which is supposed to result from pre- judice. Disadvantage is rather the absence of a good; injury is a positive evil: the want of education may frequently be a disadvantage to a person by retarding his advancement; the ill word of an- other may be an injury by depriving him of friends. Disadvantage, there- fore, is applied to such things as are of of an adventitious nature: the injury, to that which is of essential impor- tance. Hurt, detriment, and prejudice are all species of injuries. Injury, in general, impUes whatever ill befalls an object by the external action of other objects, whether taken in relation to physical or moral evil, to persons or to things; hurt is that species of injury which is produced by more direct violence; too close an appUcation to study is in- jurious to the health; reading by an improper hght is hurtful to the eyes; so in a moral sense, the light reading which a circulating Ubrary suppUes is often injurious to the morals of yoimg people; all violent affections are hurt- ful to the mind. Detriment and prejudice are species of injury which affect only the out- ward circumstances of a person or thing, the former implying what may lessen the value of an object, the latter what may lower it in the esteem of others. Whatever affects the stabiUty DISBELIEF 267 of a merchant's credit is highly detri- mental to his interests: whatever is prejudicial to the character of a man should not be made the subject of in- discriminate conversation. DISAFFECTION, Disloyalty, Dis- affection is general: disloyalty is par- ticular; it is a species of disaffection. Men are disaffected to the government, disloyal to their prince. Disaffection may be said with regard to any form of government; disloyalty, only with re- gard to monarchy. Although both terms are commonly employed in a bad sense, yet the former does not al- ways convey the unfavorable meaning which is attached to the latter. A man may have reasons to think himself justified in disaffection, but he will never attempt to offer anything in justi- fication of disloyalty. A usm-ped gov- ernment will have many disaffected sub- jects with whom it must deal leniently; the best king may have disloyal sub- jects, upon whom he must exercise the rigor of the law. Many were disaffected to the usurpation of OUver Cromwell, because they would not be disloyal to their king. DISAGREE. See Differ. DISAPPEAR, Vanish. To disap- pear signifies not to appear (see Air). Vanish, in French ivanouir, Latin ev~ aneo or evanesco, compoimded of e and vanescere, to become empty, from vanus, empty, signifies to go out of sight. To disappear comprehends no par- ticular mode of action; to vanish in- cludes in it the idea of a rapid motion. A thing disappears either gradually or suddenly; it vanishes on a sudden; it disappears in the ordinary course of things; it vanishes by an unusiial effort, a supernatural or a magic power. Anv object that recedes or moves away will soon disappear; in fairy tales things are made to vanish the instant they are beheld. To disappear is often a tempo- rary action; to vanish generally con- veys the idea of being permanently lost to the sight. The stars appear and disappear in the firmament; hghtning vanishes with a rapidity that is un- DISAPPOINT. See Defeat. DISAPPROBATION. See Dis- pleasure. DISAPPROVE, DisuKE. To dis- approve is not to approve, or to think not good. To dislike is not to like, or to find imlike or unsuitable to one's wishes. Disapprove is an act of the judgment; dislike is an act of the will or the affec- tion. To approve or disapprove is pe- culiarly the part of a superior, or one who determines the conduct oi others; to dislike is altogether a personal act, in which the feelings of the individual are consulted. It is a misuse of the judgment to disapprove where we need only dislike; it is a perversion of the judgment to disapprove because we dislike. DISASTER. See Calamity. DISAVOW, Deny, Disown. To disavow, from dis and avow (see Ac- knowledge), is to avow that a thing is not: deny is to assert that a thing is not: disown, from dis and own, is to assert that a person or thing is not one's own or does not belong to one. A disavowal is a general declaration; a denial is a particular assertion; the former is made voluntarily and unasked for, the latter is always in direct an- swer to a charge: jwe disavow in mat- ters of general interest where truth only is concerned; we deny in matters of personal interest where the character or feelings are implicated. What is disavowed is generally in support of truth; what is denied may often be in direct violation of truth: an honest mind will always disavow whatever has been erroneously attributed to it; a timid person sometimes denies what he knows to be true from a fear of the consequences. Deny is said of things that concern others as well as ourselves; disown only of things in which one is personally concerned or supposed to be so. De- nial is employed for events or indiffer- ent matters; disowning extends to what- ever one tan own or possess: a person denies that there is anv truth m the assertion of another; he disowns all participation in any aiffair. Our verac- ity or judgment is often the only thing impUcated in the denial: our guilt or innocence, honor or dishonor, is im- pUcated in what we disown. DISAVOWED. See Neutral. DISBELIEF, Unbeuef. DisbeHrf 268 DISCARD properly implies the believing that a thing is not, or refusing to believe that it is. Unbelief expresses properly a believing the contrary of what one has believed before: disbelief is most appU- cable to the ordinary events of life; unbelief to serious matters of opinion: our disbelief of the idle tales which are told by beggars is justified by the fre- quent detection of their falsehood; our Saviour had compassion on Thomas for his unbelief, and gave him such evi- dences of His identity as dissipated every doubt. DISCARD. See Dismiss. DISCERN. See Perceive. DISCERNMENT, Penetration, Discrimination, Judgment. Discern- ment expresses the power of discerning (see Perceive). Penetration denotes the act or power of penetrating, from penetrate, in Latin penetraiv^, parti- ciple of penetrare, from penitus, within, and penus, the inner part of a sanc- tuary, signifying to see into the in- terior. Discrimination denotes the act or power of discriminating, from dis- criminate, in Latin discriminatus, par- ticiple of discrimino, to make a differ- ence. Judgment denotes the power of judging, from judge, in Latin jvdico, compounded of jus, right, and dicere, signifying to pronounce right. The first three of these terms do not express different powers, but different modes of the same power; namely, the power of seeing intellectually, or exert- ing the intellectual sight. Discernment is not so powerful a mode of intellectual vision as penetration; the former is a common faculty, the latter is a higher degree of the same faculty; it is the power of seeing quickly, and seeing in spitfe of all that intercepts the sight and keeps the object 6ut of view: a man of common discernment discerns charac- ters which ar^ not concealed by any particiilar disguise; a man of penetra- tion is not to be deceived by any arti- fice, however thoroughly cloaked or secured, even from suspicion. Discern- OTenlktid penetration serve for the dis- covery of individual things by their outward marks; discrimination is em- Eloyed in th6 discovery of differences etween two or more objects; the for- mer consists of simple observation, the latter combines also comparison: dis- cernment and penetration are great aids toward discrimination; he who can dis- cern the springs of human action or penetrate the views of men wiU be most fitted for discriminating between the characters of different men. Although judgment derives much as- sistance from the three former opera- tions, it is a totally distinct power: these only discover the things that are acting on external objects by seeing them: the judgment is creative; it produces by deduction from that which passes inwardly. Discernment and the others are speculative; they are di- rected to that which is to be known, and are confined to present objects; they serve to discover truth and false- hood, perfections and defects, motives and pretexts: the judgment is practical; it is directed to that which is to be done, and extends its views to the future; it marks the relations and connections of things; it foresees their consequences and effects. Of discernment, we say that it is clear;, it serves to remove all obscurity and confusion: of penetration we say that it is acute; it pierces every veil which falsehood draws before truth, and prevents us from being deceived: of discrimination we say that it is nice ; it renders our ideas accurate and serves to prevent us from confounding objects; of judgment we say that it is solid or sound; it renders the conduct prudent and prevents us from com- mitting mistakes or involving ourselves in embarrassments. When the question is to estimate the real quahties of either persons or things, we exercise discernment; when it is re- quired to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exer- cise penetration; when the question is to determine the proportions and de- grees of qualities in persons or things, we must use discrimination; when called upon to take any step or act any part, we must employ judgment. Discernment is more or less indispen- sable for every man in private or public stations; he who has the most pro- miscuous deahngs with "men has the greatest need of it: penetration is of pecuhar importance for princes and statesmen: discrimination is of great utiUty for all who have to determine DISCREDIT 269 the characters and merits of others: judgment is an absolute requisite for all to whom the execution or management of concerns is intrusted. See also Gumption. DISCHARGE. See Dismiss. DISCIPLE. See Scholar. DISCLAIM, Disown. Disclaim and disown are both personal acts respect- ing the individual who is the agent; to disclaim is to throw off a claim, as to disoum (see Disavow) is not to ad- mit as one's own; as claim, from the Latin clamo, signifies to declare with a loud tone what we want as our own; so to disclaim is, with an equally loud or positive tone, to give up a claim: this is a more positive act than to disown, which may be performed by insinuation or by the mere abstaining to own. He who feels himself dis- graced by the actions that are done by his nation or his family will be ready to disclaim the very name which he bears in common with the offending party; an absurd pride sometimes im- pels men to disown their relationship to those who are beneath them in ex- ternal rank and condition: an honest mind will disclaim, all right to praise which it feels not to belong to itself; the fear of ridicule sometimes makes a man disown that which would re- dound to his honor. DISCLOSE. See Publish; Un- cover; Unveil. DISCOMPOSE. See Abash; Dis- order. DISCONCERT. See Abash; Baf- fle; Disorder; Snub. DISCONTINUE. See Cease. DISCORD, Strife. Discord comes from Latin dis, apart, and the stem cx>rd, heart, signifying a lack of harmony between two people, but now it is con- sciously used as a metaphor in which it derives its signification from the harshness produced in music by the clashing of^ two strings which do not suit with each other; whence, in the moral sense, the chords of the mind which come into an unsuitable col- lision produce a discord. Strife comes from the word strive, to denote the action of striving, that is, in any angry maimer (see Contend); where there is strife there must be discord; but there may be discord without strife; discord consists most in the feeling; strife consists most in the outward ac- tion. Discord evinces itself in various ways; by looks, words, or actions: strife displays itself in words or acts of violence. Discord is fatal to the happiness of families; strife is the greatest enemy to peace between neigh- bors; discord arose between the god- desses on the apple being thrown into the assembly; Homer commences his poem with the strife that took place between Agamemnon and Achilles. Discord may arise from mere difference of opinion; strife is in general occa- sioned by some matter of personal in- terest; discord in the councils of a nation is the almost certain fore- runner of its ruin; the common prin- ciples of p>oliteness forbid strife among persons of good breeding. See also Dissension. DISCOURAGE. See Deter. DISCOURSE. See Speak. DISCOVER, Manifest, Declare. The idea of making known is conveyed by all these terms; but discover, which signifies simply to take off the covering from anything, expresses less than manifest (see Apparent), and that than declare (see Declare): we discover by any means direct or indirect; we mani- fest by imquestionable marks; we de- clare by express words: talents and dispositions discover themselves; par- ticular leeUngs and sentiments mani- fest themselves; facts, opinions, and sentiments are declared; children early discover a turn for some particular art or science; a person manifests his re- gard for another by unequivocal proofs of kindness; a person of an open dis- position is apt to declare his sentiments without disguise. Animals or unconscious agents may be said to discover, as things discover symptoms of decay; but persons only, or things personified, manifest or de- clare; cruelty may oe manifested by actions; the works of the creation de- clare the wisdom of the Creator. See also Detect; Find; Spt; Un- cover. DISCREDIT, Disgrace, Reproach. Scandal. Discredit signifies the loss of credit; disgrace, the loss of grace, favor, or esteem; reproach stands for the thing that deserves to be reproached, 270 DISCRETION and scandal comes from Greek oKavSaKov, Latin scandalum, a stumbling-block, from the root found in ascend, signify- ing to step or jump. The conduct of men in their various relations with one another may give rise to the un- favorable sentiment which is expressed in common by these terms. Things are said to reflect discredit or disgrace, or to bring reproach or scandal on the in- dividual. These terms seem to rise in sense one upon the other: disgrace is a stronger term than discredit, reproach than disgrace, siadscandal thajxreproach. Discredit interferes with a man's credit or respectabiUty; disgrace marks him out as an object of unfavorable distinction; reproach makes him a sub- ject of reproachfid conversation; scan- dal makes him an object of offence or even abhorrence. As regularity in hours, regularity in habits or modes of hving, regularity in payments, are a credit to a family, so is any deviation from this order to its discredit: as moral rectitude, kindness, charity, and benev- olence serve to insure the good-will and esteem of men, so do instances of unfair deahng, cruelty, inhumanity, and an unfeeling temper tend to the dis- grace of the offender: as a life of dis- tinguished virtue or particular in- stances of moral excellence may cause a man to be spoken of in strong terms of commendation, so will flagrant atrocities or a course of immorality cause his name and himself to be the general subject of reproach: as the profession of a Christian with a con- sistent practice is the greatest orna- ment which a man can put on, so is the profession with an inconsistent prac- tice the greatest deformity that can be witnessed; it is calculated to bring a scandal on reUgion itself in the eyes of those who do not know and feel its intrinsic excellences. Discredit and disgrace are negative qualities, and apply properly to the out- ward and adventitious circumstances of a person; but reproach and scandal are something positive and have respect to the moral character. A man may bring discredit or disgrace upon himself by trivial or indifferent things; but re- proach or scandal follows only the vio- lation of some positive law, moral or divine. The term reproach is also taken for the object of reproach, and scandal for the object of scandal. See also Disgrace. DISCRETION. See Judgment. DISCRIMINATE. See Distin- guish. DISCRIMINATION. See Discern- ment. DISCUSS, Examine. Discuss, in Latin disciissus, participle of discutio, from dis, apart, and quatere, to shake, signifies to shake asunder or to sepa- rate thoroughly so as to see the whole composition. Examine, in Latin ex- amino, comes from examen, the middle beam, or thread, by which the poise of the balance is held, because the judgment holds the balance in exam- ining. The intellectual operation expressed by these terms is applied to objects that cannot be immediately discerned or understood, but they vary both in mode and degree. Discussion is alto- gether carried on by verbal and per- sonal communication; examination pro- ceeds by reading, reflection, and ob- servation; we often examine, therefore, by discussion, which is properly one mode of examination; a discussion is al- ways carried on by two or more per- sons; an examination may be carried on by one only: politics are a frequent though not always a pleasant subject of discussion in social meetings; com- plicated questions cannot be too thoroughly examined. DISDAIN. See Contemn; Haugh- tiness. DISDAINFUL. See Contemptu- ous. DISEASE. See Disorder. DISEASED. See Sick. DISENGAGE, Disentangle, Ex- tricate. Disengage signifies to make free from an engagement. Disentangle is to get rid of an entanglement. Extri- cate, in Latin extricatvs, from ex and triccB, difficulties, impediments. As to engage signifies simply to bind, and entangle signifies to bind in an involved manner (for derivation and meaning see Embarrass), to disentangle is naturally apphed to matters of great- er difficulty and perplexity than to disengage; and as the term extricate DISHONOR 271 includes the idea of that which would hold fast and keep within a tight in- volvement, it is employed with re- spect to matters of the greatest pos- sible embarrassment and intricacy: we may be disengaged from an oath; disentangled from pecimiary difficul- ties; extricated from a perplexity; it is not right to expect to be disengaged from all the duties which attach to men as members of society; he who enters into metaphysical disquisitions must not expect to be soon disentangled: when a general has committed himself by coming into too close a contact with a very superior force, he sometimes may be able to extricate himself from his awkward situation by his general- ship. DISENTANGLE. See Disengage. DISFIGURE. See Deface. DISGRACE. See Abase; Dis- credit; DiSHONOK. DISGUISE. See Conceal. DISGUST, Loathing, Nausea. Disgust, from dis and gustare, to taste, from Latin gicstus, the taste, denotes the aversion of the taste to an object. Loathing (see Abhor). Nausea, in Latin nausea, from the Greek vavc, a ship, properly denotes seasickness. Disgust is less than loathing, and that than nausea. When applied to sensible objects, we are disgusted with dirt; we loathe the smell of food if we have a sickly appetite; we nauseate medicine: and when apphed metaphorically we are disgusted with affectation; we loathe the endearments of those who are of- fensive; we natiseate all the enjoy- ments of life after having made an intemperate use of them and dis- covered their inanity. See also Dislike. DISHEARTEN. See Abash; De- ter. DISHONEST, Knavish. Dishonest marks the contrary to honest; knavish marks the hkeness to a knave, from Anglo-Saxon cnapa, a boy, German knabe, a boy, a bojr-servant; hence some one as mischievous and un- rehable as boy-servants were likely to be. Dishonest characterizes sim- ply the mode of action;. knavish char- acterizes the agent as well as the action: what is dishonest violates the estab- lished laws of man; what is knavish supposes peculiar art and design in the accomplishment. It is dishonest to take anything from another which does not belong to one's self^ it is knavish to get it by fraud or artifice, or by imposing on the confidence of an- other. We may prevent dishonest prac- tices by ordinary means of security; but we must not trust ourselves in the company of knavish people if we do not wish to be overreached. DISHONOR, Disgrace, Shame. Dishonor signifies what does away honor. Dis^ace (see Degrade). Shame signifies what produces sliame. Dis- honor deprives a person of those out- ward marks of honor which men look for according to their rank and station, or it is the state of being dishonored or less thought of and esteemed than one wishes. Disgrace deprives a man of the favor and kmdness which he has here- tofore received from others, or it is the state of being positively cast off by those who have before favored him or by whom he ought to be looked upon with favor. It is the fault of the indi- vidual that causes the disgrace. Shame expresses more than disgrace; it is oc- casioned by direct mord turpitude or that of which one ought to be ashamed. The fear of dishonor acts as a laudable stimulus to the discharge of one's duty; the fear of disgrace or shame serves to prevent the commission of vices or crimes. A soldier feels it a dishonor not to be placed at the j)ost of danger, but he is not always suflBciently alive to the disgrace of being punished, nor is he deterred from his irregularities by the open shame to which he is some- times put in the presence of his fellow- soldiers. As epithets they likewise rise in sense and are distmguished by other characteristics: a dishonorable action is that which violates the principles of honor; a disgraceful action is that which reflects disgrace; a shameful action is that of which one ought to be fully ashamed: it is very dishonorable for a man not to keep his word; very dt«- gracefuL for a gentleman to associate with those who are his inferiors in station and education; very shameful for him to use his rank and influence over the lower orders only to mislead them from their duty. The sense of 272 DISINCLINATION what is dishonorable is to the superior what the sense of the disgraceful is to the inferior, but the sense of what is shamefid is independent of rank or Station, and forms a part of that moral sense which is inherent in the breast of every rational creature. Whoever, therefore, cherishes in himself a Uvely sense of what is dishonorable or dis- graceful is tolerably secure of never committing anything that is shameful. See also Disgrace. DISINCLINATION. See Dislike. DISJOIN. See Separate. DISJOINT, Dismember. Disjoint signifies to separate at the joint. Dis- member signifies to separate the mem- bers. The terms here spoken of derive their distinct meaning and application from the signification of the words joint and member. A limb of the body may be disjointed if it be so put out of the joint that it cannot act; but the body itself is dismembered when the different limbs or parts are separated from one another. So in the metaphorical sense our ideas are said to be disjointed when they are so thrown out of their order that they do not fall in with one an- other: and kingdoms are said to be dismembered where any part or parts are separated from the rest. DISLIKE, Displeasure, Dissatis- faction, Distaste, Disgust. Dislike (see Aversion). Displeasure signifies the opposite to pleasure. Dissatisfac- tion is the opposite to satisfaction. Distaste is the opposite to an agreeable taste. Dislike and dissatisfaction denote the feeling or sentiment produced either by persons or things: displeasure, that pro- duced by persons only : distaste and dis- gust, that produced by things only. In regard to persons, dislike is the senti- ment of equals and persons uncon- nected; displeasure and dissatisfaction, of superiors, or such as stand in some particular relation to one another. Strangers may feel a dislike upon seeing each other: parents or masters may feel displeasure or dissatisfaction: the former sentiment is occasioned by sup- posed faults in the moral conduct of the child or servant; the latter by sup- posed defective services. I dislike a person for his assumption or loquacity; I am displeased with him for his care- lessness, and dissatisfied with his labor. Displeasure is awakened by whatever is done amiss: dissatisfaction is caused by what happens amiss or contrary to our e^qpectation. Accordingly, the word dissatisfaction is not confined to persons of a particular rank, but to the nature of the connection which sub- sists between them. Whoever does not receive what he thinks himself en- titled to from another is dissatisfied. A servant may be dissatisfied with the treatment he meets with from his master; and may be said, therefore, to express dissatisfaction, though not displeasure. In regard to things, dislike is a casu- al feeling not arising from any specific cause. A dissatisfaction is connected with our desires and expectations: we dislike the performance of an actor from one or many causes, or from no ap- parent cause; but we are dissaiisfied with his performance if it fall short of what we were led to expect. In order to lessen the number of our dislikes we ought to endeavor not to dislike with- out a cause; and in order to lessen our dissatisfaction we ought to be moderate in our expectation. Dislike, distaste, and disgust rise on one another in their signification. Dis- taste expresses more than dislike, and disgust more than distaste. Dislike is a partial feeling, quickly produced and quickly subsiding; distaste is a settled feeling, gradually produced and perma- nent in its duration: disgust is either transitory or otherwise; momentarily or gradually produced, but stronger than either of the two others. Caprice has a great share in our Ukes and dis- likes: distaste depends upon the changes to which the constitution physically and mentally is exposed: disgust owes its origin to the nature of things and their natural operation on the minds of men. A child likes and dislikes his playthings without any apparent cause for the change of sentiment: after a long illness a person will frequently take a distaste to the food or the amusements which before afforded him much pleasure: what is indecent or filthy is a natural object of disgust to every person whose mind is not de- praved. It is good to suppress un- DISORDER 273 founded dislikes; it is difficult to over- come a strong distaste; it is advisable to divert our attention from objects calculated to create disgust. See also Aversion; Disapprove. Dislike, Disinclination. — Dislike (see above) . Disinclination is the reverse of inclination (see Attachment). Dislike applies to what one has or does; dis- inclination only to what one does: we dislike the thing we have, or dislike to do a thing; but we are disinclined only to do a thing. They express a similar feeUng that differs in degree. Disincli- nation is but a small degree of dislike; dislike marks something contrary; dis- inclination does not amount to more than the absence of an incUnation. None but a disobU^ng temper has a dislike to comply with reasonable re- quests; but the .most obhging disposi- tion may have an occasional disinclina- tion to comply with a particular re- quest. DISLOYALTY. See Disaffection. DISMAL. See Dull. DISMANTLE. See Demolish. DISMAY, Daunt, Appal. Dismay comes from the Old French participle form, dismaye, of a verb compounded from Latin dis, privative, and Old High German magan, might or power. Daunt comes from Latin domare to tame, English tame being probably the same word originally. Appal, compounded of the intensive ad and pallere, to grow pale, signifies to make pale with fear. The effect of fear on the spirit is strongly expressed by all these terms; but dismay expresses less than daunt, and this than appall. We are dismayed by alarming circumstances; we are daunted by terrifying; we are appalled by horrid circumstances. A severe de- feat will dismay so as to lessen the force of resistance: the fiery glare from the eyes of a ferocious beast will daunt him who was venturing to approach: the sight of an apparition will appall the stoutest heart. DISMEMBER. See Disjoint DISMISS, Discharge, Disca.rd. Dismiss, in Latin dismissus, participle of dimitto, compounded of dis, away, and mittere, to send, signifies to send away. Discharge signifies to release from a charge. Discard, in Spanish descartar, compounded ofdes and cartar, signifies to lay cards out or aside, to cast them off. The idea of removing to a distance is included in all these terms, but with various collateral circumstances. Dis- miss is the general term; discharge and discard are modes of dismissing: dismiss is applicable to persons of all stations, but used more particularly for the higher orders: discharge, on the other hand, is confined to those in a sub- ordinate station. A clerk is dis- missed; a menial servant is discharged: an officer is dismissed; a soldier is discharged. Neither dismiss nor discharge defines the motive of the action ; they are used indifferently for that which is volim- tary or the contrary: discard, on the contrary, always marks a dismissal that is not agreeable to the party discarded. A person may request to be dismissed or discharged, but never to be discarded. The dismissal or discharge frees a person from the obligation or necessity of pierforming a certain duty; the dis- carding throws him out of a desirable rank or station. They are all applied to things in the moral sense: we are said to dismiss our fears, to discharge a duty, and to discard a sentiment from the mind. DISORDER, Derange, Discon- cert, Discompose. Disorder signifies to put out of order. Derange, from de ana range or rank, signifies to put out of the rank in which it was placed. Disconcert, to put out of the concert or harmony. Discompose, to put out of a state of composure. All these terms express the idea of putting out of order; but the latter three vary as to the mode or object of the action. The term disorder is used in a perfectly indefinite form, and might be applied to any object. As everything may be in order, so may everything be disordered; yet it is seldom used except in regard to such things as have been in a natural order. Derange and disconcert are employed in speaking of such things as have been put into an artificial order. To derange is to disorder that which has been systematically arranged or put in a certain range; and to disconcert is to disorder that which has been put 274 DISORDERED together by concert or contrivance: thus the body may be disordered; a man's affairs or papers deranged; a scheme disconcerted. To discompose is a species of derangement in regard to trivial matters: thus a tucker, a frill, or a cap may be discomposed. The shghtest change of diet will disorder people of tender constitutions: mis- fortunes are apt to derange the affairs of the most prosperous: the unexpected return of a master to his home dis- concerts the schemes which have been formed by the domestics: those who are particular as to their appearance are careful not to have any part of their dress discomposed. When apphed to the mind, disorder and derange are said of the intellect; disconcert and discompose of the ideas or spirits, the former denoting a per- manent state, the latter a temporary or transient state. The mind is said to be disordered when the faculty of ratiocination is in any degree inter- rupted; the intellect is said to be deranged when it is brought into a posi- tive state of incapacity for action: persons are sometimes disordered in their minds for a time by particular occurrences who do not become actual- ly deranged; a person is said to be dis- concerted who suddenly loses his col- lectedness of thinking: he is said to be discomposed who loses his regularity of feehng. A sense of shame is the most apt to disconcert: the more irritable the temper the more easily one is discom- posed. See also Jumble. Disorder, Disease, Distemper, Malady. — Disorder signifies the state of being out of order. Disease signifies the state of being ill at ease, from Old French des, privative, and aise, ease. Distemper signifies the state of being out of temper or out of a due tempera- ment. Malady is derived from the Latin male habitus, badly settled, in a bad condition. AH these terms agree in their apph- cation to the state of the animal body. Disorder is, as before, the general term, and the other specific. In this general sense disorder is altogether indefinite; but in its restricted sense it expresses less than all the rest: it is the mere commencement of a disease: disease is also more general than the other terms, for it comprehends every seri- ous and permanent disorder in the animal economy, and is therefore of universal application. The disorder is sUght, partial, and transitory: the disease is deep-rooted and permanent. The disorder may he in the extremities: the disease hes in the humors and the vital parts. Occasional headaches, colds, and what is merely cutaneous are termed disorders; fevers, dropsies, and the like are diseases. Distemper is used for such particularly as throw the animal frame most completely out of its temper or course, and is conse- quently apphed properly to virulent disorders, such as the smallpox. Malady has less of a technical sense than the other terms; it refers more to the suffering than to the state of the body. There "may be many maladies where there is no disease; but diseases are themselves in general maladies. Our maladies are frequent- ly bom with us, but oiu* diseases may come upon us at any time of hfe. Blindness is in itself a malady and may be produced by a disease in the eye. Oiu" disorders are frequently cured by abstaining from those things which caused them; the whole science of medicine consists in finding out suitable remedies for our diseases; our maladies may be lessened with pa- tience, although they cannot always be alleviated or removed by art. The terms disorder, disease, and dis- temper may be apphed with a similar distinction to the mind as well as the body. The disorders are either of a temporary or a permanent nature, but, unless specified to the contrary, are understood to be temporary: diseases consist in vicious habits: our distempers arise from the violent opera- tions of passion; our maladies lie in the injuries which the affections oc- casion. Any perturbation in the mind is a disorder: avarice is a disease: melancholy is a distemper as far as it throws the mind out of its bias; it is a malady as far as it occasions siiffering. DISORDERED. See Topsy-turvy. DISORDERLY. See Irregular. DISOWN. See Disavow; Disclaim. DISPARAGE, Detract, Traduce, Depreciate, Degrade, Decry. Dis- DISPARITY 275 Enrage, compounded of dis and Late atin paraticum, from par, equal, sig- nifies to make a thing imequal or be- low what it ought to be. Detract (see Asperse). Traduce, from Latin trans, across, and ducere, to lead, signifies to carry from one to another that which is unfavorable. Depreciate, from the Latin pretium, a price, signifies tq bring down the price. Degrade (see Abase). Decry signifies Uterally to cry down. The idea of lowering the value of an object is common to all these words, which differ in the circiunstances and object of the action. Disparagement is the most indefinite in the manner: de- tract and traduce are specific in the forms by which an object is lowered: dis- paragement respects the mental endow- ments and qualifications: detract and traduce are said of the moral character, the former, however, in a less specific manner than the latter. We disparage a man's performance by speaking slightingly of it: we detract from the merits of a person by ascribing his suc- cess to chance; we traduce him by handing about tales that are unfavor- able to his reputation: thus authors are apt to disparage the writings of their rivals; or a soldier may detract from the skill of his commander, or he may traduce him by relating scandalous reports. To disparage, detract, and traduce can be applied only to persons or that which is personal; depreciate, degrade, and decry, to whatever is an object of esteem; we depreciate and degrade, therefore, things as well as persons, and decry things: to depreciate is, however, not so strong a term as to degrade, for the language which is employed to depreciate will be mild compared with that used for degrading: we may depre- ciate an object by implication or in indirect terms, but harsh and unseemly epithets are employed for degrading: thus a man may be said to depreciate himian nature who does not represent it as capable of its true elevation; he degrades it who sinks it below the scale of rationaUty. We may depreciaie or degrade an individual, a language, and the like; we decry measures and princi- ples: the former two are an act of an mdividual; the latter is properly the act of many. Some men have such p>erverted notions that they are always depreciating whatever is esteemed ex- cellent in the world: they whose in- terests have stifled all feelings of hu- manity have degraded the poor Afri- cans in order to justify the enslaving of them: political partisans commonly decry the measures of one party in order to exalt those of another. Disparage, Derogate, Degrade. — Dis- parage (see above). Derogate, in Latin derogatus, from de, from, away, and rogare, to ask, meaning to "ask away," to repeal in part, signifies to take from a thing that which is claimed. Degrade (see Abase). Disparage is here employed, not as the act of persons, but oi things, in which case it is aUied to derogate, but retains its indefinite and general sense as before : circumstances may disparage the performances of a writer, or they may derogate from the honors and dig- nities of an individual: it would be a high disparagement to an author to have it known that he had been guilty of plagiarism; it derogates from the dignity of a magistrate to take part in popular measures. To degrade is here, as in the former case, a much stronger expression than the other two: what- ever disparages or derogates does but take away a part from the value: but whatever degrades a thing sinks it many degrees in the estimation of those in whose eyes it is degraded; in this man- ner religion is degraded by the low arts of its enthusiastic professors: whatever tends to the disparagement of learning or knowledge does injury to the cause of truth; whatever derogates from the dignity of a man in any office is apt to degrade the office itself. DISPARITY, Inequality. Dis- parity, from dis, negative, and par^ equal, means to be unequal. Inequalr- ily, from the Latin in, negative, and ceguus, even, signifies having no regu- larity. Disparity appUes to two objects which should meet or stand in coahtion with each other: inequality is appli- cable to those who are compared with each other: the disparity of age, situa- tion, and circimistances is to be con- sidered with regard to persons enter- ing into a matrimonial connection: the inequality in the portion of labor 276 DISPASSIONATE which is to be performed by two per- sons is a ground for the inequality of their recompense: there is a great inequality in the chance of success where there is a disparity of acquire- ments in rival candidates: the dis- parity between David and GoUath was such as to render the success of the former more strikingly miraculous; the inequality in the conditions of men is not attended with a corresponding inequality in their happiness. DISPASSIONATE, Cool. Dispas- sionate is taken negatively, it marks merely the absence of passion; cool is taken positively, it marks an entire freedom from passion. Those who are prone to be passion- ate must learn to be dispassionate; those who are of a cool temperament will not suffer their passions to be roused. Dispassionate solely respects angry or irritable sentiments; cool respects any perturbed feeling: when we meet with an angry disputant it is necessary to be dispassionate in order to avoid quarrels; in the moment of danger our safety often depends upon our coolness. DISPEL, Disperse. Dispel, from the Latin pellere, to drive, signifies to drive away. Disperse comes from Latin dis, apart, and spargere, to scatter, and means to scatter in all directions. Dispel is a more forcible action than to disperse: we destroy the existence of a thing by dispelling it; we merely destroy the junction or cohesion of a body by dispersing it; the sun dispels the clouds and darkness; the wind dis- perses the clouds or a surgeon dis- perses a tumor. DISPENSE, Distribute. Dispense, from dis, asunder, and pendere, to weigh, to weigh out money, to bestow, signifies to bestow in different direc- tions; and distribute, from the Latin trihu£re, to assign, signifies the same thing. Dispense is an indiscriminate action; distribute is a particularizing action: we dispense to all; we distrib- vie to each individually: nature dis- penses her gifts bountifully to all the mihabitants of the earth; a parent dis- tribuies among his children different tokens of his parental tenderness. Dispense is an indirect action that has no immediate reference to the receiver; distribute is a direct and personal action communicated by the giver to the re- ceiver : Providence dispenses His favors to those who put a sincere trust in Him; a prince distributes marks of his favor and preference among his courtiers. DISPERSE. See Dispel; Spread. DISPLAY. See Show. DISPLEASE, Offend, Vex. Dis- please (see Dislike) naturally marks the contrary of pleasing. Offend, from Latin ob, against, and fendere, to strike, means, hterally, to strike against. Vex, in Latin vexo, is a frequentative of ve- here, to carry (whence vehicle), signify- ing literally to toss up and down. These words express the painful sen- timent which is felt by the supposed impropriety of another's conduct. Dis- please is not always applied to that which personally concerns ourselves; although offend and vex have always more or less of what is personal in them: a superior may be displeased with one who is under his charge for improper behavior toward persons in general; he will be offended with him for disrespectful behavior toward him- self or neglect of his interests: circum- stances as well as actions serve to displease; a supposed intention or de- sign is requisite in order to offend; we may be displeased with a person or at a thing; one is mostly offended with the person; a child may be displeased at not having any particular hberty or indulgence granted to him; he may be offended with his playfellow for an act of incivihty or unkindness. Displease respects mostly the inward state of feeUng; offend and vex have most regard to the outward cause which provokes the feeling: a humorsome person may be displeased without any apparent cause, but a captious person will at least have some avowed trifle for which he is offended. Vex expresses more than offend; it marks, in fact, frequent efforts to offend, or the act of offending under aggravated circum- stances: we often unintentionally dis- please or offend, but he who vexes has mostly that object in view in so doing: any instance of neglect displeases; any marked instance of neglect offends; any aggravated instance of neglect vexes. The feeling of displeasure is more per- ceptible and vivid than that of offence, DISPOSAL 277 but it is less durable: the feeling of vexation is as transitory as that of dis- pleasure, but stronger than either. Dis- pleasure and vexation betray themselves by an angry word or look; offence dis- covers itself in the whole conduct: our displeasure is unjustifiable when it exceeds the measure of another's fault; it is a mark of great weakness to take offence at trifles; persons of the greatest irritabihty are exposed to the most frequent veocations. These terms may all be applied to the acts of unconscious agents on the mind. As epithets they admit of a similar distinction: it is very displeasing to parents not to meet with the most respectful attentions from children when they give them counsel; and such conduct on the part of children is highly offensive to God: when we meet with an offensive object we do most wisely to turn away from it: when we are troubled with vexatious affairs our best and only remedy is patience. Displeasure, Anger, Disapprobation. — Displeasure (see Dislike). Anger (for derivation see Anger) . Disapprobation is the reverse of approbation (see Assent). Between displeasure and anger there is a difference in the degree, the cause, and the consequence of the feel- ing: displeasure is always a softened and gentle feeling; anger is always a harsh feeUng, and sometimes rises to vehemence and madness. Displeasure is always produced by some adequate cause, real or supposed; but anger may be provoked by every or any cause, ac- cording to the temper of the individual: displeasure is mostly satisfied with a simple, verbal expression; but anger, unless kept down with great force, al- ways seeks to return evil, for evil. Displeasure and disapprobation are to be compared, inasmuch as they respect the conduct of those who are imder the direction of others: displeasure is an act of the will, it is an angry sentiment; disapprobation is an act of the judg- ment, it is an opposite opinion: any mark of self-will in a child is calculated to excite displeasure; a mistaken choice in matrimony may produce disappro- bation in the parent. Displeasure is always produced by that which is already come to pass; disapprobation may be felt ujwn that which is to take place; a master feels displeasure at the carelessness of his servant; a parent expresses his disap- probaiion of his son's proposal to leave his situation; it is sometimes prudent to check our displeasure, and mostly prudent to express our disapprobation; the former cannot be expressed with- out infhcting pain; the latter cannot be withheld when required without the danger of misleading. See also Dislike. DISPOSAL, Disposition, These words derive their different meanings from the verb to dispose, to which they owe their common origin. Disposal is a personal act; it depends upon the will of the individual: disposition is an act of the judgment; it depends upon the nature of the things. The removal of a thing from one's self is involved in a disposal; the good order of the things is comprehended in their disposition. The disposal of property is in the hands of the rightful owner; the success of a battle often depends upon the right disposition of an army. Dispose, Arrange, Digest. — Dispose, in French disposer, from Latin dis, apart, and French poser, is derived from Greek iravmg, a pause, not from Latin ponere (see Compose). Arrange (see Class). Digest, in Latin digestus, par- ticiple of digero, or dis, apart, and gerere, past participle gestus, to carry, signifies to gather apart with design. The idea of a systematic laying apart is common to all, and proper to the word dispose. We dispose when we arrange and digest; but we do not al- ways arrange and digest when we dis- pose; they differ in the circumstances and object of the action. There is less thought employed in disposing than in arranging and digesting; we mav dis- pose ordinary matters by simply as- signing a place to each; in this manner trees are disposed in a row, but we arrange and digest by an intellectual effort ; in the first case by putting those together which ought to go together, and in the latter case bj^ both separat- ing that which is dissimilar and bring- ing together that which is similar^ in this manner books are arranged m a library according to their size or their 278 DISPOSED subject; the materials for a literary production are digested, or the laws of the land are digested. What is not wanted should be neatly disposed in a suitable place: nothing contributes so much to beauty and convenience as the arrangement of everything according to the way and manner in which they should follow; when writings are in- volved in great intricacy and confusion, it is diflBcult to digest them. In an extended and moral apph cation of these words we speak of a person's time, talent, and the like being dis- posed to a good purpose; of a man's ideas being properly arranged, and of being digested into form. On the dis- position of a man's time and property will depend in a great measure his suc- cess in life; on the arrangement of ac- counts greatly depends his facility in conducting business; on the habit of digesting our thoughts depends in a great measiu-e correctness of thinking. See also Direct; Place. Disposition, Temper. — Disposition, from dispose, signifies here the state of being disposed. Temper, like tempera- ment, from the Latin temperare, to temper or manage, signifies the thing mocieUed or formed. These terms are both applied to the mind and its bias; but disposition re- spects the whole frame and texture of the mind; temper respects only the bias or tone of the feeUngs. Disposition is permanent and settled; temper may be transitory and fluctuat- ing. The disposition comprehends the springs and motives of actions; the temper influences the action of the mo- ment: it is possible and not infrequent to have a good disposition with a bad temper, and vice versd. A good disposition makes a man a useful member of society, but not al- ways a good companion; a. good temper renders him acceptable to all and peaceable with all, but essentially use- ful to none: a good disposition will go far toward correcting the errors of temper; but where there is a bad dis- position there are no hopes of amend- ment. The disposition is properly said to be natural, the temper is rather ac- quired or formed by circiunstances. If the temper be taken for what is natural, it implies either the physical temperament or that frame of mind which results from or is influenced by it. Disposition, Inclination. — Disposi- tion in the former section is taken for the general frame of the mind; in the present case for its particular frame. Inclination (see Attachment). Disposition is more positive than in- clination. We may always expect a man to do that which he is disposed to do; but we cannot always calculate upon his executing that to which he is merely inclined. We indulge a disposi- tion; we yield to an inclination. The disposition comprehends the whole state of the mind at the time; an inclina- tion is particular, referring always to a particular object. After the perform- ance of a serious duty, no one is ex- pected to be in a disposition for laugh- ter or merriment: it is becoming to suppress our inclination to laughter in the presence of those who wish to be serious; we should be careful not to enter into controversy with one who shows a disposition to be unfriendly. When a young person discovers any inclination to study, there are hopes of his improvement. DISPOSED. See Affected. DISPROVE. See Confttte. DISPUTE. See Argue; Bicker; Contend; Controvert; Difference. DISQUISITION. See Topic. DISREGARD, Neglect, Slight. Disregard signifies properly not to re- gard. Neglect, in Latin neglectus, parti- ciple of negligo, is compoimded of nee, not, and legare, to gather or choose out, signifying not to choose, to pay no attention to. Slight comes from an Old Low Grerman word which original- ly meant flat, smooth, and developed in English through a series of meanings, smooth, simple, etc., into the meaning of trivial, unimportant. The verb slight means to treat as if of no im- portance. We disregard the warnings, the words, or opinions of others; we neglect their injunctions or their precepts. To disregard results from the settled pur- pose of the mind; to neglect, from a temporary forgetfulness or oversight. What is disregarded is seen and passed over; what is neglected is generally not DISTINGUISH 279 thought of at the time required. What is disregarded does not strike the mind at all; what is neglected enters the mind only when it is before the eye: what we disregard is not esteemed; what we neglect is often esteemed, but not sufficiently to be remembered or prac- tised: a child disregards the prudent counsels of a parent; he neglects to use the remedies which have been pre- scribed to him. Disregard and neglect are frequently not personal acts; they respect the thing more than the person; slight is altogether an intentional act toward an individual or toward any object which one has heretofore esteemed or ought to esteem. DISSATISFACTION. See Dislike. dissatisfying; See Unsatis- TACTORY. DISSEMBLE. See Conceal. disseminate. See Spread. DISSENSION, Contention, Dis- cord. Dissension marks either the act or the state of dissenting. Contention marks the act of contending. Discord (see Contention). A collision of opinions produces dis- sension; a colUsion of interests pro- duces contention; a colUsion of humors produces discord. A love of one's own opinion, combined with a disregard for the opinion of others, gives rise to dissension; selfishness is the main cause of contention, and an imgovemed temper that of discord. Dissension is pecuUar to bodies or communities of men; contention is ap- pUcable mostly, and discord always, to individuals. A Christian temper of conformity to the general wiU of those with whom one is in connection would do away with dissension; a limitation of one's desire to that which is attainable by legitimate means would put a stop to contention; a correction of one s impatient and irritable humor would check the progress of discord. Dissen- sion tends not only to alienate the minds of men from one another, but to dissolve the bonds of society; conten- tion is accompanied by anger, ill-will, envy, and many evil passions; discord interrupts the progress of the kind affections, and oars all tender inter- course. DISSENT. See Differ. DISSENTER. See Heretic. DISSERTATION. See Essay. DISSIMILAR. See Heterogene- otrs. DISSIMULATION. See Simula- tion. DISSIPATE. See Spend. DISSOLUTE. See Loose. DISTANT, Far, Remote. Distant is employed as an adjunct or other- wise; far is used only as an adverb. We speak of distant objects, or objects being distant; but we speak of things only as being far. Distant, in Latin distans, compounded of dis, apart, and the participle starts, standing, from the verb stare, to stand, means standing apart, and is employed only for bodies at rest. Far comes from a Germanic and ultimately an Aryan root meaning beyond, found in Greek irspav, be- yond; and is employed for bodies either stationary or otherwise; hence we say a thing is distant, or it goes, runs, or flies far. Distant is used to desig- nate great space; far only that which is ordinarj': astronomers estimate that the sun is ninety-four miUions of miles distant from the earth; a person Uves not very far off, or a person is far from the spot. Distant is used absolutely to express an intervening space. Re- mote, in Latin remotus, participle of removere, to move back or away, rather expresses the relative idea of being gone out of sight. A person is said to Uve in a distant country, or in a remote corner of any country. They bear a similar analogy in the figurative application; when we speak of a remote idea it designates that which is less liable to strike the mind than a distant idea. A distant relationship between individuals is never altogether lost sight of; when the connection be- tween objects is very remote it easily escapes observation. DISTASTE. See Disukb. DISTEMPER. See Disorder. DISTINCT. See Categorical; Different. DISTINCTION. See Difference; Fashion. DISTINCTLY. See Clear. DISTINGUISH, Discriminate. To distinguish (see Abstract) is the gen- 280 DISTORT eral, to discriminate (see Discernment) is the particular term: the former is an indefinite, the latter a definite action. To discriminate is in fact to distinguish specifically; hence we speak of a dis- tinction as true or false, but of a dis- crimination as nice. We distinguish things as to their divisibility or unity; we discriminate them as to their inher- ent properties; we distinguish things that are alike or unhke, in order to separate or collect them; we discrimi- nate those that are different, for the purpose of separating one from the other: we distinguish by means of the senses as well as the imderstanding; we discriminate by the understanding only: we distinguish things by their color or we distinguish moral objects by their truth or falsehood; we discrimi- nate the characters of men or we discriminate their merits according to circumstances. See also Abstract; Perceive; Sig- nalize. Distinguish, Conspicuous, Noted, Eminent, Illustrious. — Distinguished signifies having a mark of distinction by which a thing is to be distinguished (see Abstract). Conspicuous, in Latin conspicuus, from con, intensive, and spicere, to see, signifies easily to be seen. Noted comes from notus, known, well known. Eminent, in Latin eminens, from emineo, or e and a stem min, sig- nifying to project, found in English prominent, means projecting out. Il- lustrious is a badly coined word from the root of lux, fight, meaning full of light, shining out. The idea of an object having some- thing attached to it to excite notice is common to all these terms. Distin- guished in its general sense expresses little more than this idea; the rest are but modes of the distinguished. A thing is distinguished in proportion as it is distinct or separate from others; it is conspicuous in proportion as it is easily seen; it is noted in proportion as it is widely known. In this sense a rank is distinguished; a situation is conspicu- ous; a place is noted. Persons are dis- tinguished by external marks or by char- acteristic qualities; persons or things are conspicuous mostly from some ex- ternal mark; persons or things are noted mostly by collateral circum- stances. A man may be distinguished by his decorations, or he may be dis- tinguished by his manly air, or by his abiUties: a person is conspicuous by the gaudiness of his dress; a house is conspicuous that stands on a hill: a person is noted for having performed a wonderful cure; a place is noted for its fine waters. We may be distinguished for things good, bad, or indifferent: we may be conspicuous for our singularities or that which only attracts vulgar notice: we may be noted for that which is bad, and mostly for that which is the subject of vulgar discourse: we can be eminent and illustrious only for that which is really good and praiseworthy; the former applies, however, mostly to those things whicdi set a man high in the circle of has acquaintance; the latter to that which makes him shine before the world. A man of distinguished talent wiU be apt to excite envy if he be not also distinguished for his private virtue : affection is never better pleased than when it can place itself in such a conspicuous situation as to draw all eyes upon itself: lovers of fame are sometimes contented to render them- selves noted for their vices or absurdi- ties: nothing is more gratifying to a man than to render himself eminent for his professional skill: it is the lot of but few to be illustrious, and those few are very seldom to be envied. In an extended and moral appfica- tion these terms may be employed as epithets to heighten the character of an object: valor may be said to be distinguished, piety eminent, and a name illustrious. DISTORT. See Turn. DISTORTED. See Wry. DISTRACTED. See Absent. DISTRESS, Anxiety, Anguish, Agony. Distress (see Adversity). Anxiety is aUied to Latin angustus, nar- row, and angere, to choke, from a root found also in anger. Agony, in French agonie, Latin agonia, Greek aywv/a, a struggle, signifies a severe struggle with pain and suffering. Distress is the pain felt when in a strait from which we see no means of extricating ourselves; anxiety is that pain which one feels on the prospect of an evil. Distress always deoends unon DISTRIBUTE 281 some outward cause; anxiety often lies in the imagination. Distress is pro- duced by the present but not always immediate evil; anxiety respects that which is future; anguish arises from the reflection on the evil that is past; agony springs from witnessing that which is immediate or before the eye. Distress is not pecuUar to any age; where there is a consciousness of good and evil, pain and pleasure, distress will inevitably exist from some circum- stance or another. Anxiety, anguish, and agony belong to riper years: in- fancy and childhood are deemed the happy periods of human existence be- cause they are exempt from the anxie- ties attendant on every one who has a station to fill and duties to discharge. Anguish and agony are species of dis- tress, of the severer kind, which spring altogether from the maturity of reflec- tion and the full consciousness of evil. A child is in distress when it loses its mother, and the mother is also in distress when she misses her chUd. The station of a parent is, indeed, that which is most productive, not only of distress, but of anxiety, anguish, and agony: the mother has her pecuUar anxieties for her child while rearing it in its infant state: the father has his anxiety for its welfare on its entrance into the world: they both suffer the deepest anguish when their child dis- appoints their dearest hopes by running a career of vice; not unfrequently they are doomed to suffer the agony of seeing a child encircled in flames from which he cannot be snatched, or sinking into a watery grave from which he cannot be rescued. See also Afflict. Distress, Harass, Perplex. — Distress (see above). Harass, in French harasser, is possibly derived from Old French harer, to set a dog on, from an Old High German word to call out. Per- plex, in Latin perplexus, participle of perplector, compounded of plectere, to plait, with the prefix per, through, meaning to braid in and out, hence to make something difficult to unravel or to imderstand. A person is distressed either in his out- ward circumstances or his feelings; he is harassed mentally or corporeally; he is perplexed in his understanding more than in his feelings: a deprivation dis- tresses; provocations and hostile meas- lu-es harass; stratagems and ambiguous measures perplex: a besieged town is distressed by the cutting off its resources of water and provisions; the besieged are harassed by perpetual attacks; the besiegers are perplexed in all their ma- noeuvres and plans by the counter- manoeuvres and contrivances of their opponents: a tale of woe distresses; continual alarms and incessant labor harass; unexpected obstacles and in- extricable difficulties perplex. DISTRIBUTE, Allot, Assign, Ap- portion. Distribute, in Latin distribiir tvs, participle of distrUmo, from dis, apart, and tribuere, to bestow, signifies to portion out to several. Allot (for derivation see Allot). Assign, in French assigner, Latin assigno, from ad, to, and signare, to set a seed to, signifies, by signing or marking, to set out for a particular purpose. Appor- tion, from ad, to, and portio, a part pre- pared, signifies to give by way of por- tion for a particular purpose. The idea of giving to several is com- mon to these terms; this is the proper signification of distribute; but to that of the other terms is annexed some qualification. Distributing is always applied to a number of individuals, but allotting, assigning, or apportioning is the giving either to one or several: a sum of money is distributed among a number of f)oor people; it is allotted, as- signed, or apportioned to a particular individual, or to each individual out of a number. Distribute is said prop- erly of that which is divided, or divis- ible into any number of parts, as bread is distributed in loaves, or money is distributed in the way of shillings j al- lotted is appUed to that which is divisi- ble into lots, and apportion to that which is formed into certain propor- tional parts or portions, as to allot land, to give a lot of land; to apportion a sum of money — that is, to give it in certain proportions. Assign is applied to any distinct whole, not considered either as divided or divisible, as to assign a house, place, etc. To distribute is to give promiscuously, without refer- ence to the nature of objects or the purpose for which they are given; things may be distributed to the worthy 282 DISTRICT or the unworthy, to those who want it or those who do not, at the will of the distributor or otherwise. To allot is to give according to the lots into which the thing is divided for a given purpose, as to allot land to each cottager; to assign is to set apart something that is suited to the person or adapted for the ob- ject proposed, as a prize is assigned to the most meritorious; a house is as- signed for the reception of the houseless wanderer; to apportion is to give in a certain proportion according to a cer- tain rule, as to apportion rent to differ- ent houses according to their size and value. So in the figurative or moral appUca- tion, the goods or iUs of life are dis- tributed by a wise Providence, but often in ways or for purposes that are hidden from our view. Particular portions of that which is desirable, or the contrary, is allotted to each according to the circimastances of the case. OflBces, duties, properties, and the like are assigned according as they real- ly are or are supposed to be suitable. Labor, happiness, misery, or any- thing of which only parts can be had, may be apportioned. See also Dispense; Divide. DISTRICT, Region, Tract, Quar- ter. District is derived from the past participle of the verb distringere, from dis, apart, and stringere, to pull. It means to pull asunder, to vex, hence to force or rule; a district was a section in which a lord has power to enforce justice. Region, in Latin regio, from regere, to rule, signifies a portion that is within rule. Tract, in Latin tractus, from trahere, to draw, signifies a part drawn out. Quarter, from Latin quar- ttis, signifies hterally a fourth part. These terms are all appUed to por- tions of country, the former two com- prehending divisions marked out on poUtical grounds; the latter a geo- graphical or an indefinite division: dis- trict is smaller than a region; the former refers only to part of a country, the latter frequently applies to a whole country: a quarter is indefinite, and may be applied either to a quarter of the world or a particular neighborhood: a tract is the smallest portion of aU, and comprehends frequently no more than what may fall within the compass of the eye. We consider a district only with relation to government; every magistrate acts within a certain dis- trict: we speak of a region when con- sidering the circumstances of climate, or the natural properties which distin- guish different parts of the earth; as the regions of heat and cold: we speak of the quarter simply to designate a point of the compass; as a person hves in a certain quarter of the town that is north or south, east or west, etc.; and so also, in an extended apphcation, we say to meet with opposition in an imexpected quarter: we speak of a tract to designate the land that nms on in a line; as a mountainous tract. DISTRUST, Suspicion, Diffi- dence. Distrust signifies not putting trust in (see Belief). Suspicion, from the Latin suspicio, or sub and specere, signifies looking at askance, or with a un-y mind. Diffidence, from the Latin diffido or disfido, signifies having no faith. Distrust is said of either ourselves or others; suspicion is said only of others; diffidence only of ourselves: to be dis- trustful of a person is to impute no good to him; to be suspicious of a person is to impute positive evil to him: he who is distrustful of another's honor or pru- dence wiU abstain from giving him his confidence; he who is suspicious of an- other's honesty will be cautioiis to have no dealings with him. Distrust is a particular state of feel- ing having a specific object; suspicion is an habitual state of feehng, and has indefinite objects. As regards one's self, a person may distrust his own powers for the execu- tion of a particular office, or a distrust of himself in company; he has a gen- eral diffidence, or he is naturally diffiy dent. DISTURB, Interrupt. Disturb (see Commotion). Interrupt, from the Latin inter, between, and rumpere, to break, signifies to break in between so as to stop the progress. We may be disturbed either inwardly or outwardly; we are interrupted only outwardly: our minds may be dis- turbed by disquieting refiections, or we may be disturbed in our rest or in our business by unseemly noises; but we DIVIDE 283 can be interrupted only in our business or pursuits: the disturbance, therefore, depends upon the character of the per- son; what disturbs one man will not disturb another: an interruption is, however, something positive: what in- terrupts one person will interrupt an- other: the smallest noises may disturb one who is in bad health; illness or the visits of friends will interrupt a person in any of his business. The same distinction exists between these words when applied to things as to persons: whatever is put out of its. order or proper condition is disturbed; thus water which is put into motion from a state of rest is disturbed: what- ever is stopped in the evenness or regu- larity of its course is interrupted; thus water which is turned out of its ordi- nary channel is interrupted. See also Trouble; Worpy. DISTURBANCE. See COMMOTION. DITCH. See Trench. DIURNAL. See Daily. DIVE. See Plunge. DIVERGE. See Deflect. DIVERS. See Different. DIVERSION. See Amusement. DIVERSITY. See Difference. DIVERT. See Amuse, DIVERTED. See Absent. DIVIDE, Separate, Part. Divide comes from Latin dis, apart, and a lost verb meaning to separate. Sepa- rate (see Abstract). Part signifies to make into parts. That is said to be divided which has been or is conceived to be a whole, that is separated which might be joined: an army may be divided into two or three divisions or portions: the divisions are frequently separated in their march. Things may be divided by anything which distingviishes the parts from one another; they are separated by disjimc- tion of space only. Things may be mentally divided, but they are separated only corporeally: the minds of men are often most di- vided when in person they are least separated. To part has an intermediate sense between divide and separate; to divide is properly to make any whole into two parts; to part is to destroy the cohesion of two or more wholes when joined together: a loaf is divided when it is cut into two or more pieces; two loaves are parted. Sometimes things are both divided and parted in order to be dis- tributed; in this case the distinction is the same; solid things, or what is in a mass, is divided; but things which do not lose their integrity are parted: an estate is divided; gooos or efifects are parted. As disjunction is the common idea attached to both separate and part, they are frequently used in relation to the same objects; things are mostly said to be parted which are made to be apart for any temporary purpose or by any means, however shght or trivial; thus rooms may be parted by a parti- tion; that is said to be separated which is intended to be kept permanently separate, or which ought not to be joined; thus fields are separated by hedges. With regard to persons, part desig- nates the actual leaving of the person; separate is used in general for that which lessens the society; the former is often casual, temporary, or partial; the lat- ter is positive and serious; the parting is momentary; the separation may be longer or shorter: two friends part in the streets after a casual meeting; two persons separate on the road who had set out to travel together; men and their wives often part without coming to a positive separation: some couples are separated from each other in every respect but that of being directly parted; the moment of parting between friends is often more painful than the separation which iafterward ensues. Divide, Distribute, Share. — Divide (see above). Distribute, in Latin dis- tributus, from distribuere, or dis and tribuere, signifies to bestow apart. Share, aUied to the word shear, and the German scheeren, signified originally to cut. The act of dividing does not extend beyond the thing divided; that of dis- tributing and sharing comprehends also the purpose of the action: we divide the thing; we distribute to the person: we may divide, therefore, without dis- tributing; or we may divide in order to distribute: thus we divide our land into distinct fields for our private con- venience; or we divide a sum of money 284 DIVINE into so many parts, in order to distrib- vie it among a given nimiber of per- sons: on the other hand, we may dis- tribute without dividing; for money, books, fruit, and many other things may be distributed which require no division. To share is to make into parts, the same as divide, and it is to give those parts to some persons, the same as distribute; but the person who shares takes a part himself; he who distributes gives it all to others; a loaf is divided in order to be eaten, bread is distrib- uted in loaves among the poor; the loaf is shared by a poor man with his poorer neighbor, or the profits of a business are shared by the partners. To share may imply either to give or to receive; to distribute imphes giving only: we share our own with another, or another shares what we have; but we distribute our own to others. DIVINE. See Ecclesiastic; God- like; Guess; Holy. DIVINITY. See Deity. DIVISION. See Part. DIVORCE, Separation, Divorce, in French the same form, from the Latin divortium, compounded of dis, apart, and vertere, to turn, means the legal dissolution of the marriage con- tract, with a complete severance of all mutual claims and the right to re- marry. A separation, often called a legal separation or a judicial separation, is a separation countenanced or re- quired by a court of law, but not im- plying a complete severance of the marriage tie or the right to remarry. Divorce is often used, in a figurative sense, to refer to any disunion of things which have been closely united, and separation, of course, has also a wider application. See Separate. DIVULGE. See Publish. DO. See Act. DOCILE, Tractable, Ductile. Docile, in Latin docilis, from docere, to teach, means ready to be taught. Tractable, from tractare, the frequen- tative of trahere, to draw, denotes the readiness to be drawn. One is docile as a scholar; one is tractable as a child or a servant. Where anything is to be learned, docility is necessary; where anything is to be done at the call of another, tractability is required. Duc- tility, from dv/M, to lead, signifies apt- ness to be led, and is applied to the mind or its powers, which yield readily to impressions. Animals may be said to be docile and tractable with a hke distinction; in- animate objects, as metals, etc., may be ductile. DOCTRINE, Precept^ Principle. Doctrine, in French doctrine, Latin doc- trina, from docere, to teach, signifies the thing taught; precept, from the Latin prae, before, and capere, to take, sig- nifies the thing placed before one as a guide to conduct. Principle comes from French prindpe, Latin princip- ium, the beginning of things, their first or original component parts. A doctrine requires a teacher; a pre- cept requires a superior with authority; a principle requires only a maintainer or holder. A doctrine is always framed by some one; a precept is enjoined or laid down by some one; a principle lies in the thing itself. A doctrine is com- posed of principles; a precept rests upon principles or doctrines. Pythagoras taught the doctrine of metempsy- chosis, and enjoined many precepts on his disciples for the regulation of their conduct, particularly that they should abstain from eating animal food and be only silent hearers for the first five years of their scholarship: the former of these rules depended upon the pre- ceding doctrine of the soul's trans- migration to the bodies of animals; the latter rested on that simple prin- ciple of education, the entire devotion of the scholar to the master. We are said to believe in doctrines, to obey precepts, to imbibe or hold principles. Doctrine is that which constitutes our faith; precepts are that which directs the practice: both are the subjects of rational assent, and suited only to the matured understanding: principles are often admitted without examination, and imbibed as frequently from ob- servation and circumstances as from any direct personal efforts; children as well as men acquire principles. Doctrine, Dogma, Tenet. — A doctrine originates with an individual. Dogma, from the Greek Soy/ia, and Sokeo), think, signifies something thought, admitted, or taken for granted; this lies with a body or number of individ- DOUBT 285 uals. Tenet, from the Latin tenet, he holds, signifies the thing held or main- tained, and is a species of principle specifically maintained in matters of opinion by persons in general. A doc- trine rests on the authority of the in- dividual by whom it is framed; the dogma, on the authority of the body by whom it is maintained; a tenet rests on its own intrinsic merits. Many of the doctrines of our blessed Savioiu- are held by faith in him; they are subjects of persuasion by the exercise of our rational powers; the dogmas of the Romish Church are admitted by none but such as admit its authority: every sect has its peculiar tenets. DOGMA. See Doctrine. DOGMATICAL. See Confident; Oracular. DOLEFUL. See Piteous. DOMESTIC. See Servant. DOMICILE, Habitation, Home, House, Residence. These words all signify a dwelling-place, but they differ in their application and in the dignity of their usage. Domicile, from Latin domus, home, is the Latin term cor- responding to the native English home, Anglo-Saxon ham. Home is the familiar and homely word, carrying with it all the emotional and imagina- tive connotations of the intimate com- munal life of those bound together by ties of birth and affection. Donv- icile is the corresponding intellectual and "learned" word, meaning more than the mere externals of home in- dicated in habitation or residence^ for instance, but emptied of all emotional content, and sometimes employed, like many Latin words in English, with a sUghtly humorous assumption of dig- nity. Domicile is also used as a verb meaning "to make one's self at home." Habitation, from Latin habitare, a fre- quentative of habere, to have, means simply a dweUing-place. House also signifies a dwelling-place, but it is a more specific term than habitation, in- dicating a certain kind of permanent shelter, built for warmth and comfort. A house is a habitation; but a habita- tion is not necessarily a house. Tents, dug-outs, caves, etc., may be habitations. Many people have a sentimental habit of substituting home for the word house, when they mean merely the structure that may contain a home. "We have bought a new home," they say, meaning merely that they have bought a new house to contain the old home. A home is the outside shell of a home. Residence is used to indicate a ho-use of some pretension and state- hness. We speak of a spacious resi- dence, a handsome residence, etc. It may also be extended to refer simply in a general way to one's dweUing-place, as when we speak of residence in the city, etc., not referring to any specific habitation, but merely the general idea of living or dwelUng. DOMINEERING. See Imperious. DOMINION. See Empire; Power; Territory. DONATION. See Benefaction; Gift. DOOM. See Destiny; Sentence. DOUBT, Question. Doubt, in French douter, Latin dubito, from duo, two, and ire, past participle itus, to go, signifies a state in which the mind is going in two directions, as it were, or does not know which direc- tion to take. Question, in Latin qv/Bstio, from quoerere, to inquire, sig- nifies to make a question. Both these terms express the act of the mind in staying its decision. Doubt hes altogether in the mind; it is a less active feeling than question: by the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in deciding. We may doubt in silence: we cannot question without expressing it, directly or indirectly. He who suggests doubts does it with caution: he who makes a question throws in difficulties with a degree of confidence. Doubts insin- uate themselves on the part of the doubter; questions are always made with an express design. We doubt in matters of general interest, on abstruse as well as common subjects: we ques- tion mostly in ordinary matters that are of a personal interest : we doubt the truth of a position; we question the veracity of an author. When the prac- ticability of any plan is questioned, it is unnecessary to enter any further into its merits. The doxibt is frequently confined to the individual; the que^ion frequently respects others. We doubt whetlier we 286 DOWNFALL shall be able to succeed; we question another's right to interfere: we doubt whether a thing will answer the end proposed; we question the utihty of any one making the attempt. There are many doubtful cases in medicine, where the physician is at a loss to decide; there are many questionable measures proposed by those who are in or out of power which demand con- sideration. A disposition to doubt everything is more inimical to the cause of truth than the readiness to believe everything; a disposition to qu^tion whatever is said or done by others is much more calculated to give offence than to prevent deception. See also Demur. Doubt, Suspense. — Doubt respects that which we should beheve; suspense that which we wish to know or ascer- tain. We are in doubt for the want of evidence; we are in suspense for the want of certainty. Doubt interrupts our progress in the attainment of truth; suspense impedes us in the at- tainment of our objects: the former is connected principally with the under- standing; the latter acts altogether upon the hopes. We have our doubts about things that have no regard to time; we are in suspense about what is to happen in the future. Those are the least inchned to doubt who have the most thorough knowledge of a subject; those are the least exposed to the un- pleasant feehng of suspense who con- fine their wishes to the present. See also Quandary. Doubtful, Dubious, Uncertain, Pre- carious.— The doubtful admits of doubt; the dubious creates doubt or suspense. The doubtful is said of things in which we are required to have an opinion; the dubums respects events and things that must speak for themselves. In doubt- ful cases it is advisable for a judge to lean to the side of mercy; while the issue of a contest is dubious, all judg- ment of the parties, or of the case, must be carefully avoided. Doubtful and dubious have always a relation to the person forming the opinion on the subject in question; uncertain and precarious are epithets which designate the qualities of the things themselves. Wliatever is un- certain may from that very circum- stance be doubtful or dubious to those who attempt to determine upon them; but they may be designated for their uncertainty, without any regard to the opinions which they may give rise to. A person's coming may be doubtful or uncertain, the length of his stay is oftener described as uncertain than as doubtful. The doubtful is opposed to that on which we form a positive con- clusion, the uncertain to that which is definite or prescribed. The efficacy of any medicine is doubtful; the man- ner of its operation may be uncertain. While our knowledge is hmited, we must expect to meet with many things that are doubtful; as everything in the world is exposed to change, and all that is futiu-e is entirely above our control, we must naturally expect to find everything uncertain but what we see passing before us. Precarious, from the Latin pre- carius, and precare, to pray, signifies granted to entreaty, depending on the will or humor of another, whence it is appUcable to whatever is obtained from others. Precarious is the highest species of uncertainty, apphed to such things as depend on future casualties in opposition to that which is fixed and determined by design. The weath- er is uncertain; the subsistence of a person who has no stated income or source of hving must be precarious. It is uncertain what day a thing may take place until it is determined ; there is nothing more precarious than what depends upon the favors of princes. DOWNFALL. See Fall. DOZE. See Sleep. DRAIN. See Spend. DRAMATIC. See Theatrical. DRAW, Drag, Haul or Hale, Pull, Pluck, Tug. Draw comes from Anglo-Saxon dragan, German tragen, to draw, and drag is the Scandinavian form of the same word. Haul or hale comes through French from an Old High German word signifying to re- quire or get. Pull comes from Anglo- Saxon- pvllian, to pull or pluck. Pluck is a Teutonic word which may possibly be borrowed from Late Latin piluc- care, Itahan piluccare, from pilus, hair (EngUsh pile), meaning to pluck out hairs. Tu^ is a Scandinavian word; compare Icelandic tog, a rope to pull by. DREGS 287 Draw expresses here the idea com- mon to the first three terms, namely, of putting a body in motion from be- hind one 8 self or toward one's self; to drag is to draw a thing with violence, or to draw that which makes resistance; to havl is to drag it with still greater violence. We draw a cart; we drag a body along the ground ; or liavl a vessel to the shore. To pull signifies only an effort to draw without the idea of mo- tion: horses jmll very long sometimes before they can draw a heavily laden cart uphill. To pluck is to ■pvll with a sudden twitch, in order to separate; thus feathers are 'plucked from animals. To tv^ is to pull with violence; thus men tug at the oar. In the moral application of the words we may be said to be drawn by anything which can act on the mind to bring us near to an object; we are dragged only by means of force; we pvll a thing toward us by a direct effort. To haul, pluck, and tv^ are seldom used but in physical appUcation. DREAD. See Apprehend; Awe. DREADFUL. See Fearful; For- midable. DREAM, Revert. Dream is a word of uncertain origin apparently unrelated to the AnglohSaxon dream. which meant joy, and aUied to Ola Norse drauge, a ghost, the radical meaning being a deceptive appearance, an illusion. Compare German trugen, to deceive. Revery, in French riverie, like the English rave and the Latin rabies, madness, originally signified something wandering or incoherent. Dreams and reveries are alike op- posed to the reahty, and have their origin in the imagination; but the former commonly passes in sleep, and the latter when awake; the dream may and does commonly arise when the imagination is in a sound state; the revery is the fruit of a heated imagi- nation: dreams come in the course of nature; reveries are the consequence of a peculiar ferment. When the term dream is applied to the act of one that is awake it admits of another distinction from revery. Thev both designate what is confound- ed, but the dream is less extravagant than the revery. Ambitious men please themselves with dreams of future greatness; enthusiasts debase the puritjy- of the Christian reUgion by blending their own wild reveries with the doctrines of the Gospel. He who indulges himself in idle dreams lays up a store of disappointment for him- self when he recovers his recollection, and finds that it is nothing but a dream: a love of singularity operating on an ardent mind will too often lead men to indulge in strange reveries. DREGS, Sediment, Dross. Scum, Refuse. Dregs is a Scandinavian word; it is the plural form of a word which in Middle English means mire. Sediment, from sedere, to sit, signifies that which settles at the bottom. Dross is a Germanic word; compare German drusen, meaning husks of grapes. Scum comes from a Scandi- navian word meaning froth or foam, and referred especially to the scum thrown off from metals in the process of melting. Refuse comes from Latin re, away, and fundere, to pour, signify- ing that which is poured out, thrown away. All these terms designate the worth- less part of any body; but dregs is taken in a worse sense than sediment, for the dregs is that which is altogether of no value; but the sediment may sometimes form a necessary part of the body. The dregs are mostly a sediment in liquors, but many things are a sediment which are not dregs. After the dregs are taken away, there will frequently remain a sediment; the dregs are commonly the corrupt part which separates from compound liquids, as wine or beer; the sediment con.sists of the heavy particles which belong to all simple liquids, not excepting water itseli. The dregs and sediment separate of themselves, but the scum and dross are forced out by a process; the former from liquids, and the latter from soUd bodies rendered Uquid or otherwise. Dross is applied to solid bodies in the same sense as scum, being that which remains after the purifying, as the dross of com after threshing and cleaning. Refuse, as its derivation im- plies, is always said of that which is intentionally separated to be thrown away, and agrees with the former terms only inasmuch as they express what is worthless. With this distinction 288 DRENCH they are figuratively applied to moral objects. DRENCH. See Soak. DRIFT. See Tendency; Tenor. DROLL. See Farcical; Laughable. DROOP. See Fall. DROSS. See Dregs. DROWSE. See Sleep. DRUDGE. See Servant. DRUMMER, Commercial-travel- ler, Salesman, Solicitor. Drummer is a pure Americanism, supposed to have been derived from the old custom of having a man beat a drum to at- tract people to a circus, fair, show, recruiting-place, and the Uke, and signi- fies, UteraUy one who drums up or summons people for a special purpose. Its general appUcation is to a person employed by a manufacturer or mer- chant to soUcit or "drum up trade," to secure new customers, to open up new fines of business. The professional drummer is not regarded in the same fight as a salesman. The latter may be a graduated drummer, but his busi- ness is more particularly to keep in touch with the customers he has se- cured for his employer, ascertain the condition or amount of their stock of commodities he is interested in, and make such sales as he can. The commercial - traveller and the salesman are quite similar in quality, but with this difference: the former travels extensively and at regular sea- sons to meet his customers at their places of business, and the latter usual- ly remains at the home house to meet the customers from other cities who come to his house for purchases, though he, too, may travel. Again, a sahsman may be an ordinary em- ployee in a retail store who waits on and sells to ordinary patrons. The drummer and solicitor are also quite similar in quafity, as both seek orders for goods from any one likely to buy, whether regular customers or stran- gers. DUBIOUS. See Doubtful. DUCTILE. See Docile. DULL, Gloomy, Sad, Dismal. DuU comes from Anglo-Saxon dol, foolish, German toll, mad. Gloomy is in Middle English gloumen, to lower, and is allied to Norwegian glyma, an overcast sky; compare the adjective glum. Sad, Anglo-Saxon seed, meant ori^ally sated; hence tired, dispirited, grieved. Dismal comes from Latin diesmxili, bad days, unlucky days. When applied to natural objects, dull and gloomy denote the want of neces- sary fight or life: in this sense metals are more or less dull according as they are stained with dirt: the weather is either dull or gloomy in different de- grees, that is, dull when the sun is obscured by clouds, and gloomy when the atmosphere is darkened by fogs or thick clouds. Dismal denotes not merely the want of that which is neces- sary, but also the presence of that which is repugnant to the senses; as a glare of fight or a sound may be dismal. A room is dull, gloomy, or dismal, according to circumstances: it is dull if the usual quantity of fight and sound be wanting; it is gloomy if' the darkness and stiUness be very con- siderable; it is dismal if it have only light enough to show its wretchedness; in this sense a dungeon is a dismal abode. Sad is not appfied so much to sensible as moral objects, in which sense the distressing events of hunian fife, as the loss of a parent or a child, is justly denominated sad. In regard to the frame of mind which is designated by these terms, it wiU be easily perceived from the above ex- planation. As sfight circumstances produce dulness, any change, however small, in the usual flow of spirits may be termed dull. Gloom weighs heavy on the mind, and gives a turn to the reflections and the imagination: de- sponding thoughts of futurity wiU spread a gloom over every other object. Sad indicates a wounded state of the heart, feefings of unmixed pain. See also Obtuse; Stupid. DUMB. See Silent. DUNCE. See Ninny. DUPLICITY. See Deceit. DURABLE, Lasting, Permanent. Durable is said of things that are in- tended to remain a shorter time than that which is lasting; and 'permanent expresses less than durable. Durable, from the Latin durus, hard, respects the texture of bodies and marks their capacity to hold out. Lasting is the participle of the verb laM from the DUTIFUL 289 Anglo-Saxon Icestan, to observe, per- form, originally to follow in the track of, from last, a foot-track (found in the shoemaker's term — last of a shoe). It is applicable to that which is of the longest duration. Permanent, from the Latin per, through, and manere, to remain, signifies remaining to the end. Durable is naturally said of material substances, and lasting of those which are spiritual, although in ordinary discourse sometimes they exchange offices: permanent applies more to the affairs of men. That which perishes quickly is not durable; that which ceases quickly is not lasting; that which is only for a time is not perma- nent. Stone is more durable than iron, and iron than wood: in the feudal times animosities between famihes used to be lasting; a clerk has not a permanent situation in an office. Durable, Constant. — Durability lies in the thing. Constancy lies in the person. What is durable is so from its inherent property; what is constant is so by the power of the mind. No durable connections can be formed where avarice or lust prevails. DURATION, Time. In the phil- osophical sense, according to Locke, time is that mode of duration which is formed in the mind by its own power of observing and measuring the passing objects. In the vulgar sense, in which duration is synonjmaous with time, it stands for the time of duration, and is more particularly applicable to the objects which are said to last; time being employed in general for what- ever passes in the world. Duration comprehends the begin- ning and end of any portion of time, that is, the how long of a thing; time is employed more frequently for the particular portion itself, namely, the time when: we mark the duration of a sound from the time of its commence- ment to the time that it ceases; the duration of a prince's reign is an object of particular concern to his subjects if he be either very good or the reverse; the time in which he reigns is marked by extraordinary events: the his- torian computes the duration of reigns and of events in order to determine the antiquity of a nation; he fixes the exact 19 time when each person begins to reign and when he dies, in order to deter- mine the number of years that each reigned. See also Continuance. DUTIABLE. See Ethical. DUTIFUL, Obedient, Respectful. Dutiful signifies fuU of a sense of duty or full of what belongs to duty. Obedient signifies ready to obey. Re- spectful signifies hterally full of respect. The obedient and respectful are but modes of the dutiful: we may be dutiful without being either obedient or respect- ful; but we are so far dutiful as we are either obedient or respectful. Duty de- notes what is due from one being to another: it is independent of all cir- cumstances: obedience and respect are relative dulies depending upon the character and station of individuals: as we owe to no one so much as to our parents, we are said to be dutiful to no earthly being besides; and in order to deserve the name of dutiful a child, during the period of his child- hood, ought to maJce a parent's will to be his law, and at no future period ought that will ever to be an object of indifference: we may be obedient and respectful to others besides our parents, although to them obedience and respect are in the highest degree and in the first case due; yet servants are enjoined to be obedient to their mas- ters, wives to their husbands, and sub- jects to their king. Respectful is a term of still greater latitude than either; for as the characters of men as much as their stations demand re- spect, there is a respectful deportment mie toward every superior. Duly, Obligation. — Duly, as we see in the preceding section, consists alto- gether of what is right or due from one being to another. Obligation, from the Latin obligo, to bind, signifies the bond or necessity which lies in the thing. All duly depends upon moral obliga- tion which subsists between man and man or man and his Maker; in thia abstract sense, therefore, there can be no duty without a previous obligation, and where there is an obligation it in- volves a duty; but in the vulgar ac- ceptation, duty is applicable to the con- duct of men in their various relations; obligation only to particular circum- 290 DWELL stances or modes of action: we have duties to perform as parents and chil- dren, as husbands and wives, as rulers and subjects, as neighbors and citizens: the debtor is under an obligation to dis- charge a debt; and he who had prom- ised is under an obligation to fulfil his promise: a conscientious man, there- fore, never loses sight of the obligations which he has at different times to dis- charge. The duty is not so peremptory as the obligation; the obligation is not so lasting as the duiy:'onr affections im- pel us to the discharge of duty; interest or necessity impels us to the discharge of an obligation: it may therefore some- times happen that the man whom a sense of duty cannot actuate to do that which is right will not be able to withstand the obligation under which he has laid himself. See also Business; Tax. DWELL, See Abide. DYE. See Color. EASE 291 E EACH. See All. EAGER, Earnest, Serious. Eager (see Avidity.) Earnest, Anglo-Saxon earnest, meaning earnestness, comes from a root found in Greek opw/ii, to excite, and in Icelandic ambrick, implying intensity of spirit; not the same as pledge (see below). Serious, Latin serius, grave, earnest, may pos- sibly be allied to German schwer, heavy. Eager is used to qualify the desires or passions; earnest, to qualify the wishes or sentiments; the former has either a physical or moral application, the latter altogether a moral appUcation: a child is eager to get a plaything; a hungry person is eager to get food; a covetous man is eager to seize whatever comes within his grasp: a person is earnest in sohcitation, earnest in ex- hortation, earnest in devotion. Eager- ness is mostly faulty; it cannot be too early restrained in children. Whence this term is with particular propriety applied to brutes. Earnestness is always taken in the good sense for the inward conviction of the mind, accompanied with the warmth of the heart in a good cause. A person is said to be earnest, or in earnest; a person or tlyng is said to be serious: the former characterizes the temper of the mind, the latter char- acterizes the object itself. In regard to persons, in which alone they are to be compared, earnest expresses more than serious; the former is opposed to lukewarmness, the latter to uncon- cernedness: we are earnest as to our wishes or our persuasions; we are serious as to our intentions: the earnest- ness with which we address another depends upon the force of our convic- tion; the seriousness with which we address them depends upon our sin- cerity and the nature of the subject: the preacher earnestly exhorts his hear- ers to lay aside their sins; he seriously admonishes those who are guilty of irregularities. Earnest, Pledge. — In the proper sense, the earnest, compounded of Old French erre«, arres, from Latin arrha and a diminutive, is given as a token of our being in earnest in the promise we have made; the pledge, in all probabihty from plico, to fold or implicate, sigm- fies a security by which we are engaged to indemnify for a loss. When a con- tract is only verbally formed, it is usual to give earnest; whenever money is advanced, it is common to give a pledge. In the figurative application the terms bear the same analogy: a man of genius sometimes, though not al- ways, gives an earnest in youth of his future greatness; children are the dearest pledges of affection between parents. EAGERNESS. See AviDlTr. EARLY. See Soon. EARN. See Acquire. EARNESTNESS. See UNcnoN. EARTH. See Cosmos. EASE, Quiet, Rest, Repose. Ease comes from the French aise, a word of unknown origin. Quiet is derived from Latin quietus, quiet. Rest comes from Anglo-Saxon rest, originally, perhaps, a halting-place. Repose comes from Latin re, back, and French poser, to place, from Late Latin pausare, allied to pause; it means to place one's self backward in an easy posture. The idea of a motionless state is com- mon to all these terms: ease and quiet respect action on the body; rest and repose respect the action of the body: we are easy or quiet when freed from any external agency that is painful; we have rest or repose when the body is no longer in motion. Ease denotes an exemption from any painful agency in general; quiet denotes an exemption from that m particular which noise, disturbance, or the violence of others may cause: we are easy or at ease when the body is in a posture agree- able to itself, or when no circumjacent object presses imequally upon it; we are quiet when there is an agreeable 292 EASTERN stillness around: our ease may be dis- turbed either by internal or external causes; our quiet is most commonly disturbed by external objects. Rest simply denotes the cessation of motion; repose is that species of rest which is agreeable after labor: we rest as circumstances require; in this sense, our Creator is said to have rested from the work of creation: repose is a cir- cumstance of necessity; the weary seek repose; there is no human being to whom it is not sometimes indispensable. We may rest in a standing posture; we can repose only in a lying position: the dove which Noah first sent out could not find rest for the sole of its foot; soldiers who are hotly pursued by an enemy have no time or opportunity to take repose: the night is the time for rest; the pillow is the place for repose. Rest may be as properly applied to things as to persons; repose is figura- tively apphed to things. Ease, Easiness, Facility, Lightness. — Ease denotes either the abstract state of a person or quaUty of a thing; easi- ness, from easy, signifying having ease, denotes simply an abstract quaUty which serves to characterize the thing; a person enjoys ease, or he has an easiness of disposition. Ease is said of that which is borne, or that which is done; easiness and facility, from the Latin facilis, easy, from facere, to do, most commonly of that which is done; the former in ap- phcation to the thing as before, the latter either to the person or the thing: we speak of the easiness of the task, but of a person's facility in doing it: we judge of the easiness of a thing by comparing it with others more difficult ; we judge of a person's facility by com- paring him with others who are less skilful. Ease and lightness are both said of what is to be borne; the former in a general, the latter in a particular sense. Whatever presses in any form is not east/; that which presses by ex- cess of weight is not light: a coat may be easy from its make; it can be light only from its texture. A work is easy which requires no particular effort either of body or of mind from any one performing it; a work is light as far as it requires no bodily effort, or not more than what the individual can easily make who has to perform it. The same distinction exists between their derivatives, to ease, facilitate, and lighten; to ease is to make easy or free from pain, as to ease a person of his labor; to facilitate is to render a thing more practicable or less difficult, as to facilitate a person's progress; to lighten is to take off an excessive weight, as to lighten a person's biirdens. Easy, Ready. — Easy signifies here a freedom from obstruction in ourselves. Ready is derived from rcede, which meant literally equipped for riding, prepared for a raid — all these words coming from the same root. Easy marks the freedom of being done; ready, the disposition or wiUing- ness to do; the former refers mostly to the thing or the manner, the latter to the person; the thing is easy to be done: the person is ready to do it; it is easy to make professions of friend- ship in the ardor of the moment; but every one is not ready to act up to them when it interferes with his con- venience or interest. As epithets, both are opposed to difficult, but agree- ably to the above explanation of the terms; the former denotes a freedom from such difficulties or obstacles as he in the nature of the thing itself; the latter an exemption from such as he in the temper and character of the person; hence we say a person is easy of access whose situation, rank, em- ployments, or circumstances do not prevent him from admitting others to his presence; he is ready to hear when he himself throws no obstacles in the way, when he lends a wilhng ear to what is said. So likewise a task is said to be easy; a person's wit, or a person's reply, to be ready. EASTERN. See Orient. EBULLITION, Effervescence, Fermentation, Ferment. These technical terms have a strong resem- blance in their signification, but they are not strictly synonymous; they have strong characteristic differences. Ebul- lition, from the Latin ebullitio and ebullio, compounded of e and bullire, to bubble, boil, marks the commotion of a liquid acted upon by fire, and in chem- istry it is said of two substances which, ECONOMICAL 293 by penetrating each other, occasion bubbles to rise up. Effervescence, from the Latin effervescentia, and effervescere, to grow hot, marks the commotion which is excited in hquors by a com- bination of substances, such as of acids, which are mixed and commonly produce heat. Ferment, or fermenta- tion, from the Latin fermentatio and fermentum or fervimentum, from fervere, to grow hot, marks the internal move- ment which is excited in a Uquid of itself, by which its components imdergo such a change or decomposition as to form a new body. Ebullition is a more violent action than effervescence; ferment and fer- mentation are more gradual and per- manent than either. Water is exposed to ebullition when acted upon by any powerful degree of external heat; iron m aqua-fortis occasions effervescence; beer and wine xmdergo a ferment or fermentation before they reach a state of perfection. These terms are applied figuratively to moral objects. The passions are exposed to ebullitions; the heart and affections to effervescence when powerfully awakened by partic- ular objects. The minds or spirits, particularly of numbers, may be in a ferment or fermentation. If the angry humors of an irascible temper be not restrained in early Ufe, they but too frequently break forth in the most dreadful ebullitions in maturer years; rehgious zeal, when not constrained by the sober exercise of judgment and corrected by sound knowledge, is an unhappy effervescence that injures the cause which it espouses and often proves fatal to the individual by whom it is indulged: the ferment produced by public measures may often endanger the public peace. ECCENTRIC. See Erratic; Par- ticular. ECCLESIASTIC, DmNE, Theo- logian. An ecclesiastic derives his title from the office which he bears in the ecclesia, or church; a divine and theologian, from his pursuit after or engagement in divine or theological mat- ters. An ecclesiastic is connected with an episcopacy; a divine or theologian is unconnected with any form of church government. An ecclesiastic need not m his own person perform any office, although he fills a station; a divine not only fills a station, but actually per- forms the office of teaching; a theo- logian neither fills any particular sta- tion nor discharges any specific duty, but merely follows the pursuit of studying theology. An ecclesiastic is not always a divine, nor a divine an ec- clesiastic; a divine is always more or less a theologian, but every theologian is not a divine. Among the Roman Cathohcs all monks, and in the Church of England the various dignitaries who perform the episcopal functions, are entitled ecclesiastics. There are but few denominations of Christians who have not appointed teachers who are called divines. Professors or writers on theology are peculiarly denominated theologians. ECLIPSE, Obscure. Eclipse, from Greek U, out, and Xtiwuv, to leave, means the leaving out or vanishing of light. Obsctire, from the adjective obscure (see Dark), signifies to cause the intervention of a shadow. In the natural as well as the moral appUcation eclipse is taken in a particu- lar and relative signification; obscure is used in a general sense. Heavenly bodies are eclipsed by the intervention of other bodies between them and the beholder; things are in general 06- scured which are in any way rendered less striking or visible. To eclipse is therefore a species of obscuring: that is always obscured which is eclipsed; but everything is not eclipsed which is obscured. So, figuratively, real merit is eclipsed by the intervention of su- perior merit; it is often obscured by an ungracious exterior in the possessor or by his unfortunate circumstances. ECONOMICAL, Saving, Sparing, Thrifty, Penurious, Niggardly. The idea of not spending is common to all these terms; but economical sig- nifies not spending unnecessarily or unwisely. Saving is keeping and lay- ing by with care; sparing is keeping out of that which ought to be sjjent; thrifty or thriving is accumulating by means of saving; venurious is suffering as from penury by means of saving; niggardly, after the manner of a nig- gard, nigh or close person, is not spend- ing or fetting go out in the smallest possible quantities. To be economical 294 ECONOMIZE is a virtue in those who have but nar- row means; all the other epithets, how- ever, are employed in a sense more or less unfavorable; he who is saving when young will be avaricious when old; he who is sparing will generally be sparing out of the comforts of others; he who is thrifty commonly adds the desire of getting with that of saving; he who is penurious wants nothing to make him a complete miser; he who is niggardly in his dealings will be mostly avaricious in his character. Economy, Frugality, Parsimony. — Economy, from the Greek oiKovofiia, the management of a house, is derived from Greek oTkoq, house, and vkfifiv, to deal out. Frugality, from the Latin /rugfes, fruits, means subsisting on the fruits of the earth, hence temperance. Parsi- mony (see AvARiciotrs) impUes simply forbearing to spend, which is in fact the common idea included in these terms; but the economical man spares expense according to circumstances; he adapts his expenditure to his means and ren- ders it by contrivance as effectual to his purpose as possible; the frugal man spares expense on himself, or on his in- dulgences; he may, however, be liberal to others while he is frugal toward him- self as well as others; he has no other object than saving. By economy a man may make a lunited income turn to the best account for himself and his family; by frugality he may with a hmited. income be enabled to lay by money; by parsimony he may be enabled to accumulate great sums out of a narrow income; hence it is that we recommend a plan for being eco- nomical; we recommend a diet for being frugal; we condemn a habit or a character for being parsimonioiis. Economy, Management. — Economy has a more comprehensive meaning than management; for it includes the system of science and of legislation as well as that of domestic arrangements: as the economy of agriculture; the in- ternal economy of a government; po- litical, civil, or reUgious economy: or the economy of one's household. Man- agement, on the contrary, is an action that is very seldom abstracted from its agent, and is always taken in a partial sense, namely, as a part of economy. The internal economy of a family depends principally on the prudent management of the female: the economy of every well-regulated com- munity requires that all the members should keep their station and preserve a strict subordination; the management of particular branches of this economy should belong to particular individuals. ECONOMIZE. See Husband. ECSTASY, Rapture, Transport. There is a strong resemblance in the meaning and apphcation of these words. They all express an extraor- dinary elevation of the spirits or an excessive tension of the mind. Ecstasy marks a passive state, from the Greek tKtxTaaig, from U, out, and 'iarafiat, I stand, means to be out of one's self, out of one's mind. Rapture, from the Latin rapere, to seize or carry away; and transport, from trans and portare, to carry beyond one's self, rather desig- nate an active state, a violent impulse with which it hurries itself forward. Ecstasy and rapture are always pleas- urable, or arise from pleasurable causes; transport respects either pleasurable or painful feeUngs: joy occasions ecstasies or raptures; joy and anger have theit transports. An ecstasy benumbs the faculties; it will take away the power of speech and often of thought; it is commonly occasioned by sudden and unexpected events: rapture, on the other hand, often invigorates the powers and calls them into action; it frequently arises from deep thought: the former is common to all persons of ardent feelings, but more particularly to children, ignorant people, or to such as have not their feeUngs under con- trol; rapture, on the contrary, is ap- phcable to persons with superior minds and to circumstances of peculiar im- portance. Transports are sudden bursts of passion which, from their vehemence, may lead to intemperate actions: a re- prieve from the sentence of death will produce an ecstasy or delight in the pardoned criminal. Religious contem- plation is calculated to produce holy raptures in a mind strongly imbued with pious zeal: in transports of rage men have committed enormities which have cost them bitter tears of re- pentance ever after: youth is the period in which transports of delight are mostly felt. EFFECT 295 EDGE. See Border. EDICT. See Decree; Ordinance. EDIFICE, Structure, Fabric. Edifice, in Latin oedificium, from cedi- fico, or cedes, a house, and facere, to make, signifies properly the house made. Structure, from the Latin struc- lura, and struere, to heap together, sig- nifies the raising a thing or the thing raised. Fabric comes from Latin faber, a workman, from a base signifying skill, and means something made by skiU. Edifice in its proper sense is always appUed to a builaing; structure and fabric are either employed as abstract actions or the results and fruits of actions: in the former case they are applied to many objects besides build- ings, structure referring to the act of raising or setting up together, fabric to that of framing or contriving. As edifice bespeaks the thing itself, it re- quires no modification, since it conveys of itself the idea of something superior: the word structure must always be qualified; it is employed only to desig- nate the mode of action; fabric is it- self a species of epithet, it designates the object as something contrived by the power of art or by design. Edifipes dedicated to the service of rehgion have in all ages been held sacred: it is the business of the architect to estimate the merits or demerits of any structure; when we take a survey of the vast fabric of the universe, the mind becomes bewildered with contem- plating the infinite power of its Divine author. When employed in the abstract sense of actions, structure is hmited to ob- jects of magnitude, or such as consist of complicated parts :/a6ric is extended to everything in which art or contriv- ance is requisite; hence we may speak of the structure of vessels, and the fabric of cloth, ironware, or the fabric of states, the universe, etc. EDUCATION, Instruction, Breeding. Instruction and breeding are to education as parts to a whole: instruction respects the communication of knowledge, and breeding respects the manners or outward conduct; but edu- cation comprehends not only both these, but the formation of the mind, the regulation of the heart, and the establishment of the principles: good instruction makes one wiser; good breeding makes one more p>olished and agreeable; good education makes one really good. A want of education will always be to the injury, if not to the ruin, of the sufferer: a want of instruc- tion is of more or less inconvenience, according to circumstances; a want of breeding only unfits a man for the society of the cultivated. Education belongs to the period of childhood and youth; instruction may be given at different ages; good-breeding is best learned in the early part of lue. EFFACE. See Blot. EFFECT, Produce, Perform. The latter two are in reality included in the former; what is effected is both pro- duced and performed; but what is pro- duced or performed is not always ef- fected. To effect, in Latin effectus, par- ticiple of effido, compoimded of ex, out, and facere, to make, signifies to make out anything. To produce, from the Latin pro, forth, and ducere, to draw, signifies literally to draw forth. To perform. Old French oar/burmV, from Latin per, through, ana Old High Ger- man frumjan, to provide, French foumir, English furnish, signifies to do or provide everything necessary. To produce signifies to bring some- thing forth or into existence; to per- form to do something to the end: to effect is to produce an effect by perform- ing; whatever is effected is the conse- quence of a specific design; it always requires, therefore, a rational agent to ej^ect: what is produced aiay follow in- cidentally, or arise from the action of an irrational agent oi an inanimate object; what is performed is done by specific efforts; it is, therefore, like effect, the consequence of design, and requires a rational agent. To effect respects both the end and the means by which it is brought about; to pro- duce respects the end only; to perform the means only. No person ou^ht to calculate on effecting a reformation in the morals of men without the aid of rehgion; changes both in individuals and communities are often produced by trifles. To effect is said of that which ema- nates from the mind of the agent him- self; to perform, of that which is marked 296 EFFECTS out by rule or prescribed by another. We effect a purpose, we perform a part, a duty, or office. A true Christian is always happy when he can effect a reconciliation between parties who are at variance: it is a laudable ambition to strive to perform one's part credit- ably in society. See also Accomplish; Conse- quence. Effective, Efficient, Effectual, Effica- cious.— Effective signifies capable of effecting; efficient signifies, literally, effecting; effectual and efficacious signify having the effect, or possessing the power to effect. Effective and efficient are used only in regard to physical ob- jects: an army or a revenue is effective that can be employed to effect any ob- ject: a cause is efficient that is adequate to produce an effect. Effectual and efficacious are said of operations and intellectual objects: an end or result is effectual; the means are efficacious: a remedy or cure is effectual that is in reahty effected; a medicine is efficacious that effects a cure. No effectual stop can be put to the vices of the lower orders while they have a vicious example from their superiors: a seasonable exercise of severity on an offender is often very efficxiciovs in queUing a spirit of insubordination. When a thing is not found effectual, it is requisite to have recourse to further measures; that which has been proved to be inefficacious should never be adopted. EFFECTS. See Goods. EFFEMINATE. See Female. EFFERVESCENCE. See Ebulli- tion. EFFICACIOUS. See Effect. EFFIGY. See Likeness. EFFORT. See Attempt; En- deavor. EFFRONTERY. See Audacity. EFFUSION, Ejaculation. Effu- sion signifies the thing poured out, from ex, out, and fundere, to pour, and ejacu- lation, the thing ejaculated or thrown out, from ex, out, and iacere, to throw, both indicating a species of verbal, expression; the former either by utter- ance or in writing; the latter only by utterance. The effusion is not so vehement or sudden as the ejaculation; the ejaculation is not so ample or dif- fuse as the effusion; effusion is seldom taken in a good sense; ejaculation rarely otherwise. An effusion com- monly flows from a heated imagination uncorrected by the judgment; it is, therefore, in general not only incohe- rent, but extravagant and senseless: an ejaculation is produced by the warmth of the moment, but never without ref- erence to some particular circumstance. Enthusiasts are full of extravagant ef- fusions; contrite sinners will often ex- press their penitence in pious ejacula- tions. EGOISTICAL. See Misanthrop- ical; Opinionated. EJACULATION. See Effusion. ELATED. See Sanguine. ELDER. See Senior. ELDERLY, Aged, Old. These three words rise by gradation in their sense; aged denotes a greater degree of age than elderly, and old still more than either. The elderly man has passed the meridian of hfe; the aged man is fast approaching the term of our existence; the old man has already reached this term or has exceeded it. In conformity, however, to the vulgar prepossession against age and its con- comitant infirmities, the term elderly or aged is always more respectful than old, which latter word is often used by way of reproach, and can seldom be used free from such an association unless quaUfied by an epithet of praise, as good or venerable. ELECT. See Choose. ELECTRIC, Magnetic. Electric comes from Latin electrum, Greek iiXeKrpov, amber; and derives its pres- ent meaning from the fact that amber developed electricity when excited by friction. Magnetic referred to a similar property observed in the magnesian stone, so called because it was foimd in large quantities in magnesia. This stone had the power to attract iron and steel. Both words originally referred to the attractive power associated with certain substances under certain con- ditions. But, as the science of elec- tricity has developed, magnetic has been associated with the properties of the magnet and electric with a force or current existent or generated under cer- tain conditions. When used figura- tively electric refers to the swift and EMBARGO 297 thrilling quality of electricity, magnetic to a quality of attractiveness associated with the mysterious thrill of electrical force. ELEGANT. See Superb. ELEMENTARY, CONSTITUENT, Primary. Rudimentary. Elementary is the adjective corresponding to ele- ment, Latin elementum, a word whose et3Tnology and primary meaning are uncertain, but which is used to indi- cate one of the simple substances of which aU material bodies are com- poimded. Constituent, from Latin con, together, and statuere, to set up, indi- cates that which when joined to some- thing else goes to make up a complex whole. But it does not indicate a simple or uncompounded substance, as does elementary. Primary, from Latin primtis, first, means the first elements, the things absolutely necessary to form a contemplated whole; but it does not definitely suggest the combination of substances as does constituent. Rudi- mentary, from Latin rudimentum, from rudis, rough, indicates the first rude state of things. These words, therefore, all mean characteristic of that which is necessary to the formation of a com- plex whole; but they differ in the em- phasis upon the character of the thing indicated, and its relation to a larger whole. ELEVATE. See Lift. ELIGIBLE, Preferable. Eligible, or fit to be elected, and preferable, fit to be preferred, serve as epithets in the sense of choose and prefer (see Choose" Prefer): what is eligible is desirable in itseli, what is preferable is more desirable than another. There may be many eligible situations, out of which perhaps there is but one preferable. Of persons, however, we say rather that they are eligible to an office than preferable. ELOCUTION, Eloquence, Ora- tory, Rhetoric. Elocution and elo- mience are derived from the same Latin verb, eloqui, from ex, out, and loqui, to speak, to speak out. Oratory, from orare, to implore, signifies the art of making a set speech. Elocution consists in the manner of delivery; eloquence in the matter that is delivered. We employ elocution in repeating the words of another; we employ eloquence to express our own thoughts and feelings. Elocution is requisite for an actor; eloquence for a speaker. Eloquence lies in the person: it is a natural gift: oratory Ues in the mode of expression; it is an acquired art. Rhetoric is properly the theory of that art of which oratory is the practice. But the term rhetoric may be sometimes employed in an improper sense for the display of oratory or scientific speak- ing. Eloquence speaks one's own feel- ings; it comes from the heart and speaks to the heart: oratory is an imitative art; it describes what is felt by another. Rhetoric is either in the technical sense the science of oratory, or oratory reduced to rule, or, in the vulgar acceptation, it is the affectation of oratory. ELUCIDATE. See Explain. ELUDE. See Escape. EMANATE. See Arise. EMANCIPATE, Enfranchise, Un- shackle. Emancipate comes from Latin emandpare, e manibus capere, to take out of the hands of, and referred to the provision made in Roman law for freeing a child or a wife from the powor of the father or husband. It also referred to the freeing of slaves. Enfranchise comes from Old French franchise, privileged Uberty, and re- ferred especially to the admitting of a slave or a serf to personal freedom. The two words have therefore almost exactly the same meaning, but enfran- chise has also been given the special significance of to admit to the full rights of a citizen, especially to grant the right to vote. Hence when we speak of the emancipation of the negro slaves, we refer to the decree of the President delivering them from the power of their masters. When we sp>eak of their enfranchisement, we refer to the passing of the amendment to the Constitution of the United States granting them the right to vote. Unshackle is a figurative word from shackle (see Chain), meaning to deliver from shackles, and may be used to mean either emancipate or enfranchise or free in a still larger sense. See Free. EMBARGO, Ban, Prohibition. Embargo, Spanish embargo, from barra, a bar, means a prohibiting order, for- 298 EMBARRASS bidding the ships of a foreign power to enter or leave the ports of a country or native ships to proceed there, gen- erally issued in anticipation of war. It also indicates a suspension of com- merce by municipal law. Ban is an older term of Germanic origin signify- ing a formal edict — a call to arms, an announcement of intention to marry, or an ecclesiastical excommunication. Prohibition (for derivation see Ban) is used in a special sense to refer to the forbidding of the sale of alcohoUc liquor by the law of a community. It refers to a special embargo on alcohoUc drink. See also Intern. EMBARRASS, Perplex, Entan- gle. Embarrass (see Difficulty) re- spects a person's manners or circum- stances, verplex (see Distress), his views ana conduct; entangle (see Dis- engage) is said of particular circum- stances. Embarrassments depend al- together on ourselves; the want of prudence and presence of mind is the common cause; perplexities depend on extraneous circumstances as well as our- selves; extensive deaUngs with others are mostly attended with perplexities; entanglements arise mostly from the evil designs of others. That embarrasses which interrupts the even course or progress of one's actions: that per- plexes which interferes with one's deci- sions: that entangles which binds a person in his actions. Pecuniary diffi- culties embarrass, or contending feeUngs produce embarrassment; contrary coun- sels or interests perplex; the artifices of cunning entangle. Steadiness of mind Erevents embarrassment in the outward ehavior. Firmness of character is requisite in the midst of perplexities; caution must be employed to guard against entanglements. EMBARRASSMENT. See Quan- dary. EMBARRASSMENTS. See Diffi- culties. EMBELLISH. See Adorn; Gar- nish. EMBLEM. See Figure. EMBOLDEN. See Encourage. EMBRACE. See Clasp; Comprise. EMBRYO, Fanxrs. Embryo, in French embryon, Greek tiifipvov, from ^pvtiv, to swell out or germinate, sig- nifies the thing germinated. Foetus, Latin foetics, comes from an obsolete Latin verb signifying to generate or pro- duce, and signifies the thing cherished. Both words refer to what is formed in the womb of the mother; but embryo properly impUes the first-fruit of con- ception, and the foetxis that which is arrived to a maturity of formation. Anatomists teU us that the embryo in the human subject assumes the char- acter of the foetus about the forty- second day after conception. Foetus is applicable only in its proper sense to animated beings: embryo has a figiirative application to plants and fruits when they remain in a confused and imperfect state, and also a moral apphcation to plans, or whatever is roughly conceived in the mind. See also Germ. EMEND. See Amend. EMERGE. See Rise. EMERGENCE. See Exigency. EMINENT. See Distinguished. EMISSARY, Spy. Emissary, in Latin emissarius, from emittere, to send forth, signifies one sent out. Spy is a shortened form of espy, which comes through French espier, from Old High German spehon, German spdhen, to spy. Both these words designate a person sent out by a body on some public con- cern among their enemies; but they dif- fer in their office according to the ety- mology of the words. The emissary is by distinction sent forth; he is sent so as to mix with the people to whom he goes, to be in aU places, and to asso- ciate with every one individually as may serve his purpose; the spy, on the other hand, takes his station wherever he can best perceive what is passing; he keeps himself at a distance from all but such as may particularly aid him in the object of his search. Although the offices of emissary and spy are nei- ther of them honorable, yet that of the former is more disgraceful than that of the latter. The emissary is generally employed by those who have some illegitimate object to pursue; spies, on the other hand, are employed by all regular governments in a time of war- fare. Nations that are at war some- times send emissaries into the states of the enemy to excite civil commo- EMPIRE 299 tions. At Sparta, the trade of a spy was not so vile as it has been generally esteemed; it was considered as a self- devotion for the pubUc good, and formed a part of their education. These terms are applied to other ob- jects figuratively. See also Spy. EMIT, Exhale, Evaporate. Emii, from the Latin emittere, expresses prop- erly the act of sending out: exhale, from halitus, the breath, and evaporate, from vapor, vapor or steam, are both modes of emitting. Emit is used to express a more posi- tive effort to send out; exhale and evaporate designate the natural and pro- gressive process of things; volcanoes emit fire and lava; the earth exhales the damps, or flowers exhale perfumes; liquids evaporate. Animals may emit by an act of volition; things exhale or evaporate by an external action upon them; they exhale that which is foreign to them; they evaporate that which constitutes a part of their substance. The skunk emits such a stench from it- self when pursued as to keep its pur- suers at a distance from itself: bogs and fens exhale their moisture when acted upon by the heat: water evap- orates by means of steam when put into a state of ebuUition. See also Transpire. EMOLUMENT. See Gain. EMOTION. See Agitation. ■ EMPHASIS. See Stress. EMPIRE, Kingdom, Republic. Al- though the first two words obviously refer to two species of states, where the princes assume the title of either em- peror or king, yet the difference be- tween them is not limited to this dis- tinction. The word empire carries with it the idea of a state that is vast and com- posed of many different people; that of kingdom marks a state more hmited in extent and united in its composition. In kingdoms there is a uniformity of fimdamentai laws, the difference in regard to particular laws or modes of jurisprudence being merely variations from custom, which do not affect the unity of poUtical administration. From this uniformity, indeed, in the functions of government, we may trace the origin of the words king and kingdom, since there is but one prince or sovereign ruler, although there may be many employed in the administration. With empires it is different: one part is sometimes governed by fundamental laws very different from those by which another part of the same empire is governed, which diversity destroys the. unity of government and makes the union of the state to consist in the sub- mission of certain chiefs in the com- mands of a superior general or chief. From this very right of commanding, then, it is evident that the words em- pire and emperor derive their origin; and hence it is that there may be many princes or sovereigns, and kingdoms, in the same empire. Rome, therefore, was first a kingdom while it was formed of only one people: it acquired the name of empire as soon as other nations were brought into subjection to it and be- came members of it, not by losing the distinctive character as nations, but by submitting themselves to the su- preme command of their conquerors. For the same reason the German em- pire was so denominated because it consisted of several states independent of one another, yet all subject to one ruler or emp>eror; so Hkewise the Rus- sian empire, the Ottoman empire, and the former Mogul empire, which were composed of different nations: and, on the other hand, the kingdom of Spain and of England, both of which, though divided into different provinces, were, nevertheless, one people, having but one ruler. While France, however, included many distinct countries within its jurisdiction, it properly assumed the name of an empire, and, with Portugal later, took the name ol republic; and England, having by a legislative act united to itself a country distinct both in its laws and customs, has hkewise. with equal propriety, been denominated the British empire. The term republic appUes both to countries as vast as the United States, Brazil, and Mexico, as several in Eu- rope, and also to smaller ones, as those in Central and South America and some parts of Europe; and the term represents the form of government, the supreme authority being chosen or delegated by the people instead of being hereditary m a smgle family. soo EMPIRICAL Empire, Reign, Dominion. — In the preceding article empire has been con- sidered as a species of state: in the present case it conveys the idea of power or an exercise of sovereignty. In this sense it is aUied to the word reign, which, from the verb to reign, signifies the act of reigning; and to the word dominion, which, from the Latin dominus, a lord, signifies either the power or the exercise of the power of a lord. As empire signifies command, or the power exercised in commanaing, it properly refers to the country or people commanded; and as reign signifies the act of reigning, it refers to the individ- ual who reigns. If we speak of an extended empire, it has regard to the space over which it extends; if of an extended reign, it has regard either to the country reigned over or to the length of time that a prince reigns. lYom this distinction of the terms the epithets vast, imited, dismember- ized, and the hke are most appro- priately applied to empire; the epithets peaceful, warhke, glorious, prosperous, and the hke, to reign. Empire and reign are properly apphed to civil gov- ernment or the exercise of regular pow- er; dominion signifies either the act of TuUng by a sovereign or a private individual, or the power exercised in ruhng, which may be either regular or irregular; a sovereign may have do- minion over many nations by force of arms; he holds his reign by force of law. If empire and reign be extended in their appUcation to other objects, it is figurative; thus a female may be said to hold her empire among her admirers, or fashions may be said to have their reign. Dominion may be apphed in the proper sense to the power which man exercises over the brutes or inanimate objects, and figuratively to the power of the passions. In countries under the repubhcan form of government the entire body of citizens constitute the sovereignty. They choose the Congress, which is the highest lawmaking authority, and elect the President, who is the chief execu- tive of the laws, EMPIRICAL, Experimental, Hy- pothetical, Provisional, Tentative. All these words mean "not yet estab- hshed as an absolute fact, but serving as a working basis" for further dis- covery. But the failure to estabhsh as an absolute fact or law is indicated under somewhat different conditions. Empirical, from Greek iv, on, in, and irfipa, trial, experience, refers to knowledge gained simply from observa- tion and experience, not based on any thorough study of cause and effect or even on scientific experiment. Experi- mental, on the other hand, coming from Latin experiri, to make a thorough trial of, means the process of discov- ering laws or facts through system- atized observation; experimental sim- ply suggests an incomplete process of discovery. Hypothetical, from Greek vno, under, and 9kaiQ, a placing; it is the adjective corresponding to hy- pothesis. A hypothesis is a formulation of a possible law which has not yet been fully demonstrated by experience. That which is experimental may be as yet unformulated; that which is hy- pothetical may be formulated, but not yet proved by experiment. Provisional^ from pro, forward, and videre, to see, means taken as truth or right until a better way can be discovered; it is a formulation of a principle or method of action with the distinct expectation that it will be superseded; and is in- tended to serve as a means to an end. Tentative, from Latin tentare, to try, also means experimental, but it refers to informal rather than formal and systematic experiment, and partly sug- gests the meaning of provisional. That which is tentative is tried as an experi- ment till something better can be dis- covered. EMPLOY, Use. Employ, from the Latin in, in, and plicare, to fold, signi- fies to implicate or apply for any special purpose. Use, from the Latin usus, past participal of utor, signifies to enjoy or derive benefit from. Employ expresses less than xise; it is in fact a Species of partial using: we al- ways employ when we iise; but we do not always wse when we employ. We employ whatever we take into our ser- vice or make subservient to our con- venience for a time; we use whatever we entirely devote to our purpose. Whatever is employed by one person may, in its turn, be employed by an- ENCOURAGE 301 other, or at different times be employed by the same person; but what is used is frequently consumed or rendered un- fit for a similar use. What we employ may frequently belong to another; but what one uses is supposed to be his ex- clusive property. On this ground we may speak of employing persons as well as things: but we speak of u^ing things only, and not persons, except in the most degrading sense. Persons, time, strength, and power are employed; houses, furniture, and all materials, of which either necessities or conveniences are composed, are used. It is a part of wisdom to employ well the short por- tion of time which is allotted to us in this sublunary state, and to use the things of this world so as not to abuse them. No one is exculpated from the guilt of an immoral action by suffering himself to be employed as an instrvunent to serve the purposes of another: we ought to use our utmost endeavors to abstain from all connections with such as wish to implicate us in their guilty practices. EMPLOYMENT. See Business; Vocation. EMPOWER.^ See Commission. EMPTY, Vacant, Void, Devoid. Empty is in Anglo-Saxon oemta, (emetta, meaning leisure. Void ana devoid come from Old French voide, of un- known origin, meaning empty. Empty is the term in most general use; vacant, void, and devoid are em- ployed in particular cases; empty and vacant have either a proper or an im- proper application; void or devoid only a moral acceptation. Empty, in the natural sense, marks an absence of that which is substantial, of adapted for filUng: vacant designates or marks the absence of that which should occupy or make use of a thing. That which is hollow may be empty: that which re- spects an even space may be vacant. A house is empty which has no inhabi- tants; a seat is vacant which is without an occupant; a room is empty which is without furniture; a space on paper is vacant which is free from writing. In their figurative apphcation empty and vacant have a similar analogy: the empty is opposed to that which is sub- stantial: the vacant to that which is or ought to be occupied; a dream is said to be empty, or a title empty; a stare is said to be vacant, or an hour vacant. Void and devoid are used in the same sense as vacant, as qualifying epithets, but not prefixea as adjectives, and al- ways followed by some object; thus we speak of a creature as void of reason, and of an individual as devoid of com- mon sense. See also Hollow. EMULATION. See Competition. ENCHANT. See Charm. ENCHANTED. See Spellbound. ENCIRCLE. See Surround. ENCOMIUM, Eulogy, Panegyric. Encomium comes from Greek Iv, in, and Koipoc, revelry, and signifies a set form of verses used on festive occasions for the purposes of praise. Eulogy, in Greek tvXoyia, from ei and Xoyoc, sig- nifies, literally, speaking well of any one. Panegyric, in Greek vavtjyvpucov, from irdv, the whole, and Ayopd, an assembly, signifies that which is spoken before an assembly, a solemn oration. The idea of praise is common to all these terms; but the first seems more properly appUed to the thing, or the un- conscious object; the second to persons in general, their characters and actions; the third to the person of some particu- lar individual: thus we bestow en- comiums upMjn any work of art or pro- duction of genius, without reference to the performer; we bestow eulogies on the exploits of a hero, who is of another age or country; but we write pane- gyrics either in a direct address or in direct reference to the person who is panegyrized: the encomium is produced oy merit, real or supposed; the eulogy may spring frcun admiration of the per- son eulogized; the panegyric may be mere flattery, resulting from servile de- pendence: great encomiums have been paid by all persons to the constitution of England; our naval and military heroes have received the eulogies of many besides their own countrjTnen; authors of no mean reputation have condescended to deal out their pane- gyrics pretty freely, in dedications to their patrons. ENCOMPASS. See Besieob, ENCOUNTER. See Attack. ENCOURAGE, Animate, Incite, Impel, Urg£, Stimulate, Investi- 302 ENCOURAGE GATE. Encourage (see Cheer). Ani- mate (see Animate). Incite, from the Latin dtare, to stir up, signifies to put into motion toward an object. Impel (see Actuate) . Urge comes from Latin urgere, to drive. Stimulate, from the Latin stimulus, a spur or goad, and instigate, from the Latin stigo, signify literally to goad. The idea of actuat- ing or calling into action is common to these terms, which vary in the cir- cumstances of the action. Encouragement acts as a persuasive: animate, as an impelling or enhvening cause: those who are weak require to be encouraged; those who are strong become stronger by being animated: the former require to have their diffi- culties removed, their powers reno- vated, their doubts and fears dispelled; the latter may have their hopes in- creased, their prospects brightened, and their powers invigorated; we are en- couraged not to give up or slacken in our exertions; we are animated to in- crease oiu* efforts: the sinner is encour- aged by offers of pardon, through the merits of a Redeemer, to turn from his sinful ways; the Christian is animated by the prospect of a blissful eternity, to go on from perfection to perfection. What encourages and animates acts by the finer feelings of our nature; what incites acts through the medium of our desires: we are encouraged by kindness; we are animated by the hope of reward: we are incited by the desire of distinction. What impels, urges, stimulates, and instigates acts forcibly, be the cause internal or external: we are impelled and stimulated mostly by what is in- ternal; we are urged and instigated by both the internal and the external, but particularly the latter: we are impelled Ijy motives; we are stimulated by appe- tites and passions; we are urged and instigated by the representations of others: a benevolent man is impelled by motives of humanity to relieve the wretched; an ardent mind is stimulated by ambition to great efforts; we are urged by entreaties to spare those who are in our power; one is instigated by malicious representations to take re- venge on a supposed enemy. We may be impelled and urged, though not properly stimulated or in- stigated, by circumstances; in this case the former two differ only in the degree of force in the impelling cause: less constraint is laid on the will when we are impelled than when we are urged, which leaves no alternative or choice: a monarch is sometimes impelled by the state of the nation to make a peace less advantageous than he would other- wise do; he is urged by his desperate condition to throw himself upon the mercy of the enemy: a man is impelled by the mere necessity of choosing to take one road in preference to another; he is urged by his pecuniary embar- rassments to raise money at a great loss. We may be impelled, urged, and stimulated to that which is bad; we are never instigated to that which is good; we may be impelled by ciu-iosity to pry into that which does not concern us; we may be urged by the entreaties of those we are connected with to take steps of which we afterward repent; we may be stimulated by a desire of re- venge to many foul deeds; but those who are not hardened in vice require the instigation of persons more aban- doned than themselves before they will commit any desperate act of wicked- ness. Encouragement and incitement are the abstract nouns either for the act of encouraging or inciting, or the thing that encourages or incites: the encour- agement of laudable undertakings is it- self laudable; a single word or look may be an encouragement: the incite- ment of passion is at all times danger- ous, but particularly in youth; money is said to be an incitement to evil. In- centive, which is another derivative from incite, has a higher application for things that incite than the word incite- ment; the latter being mostly applied to sensible, and the former to spiritual objects: savory food is an incitement to sensualists to indulge in gross acts of intemperance: a religious man wants no incentives to virtues; his own breast furnishes him with those of the noblest kind. Impulse is the derivative from impel, which denotes the act of impel- ling; stimulus, which is the root of the word stimulate, naturally designates the instrument, namely, the spur or goad, with which one is stimtdated: hence, we ENCROACH 303- speak of acting by a blind impulse, or wanting a stimtdus to exertion. See also Hearten. Encourage, Advance, Promote, Prefer, Forward. — To encourage (see above). Advance (see Advance) . Promote, from the Latin -pro, forward, and movere, to move, signifies to move forward. Pre- fer, from the Latin prcefero, from prce, before, and ferre, to carry, signifies to set up before others. To forward is to put forward. The idea of exerting an influence to the advantage of an object is included in the signification of all these terms, which differ in the circumstances and mode of the action: to encourage, ad- vance, and promote are apphcable to both persons and things ; prefer, to per- sons only ; forward, to things only. First as to persons, encourage is par- tial as to the end, and indefinite as to the means: we may encourage a person in anything, however trivial, and by any means; thus we may encourage a child in his rudeness by not checking him; or we may encourage an artist or man of letters in some great national work; but to advance^ promote, and prefer are more general in their end and specific in the means; a person may advance himself, or may be advanced by others; he is promoted and preferred only by others: a person's advancement may be the fruit of his industry, or result from the efforts of his friends; promotion and preferment are the work of one's friends; the former in regard to offices in general, the latter mostly in regard to ecclesiastical situations: it is the duty of every one to encourage, to the utmost of his power, those among the poor who strive to obtain an honest livelihood; it is every man's duty to advance himself in life by every legitimate means; it is the duty and the pleasure of every good man in the state to promote those who show them- selves deserving of promotion; it is the duty of a minister to accept of prefer- ment when it offers, but it is not his duty to be sohcitous for it. When taken in regard to things, en- courage is used in an improper or figu- rative acceptation; the rest are applied properly: if we encourage an under- taking, we give courage to the under- taker; but when we spealc of advancing a cause, or promoting an interest, or forwarding a purpose, these terms prop- erly convey the idea of keeping things alive or in a motion toward some de- sired end: to advance is, however, gen- erally used in relation to whatever ad- mits of extension and aggrandizement ; promote is applied to whatever admits of being brought to a point of maturity or perfection; forward is but a partial term, employed in the sense of promote in regard to particular objects: thus we advance reUgion or learning; we promote an art or an invention; we forward a plan. Encourage, Embolden. — To eruxmra^e is to give courage, and to embolden to make bold, the former impelling to action in general, the latter to that which is more difficult or dangerous: we are encouraged to persevere; the reso- lution is thereby confirmed: we are emboldened to begin; the spirit of en- terprise is roused. Success encourages; the chance of escaping danger em- boldens. ENCROACH, Intrench, Intrude, Invade, Infringe. Encroach comes through Old French en crochier, from French en (Latin in), and Middle Dutch kroke, hook (corresponding to English crook), and means Uterally to hook in. Intrench, from Latin in and trencare for truncare, to cut, from trun- cus, the trimk of a tree, signifies to cut into another's territory. Intrude comes from Latin in, and trudere, to thrust, meaning, literally, in the slang phrase, "to butt in." Invade, from in, m, and vadere, to go, signifies to march in upon. Infringe, from the Latin infringo. com- poundea of in and frangere, to break, signifies to break in uix)n. All these terms denote an unauthor- ized procedure; but the first two desig- nate gentle or silent actions, the latter violent if not noisy actions. Encroach is often an imperceptible action, per- formed with such art as to elude ob- servation; it is, according to its deri- vation, an insensible creeping into: intrench is, in fact, a species of encroach- ment, namely, that perceptible species which consists in exceeding the boun- daries in marking out the groimd or space. In an extended and figurative appli- cation of the terms one is saia to 304 ENCUMBER encroach on a person or on a person's time, etc.; to intrench on the sphere or privilege of another. Intrude and invade designate an un- authorized entry, the former in viola- tion of right, equity, or good manners, the latter in violation of public law: the former is more commonly apphed to individuals; the latter to nations or large communities: unbidden guests intrude themselves sometimes into fam- iUes to their no small annoyance; an army never invades a coimtry without doing some mischief. They are figuratively applied to other objects: intrude, in the sense of going in without being invited, as un- welcome thoughts intrude themselves into the mind : invade, in the sense of going in by force, as sounds invade the ear. To invade and infringe are both vio- lent acts; but there is more violation of good faith in infringing than in in- vading, as the infringement of a treaty. A privilege may be either invaded or infringed; but to invade in this sense is applied to any privilege, however ob- tained; but infringe properly appUes to that which persons hold under some grant, compact, or law. ENCUMBER. See Clog. ENCYCLOPAEDIA. See Diction- ary. END, Terminate, Close. To end is either to come to an end or put an end to. To terminate, either to come to a term or set a term to. To close, to come or bring to a close. To end is in- definite in its meaning and general in its apphcation ; terminate and close are modes of ending: to terminate is to end finally; to close, to end gradually. Whatever is begun will end, and it may end in any way; but what terminates is that which has been designedly brought to an end; a string, a Une, a verse, etc., may end, but a road is said properly to terminate. Things may end abruptly or at once, but they close by a process or by bring- ing the parts or points together; a scene may dose, or several Unes may close. Any period of time, as a day, a life, may end or close. See also Aim; Sake. End, Extremity. — Both these words imply the last of those parts which con- stitute a thing; but the end designates that part generally; the extremity marks the particular point. The ex- tremity is from the Latin extremus, the very last end, that which is outermost. Hence end may be said of that which bounds anything, but extremity of that which extends farthest from us: we may speak of the ends of that which is circular in its form, or of that which has no specific form; but we speak of the extremities of that only which is sup- posed to project lengthwise. The end is opposed to the beginning; the ex- tremity to the centre or point from which we reckon. When a man is said to go to the end of a journey or the end of the world, the expression is in both cases indefinite and general: but when he is said to go to the extremities of the earth or the extremities of a kingdom, the idea of relative distance is mani- festly imphed. He who goes to the end of a path may possibly have a Httle farther to go in order to reach the extremity. In the figurative applica- tion, end and extremity differ so widely as not to admit of any just compari- son. ENDEAVOR, Aim, Strive, Strug- gle. To endeavor is general in its object, aim is particular; we endeavor to do whatever we set about; we aim at doing something which we have set before ovu-selves as a desirable object. To strive is to endeavor earnestly; to struggle is to strive earnestly. An en- deavor springs from a sense of duty (from French en devoir, on duty); we endeavor to do that which is right and avoid that which is wrong: aiming is the fruit of an aspiring temper; the ob- ject aimed at is always something su- perior either in reality or in imagina- tion, and calls for particular exertion: striving is the consequence of an ardent desire; the thing striven for is always conceived to be of importance: strug- gling is the effect of necessity; it is pro- portioned to the difficulty of attain- ment and the resistance which is op- posed to it; the thing struggled for is in- dispensably necessary. Those only who endeavor to discharge their duty to God and their fellow-creatures can expect real tranquillity of mind. Whoever aims at the acquirement of great wealth ENEMY 305 or much power opens the door for much misery to himself. As our pas- sions are acknowledged to be our Neat- est enemies when they obtain the as- cendency, w^e should always strive to keep them imder our control. There are some men who struggle through Ufe to obtain a mere competence, and yet die without succeedmg in their object. Endeavor, Effort, Exertion. — Endeav- or (see Attempt and above). Effort comes from Latin ex, out, and fortis, strong, and means to bring force to bear upon. Exertion is derived from Latin ex, out, and serere, to join, or put, meaning to put forth the strength and apply it to something. The idea of calling our powers into action is common to these terms; en- deavor expresses httle more than this common idea, being a term of general import: effort ana exertion are par- ticular modes of endeavor; the former being a special strong endeavor, the latter a continued strong endeavor. An endeavor is called forth by ordinary cir- cumstances; effort and exertion, by those which are extraordinary. An en- deavor flows out of the condition of our being and constitution ; as rational and responsible agents we must make daily endeavors to fit ourselves for a hereafter; as willing and necessitous agents we use our endeavors to obtain such things as are agreeable or needful for us: when a particular emergency arises we make a great effort. An endeavor may call forth one or many powers; an effort calls forth but one power: the endeavor to please in society is laudable if it do not lead to vicious compliances; it is a laudable effort of fortitude to sup- press our complaints in the moment of suffering. The exertion is as indefinite as the en- deavor is to the means, but, like the effortj is definite as to the object: when a serious object is to be obtained, suit- able exertions must be made. The en- deavor is mostly apphed to individuals, but the exertion may frequently be the combined endeavors of numbers. ENDLESS. See Eternal. ENDOW. See Invest. ENDOWMENT. See Gift. ENDURANCE. See Patience. ENDURE. See Bear; Brook; Tol- erate; Undergo. ENEMY, Foe, Adversary, Oppo- nent, Antagonist. Enemy, in Latin inimicus, compoimd of in, privative, and amicus, a friend, signifies one that is unfriendly. Foe comes from Anglo- Saxon /aA, hostile. Adversary, in Latin adversarius from adversus, against, sig- nifies one that takes part against an- other; adversarius in Latin was partic- ularly applied to those who contested a point in law with another. Opponent, in Latin opponens, participle of op- ponere, from ob, in the way of, and ponere, to place, signifies one pitted against another. Antagonist, in Greek uvrayajviarrji, compounded of dvri, against, and dywviZofiat, I struggle, signifies one struggling against an- other. An enemy is not so formidable as a foe; the former may be reconciled, but the latter always retains a deadly hate. An enemy may be so in spirit, in action, or in relation; a foe is always so in spirit, if not in action likewise: a man may be an enemy to himself, though not a. foe. Those who are national or polit- ical enemies are often private friends, but a foe is never anything but a foe. A single act may create an enemy, out continued warfare creates a foe. Enemies are either public or private, collective or personal; in the latter sense the word enemy is most analogous in signification to that of adversary, op- ponent, antagonist. The term enemy is always taken in a larger sense than the other terms: a private enemy is never inactive; he seeks to do mischief from the desire of so doing. An adversary, opponent, and antagonist may be so simply from the relation which they stand in to others: the adversary is one who is adverse either in his claims, his opinions, his purposes, or his endeavors; he is active against others only as far as his interests and views require. An opponent is one who stands or acts in opposition to another: an opponent opposes the opinions, principles, con- duct, and writings of others. An ad- versary is always personal, and seta himseu up immediately against an- other; but an opponent has nothing to do with the person, but with the thing that emanates from or is connected 306 ENERGY with the person. A man can have no adversaries except while he is Hving, but he may have opponents after he is dead; partisans are always opponents to each other. An antagonist is a particular species of opponent either in combat or in action; it is personal or otherwise, according to circumstances: there may be antagonists who contend for victory without any feehng of animosity; such were the Horatii and Curiatii among the Romans: or they may engage in a personal and bloody conflict, as the gladiators who fought for their Uves: in this sense wild beasts are antagonists when they engage in battle; there are also hterary antagonists who are di- rectly pitted against each other: as Scahger and Petavius among the French; Boyle and Bentley among the Enghsh. Enemy and foe are figuratively ap- plied to moral objects, the first in a general, the second in a particular sense: our passions are our enemies when indulged : envy is a foe to happi- ness. The word antagonist may also be apphed metaphorically to other ob- jects. ENERGY, Force, Vigor. Energy comes from Greek Ivtpytia, from Greek «v, in, and ipyov, work, meaning work put into something. Fm-ce (see Com- pel). Vigor, from the Latin vigere, to flourish, signifies* unimpaired power, or that which belongs to a subject in a sound or flourishing state. With energy is connected the idea of activity; with force, that of capability; with vigor, that of health. Energy lies only in the mind; force and vigor are the property of either body or mind. Knowledge and freedom combine to produce energy of character; force is a gift of nature that may be increased by exercise: vigor, both bodily and men- tal, is an ordinary accompaniment of youth, but is not always denied to old age ENERVATE. See Weaken. ENFEEBLE. See Weaken. ENFRANCHISE. See Emancipa- tion. ENGAGE. See Attract; Bespeak; Bind. ENGAGEMENT. Business; Promise. See Battle; ENGENDER. See Breed. ENGRAVE. See Imprint. ENGRAVING. See Picture. ENGROSS. See Absorb; Monop- olize. ENIGMA, Paradox, Riddle. All these words indicate something puz- zUng, hard to understand or solve, but the character of the imphed intellect- ual difficulty varies. Enigma comes from Greek aiviyfta, meaning an ob- scure speech, and referred to a short composition in prose or verse in which something was described by intentional- ly obscure metaphors, in order to afi'ord an exercise for the ingenuity of the reader in guessing what was meant. Riddle, Anglo-Saxon rasdels, is the na- tive Enghsh term for exactly the same sort of thing. A paradox, from Greek irapd, contrary to, and SS^a, opinion, is a statement contrary to received opinion, a statement which on the face of it seems self-contradictory, absurd, or at variance with common sense, though it may be essentially true. An enigma, therefore, is not a paradox, but a paradox, not being intelhgible, may seem like an enigma. Between enigma and riddle there is no essential difference. Enigma, being the Greek term and the learned word, less clearly suggests its exact character to the popular mind than the famihar native term riddle. Accordingly it is at once more vague and more dignified. Paradox has an essentially different meaning from enigma and riddle, but it is included because it shares with them the general imphcation of ob- scurity— something puzzhng to the mind, difficult to solve. ENJOYMENT, Fruition, Grati- fication._ Enjoyment, from enjoy, to have the joy or pleasure, signifies either the act of enjoying or the pleasure itself derived from that act. Fruition, from frui, to enjoy, is employed only for the act of enjoying; we speak either of the enjoyment of any pteasure or of the enjoyment as a pleasure: we speak of those pleasures which are received from the fruition, in distinction from those which are had in expectation. Enjoyment is either corporeal or spirit- ual, as the enjoyment of music or the enjoyrnent of study: but the fruition of eating or any other sensible, or at ENORMOUS 807 least external, object: hope intervenes between the desire and the fruition. Gratification, from the verb to gratify, to make grateful or pleasant, signifies either the act of giving pleasure or the pleasure received. Enjoyment springs from every object which is capable of yielding pleasure; by dis- tinction, however, and in the latter sense, from moral and rational objects: but gratification, which is a species of enjoyment, is obtained through the mediu of the senses. Enjoyment is not so vivid as gratification: gratifica^ tion is not so permanent as enjoyment. Domestic life has its peculiar enjoy- ments; brilliant spectacles afford graii/- fication. Our capacity for enjoyment depends upon our intellectual endow- ments; our gratification depends upon the tone of our feelings and the nature of our desires. ENLARGE, Increase, Extend. Enlarge signifies Uterally to make large or wide, and is apphed to dimension and extent. Increase, from the Latin increscere, from in, in, and crescere, to grow, means to grow from within, and is applicable to quantity, signifying to be- come greater in size by natural de- velopment. Extend, in Latin extendo, or ex, out, and tendere, to stretch, sig- nifies to stretch out, that is, to make greater in space. We speak of enlarg- ing a house, a room, premises, or boun- daries; of increasing an army or prop- erty, capital, expense, etc. ; oi extending the Doundaries of an empire. We say the hole or cavity enlarges, the head or bulk enlarges; the number increases, the swelling, inflammation, and the like increase: so hkewise in the figurative sense, the views, the prospects, the powers, the ideas, and the mind are enlarged; pain, pleasure, hope, fear, anger, or kindness is increased; views, prospects, connections, and the like are extended. ENLIGHTEN. See Illuminate. ENLIST. See Enroll. ENLIVEN. See Animate. ENMITY, Animosity, Hostility. Enmity hes in the heart ; it is deep and maUgnant. Animosity, from animus, a spirit, hes in the passions; it is fierce and vindictive: hostility, from hostis, a poUtical enemy, lies in the action; it is mischievous and destructive. Enmity ia something permanent; ani- mosity is partial and^ transitory: in the feudal ages, when the darkness and ignorance of the times prevented the mild influence of Christianity, enmities between particular families were hand- ed down as an inheritance from father to son; in free states party spirit en- genders greater animosities than private disputes. Enmity is altogether personal; hostil- ity respects public or private measures. Enmity often hes concealed in the heart and does not betray itself by any open act of hostility. See also Hatred. ENORMOUS, Huge, Immense, Vast. Enormous, from e and norma, a rule, signifies out of rule or order. Huge comes from Anglo-French ahogct the origin of which is unknown. Im- mense, in Latin immensus, compounded of in, privative, and menms, measured, signifies not to be measured. Vast, in French vaste, Latin vastxis, waste, sig- nifies characteristic of a great open space, of a waste or wUdemess. Enormous and huge are pecuUarly apphcable to magnitude; immense and vast to extent, quantity, and number. Enormous expresses more than huge, as immense expresses more than wos/: what is enormous exceeds in a very great degree all ordinary bounds; what is huge is great only in the superlative degree. The enormous is always out of proportion; the hv^e is relatively ex- traordinary in its dimensions. Some animals may be made enormously fat by a particular mode of feeding: to one who has seen nothing but level groimd common hills will appear to be huge moim tains. The immense is that which exceeds all calculation: the vast comprehends only a very great or un- usu£j excess. The distance between the earth and sun may be said to be im- mense: the distance between the poles is vast. Of all these terms huge is the only one confined to the proper appUcation and in the proper sense of size: the rest are employed with regard to moral objects. We speak only of a huge anunal, a huge monster, a huge mass, a hv^e size, a huge bulk, and the like; but we sp>eak of an enormous waste, an immense difference, and a vast number. SOS ENOUGH Enormous, Prodigioiis, Monstrous. — Enormous (see above). Prodigious comes from prodigy, in Latin prodigium, signifying, literally, breaking out in excess or extravagance. Monstrous, from monster, in Latin monstrum, and monstro, show or make visible, signifies remarkable, or exciting notice. The enormous contradicts our rules of estimating and calculating; the prodig- ious raises our minds beyond their or- dinary standard of thinking: the mon- strous contradicts nature and the course of things. What is enormous excites om* surprise or amazement: what is prodigious excites our astonishment: what is monstrous does violence to our senses and understanding. There is something enormous in the present scale upon which property, whether public or private, is amassed and ex- pended : the ^works of the ancients in general, but the Egyptian pyramids in particular, are objects of admiration, on account of the prodigious labor which was bestowed on them: igno- rance and superstition have always been active in producing monstrous images for the worship of its bUnd votaries. ENOUGH, Sufficient. Enough, Anglo-Saxon genoh, German genug, probably comes from a root signifying to attain to. Sufficient, in Latin suffixdens, participle of sufficio, com- pounded of svb and facere, to make, sig- nifies made or suited to the purpose. He has enough whose desires are sat- isfied; he has sufficient whose wants are supplied. We may therefore frequent- ly have sufficiency when we have not enough. A greedy man is commonly in this case, who has never enough, al- though he has more than a sufficiency. Enough is said only of physical objects of desire: sufficient is employed in a moral application for that which serves the purpose. Children and animals never have enough food, nor the miser enough money: it is requisite to allow 8uffi,cient time for everything that is to be done, if we wish it to be done well. ENRAPTURE. See Charm. ENROLL, Enlist or List, Regis- ter, Record. Enroll, compounded of French en, Latin in, and role, from rotula, a Uttle wheel, signifies to place in a roll, that is, in a roll of paper or a book. Enlist is compounded of French en and liste from Old High German lista, a border or strip, signifying a long strip of paper on which names were written; the verb meaning to put on a list. Register comes from Latin re, back, and gestum, past participle of gerere, to carry, and means a thing carried back, a memorandum brought back; the verb means to write the memorandum. Record, in Latin recorder, compounded of re, back or again, and cors, the heart, signifies to bring back to the heart or call to mind by a memorandum. Enroll and enlist respect persons only; register respects persons and things; record respects things only. Enroll is generally applied to the act of inserting names in an orderly manner into any book; enlist is a species of enrolling ap- plicable only to the military. The en- rolment is an act of authority; the enlisting is the voluntary act of an individual. Among the Romans it was the office of the censor to enroll the names of all the citizens, in order to ascertain their number and estimate their property: in modem times sol- diers are mostly raised by means of enlisting. In the moral application of the terms, to enroll is to assign a certain place or rank; to enlist is to put one's self under a leader or attach one's self to a party. Hercules was enrolled among the gods; the common people are always ready to enlist on the side of anarchy and re- bellion. To enroll and register both imply writing down in a book ; but the former is a less formal act than the latter. The insertion of the bare name or designation in a certain order is enough to constitute an enrolment; but regis- tering comprehends the birth, family, and other collateral circumstances of the individual. The object of register- ing Ukewise differs from that of enroll- ing: what is registered serves for future purposes and is of permanent utihty to society in general; but what is enrolled often serves only a particular or tem- porary end. Thus in numbering the people it is necessary simply to enroll their names; but when in addition to this it was necessary, as among the Romans, to ascertain their rank in the state, everything connected with their ENTHUSIAST 309 property, their family, and their con- nection required to be registered; so in like manner, in more modem times, it has been found necessary for the good government of the state to register the births, marriages, and deaths of every citizen: it is manifest, therefore, that what is registered, as far as respects per- sons, may be said to be enrolled; but what is enrolled is not always registered. Persons only, or things personal, are enrolled, and that properly for pubUc purposes only; but things as well as persons are registered for private as well as pubUc purposes. To register in its proper sense is to place in writing; to record is to make a memorial of anything, either by writ- ing, printing, engraving, or otherwise: registering is for some specific and im- mediate purpose; as to register decrees or other proceedings in a court: record- ing is for general and oftentimes remote purposes: to record events in history. In an extended and figurative appU- cation, things may be said to be regis- tered in the memory; or events recorded in history. We have a right to believe that the actions of good men are regis- tered in heaven; the particular sayings and actions of princes are recorded in history, and handed down to the latest posterity. ^ ENSAMPLE. See Example. ENSLAVE, Captivate. To enslave is to bring into a state of slavery. To captivate is to make a captive. There is as much difference between these terms as between slavery and cap- tivity: he who is a slave is fettered both body and mind; he who is a captive is only constrained as to his body: hence to enslave is always taken in the bad sense; captivate, in a good or bad sense: enslave is employed literally or figiu"a- tively; captivate only figuratively: we may be enslaved by persons or by our gross passions; we are captivated by the charms or beauty of an object. ENSUE. See Follow. ENTANGLE. See Embarrass; In- SNARE. ENTER. See Begin. ENTERPRISE. See Attempt. ENTERPRISING, Adventurous. These terms mark a disposition to en- gage in that which is extraordinary and hazardous; but enterprising, from en- terprise (see Attempt), is connected with the understanding; and adventur- ous, from adventure (from Latin ad, to, and venire, to come, meaning a coming to, an attempt or trial), is a characteris- tic of the passions. The enterprising character conceives great projects, and pursues objects that are difficult to be obtained; the adventurous character is contented with seeking that which is new and placing himself in dangerous and unusual situations. An enterpris- ing spirit belongs to the commander of an army or the ruler of a nation; an adventurous disposition is suitable to men of low degree. Peter the Great possessed, in a peculiar manner, an enterprising genius; Robinson Crusoe was a man of an adventurous turn. Enterprising characterizes persons only, but adventurous is also apphed to things, to signify containing adventures; hence a journey, or a voyage, or a history may be denominated adventurous. ENTERTAIN. See Amuse. ENTERTAINMENT. See Amuse- ment; Feast. ENTHUSIAST, Fanatic, Vision- ary, Devotee. The enthiisiast,faTuUic, and visionary have disordered imagina- tions; but the enthusiast is only affected inwardly with an extraordinary fervor, the fanatic and visionary betray that fervor by some outward mark; the former by singularities of conduct, the latter by singularities of doctrine. Fanatics and visionaries are therefore always more or less enthusiasts; but enthusiasts are not always fq,natics or visionaries. ^EvQovaidarai, among the Greeks, from iv, in, and Sfof, God, signified those supposed to have, or pretending to have, divine inspiration. Fanatici were so called among the Latins from fana (temples), in which they spent an extraordinary portion of their time; they, like the tvOovmaarai of the Greeks, pretended to revelations and inspirations, during the influence of which they indulged themselves in many extravagant tricks, cutting them- selves with knives, and distorting themselves with every species of antic, gesture, and grimace. In the modem acceptation of these terms the fanatic is one who fancies himself inspired, and, rejecting the use of his understanding, falls into every 810 ENTHUSIASTIC kind of extravagance; it is mostly ap- Elied to a man's religious conduct and eUef, but may be applied to any ex- travagant conduct founded on false principles. An enthiisiast is one who is under the influence of any particular fervor of mind, more especially where it is a religious fervor. There may be enthusiasm in other matters, where it is less mischievous. There may be enthusiasts in the cause of humanity, or in the love of one's country, or in any other matter in which the affections may be called into exercise. The visionary is properly one that sees or professes to see visions, and is mostly appUed to those who pretend to supernatural visions, but it may be employed in respect to any one who indulges in fantastical theories. A devotee is one who is extravagantly and, it may be, superstitiously devoted to a cause. The word expresses exag- gerated interest, and, so far, is synony- mous with the other terms, but it does not suggest disordered imagination, as does fanatic. ENTHUSIASTIC. See Sanguine. ENTICE. See Allure; Persuade; TWEEDLE. ENTIRE. See Whole. ENTIRELY. See Quite. ENTITLE. See Name. ENTRAP. See Insnare. ENTREAT. See Beg. ENTREATY. See Prayer. ENVIOUS. See Invidious. ENVIRON. See Surround. ENVOY. See Ambassador. ENVY. See Jealousy. EPHEMERAL. See Evanescent. EPHEMERIS. See Calendar. EPICURE. See Sensualist. EPIDEMICAL. See Contagious. EPITHET, Adjective. Epithet is the technical term of the rhetorician; adjective that of the grammarian. The same word is an epithet as it quahfies the sense; it is an adjective as it is a part of speech: thus, in the phrase "Alexander the Great," great is an epithet, inasmuch as it designates Alexander in distinction from aU other persons: it is an adjective as it ex- presses a quahty in distinction from the noun Alexander, which denotes a thing. The epithet {kTriOriTov, from ini, be- side, and riOrjui., I place) is the word added by way of ornament to the diction; the adjective, from adjectivum, is the word added to the noun as its appendage, and made subservient to it in aU its inflections. When we are estimating the merits of any one's style or composition, we should speak of the epithets he uses; when we are talking of words, their dependencies and relations, we should speak of adjectives: an epithet is either gentle or harsh, an adjective is either a noun or a pronoun adjective. All adjectives are epithets, but all epi- thets are not adjectives; thus, in Vir- gil's Pater ^Eneas, the pater is an epithet, but not an adjective. EPOCHA. See Time. EQUAL, Even, Equable, Like or Alike, Uniform. EqvM, in Latin cequalis, comes from aquus. Even is in Anglo-Saxon efen. Equable, in Latin equabilis, signifies susceptible of eqtud- ity. Like, Anglo-Saxon lie, comes from a Teutonic base meaning resembling in form. Uniform, compounded of unu^, one, and forma, form, bespeaks its own meaning. All these epithets are opposed to dif- ference. Equal is said of degree, quan- tity, number, and dimensions, as equal in years; of an equnl age; an equal height: even is said of the surface and position of bodies; a board is made even with another board; the floor or the ground is even: like is said of ac- cidental qualities in things, as alike in color or in feature: uniform is said of things only as to their fitness to cor- respond; those which are unlike in color, shape, or make are not uniform, and cannot oe made to match as pairs: equable is used only in the moral ac- ceptation, in which all the others are likewise employed. As moral qualities admit of degree, they admit of equality: justice is dealt out in equxil portions to the rich and the poor; God looks with an equnl eye on all mankind. As the natural path is rendered uneven by high and low ground, so the evenness of the temper, in the figurative sense, is destroyed by changes of humor, by elevations and depressions of the spirits; and. the equability of hfe, from prosperous to adverse. ERROR 811 Even and equable are applied to the same object in regard to itself, as an even path or equable course; like or alike is applied to two or more objects in regard to one another, as two persons are alike in disposition, taste, opinions, etc.; uniform is said, either of one ob- ject in regard to itself, as to be uniform in conduct, or of many objects in re- gard to one another, as modes are uniform. EQUIP. See Fit. EQUITABLE. See Faib. EQUITY. See Justice. EQUIVOCAL. See Ambiguous. EQUIVOCATE. See Evade. EQUIVOCATION. See Sophis- try. ERA. See Time. ERADICATE, Extirpate, Exter- minate. To eradicate, from radix, the root, is to get out by the root: extirpate, from ex and stirps, the stem, is to get out the stock, to destroy it thoroughly. In the natural sense we may eradicate noxious weeds whenever we pull them from the ground; but we can never extirpate all noxious weeds, as they al- ways disseminate their seeds and spring up afresh. These words are seldomer used in the physical than in the moral sense; where the former is applied to such objects as are conceived to be plucked up by the roots, as habits, vices, abuses, evils; and the latter to whatever is united or supposed to be united into a race or family, and is destroyed root and branch. Youth is the season when vicioUs habits may be thoroughly eradicated; by the imiversal deluge the whole human race was ex- tirpated with the exception of Noah and his family. Exterminate, in Latin exterminatus, participle of extermino, from ex or ex- tra and terminus, boundary, signifies to expel beyond the boundary (of life), that is, out of existence. It is used only in regard to such things as have hfe, and designates a violent and im- mediate action: extirpaie, on the other hand, may designate a progressive action: the former may be said of indi- viduals, but the latter is employed in the collective sense only. Plague, pestilence, famine, extirpate: the sword exterminates. ERASE. See Blot. ERECT. See Build; iNgiTi'UTg; Lift. ERRAND. See Message. ERRATIC, Eccentric. Erratic comes from French erratique, Latin erraiicus, prone to wander, from errare, to wander. Eccentric comes through French from Greek Ik, out, and Kivrpov, circle, meaning not concentric with an- other circle, or, in astronomy, moving in an orbit deviating more or less from a center. These words have similar meanings. Both were as- tronomical terms; both indicate mo- tion deviating from a fixed course; and both have been employed, in a figura- tive sense, to indicate that which does not correspond to a set .standard. Erratic, however, refers to a more active departure from a fixed course than does eccentric. The eccentric i>er- son does not do as others do; the er- ratic person fails to do as others do, but acts in a particularly irregular and jerky and imsystematic fashion. ERROR, Mistake, Blunder. Er- ror, in French erreur, Latin error, from errare, to wander, marks the act of wan- dering, as applied to the rational fac- ulty. A mistake is a taking amiss or wrong, and is derived from the Scandi- navian. Blunder is a Scandinavian word formed as a frequentative from Ice- landic blunda, to doze or slumber, al- lied to blind. Error in its universal sense ia the gen- eral term, since every deviation from what is right in rational agents is termed error, which is strictly opposed to truth; error is the lot of hiunanity; into whatever we attempt to do or think error will be sure to creep: the term, therefore, is of unlimit«l use: the very mention of it reminds us oi our condition: we have errors of judg- ment, errors of calculation, errors of the head, and errors of the heart. The other terms designate modes of error, which mostly refer to the common concerns of hfe: mistake is an error of choice; blunder an error of action: chil- dren and careless people are most apt to make mistakes; ignorant, conceited, and stupid people commonly commit blunders: a mistake must be rectified: in commercial transactions it may be of serious consequence: a blunder must be 3112 ERST set right ; but blunderers are not always to be set right; and blunders are fre- quently so ridiculous as only to excite laughter. See also Sophistry. Error, Fault. — Error respects the act; fault, from Latin fallere, to deceive, English fail, respects the agent: an error may Ue in the judgment or in the conduct; but a fault hes in the will or intention: the errors of youth must be treated with indulgence; but their faults must on all accounts be corrected: error is said of that which is individual and partial; faidt is said likewise of that which is habitual: it is an error to use intemperate language at any time; it is a fault in the temper of some persons that they cannot re- '' strain their anger. See also Lapse. ERST. See Once. ERUDITION. See Knowledge. ERUPTION, Explosion. Eruption, from e, out, and rumpere, to break, sig- nifies the breaking forth, that is, the coming into view, by a sudden bursting; explosion, from ex, out, and plaudere, to clap, meant to drive off the stage by clapping; and now signifies bursting out with a noise: hence of flames there will be properly an eruption, but of gunpowder an explosion: volcanoes have their eruptions at certain inter- vals, which are sometimes attended with explosions: on this account erup- tions are apphed to the human body for whatever comes out as the effects of humor, and may be applied in the same manner to any indications of humor in the mind; explosions are also applied to the agitations of the mind which burst out. ESCAPE, Elude, Evade. Escape means Uterally to sUp out from under one's cape, from French es, out, Latin ex, and cappa, cape. Elude (see Avoid). Evade, from the Latin evado, com- pounded of e, out, and vadere, to go, signifies to go or get out of a thing. The idea of being disengaged from that which is not agreeable is compre- hended in the sense of all these terms; but escape designates no means by which this is effected; elude and evade define the means, namely, the efforts which are used by one's self: we are simply disengaged when we escape, but we disengage ourselves when we elude and evade: we escape from dan- ger; we elude search: our escapes are often providential and often narrow; our success in eluding depends on our skill: there are many bad men who escape punishment by the mistake of a word; there are many who escape de- tection by the art with which they elitde observation and inquiry. Elude and evade both imply the prac- tice of art on trying occasions; but the former is employed to denote a more ready and dexterous exercise of art than the latter; the former consists mostly of that which is done by a trick, the latter consists of words as well as actions: a thief eludes those who are in pursuit of him by dexterous modes of concealment; he evades the interrogatories of the judge by equiv- ocating rephes. One is said to elude a punishment and to evade a law. ESCORT. See Accompany. ESPECIALLY, Particularly, Principally, Chiefly. Especially and particularly are exclusive or super- lative in their import; they refer to one object out of many that is superior to all; principally and chiefly are com- parative in their import; they desig- nate in general the superiority of some objects over others. Especially is a term of stronger imp>ort than particw- larly, and principally expresses s6me- thing less general than chiefly: we ought to have God before our eyes at all times, but especially in those mo- ments when we present ourselves be- fore Him in prayer: the heat is very oppressive in all countries under the torrid zone, but particularly in the deserts of Arabia, where there is a want of shade and moisture: it is principally among the higher and lower orders of society that we find vices of every description to be prevalent; robberies happen chiefly by night. ESPOUSE, Betroth. Espouse, in old French espouser, modem French 4pouser, a spouse or wife, from the Latin sponso, to betroth, that from spondere, to promise, old Spanish esposar, Ital- ian sposare, has two very different sig- nifications. In the present and more common one the term implies to prom- ise, or engage in marriage, usually by a written contract, sometimes by word ESTATE 313 of mouth with or without witnesses, and espousal implies the act of con- tracting a man and woman to each other in marriage. Betroth, a compound of the Enghsh be and the Old Enghsh troth, truth, signifies the act of pUghting or pledging one's troth, a token of faith, truth, or earnest intention: in this appUcation a pledge or agreement of marriage. To espouse is to wed; ta betroth is to give a pledge that the man and woman will wed. A father or sponsor gives a woman to a man to be his spouse, or wife, and a bridegroom takes the woman as his spouse. Espouse is also used figuratively, meaning to make one's own entirely, as in the phrase to espouse a cause. ESPY. See Fiiro. ESSAY, Treatise, Tract, Disser- tation. All these words are employed by authors to characterize compositions varying in their form and contents. Essay, which signifies a trial or at- tempt, is here used to designate in a specific manner an author's attempt to illustrate any point: it is most com- monly appUed to small detached pieces, which contain only the general thoughts of a writer on any given subject, and afford room for amplification into de- tails also: though, by Locke, in his "Essay on the Understanding," Beat- tie, in his "Essay on Truth," and other authors, it is modestly used for their connected and finished endeavors to elucidate a doctrine. A treatise is more systematic than an essay; it treats on the subject in a methodical form, and conveys the idea of something labored, scientific, and instructive. A tract is only a species of a small treatise, drawn up upon particular occasions, and pub- hshed in a separate form; they are both derived from the Latin tractus, Earticiple of traho, draw, manage, or andle. Dissertation, from Latin dis- serere, compounded of dis, apart, and serere, to join, means the taking up of a subject part by part, suggesting a thorough and exhaustive analysis. Essays are either moral, political, philosophical, or Uterary: they are the crude attempts of the youth to digest his own thoughts or they are the more mature attempts of the man to com- municate his thoughts to others: of the former description are the prize essays in schools; and of the latter are the innumerable essays which have been published on every subject since the time of Bacon to the present day: treatises are mostly written on ethical, p>ohtical, or speculative subjects such as F^nelon's, Milton's, or Locke's treatise on education; Ete Lolme's treatise on the constitution of England; Colquhoun's treatise on the police: dis- sertations are employed on disputed points of Uterature, as Bent ley's dis- sertation upon the epistles of Phalaris; De Pauw's dissertations on the Egyp- tians and Chinese: tracts are ephem- eral productions, mostly on political and religious subjects, which seldom survive the occasion which gave them birth; of this description are the pam- f)hlets which daily issue from the press, or or against the measures of govern- ment or the pubUc measurqs of any particular party. See also Attempt. ESSENTIAL. See Necessary. ESTABLISH. See CoNnRii; Fix; Institute. ESTATE, Property, Rank. Es- tate, Old French estat, from Latin status. meant originally condition in general or a good condition, with special refer- ence to worldly prosperity. Out oS its original sense it developed several different meanings, characterized in each case, however, by a certain for- mality and legal stiffness in its applica- tion. In one sense estate is a sjiionyme of property, from Latin proprius, one's own, meaning that whicn is one's own. Property is the general and familiar term apphed to all that one owns; estate a legal term applied to the in- terest that any one has in lands, tene- ments, or other effects. Again property may indicate a piece of land owned by an individum or a corporation; estate that same piece of land if it is sufficiently large and sumptuously de- veloped. We speak of the farmer's property; the rich man's estate. Estate, Rank. — Estate is also a synonyme of rank (see Class), from which it differs in suggesting not mere- ly a division into ranks, but something of its original reference to worldly con- dition; as well as in being a some- what more formal and specific word 314 ESTEEM with distinctly French associations. In Great Britain the estates of the realm mean the lords spiritual, the lords tem- poral, and the commons — the first two being represented in the House of Lords, the last in the House of Com- mons. ESTEEM, Respect, Regard. Esteem (see Appraise). Respect, from the Latin respicere, signifies to look back upon, to look upon with atten- tion. Regard (see Attend). A favorable sentiment toward par- ticular objects is included in the mean- ing of all these terms. Esteem and respect flow from the understanding; regard springs from the heart as well as the head: esteem is produced by in- trinsic worth; respect by extrinsic quahties; regard is affection blended with esteem: it is in the power of every man, independently of all col- lateral circumstances, to acquire the esteem, of others; but respect and regard are within the reach of a Umited niun- ber only: the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the equal and the unequal are each, in their turn, the objects of esteem; those only are ob- jects of respect who have some mark of distinction or superiority of either birth, talent, acquirements, or the like; regard subsists only between friends, or those who stand in close connection with one another: industry and sobriety excite our esteem for one man, charity and benevolence our esteem for another; superior learning or abihties excite our respect for another; a long acquaintance or a reciprocity of kind offices excites a mutual regard. See also Value. ESTIMATE, Compute, Rate. Esti- mate (see Appraise). Compute (see Calculate). Rate, in Latin ratus, participle of rear, to think, signifies to weigh in the mind. AU these terms mark the mental operations by which the swax, amount, or value of things is obtained: to esti- mate is to obtain the aggregate sum in one's mind, either by an immediate or a progressive act; to compute is to obtain the sum by the gradual process of putting together items; to rate is to fix the relative value in one's mind by deduction and comparison; a builder estimates the expense of building a house on a given plan; a proprietor of houses computes the probable diminu- tion in the value of his property in con- sequence of wear and tear; the sur- veyor rates the present value of lands or houses. In the moral acceptation they bear the same analogy to each other: some men are apt to estimate the adventi- tious privileges of birth or rank too high; it would be a useful occupation for men to compute the loss they sustain by the idle waste of time, on the one hand, and its necessarily improfitable consumption, on the other: he who rates his abilities too high is in danger of despising the means which are essen- tial to secure success; and he who rates them too low is apt to neglect the means, from despair of success. ESTRANGEMENT. See Abstrac- tion. ETERNAL, Endless, Everlast- ing. The eternal is set above time, the endless lies within time; it is therefore by a strong figure that we apply eternal to anything sublunary; although end- less may with propriety be appUed to that whach is heavenly; that is properly eternal which has neither beginning nor end; that is endless which has a begin- ning but no end: God is, therefore, an eternal, but not an endless being: there is an eternal state of happiness or mis- ery which awaits all men, according to their deeds in this hfe; but their joys or sorrows may be endless as regards the present hfe. That which is endless has no cessation; that which is everlasting has neither interruption nor cessation: the endless may be said of existing things; the everlasting naturally ex- tends itself into futurity: hence we speak of endless disputes, an endless warfare; an everlasting memorial, an everlasting crown of glory. ETHEREAL, Celestial, Heaven- ly, Spiritual. Ethereal, derived from the same source as ether, viz., the Greek aiOrjp, the sky, from aWo), to light up, cognate with the Latin cestas, summer, or cestus, heat, in Italian etere, implies, hterally, that which pertains to, or is formed of, ether, the fluid that is beheved to pervade all space beyond the atmosphere of the earth, and, figuratively, the high heavens or home of the gods. Ethereal, in chem- EUPHONIOUS 315 istry, applies to whatever contains ether, but in ordinarj- language it has a strong poetical and religious sig- nificance. Celestial specifically implies that which pertains to the sky or heavens, and, commonly, that which is exquisite or supremely excellent or which relates to the empire or people of China. Whatever is heavenly pertains to or re- sembles heaven, the firmament or sky, the abode of God and the blessed, and implies the state or condition of abso- lute bliss. Because of the general re- ligious and the mythological belief that heaven is the abode of the redeemed and the gods who controlled the desti- nies of mankind, the term has come to designate the spiritual or incorporeal part of humanity, the state of being pure, holy, and heavenly-minded. ETHICAL, Moral. Moral, from Latin vws, moris, meaning custom, was Cicero's translation of the Greek ^QtKog, indicating habitual conduct. Both words, therefore, were meant to refer to a habit of right action habitual with the individual and sanctioned by the custom of the society in which he hved. But ethical has come to refer to the principles of right in the abstract, with reference to the indi- vidual character and its complete de- velopment in accordance with general human laws; moral refers to action as affecting the community and sanc- tioned by social and reUgious law. Ethical has philosophical connotations; moral practical and religious ones. When we speak of something as being ethically right, we suggest that we are going back to first principles and judging it as a matter of abstract right and wrong. When we speak of something as morally wrong, we are thinking especially of the act in rela- tion to society and social judgments. ETIQUETTE, Ceremony, Deco- rum, Fashion, Manners. Etiquette, in Old French estiquet, a little note, from the German stichen, to stick, is really a doublet of ticket, and signifies, Uter- ally, a ticket on which the forms to be observed on particular occasions were inscribed. Originally, the term was applied to a httle piece of paper or note stuck up on the gate of a court. On state or very formal occasions it was customary to send small tickets to invited guests, informing them con- cerning the parts they were expected to take in the ceremony. From this practice the present meaning of the term doubtless arose, and the word came to signify the forms that should be observed in the ceremonial inter- courses of life. Of the words included in this article as synonymes of etiquette, manners is the most general, for the derivation and definition of which see Manners. It means simply ways of doing things. Decorum (see Decency) means marir- ners, with special reference to that which is suitable and graceful. Fashion (see Fashion) signifies manners with special reference to the habits that happen to prevail in society at the minute. Etiquette indicates the marir- ners that prevail in formal society considered as a well-defined system, in which every detail of conduct is reg- ulated. Ceremony is the etiquette of particular formal occasions, with special reference to external dignity and form (see Form), EUGENICS, Breeding. There is no real synonyme for eugenics, but the general word breeding, which it haa partly replaced, may serve the purpose. Eugenics, from Greek «;, well, and yivog, race, means the science of pro- ducing a good race of human beings, and all that pertains thereto. Breed- ing (see Breed) means simpl> the pro- duction of animals or plants, but it has been speciaUzed among raisers of stock, etc., to refer to the production of a good stock or particular kinds of stock, and hence as applied to the development of the lower orders of being it has much the same meaning as eugenics. EULOGY. See ENcoBnuM. EUPHONIOUS, Harmonious. Ei*- phxmious, from Greek nJ, well, and ^ovTi, a sound, meaning a pleasant sound, and harmonious (see Melody), both mean "agreeable to the car," but harmonious is a more positive word than euphonious. Harmonious suggests the presence of sounds whose combination IS delightful; euphonious the absence of all sounds which might be unpleas- ant. Euphonious refers especially to the juxtaposition of sounds in speaking: 316 EUTHANASIA harmonious to the juxtaposition of musical sounds, in singing, playing, etc. EUTHANASIA, Easy Death. Eu- thanasia, from Greek tv, well, and Gdvarog, death, being a technical word, has no exact synonymes except phrases like easy death, painless death, which are simply translations of the Greek term into familiar Enghsh. It refers to an easy or painless death, especially one attained through the administra- tion of a drug by a physician in cases of mortal and painful illness. EVADE, Equivocate, Prevari- cate. Evade (see Escape). Equivo- cate (see Ambiguity). Prevaricate comes from Latin prevaricari, from proB, especially, very, and varus, crooked, and originally meant to say something very crooked, to tell a lie. These words designate an artful mode of escaping the scrutiny of an inquirer: we evade by artfuUy turning the subject or calling off the atten- tion of the inquirer; we equivocate by the use of equivocal expressions; we prevaricate by the use of loose and in- definite expressions; we avoid giving satisfaction by evading; we give a false satisfaction by equivocating: we give dissatisfaction by prevaricating. Evad- ing is not so mean a practice as equivo- caiing: it may be sometimes prudent to evade a question which we do not wish to answer; but equivocations are employed for the purposes of false- hood and interest: prevarications are stiU meaner; and are resorted to most- ly by criminals in order to escape detection. Evasion, Shift, Subterfuge. — Evasion is here taken only in the bad sense; shift and subterfuge are modes of evasion: the former signifies that gross kind of evasion by which one attempts to shift off an obUgation from one's self; the subterfuge, from svbter, under, and fu^, to fly, is a mode of evasion in which one has re- course to some screen or shelter. The evasion, in distinction from the others, is resorted to for the gratification of pride or obstinacy: whoever wishes to maintain a bad cause must have re- course to evasions; candid minds de- spise aU evasions; the shift is the trick of a knave, it always serves a paltry, low purpose; he who has not courage to turn open thief will use any shifts rather than not get money dishonestly: the subterfuge is the refuge of one's fears; it is not resorted to from the hope of gain, but from the fear of a loss; not for purposes of interest, but for those of character; he who wants to justify himself in a bad cause has recourse to subterfuge. EVANESCENT, Ephemeral, Tran- sitory. These words all indicate that which endures for only a little space, but there is some difference in the image conveyed in each word. Evanes- cent, from Latin e, away, and vanescere, about to vanish, means about to van- ish away. Ephemeral, from Greek tTTi and vfifpa, for a day, means enduring but for a day. Transitory, from Latin trans, beyond, and itus, the past par- ticiple of ire, to go, means about to pass beyond our sight. Ephemeral in- dicates that which by its ver>' nature cannot endure; transitory that which, as a matter of fact but not of necessity, is not enduring. Evanescent indicates a higher degree of transitoriness sug- gesting that which is disappearing into thin air, as it were, before our very eyes. EVANGELICAL, Gospel, Ortho- dox. Gospel, used as an adjective, is a translation of the Greek evayjEKiKog (from tv, well, and dyyekia, tidings), into Anglo-Saxon god, good, and spell, story or tale. Both referred specifical- ly to the original documents of the Christian faith, the biographies of Christ, and the message therein de- Uvered. But, as in the case of many other similar pairs of words, the Greek has been speciaUzed to refer to particu- lar sects and tenets. Evangelical means like the original gospel, and has been adopted by certain sects, to characterize their attempts to carry out the precepts of the New Testament more literally. Gospel perfection means the standard of perfection enjoined in the Christian gospel; evangelical teaching may refer to the teaching of the New Testament or to the particular teaching of the evangelical sects. Orthodox, from Greek 6p96g, straight, S6^a, opinion, means holding the right opinion concerning matters of Christian faith, and refers to matters of intellectual beUef, rather than the active practice or emotional EVENT 317 faith suggested in evangelical. It also refers to the whole body of Christian teaching founded upon the gospel rather than to the gospel itself. EVEN, Smooth, Level, Plain. Even (see Equax,). Smooth, Anglo- Saxon smethe, comes from a Teutonic base signifying creamy. Level, Late Latin lihelUi, from libra, balance, was originally simply the name of a car- penter's instrument for determining that a thing is horizontal. Plain (see Apparent). Even and smooth are both opposed to roughness; but that which is even is free only from great roughness or ir- regularities; that which is smooth is free from every degree of roughness, however small: a board is even which has no knots or holes; it is not smooth unless its surface be an entire plane: the ground is said to be even, but not smooth; the sky is smooth, but not even. Even is to level, when appUed to the ground, what smooth is to even; the even is free from protuberances and depressions on its exterior surface; the level is free from rises or falls: a path is said to be even; a meadow is level: ice may be level, though it is not even; a walk up the side of a hill may be even, although the hill itself is the reverse of a level: the even is said of that which unites and forms one un- interrupted surface; but the level is said of things which are at a distance from each other, and are discovered by the eye to be in a parallel line; hence the floor of a room is even with regard to itself; it is level with that of an- other room. Evenness respects the surface of bodies; plainness respects their direction and freedom from ex- ternal obstructions: a path is even which has no indentures or footmarks; a path is plain which is not stopped up or interrupted by wood, water, or any other thing intervening. When applied figuratively, these words preserve their analogy: an even temper is secured from all violent changes of humor; a smooth speech is divested of everything which can ruffle the temper of others; but the former is always taken in a good sense, and the latter mostly in a bad sense, as evincing an illicit design or a purpose to deceive: a plain speech. on the other hand, is divested of every- thing obscure or figurative, and is consequently a sjieech free from dis- guise and easy to be understood. Even and level are applied to conduct or condition, the former as regards ourselves, the latter as regards others: he who adopts an even course of conduct is in no danger of putting himself upon a level with those who are otherwise his inferiors. EVENING. See Gloaming. EVENT, Incident, Accident, Ad- venture, Occurrence. Event, in Latin eventtis, participle of evenire, to come out, signifies that which falls out or turns up. Incident, in Latin in- cidens, from incidere, signifies that which falls in or forms a collateral part of anything. Accident (for derivation see Accident). Adventure, from the Latin advenire, to come to, signifies what comes to or befalls one. Occur- rence, from the Latin 6b, in the way, and currere, to learn, signifies that which runs or comes in the way. These terms are expressive of what passes in the world, which is the sole signification of the term event; while to that of the other terms are annexed some accessory ideas: an incident is a personal event; an accident, an ac- ciaental event which happens by the way; an adventure, an extraordinary event; an occurrence, an ordinary or domestic event: event, in its ordinary and Umited acceptation, excludes the idea of chance; accident excludes that of design; incident, adventure, and oc- currence are applicable in both cases. Events affect nations and communi- ties as well as individuals; incidents and adventures affect particular individuals; accidents and occurrences affect persons or things particularly or generally, in- dividually or collectively: the making of peace, the loss of a battle, and the death of a prince are national events; the forming a new acquaintance and the revival of an old one are incidents that have an interest for the parties concerned; an escape from shipwTeck, an encounter with wild beasts or sav- ages, are adventures which individuals are pleased to relate and others to hear; a fire, the fall of a house, the breaking of a limb, are accidents or 318 EVER occurrences; a robbery and the death of individuals are properly occurrences which afford subject for a newspa- per and excite an interest in the reader. Event, when used for individuals, is always of greater importance than an incident. The settlement of a young person in hfe, the adoption of an em- ployment, or the taking a wife, are events, but not incidents; while, on the other hand, the setting out on a jour- ney or the return, the piu-chase of a house, and the despatch of a vessel are characterized as incidents, and not events. It is further to be observed that accident, event, and occurrence are said only of that which is supposed really to happen: incidents and adventures are often fictitious; in this case the incident cannot be too important, nor the ad- venture too marvellous. History re- cords the events of nations; plays re- quire to be full of incident in order to render them interesting; romances and novels derive most of their charms from the extravagance of the adventures which they describe; periodical works supply the pubhc with information respecting daily occurrences. See also Consequence. EVER. See Always. EVERLASTING. See Eternal. EVERY. See All. EVERYWHERE. See Ubiquitous. EVIDENCE. See Deponent; Proof. EVIDENT. See Apparent. EVIL or III, Misfortune, Harm, Mischief. Evil, in its full sense, com- prehends every quaUty which is not good, and consequently the other terms express only modifications of evil. The word is, however, more Umited in its appUcation than its meaning, and ad- mits, therefore, of a just comparison with the other words here mentioned. They are all taken in the sense of evils proauced by some external cause, or evUs inherent in the object and aris- ing out of it. The evil, or, in its con- tracted form, the ill, befalls a person; the misfortune comes upon him; the harm, originally Anglo-Saxon hearm, is taken, or one receives the harm; mischief is compounded of French mes^ Latin minus, lacking in, less, and chef, Latin caput, head, and means foohsh- ness, something lacking in sense and wit, hence something harmful or an- noying to others. Evil, in its limited apphcation, is taken for evils of the greatest magni- tude; it is that which is evil without any mitigation or qualification of cir- cumstances. The misfortune is a minor evil; it depends upon the opinion and circumstances of the individual; what is a misfortune in one respect may be the contrary in another respect. An untimely death, the fracture or loss of a limb, are denominated evils; the loss of a vessel, the overturning of a car- riage, and the like are misfortunes, in- asmuch as they tend to the diminution of property; but as all the casualties of life may produce various conse- quences, it may sometimes happen that that which seems to have come upon us by our ill fortune turns out ultimately of the greatest benefit; in this respect, therefore, misfortune is but a partial evil: of evil it is hkewise ob- servable that it has no respect to the sufferer as a moral agent; but mis- fortune is used in regard to such things as are controllable or otherwise by hu- man foresight. The evil which befalls a man is opposed only to the good which he in general experiences; but the misfortune is opposed to the good fortune or the prudence of the in- dividual. Sickness is an evil, let it be endured or caused by whatever cir- cvunstances it may; it is a misfortune for an individual to come in the way of having this evil brought on himself: his own relative condition in the scale of being is here referred to. Harm and mischief are species of minor evils, the former of which is much less specific than the latter both in the nature and cause of the evil. A person takes harm from circum- stances that are not known; the mis- chief is done to him from some positive and immediate circumstance. He who takes cold takes harm, the cause of which, however, may not be known or suspected: a fall from a horse is at- tended with mischief if it occasion a fracture or any evil to the body. EvU and misfortune respect persons only as the objects; harm and mischief are said EXAMINATION 319 of inanimate things as the object. A tender plant takes harm from being exposed to the cold air; mischief is done to it when its branches are vio- lently broken off or its roots are laid bare. See also Bad. EVINCE. See Argue; Prove. EVOLUTION, Development. Evo- lution, from Latin e, out, and volvere, to roll, unfold, and development, from de, down, and volvere, to roll, have original- ly the same meaning, but evolviion has become a somewhat technical term re- ferring to what in a more general way is indicated in development. Develop- ment refers to the orderly unfolding of plant or animal Ufe or to the courses of history, evolution to this same order- ly unfolding with specific reference to the doctrines and laws of development formulated by the natural scientists of the nineteenth century, especially Darwin, and extended from the field of natural science to all fields. EXACT, Extort. Exact, in Latin exodus, participle of exigere, to drive out, signifies the exercise of simple force; but extort, from extortu^, par- ticiple of extorqv^re, to wring out, marks the exercise of unusual force. In the appUcation, therefore, to exact is to demand with force — it is commonly an act of injustice: to extort is to get with violence — it is an act of tyranny. The collector of the revenue exacts when he gets from the people more than he is authorized to take: an arbitrary prince extorts from his conquered subjects whatever he can grasp at. In the figurative sense, deference, obedience, applause, and admiration are exacted: a confession, an acknowledgment, a discovery, and the hke are extorted. Exeunt, Nice, Particular, Punctual. — Exact (see Accurate). Nice in Middle Enghsh means fooUsh or simple, from Old French nice, lazy, simple, Latin nescius, ignorant, compounaed of ne, not, and scius, knowing. From ,the earlier meaning of simple the mean- ing of fastidious, careful in httle things, developed. Particular means atten- tive to each httle particle. Punctual, from the Latin punctum, a point, sig- nifies keeping to a point. Exact and nice are to be compared in their application either to persons or to things: particular and punctual, only in apphcation to persons. To be exact is to arrive at perfection; to be nice is to be free from faults; to be partic- ular is to be nice in certain particulars; to be punctual is to be exact in certain points. We are exact in our conduct or in what we do, nice and particular in our mode of doing it, punctual as to the time and season for doing it. It is necessary to be exact in our accoimts; to be nice as an artist in the choice and distribution of colors; to be particular as a man of business, in the nimiber and the details of merchandises that are to be deUvered out; to be punctual in observing the hou^ of the day that has been fixed upon. EoMctness and punctuality are always taken in a good sense; they designate an attention to that which cannot be dispensed with: they form a part of one's duty: niceness and particularity are not always taken in the best sense; they designate an excessive attention to things of inferior importance, to matters of taste and choice. Earlv habits of method and regularity will make a man very exact in the p)er- formance of all his duties, and particu- larly punctual in his payments: an over-niceness in the observance of mechanical rules often suppUes the want of genius; it is the mark of a con- tracted mind to amuse itself with par- ticularities about dress, personal apH pearance, furniture, and the like. When exact and nice are appUed to things, the former expresses more than the latter; we speak of an exact re- semblance and a nice distinction. The exact point is that which we wish to reach; the nice point is that which it is difficult to keep. EXAGGERATION. See Carica- ture. EXALT. See Lift. EXAMINATION, Search,Inquibt, Research, Investigation, Scrutiny. Examination (see Discuss). Search comes from Old French cercher, Latin circare, to go around in a circle, to look everywhere. Inquiry (see Ask). Research is an intensive of search. In- vestigation, from the Latin vestigium, a track, signifies seeking by the tracks or footsteps. Scrutiny, from the Latin scrutor, to search, ana scruta, broken 320 EXAMINE Eieces, signifies looking for among rub- ish, to ransack. Examination is the most general of these terms, which all agree in ex- pressing an active effort to find out that which is unknown. An examina- tion may be made without any par- ticular effort, and may be made of things that are open to the observa- tion, as to examine the face or feat- ures of a person, or anatomically to examine the body: a search is a close examination into matters that are hid- den or less obvious: as to search the person or papers of one that is sus- pected, to search a house for stolen goods. Examinations may be made by put- ting questions; an inquiry is always made in this manner. We may ex- amine persons or things; we inquire of persons and into things: an exami- nation of persons is always done for some specific and public purpose; one person inquires of another only for private purposes; a student is ex- amined for the purpose of ascertaining his progress in learning; an offender is examined in order to ascertain his guilt; a person inquires as to the resi- dence of another, or the road to be taken, and the like. In the moral appUcation of these terms, the examination is, as before, a general and indefinite action, which may either be confined simply to those matters which present themselves to the mind of the examiner or it may be extended to all points: the search is a laborious examination into that which is remote; the inquiry is extended to examination into that which is doubtful. A research is a remote search; an in- vestigation is a minute inquiry; a scru^ tiny is a strict examination. Learned men of inquisitive tempers make their researches into antiquity: magistrates investigate doubtful and mysterious af- fairs; physicians investigate the causes of diseases; men scrutinize the actions of those whom they hold in suspicion. Acuteness and penetration are pe- culiarly requisite in making researches, patience and perseverance are the necessary qualifications of the investi- gator; a quick discernment will essen- tially aid the scrutinizer. Examine, Search, Explore. — Examine and search (see above for both). Ex- plore, in Latin exploro, compounded of ex, out, and plorare, to flow, signifies to make to flow out, to look for some- thing until it is found. These words are here considered as they designate the looking upon places or objects, in order to get acquainted with them. To examine expresses a less effort than to search, and this ex- presses less than to explore. We exam- ine objects that are near; we search those that are hidden or removed at a certain distance; we explore those that are unknown or very distant. The painter examines a landscape in order to take a sketch of it; the botanist searches after curious plants; the in- quisitive traveller explores unknown regions. An author examines the books from which he intends to draw his authorities; the antiquarian searches every corner in which he hopes to find a monument of antiquity; the classic scholar explores the learning and wis- dom of the ancients. EXAMINE. See Assay; Discuss. EXAMINER. See Censor. EXAMPLE, Pattern, Ensample. Example, in Latin exemplum, from Latin ex, from, and emere, to take, means that from which something is to be imitated or taken. Pattern (see Copy). Ensample is an Anglo-French corruption of Latin exemplum. All these words are taken for that which ought to be followed: but the example must be followed generally; the pattern must be followed particu- larly, not only as to what, but how a thing is to be done: the former serves as a guide to the judgment; the latter to guide the actions. The example com- prehends what is either to be followed or to be avoided; the pattern only that which is to be followed or copied: the ensample is a species of example, the word being employed only in the sol- emn style. The example may be pre- sented either in the object itself or the description of it; the pattern displays itself most completely in the object itself; the ensample exists only in the description. Those who know what is right should set the example of prac- tising it ; and those who persist in doing wrong must be made an example to deter others from doing the same : every EXCELLENCE 321 one, let his age and station be what it may, may afford a pattern of Christian virtue; the child may be a pattern to his playmates of diUgence and dutiful- ness; the citizen may be a pattern to his feUow-citizens of sobriety, and con- formity to the laws; the soldier may be a pattern of obedience to his com- rades: our Saviour has left us an ex- ample of Christian perfection which we ought to, imitate, although we cannot copy it: the Scripture characters are drawn as ensampUs for our learning. Example, Precedent. — Example (see above). Precedent, from the Latin precedens, preceding, signifies by dis- tinction that preceding which is en- titled to notice. Both these terms apply to that which may be followed or made a rule; but the example is com- monly present or before our eyes; the precedent is properly something past; the example may derive its authority from the individual; the precedent ac- quires its sanction from time and com- mon consent: we are led by the exam- ple, or we copy the example; we are guided or governed by the precedent. The former is a private and often a partial affair; the latter is a pubhc and often a national concern; we quote examples in literature and precedents in law. Example, Instance. — Example refers in this case to the thing. Instance, from the Latin instans, standing on or in, signifies that which stands or serves as a resting-point. The eocample is set forth by way of illustration or instruction; the instance is adduced by way of evidence or proof. Every instance may serve as an example, but every example is not an instance. The example consists of moral or intel- lectual objects; the instance consists of actions only, or of what serves as a proof. Rules are illustrated by exam- ples; characters are illustrated by in- stances: the best mode of instructing children is by furnishing them with examples for every rule that is laid down; the Roman history furnishes us with many extraordinary instances of self-devotion for their country. EXASPERATE. See Aggravate. EXCEED, Excel, Surpass, Tran- scend, Outdo. Exceed, from the Latin excedo, compjounded of ex, out, and 21 cedere, to pass, means to pass out of, or beyond, the hne, and is the general term. Surpass, compounded of French sur, Latin super, beyond, and French passer, to pass, from Latin ■passv^, step, is one species of exceeding. Excel, compounded of ex and cella-e^ to lift or move over, found only in com- pounds, is another species. Exceed is applied mostly to things in the sense of going beyond in measure, degree, quantity, and quaUty; one thing exceeds another in ma^itude, height, or any other dimensions; a person's success exceeds his expecta- tions. It is taken either in an indifferent or in a bad sense, particularly in regard to persons, as a person exceeds his instruc- tions or exceeds the due measure. To excel and surpass signify to ex- ceed, or be superior in that which is good. To excel may be used with refer- ence to all persons generally, as a per- son strives to excel; to surpass is used in regard to particular objects, as to surpass another in any trial of skill. When excel is used in respect of par- ticular objects, it is more general in its sense than surpass: the Dutch and Itahans formerly excelled the English in painting; one person may surpass an- other in bravery, or a thing may sur- pass one's expectations. Men excel in learning, arts, or arms; .competi- tors surpass one another in feats of agility. The derivatives excessive and excel- lent have this obvious distinction be- tween them, that the former alwaj's signifies exceeding in that which ought not to be exceeded; and the latter ex- ceeding in that where it is honorable to exceed: he who is habitually excessive in any of his indulgences must be in- sensible to the excellence of a temperate Ufe. Transcend, from trans, beyond, acarir- dere, to climb, signifies to climb be- yond; and outdo — that is, to do out of the ordinary course, are particular modes of excelling or exceeding. The genius of Homer transcends that of almost every poet; HeUogabalus out- did every other emperor in extrava- gance. EXCELLENCE, Superiority. Ex- cellence is an absolute term; superiority 322 EXCEPT is a relative term; many may have excellence in the same degree, but they must have superiority in different de- grees; superiority is often superior ex- cellence, but in many cases they are appUed to different objects. There is a moral excellence attainable by all who have the will to strive after it; but there is an intellectual and physical superiority which is above the reach of our wishes and is granted to a few only. EXCEPT. See Besides; But; Un- less. EXCEPTION. See Objection. EXCESS, Superfluity, Redun- dancy. Excess is that which exceeds any measure; superfluity, from super, over, and flu£re, to flow, and redundancy, from re, back, and unda, a wave, to stream back or over, signify an excess of a good measure. We may have an excess of heat or cold, wet or dry, when we have more than the ordinary quan- tity, but we have a superfluity of pro- visions when we have more than we want. Excess is appUcable to any ob- ject, but superfluity and redundancy are species of excess, the former apphcable in a particular manner to that which is an object of our desire, and redun- dancy to matters of expression or feel- ing. We may have an excess of pros- perity or adversity, a superfluity of good things, and a redundancy of speech or words. Excessive, Immoderate, Intemperate. — The excessive is beyond measure; the immoderate, from modu^, a mode or measure, is without measure; the in- temperate, from tempus, a time or term, is that which is not kept within bounds. Excessive designates eaxess in general; immoderate and intemperate designate excess in moral agents. The excessive lies simply in the thing which exceeds any given point: the immoderate hes in the passions which range to a boundless extent: the intemperate lies in the will which is under no control. Hence we speak of an excessive thirst physically considered, an immoderate ambition or lust of power, an intemperate indul- gence, an intemperate warmth. Exces- sive admits of degrees; what is exces- sive may exceed in a greater or less degree: immoderate and intemperate mark a positively great degree of excess, the former stiU higher than the latter: immoderate is in fact the highest con- ceivable degree of excess. The excessive use of anything wiU always be attended with some evil consequence: the im- moderate use of wine will rapidly tend to the ruin of him who is guilty of the excess: the intemperate use of wine will proceed by a more gradual but not less sure process to his ruin. See also Unreasonable. - EXCHANGE, Barter, Truck, Commute. To exchange (see Change) is the general term signifying to take one for another, or put one thing in the place of another; the rest are but modes of exchanging. To barter is to exchange one article of trade for another, from Old French barater, to cheat, beguile, a word of doubtful origin, possibly Celtic. To tru^k is a famihar term to express a famiharaction for exchanging one article of private property for another. Com- mute, from the Latin syllable cum, with, and mutare, to change, signifies an ex- changing one mode of punishment for another, or one mode of payment for another; we may exchange one book for another; traders barter trinkets for gold-dust; coachmen or stablemen tru£k a whip for a handkerchief; gov- ernment commutes the punishment of death for that of banishment. Commute is now used, in a special sense, to refer to the traveUing to and fro of people who dwell in the sub- urb of a city and do their business and find their pleasure within the city itself. EXCITE, Incite, Provoke. To excite (see Awaken) is said more par- ticularly of the inward feelings; incite (see Encourage) is said of the external actions; provoke (see Aggravate) is said of both. A person's passions are excited; he is incited by any particular passion to a course of conduct; a par- ticular feehng is provoked, or he is provoked by some feehng to a particular step. Wit and conversation excite mirth; men are incited by a lust for gain to fraudulent practices; they are provoked by the opposition of others to intemperate language and intemperate measiires. To excite is very frequently used in a physical acceptation; incite always, and provoke mostly, in a moral appUcation. We speak of exciting hun- EXECUTE 323 ger, thirst, or perspiration; of inciting to noble actions; of provoking imperti- nence, provoking scorn or resentment. When excite and provoke are appUed to similar objects, the former designates a much stronger action than the latter. A thing may excite a smile, but it pro- vokes laughter; it may excite dis- pleasure, but it provokes anger; it may excite joy or sorrow, but it pro- vokes to madness. EXCITING. See Electric. EXCLAIM. See Call. EXCLUDE. See Comprise; Segre- gate. EXCLUDING. See Bur. EXCLUSION. See Lockout. EXCOMMUNICATE, Anathema- tize. Excommunicate and anathenui- tize are used in similar connections to refer to the denunciation of individuals by the CathoUc Church, but they dif- fer somewhat in meaning. Excommuni- cate, from Latin ex, out, and communis, common, means to banish from the common society and privileges of the church and the good graces and ser- vices of all Christian people. Anath- emaiize, from Greek dvaOrjua, means to denounce formally and publicly, and may refer to opinions and actions as well as individuals. It does not necessarily include, however, the for- mal act of excommunication. Both terms may be extended to refer to punishment by any society, or formal denunciation of any sort. EXCORIATE. See Skin. EXCULPATE. See Apologize; Exonerate. EXCURSION, Ramble, Tour, Trip, Jaunt. Excursion signifies go- ing out of one's course, from the Latin ex and cursu^, the course or prescribed path: a ramble is a going without any course or regular path (see ramble imder Wander). A tour is a cir- cuitous course: a trip, Middle EngUsh trippen, from base trap, meaning tread, found in tramp, means as a verb to tread lightly, and, as a substantive, a pleasant walk or, at present, any journey; jaunt comes from Old French jaunts, meaning toil, exercise. To go abroad in a carriage is an idle excur- sion, or one taken for mere pleasure: travellers who are not contented with what is not to be seen from a high- road make frequent excursions into the interior of the country. Those who are fond of rural scenery, and pleased to follow the bent of their inclinations, make frequent rambles. Those who set out upon a sober scheme of enjoyment from travelling are satisfied with mak- ing the tour of some one country or more. Those who have not much time for pleasure take trips. Those who have no better means of spending their time make jaunts. EXCUSE, Pardon. We excuse (see Apologize) a person or thing by exempting him from blame. We par- don (from Late Latin perdonare, to give entirely or freely) by remitting the punishment for the offence one has committed. We excuse a small fault, we pardon a great fault; we excuse that which per- sonally affects ourselves; we pardon that which offends against morals: we may excuse as equals: we can pardon only as superiors. We exercise good- nature in excusing: we exercise gen- erosity or mercy in pardoning. Friends excuse one another for the unintentional omission of formaUties; it is the pre- rogative of the king to pardon criminals whose offences will admit of pardon: the violation of good manners is in^ excusable in those who are cultivated; falsehood is unpardonable even in a child. See also Pretence. EXECRABLE. See Abominable. EXECRATION. See Malediction. EXECUTE, Fulfil, Perform. Execute (see Accomplish), in Latin executu^, participle of exsequi, com- pounded of ex, out, and sequi, to follow, IS to follow up to the end. To fuljU is to fill up to the full of what is wanted. Perform comes from Old French var- foumir. from Latin per, thorougnlv, and Old French foumir, to furnish, Old High German jfrumjon, to provide; and meant to furnish completely, to carry through to the end. To execuie is more than to fulfil, and to fulfil than to perform. To execuie is to bnng about an end; it involves ac- tive measures and is peculiarly ap- plicable to that which is extraordinary or that which requires particular spint and talents; schemes of ambition are 324 EXEMPT executed: to fulfil is to satisfy a moral obligation; it is applicable to those duties in which rectitude and equity are involved; we fulfil the duties of citizens: to perform is to carry through by simple action or labor; it is more particularly applicable to the ordinary and regular business of Ufe; we per- form a work or a task. One executes according to one's own intentions or those of others; the soldier executes the orders of his general; the merchant executes the commissions of his cor- respondent: one fulfils according to the wishes and expectations of one's self or others; it is the part of an honest man to enter into no engage- ments which he cannot fulfil; it is the part of a dutiful son, by diligence and assiduity, to endeavor to fulfil the ex- pectations of an anxious parent: one performs, according to circumstances, what suits one's own convenience and purposes; every good man is anxious to perform his part in life with credit and advantage to himself and others. EXEMPT. See Free. EXEMPTION. See Privilege. EXERCISE, Practice. Exercise, in Latin exercere, from Latin ex, out, and arcere, to enclose, meant originally to drive out of an enclosure, to set at work.' Practice, from the Greek Trpaaaeiv, to do, signifies to perform a part. These terms are equally applied to the actions and habits of men; but we exercise in that where the powers are called forth; we practice in that where frequency and habitude of action are requisite: we exercise an art; we prac- tice a profession: we may both exercise and practice a virtue; but the former is that which the particular occurrence calls forth, and which seems to de- mand a pecuhar effort of the mind; the latter is that which is done daily and ordinarily: thus we in a peculiar manner are said to eocercise patience, fortitude, or forbearance; to practice charity, kindness, benevolence, and the Uice. A similar distinction characterizes these words as nouns, the former ap- plying solely to the powers of the body or mind, the latter solely to the me- chanical operation: the health of the body and the vigor of the mind are alike impaired by the want of exercise; in every art practice is an indispensable requisite for acquiring perfection: the exercise of the memory is of the first importance in the education of chil- dren; constant practice in writing is almost the only means by which the art of penmanship is acquired. EXERT, Exercise. The employ- ment of some power or qualification that belongs to one's self is the com- mon idea conveyed by these terms; but exert (see Endeavor) may be used for what is internal or external of one's self; exercise (see above) only for that which forms an express part of one's self; hence we speak of exerting one's strength, or exerting one's voice, or exerting one's influence: of exercising one's limbs, exercising one's under- standing, or exercising one's tongue. Exert is often used only for an individ- ual act of calling forth into action; exercise always conveys the idea of re- peated or continued exertion; thus a person who calls to another exerts his voice; he who speaks aloud for any^ length of time exercises his lungs. EXERTION. See Endeavor. EXHALE. See Emit. EXHAUST. See Speed. EXHIBIT. See Give; Show. EXHILARATE. See Animate. EXHORT, Persuade. Exhort, in Latin exhorter, compounded of ex, in- tensive, and hortari, to persuade, meant to persuade earnestly. Per- suade (see Conviction). Exhortation has more of impelling in it; persuasion, more of drawing: a superior exhorts; his words carry au- thority with them, and rouse to action : a friend and an equal persuades; he wins and draws by the agreeableness or kindness of his expressions. Ex- hortations are employed only in matters of duty or necessity; persuasions are employed in matters of pleasure or convenience. EXIGENCY, Emergency. Neces- sity is the idea which is common to the signification of these terms: exi- gency, from the Latin exigere, to force out, to demand, expresses what the case demands; and emergency, from emergere, to arise out of, denotes what rises out of the case. The exigency is more common, but less pressing; the emergency is im- EXPEDIENT 325 perious when it comes, but comes less frequently: a prudent traveller will never carry more money with him than what will supply the exigencies of his journey; and in case of an emergency will rather borrow of his friends than risk his property. EXILE. See Banish; Proscribe. EXIST, Live. lAve, Anglon^axon libban, is the native English word cor- responding to the Latin exist, for which see Be. Existence is the property of all things in the universe; life, which is the inherent power of motion, is the particular property communicated by the Divine Being to some parts only of His creation: exist, therefore, is the general, and live the specific term: whatever lives, exists according to a certain mode; but many things exist without living: when we wish to speak of things in their most abstract rela- tion, we say they const; when we wish to characterize the form of existence we say they live. Existence, in its proper sense, is the attribute which we commonly ascribe to the Divine Being, and it is that which is immediately communicable by Himself; life is that mode of exist- ence which He has made to be com- municable by other objects besides Himself; existence is taken only in its strict and proper sense, independent of all its attributes and appendages; but life is regarded in connection with the means by which it is supported, as animal hie, or vegetable hfe. In like manner, when speaking of spiritual objects, eodst retains its abstract sense, and live is employed to denote an active principle: animosities should never exist in the mind; and everything which is calculated to keep them alive should be kept at a distance. EXIT, Departure. Both these words are metaphorically employed for death or a passage out of this hfe; the former is borrowed from the act of going off the stage; the latter from the act of setting off on a journey. Exit seems to convey the idea of voUtion; for we speak of making our exit; de- parture aesignates simply the event; the hour of a man's departure is not made known to him. When we speak of an exit, we think only of the place left; when we speak of a departure, we think of the place gone to: the unbe- Uever may talk of his exit; the Christian most commonly speaks of his departure. EXONERATE, Exculpate. Exodt erate, from onus, a burden, signifies to take off the burden of a charge or of guilt; to exculpate, from culpa, a fault or blame, is to throw off the blame: the first is the act of another; the second is one's own act: we exonerate him upon whom a charge has lain, or who has the load of guilt; we exculpate ourselves when there is any danger of being blamed: circumstances may sometimes tend to exonerate; the ex- planation of some person is requisite to exculpate: in a case of dishonesty, the absence of an individual at the mo- ment when the act was committed will altogether exonerate him from sus- picion; it is fruitless for any one to attempt to exculpate himself from the charge of faithlessness who i.s detected in conniving at the dishonesty of others. EXPAND. See Dilate; Spread. EXPECT. See Wait. EXPECTATION. See Hope. EXPEDIENT, Resource. The ex~ pedient is an artificial means; the re- source is a natural means: a cunning man is fruitful in expedients; a fortu- nate man abounds in resources: Robin- son Crusoe adopted every expedient in order to prolong his existence at a time when his resources were at the lowest ebb. Expedient, Fit. — Expedient ^ from the Latin expedire, present participial stem, expedient (compounded of ex, out, and pedem, foot, and meaning to take one's feet out, to be ready to start) supposes a certain degree of necessity from cir- cumstances; fit for the purpose signi- fies simply an agreement with, or suit- ability to, the circumstances: what is expedient must he fit, because it is callcerly belongs to brutes as well as men, the countenance is the pecuhar property of man, although sometimes applied to the brutes; the visage is pecuharly apphcable to su- perior bein^: the last term is em- ployed only in the grave or lofty style. FACETIOUS, Conversable, Pleasant, Jocular, Jocose. All these epithets designate that com- Eanionable quaUty which consists in veliness of speech. Facetums was in Latin facetvs, signifying fine, witty, courteous. Conversable is literally able to hold a conversation. Pleasant (see Agreeable) signifies making ourselves pleasant with others, or them pleased with us. Jocular signifies after the manner of a joke, from joculus, a Uttle joke; jocose, using or h&viag jokes, from iocus, joke. Facetious may be employed either for writing or for conversation; the rest only in conversation: the facetious man deals in that kind of discourse which may excite laughter; a conversable man may instruct as well as amuse; the pleasant man says everything in a pleasant manner; his pleasantry even on the most delicate subject is with- out offence: the person speaking is jocose; the thing said, or the manner of saying it, is jocular; it is not for any one to be always jocose, although sometimes one may assume a jocular air when we are not at liberty to be serious. A man is facetious from hu- mor; he is conversable by means of information; he indulges himself in occasional pleasantry, or allows himself to be jocose, in order to enUven con- versation; a useful hint is sometimes conveyed in jocular terms. FACILITY. See Ease. FACT. See Circumstance. FACTION, Party. These two words equally supj)Ose the union of many persons, and their opposition to certain views different from their own: but /adwm, from /acerty creates. Family is confined to a comparatively small num- ber; rcux is a term of extensive im- port, including all mankind, as the human race, or particular nations, as the race of South Sea Islanders; or a particular family, as the race oi the Heraclides: from Hercules sprang a race of heroes. FAMOUS, Celebrated, Re- nowned, iLLtrsTRious. Famous sig- nifies literally having fome or the cause of fame; it is appUcable to that which causes a noise or sensation; to that which is talked of, written upon, dis- cussed, and thought of; to that which is reported of far and near; to that which is circulated among all ranks and orders of men. Celebrated sig- nifies Uterally kept in the memory by a celebration or memorial, and is ap- pUcable to that which is praised and honored with solemnity. Renowned signifies literally possessed of a name, and is apphcable to whatever extends the name or causes the name to be often repeated. Illustrious signifies Uterally what has or gives a lustre: it is applicable to whatever confers dig- nity. Famous is a term of indefinite im- port; it conveys of itself frequently neither honor nor dishonor, since it is employed indifferently as an epithet for things praiseworthy or otherwise: it is the only one of these terms which may be used in a bad sense. The others rise in a gradually good sense. The celebrated is founded upon merit, and the display of talent in the arts and sciences; it gains the subject re- spect: the renoivned is founded upon the possession of rare or extraordinary qualities, upon successful exertions and 340 FANATIC an accordance with public opinion; it brings great honor or glory to the sub- ject: the illustrious is founded upon those BoUd quahties which not onl.y render one known, but distingmshed; it insures regard and veneration. A person may be famous for his eccen- tricities; celebrated as an artist, a writer, or a player; renovmed as a warrior or a statesman; illustrious as a prince, a statesman, or a senator. The Maid of Orleans, who was decried by the Enghsh and idohzed by the French, is equally famous in both nations. There are celebrated authors whom to censiu-e, even in that which is censurable, would endanger one's reputation. The renovmed heroes of antiquity have, by the perusal of their exploits, given birth to a race of modem heroes not inferior to themselves. Princes may shine in their lifetime, but they cannot render themselves illuslriotis to posterity except by the moniunents of goodness and wisdom which they leave after them. FANATIC. See Enthusiast. FANCIFUL, Fantastical, Whim- sical, Capricious. Fanciful signifies full of fancy (see Conceit) . Fantasti- cal signifies belonging to the fantasy, which is the imme/Jate derivative from the Greek tpavraaia, Latin fantasia, a vision, from root meaning to shine. Whimsical signifies either like a whim or having a whim, from a Scandina- vian word meaning freak. Capricious means having caprice. Fanciful and fantastical are both em- ployed for persons and things; whim- sical and capricious are mostly em- ployed for persons, or what is personal. Fanciful is said of that which is irregu- lar in the taste or \\xdgp\ea.i; fantastical is said of that which violates all pro- priety as well as regularity: the former may consist of a simple deviation from rule; the latter is something extrava- gant. A person may, therefore, some- times be advantageously fanciful, al- though he can never be fantastical but to his discredit. Lively minds will be fanciful in the choice of their dre.ss, furniture, or equipage: the affectation of singularity frequently renders peo- ple fantastical in their manners as well as their dress. Fanciful is said mostly in regard to errors of opinion or taste; it springs from an aberration of the mind: whim~ sical is a species of the fanciful in re- gard to one's hkes or disUkes; capri- cious respects errors of temper or irregu- larities of feeUng. The fanciful does not necessarily imply instabiUty; but the capricious excludes the idea of fixedness. One is fanciful by attach- ing a reahty to that which only passes in one's own mind; one is whimsical in the inventions of the fancy; one is capricious by acting and judging with- out rule or reason that which admits of both. See also Utopian. Fancy, Imagination. — From what has already been said the distinction between fancy and imagination, as operations of thought, will be obvious. Fancy, considered as a power, simply brings the object to the mind or makes it appear; but imagination, from image, in Latin imago, from the root found in imiiari, EngUsh imitate, is a power which presents the images or likenesses of things. The fancy, there- fore, only employs itself about things without regarding their nature; but the imagination aims at tracing a re- semblance and getting a true copy. The fancy consequently forms combi- nations, either real or unreal, as chance may direct; but the imagination is seldomer led astray. The /anq/ is busy in dreams or when the mind is in a disordered state; but the imagination is supposed to act when the intellectual powers are in fuU play. The fancy is employed on Hght and trivial objects which are present to the senses; the imagination soars above all vulgar objects and carries us from the world of matter into the world of spirits, from time present to the time to come. A milliner or mantua-maker may employ her fancy in the decorations of a cap or gown; but the poet's imagination depicts everything grand, everything bold, and everything re- mote. Although Mr. Addison has thought proper, for his convenience, to use the words fancy and imagination promiscu- ously when writing on this subject, yet the distinction, as above pointed out, has been observed both in familiar di=- FASTIDIOUS 341 course and in writing. We say that we fancy, not that we imagine, that we see or hear something; the pleasures of the imagination, not of the fanpy. See also Conceit; Vagary. FANTASTIC. See Quixonc. FANTASTICAL, See Fanciful. FAR. See Distant. FARCICAL, Comic. Farcical, the adjective of farce (in French the same form, from farcer, to stuff, Latin farcio, Italian far so), signifies, Uterally, the stuffing in meat, and, in ordinary lan- guage, whatever pertains to a farce, anything stuffed with foreign matters, specifically a dramatic piece of a hu- morous character, fufl of exaggeration and drollery; hence, anything absurd- ly exaggerated. Farce differs from comedy proper in degree, but not in kind. The aim of both is to excite mirth, but while the comedy does so by a comparatively faithful adherence to nature and truth, the farce takes much greater license and does not scruple to make use of any extravagance or improbability that may serve its purpose. At one time a farce was a petty show ex- hibited in the streets, then it was a short after-piece on the stage following a more serious performance, and lat- terly it supphed the entire perform- ance. FARE, Provision. Fare, from Anglo-Saxon faran, to go, signifies in general the condition or thing that comes to one or is provided for a jour- ney. Provision, from provide, signifies the thing provided for one. These terms are alike employed for the ordinary concerns of life, and may either be used in the limited sense for the food one procures or in general for whatever necessity or convenience is procured : to the term fare is annexed the idea of accident; provision includes that of design: a traveller on the Con- tinent must frequently be contented with humble /are, unless he takes the precaution of carrying his provisions with him. FARMER, Husbandman, Agricult- urist. Farmer comes from Anglo- French ferine. Late Latin firma, from firmus, a fixed rent, a farmer being one who paid a fixed rent to a landlord; husbandman is one following husbandry, that is, the tillage of land by manual labor; the farmer, therefore, conducts the concern, and the husbandman labors under his direction: agriculturist, from the Latin ager, a field, and cohere, to till, signifies any one engaged in the art of cultivation. The farmer is al- ways a practitioner; the agricuUwrist may be a mere theorist: the farmer fol- lows husbandry solely as a means of hying: the agriculturist follows it as a science; the former tills the land upon given admitted principles; the latter frames new principles or alters those that are established. Between the farmer and the agriculturist there is the same difference as between practice and theory: the former may be assisted by the latter so long as they can go hand in hand; but in the case of a coUision the farmer will be of more ser- vice to himself and his country than the agriculturist; farming brings imme- diate profit from personal service; agriculture may only promise future, and consequently contingent, advan- tages. Husbandman is now obsolete in prose, though it is still used in poetry. FARRAGO. See Olio. FARTHEST, See Uttermost. FASCINATE, See Charm. FASCINATED, See Spellbound. FASHION, Quality, Distinction. These epithets ax& employed promis- cuously in colloquial discourse, but not with strict propriety: by men of fashion are understood such men as live in the fashinable world and keep the best company; by men of quality are understood men of rank or title: by men of distinction are imderstooa men of honorable superiority, whether by wealth, office, or pre-eminence in society. Gentry and merchants, though not men of quality, may, by their mode of hving, be men of fashion; and by the office they hold in the state they may likewise be men of distinction. See also Custom; Etiquette; Form; Vogue. FAST. See Abstinence. FASTEN, See Fix. FASTIDIOUS, Squeamish. Fas- tidious comes from Latin fastidium, loathing, perhaps from fastus, arro- gance, anci tcedium, disgust, fastidium meaning arrogant disgust; squeamish 342 FATAL is in Middle English skeymous, disdain- ful, from Anglo-French escoymoiLs, deli- cate, nice as to food, from Greek axnf^a, English scheme, meaning form, air, mien, manners — hence Uterally fuU of airs: in a moral sense it signifies fooUsh- ly sickly, easily disgusted. Squeamish implies a stronger physical snrinking than fastidious. The fastidious man avoids or rejects what he does not like; a squeamish person reacts more obvi- ously against it with a kind of nervous horror. Whoever examines his own im- perfections will cease to be fastidious; whoever restrains humor and caprice will cease to be squeamish. FATAL. See Deadly. FATE. See Chance; Destiny. FATIGUE, Weariness, Lassitude. Fatigue, from the Latin faiigare, pos- sibly from a root meaning to yawn, is the Latin word corresponding to the English weariness. Weariness is the substantive corresponding to weary, Anglo-Saxon werig, from worian, to tramp about in a swampy place, from wor, swamp; hence the state of feeUng produced by walking over swampy ground. Lassitude, from the Latin lassu^, weary, marks a state without specifying a cause. Fatigue is an exhaustion of the ani- mal or mental powers; weariness is a wearing out the strength or breaking the spirits; lassitude is a general re- laxation of the animal frame: the la- borer experiences fatigue from the toils of the day; the man of business, who is harassed by the multiplicity and complexity of his concerns, suffers fatigue; and the student who labors to fit himself for a public exhibition of his acquirements is in like manner exposed to fatigue: weariness attends the traveller who takes a long or path- less journey; weariness is the lot of the petitioner who attends in the ante- chamber of a great man; the critic is doomed to suffer weariness who is obliged to drag through the shallow but voluminous writings of a dull author. Lassitude is the consequence of a distempered system, sometimes brought on by an excess of fatigue, sometimes by sickness, and frequently by the action of the external air. FAULT. See Blemish; Error; Imperfection; Lapse. FAULTLESS. See Orient; Unof- fending. FAULTY. See Culpable. FAVOR. See Benefit; Credit; Grace. FAVORABLE, Propitious. In a former paragraph (see Auspicious) I have shown propitious to be a species of the favorable, namely, the favorable as it springs from the design of an agent; what is propitious, therefore, is always favorable, but not vice versd: the favorable properly characterizes both persons and things; the propitious, in the proper sense, characterizes the per- son only: as applied to persons, an equal may be favorable; a superior only is propitious: the one may be favorable only in inchnation ; the latter is favor- able also in granting timely assistance. Cato was favorable to Pompey; the gods were propitious to the Greeks: we may all wish to have our friends favorable to our projects; none but heathens expect to have a blind destiny propitious. In the improper sense, propitious may be apphed to things with a similar distinction: whatever is well disposed to us, and seconds our endeavors, or serves our purpose, is favorable; whatever efficaciously pro- tects us, speeds our exertions, and de- cides our success is propitious to us: on ordinary occasions, a wind is said to be favorable which carries us to the end of our voyage; but it is said to be propitious if the rapidity of our pas- sage forwards any great purpose of our own. See also Opportune. FAWN. See Coax. FEALTY. See Homage. FEAR. See Apprehend; Worry. FEARFUL, Dreadful, Frightful, Tremendous, Terrible, Terrific, Horrible, Horrid. Fearful here sig- nifies full of that which causes fear (see Alarm); dreadful, full of what causes dread (see Apprehension); frightful, full of what causes fright (see Afraid) ; tremendous, that which causes trem- bling; terrible or terrific, causing terror; horrible or horrid, causing horror. The application of these terms is easily to be discovered by these definitions: the first two affect the mind more than the senses; all the others affect the senses FEAST 343 more than the miijd: a contest is fear- ful when the issue is inip>ortant but the event doubtful; the thought of death is dreadful to one who feels him- self unprepared. The frightful is less than the tremendous, the tremendous than the terrible, the terrible than the horrible: shrieks may be frightful; thunder and hghtning may be tre- mendous; the roaring of a Hon is ter- rible; the glare of his eye terrific; the actual spectacle of killing is horrible or horrid. In their general appUcation these terms are often employee! promis- cuously to characterize whatever pro- duces very strong impressions: hence we may speak of a frigh'^-"^, dreadful, terrible, or horrid dream; or / '^htful, dreadful, or terrible tempest; drecZful, terrible, or horrid consequences. FEARLESS. See Bold. FEASIBLE. See Colorable. FEAST, Banquet, Carousal, En TERTAINMENT, TrEAT. As feOStS, in the reUgious sense, being derived from festus, joyful, are always days of leisure and frequently of public re- joicing, this word has been appUed to any social meal for the purposes of pleasure: this is the idea com- mon to the signification of all these words, of which feast seems to be the most general; and for all of which it may frequently be substituted, al- though they have each a distinct ap- pUcation :/eas< conveys the idea merely of enjoyment: banquet is a splendid feast, attended with pomp and state; it is a term of noble use, particularly adapted to poetry and the high style: carousal, French carous, from the Ger- man garaus (from gar, entirely, and aus, out), means the emptjdng out of the glass, a drinking-bout; enter tainr m£nt and treat convey the idea of hospitaUty. Feast, entertainment, and treat are taken in a more extended sense, to express other pleasures besides those of the table: feast retains its significa- tion of a vivid pleasure, such as volup- tuaries derive from delicious viands; entertainment and treat retain the idea of being granted by way of courtesy: we speak of a thing as being a feast or high deUght ; and of a person contribut- ing to one's entertainment, or giving one a treat. To a benevolent mind the spectacle of an afflicted man reUeved and comforted is a feast; to a mind ardent in the piu^uit of Imowledge, an easy access to a well-stocked library is a continued feast: men of a happy temper give and receive entertainment with equal facihty; they afford enter- tainmenl to their guests by the easy cheerfulness which they impart to everything around them; they in like manner derive entertainment from ev- erything they see or hear or observe: a treat is given or received onlv on par- ticular occasions; it depends on the relative circumstances and tastes of the giver and receiver; to one of a musical turn One may give a treai by inviting him to a musical party; and to one of an intelligent turn it will be equally a treat to be of the party which consists of the enlightened and conversable. Feast, Festival, Holiday. — Feast, in Latin festum, or festus, changed most probably from fesice and ferice, which latter, in all probability, comes from the Greek Upua, sacred, because these days were kept sacred or vacant from all secular labor: festival and holiday, as the words themselves denote, have precisely the same meaning in their original sense, with this difference, that the former derives its origin from heathenish superstition, the latter owes its rise to the estabUshment of Chris- tianity in its reformed state. A feast, in the Christian sense of the word, is appUed to every day which is regarded as sacred and observed with particular solemnity, except Sundays; a holyday, or, according to its modem orthography, a holiday, is simply a day on which ordinary business is sus- pended: among the Roman CathoUcs there are many days which are kept holy, and consequently by them de- nominated feasts, which in the EngUsh reformed church are only observed as holidays, or days of exemption from public business; of this description are the saints' days, on which the public offices are shut: on the other hand, Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide are regarded in both churches more as feasts than as holidays. There are, therefore, many feasts where there are no holidays, and many holidays where there are no feasts. 314 FEAT K feast is altogether sacred; a holiday has frequently nothing sacred in it, not even in its cause; it may be a simple ordinary transaction, the act of an individual : a festival has always either a sacred or a serious object. A feast is kept by reUgious worship; a holiday is kept by idleness; a festival is kept by mirth and festivity: some feasts are festivals, as in the case of the car- nival at Rome; some festivals are holi- days, as in the case of weddings and public thanksgivings. See also Saturnalia. FEAT. See Deed. FEEBLE. See Weak. FEEL, Be Sensible, Conscious.^ From the simple idea of a sense, the word feel has acquired the most exten- sive signification and appUcation in our language, and may be employed indifferently for all the other terms, but not in aU cases : to feel is said of the whole frame, inwardly and outwardly; it is the accompaniment of existence: to be sensible, from the Latin sentio, is said only of the senses. It is the property of aU hving creatures to feel pleasure and pain in a greater or less degree: those creatures which have not the sense of hearing will not be sensible of sounds. In the moral ap- pHcation, to feel is pecuUarly the prop- erty or act of the heart; to be sensible is that of the understanding: an in- genuous mind feels pain when it is sensible of having committed an error : one mav, however, feel as well as be sensible oy means of the understanding : a person feels the value of another's service; is sensible of his kindness: one feels or is sensible of what passes out- wardly; one is conscious only of what passes inwardly, from con or cum and scio, to know to one's self: we feel the force of another's remark; we are sen- sible of the evil which must spring from the practice of vice; we are conscious of having fallen short of our duty. Feeling, Sense, Sensation. — Feeling, from Anglo-Saxon felan, is aUied to Anglo-Saxon folm, the palm of the hand — the hand being that with which one feels. Sensation is taken only in a partiailar sense. Feeling and sense are either physical or moral properties; sensation is a particular act of physical or moral feehng. Feeling, physically considered, is bat a mode of sense; anatomists reckon five senses, of which feeling is one : sense is the abstract faculty of perceiving through the medium of the sense, as to be deprived of sense when stunned by a blow; to be without sense when divested of the ordinary faculties. As. all creatures which have life have feeling, the expression, creatures with- out feeling, may be applied to inani- mate objects; but in general the term feeling is taken for the sense of feeling. Feeling, in its limited acceptation, is either a state of feeling or an act of feeling: sense is a mode of sense, i. e., a mode of perceiving through the medium of any particular organ of sense, or a state of perceiving particu- lar objects. In this acceptation /eeim*; is apphed to moral as well as physical objects, sense, to intellectual as well as sensible objects: feeling has its seat in the heart, sense in the understanding; feeling is transitory and fluctuating, sense is permanent and regular. There axe feelings of love, charity, compassion, etc.; there is a sense of justice, recti- tude, propriety, etc. As the sensation denotes a particular act of feeling, it differs from feeling only in application : the term feeling is most adapted to ordinary discourse on famihar matters; sensation, to the grave and scientific style: a child may talk of an impleasant or pleasant feeling, a feeling of cold or hunger; the pro- fessional man talks of the sensation of giddiness, a gnawing sensation, and the like. Feeling, Sensibility, Susceptibility. — Feeling, in the present case, is taken for a positive characteristic, namely, the property of feeling in a strong de- gree; in this sense feeling expresses either a particular act or a habitual property of the mind. Sensibility is always taken in the sense of a habit. Traits of feeling in young people are happy omens in the estimation of the preceptor: an exquisite sensibility is not a desirable gift; it creates an in- finite disproportion of pain. Feeling and sensibility are here taken as moral properties, which are awakened as much by the operations of the mind within itself as by external objects: susceptibility, from the Latin susdpcrt^ FENCE 345 and capere, to take, designates that property of the body or the mind which consists in being ready to be influenced by external objects; hence we speak of a person's susceptibility to take cold or his susceptibility to be affected with grief, joy, or any other passion: if an excess of sensibility be an evil, an excess of susceptibility is a still greater evil; it makes us slaves to every circumstance, however trivial, which comes imder our notice. FEIGN, Pretend. Feign, in Latin Jingo orfigo, meant originally to fashion with the hands. Pretend, in Latin prce, before, and tendere, to stretch, signifies properly to stretch before, that is, to put on the outside. These words may be used for either doing or saying; they are both op- posed to what is true, but they differ from the motives of the agent : to feign is taken in either a bad or an indiffer- ent sense; to pretend, always in a bad sense: one feigns in order to gain some future end; a person feigns sickness in order to be excused from paying a dis- agreeable visit: one pretends in order to serve a present purpose; a child pretends to have lost his book who wishes to excuse himself for his idle- ness. To feign consists often of a line of conduct; to pretend consists mostly of words, sometimes coupled with as- sumed looks and manners: Ulysses feigned madness in order to escape from going to the Trojan war: according to Virgil, the Grecian Sinon pretended to be a deserter come over to the Trojan camp. In matters of speculation, to feign is to invent by force of the imagination; to pretend is to set up by force of self- conceit or false opinion: it is feigned by the poets that Orpheus went down into heU and brought back Eurydice, his wife; infidel philosophers pretend to account for the most mysterious things in nature upon natural or, as they please to term it, rational prin- ciples. See also Invent; Unfeigned. FELICITATE, Congrattjlate. Felicitate, from the Latin felix, happy, signifies to make happy, and is ap- plicable only to ourselves; congratulate from gratus, pleasant or agreeable, is to make agreeable, and is applicable to either ourselves or others: we felici- tate ourselves on having escaped the danger; we congratuiate others on their good fortune. FELLOWSHIP, Society. Both these terms are employed to denote a close intercourse; but fellowship is said of men as individuals, society of them collectively: we should be careful not to hold fellowship with any one of bad character, or to join the society of those who profess bad principles. FELON. See Criminal. FEMALE, Feminine, Effeminate. Female is said of the sex itself, and feminine of the characteristics of the sex. Female is opposed to male, femi- nine to masculine. In the female character we expect to find that which is feminine. The fe- male dress, manners, and habits have engaged the attention of all essayists from the time of Addison to the pres- ent period. The feminine is natural to the female; the effeminate is un- natural to the male. A feminine air and voice, which is truly grateful to the observer in the one sex, is an odious mark of effeminacy in the other. Beauty and deUcacy are feminine prop- erties; robustness and vigor are mas- culine properties; the former, there- fore, when discovered in a man, entitle him to the epithet effeminate. FENCE, Guard, Security. Fence is a contraction of defence. Guard comes from Anglo-Saxon weardian, to watch, allied to ward, wary, etc.; gu is the French form correspKjnding to Germanic w — as in guise and urise, for example. Security implies that which secures or prevents injury, mis- chief, and loss. A fence, in the proper sense, is an inanimate object; a guard is a living agent; the former is of per- manent utility, the latter acts to a partial extent: in the figurative sense they retain the same distinction. Modesty is & fence to a woman's virtue; the love of the subject is the monarch's greatest safeguard. There are prej- udices which favor religion and sub- ordination, and act as fences against the introduction of licentious orinciples into the juvenile or unenlightened mind; a proper sense of an overruling Providence will serve as a ^uard to prevent the admission of improper 346 FERMENT thoughts. The gtiard only stands at the entrance to prevent the ingress of evil: the security stops up all the avenues, it locks up with firmness. A guard serves to prevent the ingress of every- thing that may have an evil intention or tendency: the security rather seciu-es the possession of what one has and pre- vents a loss. A king has a guard about his person to keep off all violence. FERMENT. See Eb ULLITION ; Fermentation. FEROCIOUS, Fierce, Savage. Fe- rocious and fierce are both derived from the Latin ferox, from ferus, wild. Savage (see Cruel). Ferocity marks the untamed charac- ter of a cruel disposition : fierceness has a greater mixture of pride and anger in it, the word fi^r in French being taken for haughtiness: savageness marks a more permanent, but not so violent, a sentiment of either cruelty or anger as the former two. Ferocity and fierceness are in common appUed to the brutes to designate their natural tempers: savage is mostly employed to designate the natural tempers of man when uncontrolled by the force of reason and a sense of rehgion. Ferocity is the natural characteristic of wild beasts; it is a dehght in blood that needs no outward stimulus to call it into action; but it displays itself most strikingly in the moment when the animal is going to grasp, or when in the act of devouring, its prey: fierceness may be provoked in many creatures, but it does not discover it- self unless roused by some circum- stance of aggravation; many animals become fierce by being shut up in cages and exposed to the view of spectators: savageness is as natural a temper in the uncivihzed man as ferocity or fierceness in the brute; it does not wait for an enemy to attack, but is restless in search of some one whom it may make an enemy and have an opportunity of destroying. It is an easy transition for the savage to become the ferocious cannibal, glutting himself in the blood of his enemi«», or the fierce antagonist to one who sets himself up in opposition to him. In an extended appUcation of these terms, they bear the same relation to one another: the countenance may be either ferocious, fierce, or savage, ac- cording to circumstances. A robber who spends his Ufe in the act of imlaw- f uUy shedding blood acquires a ferocity of countenance: a soldier who follows a predatory and desultory mode of war- fare betrays the hcentiousness of his calling and his imdiscipUned temper in the fierceness of his coimtenance; the tjTant whose enjoyment consists in inflicting misery on his dependants or subjects evinces the savageness of his temper by the savage joy with which he witnesses their groans and tort- ures. FERTILE, Fruitful, Prolific. Fertile, in Latin fertilis, from ferre, to bear, signifies capable of bearing or bringing to hght. Fruitful signifies full of fruit, or containing within itself much fruit. Prolific is compounded of proles and facere, to make a progeny. Fertile expresses in its proper sense the faculty of sending forth from itself that which is not of its own nature, and is pecuharly apphcable to the ground which causes everything within itself to grow up. Fruitful expresses a state containing or possessing abun- dantly that which is of the same nature; it is, therefore, pecuharly apphcable to trees, plants, vegetables, and whatever is said to bear /rMif. ProZi^c expresses the faculty of generating; it conveys, therefore, the idea of what is creative, and is pecuharly applicable to animals* We may say that the ground is either fertile or fruitful, but not so properly prolific: we may speak of a female of any species being fruitful and prolific, but not fertile; we may speak of nature as being fruitful, but neither fertile nor prolific. A country is fertile as it re- spects the quahty of the soil; it is fruitful as it respects the abundance of its produce: it is possible, therefore, for a coimtry to be fruitful by the in- dustry of its inhabitants which was not fertile by nature. An animal is said to be fruitful as it respects the number of young which it has; it is said to be prolific as it respects its generative power. Some women are more fruitful than others; but there are many ani- mals more prolific than human creat- ures. FIGURE 347 In the figurative application they ad- mit of a similar distinction. A man is fertile in expedients who readily con- trives upon the spur of the occasion; he is fruitful in resources who has them ready at his hand; his brain is 'prolific if it generates an abundance of new conceptions. A mind is fertile which has powers that admit of cul- tivation and expansion: an imagina- tion is fruitful that is rich in stores of imagery; a genius is prolific that is rich in invention. Females are fertile in expedients and devices; ambition and avarice are the most fruitful sources of discord and misery in public and private Ufe; novel-writers are the most prolific class of authors. FERVOR, Ardor. Fervor, from fervere, to boil, is not so violent a heat as ardor, from ardere, to burn. The affections are properly fervent; the passions are ardent: we are fervent in feeling, and ardent in acting; the fervor of devotion may be rational, but the ardor of zeal is mostly intemperate. The first martyr, Stephen, was filled with a holy fervor; St. Peter, in the ardor of his zeal, promised his Master to do more than he was able to per- form. See also Unction. FESTIVAL. See Feast. FESTIVITY, Mirth. There is commonly mirth and festivity, but there may be frequently mirth without festivity. The festivity Ues in the out- ward circumstances, mirth in the tem- per of the mind. Festivity is rather the producer of mirth than the mirth itself. Festivity includes the social en- joyments of eating, drinking, dancing, cards, and other pleasures: mirth in- cludes in it the buoyancy of spirits which is engendered by a participation in such pleasures. FETCH. See Bring. FETTER. See Chain. FEUD. See Quarrel. FICKLE. See Changeable. FICTION, Fabrication, False- hood. Fiction is opposed to what is real; fabrication ana falsehood to what is true. Fiction relates what may be, though not what is: fabricaiion and falsehood relate what is not as what is, and vice versd. Fiction serves for amusement and instruction :/a6rim/ion and falsehood serve to mislead and de- ceive. Fiction and fabrication both require invention : falsehood consists of simple contradiction. The fables of ^sop are fictions of the simplest kind, but yet such as require a pecuharly hvely fancy and inventive genius to produce : the fabrication of a play, as the production of Shakespeare's pen, was once executed with sufficient skill to impose for a time upon the public credulity: a good memory is all that is necessary in order to avoid uttering falsehoods that can be easily contra- dicted and confuted. In an extended sense of the word fiction, it approaches still nearer to the sense of fabricate, when said of the fictions of the ancients, which were dehvered as truth, although admitted now to be false: the motive of the narrator is what here constitutes the difference, namely, that in the former case he beUeves what he re- lates to be true, in the latter he knows it to be false. The heathen mythology consists principally of the fictions of the poets: newspapers commonly abound in fabrication. Fabrication may sometimes be used in a good sense: in this case it denotes not the thing fabricated, but the act of fabricating. As epithets, fictitious and false are very closely allied; for what is ficti- tious is false, though all that is false is not fictitious: the fictitious is that which has been feigned, or falsely made by some one; the false is sim- ply that which is false by the nature of the thing; the fictitious account is therefore the invention of an in- dividual, whose veracity is thereby impeached; but there may be many false accounts imintentionaUy cir- culated. FICTITIOUS. See Artful. FIDELITY. See Faith. FIENDISH, See Diabolic. FIERCE. See Ferocious. FIGURE, Metaphor, Allegory, Emblem, Symbol, Type. Figure, in Latin fig-ura, from fingere, to fashion or shape, signifies anything painted or feigned by the mind. Metayhor, in Greek ntraose. Accommodate signifies to make commodious. Adjust signifies to make a thing just as it is desired to be. To fit, in the transitive sense, is to make of like proportions, so that one thing may join with another as it ought : as to ^ one board to another; to fit clothes to the body: to suit is to make things agreeable to one an- other, and is mostly applied to moral objects: as to suit one's actions or language to the occasion. Fit may Ukewise be figuratively ap- plied to moral objects, in the sense of making one object fit for another, as to fit a person by his education for a particular walk of Ufe; to fit the mind for the reception of truth. In the transitive sense these words have precisely the same distinction: as the shoe fits, or fits the foot, which is made to the same size; tilings suit which agree in essential qualities or produce an agreeable effect when placed together; as furniture is made to suit. In the moral sense, the fitness of things is what we term just, right, or decent: that which suits falls in with our ideas and feelings. To adapt is a species of fitting; to ac- commodate is a species of suiting; both applied to the moral actions of con- scious beings. Adaptation is an act of the judgment; accommodation is an act of the will; we adapt by an exercise of discretion; we accommodate by a management of the humors: an adaptor tion does not interfere with our inter- ests; but an accommodation always supposes a sacrifice: we adapt our lan- guage to the imderstandings of our hearers; we accommodate ourselves to the humors of others. The mind of an infinitely wise Creator is clearly evinced in the world by the universal 354 FITTED adaptation of means to their ends: a| spirit of accommodation is not merely a characteristic of pohteness: it is of sufficient importance to be ranked among the Christian duties. Accommodate and adjust are both ap- plied to the affairs of men which require to be kept, or put, in right order : but the former implies the keeping as well as putting in order; the latter simply the putting in order. Men accommo- date each other, th&t is, make things commodious for one another; but they adjust things either for thernselves or for others. Thus they accomm/)date one another in pecuniary matters; or they adjust the ceremonial of a visit. Accommodate likewise always supposes a certain sacrifice or yielding on the part of the person accommodating for the convenience of the person accom- modated. On this ground we may say that a difference is either accommodated or adjusted; for it is accommodated, inasmuch as the parties yield to each other so as to make it commodious to both; it is adjusted, inasmuch as that which was wrong is set right. FITTED. See Competent. FIX, Fasten, Stick. Fix is a generic term; fasten, i. e., to make fast, and stick, i. e., to make to stick, are but modes of fixing: we fix what- ever we make to remain in a given situ- ation; we fasten if we fix it firmly; we stick when we fix a thing by means of sticking. A post is ^xed in the ground; it is fastened to a wall by a nail; it is stu^k to another board by means of glue. Shelves are fixed: a horse is fastened to a gate; bills are stuck. What is fixed may be removed in vari- ous ways : what is fastened is removed by main force: what is stuck must be separated by contrivance. See also Firm. Fix, Settle, Establish. — Fix, in Latin Jixi, perfect of figo, signifies simply to make to keep its place. Settle, from Anglo-Saxon sell, seat, alhed to sit, signifies to make to sit or be at rest. Establish, from the Latin stabilis, signi- fies to make stable. Fix is the general and indefinite term: to settle and establish are to fix strongly. Fix and settle are apphed either to material or spiritual objects, establish only to moral objects. A post may be fixed in the ground in any manner, but it requires time for it to settle. A person may either fix him- self, settle himself, or establish himself: the first case refers simply to his taking up his abode or choosing a certain spot; the second refers to his permanency of stay; and the third to the business which he raises or renders permanent. The same distinction exists between these words in their further application to the conduct of men. We may fix one or many points, important or un- important— it is a mere act of the will; we settle many points of importance — it is an act of deliberation; thus we fix the day and hour of doing a thing; we settle the affairs of our family: so likewise to fix is properly the act of one; to settle may be the joint act of many; thus a parent fixes on a busi- ness for his child, or he settles the mar- riage contract with another parent. To fix and settle are personal acts, and the objects are mostly of a private nature: but establish is an indirect action, and the object mostly of a pubhc nature: thus we^x our opinions; we settle our minds; or we are in- strumental in establishing laws, institu- tions, and the hke. It is much to be lamented that any one should remain unsettled in his faith; and still more so, that the best form of faith is not universally established. Fix, Determine, Settle, Limit. — To fix is here the general term; to deter- mine (see Decide); to settle (see Pre- ceding); to limit (see Bound), are here modes of fixing. They all denote the acts of conscious agents, but differ in the object and circumstances of the action; we may fix any object by any means and to any point; we may fix material objects or spiritual objects; we may^ either by means of our senses or our thoughts; but we can determine only by means of our thoughts. To fix, in distinction from the rest, is said in regard to a single point or a Une; but to determine is always said of one or more points or a whole: we fix where a thing shall begin; but we determine where it shall begin and where it shall end, which way and how far it shall go, and the hke: thus, we may fix our eye upon a star, or we fix our minds upon a particular branch FLATTERER 355 of astronomy; but we determine the distance of the heavenly bodies, or the specific gravity of bodies, and the like, upon philosophical principles. So m respect to other objects, to fix is a positive and immediate act; as to fix the day, hour, or minute, etc.; to determine requires consideration; as to determine times and seasons, or modes of doing things, and the Uke. Determine is to settle as a means to the end; we conmionly determine all subordinate matters in order to settle a matter finally: thus, the determination of a single cause will serve to settle all other differences. The determination respects the act of the individual who fixes certain points and brings them to a term; the settlement respects simply the conclusion of the affair or the termination of all dispute and ques- tion. To determine and limit both signify to fix boundaries; but to determine or fix a term to a thing respects such boundaries or terms as are formed by the nature of things: to limit is the act of a conscious agent; a question is determined by removing the doubt; the price is limited by law, or the com- mand of the magistrate, or the agree- ment of the parties. FIXED. See Firm. FLAG, Droop, Languish, Pine. Flag comes from a Teutonic base found in Anglo-Saxon flacor, flying^ roving, and Icelandic fiaka, originally an imi- tative syllable found in flap, flicker, etc.; it means here to be weary after roving, to cease to rove, etc. Droop (see Fall). To languish is to be- come or continue languid (see Faint). Pine, Middle English pinen, to suffer, more frequently to torment (from Anglo-Saxon pin, borrowed from Latin pcena, pain, penalty), means to languish with suffering. In the proper appUcation nothing flags but that which can be distended and made to flutter by the wind, as the leaves of plants when they are in want of water or in a weakly condition: hence figurativelj^ the spirits are said to flag: nothing is said to droop but that the head of which flags or drops; the snow-drop droops, and flowers will generally droop from excess of drought or heat : the spirits in the same manner are said to droop, which expresses more than to flag; the human body ilso droops when the strength fails: fan- guish is a still stronger expression thMi droop, and is appUcable principally to Ijersons; some languish in sickness, some in prison, and some in a state of distress: to pine is to be in a state of wearing pain which is mostly of a mental nature; a child mav pine when absent from all its frienos and sup- posing itself deserted. FLAGITIOUS. See Heinous. FLAGRANT. See Heinous. FLAME, Blaze, Flash, Flare, Glare. Flame, in iadin flamma, from the Greek (pXiyeiv, to bum, signifies the luminous exhalation emitted from fire. Blaze, Anglo-Saxon blcBse, torch, signi- fies a flame blown up, that is, an ex- tended flame: flash comes from Middle English flaschen, to dash, Icelandic flas, a swift rushing, and refers to a sudden rush of light. Flare is only a variant of Swedish flasa, to bum violently. Flash and flare, which are but varia- tions of flame, denote different species of flame; the former, a sudden flame, the second, a dazzling, imsteady flame. Glare, Anglo-Saxon gker, amber, is pos- sibly allied to glass; it refers to a sharp and shining flight, a strong flame, that emits a strong light: a candle bums only by flame, paper commonly by a blaze, gunpowder oy a flash, a torch by a flare, and a conflagration by a glare. FLAT, Level. Flat is a Scandina- vian word of uncertain origin. Level, in all probability from libella and libra, a balance, signifies the evenness of a balance. Flat is said of a thing with regard to itself* it is opposed to the round or protuberant; level, as it re- spects another thing; it is opposed to the uneven: a country is^^ which has no elevation; a coimtry is level as con- trasted with that which is mountain- ous, or a wall is level with the roof of a house when it rises to the height of the roof. In the moral application they differ too widely to render comparison neces- sary. See also Insipid. FLATTER. See Adulate. FLATTERER, Sycophant, Para- site. Flatterer (see Adulate). SyoO' 356 FLAVOR phant, in Greek avKo^avrric, signified originally an informer on the matter of figs, but has now acquired the mean- ing of an obsequious and servile per- son. Parasite, in Greek Trapaalrog, from Trapd and airog, corn or meat, originally referred to the priests who attended feasts, but it is now apphed to a hanger-on at the tables of the great. The flatterer is one who flatters by words; the sycophant and parasite is therefore always a flatterer, and some- thing more, for the sycophant adopts every mean artifice by which he can ingratiate himself, and the parasite sub- naits to every degradation and servile compUance by which he can obtain his base purpose. These terms differ more in the object than in the means, the former having general purposes of favor, and the latter particular and still lower purposes to answer. Cour- tiers may be sycophants in order to be well with their prince and obtain pre- ferment; but they are seldom parasites, who are generally poor and in want of a meal. FLAVOR. See Taste. FLAW. See Blemish. FLAY. See Skin. FLEETING. See Temporary. FLEETNESS. See Quickness. FLEXIBLE, Pliable, Pliant, Sup- ple. Flexible, in Latin fl^xibilis, from fl^ctere, to bend, signifies able to be bent. Pliable signifies able to be plied or folded: pliant signifies hterally ply- ing, bending, or folding. Supple, in French souple, comes from Latin sup- plicem (accusative), in the old sense of bending under; compare supplicate. Flexible is used in a natural or moral sense; pliable, in the familiar sense only; pliant, in the higher and moral application only: what can be bent in any degree as a stick is flexible; what can be bent as wax, or folded like cloth, is pliable. Supple, whether in a proper or a figurative sense, is an excess of pliability; what can be bent backward and forward, like osier twig, is supple. In the moral application, flexible is indefinite both in degree and applica- tion; it may be greater or less in point of degree; whereas pliant supposes a great degree of pliability, and supple- ness a great degree of pliancy or pliabiU ity; it apphes likewise to the outward actions, to the temper, the resolution, or the principles; but pliancy is ap- plied to the principles or the conduct dependent upon those principles; sup- pleness, to the outward actions and behavior only. A temper is flexible which yields to the entreaties of others; the person or character is pliant when it is formed or moulded easily at the will of another; a person is supple who makes his actions and his manners bend according to the varying humors of another: the first belongs to one in a superior station who yields to the wishes of the applicant; the latter two belong to equals or inferiors who yield to the influence of others. Flexibility is frequently a weakness, but never a vice; it always consults the taste of others, sometimes to its own incon- venience and often in opposition to its judgment; pliancy is often both a weakness and a vice: it always yields for its own pleasure, though not always in opposition to its sense of right and wrong: suppleness is always a vice, but never a weakness; it seeks its grati- fication to the injury of another by flattering his passions. Flexibility is opposed to firmness, pliancy to steadi- ness, suppleness to rigidity. FLICKERING. See Lambent. FLIGHT. See Situation. FLIGHTINESS. See Lightness. FLIMSY. See Superficial. FLOAT. See Waft. FLOATING. See Unfunded. FLOURISH, Thrive, Prosper. Flourish, in French flsurir, fl/yrissant, Latin floresco, or fl/yreo, from flx)S, a flower, is a figure of speech borrowed from the action of flowers which grow in full vigor and health. Thrive is a Scandinavian word from a root signi- fying to seize, meaning to seize for one's self, hence to prosper. Prosper, in Latin prosper, prosper~us, com- poimded of pro and spes, hope, signifies to be agreeable to the hopes. To flourish expresses the state of being that which is desirable: to thrive the process of becoming so. In the proper sense, flourish and thrive are applied to vegetation: the former to that which is full grown, the latter to FOLLOW 357 that which is in the act of growing: the oldest trees are said to flourish which put forth their leaves and fruits in full vigor; young trees thrive when they increase rapidly toward their full growth. Flourish and thrive are taken like- wise in the moral sense; prosper is employed only in this sense; flourish is said either of individuals or of com- munities of men; thrive and prosper only of individuals. To flourish is to be in full possession of powers, physi- cal, intellectual, and incidental: an author flourishes at a certain p>eriod; an institution flourishes; hterature or trade flourishes; a nation flourishes. To thrive is to carry on one's concerns to the advantage of one's circumstances; it is a term of familiar use for those who gain by positive labor: the in- dustrious tradesman thrives. To pros- per is to be already in advantageous circimastances: men prosper who ac- cumulate wealth agreeably to their wishes and beyond their expectations. FLOW, Stream, Gush. For the derivation of flow see Arise. Stream is, in Anglo-Saxon, stream, from a root signifying to flow. Gush comes from a Teutonic root and is aUied to Ice- landic gjiota, to pour. Flow is here the generic term: the other two are specific terms, express- ing different modes: water may flow either in a large body or in a long, but narrow course; the stream, in a long, narrow course only: thus, waters flow in seas, rivers, rivulets, or in a small pond; they stream only out of spouts or small channels: they flow gently or otherwise; they stream gently; but they gush with violence: thus, the blood flows from a woimd which comes from it in any manner; it streams from a woimd when it runs, as it were, in a channel; it gushes from a wound when it runs with impetuosity and in as large quantities as the cavity admits. See also Arise. FLUCTUATE, Waver. Fluctuate, in Latin fluctuatus, participle of fluctu- are, from fiuctu^, a wave, signifies to move backward and forward like a wave. WoAier comes from Anglo-Saxon woefre, restless, wandering; it is not, however, the same word as wave, which is aUied to wag. To fluctuate conveys the idea of strong agitation; to waver, that of constant motion backward and for- ward : when appUed in the moral sense, to fluctuate designates the action of the spirits or the opinions; to waver is said only of the will or opinions: he who is alternately merry and sad in quick succession is said to be fluxAuat- ing; or he who has many opinions in quick succession is said to fluctuate; but he who cannot form an opinion or come to a resolution is said to vxiver. See also Wag. FLUENT. See Voluble. FLUID, Liquid, Liquidate. Fluid, from fluere, to flow, signifies that which from its nature flows; liquid, from li- quere, to be clear, signifies that which is melted. These words may be em- ployed as epithets to the same objects; but they have a distinct office which they derive from their original mean- ing: when we wish to represent a thing as capable of passing along in a stream or current, we should denomi- nate it a fluid; when we wish to repre- sent it as passing from a congealed to a dissolved state, we should name i it a liquid; water and air are both represented as fluids from their general property of flowing through certain spaces; but ice, when thawed, becomes a liquid and melts; melted lead is also termed a liquid: the humors of the animal body and the juices of trees are fluids; what we drink is a liquid, as opposed to what we eat, which is soUd. We liquidate an obhgation or debt when we settle it or pay it off. FLUTTER. See Palpitate. FLYING-MACHINE. See AlB- craft. FOE. See Enemy. FCETUS. See Embryo. FOIBLE. See Imperfection. FOIL. See Defeat. folks. See People. FOLLOW, Succeed, Ensue. Fol- low comes from Anglo-Saxon folgian. Succeed is compounded of Latin sub, next, and cedere, to go, meaning to go after. Ensue comes from French suivre, Latin sequi, to follow. Follow and succeed are said of p>ersons and things; ensu£, of things only: fol- low, in respect of persons, denotes the 358 FOLLOW going in order, in a trace or line; suc- ceed denotes the going or being in the same place immediately after another: many persons may follow one another at the same time; but only one in- dividual properly succeeds another. Follow is taken literally for the motion of the physical body in relation to another; succeed is taJcen in the moral sense for taking the place of another: people follow one another in a pro- cession, or one follows another to the grave; a king succeeds to a throne, or a son succeeds to the inheritance of his father. To follow may also be to ga in the same course, though not at the same time, as to follow a person to the grave in the sense of dying after him: to succeed is always to go in the place of another, whether living or dead, as one minister of state succeeds another, or a son succeeds his father. Persons may follow things, but things only succeed things: as to follow a rule or follow a course of conduct. To follow, in relation to things, is said either simply of the order in which they go or of such as go by a connec- tion between them; to succeed implies simply to take the place after another; to ensue is io followhy a necessary con- nection: as in a natural tempest one wave of the sea follows another in rapid succession, so in the moral tem- pest of political revolutions one mad convulsion is quickly succeeded by an- other: nothing can ensue from popular commotions but bloodshed and misery. Follow is used in general propositions; ensiie is used in specific cases: sin and misery follow each other as cause and effect; quarrels too often ensue from the conversations of violent men who differ either in religion or politics. Follow, Pursue. — The idea of going after any object in order to reach or obtain it is common to these terms, but imder different circumstances: to follow a person is mostly with a friendly intention; to pursue (see Continue), with a hostile intention: a person fol- lows his fellow-traveller whom he wishes to overtake; the officers of justice pur- sue the criminal whom they wish to apprehend; so likewise the huntsmen and hunters follow the dogs in the chase; the dogs pursue the hare. In application to things, follow is taken more in the passive, and pursue more in the active sense: a man follows the plan of another, and pursues his own plan; he follows his inclinations, and pursues an object. Follow, Imitate. — Follow (see above). Imitate is in Latin imitatus, participle of imitare, from a root also found in imago. Both these terms denote the regulat- ing our actions by something that offers itself to us or is set before us; but we follow that which is either internal or external; we imitate that only which is external: we either follow the dic- tates of our own minds or the sugges- tions of others; but we imitate the conduct of others: in regard to external objects, we follow either a rule or an example; but we imitate an example only: we follow the footsteps of our forefathers; we imitate their virtues and their perfections: it is advisable for young persons as closely as possible to follow the good example of those who are older and wiser than them- selves; it is the boimden duty of every Christian to imitate the example of our blessed Saviour to the utmost of his power. To follow and imitate may both be applied to that which is good or bad: the former to any action, but the latter only to the behavior or the mode of doing anything: we may follow a person in his career of virtue or vice; we imitate his gestures, tone of voice, and the like. Follower, Adherent, Partisan. — A fol- lower is one who follows a person gen- erally; and adherent is one who adheres to his cause; a partisan is the follower of a party; the follower follows either the person, the interests, or the prin- ciples of any one; thus the retinue of a nobleman, or the friends of a states- man, or the friends of any man's opin- ions, may be styled his followers; but the adherent is that kind of follower who espouses the interests of another, as the adherents of Charles I.: a, follower follows near or at a distance; but the adherent is always near at hand; the partisan hangs on or keeps at a certain distance; the follower follows from vari- ous motives; the adherent adheres from a personal motive; the partisan, from a partial motive: Charles I. had as FOOL 359 many adherents as he had followers; the rebels had as many partisans as they had adherents. FOLLY, Foolery. Folly is the ab- stract of fooUsh, and characterizes the thing; foolery ^ the abstract of fool, and characterizes the person: we may commit an act of folly without being chargeable with weakness or folly; but none are guilty of fooleries who are not themselves fools, either habitually or temporarily: young people are perpetu- ally committing follies if not under proper control; fashionable people lay aside one foolery only to take up another. FOND. See Affectionate; Amo- rous; Indulgent. FONDLE. See Caress; Dally. FOOD, Diet, Regimen. Food, An- glo-Saxon foda, signifying what one eats, comes from a root which appears in Latin panis, bread (English pantry), pasture, etc., p in Latin corre8p>onding to / in the Teutonic languages, as in pater and faiher, pedem and foot. Diet, from StaiTau), to hve medicinally, sig- nifies any particular mode of Uving. Regimen, in Latin regimen, from rego, signifies a system or practice by rule. All these terms refer to our Hving, or that by which we hve: food is here the general term; the others are specific. Food specifies no circumstances^ what- ever is taken to maintain life is food: diet is properly prescribed or regular food: it is the hard lot of some among the poor to obtain with difficulty food and clothing for themselves and their famiUes; an attention to the diet of children is an important branch of their early education. Food is an un- qualified term appHcable to either man or beast; diet is applied to man only, not merely to individuals in the limited sense, but to the species in the sense of their daily and regular food. Food has also a figurative apphcation which diet has not. Diet and regimen are both particular modes of Hving; but the former re- spects the quaUty of food, the latter the quantity as well as quahty: diet is confined to modes of taiking nourish- ment; regimen often respects the ab- stinence from food, bodily exercise, and whatever may conduce to health: diet is generally tne consequence of an im- mediate prescription from a physician. and during the period of sickness; regi- men commonly forms a regular part of a man's system of Uving: diet is in certain cases of such importance for the restoration of a patient that a single deviation may defeat the best m^i- cine; it is the misfortune of some people to be troubled with diseases from which they cannot get any exemption but by observing a strict regimen. FOOL, Idiot, Buffoon. Fool comes from Latin /oMis, a wind-bag, andfolles, puffed cheeks. Idiot comes from the Greek ISmrrtQ, signifying either a private person or one that is rude and unskilled in the ways of the world. Buffoon comes from French bouffer, to puff. The fool is either naturally or arti- ficially 3, fool; the idiot is a natural /ooZ; the buffoon is an artificial fool: whoever violates common sense in his actions is a fool; whoever is unable to act ac- cording to common sense is an idiot; whoever intentionally violates common- sense is a buffoon. See also Ninny. Foolhardy, Adventurous, Rash. — Fool- hardy signifies having the hardihood of a fool. Adventurous signifies ready to venture. Rash comes from a Ger- manic root signifying quick, sudden. Foolhardy expresses more than the adventuroUrS, and adventurous than rash. The foolhardy man ventures in defiance of consequences: the adventurous man ventures from a love of the arduous and the bold; the rash man ventures for want of thought: courage and bold- ness become foolhardihood when they lead a person to run a fruitless risk; an adventurous spirit sometimes leads a man into unnecessary difficulties; but it is a necessary accompaniment of greatness. There is not so much de- sign, but there is more violence and impetuosity in rashness than in fool- hardihood: the former is the conse- quence of an ardent temper which will admit of correction by the influence of the judgment; but the latter compre- hends the perversion of both the will and the judgment. An infidel is fool- hardy, who risks his future salvation for the mere gratification of his pride; Alexander was an adventurous prince who dehghted in enterprises in propor- tion as they presentea difficulties; he was Ukewise a rash prince, as was 360 FOOLISH evinced by his jumping into the river Cydnus while he was hot, and by his leaping over the wall of Oxydracse and exposing himself singly to the attack of the enemy. FOOLISH. See iRRATioNAii; Sim- ple. FOOTSTEP. See Mark. FOPPISH. See Finical. FORBEAR. See Abstain. FORBID, Prohibit, Interdict. The joT in forbid, like the German ver, is negative, signifying to bid not to do. The pro in prohibit, and inter in interdict, have both a similarly neg- ative sense: the former verb, from ha- bere, to have, signifies to have or hold that a thing shall not be done, to re- strain from doing; the latter, from dicere, to say, signifies to say that a thing shall not be done. Forbid is the ordinary term; pro- hibit is the judicial term; interdict the moral term. To forbid is a direct and personal act; to prohibit is an indi- rect action that operates by means of extended influence: both imply the ex- ercise of power or authority by any person; but the former is more ap- plicable to the power of private per- sons, and the latter to the authority of government. A parent forbids his child marrying when he thinks proper: the government prohibits the use of spirituous liquors. Interdict is a species of forbidding applied to more serious concerns, as to interdict the use of any one strong drink. To forbid or inter- dict is opposed to command; to pro- hibit, to allow. As nothing is forbidden to Christians which is good and just in itself, so nothing is commanded that is hurtful and imjust. As no one is prohibited in our own country from writing that which can tend to the improvement of mankind, so on the other hand he is not allowed to indulge his private maUgnity by the publica- tion of injurious personalities. Forbid and interdict, as personal acts, are properly applicable to persons only, but by an improper appUcation are ex- tended to things; prohibit, however, in the general sense of restraining, is ap- plied with equal propriety to things as to persons : shame forbids us doing a thing ; law, authority, and the Uke, prohibit. See also Ban. FORCE, Violence. Both these terms imply an exertion of strength; but the former in a much less degree than the latter. Force (see Compel) is ordinarily employed to supply the want of a proper wiU; violence, in Latin violentia, from vis, and the Greek, fiia, strength, is used to coimteract an op- posing will. The arms of justice must exercise /orce in order to bring offenders to a proper account; one nation exer- cises violence against another in the act of carrying on war. Force is mostly conformable to reason and equity; vio- lence is always resorted to for the at- tainment of that which is unattain- able by law. All who are invested with authority have occasion to use force at certain times to subdue the unruly will of those who should sub- mit : violence and rapine are inseparable companions; a robber could not sub- sist by the Jatter without exercising the former. In an extended and figurative ap>- plication to things, these terms convey the same general idea of exerting strength. That is said to have force that acts with force; and that to have violence that acts with violence. A word, an expression, or a remark has force or is forcible; a disorder, a passion, a sentiment, has violence or is violent. Force is always something desirable; violence is always something hurtful. We ought to hsten to arguments which have force in them; we endeavor to correct the violence of all angry pas- sions. See also Energy; Power; Strain. FORCIBLE. See Cogent. FOREBODE. See Augttr. FORECAST. See Foresight. FOREFATHERS, Progenitors, Ancestors. Forefathers signifies our fathers before us, and includes our im- mediate parents. Progenitors, from pro and gignere, to beget, signifies those begotten before us, exclusive of our immediate parents. Ancestors, con- tracted from antecessors, or those going before, is said of those from whom we are remotely descended. Forefathers is a partial and famiUar term for the pre- ceding branches of any family. Progenitors is a higher term in the same sense applied to families of dis- FORETELL 361 tinction: we speak of the forefathers of a peasant, but the progenitors of a nobleman. Forefathers and progenitors, but par- ticularly the latter, are said mostly of individuals, and respect the regular line of succession in a family; ancestors is employed collectively as well as in- dividually and regards simply the order of succession: we may speak of the ancestors of a nation as well as of any particular person. FOREGO. See Give Up; Waive. FOREGOING. See Antecedent. FOREIGN. See Extraneous. FOREIGNER. See Stranger. FORERUNNER, Precursor, Mes- senger, Harbinger. Forerunner and precursor signify hterally the same thing, namely, one running before; but the term forerunner is properly applied only to one who runs before to any spot to communicate intelligence; and it is figuratively applied to things which in their nature, or from a natural con- nection, precede others; precursor is only employed in this figurative sense: thus imprudent speculations are said to be the forerunners of a man's ruin; the ferment which took place in men's minds was the precursor of the revo- lution. Messenger signifies literally one bear- ing messages: and harbinger, from the Old French herberger, Old High Ger- man heri-berga, from heri, an army, and bergan, to shelter, signified, one who proviaed a shelter for an army. Both terms are employed for persons: but the messenger states what has been or is; the harbinger announces what is to be. Our Saviour was the messenger of glad tidings to all mankind: the prophets were the harbingers of the Messiah. A messenger may be em- ployed on different offices; a harbinger 18 a messenger who acts in a specific office. The angels are represented as messengers on different occasions. John the Baptist was the harbinger of our Saviour, who prepared the way of the Lord. They are both appUed figura- tively to other objects. FORESIGHT, Forethought, Fore- cast, Premeditation. Foresight, from seeing before, and forethought, from thinking beforehand, denote the simple act of the mind in seeing a thing be- fore it happens: forecast, from casting the thoughts onward, signifies coming at the knowledge of a thing beforehand by means of calculation: premeditation, from meditate, signifies obtaining the same knowledge by force of meditating, reflecting deeply. Foresight and fore- thought are general and indefinite terms; we employ them on either ordinary or extraordinary occasions; hni forethought is, of the two, the most familiar term; forecast and premeditaiion, mostly in the latter case: all business requires foresight; state concerns require fore- cast; foresight and forecast respect what is to happen; they are the operations of the mind in calculating futurity: premeditation respects what is to be said or done; it is a preparation of the thoughts and designs for action: by foresight and forecast we guard against evils and provide for contin- gencies; by premeditation we guard against errors of conduct. A man be- trays his want of foresight who does not provide against losses in trade; he shows his want of forecast who does not provide against old age; he shows his want of premeditation who acts or speaks on the impulse of the moment: the man, therefore, who does a wicked act without premeditation lessens his guilt. FOREST, Chase, Park, are all habitations for animals of venery ; but the forest is of the first magnitude and importance, it being a franchise and the property of the king; the chase and park may be either pubUc or pri- vate property. The forest is so formed of wood, and covers such an extent of ground, that it may be the haunt of wild beasts; of this description are the forests in Germany: the chase is an indefinite and open space that is al- lotted expressly for the chase of partic- ular animals, such as deer; the park is an enclosed space that serves for the preservation of domestic animals. FORETELL, Predict, Prophesy, Prognosticate. To foretell is com- pounded of fore and tell; predict comes from prce, before, and dicere, to say; prophesy, in French prophMiser, Latin E'-ophetiso, Greek ;rpo^iJ7-ijc, from irpo, atin pro, before, and ^»;/«»', to speak, meaning to speak before the event, con- 362 FORFEITURE veys the same idea; prognosticate, from the Greek irpoyiyvo}aiceiv, to know be- forehand, to bode or imagine to one's self beforehand, denotes the action of feeling or knowing, rather than speak- ing of things to come. Foretell is the most general in its sense and famiUar in its application; we may foretell common events, al- though we cannot predict or prophesy anything important: to foretell is an ordinary gift; one foretells by a simple calculation or guess: to predict and prophesy are extraordinary gifts; one predicts by a supernatural power, real or supposed; one prophesies by means of inspiration. Men of discernment and experience easily foretell the events of imdertakings which fall imder their notice. The priests among the hea- thens, like the astrologers and conjur- ers of more modem times, pretended to predict events that affected nations and empires. The gift of prophecy was one among the number of the super- natural gifts commimicated to the primitive Christians by the Holy Ghost. Prediction, as a noim, is employed for both the verbs foretell and predict; it is, therefore, a term of less value than prophecy. We speak of a predic- tion being verified and a prophecy ful- filled: the predictions of almanac- makers respecting the weather are as seldom verified as the prophecies of visionaries and enthusiasts are ful- filled respecting the death of princes or the affairs of governments. To prognosticate is an act of the understanding; it is guided by out- ward symptoms, as a rule; it is only stimulated, and not guided, by out- ward objects; a physician prognosti- cates the crisis of a disorder by the symptoms discoverable in the patient. FORFEITURE. See Fine. FORGE. See Invent. FORGETFULNESS, Oblivion. Forgetfulness characterizes the person or that which is personal; oblivion, the state of the thing: the former refers to him who forgets, the latter to that which is forgotten: we blame a person for his forgetfulness; but we sometimes bury things in oblivion. See also Amnesia. FORGIVE, Absolve, Pardon, Re- mit. Forgive, Anglo-Saxon forgefan, compoimded of the privative for and gifan, Modern English give, and par' don (see Excuse) both signify not to give the punishnient that is due, to relax from the rigor of justice in de- manding retribution. Forgive is the famiUar term; pardon is adapted to the serious style. Individuals forgive one another personal offences; they pardon offences against law and morals: the former is an act of Christian charity: the latter an act of clemency: the former is an act that is confined to no condition; the latter is peculiarly the act of a superior. He who has the right of being offended has an oppor- tunity of forgiving the offender; he who has the authority of pvmishing the offence may pardon. Pardon, when compared with re- mission, is the consequence of offence; it respects principally the person of- fending; it depends upon him who is offended; it produces reconcihation when it is sincerely granted and sin- cerely demanded. Remission is the consequence of the crime; it has more particular regard to the pimishment; it is granted by either the prince or the magistrates; it arrests the execution of justice. Remission, hke pardon, is pecuUarly apphcable to the sinner with regard to his Maker. Absolution is taken in no other sense: it is the consequence of the fault or the sin, and properly concerns the state of the culprit; it properly loosens him from the tie with which he is bound; it is pronounced either by the civil judge or by the ecclesiastical minister; and it re-establishes the accused or the penitent in the rights of innocence. FORGOTTEN. See Bygone. FORLORN. See Forsaken. FORM, Figure, Conformation, Form, in Latin forma, signifies properly the life within which gives shape and individuality to anything. Figure sig- nifies the image feigned or conceived. Conformation, in French conformation, in Latin conformatio, from conform, sig- nifies the image disposed or put to- gether. Form is the generic term; figure and conformation are special terms. The form is the work either of nature or art; it results from the arrangement of FORM 363 the parts: the figure is the work of design: it includes the general con- tour or outUne: the conformation in- cludes such a disposition of the parts of the body aa is adapted for perform- ing certain functions. Form is the property of every substance; and the artificial form approaches nearest to perfection as it is most natural; the figure is the fruit of the imagination; it is the representation of the actual form that belongs to things; it is more or less just as it approaches to the form of the thing itself: conformation is said only with regard to animal bodies; nature renders it more or less suitable according to the accidental concurrence of physical causes. The erect form of man is one of the distinguishing marks of his superiority over every other terrestrial being: the human figure when well painted is an object of ad- miration: the turn of the mind is doubtless influenced by the conformcv- tion of the organs. A person's form is said to be handsome or ugly, common or uncommon, his figure to be correct or incorrect; a conformation, to be good or baa. Heathens have wor- shipped the Deity under various /orwzs; mathematical figures are the only true figures with which we are acquainted: the craniologist affects to judge of characters by the conformation of the skuU. Form and figure are used in a moral application, although confornuUion is not. We speak of adopting a form of faith, a form of words, a form of godh- ness; cutting a showy, a dismal, or ridiculous figure. Form, Fashion, Mould, Shape. — To form is to put into a form, which is here aa beiore the generic term: to fashion is to put into a particular or distinct form; to mould is to put into a set form; to shape is to form simply as it respects the exterior. As every- thing respects a form when it receives existence, so to form conveys the idea of producing. When we wish to repre- sent a thing as formed in any distmct or remarkable way, we may sp>eak of it as fashioned. God formed man out of the dust of the ground ; He fashioned him after His own image. When we wish to represent a thing as formed according to a precise rule, we should say it was moulded; thus the habits of a man are moulded at the will of a superior. When we wish to represent a thing as receiving the accidental qualities Which distinguish it from others, we talk of shaping it : the potter shapes the clay; the miUiner shapes a bonnet; a man shapes his actions to the humors of another. See also Make. '^ Form, Compose, Constitute. — Form is a generic and indefinite term, signify- ing to give a form. To compose and constitute are modes of forming. These words may be employed either to designate modes of action or to char- acterize things. Things may be /ormed either by persons or things; they are composed and constituted only by con- scious agents: thus persons /ottw things, or things form one another: thus we form a circle, or the reflection of the light after rain forms a rainbow. Per- sons compose and constitute: thus a musician composes a piece of music, or men constUule laws. To form, in regard to persons, is simply to put into a form; to compose is to put together into a form; and to constitute is to make to stand together in a form; to form, therefore, does not qualify the action: one forms a thing without defining how, whether at once or by degrees, whether with one or several materials; to compose and corv- stituie are both modes of forming by the help of several materials, with de- vice and contrivance; compose is said of that which only requires to be put together; constitute, of that to which a certain degree of stabihty must be given. God formed man, man form^ a cup or a vessel; he composes a book: he constitutes oflBces, bodies. poUtic, and the like. When employed to characterize things, form sigiufies simply to have a form, be it either simple or complex; compose and constitute are said only of those things which have complex forms; the former as respecting the material, the latter the essential parts of an object: thus we may say that an object forms a circle, or a semicircle, or the segment of a circle: a society is composed of individuals; but law and order constitute the essence of so- ciety: so letters and syllables compose 364 FORMER a word; but sense is essential to con^ stitute a word. Form, Ceremony, Rite, Observance- Form (see above) . Ceremony, in Latin ceremonia, signifies a formal celebra- tion. Rite, Latin ritus, means a going, a way, a way of doing, from a root ri, meaning to flow, to move. Observance signifies the thing observed, from Latin observare, to heed, to observe. All these terms are employed with regard to particular modes of action in civil society. Form is here, as in the preceding sections, the most gen- eral in its sense and apphcation; cere- m/my, rite, and observance are particular kinds of form, suited to particular oc- casions. Form, in its distinct applica- tion, respects all determinate modes of acting and speaking that are adopted by society at large in every trans- action of hfe; ceremony respects those forms of outward behavior which are made the expressions of respect and deference; rite and observance are ap- plied to national ceremonies in matters of rehgion. A certain form is requisite for the sake of order, method, and de- corum, in every social matter, whether in affairs of state, in a court of law, in a place of worship, or in the private intercourse of friends. So long as dis- tinctions are admitted in society, and men are agreed to express their senti- ments of regard and respect to one an- other, it wiU be necessary to preserve the ceremonies of poUteness which have been established. Administering oaths by the magistrate is a necessary form in law; kissing the king!s hand is a ceremony practiced at court. As far as form, ceremonies, rites, and observances respect rehgion, the first is used in the most universal and im- qualified sense in respect to religion generally or any particular form: the second may be said either of an individ- ual or a community; the third only of a commimity; and the last, more properly, of an individual either in pubUc or in private. There can be no religion without some form, but there may be different forms which are aually good. Every country has opted certain riles founded upon its peculiar religious faith, and prescribed certain observances by which individ- uals can make a public profession of their faith: baptism is one rite of initiation into the Christian church; kneeling at prayer is a ceremony, prayer itself is an observance. Formal, Ceremonious, Ceremonial. — Formal and ceremonious, from form and ceremony, are either taken in an in- different sense with respect to what contains form and ceremony, or in a bad sense, expressing the excess of form and ceremony. A person expects to have a formal dismissal before he considers himself as dismissed; people of fashion pay one another ceremonious visits, by way of keeping up a distant intercourse. Ceremonial is employed in the sense of appertaining to prescribed cere- monies; and formal implies appertain- ing to prescribed forms in public mat- ters, as formal communications from one government to another: it is the business of the church to regulate the ceremonial part of religion. Ceremonious was formerly used in the same sense as ceremonial. Formal, in the bad sense, is opposed to easy: ceremonious, to the cordial. A formal carriage prevents a person from indulging himself in the innocent f amih- arities of friendly intercourse; ceremo- nious carriage puts a stop to all hos- pitahty and kindness. Princes, in their formal intercourse with one an- other, know nothing of the pleasures of society; ceremonious visitants give and receive entertainments without tasting any of the enjoyments which flow from the reciprocity of kind offices. FORMER. See Antecedent. FORMERLY, In Times Past or Old Times, Days of Yore, Anciently or Ancient Times. Formerly supposes a less remote period than in times past: and that less remote than in days of yore and anciently. The first two may be said of what happens within the age of man; the last two are extended to many generations and ages. Any individual may use the word formerly with regard to himself: thus, we en- joyed our health better formerly than now. An old man may speak of times past, as when he says he does not en- joy himself as he did in times past. Old times, days of yore, and anciently are more apphcable to nations than to in- dividuals; and all these express differ- FORTUNATE 365 ent degrees of remoteness. With re- spect to our present period, the age of Queen Elizabeth may be called old times; the days of Alfred, and, still later, the days ^ yore: the earhest period in which Britain is mentioned may be termed ancient times. See also Once. FORMIDABLE, Dreadfiil, Ter- rible, Shocking. Formidable is ap- pUed to that which is apt to excite fear (see Apprehend). Dreadful, to what is calculated to excite dread; terrible (see Alarm), to that which excites ter- ror; and shocking (from Middle EngUsh shokken, to jolt) is apphed to that which violently shakes or agitates (see Agitate) . The formidable acts neither suddenly nor violently; the dreadful may act violently but not suddenly: thus the appearance of an army may be formidable; but that of a field of battle is dreadful. The terrible and shocking act both suddenly and vio- lently; but the former acts both on the senses and on the imagination, the latter on the moral feeUngs: thus, the glare of a tiger's eye is terrible; the unexpected news of a friend's death is shocking. FORSAKE. See Abandon. • FORSAKEN, Forlorn, Destitxjte. To be forsaken is to be deprived of the company and assistance of those we have looked to; to be forlorn, Anglo- Saxon /orZoren (Grerman verloren), past participle of forleosan, to lose entirely, signifying lost, is to be forsaken in time of difficidty, to be without a guide in an unknown road; to be destitule, from the Latin destittUus, from Latin de, away, and statuere, to place, meaning taken away from, is to oe deprived of the first necessaries of life. To be for- saken is a partial situation; to be for- lorn and destitule is a permanent con- dition. We may be forsaken by a fellow-traveller on the road; we are forlorn when we get into a deserted path with no one to direct us; we are destitute when we have no means of subsistence, nor the prospect of ob- taining the means. It is particularly painfid to be forsaken by the friend of our youth and the sharer of our fortunes; the orphan who is left to travel the road of Ufe without counsel- lor or friend is, of all others, in the most forlorn condition; if to this be added poverty, his misery is aggravated by his becoming destitute. FORSWEAR, Perjure, Suborn, Forswear is Anglo-Saxon; -perjure is Latin; the prepositions for and per are both privative, and the words signify hteraUy to swear contrary to the truth; this is, however, not their only distinc- tion : to forswear is applied to all kinds of oaths; to -perjure is employed only for such oaths as have been adminis- tered by the civil magistrate. A sol- dier forswears himself who breaks his oath of allegiance by desertion; and a subject forswears himself who takes an oath of allegiance to his sovereign which he afterward violates; a man perjures himseK in a court of law who swears to the truth of that which he knows to be false. Forswear is used only in the proper sense: perjure may be used figuratively with regard to lover's vows; he who deserts his mis- tress to whom he has pledged his afifeo- tions is a perjured man. Forswear and perjure are the acts of individuals; suborn, from the Latin sub, secretly, and omare, to a(;iorn, to en- rich, meaning to enrich secretly, to bribe, and hence to make to forswear; a perjured man has all the guilt upon himself; but he who is svbomed shares his guilt with the suborner. FORTIFY. See Strengthen. FORTITUDE. See Courage. FORTUITOUS. See Fortunate. FORTUNATE, Lucky, Fortuitous, Prosperous, Successful. Fortunate signifies having fortune (see Chance). Lucky is the adjective corresponding to lu<;k, which is not found in Anglo- Saxon, but is a late borrowing from Dutch and German. (Compare Ger- man Gluck.) Fortuitous, from fors, chance, signifies according to chance. Prosperous (see Flourish). Success- ful signifies full of success, enabled to 8^lcceed. The fortunate and lucky are both ajj- phed to that which happens without the control of man; but the latter, which is a collateral term, describes the capricious goddess Fortune in her most freakish humors, while fortunate represents her in her more sober mood : in other words, the fortunate is more according to the ordinary course of 366 FORTUNE things; the lucky is something sudden, unaccountable, and singular: a circuin- stance is said to be fortunate which turns up suitably to oiir purpose; it is said to be lucky when it comes upon us unexpectedly, at the moment that it is wanted: hence we speak of a man as fortunate in his business and the ordinary concerns of Ufe, but lucky in the lottery or in games of chance: a fortunate year will make up for the losses of the past year; a lucky idt may repair the ruined spendthrift's fortune, only to tempt him to still greater extravagances. Fortunate and lucky are appUed to particular circumstances of good fort- une and luck, but fortuitous is employed only in matters of chance generaUy and indifferently. Prosperous and successful seem to exclude the idea of what is fortuitous, although prbsperity and success are both greatly aided by good fortune. Fortur- note and lucky are applied as much to the removal of evil as to the attain- ment of good; -prosperous and successful are concerned only in what is good, or esteemed as such: we may he fortunate in making our escape; we are prosper- ous in the acquirement of wealth. For- tunate is employed for single circum- stances; prosperous only for a train of circumstances; a man may be fortw- nate in meeting with the approbation of a superior; he is prosperous in his business. Prosperity is extended to whatever is the object of our wishes in this world; success is that degree of prosperity which immediately attends ovu" endeavors; wealth, honors, chil- dren, and all outward circumstances constitute prosperity; the attainment of any object constitutes success: the fortunate and lucky man can lay no claim to merit, because they preclude the idea of exertion; the prosperous and successful man may claim a share of merit proportioned to the exertion. The epithet prosperous may be ap- plied to those things which promote prosperity or ultimate success. See also Happy. FORTUNE. See Chance. FORW.^^RD. See Encourage ; On ; Onward. FOSTER, Cherish, Harbor, In- dulge. To foster comes from Anglo- Saxon fostor, nourishment, aJUed to foda, food; to cherish, through French from Latin carus, dear, is to hold affec- tion; to harbor, from a harbor or haven, is to provide with a shelter and protec- tion; to indulge comes from Latin in- dulgere, to be courteous to, of unknown origin. These terms are all employed here in the moral acceptation, to ex- press the idea of giving nourishment to an object. To foster in the mind is to keep with care and positive endeavors; as when one fosters prejudices by en- couraging everything which favors them: to cherish in the mind is to hold dear or set a value upon ; as when one cherishes good sentiments by dwelling upon them with inward satisfaction: to harbor is to allow room in the mind, and is generally taken in the worst sense for giving admission to that which ought to be excluded; as when one harbors resentment by permitting it to have a resting-place in the heart: to indulge in the mind is to give the whole mind to it, to make it the chief source of pleasure: as when one in- dulges an affection, by making the will and the outward conduct bend to its gratification. • FOUL, See Squalid. FOUND, Ground, Rest, Build. Found, in French fonder, Latin fundo, comes from fundus, the ground, and, like the verb ground, properly signifies to make fiirm in the ground, to make the ground the support. To found im- pUes the exercise of art and contrivance in making a support; to ground signi- fies to lay a thing so deep that it may not totter; it is merely in the moral sense that they are here considered, as the verb to ground with this signifi- cation is never used otherwise. Found \a applied to outward circmnstances; ground, to what passes inwardly: a man founds his charge against another upon certain facts that are come to his knowledge; he grounds his belief upon the most substantial evidence: a man should be cautious not to make any accusations which are not well founded, nor to indulge any expectations which are not well grounded: monarchs com- monly found their claims to a throne upon the right of primogeniture; Christians ground their hopes of im- mortaUty on the word of Grod. FRAME 367 To found and ground are said of things which demand the full exercise of the mental powers; to rest is an action of less importance: whatever is founded requires and has the utmost support; whatever is rested is more by the will of the individual: a man founds his reasoning upon some un- equivocal fact; he rests his assertion upon mere hearsay. The words /ourwi, ground, and rest have always an im- mediate reference to the thing that supports; to build has an especial ref- erence to that which is supported, to the superstructiu-e that is raised: we should not say that a person founds an hypothesis without adding some- thing, as observations, experiments, and the like, upon which it was founded; but we may speak of his simply building systems, supposing them to be the mere fruit of his dis- tempered imagination; or we may say that a system of astronomy has been built upon the opinion of Copernicus respecting the motion of the earth. See also Institute. Foundation, Ground, Basis. — Fourv- dation and ground derive their meaning and appUcation from the preceding article: a report is said to be without any foundation which has taken its rise in mere conjectiu'e or in some ar- bitrary cause independent of all fact; a man's suspicion is said to be without ground which is not supported by the shadow of external evidence: un- founded clamors are frequently raised against the measures of government; groundless jealousies frequently arise between famihes to disturb the har- mony of their intercourse. Foundation and basis may be com- pared with each other, either in the proper or the improper signification: both foundation and 6am are the low- est parts of any structure; but the former hes under ground, the latter stands above: the foundation supports some large and artificially erected pile; the basis supports a simple pillar: hence we speaJc of the foundation of St. Paul's, and the base or basis of the Monument. This distinction is likewise preserved in the moral apphcation of the terms: disputes have too often their founda- tion in frivolous circumstances; trea- ties have commonly their 6am in some acknowledged general principle; with governments that are at war pacific negotiations may be commenced on the basis of the vii possidetis. FOUNTAIN. See Spring. FOURIERISM. See Socialism. FRACTURE. See Rupture. FRAGILE, Frail, Brittle. Fragile and frail, in French frele, both come from the Latin fragilis, signifying breakable; but the former is used in the proper sense only, and the latter more generally in the improper sense: man, corporeally considered, is a frag- ile creature, his frame is composed of fragile materials; mentally considered, he is a fragile creature, for he is liable to every sort of frailty. Brittle comes from the Anglo-Saxon breotan, to break, and means breakable; but it conveys a stronger idea of this quality than fragile: the latter appUes to whatever will break from the effects of time; brittle to that which will not bear a temporary violence: in this sense all the works of men are fragile, and, in fact, all sublimary things; but glass, stone, and ice are peculiarly denominatea brittle. FRAGRANCE. See Smell. FRAIL. See Fragile. FRAILTY. See Imperfection, FRAME, Temper, Temperament, Constitution. Frame, Anglo-Saxon framian, to further, is alhed to from, the preposition, and means hterally the outside of anything; it is also alhed to fram, meaning strong, and German fromm, good; it is apphed to man physically or mentally, as denoting that constituent portion of him which seems to hold the rest together; which by an extension of the metaphor is likewise put for the whole contents, the whole body, or the whole mind. Temper and temperament, in Latin tem- peramentum, from temperare, to govern or dispose, signify the particular modes of being disposed or organized. Con- stitution, from constitute or appoint, sig- nifies the particular mode oi Being con- stituted or formed. Frame, when applied to the body, is taken in its most universal sense: as when we speak of the frame being vio- lently agitated, or the human frame being wonderfully constructed: when 368 FRANK applied to the mind, it will admit either of a general or restricted sig- nification. Temper, which is appli- cable only to the mind, is taken in the general or particular state of the in- dividual. The frame comprehends either the whole body of mental powers or the particular disposition of those powers in individuals; the temper com- prehends the general or particular state of feeling as well as thinking in the in- dividual. The mental frame which re- ceives any violent concussion is Uable to derangement ; it is necessary for those who govern to be well acquainted with the temper of those whom they govern. By reflection' on the various attributes of the Divine Being, a man may easily bring his mind into a. frame of devotion: by the indulgence of a fretful, repining temper, a man destroys his own peace of mind and offends his Maker. Temperament and constitution mark the general state of the individual; the former comprehends a mixture of the physical and mental; the latter has a purely physical appUcation. A man with a warm temperament owes his warmth of character to the rapid im- petus of the blood; a man with a deh- cate constitution is exposed to great fluctuations in his health; the whole frame of a new-born infant is peculiarly tender. Men of fierce tempers are to be found in all nations; men of sanguine tempers are more frequent in warm climates; the constitviions of females are more tender than those of the male, and their frames are altogether more susceptible. See also Invent. FRANK, Candid, Ingenuous, Free, Open, Plain. Frank, in French franc, Old High German franko, a Frank, from a weapon, was originally the name of a Germanic tribe which gave its name to France; the word signified a free-bom German, as distinguished from those whom the Germans conquered, and hence the Uberal and fearless man- ners of the man who calls no man mas- ter. Candid (for derivation see Can- did). Ingenuous comes from the Latin ingenuvs, which signifies literally free- born, as distinguished from the liberti, who were afterward made free: hence the term has been employed by a figure of speech to denote nobleness of birth or character. Free, Anglo-Saxon' freo, originally meant dear, and was apphed to the free-born children of a household, distinguished from the child- slaves. Compare Latin liberi, free, which also meant children. Open (see Candid). Plain (see Apparent). All these terms convey the idea of a readiness to communicate and be com- municated with; they are all opposed to concealment, but imder diJfferent circumstances. The frank man is un- der no constraint; his thoughts and feelings are both set at ease, and his Ups are ever reidy to give utterance to the dictates of his heart; he has no reserve: the candid man has nothing to conceal; he speaks without regard to self-interest or any partial motive; he speaks nothing but the truth: the ingenvAius man throws off all disguise; he scorns all artifice and brings every- thing to fight; he speaks the whole truth. Frankness is acceptable in the general transactions of society; it in- spires confidence and invites communi- cation: candor is of peculiar use in matters of dispute; it serves the pur- poses of equity and invites to con- ciliation: ingenuousness is most wanted where there is most to conceal; it courts favor and kindness by an acknowledg- ment of that which is against itseK. Frankness is associated with un- polished manners, and frequently ap- pears in men of no rank or education; sailors have commonly a deal of frank- ness about them: candor is the com- panion of uprightness; it must be ac- companied with some refinement, as it acts in cases where nice discriminations are made: ingenuousness is the com- panion of a noble and elevated spirit: it exists most frequently in the un- sophisticated period of youth. Frank- ness displays itself in the outward be- havior; we speak of a frank air and frank manner: candor displays itself in the language which we adopt and the sentiments we express; we speak of a candid statement, a candid reply: ingenuousness shows itself in all the words, looks, or actions; we speak of an ingenuous countenance, an ingenux)us acknowledgment, an ingenuous answer. Free, open, and plain have not so high an office as the first three; free and open may be taken either in a FREE 369 good, bad, or indifferent sense; but seldomer in the first than in the last two senses. The frank, free, and o'pen men all speak without constraint; but the frank man is not impertinent, like the free man, nor indiscreet, like the open man. The frank man speaks only of what concerns himself; the free man speaks of what concerns others: a frank man may confess his own faults or inadvertencies; the free man cor- rects those which he sees in another: the /ranA; man opens his heart from the warmth of his nature; the free man opens his mind from the conceit of his temper, and the open man says all he knows and thinks, from the in- considerate levity of his temper. Plainness, the last quahty to be here noticed, is a virtue which, though of the humbler order, is not to be despised : it is sometimes employed, Uke freedom, in the task of giving counsel; but it does not convey the idea of anything unauthorized either in matter or man- ner. A free counsellor is more ready to display his own superiority than to direct the wanderer in his way; he rather aggravates faults than instructs how to amend them; he seems more like a superciUous enemy than a friendly monitor: the plain man m free from these faults: he sp>eaks plainly but truly; he gives no false coloring to his speech; it is not calculated to of- fend, and it may serve for improve- ment: it is the part of a true friend to be plain with another whom he sees in imminent danger. A. free speaker is in danger of being hated; a pUiin dealer must at least be respected. FRAUD. See Deceit. FRAUDULENT. See Fallacious. FRAY. See Quarrel. FREAK, Whim. Freak comes from Anglo-Saxon free, meaning bold, rash. Whim is a Scandinavian word, allied to Icelandic hvima, to wander with the eyes, to be foolish. Freak has more of childishness and humor than bold- ness in it, a whim more of eccentricity than of childishness. Fancy and fort- une are both said to have their /reaA;s, as they both deviate most wiaely in their movements from all rule; but whims are at most but singular devia- tions of the mind from its ordinary and even course. Females are most liable to be seized with freaks, which are in their nature sudden and not to be cal- culated upon: men are apt to indulge themselves in whims which are in their nature strange and often laughable. We should call it a freak for a female to put on the habit of a male, and so accoutred to sally forth into the streets: we term it a whim in a man who takes a resolution never to shave himself any more. FREE, Liberal. In the section on Frank, free is considered only as it respects communication by words; in the present case it respects actions Mid sentiments. In all its accepta- tions, free is a term of dispraise, and liberal that of commendation. To be free signifies to act or think at will; to be liberal is to act according to the dictates of an enlarged heart and an enlightened mind. A clown or a fool may be free with his money, and may squander it away to please his humor or gratify his appetite; but the noble- man and the wise man will be liberal in rewarding merit, in encouraging in- dustry, and in promoting whatever can contribute to the ornament, the pros- perity, and improvement of his coimtry. A man who is free in his sentiments thinks as he pleases; the man who is liberal thinks according to the extent of his knowledge. The /reethinking man is wise in his own conceit, he de- spises the opinions of others; the liberal- minded thinks modestly on his own p>ersonal attainments, and builds upon the wisdom of others. Free, Set Free, Deliver, Liberate. — To free is properly to make free, in distinction from set free; the first is employed in what concerns ourselves, ana the second in that which concerns another. A man frees himself from an engagement; he sets another free from his engagement: we free, or set our- selves free, from that which has been imposed up>on us by ourselves or by circumstances; we are delivered or lib- erated from that which others have imposed up>on us; the former from evils in general, the latter from the evil of confinement. I free myself from a bur- den; I set my own slave free from his slavery; I deliver another man's slave 370 FREIGHT from a state of bondage; I liberate a man from prison. A man frees an estate from rent, service, taxes, and all encumbrances; a king sets his sub- jects free from certain imposts or trib- utes, he delivers them from a foreign yoke, or he liberates those who have been taken in war. See also Emancipate. . Free, Familiar. — Free has already been considered as it respects words, actions and sentiments; in the present case it is coupled with familiarity, inas- much as they respect the outward be- havior or conduct in general of men one to another. To be free is to be dis- engaged from all the constraints which the ceremonies of social intercourse impMJse; to be familiar is to be upon the footing of a familiar, of a relative, or one of the same family. Neither of these terms can be ad- mitted as unexceptionable; freedom is authorized only by particiilar circum- stances and within certain limitations; familiarity sometimes shelters itself under the sanction of long, close, and friendly intercom-se. Free is a term of much more extensive import than familiar; a man may be free toward another in a thousand ways; but he is familiar toward him only in his man- ners and address. A man who is free makes free with everything as if it were his own; a familiar man only wants to share with another, and to stand upon an equal footing in his social intercoiu-se. No man can be free with- out being in danger of infringing upon what belongs to another, nor famUiar without being in danger of obtruding himself to the annoyance of others, or of degrading himself. Free, Exempt. — Free (see preceding terms). Exempt, in Latin exemptiis, from ex, out, and emere, to take, sig- nifies set out or disengaged from any- thing. The condition and not the conduct of men is here considered. Freedom is either accidental or intentional; the exemption is always intentional; we may he free from disorders, or free from troubles; we are exempt, that is, ex- empted by government, from serving in the militia. Free is appUed to everything from which any one may wish to be free; but exempt, on the contrary, to those burdens which we should share with others: we may be free from imperfections, free from- in- conveniences, free from the interrup- tions of others, but exempt from any office or tax. We may likewise be said to be exempt from troubles when speak- ing of these as the dispensations of Providence to others. Freedom, Liberty. — Freedom, the ab- stract noun of free, is taken in all the senses of the primitive. Liberty, from the Latin liber, free, is only taken in the sense of free from external con- straint, from the action of jx)wer. Freedom, is personal and private; lib' erty is public. The freedom, of the city is the privilege granted by the city to individuals; the liberties of the city are the immunities enjoyed by the city. By the same rule of distinction we speak of the freedom of the will, the freedom of manners, the freedom of con- versation, or the freedom of debate; but the liberty of conscience, the liberty of the press, the liberty of the subject. Freedom serves, moreover, to quaUfy the action; liberty is applied only to the agent; hence we say, to speak or think with freedom; but to have the liberty of speaking, thinking, or acting. Freedom and liberty are likewise em- ployed for the private conduct of in- dividuals toward one another; but the former is used in a qualified good sense, the latter often in an unquaUfied bad sense. A freedom may sometimes be Ucensed or allowed; a liberty, if it be taken, may be something not agree- able or allowed. A freedom may be innocent and even pleasant; a liberty may do more or less violence to the decencies of life or the feelings of in- dividuals. There are little freedoms which may pass between youth of dif- ferent sexes, so as to heighten the pleasures of society; but a modest woman will be careful to guard against any freMoms which may admit of mis- interpretation, and resent every liberty offered to her as an insult. FREIGHT, Burden, Cargo, Lad- ing, Load. Freight is a word which has come from Dutch or Low German through French into English; it origi- nally signified the earnings or the hire of a ship. Cargo comes through Span- ish from the Late Latin carricare, to FROLIC 371 load a car. Lading, from lade, is de- rived from Anglo-Saxon hladan, to heap, to heap together. Load conies from Anglo-Saxon lad, a way or jour- ney, allied to Modem English lead, and signifies that which is carried on a journey. Burden, from bear, conveys the idea of weight which is borne by the vessel. A captain speaks of the freight of his ship as that which is the object of his voyage, by which all who are in- terested in it are to make their profit; he speaks of the lading as the thing which is to fill the ship; the quantity and weight of the lading are to be taken into the consideration: he speaks of the cargo as that which goes with the ship, and belongs, as it were, to the ship; the amoimt of the cargo is that which is first thought of: he speaks of the burden as that which his vessel will bear; it is the property of the ship which is to be estimated. The ship- broker regulates the freight: the cap- tain and the crew dispose of the lading: the agent sees to the procuring of the cargo: the ship-builder determines the burden: the carrier looks to the load which he has to carry. FRENZY, See Madness. FREQUENT, Resort To, Haunt. Frequent comes from French fr^Quent, in Latin frequens, crowded, signifying to come in numbers, or come often to the same place. Resort comes from Late Latin resortere, from re, again, and 8ors, a lot, and meant to go to a tri- bunal, to re-obtain by appeal. Haunt, from Old French hanter, is a word whose ultimate origin and meaning are disputed. Freqiient is more commonly used of an individual who goes often to a place^ resort and haunt, of a number of individuals. A man is said to frequent a pubhc place; but several persons may resort to a private place: men who are not fond of home frequent taverns; in the first ages of Chris- tianity, while persecution raged, its professors used to resort to private places for purposes of worship. Frequent and resort are indifferent actions; but haunt is always used in a bad sense. A man may frequent a theatre, a club, or any other social meeting, innocent or otherwise; people from different quarters may resort to a fair, a church, or any other place where they wish to meet for a com- mon purpose; but those who haunt any place go to it in privacy for some bad purpose. FREQUENTLY. See Commonly; Often. FRESH. See New. FRET. See Rub. FRETFUL. See Captious; Queb- uix)U8; Splenetic. FRIENDLY. See Amicable. FRIENDSHIP. See Love. FRIGHT. See Alarm. FRIGHTEN, Intimidate. Be- tween frighten and intimidate there is the same difference as between fright (see Alarm) and /ear (see Apprehend): the danger that is near or before the eyes frightens; that which is seen at a distance intimidates: hence females are oftener frightened and men are of- tener intimidcUed: noises will frighten; threats may intimidate: we may run away when we ax& frightened; we waver in our resolution when we are intimi- dated; we fear immediate bodily harm when we are frightened; we fear harm to our property as well as our persons when we are intimidated; frighten, therefore, is always apphed to animals, but intimidate never. See also Overawe. FRIGHTFUL. See Fearful. FRIGID. See Cool. FRIVOLOUS. See Trifling. FROLIC, Gambol, Prank. Frolic is a Dutch word, allied to German froh, merry. Gambol is derived through French from Italian gambata, a kick, Itali^i gamba, a leg (French jambe), from Late Latin gamba, a joint of the leg. Prank comes from Middle Eng- lish pranken, to trim; compare prink, to arrange one's clothes before a mir- ror. The frolic is a merry, joyous entertainment; the gambol is a dancing, light entertainment; the prank is a freakish, wild entertainment. Laugh- ing, singing, noise, and feasting con- stitute the frolic of the careless mind; it belongs to a company; conceit, levity, and trick, in movement, gesture, and contrivance, constitute the gambol; it belongs to the individual: adventure, eccentricity, and humor constitute the prank; it belongs to one or many. 372 FRONT One has a frolic; one plays a gambol or a prank. FRONT. See Face. FRONTIER. See Border. FROWARD. See Awkward. FRUGALITY. See Economy. FRUITFUL. See Fertile. FRUITION. See Enjoyment. FRUITLESS. See Vain. FRUSTRATE. See Defeat. FULFIL, Accomplish, Realize. To fulfil is literally to fill quite full, that is, to bring about /«ZZ to the wishes of a person; accomplish is to bring to perfection, but without reference to the wishes of any one; to realize is to make real, namely, whatever has been aimed at. The application of these terms is evident from their explana- tions: the wishes, the expectations, the intentions and promises of an indi- vidual are appropriately said to be fulfilled; national projects, or under- takings, prophecies, and whatever is of general interest are said to be ac- complished: the fortune or the pros- pects of an individual, or whatever results successfully from specific efforts, is said to be realized: the fulfilment of our wishes may be as much the effect of good fortune as of design; the ac- complishment of projects mostly results from extraordinary exertion, as the ac- complishment of prophecies results from a miraculous exertion of power; the realization of hopes results more com- monly from the slow process of mod- erate well-combined efforts than from anything extraordinary. See also Execute; Keep. FULL. See Quite. FULLY. See Largely. FULNESS, Plenitude. Although fulness is simply the Anglo-Saxon trans- lation of Latin plenitude (from plenum, fuU), yet the latter is used either in the proper sense to express the state of objects that axe full, or in the improper sense to express great quantity, which is the accompaniment of fulness; the former only in the higher style and in the improper sense: hence we say in the fulness of one's heart, in the fulness of one's joy, or the fulness of the God- head bodily; but the plenitude of power. FULSOME, Florid, Rank. All these words indicate an overgrowth, over-development, especially as ap- pUed figm-atively to language or man- ners. Fulsome originally meant over full, indicating a fulness of growth — animal or vegetable growth — offensive to the taste. It is now almost obso- lete except as appUed figuratively to speech, to refer to exaggerated flattery or over-demonstrative affection. Florid, irovaflorem (accusative), flower, means hteraUy flowery, and is appUed figura- tively to speech, but it has different connotations; it refers simply to the elaborate and ornamental phraseol- ogy without the suggestion of flattery or demonstrativeness. Rank, Anglo- Saxon rank, strong, proud, like Jul- some, appUes to coarse, luxuriant growth, and by extension to a kind of speech — as when we say "rank flat- tery"— with an emphasis upon offen- siveness. FUNCTION. See Office. FUNDED. See Unfunded. FUNERAL, Obsequies. Funeral is in Latin funus, a burial; the term fur neral, therefore, denotes the ordinary solemnity which attends the consign- ment of a body to the grave. Obse- quies, from Latin ob, near, and sequi, to follow, means Uterally following the corpse, and refers to funerals attended with more than ordinary solemnity. We speak of the funeral as the last sad office which we perform for a friend; it is accompanied by nothing but by mourning and sorrow: we speak of obsequies as the greatest tribute of respect which can be paid to the person of one who was high in station or pub- he esteem: the funeral, by its fre- quency, becomes so familiar an object that it passes by unheeded; obsequies which are performed over the remains of the great attract our notice from the pomp and grandeur with which they are conducted. FURIOUS. See Violent. FURNISH. See Provide. FURNITURE. See Goods. FURROW. See Trench. FURY. See Anger; Madness. FUTILE. See Trifling. GARNER 373 G GABBLE. See Jabber. GAIN, Profit, Emolument, Lucre. Gain signifies in general what is gained (see Acquire; Get). Profit (see Ai>- vantage). Emolument, from emoliri, from e, out, and moliri, to work, signi- fies to work out or get by working. Lucre is in Latin lucrum, gain. Gain is here a general term, the other terms are specific: the gain is that which comes to a man; it is the fruit of Ids exertions, or agreeable to his wish: the profit is that which ac- crues from the thing. Thus, when ap>- plied to riches, that which increases a man's estate is his gains; that which flows out of his trade or occupation is his profiis; that is, they are his gains upon dealing. Emolument is a species of gain from labor, or a collateral gain; of this description are a man's emolu- m,ents from an office: a man estimates his gains by what he receives in the year; he estimates his profiis by what he receives on every article; he esti- mates his emoluments according to the nature of the service which he has to perform: the merchant talks of his gains, the retail dealer of his profiis, the placeman of his emoluments. ^ Gain and profii are also taken in an abstract sense; lucre is never used otherwise; but the latter always con- veys a bad meaning; it is, strictly speaking, unhallowed gain: an im- moderate thirst for gain is the vice of men who are always calculating profii and loss; a thirst for lucre deadens every generous feeling of the mind. Gain and profit may be extended to other objects, and sometimes opposed to each other; for as that which we gain is what we wish only, it is often the reverse of profiiable. GAIT. See Carriage. GALL. See Rub. GALLANT, Beau, Spark. These words convey nothing respectful of the person to whom they are appUed; but the first, as is evident from its deri- vation, has something in it to recom- mend it to attention above the others: as true valor is ever associated with a regard for the fair sex, a gallant man will always be a gallant when he can render a female any service; some- times, however, his gallantries may be such as to do them harm rather than good: insignificance and eflfeminacy characterize the heau or fine gentleman; he is the woman's man — the humble servant to supply the place of a lackey: the spark has but a spark of that fire which shows itself in impertinent puer- ilities; it is applicable to youth who are just broke loose from school or collie and eager to display their manhood. See also Brave. GAMBOL. See Frolic. GAME. See Play. GAMESOME. See PLAYFUli. GANG. See Band. GAP. See Breach. GAPE, Stare, Gaze. Gape is a Scandinavian word meaning to look with an open or wide mouth. Stare, Anglo-Saxon starian, is aUied to sta, the root of stand, station, staiue, etc.; and signifies to look with fixed ey^s. Gaze, Middle English qasen, is a Scan- dinavian word meamng to look at earnestly. Gape and stare are taken in a bad sense, the former indicating the aston- ishment of gross ignorance, the latter not only ignorance, but impertinence: gaze is taken always in a good sense, as indicating a laudable feeling of as- tonishment, pleasure, or curiosity: a clown gapes at the pictures of wild beasts which he sees at a fair; an im- Certinent fellow stares at every woman e looks at, and stares a modest woman out of countenance: a lover of the fine arts will gaze with admiration and de- light at the productions of Raphael or Titian; when a person is stupefied by adffright he givts a vacant stare: those who are filled with transport gaze on the object of their ecstasy. GARNER, Deposit, Hoard. Gar^ 374 GARNISH ner comes from Latin granaria, a place in which the grain {granum) is gath- ered. Deposit is derived from deposi- tus, the past participle of Latin depo- nere, to lay down. Hoard comes from Anglo-Saxon hord, from a root signify- ing to hide. These words have in common the general idea of gathering and stowing away, but they differ widely in their application. In one sense gamer is synonymous with gather, which see. It signified originally to gather and put away the grain, and is used figuratively always with a dis- tinct and poetic reminiscence of its original meaning. Deposit emphasizes not the gathering, but the putting away; it is given a special apphcation nowadays in business. A deposit of money is a sima of money paid down against a debt that may be incurred, or simply the putting away of money in a bank. Hoard adds to the idea of gathering and stowing away the special suggestion of hiding secretly. A miser hoards his money; selfish people, in time of war, hoard foodstuffs, etc. GARNISH, Trim. Garnish, Old French gamis, comes from Old High German tvamon, to defend one's self, to provide one's self with. It shares with trim the general idea of adorn- ing by the addition of something ex- ternal, especially of small and pretty decorations; but it has now a some- what more limited apphcation than trim. We speak of garnishing when we wish to refer especially to an ephemeral and perishable trimming. We garnish dishes served at the table, for instance; we may speak of garnish- ing a room with flowers. Trim is used in this connection, but it is extended to refer to aU sorts of ornamental ad- ditions, including those of a more per- manent nature — as trimming a hat, a dress, etc. It is a less dignified word than adorn and its syiionymes (see Adorn), with which it has something in common. GARRULOUS. See Talkative. GASCONADE. See Vaunt. GASP. See Palpitate. GATHER, Collect. To gather is in Anglo-Saxon gaderian, to bring things together, from the root also found in together. To collect (see As- semble) annexes also the idea of bind- ing or forming into a whole; we gather that which is scattered in different parts: thus stones are gathered into a heap; vessels are collected so as to form a fleet. Gathering is a mere act of necessity or convenience; collecting is an act of design or choice: we gather apples from a tree, or a servant gathers books from off a table; the antiquarian collects coins, and the bibhomaniac col- lects rare books. See also Garner. GAUDY. See Showy. GAUNT. See Haggard. GAY. See Cheerful; Showt. GAYETY. See Glee. GAZE, See Gape. GENDER, Sex. Gender, in Latin genus, signifies properly a genus, or kind. Sex comes from Latin sexws. "Was it originally 'division,' from se- cure, to cut?" (Skeat.) Gender is that distinction in words which marks the distinction of sex in things; there are, therefore, three genders, but only two sexes. By the inflections of words is denoted whether things are of this or that sex or of no sex. The genders, therefore, are divided in grammar into masculine, feminine, and neuter; and animals are divided into male and female sex. GENERAL, Universal. The gen- eral is to the universal what the part is to the whole. What is general includes the greater part or number; what is universal includes every individual or part. The general rule admits of many exceptions; the universal rule admits of none. Human government has the general good for its object; the govern- ment of Providence is directed to uni- versal good. General is opposed to par- ticular, and universal to individual. A scientific writer will not content him- self with general remarks when he has it in his power to enter into particu- lars; the universal complaint which we hear against men for their pride shows that in every individual it exists to a greater or less degree. It is a general opinion that women are not qualified for scientific pursuits, but many fe- males have proved themselves honor- able exceptions to this rule: it is a universal principle that children ought to honor their parents; the intention of the Creator in this respect is mani- GENTILE 375 fested in such a variety of forms as to admit of no question. See also Public. GENERALLY. See Commonly. GENERATION, Age. Generation is said of the persons who hve during any particular period; and age is said of the ])eriod itself. Those who are bom at the same time constitute the generation; that period of time which comprehends the age of man is the age: there may, there- fore, be many generations spring up in the course of an age; a fresh generation is springing up every day, which in the course of an age pass away and are succeeded by fresh generations. We consider man in his generation as to the part which he has to perform. We consider the age in which we live as to the manners of men and the events of nations. See also Race. GENEROUS. See Beneficent. GENIUS. See Intellect; Taste. GENTEEL, Polite. Genteel, in French gentil, Latin gentilis, signifies UteraUy one belonging to the same family, or the next akin to whom the estate would fall if there were no chil- dren; hence by an extended application it denoted to be of a good family. Polite (see Civil). Gentility respects rank in Ufe; polite- ness, the refinement of the mind and outward behavior. A genteel education is suited to the station of a gentleman; a polite education fits for poUshed so- ciety and conversation, and raises the individual among his equals. There may be gentility without politeness, and vice versd. A person may have genteel manners, a genteel carriage, a genteel mode of hving as far as respects his general relation with society; but a polite behavior and a polite address, which may quahfy him for every rela- tion in society and enable him to shine in connection with all orders of men, is independent of either birth or wealth; it is in part a gift of nature, although it is to be acquired by art. His equi- page, servants, house, and furniture may be such as to entitle a man to the name of genteel, although he is wanting in all the forms of real good- breeding; while fortune may sometimes frown upon the pohshed gentleman, whose politeness is a recommendation to him wherever he goes. GENTILE, Heathen, Pagan. The Jews comprehended all strangers under the name of Goim, nations or gentiles: among the Greeks and Romans they wore designated by the name of bar- barians. By the name gentile was un- derstood especially those who were not of the Jewish rehgion, including, in the end, even the Christians. Some learned men pretend that the Gentiles were so named from their having only a natural law, and such as they imp>osed on themselves, in opposition to the Jews and Christians, who have a positive re- vealed law to which they are obliged to submit. Heathen, Anglo-Saxon fwelhen, meant originally a dweller on the heath; pagan comes from Latin pagiis, village, and means a dweller in the village, be- cause when Constantine banished idol- aters from the towns they repaired to the villages, and secretly adhered to their religious worship, whence they were termed by the Christians of the fourth century Pagani, which was translated Uterally into the German hiidener, a villager or worshipper in the field. Be this as it may, it is evident that the word pagan is in our lan- guage more applicable than heathen to the Greeks, the Romans, and the culti- vated nations who practiced idolatry; and, on the other hand, heathen is more properly employed for rude and un- civilized people who worship false gods. The Gentile does not expressly be- lieve in a Divine Revelation; but he either admits of the truth in part or is ready to receive it: the heathen adopts a positively false system that is opposed to the true faith: the pagan is a species of heathen, who obstinately persists in a worship which is merely the fruit of his own imagination. The heathens and pagans are Gentiles; but the Gentiles are not all either heathens or pagans. Confucius and Socrates, who rejected the plurality of gods, ana the followers of Mohammed, who adore the true God, are, properly speaking, Gentiles. The worshippers of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, and all the deities of the ancients are termed pagans. The worshippers of Fo, Brahma, Xaca, and all the deities of savage nations are termed heathens. \ 376 GENTLE The Gentiles were called to the true faith, and obeyed the call: many of the illustrious pagans would have doubtless done the same had they en- joyed the same privilege: there are to this day many heaihens who reject this advantage, to pursue their own bhnd imaginations. GENTLE, Tame. Gentleness hes rather in the natural disposition; lame- ness is the effect either of art or cir- cumstances. Any unbroken horse may be gentle, but not tame; a horse that is broken in will be tame, but not always gentle. Gentle, as before observed (see Genteel), signifies hterally well-bom, and is opposed either to the fierce or the rude: tome is allied to Latin do- mare, to tame, whence daunt is also derived, and is opposed either to the wild or the spirited. Animals are in general said to be gentle who show a disposition to associate with man and conform to his will; they are said to be tame if, either by compulsion or habit, they are brought to mix with himaan society. Of the first descrip- tion there are individuals in almost every species which are more or less entitled to the name of gentle; of the latter description are many species, as the dog, the sheep, the hen, and the like. In the moral apphcation, gentle is always employed in the good, and tame in the bad, sense: a gentle spirit needs no control, it amalgamates freely with the will of another: a tam£ spirit is without any will of its own; it is aUve to nothing but submission; it is per- fectly consistent with our natural Ub- erty to have gentleness, but tameness is the accompaniment of slavery. The same distinction marks the use of these words when appUed to the outward conduct or the language: gentle be- speaks something positively good; tame bespeaks the want of an essential good : the former is alhed to the kind, the latter to the abject and mean qualities which naturally flow from the compres- sion or destruction of energy and will in the agent. A gentle expression is devoid of all acrimony and serves to turn away wrath: a tome expression is devoid of all force or energy, and ill calculated to inspire the mind with any feeling whatever. In giving counsel to an irritable and conceited temper it is necessary to be gentle: tame ex- pressions are nowhere such striking de- formities as in a poem or an oration. See also Soft. GENUINE. See Intrinsic. GERM, Bud, Embryo, Seed. These words all indicate the original or rudi- mentary state of a living organism — • either animal or plant. Germ and seed represent the first beginnings, as it were, of life; embryo and bud, an early stage of development. Germ is a word of doubtful origin, probably aUied to the root ger in gerere, to bear; it sig- nifies that portion of an organic being which is capable of developmg into the hkeness of that from which it sprang. Seed, from Anglo-Saxon sawan, to sow, indicates that portion of a plant which is sown in the ground, and from which the new plant springs; it is the germ, of the plant with a protective covering Embryo, Greek tfi/ipvov, Greek iv and ^pvov, neuter of the present participle of ppvHv, to be full, to swell out. It refers to the first stage of new animal life. Bud, Middle English budde, is not found in Anglo-Saxon. It refers to the first stage of a new flower or the group of new leaves folded together in a hard little bundle, as it were. GESTICULATION. See Action. GESTURE. See Action. GET, Gain, Obtain, Procure. To get signifies simply to cause to have or possess; it is generic, and the rest spe- cific: to gain is to get the thing one wishes or that is for one's advantage: to obtain is to get the thing aimed at or striven after: to procure, from pro, for, and curare, to care, to care for, is to get the thing wanted or sought for. Get is not only the most general in its sense, but in its apphcation; it may be substituted in almost every case for the other terms, for we may say to get or gain a prize, to get or obtain a reward, to get or procure a book; and it is also employed in numberless familiar cases, where the other terms would be less suitable, for, what this word gains in famiharity it loses in dignity: hence we may with propriety talk of a ser- vant's getting some water, or a person getting a book off a shelf or getting meat from the butcher, with number- GIFT 377 less similar cases in which the other terms could not be employed without losing their dignity. Moreover, get is promiscuously used for whatever comes to the hand, whether good or bad, desirable or not desirable, sought for or not; but gain, obtain, and procure always include either the wishes or the instrumentaUty of the agent, or both together. Thus a person is said to get a cold or a fever, a good or an ill name, without specifying any of the circum- stances of the action; but he is said to gain that approbation which is grati- fying to his feelings; to obtain a recom- pense which is the object of his exer- tions; to procure a situation which is the end of his endeavors. The word gain is pecuharly apph- cable to whatever comes to us fortui- tously; what we gain constitutes our good fortune; we gain a victory or we gain a cause; the result in both cases may be independent of our exertions. To obtain ana procure exclude the idea of chance, and suppose exertions di- rected to a specific end: but the former may include the exertions of others, the latter is particularly employed for one's own persorfal exertions. A per- son obtains a situation through the recommendation of a friend: he pro- cures a situation by applying for it. Obtain is Ukewise employed only in that which requires particular efforts, that which is not immediately within our reach; procure is apphcable to that which is to be got with ease, by the simple exertion of a walk, or of asking for. GHASTLY. See Hideous. GHOST. See Vision. GHOSTLY. See Spimtuous. GIBE. See Scoff. GIDDINESS. See Lightness. GIFT, Present, Donation. Gift is derived from Anglo-Saxon gifan, to give (the hard g sound being due to Scandinavian influence) , in the sense of what is communicated to another grar tuitously of one's property. Present is derived from to present, signifying the thing presented to another. Donation, in French donation, from the Latin do- nare, to present or give, is a species of gift. . The gift is an act of generosity or condescension; it contributes to the benefit of the receiver: the present is an act of kindness, courtesy, or respect; it contributes to the pleasure of the receiver. The gift passes from the rich to the poor, from the high to the low, and creates an obUgation; the present passes either between equals or from the inferior to the superior. What- ever we receive from God, through the bounty of His providence, we entitle a gift; whatever we receive from our friends, or whatever princes receive from their subjects, are entitled pres- ents. We are told by all travellers that it is a custom in the East never to ap- proach a great man without a present; the value of a gift is often heightened by being given opportunely. The value of a present often depends upon the esteem we have for the giver; the smallest present from an esteemed friend is of more worth in our eyes than the costhest presents that mon- archs receive. The gift is private, and benefits the individual: the donation is pubUc, and serves some general purpose: what is given to reUeve the necessities of any poor person is a gift; what is given to support an institution is a donation. The clergy are indebted to their patrons for the hvings which are in their pi/<; it has been the custom of the pious and charitable in all ages to make donations for the support of almshouses, hospitals, infirmaries, and such insti- tutions as serve to niminiRh the sum of human misery. Gift, Endowment, Talent. — Gift (see above). Endowment signifies the thing with which one is endowed. Talent (see Ability). Gift and endovmient both refer to the act of giving and endotoing, and of course incluae the idea of something given and something received; the word taleM conveys no such collateral idea. When we speak of a gift, we refer in our minds to a giver; when we speak of an endowment, we refer in our minds to the receiver; when we speak of a talent, we only think of its intrinsic quaUty. A gift is either super- natural or natural; an endowment is only natural. The primitive Chris- tians received various gifts through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as the 378 GIRDLE gift of tongues, the gift of healing, etc. There are some men who have a pecul- iar gift of utterance; beauty of person and corporeal agility are endowments with which some are pecuharly invested. The word gift excludes the idea of anything acquired by exertion; it is that which is commimicated to us al- together independently of ourselves, and enables us to arrive at that per- fection in any art which could not be attained any other way. Speech is denominated a general gift, inasmuch as it is given to the whole human race in distinction from the brutes; but the gift of eloquence is a pecuhar gift granted to a few individuals, in dis- tinction from others, and one which may be exerted for the benefit of man- kind. Endowments, though inherent in us, are not independent of our exer- tions; they are quahties which admit of improvement by being used; they are, in fact, the gifts of nature, which serve to adorn and elevate the possessor when employed for a good purpose. Talents are either natural or acquired, or in some measure of a mixed nature; they denote powers without specifying the 8om"ce from which they proceed; a man may have a talent for music, for drawing, for mimicry, and the like; but this talent may be the fruit of prac- tice and experience as much as of nature. It is clear from the above that an endowment is a gift, but a gift is not always an endowment; and that a talent may also be either a gift or an endowment, but that it is frequently distinct from both. The terms gift and talent are applicable to corporeal as well as spiritual actions; endowment to corporeal or mental quahties. To write a suj)erior hand is a gift, inas- much as it is supposed to be unattain- able by any force of apphcation and instruction; it is a talent, inasmuch as it is a power or property worth our possession, but it is never an endow- ment. On the other hand, com-age, discernment, a strong imagination, and the like are both gifts and endowments; and when the intellectual endowment displays itself in any creative form, as in the case of poetry, music, or any art, so as to produce that which is valued and esteemed, it becomes a talent to the possessor. GIRDLE. See Zone. GIRL. See Virgin. GIVE, Grant, Bestow. For the derivation of give see Gift; grant and bestow (see Allow). The idea of communicating to an- other what is our own or in our power is common to these terms; this is the whole signification of give; but grant and bestow include accessory ideas in their meaning. To grant is to give at one's pleasure; to bestow is to give from a certain degree of necessity. Giving is confined to no object; whatever property we transfer into the hands of another, that we give; we give money, clothes, food, or whatever is transfer- able: granting is confined to such ob- jects as afford pleasure or convenience; they may consist of transferable prop- erty or not; bestowing is appHed to such objects only as are necessary to supply wants, which always consist of that which is transferable. We give what is hked or not hked, asked for or un- asked for: we grant that only which is wished for and requested. One may give poison or medicine; one grants a sum of money by way of loan: we give what is wanted or not wanted; we bestow that only which is expressly wanted: we give with an idea of a return or otherwise: we grant volun- tarily, without any prospect of a re- turn: we give for a permanency or otherwise; we bestow only in particular cases which require immediate notice. To give has no respect to the circum- stances of the action, or the agent; it is appHcable to persons of all condi- tions: to grant bespeaks not only the will, but the power and influence of the grantor: to bestow bespeaks the necessitous condition of the receiver. Children may give to their parents and parents to their children, kings to their subjects or subjects to their kings; but monarchs only grant to their subjects, or parents to their children; and superiors in general bestow upon their dependents that which they can- not provide for themselves. In an extended apphcation of the terms to moral objects or circumstances they strictly adhere to the same fine of distinction. We give our consent; we give our promise; we give our word; we give credit; we give in all cases GIVE 379 that which may be simply transferred from one to another. Liberties, rights, privileges, favors, indulgences, per- missions, and all things are granted which are in the hands of only a few but are acceptable to many. Bless- ings, care, concern, and the Uke, are bestowed upon those who are dependent upon others for whatever they have. Crive and bestow are hkewise said of things as well as of persons; grant is said only of persons. Give is here equally general and indefinite; bestow conveys the idea of giving under cir- cumstances of necessity and urgency. One gives a preference to a particular situation; one gives a thought to a subject that is proposed; one gives time and labor to any matter that en- gages one's attention: but one bestows pains on that which demands partic- ular attention; one bestows a moment's thought on one particular subject out of the nimiber which engage attention. Give, Afford. — Give and afford are allied to each other in the sense of sending forth; but the former denotes an unqualified and imconditional ac- tion, as in the preceding article; the latter bears a relation to the circmn- stances of the agent. A person is said to give money without any regard to the state of his finances: he is said to afford what he gives, when one wishes to define his pecimiary condition. The same idea runs through the apphca- tion of these terms to aU other cases, in which inanimate things are made the agents. When we say a thing gives satisfaction, we simply designate the action; when we say it affords pleasure, we refer to the nature and properties of the thing thus specified — that is to say, its capacity to give satisfaction; the former is employed only to declare the fact, the latter to characterize the object. Hence, in certain cases, we should say this or that posture of the body gives ease to a sick person; but, as a moral senti- ment, we should say nothing affords such ease to the mind as a clear con- science. Upon the same grounds the use of these terms is justified in the following cases: to give rise; to give birth; to give occasion; to afford an opportunity; to afford a plea or a pre- text; to afford ground, and the like. Give, Present, Offer, Exhibit. — These terms have a common signification, inasmuch as they designate the man- ual act of transferring something from one's self to another. The first is, here as elsewhere, the most indefinite and extensive in its meaning; it de- notes the complete act: the latter two refer rather to the preliminaries of giving than to the act itself. What is given is actually transferred: what is presented, that is, made a present to any one, or offered, that is, brought in his way, is put in the way of being transferred: we present in giving, and offer in order to give; but we may give without presenting or offering; and, on the other hand, we may present or offer without giving, if the thing pre- sented or offered be not received. To give is the famiUar term which designates the ordinary transfer of property: to present is a term of re- spect; it includes in it the formaUty and ceremony of setting before another that which we wish to give: to offer is an act of humihty or solemnity; it bespeaks the movement of the heart, which impels to the making a transfer or gift. We give to our domestics; we present to princes; we offef to God: we give to a person what we wish to be received; we present to a person what we think agreeable; we offer what we think acceptable; what is given is supposed to be ours; what we offer is supposed to be at our com- mand; what we present need not be either our own or at our command: we give a person not only our external property, but our esteem, our con- fidence, oiu- company, and the like: an ambassador presents his credentials at court; a subject offers his services to his king. They bear the same relation to each other when applied to words or actions, instead of property: we speak of giv- ing a person an assurance or a con- tradiction; of presenting an address and offering an apology: of giving a recep- tion, presenting a figure, or offering an insult. They may hkewise be extended in their application, not only to per- sonsd and individual actions, but also to such as respect the public at large: we give a description in writing, as well as by word of mouth; one pre- 380 GIVE sents the public with the fruit of one's labors; we offer remarks on such things as attract notice and call for animad- version. These terms may also be employed to designate the actions of unconscious agents, by which they are character- ized: in this sense they come very near to the word exhibit, which, from exhiheo, signifies to hold or put forth. Here the word give is equally indefinite and general, denoting simply to send from one's self, and applies mostly to what proceeds from another, by a natural cause: thus, a thing is said to give pain or to give pleasure. Things are said to present or offer: thus, a town is said to present a fine view, or an idea presents itself to the mind; an opportunity offers, that is, offers itself to our notice. To exhibit is properly applied in this sense of setting forth to view; but expresses, hkewise, the idea of attracting notice also: that which is exhibited is more striking than what is presented or offered, thus a poem is said to exhibit marks of genius. Give Up, Deliver, Surrender, Yield, Cede, Concede. — We give up that which we wish to retain; we deliver that which we wish "not to retain. Deliver does not include the idea of a transfer; but give up impUes both the giving from and the giving to: we give up our house to the accommodation of our friends; we deliver property into the hands of the owner. To give up is a colloquial substitute for either sur- render or yield, as it designates no cir- ciunstance of the action; it may be employed in famihar discourse, in al- most every case, for the other terms: where the action is compulsory we may either say an officer gives up or surrenders his sword; when the action is discretionary, we may either say he gives up or yields a point of discussion: give up has, however, an extensiveness of application which gives it an office distinct from either surrender or yield. When we speak of famihar and personal subjects, give up is more suitable than surrender, which is confined to matters of pubUc interest or great moment: a man gives up his place, his right, his claim, and the like; he surrenders a fortress, a vessel, or his property to his creditors. When give up is com- pared with yield, they both respect personal matters; but the former ex- presses a much stronger action than the latter: a man gives up his whole judgment to another; he yields to the opinion of another in particular cases: he gives himseK up to sensual indul- gences; he yields to the force of temp- tation. Cede, from the Latin cedere, to come to, to yield, to give, is properly to sur- render by virtue of a treaty: we may surrender a town as an act of neces- sity; but the cession of a country is purely a poUtical transaction : thus, gen- erals frequently surrender such towns as they are not able to defend; and gov- ernments cede such countries as they find it not convenient to retain. To concede, which is but a variation of cede, is a mode of yielding which may be either an act of discretion or courtesy; as when a government concedes to the demands of the people certain privi- leges, or when an individual concedes any point in dispute for the sake of peace. Give Up, Abandon, Resign, Forego. — These terms differ from the preceding ones, inasmuch as they designate ac- tions entirely free from foreign in- fluence. A man gives up, abandons, and resigns from the dictates of his own mind, independently of aU con- trol from others. To give up and abandon both denote a positive decision of the mind; but the former may be the act of the understanding or the will; the latter is more commonly the act of the wiU and the passions: to give up is applied to famihar cases; abandon to matters of importance: one gives up an idea, an intention, a plan, and the hke; one abandons a project, a scheme, a measure of government. To give up and resign are apphed either to outward actions or merely to inward movements; but the former is active and determinately fixes the conduct; the latter seems to be rather passive — it is the leaning of the mind to the circumstances: a man gives up his situation by a positive act of his choice; he resigns his office when he feels it inconvenient to hold it; so, likewise, we give up expectations and resign hopes. In this sense, forego, which signifies to let go, is comparable GLANCE AT 381 with resign, inasmuch as it expresses a passive action; but we resign that which we have, and we forego that which we might have: thus, we resign the claims which we have already made; we forego the claims which we might make: the former may be a matter of prudence; the latter is always an act of virtue and forbearance. When appUed to the state of a per- son's mind, or the actions flowing from that state, to give up is used either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; aban- don always in a bad sense; resign al- ways in a good sense: a man may give himself up either to studious pm-suits, to idle vagaries, or vicious indulgences; he abandons himself to gross vices; he resigns himself to the will of Provi- dence, or to the circumstaiices of his condition: a man is said to be given up to his lusts who is without any prin- ciple to control him in their gratifica- tion; he is said to be abandoned when his outrageous conduct bespeaks an entire insensibiUty to every honest principle; he is said to be resigned when he discovers composure and tranquil- hty in the hour of affliction; so one is said to resign a thing to another when one is contented with what one has. GLAD, Pleased, Joyful, Cheer- ful. Glad comes from Anglo-Saxon gloed, smooth, bright, aUied to German glatt, smooth, poUshed. Pleased, from to please, marks the state of being pleased. Joyful bespeaks its own meaning either as full of joy or pro- ductive of great joy, from Latin gau^ dium, joy. Cheerful (see Cheerful). Glad denotes either a partial state or a permanent and habitual senti- ment: in the former sense it is most nearly allied to pleased; in the latter sense, to joyful and merry. Glad and pleased are both appUed to the ordinary occurrences of the day; but the former denotes rather a Uvely and momentary sentiment, the latter a gentle but rather more lasting feeling: we are glad to see a friend who has been long absent; we are glad to have good in- telligence from our friends and rela- tives; we are glad to get rid of a trouble- some companion; we are pleased to have the approbation of those we es- teem : we are pleased to hear our friends well spoken of; we are pleaded with the company of an intelligent and com- municative person. Glad, joyful, and cheerful all express more or less hvely sentiments; but glad is less vivid than joyful, and more so than cheerful. Gladness seems to arise as much from physical as mental causes; wine is said to make the heart glad: joy has its source in the mind, as it is influenced by external circum- stances; instances of good fortune, for either ourselves, our friends, or our country, excite joy: cheerfulness is an even tenor of the mind, which it may preserve of itself independently of all external circumstances; reUgious con- templation produces habitual cheerful- ness. Glad is seldom employed as an epithet to quaUfy things, except in the scriptural or solemn style, as glad tid- ings of great joy: joyful is sfeldomer used to qualify persons than things; hence we speak of joyful news, a joyful occurrence, joyful faces, joyful sounds, and the Mke: cheerful is employed either to designate the state of the mind or the property of the thing; we either speak of a cheerful disposition, a cheer- ful person, a cheerful society, or a cheer- ful face, a cheerful sound, a cheerful aspect, and the Uke. When used to qualify one's actions they all besp)eak the temper of the mind; gladly denotes a high degree of wiUingness as opposed to aversion: one who is suffering under excruciating pains gladly submits to anything which promises rehef: joyfully denotes un- quahfied pleasure, unmixed with any ^oy or restrictive consideration; a convert to Christianity joyfully goes through all the initiatory ceremonies which entitle him to all its privileges, spiritual and temporal; cheerful de- notes the absence of un wiUingness, it is opposed to reluctantly; the zealous Christian cheerfully submits to every hardship to which he is ejcposed in the course of his religious profession. See also Joy. GLANCE AT, Allude To. Glance is a nasalized form of Old French oto- cier, to sUp, slide; it indicated a shcung beam of Ught. AUude (see Allxide). These terms are nearly aUied in the sense of indirectly referring to any ob- ject, either in written or verbal dis- course: but glance expresses a cursory 382 GLARE and latent action; allude, simply an indirect but undisguised action: ill- naturwi satirists are perpetually glanc- ing at the follies and infirmities of in- dividuals; the Scriptures are full of allusions to the manners and customs of the Easterns: he who attempts to write an epitome of imiversal history must take but a hasty glance at the most important events. See also Glimpse; Look. GLARE. See Flame; Shine. GLARING, Barefaced. Glaring is here used in the figurative sense, drawn frpm its natural signification of broad light, which strikes powerfully upon the senses. Barefaced signifies literally having a hare or uncovered face, which denotes the absence of all disguise or all shame. Glaring designates the thing; hare- faced characterizes the person: a glar- ing falsehood is that which strikes the observer in an instant to be falsehood; a harefaced lie or falsehood betrays the effrontery of him who utters it. A glaring absurdity will be seen instantly without the aid. of reflection; a bare- faced piece of impudence characterizes the agent as more than ordinarily lost to all sense of decormn. GLEAM, Glimmer, Ray, Beam. Gleam comes from Anglo-Saxon gUsm, from a root signifying brightness, whence glimmer, a frequentative, is also derived. Ray comes from Latin radius, a ray — a beam of Ught issu- ing from a centre of light. Beam, Anglo-Saxon heam, from Teutonic root cognate with Greek ipavmg, a light, which appears in phosphorus. Certain portions of Ught are desig- nated by all these terms, but gleam and glimmer are indefinite; ray and heam are definite. A gleam is properly the commencement of light, or that por- tion of opening light which interrupts the darkness: a glimmer is an unsteady gleam: ray and beam are portions of light which emanate from some lumi- nous body; the former from all luminous bodies in general, the latter more par- ticularly from the sun: the former is, as its derivation denotes, a row of Ught issuing in a greater or less degree from any body; the latter is a great row of Ught, like a pole issuing from a body. There may oe a gleam of Ught visible on the wall of a dark room, or a glimmer if it be movable; there may be rays of Ught visible at night on the back of a glow-worm, or rays of Ught may break through the shutters of a closed room; the sim in the height of its splendor sends forth its beams. GLEAMING. See Lambent. GLEE, Gayety, Joviality, Merri- ment, Mirth. Glee, Anglo-Saxon gleo, joy, mirth, and music, signifies in ordi- nary language an expression of joy, gladness, happiness, gratification over some pleasing occurrence. Gayety im- pUes the state of being exuberant or having a superabundance of good-hu- mor, UveUness, cheerfulness, blithe- ness; joviality, the state of being joUy, convivial, festive, joyous; merriment, the state of being fiill of fim and good- humor, sportive, froUcsome, loudly cheerful, gay of heart; and mirth, the state of being playful, festive, viva- cious, witty, facetious, fond of merry- making, and the like. In another appUcation the term glee impUes a musical composition sung in parts as a series of interwoven melodies for three or more voices, each part being Umited to one voice; may be composed in any style and rendered with or without instrumentation. GLIB. See Voluble. GLIDE. See Slip. GLIMMER. See Gleam. GLIMPSE, Glance. A glimpse is the action of the object appearing to the eye; a glance is the action of the eye seeking the object: one catches a glimpse of an object; one casts a glance at an object: the latter, therefore, is properly the means for obtaining the former, which is the end: we get a glimpse by means of a glance. The glimpse is the hasty, imperfect, and sudden view which we get of an object; the glance is the hasty and imperfect view which we take of an object: the former may depend upon a variety of circumstances; the latter depends upon the will of the agent. We can seldom do more than get a glimpse of objects in a carriage that is going with rapidity: when we do not wish to be observed to look, we take but a glance at an object. GLITTER. See Shine. GLOAMING, Evening, Twilight. Of these three terms evening is the term GLOOM 383 which simply denotes the time of day — the begimiing of night. The other two terms add to the denotation of time certain special connotations. Gloam- ing is a poetic word found in the Anglo- Saxon compound oEfen-glommung, Uter- ally evening-glow, from Anglo-Saxon glowan, to glow. It indicates the time just after sunset, when there is still a glow of light in the western sky, but when the gloom of night is fast falling. The word gloaming has this double sug- gestion of both gloom and glow. Twi- light signifies literally the time of half hght, the space between day and night when Ught has not entirely given way to darkness. Compare Middle Dutch tweelicht. GLOBE, Ball. Globe comes from Latin globus, ball. Ball, Teutonic ball, is doubtless connected with the words bowl, boil, and the like, signifying that which is tm-ned or rounded. Globe is to ball as the species to the genus; a globe is a ball, but every ball is not a globe. The globe does not in its strict sense require to be of an equal rotimdity in all its parts; it is properly an irregularly round body: a ball, on the other hand, is generally any round body, but particularly one that is en- tirely, regularly round; the earth itself is therefore properly denominated a globe from its unequal rotundity: and for the same reason the mechanical body, which is made to represent the earth, is also denominated a globe: but in the higher style of writing the earth is frequently denominated a baU, and in familiar discourse every soUd body which assumes a circular form is en- titled a ball. See also Circle. GLOOM, Heaviness. Gloom has its source internally, and is often inde- pendent of outward circumstances; heaviness is a weight upon the spirits produced by a foreign cause : the former belongs to the constitution; the latter is occasional. People of a melancholy habit have a particular gloom hang over their minds which pervades all their thoughts; those who suffer imder severe disappointments for the present, and have gloomy prospects for the fut- ure, may be expected to be heavy at heart; we may sometimes dispel the gloom of the mind by the force of reflec- tion, particularly by the force of rehg- ious contemplation : heatnness of spirits is itself a temporary thing, and may be succeeded by vivacity or hghtness of mind when the pressure of the mo- ment has subsided. Gloomy, Sullen, Morose, Splenetic. — All these terms denote a temper of mind the reverse of easy or happy: gloomy Ues either in the general con- stitution or in the particular frame of the mind; sullen Ues in the temper: a man of a gloomy disposition is an in- voluntary agent; it is his misfortune, and renciers him in some measure piti- able: the sullen man yields to his evil humors; sullenness is his fault, and ren- ders him offensive. The gloomy man distresses himself most; his pains are all his own: the sullen man has a great share of discontent in his composition; he charges his sufferings upon others, and makes them suffer in common with himself. A man may be rendered gloomy for a time by the influence of particular circumstances; but suUen- ness creates pains for itself when all ex- ternal circumstances of a painful nature are wanting. Sullenness and moroseness are both the inherent properties of the temper; but the former discovers itself in those who have to submit, and the latter in those who have to command: sullen- ness therefore betrays itself mostly in early life; moroseness is the pecuhar characteristic of age. The sullen per- son has many fancied hardships to en- dure from the control of others; the morose person causes others to endure many real hardships by keeping them imder too severe a control. Sullenness shows itself mostly by an unseemly reserve: moroseness shows itself by the hardness of the speech and the roughness of the voice. Sullenness is altogether a sluggish principle that leads more or less to inaction; morose- ness is a harsh feeling, that is, not contented with exacting obedience un- less it inflicts pain. Moroseness is a defect of the temp)er; but spleen is a defect in the heart: the one betrays itself in behavior, the other more in conduct. A morose man is an unpleasant companion; a splenetic man is a bad member of society ; the former is ill-natured to those about him, the 384 GLORY latter is ill-humored with all the world. Moroseness vents itself in temporary expressions; spleen indulges itself in perpetual bitterness of expression. See also Dull; Hypochondriacal; Pessimistic. GLORY, Honor. Glory is some- thing dazzling and widely diffused, from Latin gloria. That the moral idea of glory is best represented by Ught is evident from the glory which is painted roimd the head of our Saviour. Honor is something less splendid, but more soUd. It is derived from Latin honor em (accusative), honor, reputa- tion. Glory impels to extraordinary efforts and to great undertakings. Honor in- duces to a discharge of one's duty. Excellence in the attainment and suc- cess in the exploit bring glory; a faith- ful exercise of one's talents reflects honor. Glory is connected with every- thing which has a peculiar pubUc in- terest; honor is more properly obtained within a private circle. Glory is not confined to the nation or Mfe of the individual by whom it is sought; it spreads over all the earth and descends to the latest posterity: honor is Hmited to those who are connected with the subject of it and eye-witnesses to his actions. Glory is attainable but by few, and may be an object of indiffer- ence to any one; honor is more or less within the reach of aU and must be dis- regarded by no one. A general at the head of an army goes in pursuit of glory; the humble citizen who acts his part in society so as to obtain the approbation of his fellow-citizens is in the road for honor. A nation acquires glory by the splendor of its victories and its superiority in arts as well as arms; it obtains honor by its strict ad- herence to equity and good faith in all its dealings with other nations. Glory is a sentiment selfish in its nature, but salutary or pernicious in its effect, according as it is directed; honor is a principle disinterested in its nature and beneficial in its operations. A thirst for glory is seldom indulged but at the expense of others, as it is not attainable in the plain path of duty; there are but few opportunities of ac- quiring it by elevated acts of goodness, and still fewer who have the virtue to embrace the opportunities that offer: a love of honor can never be indulged but to the advantage of others; it is restricted by fixed laws; it requires a sacrifice of every selfish consideration and a due regard to the rights of others; it is associated with nothing but virtue. Glory, Boast, Vaunt. — To glory is to hold as one's glory. To boast is to set forth to one's advantage. To vaunt is to set one's self up before others. The first two terms denote the value which the individual sets upon that which belongs to himself; the last term may be employed in respect to others. To glory is more particularly the act of the mind, the indulgence of the internal sentiment: to boast denotes rather the expression of the sentiment. To glory is apphed only to matters of moment; boast is rather suitable to trifling points: the former is seldom used in a bad sense, the latter still seldomer in a good one. A Christian martyr glories in the cross of Christ; a soldier boasts of his courage and his feats in battle. To vaunt is properly to proclaim praises aloud, and is taken either in an indifferent or bad sense. GLOSS, Varnish, Palliate. Gloss and varnish are figurative terms, which borrow their signification from the act of making the outer surface of any physical object shine. To gloss comes from a Scandinavian word signifying lustre, from a root meaning to glow; it means to give a glow or brightness to anything by means of friction, as in the case of japan or mahogany: to varnish is to give an artificial gloss by means of applying a foreign sub- stance. Hence, in the figurative use of the terms, to gloss is to put the best face upon anything by various artifices; but to varnish is to do the same thing by means of direct falsehood; to palli- ate, which likewise signifies to give the best possible outside to a thing (see Extenuate), requires stiU less artifice than either. One glosses over that which is bad by giving it a soft name, as when a man's vices are glossed over with the name of indiscretion or a man's mistress is termed his friend: one varnishes a bad character by as- cribing good motives to his bad actions, by withholding many facts that are to his discredit, and fabricating other cir- GOOD 385 cmnstances in his favor; an unvar- nished tale contains nothing but the simple truth; the varnished tale, on the other hand, contains a great mixture of falsehood: to palliate is to diminish the magnitude of an ofifence by making an excuse in favor of the offender, as when an act of theft is palliated by considering the starving condition of the thief. GLOSSARY. See Dictionaky. GLOW. See Fire. GLUT. See Satisfy. GO, Advance, Depart, Proceed, Travel. Go is a widely distributed Teutonic word. It is the generic term signifying to move in any direction. The other terms indicate particular kinds of going. Advance and proceed mean to go forward (see Advance). Depart, from Latin de, from, and pars, part, a separation, means to go away. Travel means to go about for the sake of pleasure or sightseeing. GODLIKE, Divine, Heavenly. Godlike bespeaks its own meaning, as like God, or after the manner of God, from the Teutonic word corresponding in meaning to Latin Deus, possibly sig- nifjdng the being worshipped from a root meaning to worship. Divine, in Latin divinus, from divvs or Deus, sig- nifies appertaining to God. Heavenly, or heaven-like, signifies hke or apper- taining to heaven, Anglo-Saxon heofon. Godlike is a more expressive but less common term than divine: the former is used only as an epithet of peculiar praise for an individual; divine is gen- erally employed for that which apper- tains to a superior being, in distinction from that which is human. Benevo- lence is a godlike property: the Divine image is stamped on the features of man, whence the face is called by Milton "the human face divine." As divine is opposed to human, so is hecu}- erdy to earthly; the term Divine Being distinguishes the Creator from all other beings; but a heavenly being denotes the agents or inhabitants of heaven, in distinction from earthly beings, or the inhabitants of earth. A divine influ- ence is to be sought for only by prayer to the Giver of all good things; but a heavenly temper may be acquired by a steady contemplation of heavenly things and an abstraction from those which 25 are earthly: the Divine will is the foim- dation of all moral law and obligation; heavenly joys are the fruit of all our labors in this earthly course. These terms are appUed to other objects with similar distinction. Godly, Righteous. — Godly is a con- traction of godlike. Righteous signifies conformable to right or truth. These epithets are both used in a spiritual sense, and cannot, without an indecorous affectation of reUgion, be introduced into any other discourse than that which is properly spiritual. Godliness, in the strict sense, is that outward deportment which character- izes a heavenly temper; prayer, read- ing of the Scriptures, puoUc worship, and every rehgious act enters into the signification of godliness, which at the same time supposes a temper of mind, not only to dehght in, but to profit by such exercises: righteousness, on the other hand, comprehends Christian morality, in distinction from that of the heathen or unbeliever; a righteous man does right, not only because it is right, but because it is agreeable to the will of his Maker and the example of his Redeemer; righteousness is there- fore to godliness as the effect to the cause. The godly man goes to the sanctuary and by converse with his Maker assimilates all his affections to the character of that Being whom he worships; when he leaves the sanct- uary he proves the efficacy of his godli- ness by his righteous converse with his fellow-creatures. It is easy, however, for men to mistake the means for the end and to rest content with godliness without righteousness, as too many are apt to do who seem to make their whole duty to consist in an attention to re- hgious observances and in the indul- gence of extravagant feeUngs. GOLD, Golden. These terms are both employed as epithets, but gold is the substantive used in composition, and golden, the adjective, in ordinary use. The former is strictly appUed to the metal of which the thing is made, as a goU cup or a gold coin; but the latter to whatever appertains to gold, whether properly or figuratively, as the golden Uon, the golden crown, the golden age, or a golden harvest. GOOD, Goodness. Good is a word 386 GOOD-NATURE which, under different forms, runs through all the Northern languages. Gowi and goodness are abstract terms, drawn from the same word; the former to denote the thing that is good, the latter the inherent good property of persons or things. All good comes from God, whose goodness toward His creatures is imbounded. The good we do is determined by the tendency of the action; but our goodness in doing it is determined by the motive of our actions. Good ts of a twofold nature, physical and moral, and is opposed to evil; goodness is applicable either to the disposition of moral agents or to the quahties of inanimate objects; it is op- posed to badness. By the order of Providence the most horrible convul- sions are made to bring about good; the goodness or badness of any fruit depends upon its fitness to be enjoyed. See also Virtuous. Good, Benefit, Advantage. — Good is an abstract universal term which, in its luilimited sense, comprehends every- thing that can be conceived of as suited in all its parts to the end proposed. In this sense henefii and advantage are modifications of good; but the term good has likewise a Umited apphcation, which brings it to a just point of com- parison with the other terms here chosen: the common idea which allies these words to one another is that of good as it respects a particular object. Good is here employed indefinitely; henefii and advantage are specified by some collateral circumstances. Good is done without regard to the person who does it, or him to whom it is done; but henefii has always respect to the relative condition of the giver and receiver, who must be both specified. Hence we say of a charitable man that he does much good, or that he be- stows henefits upon this or that indi- vidual. In like manner, when speaking of particular communities or society at large, we may say that it is for the good of society or for the good of mankind that every one submits to the sacrifice of some portion of his natural liberty; but it is for the henefii of the poorer orders that the charitably disposed enmloy their money in charity. Good is limited to no mode or man- ner, no condition of the person or the thing; it is applied indiscriminately: henefii is more particularly applicable to the external circumstances of a per- son, as to his health, his improvement, his pecuniary condition, and the like; it is also confined in its apphcation to persons only: we may coiinsel another for his good, although we do not coun- sel him for his henefit; but we labor for the henefit of another when we set apart for him the fruits of our labor: exercise is always attended with some good to all persons; it is of particular henefit to those who are of a lethargic habit: an indiscreet zeal does more harm than good to the cause of religion; a patient cannot expect to derive bene- . fit from a medicine when he coimteracts its effects. A henefii is a positive and direct good, an advantage is an adventitious and indirect good: the henefit serves to sup- ply some want, to remove some evil and afford some sort of rehef : an advan- tage serves to promote some ulterior object. An advantage, therefore, will not be a henefii imless it be turned to a good use. Education may be a hene- fit to a person if it enable him to pro- cure a competence; a poUte education is of advantage to one who associates with the great. GOOD - NATURE, Good - humor. Good-nature and good-humor both im- ply the disposition to please and be pleased; but the former is habitual and permanent, the latter is temporary and partial: the former hes in the nature and frame of the mind, the latter in the state of the humors or spirits. A good-natured man recom- mends himself at all times for his good-nature; a good-humored man rec- ommends himself particularly as a com- panion: good-nature displays itself by a readiness in doing kind offices; good- humor is confined mostly to the ease and cheerfulness of one's outward de- portment in social converse: good- nature is apt to be guilty of weak comphances; good-humor is apt to be succeeded by fits of peevishness and depression. Good-nature is applicable only to the character of the individual; good-humor may be said of a whole company: it is a mark of good-nature in a man not to disturb the good-humor of the company he is in by resenting GORGEOUS 387 the affront that is offered him by an- other. GOODNESS. See Good. GOOD OFFICE. See Benefit. GOODS, Furniture, Chattels, Movables, Effects. All these terms are applied to such things as belong to an individual: the first term is the most general, both in sense and ap- pUcation; all the rest are species. Furniture comprehends all household goods; wherefore in regard to an indi- vidual, supposing the house to con- tain aill he has, the general is put for the specific term, as when one speaks of a person's moving his goods for his furniture: but in the strict sense goods comprehends more than furni- ture, including not only that. which is adapted for the domestic purposes of a fsunUy, but also everything which is of value to a person: the chairs and . tables are a part of furniture; papers, books, and money are included among his goods: it is obvious, therefore, that goods, even in its most limited sense, is of wider import than furniture. ■ Chattels, Old French chatel, comes from Late Latin capitate, capital, mean- ing property, and is a technical term in law, and therefore not so frequent in ordinary use, but still sufficiently em- Eloyed to deserve notice. It compre- ends that species of goods which is in a special manner separated from one's p)erson and house; a man's cattle, his implements of husbandry, the par- tial rights which he has in land or buildings, are all comprehended under chattels: hence the propriety of the expression to seize a man's goods and chattels, as denoting the disposable property which he has about his p)cr- son or at a distance. Movables com- prehends all the other terms in the limited application to property, as far as it admits of being removed from one place to the other; it is opposed either to fixtures, when speaking of furniture, or to land as contrasted with goods and chattels. Effects is a term of nearly as exten- sive a signification as goods, but not so extensive in its application: what- ever a man has that is of any sui>- posed value, or convertible into money, IS entitled his goods; whatever a man has that can effect, produce, or bring forth money by sale is entitled his effects; goods, therefore, is applied only to that which a man has at his own disposal; effects more properly to that which is left at the disposal of others. A man makes a sale of his goods on his removal from any place; his creditors or executors take care of his effects either on his bankruptcy or decease: goods, in this case, is seldom employed but in the limited sense of what is removable, but effects includes every- thing real as well as personal. Goods, Possessions, Property. — All these terms are apphcable to such things as are the means of enjoyment; but the former term respects the direct quahty of producing enjoyment, the latter two have regard to the subject of the enjoyment; we consider goods as they are real or imaginary, adapted or not adapted for the producing of real happiness; those who abound in the goods of this world are not always the happiest; possessions must be re- garded as they are lasting or tempo- rary; he who is anxious for earthly possessions forgets that they are but transitory and dependent upon a thou- sand contingencies: property is to be considered as it is legal or illegal, just or unjust; those who are anxious for great property are not always scrupu- lous about the means by which it is to be obtained. The purity of a man's Christian character is in danger from an overweening attachment to earthlv goods; no wise man wiU boast the mul- titude of his possessions when he re- flects that if they do not leave him the time is not far distant when he must leave them; the vahdity of one's claim to property which comes by in- heritance is better founded than any other. GORGEOUS, Briluant, Dazzlinq. Gorgeous has a curious derivation. It comes from the Old French gorpe, throat (compare the slang phrase Get my gorge"), and originally meant proudt, with reference to the swelling of the throat in pride. Gorge itseu comes from Latin gurges, a whirlpool, whence in Late Latin it came to sipiify the gullet, into which everj-thing disap- pears as if into a whirlpool. Gorgeous now signifies brightly colored with spe- cial re^ence to splendor and richness 388 GOVERN \ of effect. Brilliant (for derivation see Brightness) also means very bright, but it suggests light primarily rather than color, or color in so far as it also has the quaUties of light. Dazzling in- dicates brightness of color or especially of light with special reference to the psychological effect upon the specta- tor. Dazzle refers to the sudden blur- ring of the rays of Ught to the eye when it faces something very bright. A dazzling Ught is something this side of a blinding Ught. GOVERN, Rule, Regulate. Gov- ern is in French gouvemer, Latin gu- bemo, Greek Kv^tpva. Rule and reg- ulate signify to bring imder a rvle or make by ride. The exercise of authority enters more or less into the signification of these terms; but to govern implies the exer- cise likewise of judgment and knowl- edge. To rule implies rather the un- qualified exercise of power, the making the will the rule: a king governs his people by means of wise laws and an upright administration: a despot rules over a nation according to his arbitrary decision; if he have no principle, his ride becomes an oppressive tyranny. These terms are applied either to per- sons or to things: persons govern or rule others; or they govern, rule or regulate things. In regard to persons govern is always in a good sense, but ride is sometimes taken in a bad sense; it is frequently associated with an abuse of power: to govern is so perfectly discretionary that we speak of governing ourselves; but we speak only of ruling others: nothing can be more lamentable than to be ruled by one who does not know how to govern himself: it is the business of a naan to rule his house by keeping all its members in due subjection to his authority: it is the duty of a person to nde those who are under him in all matters wherein they are incompetent to govern themselves. In application to things, govern and rule aaiait of a similar distinction: a minister governs the state and a pilot governs the vessel: the movements of the machine are in both cases directed by the exercise of the judgment; a person rules the times, seasons, fash- ions, and the like; it is an act of the individual will. Regulate is a species of governing simply by judgment; the word is apphcable to things of minor moment, where the force of authority is not so requisite: one governs the af- fairs of a nation or a large body where great interests are involved; we regur late the concerns of an individual, or we regulate in cases where good order or convenience only is consulted: so likewise in regard to ourselves, we govern our passions, but we regulate our affections. These terms are all properly used to denote the acts of conscious agents, but by a figure of personification they may be applied to inanimate or moral objects: the price of one market gov- erns the price of another, or governs the seller in his demand; fashion and caprice rule the majority, or particular fashions rule them: the time of one clock regulates that of many others. Government, Administration. — Both these terms may be employed either to designate the act of governing and administering or the persons governing and administering. In both cases gov- ernment has a more extensive meaning than administration: the former in- cludes every exercise of authority, while administration implies only that exer- cise of authority which consists in put- ting the laws or will of another in force. When we speak of the government as it respects the persons, it implies the whole body of constituted authorities; and the administration, only that part which puts in execution the intentions of the whole: the government of a coun- try, therefore, may remain imaltered, while the administration undergoes many changes: it is the business of the government to make treaties of peace and war; and without a government it is impossible for any people to negoti- ate: it is the business of the adminis- tration to administer justice, to regu- late the finances, and to direct all the complicated concerns of a nation; with- out an administration all pubHc business would be at a stand. Government, Constitution. — Govern- ment is here, as in the former article, the general term; constitution the spe- cific. Government impUes generally the act of governing, or exercising authority under any form whatever; constitulion GRACE 389 implies any constituted or fixed form of government: we may have a government without a constitution; we cannot have a constitution without a government. In the first formation of society, govern- ment was placed in the hands of indi- viduals who exercised authority ac- cording to discretion rather than any positive rule or law; here then was government without a constitution: as time and experience proved the neces- sity of some established form, and the wisdom of enUghtened men discovered the advantages and disadvantages of different forms, govemmeni in every country assumed a more definite shape and became the constitution of the country; hence then the union of gov- ernment and constitution. Governments are divided by political writers into three classes, monarchical, aristocratic, and repubUcan; but these three gen- eral forms have been adopted with such variations and modifications as to impart to the constitution of every country something peculiar. The term constitution is now particularly apphed to any popular form of government, or any govemmeni formed at the pleasure of the people, and in a still more restricted sense to the government of England. See also Empire. GRACE, Favor. Grace, in French Edce, Latin gratia, comes from gratus, nd, because a grace results from pure kindness, independently of the merit of the receiver; but favor is that which is granted voluntarily and without hope of recompense, independently of all obligation. Grace is never used but in regard to those who have offended and made themselves hable to punishment; /ai'or is employed for actual good. An act of graxte, in the spiritual sense, is that merciful influence which Groa exerts over His most unworthy creatures from the infinite goodness of His Divine nature; it is to His special grace that we attribute every good feeUng by which we are prevented from com- mitting sin: the terva favor is employed indiscriminately with regard to man or his Maker; those who are in power have the greatest opportunity of con- ferring favom; but all we receive at the hands of our Maker must be ac- knowledged as a favor. Grace, Charm. — Grace is altogether corporeal; charm is either corporeal or mental: the grace quaUfies the action of the body; the charm is an inherent quality in the body itself. A lady moves, dances, and walks with grace; the charms of her person are equal to those of her mind. Graceful, Comely, Elegant. — A grace- ful figure is rendered so by the deport- ment of the body. A comely figure has that in itself which pleases the eye. Gracefulness results from nature im- proved by art; comeliness is mostly the work of nature. It is possible to acquire gracefulness by the aid of the dancing-master, but for a comely form we >are indebted to nature aided by circumstances. Grace is a quahtj'' pleas- ing to the eye; but elegance, from the Latin e, out, and legere, to choose, meaning worthy of being chosen out, is a quality of a higher nature, that inspires admiration; elegant is appU- cable, hke graceful, to the motion of the body, or hke comely to the per- son, and is extended in its meaning also to language, and even to dress. A person's step is graceful; his air or his movements are elegant; the grace of an action Ues chiefly in its adapta- tion to the occasion. See also Becoming. Gracious, Merciful, Kind. — Gracious. when compared with merciful, is used only in the spiritual sense; the latter is appUcable to the conduct of man as well as of the Deity. Grace is exerted in doing good to an object that has merited the contrary; meraj is exerted in withholding the evil which has been merited. God is gracious to His creat- ures in affording them not only an opportunity to address Him, but every encouragement to lay open their wants to Him; their un worthiness and sinful- ness are not made impediments of ac- cess to Him. God is merdfid to the vilest of sinners, and lends an ear to the smallest breath of repentance; in the moment of executing vengeance He stops His arm at the voice of sup- plication: He expects the same mercy to be extended by man toward his offending brother. An act of grace in the largest sense, as not only indepen- dent of, but opposite to, the merits of the person, is properly ascribable to 390 GRAND God alone, but by analogy it has also been considered as the prerogative of earthly princes: thus we speak of acts of grace, by which insolvent debtors are released: in Uke manner, the grace 'of the sovereign may be exerted in various ways. Gracious, when compared with kind, differs principally as to the station of the persons to whom it is appUed. GrcLcious is altogether confined to su- periors; kind is indiscriminately em- ployed for superiors and equals: a king gives a gracious reception to the nobles who are presented to him; one friend gives a kind reception to another by whom he is visited. Gracious is a term in peculiar use at court and among princes. Kindness is a domes- tic virtue; it is found mostly among those who have not so much ceremonial to dispense with. GRAND. See Great; Noble; Superb. GRANDEUR, Magnificence. Grandeur comes from grand, in French ^and, great, Latin ^ondis, great. Mag- nificence, in Latin magnificentia, from magnvs, great, and facere, to make, sig- nifies making or acting on a large scale. An extensive assemblage of striking qualities in the exterior constitutes the common signification of these terms, of which grandeur is the genus and magnificence the species. Magnificence cannot exist without grandeur, but grandeur exists without magnificence: the former is distinguished from the latter both in degree and in appUcation. When appUed to the same objects, they differ in degree, magnificence be- ing the highest degree of grandeur. As it respects the style of living, gran- deur is within the reach of subjects; magnificence is mostly confined to princes. GRANT. See Admit; Allow; Give. GRASP. See Nab. GRASPING. See Greedy. GRATEFUL. See Acceptable. GRATIFICATION. See Enjoy- ment. GRATIFY, Indulge, Humor. To gratify, make grateful or 'pleasant (see Acceptable), is a positive act of the choice. To indulge (for derivation see Foster) is a negative act of the will, a yielding of the mind to circumstances. One gratifies his desires or appetites and indulges his humors, or indulges in pleasures: by the former, one seeks to get the pleasure which the desire promises; by the latter, one yields to the influences which the humor or pas- sion exercises. Gratifying as a habit becomes a vice, and indulging as a habit is a weakness. In this sense of the words, gratification is mostly ap- pUed to mental objects, as to gratify one's curiosity; indulgence, to matters of sense or partial feeling, as to indulge one's palate. A person who is in search of pleasure gratifies his desires as they rise; he Uves for the gratifica- tion, and depends upon it for his hap- piness. He who has higher objects in view than the momentary gratification wiU be careful not to indulge himself too much in such things as will wean him from his purpose. As occasional acts, gratify and indulge may be both innocent. We gratify and indulge others as well as ourselves, and mostly in the good sense : to gratify is for the most part in return for services; it is an act of gen- erosity: to indulge is to yield to the wishes or be lenient to the infirmities of others; it is an act of kindness or good-nature. To humor is mostly taken in a bad sense. See also Satisfy. GRATITUDE. See Thankfui^ GRATUITOUS, Voluntary. Gra- tuitous is opposed to that which is obligatory. Voluntary is opposed to that which is compulsory or involun- tary. A gift is gratuitous when it flows entirely from the free wiU of the giver, independently of right: an offer is vol- untary which flows from the free will independently of all external constraint. Gratuitous is therefore to voluntary as a species to the genus. What is gra- tuitous is voluntary, although what is voluntary is not always gratuitous. The gratuitous is properly the voluntary in regard to the disposal of one's prop- erty; and the voluntary is appUcable to all other actions. Gratuity, Recompense. — The distinc- tion between these terms is very similar to the above. They both imply a gift, and a gift by way of return for some GRAVEYARD 391 supposed service: but the gratuity is independent of ail expectation as well as right: the recompense is founded upon some admissible claim. Those who wish to confer a favor in a deli- cate manner will sometimes do it under the shape of a gratuity: those who overrate their services will in all prob- abiUty be disappointed in the recom- pense they receive. GRAVE, Serious, Solemn. Grave, in Latin gravis, heavy, denotes the weight which keeps the mind or per- son down and prevents buoyancy; it is opposed to the light. Serious, Latin seriu^, possibly allied to German schwer, heavy, marks the quaUty of slowness or considerateness, either in the mind or that which occupies the mind: it is opposed to the jocose. Grave expresses more than serious; it does not merely bespeak the absence of mirth, but that heaviness of mind which is displayed in all the movements of the body; seriou,sness, on the other hand, bespeaks no depression, but simply steadiness of action and a re- frainment from aU that is jocular. A man may be grave in his walk, in his tone, in his gesture, in his looks, and all his exterior; he is serious only in his general air, his countenance, and demeanor. Gravity is producea by some external circumstance, serious- ness springs from the operation of the mind itself or from circumstances. Misfortimes or age will produce grav- ity: seriousness is the fruit of reflection. Gravity is, in the proper sense, confined to the person, as a characteristic of his temper; serious, on the other hand, is a characteristic either of persons or of things: hence we should speak of a grave assembly, not a serious assembly, of old men; grave senators, not serious senators; of a grave speaker, not a serious speaker: but a serious, not a grave sermon; a serious, not a grave writer* but grave is sometimes ex- tendea to things in the sense of weight, as when we speak of grave matters of deUberation, a grave objection, senti- ment. Gravity is pecuharly ascribed to a judge, from the double cause that much depends upon his deportment, in which there ought to be gravity, and that the weighty concerns which press on his mind are most apt to produce gravity: on the other hand, both grao- ity and seriousness may be applied to. the preacher; the former only as it respects the manner of dehvery; the latter as it respects especially the matter of his discourse: the person may be grave or serious; the discourse only is serious. Solemn expresses more than either grave or serious, from the Latin solennis, yearly; as appUed to the stated relig- ious festivals of the Romans, it has acquired the collateral meaning of reUgious gravity: Uke serious, it is em- ployed not so much to characterize either the person or the thing: a judge pronounces the solemn sentence of con- demnation in a solemn manner; a preacher dehvers many solemn warn- ings to his hearers. Gravity may be the effect of corporeal habit, and seri- ousness of mental habit; but solemnity is something occa.sional and extraordi- nary. Some children exhibit a re- markable gravity as soon as they be- gin to observe; a regular attention to rehgious worship will induce a habit of seriotisness; the admonitions of a parent on his death-bed will have pe- culiar solemnity. See also Sober. Grave, Tomb, Sepulchre. — All these terms denote the place where bodies are deposited. Grave, in this sense, comes from Anglo-Saxon grafan, to cut or dig, and signifies something cut or dug out, especially the hollow made in the earth. Tomb. Latin twnba, Greek rvn^a, is alliea to tumulus, a mound, and tumere, to swell, and has reference to the rising above a grave. Sepulchre, from sepelio, bury^ has a reference to the use for which it is em- ployed. From this explanation it is evident that these terms have a certain propriety of appUcation: "To sink into the grave" is an expression that carries the thoughts where the body must rest in death, consequently to dieath itself: "To inscribe on the tomb, or to encircle the tomb with flowers, carries our thoughts to the extemaJ of that place in which the body is interred. To in- ter in a sepulchre, or to visit or enter a sepulchre, reminds us of a place in which bodies are deposited, or, by a figure, where anything may be buried. GRAVEYARD. See Necropous. 392 GRAVITY GRAVITY. See Weight. GREAT, Large, Big. Great, in Anglo-Saxon great, is applied to all kinds of dimensions in which things can grow or increase. Large, in Latin largus, wide, is properly appUed to space, extent, and quantity. Big, Middle English big, is probably of Scandinavian origin; it denotes great as to expansion or capacity. A house, a room, a heap, a pile, an army, etc., are great or large; an animal or a mountain is great or big: a road, a city, a street, and the like, are termed rather great than large. Great is used generally in the im- proper sense; large and big are used only occasionally: a noise, a distance, a multitude, a number, -a power, and the like, are termed great, but not large: we may, however, speak of a large portion, a large share, a large quantity; or of a mind big with con- ception, or of an event big with the fate of nations. Great, Grand, Svhlime. — These terms are synonymous only in their moral applications. Great simply designates extent; grand includes likewise the idea of excellence and superiority. A great undertaking characterizes only the ex- tent of the undertaking; a grand under- taking bespeaks its superior excellence: great objects are seen with facility; grand objects are viewed with admira- tion. It is a great point to make a gerson sensible of his faults; it should e the grand aim of all to aspire after moral and reUgious improvement. Grand and sublime are both superior to great; but the former marks the dimensions of greatness; the latter, from the Latin suhlimis, designates that of height. A scene may be either grand or sublime: it is grand as it fills the imagination with its immensity; it is sublime as it elevates the imagination beyond the surrounding and less im- portant objects. There is something grand in the sight of a vast army mov- ing forward, as it were, by one impulse; there is something peculiarly sublime in the sight of huge mountains and craggy clrffs of ice shaped into various fantastic forms. Grand may be said of the works of either art or nature; sublime is peculiarly appUcable to the works of nature. The Egyptian pyra- mids and the ocean are both grand ob- jects; a tempestuous ocean is a sublime object. Grand is sometimes applied to the mind; sublime is apphed both to the thoughts and to the express- ions. GREATEST. See Supreme. GREATNESS. See Size. GREEDINESS. See Avidity. GREEDY, Avaricious, Grasping, Rapacious, Selfish. Greedy, in Anglo- Saxon groedig, from a Teutonic root meaning to be hungry, signifies the state of a person or animal that has a keen appetite for food or drink or an eagerness for anything earnestly de- sired. The latter implication is the most common one in the relation of the term to persons, and, with the possible exception of being greedy or intensely anxious to obtain useful knowledge, the term greedy indicates a whoUy reprehensible quality, though it is to be admitted that many persons are born into that quality or state and in later life fail to escape from it. Such may be more pardonable than those of maturity who knowingly enter that state. The avaricious person is one who is possessed, nay, controlled, by an in- ordinate or insatiable desire for gain, without any consideration of the ele- ment of need. He wants something because he has none of it now, because his neighbor has it, because he wants to increase the quantity of it that he already possesses, and for aU manner of reasons, but decidedly because he wants it. The grasping person is not only avaricious, that quality giving him a motive, but he is covetous of the pos- sessions of others, desirous of obtain- ing them, jealous of the possessor be- cause of his possessions, and very apt to reach out, stretch forth, commit some underhand act, or take a mean advantage of another to accompUsh his desire. The rapacious person is more of an extremist, for he is ad- dicted to plimderings, forcible seizures, severe exactions, heartless extortions, and preposterous demands for what- ever he deares. The selfish person lives only for one person — himself; is attentive only to his own interests; is influenced in his GRIEVANCE 393 actions by motives of personal ad- vantage only; and, to use a familiar colloquialism^ "Wants the whole earth and everythmg in it." He, too, is jealous of others who have more of this world's goods than himself, covets whatever others have, and is the only person on earth to be considered under all circumstances — in his own estima- tion. GREEN, Verdant. Green, in Anglo- Saxon grene, is aUied to grow, and sig- nifies the color of growing things — of grass and herbage. Verdant, Old French verd, green, Latm viridus, green, is the Latin corresponding to Anglon-Saxon green. Green denotes simply the color green. Verdant suggests lusty and flour- ishing vegetable life. Green makes a clearer impression upon the sensuous imagination; verdant suggests more to the mind. It is a less definite word, but richer in associations. Both terms are applied figm-atively to some one who is ignorant or young — green with a definite impUed comparison with un- ripe fruits or vegetable growth; verdant as a humorous substitute for green. GREET. See Accost. GREETING. See Salute. GRIEF. See Affliction. GRIEVANCE, Hardship. Griev- ance, from the Latin gravis, heavy or buraensome, imphes that which hes heavy at heart. Hardship, from the adjective hard, denotes that which presses or bears violently on the person. Grievance is in general taken for that which is done by another to grieve or distress: hardship is a particular kind of grievance that presses upjon individ- uals. There are national grievances, though not national hardships. An infraction of one's rights, an act of violence or oppression, are grievances to those who are exposed to them, whether as individuals or bodies of men: an imequal distribution of labor^ a partial indulgence of one to the detriment of another, constitute the hardship. A weight of taxes, levied in order to support an unjust war, will be esteemed a grievance: the partiality and caprice of the collector in making it fall with unequal weight upon par- ticular persons will be regarded as a pecuUar hardship. Men seek a redress of their grievances from some higher power than that by which they are inflicted: they endure their hardships imtil an opportunity offers of getting them removed. Grieve, Mourn, Lament. — To grieve (see Affliction) is the general term; mourn, Hke murmur, being an imitation of the sound produced by pain, is a particular term. To grieve, m its lim- ited sense, is an inward act; to mmim is an outward act: the grief hes alto- gether in the mind; the mourning dis- plays itself by some outward mark. A man grieves for his sins; he mourns for the loss of his friends. One grieves for that which immediately concerns one's self, or that which concerns others; one mourns for that which concerns otners; one grieves over the loss of property: one mxmms the fate of a deceased relative. GrievCj from Old French grever, Latin gravis, is the act of an individual: mmim may be the common act or many: a nation mourns, though it does not grieve, for a public calamity. To grieve is appUcable to domestic troubles; mourn may refer to pubUc or private ills. The distractions of a state will cause many to grieve for their own losses and mourn the misfortunes of their country. Grieve and mourn are permanent sen- timents; latnent (see Bewail) is a tran- sitory feeUng: the former are produced by substantial causes, which come home to the feelings; the latter re- spects things of a more partial, often- times of a more remote and indiffer- ent, nature. A real widow rnxmrns all the remainder of her days for the loss of her husband; we lament a thing to-day which we may forget to-morrow. Mourn and lament are both expressed by some outward sign; but the former is composed and free from all noise; the latter displays itself either in cries or simple words. In the moment of trouble, when the distress of the mind is at its height, it may break out into loud lamentation, but commonly griev- ing and mourning commence when lamentation ceases. As epithets, grievous, mournful, and lamentable have a similar distinction. What presses hard or unjustly on per- sons, their property, connections, and circumstances, IS ^rievotts; what touches 394 GRIEVED the tender feelings, and tears asunder the ties of kindred and friendship, is mournful; whatever excites a painful sensation in our mind is lamentable. Famine is a grievous calamity for a nation; the violent separation of friends by death is a mournful event at all times, but particularly so for those who are in the prime of life and the fulness of expectation; the ignorance which some persons discover even in the present cultivated state of society is truly lamentable. See also Wail. GRIEVED. See Sorry. GRIM. See Hideous. GRIPE. See Press. GRISLY. See Hideous. GROAN, Moan. Groan, in Anglo- Saxon granian, may be alhed to grin. Groan and moan, however, both have the effect of onomatopcetic words. Groan is a deep sound produced by hard breathing: moan is a plaintive, long-drawn sound produced by the or- gans of utterance. The groan proceeds involuntarily as an expression of severe pain, either of body or of mind: the moan proceeds often from the desire of awakening attention or exciting compassion. Dying groans are uttered in the agonies of death: the inoans of a wounded sufferer are sometimes the only resource he has left t'o make his destitute case known. GROSS, Coarse. Gross comes from Latin grossus, thick, fat. Coarse (see Coarse). These terms are synonymous in the moral appUcation. Grossness of habit ia opposed to dehcacy; coarseness to softness and refinement. A person be- comes gross by an unrestrained indul- gence of his sensual appetites, particu- larly in eating and drinking; he is coarse from the want of pohsh as to either his mind or his manners. A gross sensualist approximates very nearly to the brute; he sets aside aU moral con- siderations; he indulges himseK in the open face of day in defiance of all de- cency: a coarse person approaches near- est to the savage, whose roughness of humor and incUnation has not been refined down by habits of restraining his own will and complying with the will of another. A gross expression conveys the idea of that which should be kept from the view of the mind which shocks the moral feeUng; a coarse expression conveys the idea of an unseemly sentiment in the mind of the speaker. The representations of the Deity by any sensible image is gross, because it gives us a low and grovelling idea of a superior being; the doing a kindness, and making the receiver at the same time sensible of your superiority and his dependence, indicates great coarseness in the char- acter of the favorer. Gross, Total. — From the idea of size \vhich enters into the original mean- ing of gross is derived that of quantity. Total, from the Latin totus, signifies HteraUy the whole: the gross implies that from which nothing has been taken: the total signifies that to which nothing need be added: the gross sum includes everything without regard to what it may be; the total includes everything which one wishes to include; we may, therefore, deduct from the gross that which does not immediately belong to it; but the total is that which admits of no deduction. The gross weight in trade is apphcable to any article the whole of which, good or bad, pure or dross, is included in op- position to the net weight; the total amount supposes all to be included which ought to form a part, in oppo- sition to any smaller amount or sub- divisions; when employed in the im- proper sense, they preserve the samo distinction: things are said to be taken or considered in the gross, that is, in the large and comprehensive way, on.^ with another; things are said to under- go a total change. GROUND. See Found. GROUP. See Assembly. GROW. See Be; Increase. GRUDGE. See Malice. GUARANTEE, Be Security, Be Responsible, Warrant. Guarantee and warrant are both derived from Old High German werent, present participle of weren, to certify to, to warrant; se- curity, from secure (see Certain), has the same original meaning; responsible (see Amenable). To guarantee and be security have respect to what is done for others; to GUARD 395 be responsible respects what is done by one's self or others; to warranl, what is done by one's self only. To guar- antee is apphed to matters of pubUc or private interest; to be security, to pri- vate matters only. The larger govern- ments frequently guarantee for the per- formance of stipulations entered mto by minor jwwers; one man becomes security to another for the payment of a simi of money by a third person. Guarantee may be taken for the person or thing that guarantees. One is security for another in pecun- iary concerns, but he is responsible for his own conduct or that of others; he becomes a security by virtue of his contract, as one tradesman becomes security for another — he is responsible by virtue of his relative office or situ- ation; masters are responsible for the conduct of their servants; a jailer is responsible for the safe custody of the prisoner^ every man is responsible for that which is placed under his charge. To vxirrant is applied to conamercial transactions: one warrants the good- ness of any commodity that is sold. The warrant serves to indemnify against loss, or, in a moral sense, to protect against censm-e, to give a sanc- tion to. GUARD, Defend, Watch. Guard comes from Anglo-Saxon weardian, to watch, the gu being due to French in- fluence. Defend (see Apologize and Defend). Watch and wake come from Anglo-Saxon wacan, to wake. To gvm-d, in its largest sense, com- prehends both watching and defending, that is, both the preventing the attack and the resisting it when it is made. In the restricted sense, to guard is properly to keep off an enemy; to defend is to drive him away when he makes the attack. The soldier guards the palace of the king in time of peace, and defends his country in time of war. Watch, like guard, consists in looking to the danger, but it does not neces- sarily imply the use of any means to prevent the danger: he who waiches may only give an alarm. In the improper apphcation they have a similaj sense: modesty guards female honor; clothing defends against the inclemency of the weather: a per- son who wants to escape waiches his opportunity to shp out unobserved. See also Fence. Guard, Sentinel. — These terms are used to designate those who are employed for the protection of either persons or things. Guard has been explained above. Sentinel, in French sentinelle, Italian sentineUa, a watch, possibly from Latin sentire, to per- ceive, signifies a mihtary guard in the time of a campaign; any one may be set as guard over property, who is em- IK)wered to keep off every intruder by force; but the sentinel acts in the army as the watch in the pohce, rather to observe the motions oi the enemy than to repel any force. They are figuratively apphed to other objects; the guard in this case acta on ordinary occasions, the sentinel in the moments of danger. Guard, Guardian. — These words are derived from the verb guard; but they have acquired ajdistinct office. Guard is used either in the hteral or figurative sense; guardian only in the improper sense. Guard is apphed either to per- sons or to things; guardian only to persons. In apphcation to persons, the guard is temporary; the guardian is fixed and p>ermanent: the guard only guards against external evils; the guar- dian takes upon him the oflBce of par- ent, counsellor, and director: when a house is in danger of being attacked, a person may sit up as a guard; when a parent is dead, a guardian suppUes his place: we expect from a gtiara nothing but hiunan assistance; but from our guardian angel we may expect super- natural assistance. Guard Against, Take Heed. — Both these terms imply express care on the part of the agent^; but the former is used with r^ard to external or inter- nal evils, the latter only with regard to internal or mental evils: in an enemy^s country it is essential to be particu- larly on one's guard, for fear of a sur- prise; in difficult matters, where we are hable to err, it is of importance to take heed lest we run from one extreme td another: young men, on their en- trance into life, cannot be too much on their guard against associating with those who would lead them into ex- f>ensive pleasures; in shppery paths, 396 GUARDIAN whether physically or morally under- stood, it IS necessary to take heed how we go. GUARDIAN. See Guard. GUESS, Conjecture, Divine. Giiess is a Scandinavian word. Con- jecture (see that word). Divine, from the Latin divinus and deus, a god, sig- nifies to think and know as a god. We guess that a thing actually is; we conjecture that which may be; we guess that it is a certain hour; we con- jecture as to the meaning of a person's actions. Guessing is opposed to the certain knowledge of a thing; con- jecturing is opposed to the full con- viction of a thing: a child guesses at that portion of his lesson which he has not properly learned; a fanciful person employs conjecture where he cannot draw any positive conclusion. To gu£ss and conjecture are natural acts of the mind : to divine, in its proper sense, is a supernatural act; in this sense the heathens affected to divine that which was known only to an Omniscient Being; and impostors in our time presume to divine in matters that are set above the reach of human comprehension. The term is, how- ever, employed to denote a species of guessing in different matters, as to divine the meaning of a mystery. GUEST, Visitor, Visitant. Guest is a Scandinavian word from the same root as Latin hostes, signifying a stran- ger or an enemy; visitor or visitant is the one who pays the visit. The guest is to the visitor as the species to the genus: every gusst is a visitor, but every visitor is not a guest; the visitor simply comes to see the person and enjoy social intercourse; but the gu^st also partakes of hospitality: we are visitors at the tea-table, at the card-table, and round the fire; we are guests at the festive board. GUIDE, Rule. Guide is to nde as the genus to the species: every rule is a guide to a certain extent; but the guide is often that which exceeds the rule. The guide, in the moral sense, as in the proper sense, goes with us and points out the exact path; it does not permit us to err either to the right OT left: the rule marks out a hne be- Jrond which we may not go; but it eaves us to trace the Wnfi. and conse- quently to fail either on the one side or on the other. The Bible is our best guidi for moral practice; its doctrines, as interpreted in the articles of the Christian Church, are the best rule of faith. See also Chaperon; Lead; Syllabus. GUILE. See Deceit. GUILTLESS, Innocent, Harmless. Guiltless, without guilt, is more than innocent: innocence, from nocere, to hurt, extends no further than the qual- ity of not hurting by any direct act; guiltless comprehends the quaUty of not intending to hurt: it is possible, therefore, to be innocent without being guiltless, though not vice versd; he who wishes for the death of another is not guiltless, though he may be innocent of the crime of murder. Guiltless seems to regard a man's general condition, innocent his particular condition: no man is guiltless in the sight of God, for no man is exempt from the guilt of sin; but he may be innocent in the sight of men, or innocent of all such intentional offences as render him obnoxious to his fellow-creatures. Guiltlessness was that happy state of perfection which men lost at the fall; innocence is that rela- tive or comparative state of perfection which is attainable here on earth: the highest state of innocence is an igno- rance of evil. Guiltless is in the proper sense ap- plicable only to the condition of man, and, when apphed to things, it still has a reference to the person: innocent is equally apphcable to persons or things; a person is innocent who has not committed any injury or has not any direct purpose to commit any in- jury; or a conversation is innocent which is free from what is hurtful. Innocent and harmless both recommend themselves as quaUties negatively good; they designate a freedom either in the person or in the thing from injuring, and differ only in regard to the nature of the injury: innocence respects moral injury, and harmless physical injury: a person is innocent who is free from moral impurity and wicked purposes; he is harmless if he have not the power or disposition to commit any violence; a diversion is innocent which has nothing in it hkely to corrupt the morals; a GYROPLANE 397 game is harmless which is not likely to inflict any wound or endanger the health. GUILTY. See Criminal. GUISE, Habit. Guise is the French form of EngUsh udse, both from a Teu- tonic root, and both signifying the man- ner. Habit, from the Latin habitus, a habit, fashion, or form, is taken for a settled or permanent mode of dress. The guise is that which is unusual and often only occasional; the habit is that which is usual among particular classes: a person sometimes assumes the guise of a peasant, in order the better to conceal himself; he who de- votes himself to the clerical profession puts on the habit of a clergyman. GULF, Abyss. Gulf, French golfe, ItaUan golfo, comes from Greek Kokirog, hollow, and is applied hterally in the sense of a deep concave receptacle for water, as the gulf of Venice, guif of Mexico, etc. Abyss, in Greek djivaffoc, compounded of d- and jivaaoQ, a bot- tom, signifies hterally a bottoinless pit. One is overwhelmed in a gvlf; it car- ries with it the idea of hquidity and profimdity, into which one inevitably sinks never to rise: one is lost in an abyss; it carries with it the idea of immense profundity, into which he who is cast never reaches a bottom, nor is able to return to the top; an in- satiable voracity is the characteristic idea in the signification of this term. A gulf is a capacious bosom, which holds within itself and buries all ob- jects that suffer themselves to sink into it, without allowing them the pos- sibiUty of escape; hell is represented as a fiery gulf, into which evil spirits are plunged, and remain perpetually overwhelmed: a guilty mind may be said, figuratively, to be plunged into a gidf of woe or despair when filled with the horrid sense of its enormities. An abyss presents nothing but an in- terminable space which has neither be- ginning nor end; he does wisely who docs not venture in, or who retreats before he has plimcied too deep to re- trace his footsteps; as tno ocean, in the natural sense, is a great abyss^ so are metaphysics an immense abyss mto which the human mind precipitates itself only to be bewildered. GUMPTION, AcuTENESs, Clever- ness, Discernment, Shrewdness. Gumption is a Scandinavian word. The term is one of colloquial usage, im- plying, as a substantive, a quickness of perception, the possession of much common sense, and, in painting, the art of preparing colors. We say that a person is possessed of gumption who exhibits a quick-acting intellectuality, who perceives the drift, heart, spirit, of things speedily, whose mental activities evidence sharpness, keenness, acuteness. Cleverness expresses more than acute- ness, for it is that state or quahty which enables its possessor to exercise a special skill or abihty on certain lines, to be dexterous, expert, hwidy, adroit, to act expeditiously and effi- ciently with mind and body, and in intercourse with his fellow-men to be good-natured and obhging. Shrewd- ness, in a proper sense, implies sagacity, ingenuity, inteUigence, "mother-wit, and cleverness in practical matters; in an improper sense, craftiness, cun- ning, slyness, depravity, and iniquity. Discernment is an act of perception, an acuteness or sharpness in judmient, a penetrative abihty, and, specifically, the quahty of discrimination, the men- tal condition of being able to weigh, analyze, segregate, and classify objects so that each may be considered by itself, and the relation of a part to the whole may be clearly determined. GUSH. See Flow. GUSTO. See Zest. GYROPLANE. See Aircraft. 398 HABIT H HABIT. See Custom; GmsE. HABITATION. See Domicile. HACKNEYED. See Trite. HAGGARD, Gaunt. These words signify a wasted appearance. Haggard originally was applied to a hawk "that preyed for herself long before she was taken," and meant wild. It was ap- pUed to a person with special reference to a wild look in the eyes, but its mean- ing has been distinctly influenced by the resemblance in form to hag, so that it came to signify hag-like. It differs from gaunt, an East AngUan word meaning lean, in referring primarily to the wasted appearance of the face, es- pecially the hollows under the eyes caused by illness or weariness. Gaunt refers both to the whole face and the whole figure. It means thin, angular, bony, with hollows where rounded flesh would naturally be. Haggard is always an abnormal condition caused by ill- ness or some physical or emotional strain. Gaunt may apply under the same conditions, but it may also indi- cate the usual or normal appearance of an individual. HAIL. See Accost. HALE. See Draw. HALLOW. See Dedicate; Sanc- tify. HALLUCINATION, Aberration. Delusion. Hallucination, in French the same form, from the Latin hallvxn- natio, that from hallucinor, to wander in the mind, signifies, in common lan- guage, a perception without a real object to be perceived, an erroneous or insane belief in the reality of things which have no existence. Specifically, the term implies a morbid condition of the mind in which a perception of something occurs where no impression has been made upon the external or- gans of the special senses, yet where the object is beUeved to be real and existent. In a sense this state is a delusion, but delv,sion differs from hallucinaiion in that it originates at the other ex- tremity of the chain of consciousness in the mind itself, and consists of erroneous interpretations of real sen- sations. Thus we recognize in an- other an aberration, a departure ■ from a customary course, a wandering from fact to fancy; a fallacy in a deceptive or false appearance, in an unsound method of reasoning; a phantasm, a vision of something that does not ex- ist, a spectre that appears visible to the victim only. A victim of halluci- nation imagines that which is wholly erroneous, non-existent, but beheves implicitly that it is real. An aberration, from Latin ah, away, and errare, to wander, means a wan- dering out of the accustomed or normal course, with reference both to thought and to conduct. As applied to the activity of the mind, it differs from hallucination and delusion in empha- sizing not the false vision or interpre- tation, but the abnormal action of the mind itself. HANDLE. See Wield. HANDSOME. See Beautiful. HANKER. See Desire. HAPLESS, Ill-fated, Luckless. Hapless is a negative of hap, a Scandi- navian word signifying good luck, whence happy, happen, etc., are de- rived. Hapless, accordingly, implies the condition that is contrary to the hap events — hence, misfortune and its attendant Adcissitudes. We say that a person is ill-fated who seems destined to misfortune. This is the strongest of the above group of terms, for it implies the recognition of a condition in which a person may have been bom or one into which he has fallen, and from which apparently he cannot extricate himself — a con- dition to which he was doomed at birth and in which he remains through fife. Luckless, on the contrary, im- HAPPINESS 399 plies a condition that may be similar to ill-faled, but in the most common usage it suggests not a permanent, but a temporary misfortune, as a venture may be luckless that is without an an- ticipated advantage: some proceedings out of many may be imfortunate in their results, while the others may turn out according to our desires. HAPPEN, Chance. To happen, that is, to fall out by a hap, is to chance as the genus to the species; whatever chances happens, but not vice versd. Happen respects all events, without in- cluding any collateral idea; chance com- prehends likewise the idea of the cause and order of events: whatever comes to pass happens, whether regularly in the course of things or particularly and out of the order; whatever chances happens, altogether without concert, intention, and often without relation to any other thing. Accidents happen daily which no hiunan foresight could prevent; the newspapers contain an account of all that happens in the course of the day or week: listeners and busybodies are ready to catch every word that chances to fall in their hearing. HAPPINESS, Felicity, Blessed- ness, Beatitude, Bliss. Happiness signifies the state of being happy. Fe- licity comes from Latin felicitas, hap- piness. Bliss is in Anglo-Saxon blilhs, happiness, hterally blitheness, from An- glo-Saxon blithe, English blithe. The original sense of blessedness may have been to consecrate with blood, either by sacrifice or the sprinkling of blood, as the word can be clearly traced back to blood; hence it may have meant to be consecrated, holy; then simply hap- piness. It retains a rehgious suggestion still. Beatitude, from the Latin beutus, signifies the property of being happy in a superior degree. Happiness comprehends that aggre- gate of pleasurable sensations which we derive from external objects. It is the ordinary term which is employed alike in the colloquial or the philo- sophical style: felicity is a higher ex- pression, comprehending inward en- joyment, or an aggregate of inward pleasure, without regard to the source whence either is derived: bliss is a still higher term, expressing more than either happiness or felicity, both as to the degree and nature of the enjoy- ment. Happiness is the thing adapted to our present condition and to the nature of our being, as a compound of body and soul; it is impure in its nature and variable in degree; it is sought for by various means and with great eagerness; but it qften lies much more within our reach than we are apt to imagine: it is not to be foimd in the possession of great wealth, of great power, of great dominions, of great splendor, or the unbounded in- dulgences of any one appetite or de- sire; but in moderate possessions with a heart tempered by religion and vir- tue for the enjoyment of that which God has bestowed upon us: it is, there- fore, not so imequally distributed as some have been led to conclude. Happiness admits of degrees, since every individual is placed in different circumstances, either of body or of mind, which fit him to be more or less happy. Felicity is not regarded in the same Ught; it is that which is positive and independent of all circumstances: do- mestic felicity and conjugal felicity are regarded as moral enjoyments, ab- stracted from everything which can serve as an alloy. Bliss is that which is purely spiritual; it has its source in the imagination and rises above the ordinary level of human enjoyments: of earthly bliss little is known but in poetry; of heavenly bliss we form but an imperfect conception from the ut- most stretch of our powers. Blessed- ness is a term of spiritual import, which refers to the happy condition of those who enjoy the Divine favor, and are permitted to have a foretaste of heav- enly bliss by the exaltation of their minds above earthly happiness. Be- atitude denotes the quahty of hap- piness only which is most exalted, namely, heavenly happiness. See also Well-being. Happy, Fortunate. — Happy and for- tunate are both applied to the external circumstances of a man; but the former conveys the idea of that which is ab- stractly good, the latter implies rather what is agreeable to one's wishes. A man is happy in his marriage, in his children, in his connections, and the like: he is fortunate in his trading con- 400 HARANGUE cems. Happy excludes the idea of chance; fortunate excludes the idea of personal effort: a man is happy in the possession of what he gets; he is for- tunate in getting it. In another sense, they bear a similar analogy. A happy thought, a happy expression, a happy turn, a happy event, and the Uke, denote a degree of positive excellence; a, fortunate idea, a fortunate circumstance, a fortunate event, are all relatively considered with regard to the wishes and views of the individual. HARANGUE. See Address. HARASS. See Distress; Weary; Worry. HARBINGER. See FoRERtTNNER. HARBOR, Haven, Port. The idea of a resting-place for vessels is common to these terms, of which harbor is gen- eral and the two others specific in their significance. Harbor is Scandinavian, from Icelandic herbergi, a shelter for an army, compounded of heri, army, Ger- man heer, and bergen, to hide; it carries with it little more than the common idea of affording a resting or anchoring place. Haven is also a Scandinavian word possibly allied to Anglo-Saxon h^af, sea. Port, from the Latin portu^, a harbor, aUied to porta, a gate, and to English /ord, conveys the idea of an enclosure. A haven is a natural harbor; a port is an artificial harbor. We char- acterize a harbor as commodious, a /laven as snug and secure; a port as safe and easy of access. A commercial country profits by the excellence and number of its harbors; it values itself on the security of its havens, and in- creases the number of its ports ac- cordingly. A vessel goes into a har- bor only for a season; it remains in a haven for a permanency; it seeks a port as the destination of its voyage. Mer- chantmen are perpetually going in and out of a harbor; a distressed vessel, at a distance from home, seeks some haven in which it may winter; the weary mar- iner looks to the port, not as the ter- mination of his labor, but as the com- mencement of all his enjoyments. Harbor, Shelter, Lodge. — The idea of giving a resting-place is common to these terms; but harbor (see Foster) is used mostly in a bad sense, shelter (see Asylum) in an indefinite sense: lodge, Old French lege, Italian loggia, comes from Old High German loube, an arbor, from loub, a leaf — an arbor being a leafy shelter. Lobby is a doub- let of lodge. One harbors that which ought not to find room anywhere; one shelters that which cannot find secu- rity elsewhere; one lodges that which wants a resting-place. Thieves, trai- tors, conspirators, are harbored by those who have an interest in secur- ing them from detection: either the wicked or the imfortunate may be sheltered from the evil with which they are threatened: travellers are lodg^ as occasion may require. As the word harbor does not, in its original sense, mean anything more than affording a temporary entertain- ment, it may be taken in a good sense for an act of hospitaUty. Harbor and shelter are said of things in the sense of giving a harbor or shel- ter; lodge in the sense of being a rest- ing-place: furnitm-e harbors vermin, trees shelter from the rain, a ball lodges in the breast; so in the moral sense a man harbors resentment, ill-will, evil thoughts, and the hke; he shelters him- self from a charge by retorting it upon his adversary; or 'a particular passion may be lodged in the breast or ideas lodged in the mind. HARD, Firm, Solid. The close ad- herence of the component parts of a body constitutes hardness. The close adherence of different bodies to one an- other constitutes ^rmness (see Fixed). That is hard which will not yield to a closer compression; that is firm which will not yield so as to produce a separa- tion. Ice is hard, as far as it respects itself, when it resists every pressure; it is firm, with regard to the water which it covers, when it is so closely bound as to resist every weight without breaking. Hard and solid respect the internal constitution of bodies and the adher- ence of the component parts; but hard denotes a much closer degree of adher- ence than solid: the hard is opposed to the soft; the solid to the fluid; every hard body is by nature solid; although every solid body is not hard. Wood is always a solid body, but it is some- times hard and sometimes soft; water, when congealed, is a solid body, and admits of different degrees of hardness. HARD 401 In another application, hardness is allied to insensibility ;^rmness to fixed- ness; solidity to substantiality; a hard man is not to be acted upon by any tender motives; a firm man is not to be turned from his purpose; a solid man holds no purposes that are not well-founded. A man is hardened in that which is bad by being made in- sensible to that which is good; a man is confirmed in anything good or bad by being rendered less disposed to lay it aside; his mind is consolidated by acquiring fresh motives for action. Hard, Callous, Hardened, Obdurate. — Hard is here, as in the former case, the general term, and the rest particular: hard, in its most extensive physical sense, denotes the property of resisting the action of external force, so as not to undergo any change in its form or separation in its parts: callous is that species of the hard, in application to the skin, which arises from its dryness and the absence of all nervous sus- ceptibihty. Hard and callous, from Latin callosu^, thick-skinned, are Uke- wise applied in the moral sense: but hard denotes the absence of tender feel- ing, or the property of resisting any impression which tender objects are apt to produce; callous denotes the property of not yielding to the force of motives to action. A hard heart cannot be moved by the sight of mis- ery, let it be presented in ever so affect- ing a form: a callous mind is not to be touched by any persuasions, however powerful. Hard does not designate any circumstance of its existence or origin: we may be hard from a variety of causes; but callousness arises from the indulgence of vices, passions, and the pursuit of vicious practices. When we speak of a person as hard, it simply determines what he is: if we speak of him as callous, it refers also to what he was, and from what he is become so. Callous, hardened, and obdurate are all employed to designate a morally depraved character; but callousness be- longs properly to the heart and con- science; hardened, to both the heart and the understanding; obdurate, more particularly to the will. Callousness is the first stage of hardness in moral de- pravity; it may exist in the infant mind, on its first tasting the p>oisonous pleasures of vice, without being ac- quainted with its remote consequences. A hardened state is the work of time; it arises from a continued course of vice, which becomes, as it were, habit- ual, and wholly unfits a person for admitting any other impressions; ob- duracy is the last stage of moral hard- ness, which supposes the whole mind to be obstinately bent on vice. A child discovers himself to be caUous when the entreaties, threats, or punishments of a parent cannot awaken in him a single sentiment of contrition; a youth Sa- covers himself to be hardened when he begins to take a pride and a pleasure in a vicious career; a man shows him- self to be obdurate when he betrays a settled and confirmed purjK)se to pur- sue his abandoned course without re- gard to consequences. Hard, Hardy, Insensible, Unfeeling. — Hard may be appUed to either that which makes resistance to external im- pressions or that which presses with a force upon other objects. Hardy, which is only a variation of hard, is appUcable only in the first case: thus, a person's skin may be hard which is not easily acted upon; but the person is said to be hardy who can withstand the elements: on the other hand, hard, when employed as an active principle, is only applied to the moral character; hence the difference between a hardy man \/ho endures everything and a hard man who makes others endure. Insensible and unfeeling are but modes of the hard; that is, they des- ignate the negative quaUty of hard- ness, or its incapacity to receive im- pression: hard, therefore, is always the strongest term of the three; and of the two others unfeeling is stronger than insensible. Hard and insensible are appUed physically and morally: unfeeling is employed only as a moral characteristic. A horse's mouth is hard when it is insensible to the action of the bit; a man's heart is hard which is in- sensible to the miseries of others; a man is unfeeling who does not regard the feeUngs of others. The heart may be hard by nature, or rendered so by the influence of some passion; but a per- son is commonly unfeelinq from cir- cumstances. Shylock is depicted by Shakespeare as hard, from his strong 402 HARD antipathy to the Christians: people who enjoy an uninterrupted state of good health are often unfeeling in cases of sickness. As that which is hard mostly hurts or pains when it comes in contact with the soft, the term hard is pecuharly apphcable to superiors or such as have power to inflict pain: a creditor may be hard toward a debtor. As insensible signifies a want of sense, it may be sometimes neces- sary: a surgeon, when performing an operation, must be insensible to the present pain which he inflicts. As «n- feeling signifies a want of feeUng, it is always taken for a want of good feel- ing: where the removal of pain is re- quired, the surgeon shows himself to be unfeeling who does not do every- thing in his power to lessen the pain of the sufferer. Hard, Difficult, Arduous. — Hard is here taken in the sense of causing trouble and requiring pains, in which sense it is a much stronger term than diffi/mlt, which, from the Latin difficilis, compounded of the privative dis and fadlis, signifies merely not easy . Hard is therefore positive, and difficult nega- tive. A difficult task cannot be got through with without exertion, but a hard task requires great exertion. Dif- ficult is apphcable to all trivial matters which call for a more than usual por- tion either of labor or thought; hard is applicable to those which are of the highest importance and accompanied with circumstances that call for the utmost stretch of every power. It is a difficult matter to get admittance into some circles of society that are select: it is difficult to decide between two fine paintings which is the finer; it is a hard matter to come to any con- clusion on metaphysical subjects. A child mostly finds it difficult to learn his letters; there are many passages in classical writers which are hard to be understood by the learned. Arduous, from the Latin arduus, lofty, signifying set at a distance or out of reach, expresses more than either hard or difficult. What is diffi- cult may be conquered by labor and perseverance without any particular degree of talent; but what is arduous cannot be effected without great men- tal powers and accomphshments. What is diffixniU is so in various degrees, ac- cording to circumstances; that which is difficult to one person may be less so to another; but that which is ar- duaus is difficult in a high degree, and positively difficult imder every cir- cumstance. See also Herculean. Hard - hearted. Cruel, Unmerciful, Merciless. — Hard-hearted signifies hav- ing a hard heart, or a heart not to be moved by the pains of others. Cruel, in Latin crudelis, allied to crvdus, raw flesh, and cruor, blood, that is, de- hghting in blood like beasts of prey, signifies ready to inffict pain: as a temper of mind, therefore, cruel ex- presses much more than hard-hearted; the latter denotes the want of that sensibihty toward others which ought to be the property of every human heart; the former, the positive inchna- tion to inflict pain and the pleasure from so doing. Hard-hearted is em- ployed as an epithet of the person; cruel, as an epithet to things as well as persons; as a cruel man, a cruel action. Hard-hearted respec.r' solely the moral affections; cruelty, in its proper sense, respects the infhction of corporeal pains, but is extended in its applica- tion to whatever creates moral pains: a person may be cruel, too, in his treatment of children or brutes by beating or starving them; or he may be cruel toward those who look up to him for kindness. The unmerciful and merciless are both modes of characteristics of the hard- hearted. An unmerciful man is hard- hearted, inasmuch as he is unwilling to extend his compassion or mercy to one who is in his power; a merciless man, which is more than an unmerciful man, is hard-hearted, inasmuch as he is restrained by no compunctious feelings from infficting pain on those who are in his power. Avarice makes a man hard- hearted even to tu.ise who are bound to him by the closest ties; it makes him unmerciful to those who are in his debt. There are many merciless tyrants in domestic life, who show their dispositions by their merciless treatment of their poor brutes. Hardly, Scarcely. — What is hard is not common, and in that respect scarce: hence the idea of imfrequency assimi- HASTEN 403 lates those terms both in signification and application. In many cases they may be used indifferently; but where the idea of practicability predominates hardly seems most proper; and where the idea of frequency predominates scarcely seems preferable. One can hardly judge of a person's features by a single and partial glance; we scarcely ever see men lay aside their vices from a thorough conviction of their enormity: but it may with equal propriety be said in general sentences, hardly one in a thousand, or scarcely one in a thousand, would form such a conclusion. HARDIHOOD, See Audacity. HARDINESS. See Audacity. HARDSHIP. See Grievance. HARLEQUIN. See Zany. HARM. See Evil; Injury; Scathe. HARMLESS. See Guiltless. HARMONIOUS. See Euphonious. HARMONY. See Concord; Mel- ody. HARSH, Rough, Severe, Rigor- ous. Harsh (see Acrimony) and rough (see Abrupt) borrow their moral sig- nification from the physical properties of the bodies to which they belong. The harsh and the rough both act pain- fully upon the taste, but the former with much more violence than the latter. An excess of the sour mingled with other unpleasant properties con- stitutes harshness: an excess of astrin- gency constitutes roughness. Cheese is said to be harsh when it is dry and biting: roughness is the peculiar qual- ity of the damascene. From this phys- ical distinction between these terms we discover the ground of their moral appUcation. Harshness in a person's conduct acts upon the feelings and does violence to the afifections: roughness acts only externally on the senses: we may be rou^h in the tone of the voice, in the mode of address, or in the manner of handling or touching an object; but we are harsh in the sentiment we con- vey and according to the persons to whom it is conveyed: a stranger may be rough when he has it in his power to be so: only a friend or one m the tenderest relation can be harsh. Severe (see Austere). Rigorous, from the Latin rigor and rigere, to stiffen, designates unbending, inflex- ible. These terms mark different modes of treating those that are in one's power, all of which are the reverse of the kind. Harsh and rough are epithets of that which is unamiable: they indi- cate the harshness and roughness of the humor: severity and rigor are not always to be condemned; they spring from principle, and are often resorted to by necessity. Harshness is always mingled with anger and personal feeling: severity and rigor characterize things more than the temper of persons. A harsh master renders every burden which he im- poses doubly severe by the grating manner in which he communicates his will: a severe master simply imposes the burden in a manner to enJorce obedience. The one seems to indulge himself in inflicting pain: the other seems to act from a motive that is in- dependent of the pain inflicted. A harsh man is therefore always severe, but with injustice: a severe man, how- ever, is not always harsh. Rigor is a high degree of severity. One is severe in the punishment of offences: one is rigorous in exacting compliance and obedience. Severity is always more or less necessary in the army, or in a school, for the preservation of good order: rigor is essential in dealing with the stubborn will and unruly passions of men. HARSHNESS. See Acrimony. HASTEN, Accelerate, Speed, Ex- pedite, Despatch. Hasten comes from Anglo-Saxon hcest, Modem Eng- lish haste, meaning originally violence. Old French haste is from the same Teutonic root. Accelerate, from celer, quick, signifies Uterally to quicken for a specific purpose. Speed, from Anglo- Saxon spouxin, to succeed, meant origi- nally to increase, to become prosperous — whence the phrase, speed the part- ing guest. Expedite (see Diligent). Despatch comes from Spanish despachar, from Latin dis, away, and a root found in the past participle padus, from pan- gere, to fix. Quickness in movement and action is the common idea of all these terms, which varj' in the nature of the move- ment and the action. To hasten ex- presses httle more than the general idea of quickness in moving toward a 404 HASTINESS point; thus, he hxistens who runs to get to the end of his journey: accelerate expresses, moreover, the idea of bring- ing something to a point; thus, every mechanical business is accelerated by the order and distribution of its' several parts. It may be employed, hke the word hasten, for corporeal and famiUar actions: a tailor accelerates any par- ticular work that he has in hand by putting on additional hands; or a compositor accelerates the printing of a work by doing his part with correct- ness. The word speed includes not only quick, but forward movement. He who goes with speed goes effectually forward, and comes to his journey's end the sooner. This idea is excluded from the term haste, which may often be a planless, unsuitable quickness. Hence the proverb, "The more haste the worse speed." Expedite and despatch are terms of higher import, in appUcation to the most serious concerns in hfe; but to expedite expresses a process, a bringing forward toward an end: despatch im- plies a putting an end to, a making a clearance. We do everything in our power to expedite a business: we des- patch a great deal of business within a given time. Expedition is requisite for one who executes; despatch is most important for one who determines and directs. An inferior officer must pro- ceed with expedition to fulfil the orders or execute the purposes of his com- mander; a general or minister of state despatches the concerns of planning, directing, and instructing. Hence it is we speak only of expediting a thing; but we may speak of despatching a per- son as well as a thing. Hasten, Hurry. — Hasten (see above). Hurry is a word of imitative origin, indicating the sound of swift movement. To hasten and hurry both imply to move forward with quickness in any matter; but the former may proceed with some design and good order, but the latter always supposes perturba- tion and irregularity. We hapten in the communication of good news when we make efforts to convey it in the short- est time possible; we hurry to get to an end when we impatiently and incon- siderately press forward without mak- ing choice of our means. To hasten is opposed to delay, or a dilatory mode of proceeding; it is frequently indispen- sable to hasten in the affairs of human Ufe: to hurry is opposed to dehberate and cautious proceeding: it must al- ways be prejudicial, and unwise to hurry; men may hasten; children hurry. As epithets, Iiasty and hurried are both employed in another sense; but hasty imphes merely an overquickness of motion which outstrips considera- tion; hurried imphes a disorderly mo- tion which springs from a distempered state of mind. Irritable people use hasty expressions; they speak before they think: deranged people walk with hurried steps; they follow the blind impulse of undirected feeling. HASTINESS. See Rashness. HASTY. See Angry; Cursory; Sudden. HATE, Detest. The alliance be- tween these terms in signification is sufficiently illustrated in the articles referred to. Their difference consists more in sense than appHcation. To hate (see Antipathy) is a personal feeUng directed toward the object in- dependently of its quaUties; to detest (see Abhor) is a feeling mdependent of the person, and altogether dependent upon the nature of the thing. What one hates one hates commonly on one's own account; what one detests one detests on accoimt of the object: hence it is that one hates, but not detests, the person who has done an injury to one's self; and that one detests, rather than hates, the person who has done in- juries to others. Joseph's brethren hated him because he was more beloved than they; we detest a traitor to his country because of the enormity of his offence. In this connection to hate is always a bad passion: to detest always laud- able; but, when both are appUed to inanimate objects, to hate is bad or good, according to circtunstances; to detest always retains its good meaning. When men hate things because they interfere with their indulgences, as the wicked hate the light, it is a bad personal feehng, as in the former case, but when good men are said to hate that which is bad it is a laudable feel- ing, justified by the nature of the ob- ject. As this feehng is, however, so HAUGHTINESS 405 closely allied to detest, it is necessary further to observe that hate, whether rightly or wrongly applied, seeks the injury or destruction of the object: but detest is confined simply to the shunning of the object, or thunking of it with very great pain. God hates sin, and on that account punishes sinners: conscientious men detest all fraud, and therefore cautiously avoid being con- cerned in it. Hatefid, Odious. — Hateful signifies, literally, full of that which is apt to ex- cite hatred. Odious, from the Latin odi, I hate, has the same sense originully. These epithets are employed in re- gard to such objects as produce strong aversion in the mind; but when em- * ployed, as they commonly are, up>on familiar subjects, they indicate an un- becoming vehemence in the speaker. Hateful is properly applied to whatever violates general principles of morality; lying and swearing are hateful vices; odioics is more commonly applied to such things as affect the interests of others and bring odium upon the indi- vidual; a tax that bears particularly hard and unequally is termed odious, or a measure of government that is oppressive is denominated odious. Hatred, Enmity, lU-tvill, Rancor. — These terms agree in this particular, that those who are under the influence of such feelings derive a pleasure from the misfortune of others; but hatred (see Aversion) expresses more than enmity (see Enemy), and this more than Ul-will, which signifies either an evil will or a willing of evil. Hatred is not contented with merely wishing ill to others, but derives its whole happiness from their misery or destruction; en- mity, on the contrary, is limited in its operations to particular circumstances: hatred, on the other hand, is frequently confined to the feeUng of the individ- ual; but enmity consists as much in the action as in the feeUng. He who is possessed with hatred is happy when the object of his passion is miserable, and is miserable when he is happy; but the hater is not always instru- mental in causing his misery or de- stroying his happiness: he who is in- flamed with enmity is more active in disturbing the peace of his enemy, but oftener displays his temper in trifling than in important matters. lU-will, as the word denotes, lies only in the mind, and is so indefinite in its sig- nification that it admits of every con- ceivable degree. When the will is evilly directed toward another in ever so small a degree it constitutes iH-tciU. Rancor comes from Latin rancius, evil smelling. HAUGHTINESS, Disdain, Arro- gance. Haughtiness denotes the ab- stract quality of haughty, which comes from Old French haid, originally halt, from alius, high. It meant originally "high and mighty." Disdain (see Contemn) . Arrogance (see that word) . Haughtiness is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; dis- dain, on the low opinion we have of others; arrogance is the result of both, but, if anything, more of the former than the latter. Haughtiness and dis- dain are prop>erly sentiments of the mind, and arrogance a mode of acting resulting from a state of mind: there may therefore be haughtiness and dis- dain which have not betrayed them- selves by any visible action; but arro- gance is always accompanied with its corresponding action : the haughty man is known by the air of superiority which he assumes; the disdairifvl man, by the contempt which he shows to others; the arrogant man, by his lofty pretensions. Haughtiness and arro- gance are both vicious; they are built upon a false idea of ourselves; but disdain may be justifiable when pro- voked by what is infamous: a lady must treat with disdain the person who insults her honor. See also Pride. Haughty, High, High - minded. — Haughty and high, derived from the .same source as haughty, characterize both the external behavior and the internal sentiment; high-minded marks the sentiment only, or the state of the mind. With regard to the out- ward behavior, haughty is a stronger term than high; a haughty carriage be- speaks not only a high opinion of one's self, but a strong mixture of contempt for others: a high carriage denotes simply a high opinion of one's self: haughtiness is therefore always offen- sive, as it is burdensome to others; 406 HAUL but height may sometimes be laudable, inasmuch as it is justice to one's self: one can never give a command in a haughty tone without making others feel their inferiority in a painful de- gree; we may sometimes assume a high tone in order to shelter oiu-selves from insult. With regard to the sentiment of the mind, haughty, whether it shows itself in the outward behavior or rests in the mind, is always bad; height as an habitual temper, and stUl more high-mindedness, which more strongly marks the personal quality, are ex- pressly inconsistent with Christian hu- mility; but a man may with reason be too high or too high-minded to con- descend to a mean action. HAUL. See Draw. HAUNT. See Frequent. HAVE, Possess. Have comes from Anglo-Saxon habban, a widely distrib- uted Teutonic word. Possess, in Latin possessus, participle of possideo, com- pounded of Latin pot, as in potes, able, and sedere, to sit, means to remain master, to be able to keep. Have is the general, possess is the particular term: have designates no circumstance of the action; possess ex- presses a particular species of having. To have is sometimes to have in one's hand or within one's reach; but to possess is to have as one's own; a clerk has the money which he has fetched for his employer; the latter possesses the money, which he has the power of turning to his use. To have is some- times to have the right to, to belong; to possess is to have by one and at one's command: a debtor has the property which he has surrendered to his cred- itor; but he cannot be said to possess it, because he has it not within his reach and at his disposal: we are not necessarily masters of that which we have; although we always are of that which we possess: to have is sometimes only temporary; to possess is mostly permanent: we have money which we are perpetually disposing of: we pos- sess lands which we keep for a per- manency: a person has the good graces of those whom he pleases; he possesses the confidence of those who put every- thing in his power. HAZARD, Risk, Venture, Jeop- ard. All these terms denote actions performed under an uncertainty of the event: but hazard (see Chance) be- speaks a want of design and choice on the part of the agent; to risk (see Danger) implies a choice of alterna- tives; to venture, which is the same as adventure (see Event), signifies a cal- culation and balance of probabihties: one hazards and risks imder the fear of an evil; one ventures with the hope of a good. He who hazards an opinion or an assertion does it from presump- tuous feelings and upon slight grounds; chances are rather against him than for him that it may prove erroneous: he who risks a battle does it often from necessity; he chooses the least of two evils; although the event is dubious, yet he fears less from a failure than from inaction: he who ventures on a mercantile speculation does it from a love of gain; he flatters himself with a favorable event, and acquires boldness from the prospect. He who jeopards a cause (from Old French jeu, Latin iocus, a game, and partitus, parted, meaning a divided game, one in which the outcome is dubious) threatens its downfall or disaster. Jeopard means to hazard, with a presumption, how- ever, in favor of an imfortunate out- come. There are but very few cir- cumstances to justify us in hazarding; there may be several occasions which render it necessary to risk, and very many cases in which it may be advan- tageous to venture. HEAD. See Chief; Topic. HEADSTRONG. See Obstinate. HEADY. See Obstinate. HEAL. See Cure. HEALING. See Sanitary. HEALTHY, Wholesome, Salubri- ous, Salutary. Healthy signifies not only having health, but also causing health. Wholesome, like the German heilsarn., signifies making whole, keep- ing whole or sound. Salubrious and salutary, from the Latin salu^, safety or health, signify hkewise contributive to health or good in general. These epithets are all appUcable to such objects as have a kindly influence on the bodily constitution: healthy is the most general and indefinite; it i& applied to exercise, to air, situation. HEARTEN 407 climate, and most other things but food, for which wholesome 'm commonly substituted: the life of a farmer is reckoned the most healthy; and the simplest diet is the most wholesome. Healthy and wholesome are rather neg- ative in their sense; salubrious and salutary are positive, that is, healthy and wholesome which does no injurv to the health; that is salubrious which serves to improve the health; and that is salutary which serves to remove a disorder: cUmates are healthy or un- healthy, according to the constitution of the person; water is a wholesome beverage for those who are not dropsi- cal; bread is a wholesome diet for man; the air and climate of southern France have been long famed for their salubrity, and have induced many invalids to re- pair thither for the benefit of their health; the effects have not been equally saluiary in all cases Wholesome and salutary have like- wise an extended and moral appUca- tion; healthy and salubrious are em- ployed only in the proper sense: wholesome in this case seems to con- vey the idea of making whole again what has been unsound; but saluiary retains the idea of improving the con- dition of those who stand in need of unprovement: correction is wholesome which serves the purpose of amend- ment without doing any injury to the body; instruction or admonition is sal- utary when it serves the purpose of strengthening good principles and awakening a sense of guilt or im- propriety: laws and punishments are wholesome to the body pohtic, as diet is to the physical body; restrictions are salutary in checking uregularities. See also Sound. HEAP, PiL?j, Accumulate, Amass. To heap signifies to form into a heap, from Anglo-Saxon heap, a crowd, a pile. To pile is to form into a pile, from Latin pHa, originally a pillar, a £ier of stone. To accumulate, from the latin cumulus, a, heap, signifies to put heap upon heap. Amass comes from French d masse, Latin ad massa, hter- ally in a mass, meaning to gather to one's self in a mass. To heap is an indefinite action; it may be performed with or without order: to pile is a definite action done with design and order; thus we heap stones, or pHe wood: to heap may be to make into large or small heaps: to pile is always to make something considerable in height: children may heap sticks together; men pile loads of wood together. To pile is used always, to heap mostly, in tLc physical, accumulate and amass in the physical or moral acceptation. To accumulate is properly to bring or add heap to heap, which is a gradual and xmfinished act ; to amass is to form into a mass, which is a single complete act; a man may accumulate guineas or any- thing else in small quantities, but he properly amasses wealth, and in a figu- rative sense he amasses knowledge. To accumulate and to am/iss are not always the acts of conscious agents: things may accumulate or amass; water or snow accumulates hy the continual accession of fresh quantities; ice amasses in rivers until they are frozen over: so in the moral acceptation, evils, abuses, and the like, a4xumulate: corruption amasses. HEAR, Hearken, Overhear. To hear is properly the act of the ear; it is sometimes totally abstracted from the mind, when we hear and do not understand: to hearken is an act of the ear and the mind in conjunction; it impUes an effort to hear, a tendency of the ear: to overhear is to hear clan- destinely, or unknown to the person who is heard, whether designedly or not. We hear sounds: we hearken for the sense; we overhear the words: a quick ear hears the smallest sound; a wiUing mind hearkens to what is said; a prying curiosity leads to overhearing. HEARSAY. See Fame. HEARTEN, Animate, Cheer, Comfort, Encourage. Hearten is a compound of the En^ish heart and the suffix en. Heart, m Anglo-Saxon heorte, aUied to Latin a/r, implies the vital, inner, or chief part of anything, in persons the seat of the faculties. To hearten another is to bestow upon him an influence directly from the heart; figuratively a spoken word or a voluntary act, when the person is disheartened, that is, timely, sincere, and thoroughly meant. To animate either a person, animal, or drooping plant is to impart new 408 HEARTINESS life to the subject by an infusion that goes directly to the heart; to inspire a person with energy, courage, ardor, to stimulate: to cheer, to comfort, con- sole, invigorate, brace up, produce a joyous, hopeful state of mind: to com- fort, to give consolation in time of affliction, sickness, or trouble, support, assistance, relief in time of misfort- vme or danger: and to encourage, to incite to renewed effort, to lu-ge for- ward, to give confidence to another, also to promote, help forward, ad- vance. While there is an apparent similarity in the import of all these terms, there are variant shades of meaning con- nected with each, which are critically considered in the articles on Animate, Cheer, and Encourage. HEARTINESS. See Zeal. ILESS, Unfeeling. Heartless (for deri- vation see Hearten) means Uterally without heart, and is appMed to a vari- ety of conditions that exhibit the worst features of human life, with nothing in extenuation. Of the terms here men- tioned brutal and pitiless are the sever- est. Brutal is associated with the ac- tions of a savage, an irresponsible, con- scienceless creature, scarcely a whit better than a wild animal, whose at- tacks are liable to occur at any moment and to be repeated indefinitely, if death does not ensue from the first. A person who is naturally brutal or who becomes so by evil influences is capable of deeds of violence and in- humanity with and without provoca- tion. The cruel person may in his conduct reach the state of brutality, for he is disposed to injure or take pleasure in the injury of others, but his acts are generally studied ones, thought out in advance, showing a disposition or a growing gratification to injure others, while the brvial one is more apt to act on a momentary impulse. Pitiless, however, impUes a combi- nation of whatever is brutal and cruel, for those whom these terms designate are destitute of compassion, are merci- less, insistent in inflicting injury upon others, deaf to appeals for considera- tion, pity, and even hf e itself, unmoved by any sentiment or sympathy, and ab- solutely unfeeling toward their victims. A further discussion of the general conditions which the above terms im- ply will be found in the article on Cruel. HEARTY, Warm, Sincere, Cor- dial. Hearty, i. e., having the heart in a thing, and warm (see Fire) express a stronger feehng than sincere (see Candid); cordial, from cor, the heart, i. e., according to the heart, is a mixt- ure of the warm and sincere. There are cases in which it may be pecuharly proper to be hearty, as when we are supporting the cause of rehgion and virtue; there are other cases in which it is peculiarly proper to be warm, as when our affections ought to be roused in favor of our friends; in all cases we ought to be sincere when we ex- press either a sentiment or a feeling; it is pecuharly happy to be on terms of cordial regard with those who stand in any close relation to us. The man himself should be hearty; his heart should be warm; professions should be sincere; a reception cordial. HEAT. See Fire. HEATHEN. See Gentile. HEAVE, Swell. Heave is used either transitively or intransitively, as a reflective or a neuter verb; swell is used only as a neuter verb. Heave im- plies raising, and swell imphes disten- sion: they differ, therefore, very widely in sense, but they sometimes agree in apphcation. The bosom is said both to heave and to swell, because it hap- pens that the bosom swells by heaving; the waves are likewise said to heave themselves or to swell, in which there is a similar correspondence between the actions: otherwise most things which heave do not swell, and those which swell do not heave. HEAVENLY. See Celestial; God- like. HEAVINESS. See Gloom; Weight. HEAVY, Dull, Drowsy. Heavy is allied to both dull and drowsy, but the latter have no close connection with each other. Heavy and dvU are employed as epi- thets both for persons and for things; heavy characterizes the corporeal state of a person; dull qualifies the spirits or the understanding of the subject. A person has a heavy look whose temper- I ament seems composed of gross and HEED 409 weighty materials which weigh him down and impede his movements; he has a dull countenance in whom the ordinary brightness and vivacity of the mind is wanting. Heavy and drowsy are both employed in the sense of sleepy; but the former is only a particular state, the latter E articular or general; all persons may e occasionally heavy or drowsy; some are habitually drowsy from disease: they hkewise differ in degree, the latter being much the greater of the two; and occasionally they are applied to such things as produce sleepiness. Heavy, Burdensome, Weighty, Pon- derous. — Heavy, from heave, signifies the causing to heave, or requiring to be hfted up with force; burdensome signifies having a burden; weighty, hav- ing a weight; and ponderotis, from the Latin pondus, a weight, has the same original meaning. Heavy is the natural property of some bodies; burdensome is incidental to some. In the vulgar sense things are termed heavy which are found diffi- cult to lift, in distinction from those which are light or easy to be hfted; but those things are burdensome which are too troublesome to be carried or borne: many things, therefore, are act- ually heavy that are never burden- some; and others are occasionally bur- densome that are never heavy: that which is heavy is so whether hfted or not; but that which is burdensome must be burdensome to some one car- rying it: hard substances are mostly heavy; but to a weak person the softest substance may sometimes be burderv- some if he is obhged to bear it; things are heavy according to the difficulty with which they are lifted; but they are weighty according as they weigh other things down. The hea^/y is there- fore indefinite; but the weighty is defi- nite and something positively great: what is heavy to one may be fight to another; but that which is weighty ex- ceeds the ordinary weight of other things: ponderous expresses even more than weighty, for it includes also the idea of bulk; the ponderous, therefore, is that which is so weighty and large that it cannot easily be moved. HECTOR, Bully. These words have a similar meaning. Hector comes from Greek "Ektw/o, tile celebrated hero of Troy and a mighty warrior. To hector was to treat others as Hector treated his foes in battle. Hector now differs from buUy in suggesting a re- peated exercise of argvunent and force — something irritating and harassing, and less definitely indicating the dis- play of superior brute force. BuJly comes from Old Low German. The oldest sense in English is "dear one," a lover. It now signifies a person who gets his own will by a display of force, especially against those whom he knows to be much weaker than himself; it carries the suggestion of a perfectly safe threat of force. The bully gen- erally knows that he will not be called upon to five up to his fierce protesta- tions; that the mere display will make his victim yield. Hector does not sug- gest this element in the verb to bully. One may hector one's equal or superior; one bullies one's inferiors. HEED, Care, Attention. Heed (see Attend) apphes to matters of im- portance to one s moral conduct; care (see Care) to matters of minor im- port: a man is required to take heed; a child is required to take care: the former exercises his imderstanding in taking heed; the latter exercises his thoughts and his senses in taking care: the former looks to the remote and probable consequences of his actions, and endeavors to prevent the evil that may happen; the latter sees princi- Eally to the thing that is immeaiately efore him. When a young man en- ters the world he must take heed lest he be not ensnared by his companions into vicious practices; in a slipperj' path we must take care that we do not fall. Heed has, moreover, the sense of thinking on what is proposed to our notice, in which it agrees with attention (see Attend); hence we speak of giv- ing fieed and paying attention: but the former is apphed only to that which is conveyed to us by another, in the shape of a direction, a caution, or an instruction; but the latter is said of everything which we are said to per- form. A good child gives heed to his parents when they caution him against any dangerous or false step; he pays attention to the lesson which is set 410 HEEDLESS him to learn. He who gives no heed to the counsels of others is made to repent his folly by bitter experience; he who faUs in paying attention cannot learn. HEEDLESS. See Negligent. HEIGHTEN, Raise, Aggravate. To heighten is to make higher (see Haughty). To raise is to cause to rise (see Akise). To aggravate (see that word) is to make heai}y. Heighten refers more to the result of the action of making higher; raise to the mode; we heighten a house by raising the roof, where raising conveys the idea of set- ting up aloft, which is not included in the word heighten. On the same ground a head-dress may be said to be height- ened which is made higher than it was before; and a chair or a table is raised that is set upon something else: but in speaking of a wall we may say that it is either heightened or raised, because the operation and result must in both cases be the same. In the improper sense of these terms they preserve a similar distinction: we heighten the value of a thing; we raise its price: we heighten the grandeur of an object; we raise a family. Heighten and aggravate have connec- tion with each other only in appUca- tion to offences: the enormity of an offence is heightened, the guilt of the offender is aggravated, by particular circumstances. The horrors of a mur- der are heightened by being committed in the dead of the night: the guilt of the perpetrator is aggravated by the addition of ingratitude to mxirder. HEINOUS, Flagrant, Flagitious, Atrocious. Heinous comes from Old French ha'inos, from hair, to hate, from the Teutonic root also found in Eng- lish hale. Flagrant, in Latin flagrans, burning, is a figurative expression de- noting excessive and violent in its nat- ure. Flagitious, in Latin jlagiiiosus, from flagitium, signifies pecuharly in- famous. Atrocious, in Latin airox, cruel, signifies exceedingly black in guilt. These epithets, which are appUed to crimes, seem to rise in degree. A crime is heinous which seriously of- fends against the laws of men; a sin is heinous which seriously offends against the will of God; an offence is flagrant which is in direct defiance of established opinions and practice: it is flagitious if a gross violation of the moral law or coupled with any gross- ness; a crime is atrocious which is attended with any aggravating circum- stances. Lying is a heinous sin; gam- ing and drunkenness are flagrant breaches of the Divine law; the mm-- der of a whole family is in the fullest sense atrocious. HELICOPTER. See Aircraft. HELP, Assist, Aid, Succor, Re- lieve. Hel-p is in Anglo-Saxon hel- ■pan, German helfen. Assist, in Latin assisto, or ad and sisto, signifies to place one's self by another so as to give him our strength. Aid, in Latin adjuiare, a frequentative of ad and juvare, to help, signifies to profit toward a specific end. (Suc- cor, in Latin succurrere, to run to the help of any one. Relieve (see Alleviate). The idea of communicating to the advantage of another in case of need is common to all these terms. Help is the generic term; the rest specific: help may be substituted for the others, and in many cases where they would not be applicable. The first three are employed either to produce a positive good or to remove an evil; the latter two only remove an evil. We help a person to prosecute his work, or help him out of a difficulty; we assist in order to forward a scheme, or we assist a person in the time of his embarrass- ment; we aid a good cause, or we aid a person to make his escape; we succor a person who is in danger; we relieve him in time of distress. To help and assist respect personal service, the former by corporeal, the latter by cor- poreal or mental labor: one servant helps another by taking a part in his employment; one author assists another in the composition of his work. We help up a person's load; we assist him to rise when he has fallen; we speak of a helper or a helpmate in mechanical employments, of an assistant to a pro- fessional man. To assist and aid are used for services directly or indirectly performed: but the former is said only of individuals; the latter may be said of bodies as well as individuals. One friend assists HERETIC 411 another with his purse, with his coun- sel, his interest, and the Hke: one per- son aids another in carrying on a scheme; or one king, or nation, aids another with armies and subsidies. We come to the assistance of a person when he has met with an accident; we come to his aid when contending against nimibers. Assistance is given, aid is sent. To siuxor is a species of immediate assistance, which is given on the spur of the occasion; the Good Samaritan went to the succor of the man who had fallen among thieves; so in hke man- ner we may succor one who calls us by his cries; or we may succor the poor whom we find in circumstances of dis- tress. So Ukewise one may succor a nation. The word relieve has nothing in com- mon with succor, except that they both express the removal of pain; but the latter does not necessarily imply any mode by which this is done, and there- fore excludes the idea of p>ersonal inter- ference. To help is commonly an act of good-nature or discretion; to relieve, an act of humanity or generosity. All these terms, except succor, may be appUed to things as well as persons; we may walk by the help of a stick, read with the assistance of glasses, learn a task quickly by the aid of a good memory, and obtain relief from medicine. HELPER. See Accommodatoe. HELPING. See Auxiliary, HERCULEAN, Brawny, Power- ful, Strong, Vigorous. Herculean, an adjective derived from Hercules (in Greek 'HpaicX^e, the hero of Grecian mythology who was said to be pos- sessed of superhuman strength, im- plies, both as to persons and objects, the quaJity of extraordinary strength. Applied to persons, brawny designates a tough, muscular condition, and re- lates particularly to the arms, calves of the legs, the breast, back, and such other parts as are employed in strenu- ous actions. Powerful, in this sense means might, force, both in an un- usually high development; strong, hav- ing the power or abiUty to exert great bodily force, the mental or physical capability to bear or endure great bur- dens, sorrow, sufferiog; and vigorous. the condition resulting from sound health, the possession of mental or physical energy, derived from the Latin vigere, to be Uvely. Herculean, Difficult, Hard, Perilous, Toilsome. — This apphcation of the term impUes actions that require the power, strength, or courage of Hercules to per- form or encounter that which is exceed- ingly great in magnitude and diflficult or dangerous in the performance. Dif- ficult implies that which is arduous, not easily managed or comprehended, more or less perplexing, that which requires much labor and skill to overcome or accomplish; hard, that ^hich is com- pact and solid, not easily pierced or broken, unyielding, and, hence, neces- sitating continuous application and la- bor and involving mental or physical fatigue; perilous, that which is beset with danger to the performer, which exposes him to injury or hazard, to the extent of his life; and toilsome, that which requires much time, labor, and ingenuity, the exertion of bodily strength, with efforts of some continu- ance or duration, producing weariness, exhaustion, fatigue, and other results of over-labor. HERESY. See Heterodoxy. HERETIC, Schismatic, Sectarian or Sectary, Dissenter, Non-con- FORMisT. A heretic is the maintainer of heresy (see Heterodoxy) ; the schis- matic is the author or promoter of schism; the sectarian or sectary is the member of a sect; the dissenter is one who dissents from an established relig- ion; and the non-conformist one who does not conform to an establishment. A man is a heretic only for matters of faith and doctrine, but he is a schis- matic in matters of discipUne and prac- tice. The heretic, therefore, is not al- ways a schismatic, nor the schismatic a heretic. Whoever holds the doctrines that are common to the Roman Cath- olic and reformed churches is not a heretic in the Protestant sense of the word, although he may in many out- ward formaUties be a schismatic. Cal- vinists are not heretics, but many among them are schismatics; on the other hand, there are many members of the estab- lishment who hold, though they do not avow, hrretical notions. The heretic is considered as such with 412 HESITATE regard to the Catholic Church or the whole body of Christians, holding the same fundamental principles; but the schismatic and sectarian are considered as such with regard to particular bodies of Christians. Schism, from the Greek ayi^Hv, to split, denotes an action, and the schismatic is an agent who sphts for himself in his own individual ca- pacity: the sectarian does not express- ly perform a part, he merely holds a relation; he does not divide anything himself, but belongs to that which is already cut or divided. The schis- matic, therefore, takes upon himself the whole moral responsibihty of the schism.; but the sectarian does not nec- essarily take an active part in the measures of his sect; whatever guilt attaches to schism attaches to the schismatic; he is a voluntary agent, acting from an erroneous principle, if not an unchristian temper: the sec- tarian is often an involuntary agent; he follows that to which he has been incidentally attached. It is possible, therefore, to be a schismatic and not a sectarian; as also to be a sectarian and not a schismatic. Those professed mem- bers of the estabUshment who affect the title of evangeUcal and wish to palm upon the Church the peculiarities of the Calvinistic doctrine, and to ingraft their own modes and forms into its discipline, are schismatics, but not sec- tarians; on the other hand, those who by birth and education are attached to a sect are sectarians, but not always schismatics. Consequently, schismatic is a term of much greater reproach than sectarian. The schismatic and sectarian have a reference to any established body of Christians of any country; but dis- senter is a term applicable only to the inhabitants of Great Britain, and bear- ing relation only to the established Church of England: it includes not only those who have individually and personally renounced the doctrines of the Church, but those who are in a state of dissent or difference from it. Dissenters are not necessarily either schismatics or sectarians, for British Roman Catholics are all dissenters, al- though they are the reverse of what is understood by schismatic and sec- tarian: it is equally clear that all schis- matics and sectarians are not disseiiters, because every established community of Christians, all over the world, have had individuals, or smaller bodies of individuals, setting themselves up against them: the term dissenter be- ing in a great measure technical, it may be apphed individually or gener- ally without conveying any idea of re- proach; the same may be said of non- conformist, which is a more special term, including only such as do not conform to some established or na- tional religion: consequently, all mem- bers of the Romish Church, or of the Kirk of Scotland, are excluded from the number of non-conformists; while on the other hand, all British-born subjects not adhering to these two forms, and at the same time renounc- ing the established form of their coun- try, are of this number, among whom may be reckoned Independents, Pres- byterians, Baptists, Quakers, Metho- dists, and all other such sects as have been formed since the Reformation. HESITATE, Falter, Stammer, Stutter. Hesitate (see Demur). Fal- ter or faulter seems to signify to com- mit a fault or blunder. Stammer comes from a root found in stand; it meant to stand fixed, amazed, and is related to German stumm, dumb. It now signi- fies the confusion and hesitation of speech incident to extreme amazement. Stutter is a frequentative of stut, once common in the sense of stutter. "I stutte; I can not speake my wordes redyly," writes Palgrave. The origi- nal root of stutter meant to strike against, hence to trip in the speech. A defect in utterance is the idea which is common in the signification of all these terms: they differ either as to the cause or the mode of the action. With regard to the cause, a hesitation results from the state of the mind and an interruption in the train of thoughts ; falter arises from a perturbed state of feeling; stammer and stutter arise either from an incidental circumstance or more commonly from a physical defect in the organs of utterance. A person who is not in the habit of public speak- ing, or of collecting his thoughts into a set form, will be apt to hesitate even in familiar conversation; he who first addresses a public assembly will be apt HIGH 413 to faltefr. Children who first begin to read will stammer at hard words: and one who has an impediment in his speech will stutter when he attempts to speak in a hurry. With regard to the mode or degree of the action, hesitate expresses less than falter; stammer less than stutter. The slightest difficulty in uttering words constitutes a hesitation; a pause or the rep)etition of a word may be termed hesitatirig: but to falter sup- poses a failure in the voice as well as the lips when they refuse to do their office. Stammering and stuttering are confined principally to the useless mov- ing of the mouth; he who stammers brings forth sounds, but not the right sounds, without trials and efforts; he who stviters remains for some time in a state of agitation without uttering a soimd. See also Scrtiple. HETERODOXY, Heresy. Hetero- doxy, from the Greek 'irepog and So^a, signifies another or a different doctrine. Heresy, through French and Latin from the Greek a'ipimc, a choice, signifies an opinion adopted by individual choice. To be of a different persuasion is heterodoxy; to have a faith of one's own is heresy, the heterodoxy charac- terizes the opinions formed; the heresy characterizes the individual forming the opinion: the heterodoxy exists in- dependently and for itself; the heresy sets itself up against others. As all division supposes error either on one side or on Doth, the words heterodoxy and heresy are appUed only to human opinions, and strictly in the sense of a false opinion, formed in distinction from that which is better founded; but the former implies any opinions, im- portant or otherwise; the latter refers only to matters of importance: the heresy is therefore a fundamental schism. There has been much hetero- doxy in the Christian world at all times, and among these have been heresies denying the most serious doc- trines which have been acknowledged by the great body of Christians since the Apostles. HETEROGENEOUS, from Greek trepoct other, and yiyog, kind, meant Uter- ally of a different kind. It signifies that which is made up of different kinds of elements, and is opposed to homo- geneous. It has no real synonymes except the more general words hste^d under different, which see. HIDDEN. See Secret. HIDE. See Conceal; Cover; Skin. HIDEOUS, Ghastly, Grim, Grisly. Hideous comes from Old French hidos, which is probably derived from Latin hispidosus, rough, shaggy. Ghastly comes from Anglo-Saxon gcestan, to terrify, allied to aghast. Grim is de- rived from Anglo-Saxon grim, fierce. Grisly, Anglo-Saxon grislic, is formed with the suflSx lie from grisan, to shudder. An unseemly exterior is character- ized by these terms; but the hideous refers to natural objects, and the ghastly more properly that which is supernat- ural, or what resembles it. A mask with monstrous grinning features looks hideous; a human form with a visage of death-like paleness is ghastly. The grim is applicable onlv to the coimte- nance; dogs or wild beasts may look very grim: grisly refers to the whole form, but particularly to the color; as blackness or darkness has always some- thing terrifying in it, a grisly figure having a monstrous assemblage of dark color is particularly calculated to strike terror. Hideous is applicable to ob- jects of hearing also, as a hideous roar; but the rest to objects of sight only. HIGH, Tall, Lofty. High is allied to German hoch. Tall comes from Mid- dle English tal, seemly, obedient, vah- ant, which was a general word of ap- proval. Lofty comes from Scandinavian loft, an upper room, aUied to Anglo- Saxon lyft, air, sky, meaning high in the air. High is the term in most general use, which seems likewise in the most unqualified maimer to ejcpress the idea of extension upward, which is common to them all. Whatever is tall and lofty is high, but everything is not tall or lofty which is high. Tall and lofty both designate a more than ordinary degree of fmght; but tall is peculiarly appli- cable to what shoots up or stands up in a perpendicular direction, while lofty is said of that which is extended in breadth as well as in height, that which 414 HIGHEST is lifted up or raised by an accretion of matter or an expansion in the air. By this rule we say that a house is high, a chimney tail, a room lofty. With the high is associated no idea of what is striking; but the tall is coupled with the aspiring, or that which strives to outtop: the lofty is always coupled with the grand and that which commands admiration. High and lofty have a moral accepta- tion, but tall is taken in the natural sense only: high and lofty are applied to persons or what is personal, with the same difference in degree as be- fore: a lofty title or lofty pretension conveys more than a high title or a high pretension. Men of high rank should have high ideas of virtue and personal dignity, and keep themselves clear from everything low and mean: a lofty ambition often soars too high to serve the purpose of its possessor, whose fall is the greater when he finds himself compelled to descend. See also Haughty. HIGHEST. See Supreme. HIGH-FLOWN, Bombastic, Swol- liEN. High-flown is a compound of the English high and floum; high, in Anglo-Saxon heah, implies that which is elevated; flown, from fly, in Anglo- Saxon fledgan, implies to move or pass through the air. High-flovm, in most common usage, is apphed to the vari- ous terms of language as employed in speech and writing that are extrava- gant, inflated, above the customary quality, in a pretentious flowery or affected style. Bombastic is from bombast, originally a soft, loose stuff used to swell out garments, and is applied to high-soimd- ing words, big and puffing, without much meaning or relation to a subject under discussion. Swollen and bombastic are terms more closely allied, each implying language that is puffed up; hence used to make one appear consequential, as possess- ing greater inteUigence than others. Swollen is a general word which may under certain conditions have the meaning of bombastic or high-flown. Bombastic and high-flown, on the other hand, are specific words applied to lan- guage and manner. HIGH-MINDED. See Haughty. HIGH-SOUNDING. See Loud. HILARITY. See Mirth. HIND. See Countryman. HINDER, Prevent, Impede, Ob- struct. Hinder comes from Anglo- Saxon hindrian, to keep back or be- hind. Prevent, from -prce and venire, to come before, signifies to hinder by coming before, or to cross another by the anticipation of his purpose. Im- pede, from in and pedes, signifies to come between a person's feet and en- tangle him in his progress. Obstruct, from ob, in the way of, and stritere, to heap together, signifies to set up something in his way, to block the passage. Hinder is the most general of these terms, as it conveys little more than the idea which is common to them all, namely, that of keeping one from his purpose. To hinder is commonly said of that which is rendered impracticable only for the time being, or merely de- layed; prevent is said of that which is rendered altogether impracticable. A person is hindered by the weather and his various engagements from reaching a place at the time he intended; he is prevented but not hindered by ill health from going there at all. If a friend calls, he hinders me from finishing the letter which I was writing; if I wish to prevent my son from reading any book I keep it out of his way. To hinder is an act of the moment, it sup- poses no design; prevent is a pre- meditated act, deliberated upon, and adopted for general purposes: the former is applied only to the move- ments of any particular individual, the latter to events and circumstances. I hinder a person who is rimning, if I lay hold of his arm and make him walk: it is the object of every good government to prevent offences rather than to punish offenders. In ordinary discourse these words come very close in sense when the circumstances of the case do not sufficiently define whether the action in hand be altogether suspended or suspended only for a time; but the above explanation must make it very clear that to hinder, in its proper sense and appKcation, is but to stop in the progress, and prevent to stop at the outset. HINT 415 To impede and obstruct are a species of hindering which is said rather of things than of persons: hinder is said of both; but hinder is commonly em- ployed in regard to trifling matters, or such as retard a person's proceed- ings in the smallest degree; impede and obstruct are acts of greater importance, or produce a still greater degree of de- lay. A person is hindered in his work, although neither impeded nor obstructed; but the quantity of artillery and bag- gage which is attached to an army will greatly impede it in its march; and the trees which are thrown across the roads will obstruct its march. Hindrances always suppose the agency of a person, either of the one who hinders or the one who is hindered: but impediments and obstructions may be employed with regard to the operations of nature on inanimate objects. Cold impedes the growth of plants; a dam obstructs the course of water. See also Retard. Hinder, Stop. — Hinder refers solely to the prosecution of an object: stop, signifying to make to stand, refers simply to the cessation of motion; we may be hindered, therefore, by being stopped; but we may also be hindered without being expressly stopped, and we may be stopped without being hiri- dered. If the stoppage does not inter- fere with any other object in view, it is a stoppage, but not a hindrance; as when we are stopped by a friend while walking for pleasure: but if stopped by an idler m the midst of urgent business, so as not to be able to pro- ceed according to our business, this is both a stoppage and a hindrance: on the other hand, if we are interrupted in the regular course of our proceeding, but not compelled to stand still or give up our business for any time, this may be a hindrance, but not a stop- page: in this manner, the conversation of others in the midst of our busi- ness may considerably retard its pro- gress, and so far hinderf but not expressly put a stop to, the whole con- cern. HINT, Suggest, Intimate, Insin- uate. Hint and suggest (see Allude). To intimate is to make one intimate, or specially acquainted with, to com- municate one's most inward thoughts. Insinuate, from the Latin sinus, a bend, is to introduce by a winding course into the mind of another. AH these terms denote indirect ex- pressions of what passes in one's own mind. We hint at a thing from fear and imcertainty; we suggest a ^ thing from prudence and modesty; we inti- mate a thing from indecision; a thing is insinua,ted from artifice. A person who wants to get at the certain knowl- edge of any circumstance hints at it frequently in the presence of those who can give him the information; a man who will not offend others by an assumption of superior wisdom sug- gests his ideas on a subject, instead of setting them forth with confidence; when a person's mind is not made up on any future action, he only intimates what may be done; he who has any- thing offensive to communicate to an- other will choose to insinuate it rather than declare it in express terms. Hints are thrown out; they are frequently characterized as broken : suggestions are offered; they are frequently termed idle or ill-grounded: intimations are given, and are either shght or broad: insinuations are thrown out, they are commonly designated as slanderous, malignant, and the like. To hint is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense; it is commonly re- sorted to by tale-bearers, mischief- makers, and all who want to talk of more than they know. To suggest is oftener used in the good than the bad sense: as to suggest doubts, queries, difficultieSj or improvements in mat- ters of opinion is truly laudable, par' ticularly for young persons; but to suggest anything to the disadvantage of another is even worse than to speak ill of him openly, for it bespeaks cow->. ardice as well as ill-nature. To inti" mate is taken either in a good or an indifferent sense; it commonly passes between relatives or persons closely connected in the communication of their half-formed intentions or of doubtful intelligence; but to insinuate is always taken in a bad sense; it ia the resource of an artful and malig- nant enemy to wound the reputation of another, whom he does not dare openly to accuse. A person is said to take a hint, to follow a suggestion, V lypt-^V Ar^A4j;uAV 416 HIKE to receive an intimation, to disregard an insinuation. See also Key. HIRE. See Aulowancb. HIRELING, Mercenary. Hireling, from hire, and mercenary, from merce- narius, based on jnerx, pay, are applied to any one who follows ^a-SQldii-fiffli. plnymput: but hireling may sometimes De taken in its proper and less re- proachful sense, for one who is hired as a servant to perform an allotted work; but in general they are both reproacn- ful epithets, the former having parti- cular reference to the meanness of the emplojrment, and the latter to the sor- did character of the person. Hireling papers are those which are in the pay of a party; a mercenary principle will some- times actuate men in the highest station. HIT. See Beat; Strike. HOARD. See Garner; Treasure. HODGE-PODGE. See Olio. HOIST. See Lift. HOLD, Keep, Detain, Retain. Hold comes from Anglo-Saxon healdan, to hold; keep from Anglo-Saxon cepan, to observe, notice, attend to. ' Detain and retain both come from the Latin tenere, to hold. The first signifies, by virtue of the particle de, meaning from, to hold from another; the second, by virtue of the particle re, to hold back for one's self. To hold is a physical act; it requires a degree of bodily strength or at least the use of the limbs; to keep is simply to have by one at one's pleasure. The having in one's power so that it shall not go is the leading idea in the sig- nification of hold; the durability of having is the leading idea in the word keep: we may hold a thing only for a moment; but what we keep we keep for a time. On the other hand, we may keep a thing by holding, although we may keep it by various other means : we may, therefore, hold without keep- ing, and we may keep without holding. A servant holds a thing in his hand for it to be seen, but he does not keep it; he gives it to his master, who puts it into his pocket, and consequently keeps, but does not hold it. A thing may be held in the hand, or kept in the hand ; in the former case the press- ure of the hand is an essential part of the action, but in the latter case it is simply a contingent part of the action: the hand holds, but the p>erson keeps it. What is held is fixed in position, but what is kept is left loose, or other- wise, at the win of the individual. Things are held by men in their hands, by beasts in their claws or mouths, by birds in their beaks; things are kept by people either about their persons or in their houses, according to convenience. Detain and retain are modes of keep- ing; the former signifies keeping back what belongs to another; the latter sig- nifies keeping a long time for one's own purpose. A jjerson may be either held, kept, detained, or retained: when he is held he is held contrary to his will by the hand of another; as suspected per- sons are held by the ofiicers of justice, that they may not make their escape: he is kept, if he stops in any place, by the desire of another; as a man is kept in prison until his innocence is proved, or a child is kept at school until he has finished his education: he is detained if he be kept away from any place to which he is going or from any person to whom he belongs; as the servant of another is detained to take back a letter, or one is detained by business, so as to be prevented from at^ tending to an appointment: a person is retained who is kept for a continuance in the service of another; as some ser- vants are said to be retained, while others are dismissed. Things are held in the improper sense: they are kept, detained, and retained in the proper sense. A money-lender holds the property of others in pledge; the idea of a temporary and partial action is here expressed by hold, in distinction from keep, which is used to express something definite and per- manent: the money-lender keeps the property as his own if the borrower forfeits it by breach of contract . When a person purchases anything he is ex- pected to keep it or pay the value of the thing ordered, if the tradesman ful- fil his part of the engagement. What is detained is kept either contrary to the will, or without the consent, of the possessor: when things are sus- pected to be stolen, the officers have the right of detaining them until in- quiry be instituted. What is retained HOLD 417 is continuQd to be kept; it supposes, however, some alteration in the terms or circumstances under which it is kept: a person retains his seat in a train, notwithstanding that he finds it disagreeable : or a lady retains some of the articles of millinery which are sent for her choice, but she returns the rest. All are used in a moral application except detain; in this case they are marked by a similar distinction. A person is said to hold an office, by which simple possession is implied: he may hold it for a long or a short time, at the will of others, or by his own will, which is not marked: he keeps a situation or he keeps his post, by which his continuance in the situ- ation or at the post is denoted: but to say he retains his office signifies that he might have given it up, or lost it, had he not been led to continue in it. In like maimer, with regard to one's sentiments or feelings, a man is said to hold certain opinions, which are ascribed to him as a part of his creed; he keeps the opinions which no one can induce him to give up; he retains his old attachments, notwithstanding the lapse of years and change of cir- cmnstances which have intervened and were naturally calculated to wean him from them. See also Contain. Hold, Occupy, Possess. — Hold (see above). Occupy, in Latin occupo, or oh and capere, to hold or keep near, so that it cannot be held by others, or fill a space so that it cannot be filled by any other object. Possess, from Latin possesstis, pastj participle of pos- sideo, or potis and sedeo, signifies to sit as master of. We hold a thing for a long or a short time; we occupy it for a per- manence: we hold it for ourselves or others; we occupy it only for oiu*selves: we hold it for various purposes; we occupy only for the pin-pose of con- verting it to our private use. Thus a person may hold an estate, or, which is the same thing, the title-deeds to an estate, pro tempore, for another person's benefit; but he occupies an es- tate if he enjoys the fruit of it. On the other hand, to occupy is only to hold under a certain compact; but to possess is to hold as one's own. The 27 tenant occupies the farm when he holds it by a certain lease and cultivates it for his subsistence: but the landlord possesses the farm, possessing the right to let it and to receive the rent. We may hold by force, or fraud, or right; we occupy either by force or right; we possess only by right. Hence we say, figm-atively, to hold a person in esteem or contempt, to oc- cupy a person's attention or a place, or to possess one's affection. Hold, Support, Maintain. — Hold is here, as in the former article, a term of very general import. Support (see Countenance) and maintain (see As- sist) include the idea of holding with other cour.teraI ideas in their signifi- cation. Hold and support are employed in the proper sense, maintain in the im- proper sense. To hold is a term un- qualified by any circumstance; we may hold a thing in any direction, hold it up or down, in a straight or oblique direction: support is a species of hold- ing up; to hold up, however, is a personal act or a direct effort of the individual; to support may be an in- direct and a passive act; he who holds anything up keeps it in an upright posture by the exertion of his strength ; he who supports a thing only bears its weight or suffers it to rest upon him- self: persons or voluntary agents can hold up; inanimate objects may sup- port: a servant holds up a child that it may see; a pillar supports a building. In the figurative application a person is said to hold power for himself, but to support the authority of another, or to have one's own mind supported by circumstances or reflections. To maintain is to hold firmly or with vigor. These terms are all appUed to the opinions with a similar distinction. Opinions are held and maintained as one's own; they are supported when they are another's. We hold and main- tain whatever we believe. We support the behef or doctrine of another or what we ourselves have asserted and maintained at a former time. What is held is held by the act of the mind within itself and as regards itself, wth- out ref-Tence to others; but what is maintained and supported is openly de- clared to be held; it is maintained with 418 HOLIDAY others or against others; it is supported in an especial manner against others; it may be maintained by simple decla- ration or assertions; it is supported by argument. What is held may be held by means of the afifections, as to hold a person dear, or hold a thing in esteem; to maintain and support are applied only to speculative matters with which the imderstanding is engaged, as to main- tain or support truth or error, to main- tain or support a cause. HOLIDAY. See Feast. HOLINESS, Sanctity. Holiness, from Anglo-Saxon halig, allied to hal, whole, and health, has altogether ac- quired a Christian signification; it re- spects the life and temper of a Christian. Sanctity, based on the Latin sanctum, holy, has merely a moral signification, which it derives from the sanction of himaan authority. Holiness is to the mind of a man what sanctity is to his exterior, with this difference, that holiness to a cer- tain degree ought to belong to every man professing Christianity; but sanc- tity, as it lies in the manners, the outward garb, and deportment, is be- coming only to certain persons and at certain times. Holiness is a thing not to be affected; but sanctity, consisting in externals, is from its very nature exposed to falsehood. It becomes those who fill a sacred office, but no others. HOLLOW, Empty. Hollow, from hole, signifying like a hole, concerns the body itself; the absence of its own ma- terials produces hollowness. Empty concerns foreign bodies; their absence in another body constitutes emptiness. Hollowness is therefore a preparative to emptiness, and may exist indepen- dently of it; but emptiness presupposes the existence of hollowness: what is empty must be hollow; but what is hol- low need not be empty. Hollowness is often the natural property of a body; emptiness is a contingent property: that which is hollow is destined by nature to contain; but that which is empty is deprived of its contents by a casu- alty: a nut is hollow for the purpose of receiving the fruit; it is empty if it contain no fruit. They are both employed in a moral acceptation and in a bad sense; the hollow, in this case, is applied to what ought to be solid or sound, and empty to what ought to be filled; a person is hollow whose goodness lies only at the surface, whose fair words are without meaning; a truce is hollow which is only an external cessation from hostili- ties: a person is empty who is void of understanding and knowledge; an excuse is empty which is unsupported by fact and reason; a pleasure is emp- ty which cannot afford satisfaction. HOLY, Pious, Devout, Religious. Holy (see Holiness). Pious, in Latin piu^, signifies having a regard for the gods. Devout, in Latin devolve, from devovere, to engage by a vow, signifies devoted or consecrated. Religious, in Latin religiosu^, comes from religio, meaning attention to the worship of the gods. A strong regard for the Supreme Be- ing is' expressed by all these epithets; but holy conveys the most compre- hensive idea; piov^ and devout desig- nate most fervor of mind; religious is the most general and abstract in its signification. A holy man is in all respects heavenly-minded; he is more fit for heaven than earth: holiness, to whatever degree it is possessed, ab- stracts the thoughts from sublunary objects and fixes them on things that are above. Our Saviour was a perfect pattern of holiness; his apostles after him, and innumerable saints and good men, both in and out of the ministry, have striven to imitate his example by the holiness of their life and con- versation. Piou^ is a term more restricted in its signification, and consequently more extended in application than holy: pi- ety is not a virtue peculiar to Chris- tians; it is common to all believers in a Supreme Being; it is the homage of the heart and the affections to a su- perior Being: from a similarity in the relationship between a heavenly and an earthly parent, devotedness of the mind has in both cases been denomi- nated piety. Piety toward God natu- rally produces piety toward parents; for the obedience of the heart, which gives rise to the virtue in the one case, seems instantly to dictate the exercise of it in the other. The difference between holiness and piety is obvious from this. HOMAGE 4ia that our Saviour and his apostleo are characterized as holy, but not jrioxis, because piety is swallowed up in holi- ness. On the other hand, Jew and Gentile, Christian and heathen, are alike termed -pious when they cannot be called holy, because piety is not only a more practicable virtue, but because it is more imiversally applicable to the dependent condition of man. Devotion is a species of piety pecuhar to the worshipper; it bespeaks that devotedness of mind which displays it- self in the temple when the individual seems by his outward services solemnly to devote himself, soul and body, to the service of his Maker. Piety, there- fore, lies in the heart and need not appear externally; but devotion requires to be marked by some external observ- ance: a vasia piously resigns himseK to the will of God in the midst of his afflictions; he prays devovily in the bosom of his family. Religious is a term of less import than either of the other terms; it denotes httle more than the simple existence of religion, or a sense of religion, in the mind: the religious man is so more in his principles than in his affections; he is religious in his sentiments, inas- much as he directs all his views accord- ing to the will of his Maker; and he is religious in his conduct, inasmuch as he observes the outward formalities of homage that are due to his Maker. When applied to things, these terms preserve a similar distinction: we speak of the holy sacrament; of a pious dis- course, a pious ejaculation; of a devoid exercise, a devoui slit; a religious senti- ment, a religious life, a religious educa- tion, and the like. Holy, Sacred, Divine. — Holy is here, as in the former article, a term of higher import than either sacred, which is in Latm sax:er, or divine (see God- like). Whatever is most intimately connected with religion and religious worship, in its piu-est state, is holy, unhallowed by a mixture of inferior objects, and elevated in the greatest possible degree, so as to suit the nature of an infinitely perfect and exalted Being. Among the Jews, the holy of holies was that place which was in- tended to approach the nearest to the heavenly ab<>de, consequently was pre- served as much as possible from all contamination with that which is earthly: among the Christians, that religion or form of religion is termed holy which is esteemed purest in its doctrine, discipline, and ceremonies. Sacred is less than holy; the sacred derives its sanction from human insti- tutions and is connected rather with our moral than our religious duties; what is holy is altogether spiritual, and abstracted from the earthly. The laws are sacred, but not holy; a man's word should be sacred, though not holy: for neither of these things is to be reverencedj but both are to be kept free from mjury or external violence. The holy is not so much opposed to, as it is set above, everything else; the sacred is opposed to the profane: the Scriptures are properly denominated holy, because they are the word of God, and the fruit of His Holy Spiritr but other writings may be termea sacred which appertain to religion, in distinction from the profane, which appertain only to worldly matters. Divine is a term of even less import than sacred; it signifies either belong- ing to a deity or being like a deity; but from the looseness of its applica- tion it has lost in some respects the dignity of its meaning. The divine is often contrasted with the human: but there are many human things which are denominated divine: Milton's poem is entitled a divine poem, not merely on accoimt of the subject, but from the exalted manner in which the poet has treated his subject: what is divine, therefore, may be so superlatively ex- cellent as to be conceived of as having the stamp of inspiration from the Deity, which, of course^ as it apphes to himian performances, is but a hyperbohcal mode of speech. HOMAGE, Fealty, Court. Hom- age, in Old French homage, from Latin homo, a man, signifies a man's, that is an inferior's, act of acknowledging su- periority. Homage, in the technical sense, was an oath taken, or a service performed, by the tenant to his lord, on being admitted to his land; or by in- ferior princes to a sovereign, whereby they acknowledged his sovereignty and Eromised fidelity: in its extended and gurative sense it comprehends any 420 HOME solemn mark of deference, by which the superiority of another is acknowl- edged. Fealty, through Old French/eoZ^e, from Latin fidelatem, based on jidelis, loyal, trusty, is a lower species of homage, consisting only of an oath; it was made formerly by tenants, who were bound thereby to personal service under the feudal system. Court, which derives its meaning from the verb to court, woo, and seek favor, is a species of homage, complaisance, or deference, which is assmned for a specific purpose; it is not only voluntary, but depends upon the humor and convenience of the courtier. Homage is paid or done to superior endowments; court is paid to the con- tingent, not the real, superiority of the individual. Fealty is figuratively employed in the sense of fidelity to one's sovereign. Homage consists in any form of respect which is admitted in civil society; the Romans did hom^- age to the talents of Virgil by always rising when he entered the theatre; men do homage to the wisdom of an- other when they do not venture to contradict his assertions or call in question his opinions. Court is every- thing or nothiiig, as circvunstances re- quire; he who pays his court consults the will and humor of him to whom it is paid, while he is consulting his own interest. HOME. See Domicile. HONEST. See Fair; Sincere. HONESTY, Probity, Uprightness, Integrity. Honesty is the most fa- mihar and imiversal term; it is ap- plied alike to actions and principles, to a mode of conduct or a temper of mind: a person may be honest, a prin- ciple honest, or an action honest; the other terms are applied to the person, as a person of probity, uprightness, and integrity: a man is said to be honest who in his dealings with others does not violate the laws; a servant is honest who does not take any of the Eroperty of his master or suffer it to e taken; a tradesman is honest who does not sell bad articles; and people in general are denominated honest who pay what they owe and do not adopt any methods of defrauding others. Honesty is a negative virtue ; all the other terms denote positive virtues and higher characteristics. Probity, from probus, good, and probo, to prove, sig- nifying tried virtue or solid goodness, is applied not merely to the com- mercial dealings of men, but to all the concerns of life where truth and goodness are called into exercise. Probity refers to the rights of men, giving to every one his due, whether as regards his property, reputation, honor, or any other thing on which a value is set. Honesty is opposed to direct fraud, probity to any species of insincerity. Uprightness, from upright or up and right, signifies bearing up in a straight and undeviating course in opposition to every temptation which may offer. Uprightness, therefore, supposes an in- dependent and positive principle which forms the rule of life. Any person may be said to be upright in all situations where confidence and intelligence are required, but more particularly a judge who scrupulously adheres to the dictates of an unbiassed conscience. Integrity, from integer, whole or sound, "signifying soimdness of princi- ple, (as in Horace, "integer vitoe, sceleris- qu£ purus") is appUed, like uprightness, to cases where a particular trust is re- posed ; but integrity is taken absolutely, that is, without any reference to the outward circumstances which might tend to produce the contrary charac- teristic. He who faithfully discharges his trust and consults the interests of others rather than his own is justly styled a man of integrity. This virtue is to be looked for especially in those who fill any office. Honesty, Honor. — These terms both regard the principle which actuates men in the adjustment of their rights with one another. The words are both derived from the same source, namely, the Hebrew hon, substance or wealth, which, being the primitive source of esteem among men, became at length put for the measure or standard of esteem, namely, what is good. Hence honesty and honor are both founded upon what is estimable, with this dif- ference, that honesty is confined to the first principles or laws upon which civil society is foimded, and honor is an independent principle that extends to everything which by usage has been admitted as estimable or entitled to HOPE 421 esteem. An honest action, therefore, can never reflect so much credit on the agent as an honorable action, since in the performance of the one he may be guided by motives comparatively low, whereas in the other case he is actuated solely by a fair regard for the honor or the esteem of others. To a breach of honesty is attached punish- ment and personal inconvenience in various forms; but a breach of honor is only followed ^^^ disgrace or the ill opinion of others. On the other hand, honesty is founded on the very first principles of human society, and fionor on the incidental principles which have been attached to them in the progress of time and culture; the former is positive and definite, and he who is actuated by this principle can never err; but the latter is mdefinite and variable, and, as it depends upon opin- ion, it will easily mislead. We cannot have a false honesty, but we may have false honor. Honesty always keeps a man within the hne of his duty; but a mistaken notion of what is honor- able may carry a man very far from what is right, and may even lead him to run counter to common honesty. See also Glory. HONOR, Reverence, Respect. These terms agree in expressing the act of an inferior toward his superior; but honor (see Glort) expresses less than reverence (see Adore), and more than respect (see Esteem). To honor is only an outward act; to reverence is either an act of the mind or the outward expression of a senti- ment; to respect is mostly an act of the mind, though it may admit of being expressed by some outward act. We hcmor God by adoration and worship, as well as by the performance of His will; we honor our parents by obeying them and giving them our personal service: we reverence our Maker by cherishing in our minds a dread of offending Him and making a profane use of His holy name and word: we reverence our parents by holding a similar sentiment in a less degree. To honor, when apphed to things, is taken in the sense of holding in honor; and respect, to have respect for, with the same distinction between them. Honor, Dignity. — Honor may be taken either for that which intrinsically belongs to a person or for that which is conferred on him. Dignity, based on the Latin dignus, worthy, signifying worthiness, may be equally appUed to what is extrinsic or intrinsic in a man. In the first case honor has a reference to what is esteemed by others; dignity to that which is esteemed by ourselves: a sense of honor impels a man to do that which is esteemed honorable among men; a sense of dignity to do that which is consistent with the worth and great- ness of his nature: the former impels a man to elevate himself as an indi- vidual; the latter to raise himself to the standard of his species: the former may lead a person astray, but the lat- ter is an unerring guide. It is honor which makes a man draw his sword upon his friend: it is dignity which makes him despise every paltry affront from others, and apologize for every apparent affront on his own part. This distinction between the terms is kept up in their appUcation to what is extraneous of a man: honor is that which is conferred on him by others; but dignity is the worth or value which is added to his condition: hence we always speak of honors as conferred or received; but dignities as possessed or maintained. Honors may sometimes be casual; but dignities are always permanent: an act of condescension from the sovereign is an honor; but the 4ignily is that which exalts the man. Hence it is that horurrs are mostly civil or political; dignities may also be ecclesiastical. HOPE, Expectation, Trust, Con- fidence. Anticipation of futurity is the common idea expressed by all these words. Hope is in Anglo-Saxon hopa. Hope is that which is welcome; expec- tation (see Await) is either welcome or unwelcome: we hope only for that which is good; we exvecl the bad as well as the good. In Dad weather we hope it will soon be better; but in a bad season we expect a bad harvest, and in a good season a good harvest. Hope is simply a presentiment; it may vary in degree, more according to the temper of the mind than the nature of the circumstances; some hope where there is no ground for hope. 422 HOPEFUL and others despair where they might fiope: expectation is a conviction that excludes doubt; we expect in propor- tion as that conviction is positive: we hope that which may be or can pos- sibly be; we expect that which must be or which ought to be. The young man hopes to hve many years; the old man expects to die in a few years. Hope and expectation consist in look- ing for some good, trust (see Belief) and confidence (see Confide) in a de- pendence on a person or thing to bring about the good. We may, therefore, have either hope or expectation grounded on trust or confidence, or we may have them where there is no room for either trust or confidence; a person may hope that something good may turn up be- cause the future is imcertain; we may expect that it will rain to-day; a person may trust to the skill of another, or confide in his promises. Trust and con- fidence denote the same sentiment, but trust is applied to objects generally, confidence to particular objects; we may tmst partially, but we confide entirely; we may trust strangers, we confide in friends or those we are partial to. Trust and confidence may both be appUed to a man's self, or that which belongs to him, with a similar distinc- tion. HOPEFUL. See Sangihnb. HOPELESS. See Desperate. HORRIBLE. See Fearful. HORRID. See Fearful. HOST. See Army. HOSTILE. See Adverse. HOSTILITY. See Enmity. HOT, Fiery, Burning, Ardent. These terms characterize either the presence of heat or the cause of heat. Hot, Anglo-Saxon hat, is the general term which marks simply the presence of heai; fiery, i. e., having fire, goes further, it denotes the presence of fire, which is the cause of heat; burning, i. e., in a state of burning, denotes the action of fire, and consequently is more expressive than the two; ardent (see Fervor), which is literally the same in signification, is employed either in poetry or in apphcation to moral ob- jects: a room is hot; a furnace or the tail of a comet fi^ry; a coal burning; the sun ardent. In the figm-ative appUcaticn, a tem- per is said to be hot or fiery; rage is burning; the mind is ardent m pursuit of an object. Zeal may be h^t, fiery, burning, and ardent, but in the first three cases it denotes the intemperance of the mind when heated by reUgion or poUtics; the last is admissible so long as it is confined to a good object. See also Fire. HOUSE. See Family. HOWEVER, Yet, Nevertheless, Notwithstanding. These conjunc- tions are in grammar termed advers- ative, because they join sentences to- gether that stand more or less in opposition to each other. However is the most general and indefinite; it serves as a conclusive deduction drawn from the whole. "The truth is, however, not yet all come out"; by this is under- stood that much of the truth has been told, and much yet remains to be told: so likewise in similar sentences, "I am not, however, of that opinion"; where it is implied either that many hold the opinion or much may be said of it, but, be that as it may, I am not of that opinion: "however, you may rely on my assistance to that amount"; that is, at all events, let whatever happen, you may rely on so much of my assist- ance: however, as is obvious from the above examples, connects not only one single proposition, but many proposi- tions either expressed or understood. Yet, nevertheless, and notwithstanding are mostly employed to set two spe- cific propositions either in contrast or direct opposition to each other; the latter two are but speciss of the former, pointing out the opposition in a more specific manner. There are cases in which yet is pe- cuharly proper, others in which never- theless, and others in which notwith- standing are preferable. Yet bespeaks a simple contrast; "Addison was not a good speaker, yet he was an admirable writer; Johnson was a man of uncouth manners, yet he had a good heart and a sound head"; nevertheless and not- withstanding could not in these cases have been substituted. Nevertheless and notwithstanding are mostly used to imply efifectis or consequences opposite to what might naturally be expected to result. " He has acted an unworthy HUMBLE 423 part, nevertheless I will be a friend to him as far as I can"; that is, although he has acted an unworthy part, I will be no less his friend as far as lies in my p>ower. " Notwithstanding all I have said, he still persists in his own impru- dent conduct ; that is, all I have said notwithstanding or not restraining him from it, he still persists. "He is still rich, notwithstanding his loss"; that is, his loss notwithstanding, or not standing in the way of it, he is still rich. From this resolution of the terms, more than from any specific rule, we may judge of their distinct applications, and clearly perceive that in such cases as those above cited the conjunctions neverthe- less and notwithstanding could not be substituted for each other, nor yet for either: in other cases, however, where the objects are less definitely pointed out, they may be used indifferently. "The Jesuits piqued themselves always upon their strict morality, and yet [nottvith- standing or nevertheless] they admitted of many things not altogether conso- nant with moral principle. You know that these are but tales, yet [notwith- standing, nevertheless]you beUevethem." HtTDDLE. See Jumble. HUE. See Color. HUG. See Clasp. HUGE. See Enormous. HUMAN, Humane. Though both derived from hoTtw, a man, they are thus far distinguished that human is said of the genus and humane of the species. The human race or human beings are opposed to the irrational part of the creation; a humane race or a humane individual is opposed to one that is cruel and fond of inflicting pain. He who is not human is divested of the first and distinguishing characteristics of his kind; he who is not humane, of the most important and elevated char- acteristic that belongs to his nature. HUMANITY. See Benevolence. HUMBLE, Lowly, Low. Humble is here compared with the other terms as it respects both persons and things. A person is said to be humble on ac- coimt of the state of his mind: he is said to be lowly and low either on ac- count of his mind or his outward cir- cumstances. A humble person is so in his principles and in his conduct; a lowly person is so in the tone of his feelings, or in his station and walk of life; a low person is so either in his sentiments, in his actions, or in his rank and condition; but persons may sometimes be law from particular cir- cumstances who are not low in condi- tion. Humility should form a part of the character, as it is opposed to arro- gance and assumption; it is most con- sistent with the fallibility of our nature. Lowliness, in the Christian belief, should form a part of our temper, as it is op- posed to an aspiring and lofty mind; it is most consistent with the temper of our Saviour, who was meek and lowly of mind. The humble and lowly are alwaj^ taken in a good sense; but the low either in a bad or an indifferent sense. A lowly man, whether as it regards his mind or his condition, is so without any moral debasement; but a man who is low in his condition is likewise con- ceived to be low in his habits and his sentiments, which is being nearly akin to the vicious. The same distinction is preserved in applying these terms to inanimate or spiritual objects. A humble roof, a hurnble office, a humble station are associated with the high- est moral worth; while a low office, a low situation, a low birth, seem ta exclude the idea of worth. See also Abase. Humble^ Modest, Submissive. — These terms designate a temper of mind the reverse of self-conceit or pride. The humble, in Latin humilis, low, from humus, the ground, signifying the lowest position, is so with regard to ourselves or others. Modesty (see Modest) is that which regards our- selves only: submissiveness, from sub- missus, signifying putting under, is that which regards others. A man is humble from a sense of his comparative inferi- ority to others in point of station and outward circumstances ; or he is humble from a serfse of his imperfections and a consciousness of not being what he ought to be: he is modest, inasmuch as he sets but httle value on his qualifica- tions, acquirements, and endowments. Humility is a painful sentiment; for when it concerns others it is coupled with fear; when it concerns our own un worthiness it is coupled with sorrow: modesty is a peaceful sentiment; it 424 HUMIDITY ^ serves to keep the whole mind in due bounds. When humility and modesty show themselves in the outward con- duct, the former bows itself down, the latter shrinks: a humble man gives freely to others from a sense of their deserving; a, modest man demands noth- ing for himself, from an imconscious- ness of deserving in himself. Between humble and submissive there is this prominent feature of distinction, that the former marks a temper of mind, the latter a mode of action: the former is, therefore, often the cause of the latter, but not so always; we may be submissive because we are humble; but we may likewise be submissive from fear, from interested motives, from ne- cessity, from duty, and the like; and on the other hand, we may be humble without being submissive, when we are not brought into connection with others. A man is humble when in solitude he takes a review of his sinfulness; he is submissive to a master whose displeas- ure he dreads. Humble, Humiliate, Degrade. — Hum- ble and humiliate are both drawn from the same som-ce (see above). Degrade (see above). Humble is commonly used as the act either of persons or things: a person may humble himself or he may be humbled: humiliate is employed to char- acterize things; a thing is humiliating or a humiliation. No man humbles himself by the acknowledgment of a fault; but it is a great humiliation for a person to be dependent on another for a hving when he has it in his power to obtain it for himself. To humble is to bring down to the ^ound; it supposes a certain eminence, either created by the mind or really existing in the outward circmnstances; to degrade is to set down lo\^.?r; it sup- poses steps for descending. He who is most elevated in his own esteem may be most humbled; misfortunes may humble the proudest conqueror: he who is most elevated in the esteem of others may be the most degraded; envy is ever on the alert to degrade. A lesson in the school of adversity is humbling to one who has known nothing but prosper- ity: terms of peace are humiliating: low vices are pecuUarly degrading to a man of rank. HUMIDITY. See Moisture. HUMILIATE. See Hximble. HUMOR, Temper, Mood. Humor literally signifies moisture or fluid, in which sense it is used for the fluids of the human body; and as far as these humors or their particular state is con- nected with, or has its influence on, the animal spirits and the moral feel- ings, so far is humor applicable to moral agents. Temper (see Disposition) is less specific in its signification; it may, with equal propriety, under the changed form of temperament, be appHcable to the general state of the body or the mind. Mood, which is but a change from mode or manner, has an original - signification not less indefinite than the former; it is applied, however, only to the mind. As the humors of the body are the most variable parts of the ani- mal frame, humor in regard to the mind denotes but a partial and transitory state when compared with the temper, which is a general and habitual state. The humor is so fluctuating that it varies in the same mind perpetually; but the temper is so far confined that it always shows itself to be the same whenever it shows itself at all: the humor makes a man different from him- self; the temper makes him different from others. Hence we speak of the humor of the moment; of the temper of youth or of old age: so likewise we say, to accommodate one's seK to the humor of a person; to manage his tem- per: to put one into a certain humor; to correct or sour the temper. Humor is not less partial in its nature than in its duration; it fixes itself often on only one object, or regards only one par- ticular direction of feelings: temper ex- tends to aU the actions and opinions as well as feelings of a man: it gives a coloring to all he says, does, thinks, and feels. We may be in a humor for writing or reading; for what is gay or what is serious; for what is noisy or what is quiet; but our temper is dis- coverable in our daily conduct; we may be in a good or ill humor in company, but in domestic life and in om- closest relations we show whether we are good or iU tempered. A man shows his hu/- mar in different or trifhng actions; he shows his temper in the most important actions: it may be a man's humor to HURT 425 sit while others stand, or to go un- shaven while others shave; but he shows his temper as a Christian or otherwise in forgiving injuries or not harboring resentments ; in Uving peace- ably) not indulging himself in con- tentions. When applied to bodies of men hvn mor, as denoting a temporary or fluctu- ating feeling, is more commonly used than temper. Humor and mood agree in denoting a particular and temporary state of feeling; but they differ in the cause, the former being attributable rather to the physical state of the body, and the latter to the moral frame of the mind; the former, therefore, is inde- pendent of all external circumstances, or at all events of any that are re- ducible to system; the latter is guided entirely by events, or the view which the mind tjikes of events. Humor is, therefore, generallv taken in a bad sense unless actually qualified by some epithet to the contrary: mMxi is always taken in an inr'lfTerent sense. There is no calculating on the humxrr of a man; it depends upon his mood whether he performs ill or well: it is necessary to suppress humor in a child; we dis- cover by the melancholy viood of a man that something distressing has happened to him. See also Gratify; Qualify; Wit. Humor, Caprice. — Humor is general, caprice (see Fanciful) is particular: hum^rr may be good or bad; caprice is always taken in a bad sense. Humor is always independent of fixed prin- ciple; it is the feeling or impulse of the moment: caprice is always opposed to fiixed principle or rational motives of acting; it is the feeling of the indi- vidual setting at naught aU rule and defying all reason. The feeling only is perverted when the humor predomi- nates; the judgment and will are per- verted by caprice; a child shows its humor in fretfulness and impatience; a man betrays his caprice in his inter- course with others, in the management of his concerns, or in the choice of his amusements. Indulgence, according to a mode of speech now practically obsolete, ren- ders children and subordinate persons humorsotne; prosperity or unlimited power is apt to render a man capricious: a humor some person commonly objects to be pleased or is easily displeased ; a capricious person likes and dislikes, approves and disapproves the same thmg in quick succession. Humorsome, Hurnxnous, Capricious — Humor, when applied to things, has the sense of wit, whence the distinction between humorsome and humorous, the former implying the existence of humor or perverted feeling in the person; the '.-.tter implying the existence of humor or wit in the person or thing. Caprice is improperly applied to things to des- ignate their total irregularity and plan- lessness of proceeding, as, m speaking of fashion, we notice its caprice when that which has been laid aside is again taken into use; diseases are termed capricious which act in direct opposi- tion to all established rule. HUNT, Chase. The leading idea in the word hunt from Anglo-Saxon huntian, to capture, is that of searching after; the leading idea in the word chase is that of driving away or before one. In a strict sense, hunt denotes a search for objects not within sight; chase is a pursuit after such objects only as are within sight: we may hunt, therefore, without' chasing: we may chase without hunting: a person hunts after, but does not chase that which is lost : a boy chases, but does not hunt. a butterfly. When applied to field sports, the hunt commences as soon as the huntsman begins to look for the game; the chase commences as soon as it is found: on this ground, perhaps, it is that hunt is used, in familiar dis- course, to designate the specific act of taking this amusement; and chase is used only in particular cases where the peciUiar idea is to be expressed: a fox- hunt, or a stag-hunt, is said to take place on a particular day; or that there has been no hunting this season, or that the hunt has been very bad: but we speak, on the other hand, of the pleas- ures of the chase, or that the chase lasted very long; the animal gave a long chase. HURL. See Cast. HURRY. See Hasten. HURT. See Disadvantage; In- jury; Sorry. 426 HURTFUL HURTFUL, Pernicious, Noxious, Noisome. Between hurtful, signifying full of hurt, and -pernicious there is the same distinction as between hurting and destroying: that which is hurtful may hurt in various ways; but that which is pernicious necessarily tends to destruction: confinement is hurtful to the health: bad company is perni- cimis to the morals, or the doctrines of free-thinkers are said to be pernicious to the well-being of society. Noxious and noisome, from nocere, to hurt, are spe- cies of the hurtful: things may be hurt- ful both to body and mind; noxious and noisome only to the body: that which is noxious inflicts a direct in- jury; that which is noisome inflicts it indirectly: noxious insects are such as wound; noisome vapors are such as tend to create disorders. HUSBAND, Conserve, Economize. Husband, from the Icelandic husbondi, that contracted from huslmandi, com- pound of hus, a house, and buandi, a dwelling, all imply the male head of a household. In the present appUcation the term signifies to manage one's affairs with frugality, to use one's resources so as to produce the best results. Conserve, from Latin conservare, means primarily to save. We con- serve our health and property by adopting such methods as will save them from depreciation, injury, loss, or destruction. We economize our health, time, and property by managing each with care, prudence, and a proper re- gard for their value. Economize has an original meaning similar to that of hus- band, being derived from the Greek word for house, and indicating the man- agement of the household. Husband, however, means primarily prudence in saving, in gathermg together, and con- serving resources; economize signifies prudence in spending. See Economical. HUSBANDMAN. See Farmer. HUSBANDRY. See Cultivation. HYDROPLANE. See Aircraft. HYPNOTISM, Mesmerism, Ani- mal Magnetism. The difference be- tween these three words is not a differ- ence in meaning, but a difference in the theory implied in them, and in fashion- able and professional usage. Hypno- tism replaced mesmerism, and mesmer- ism animal magnetism in professional usage as names for the same phenome- non. This phenomenon is a pecuhar condition of the nervous system induced by a fixed, abstracted attention of the mental and visual eye on one object not of an exciting nature. It was called animal magnetism by F. A. Mes- mer, because he belieVed in a mag- netic force in animals, peculiar to hving beings, by which one acts on another just as the magnet acts on steel; to this the inducing of the hypnotic state was due. The phenomenon was by others called mesmerism, after Mesmer (about 1766), because it was made known to the pubUc everywhere chiefly through his somewhat spectacular meth- ods of producing it. Mesmerism refers, then, primarily to the manner of induc- ing a hypnotic condition. The term hypnotism, fro^n vwoq, sleep, and vtvpov, nerve, was coined in 1842 by James Braid, who was the first tg investigate the subject in a physiological way. This name was intended to imply that the phenomenon was due not to any occult magnetic force, inherent in or- ^ ganic life everywhere, but to a pecul- iar condition of the nerves. His name replaced mesmerism in popular usage. HYPOCHONDRIACAL, Melan- cholic, Splenetic. These words all refer to an abnormal psychological con- dition supposed 3 be produced or ac- companied by a disorder of the spleen; but they indicate slightly different psychological states. Hypochondriacal (from Greek iwo and XovSpia, the parts beneath the breast- bone, i. e., the spleen) is the adjective corresponding to hypochondria, a gloomy and irritable state of mind in which the subject believes that his health is in a very serious condition and that he is threatened with death. Melancholic (Greek fieXayxoXia, black bile, refer- ring to secretions of the spleen) refers simply to a state of morbid gloom. SptenetiCfirora Latin splen, Greek (tttX^v, spleen, refers to a state of morbid gloom especially characterized by irritableness of temper, a disposition to take offence at everything. HYPOCRITE, Dissembler. Hyp- ocrite, in Greek vTroKpirTjg, from viro and Kpivofiai, signifies one playing a part on a stage. Dissembler, from dissemble, in Latin dissimulo or dis and HYPOTHETICAL 427 simUis, signifies one who makes him- self appear unlike what he really is. The hypocrite feigns to be what he is not; the dissembler conceals what he is: the former takes to himself the credit of virtues which he has not; the latter fionceals the vices that he has; every hypocrite is a dissembler; but every dis- sembler is not a hypocrite: the hypocrite makes truth serve the purpose of false- hood; the dissembler is content with making falsehood serve his own par- ticular purpose. HYPOTHETICAL. See Empirical. 428 IDEA IDEA, Thought, Imagination. Idea, in Latin idea, in Greek ISka, from the root found in Latin videre, to see, signifies the thing seen in the mind. Thought comes from Anglo- Saxon thencan, modern English think. Imagination signifies the thing imag- ined, from Latin imago, from the root im, found in imitare, English imitate. The idea is the simple representation of an object; the thought is the re- flection; and the imagination is the combination of ideas: we have ideas of the sun, the moon, and all material objects; we have thoughts on moral subjects; we have imaginations drawn from the ideas already existing in the mind. Ideas are formed; they are the rude materials with which the thinking \ faculty exerts itself: thoughts arise in the mind by means of association and combination, or recur in the mind by the power of the memory; they are the materials with which the thinking faculty employs itself : imaginations are created by the mind's reaction on it- self; they are the materials with which the understanding seeks to enrich it- self. The term ideas is used in all cases for the mental representation, abstractedly from the agent that rep- resents them: hence ideas are attached to words; ideas are analyzed, con- foimded, and the like; in which cases the word thought could not be substi- tuted. Thought belongs only to think- ing and rational beings: the animals may be said to have ideas, but not thoughts: hence thoughts are either mean, fine, grovelling, or sublime, ac- cording to the nature of the mind in which they exist: hence we say with more propriety, to indulge a thought than to indulge an idea; to express one's thoughts, rather than one's ideas, on any subject: although the latter term idea, on account of its compre- hensive use, may, without violation of any express rule, be indifferently em- gloyed in general discourse for thought; ut the former term does not on this account lose its characteristic meaning. Imagination is not only the fruit of thought, but of pecuUar thought: the thmight may be another's : the imagina- tion is one's own: the thought occurs and recurs; it comes and it goes; it is retained or rejected at the pleasure of the thinking being: the imagination is framed by the power which we term imagination; it is cherished with the partiality of a parent for its offspring. Thoughts are busied with the sur- rounding objects; imaginations are em- ployed on distant and strange objects: hence thoughts are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; imaginations, wild and extravagant. See also Perception. Ideal, Imaginary. — Ideal does not strictly adhere to the sense of its primi- tive, idea: the idea is the representation of a real object in the mind; but ideal signifies belonging to the idea indepen- dently of the reaUty or the external object. Imaginary preserves the sig- nification of its primitive, imagination (see Fancy) denotes what is created by the mind itself. The ideal is not directly opposed to, but ab- stracted from the real; the imaginary, on the other hand, is d rectly opposed to the real; it is the unreal thing formed by the imagination. Ideal hap- piness is the happiness which is formed in the mind without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something pos- sible to be realized; it may be above nature, but not in direct contradiction to it: the imaginary is that which is opposite to some positive existing re- ality; the pleasure which a lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is altogether imaginary. See also IJtopian. IDIOM. See Language. IDIOT. See Fool. IDLE, Lazy, Indolent. Idle comes from Anglo-Saxon idel, vain, empty. Lazy comes from Low German lasich, aUied to loose, signifying languid, idle. IGNORANT 429 Indolent, in Latin indolens, from in, not, and dolens, from dolere, to grieve, signifies not grieving, lacking in feel- ing; hence, lacking in life and en- ergy. A propensity to inaction is the co""- mon idea by which these words are connected ; they differ in the cause and degree of the quaUty: idle expresses less than lazy, and lazy less than in- dolent: one is termed tdle who will do nothing useful; one is lazy who will do nothing at all without great re- luctance; one is indolent who does not care to do anything or set about any- thing. There is no direct inaction in the idler; for a child is idle who will not learn his lesson, but he is active enough in that which pleases himself: there is an aversion to corporeal action in a lazy man, but not always to mental action; he is lazy at work, lazy in walking, or lazy in sitting; but he may not object to any employment, such as reading or thinking, which leaves his body entirely at rest: an indolent man, on the contrary, fails in activity from a defect both in the mind and the body; he will not only not move, but he will not even think, if it give him trouble; and trifling exertions of any kind are sufficient, even in pros- pect, to deter him from attempting to move. Lazy is figuratively applied to other objects. Idle is also applied to things in the sense of leisure and vanity, for which see the next analysis. Idle, Leisure, Vacant. — Idle is op- posed here to busy; leisure comes from Anglo-French leisir, originally the in- finitive mood, signifying to be per- mitted, from Latin licere. He, there- fore, who is idle, instead of being busy, commits a fault; which is not always the case with him who is at leisure or free from his employment. Idle is al- ways taken in a sense more or less unfavorable; leisure in a sense perfectly indifferent: if a man says of himself that he has spent an idle hour in this or that place, in amusement, company, and the like, he means to signify _ he would have spent it better if anything had offered; on the other hand, he would say that he spends his leisure moments in a suitable relaxation: he who values his time will take care to have as few idle hours as possible; but since no one can always be employed in severe labor, he wiU occupy his leisure hours in that which best suits his taste. Idle and leisure are said in particular reference to the time that is employed; vacant (see Fill) is a more general term that simply qualifies the thing: an idle hour is one without any prof)er employment; a vacant hour is in gen- eral one free from the employments with which it might be fiUed; a per- son has leisure time according to his wishes; but he may have voamtiI time from necessity; that is, when he is in want of employment. Idle, Vain. — These epithets are both opposed to the solid or substantial; but idle has a more particular reference to what ought or ought not to engage the time or attention; vain, in Latm vanus, signifying empty, seems to qual- ify the thing without any such refer- ence. A pursuit may be termed either idle or vain: in the former case, it re- flects immediately on the agent for not employing his time on something more serious; but in the latter case it simply characterizes the pursuit as one that will be attended with no good conse- quences: when we consider ourselves as beings who have but a short time to live, and that every moment of that time ought to be thoroughly well spent, we should be careful to avoid all idle concerns; when we consider ourselves as rational beings, who are responsible for the use of those powers with which we have been invested by God we shall be careful to reject all vain concerns: an idle effort is made by one who does not care to exert himself for any useful purpose, who works only to please him- self; a vain effort may be made by one who is in a state of desperation. IGNOMINY. See Infamy. IGNORANT, Illiterate, Un- learned, Unlettered. Ignorant, in Latin ignorans, from the privative in, and the root gno, signifying to know, signifies not knowing things in gen- eral, or not knowing any particular cir- cumstance. Unlearned, illiterate, and unlettered are compared with ignorant in the general sense. Ignorant is a comprehensive term; 430 ILL it includes any degree from the high- est to the lowest, and consequently in- cludes the other terms, illiterate, un- learned, and unlettered, which express different forms of ignorance. Ignorance is not always to one's disgrace, since it is not always one's fault; the term is not, therefore, directly reproachful: the poor, ignorant savage is an object of pity rather than condemnation; but when ignorance is coupled with self-conceit and presumption, it is a real deformity: hence the word il- literate, which is mostly used in such cases, has become a term of reproach: an ignorant man who sets up to teach others is termed an illiterate preacher; and quacks, whether in reUgion or med- icine, from the very nature of their calling, are altogether an illiterate race of men. The term illiterate is in all cases taken for one who is without education or even the knowledge of his letters; the words unlearned and un- lettered are disengaged from any im- favorable associations. A modest man, who makes no pretensions to learning, may suitably apologize for his sup- posed deficiencies by saying he is an unlearned or unlettered man; the former is, however, a term of more familiar use than the latter. A man may be described either as generally unlearned or as unlearned in particular sciences or arts; as unlearned In history; un- learned in philosophy; unlearned in the ways of the world: a rustic poet's muse may be described as unlettered. ILL. See Badly; Evil. ILL-FATED. See Hapless. ILLiqpERATE. See Ignorant. ILLNESS. See Sickness. ILLUMINATE,Illxjmine,Enlight- EN. Illuminate, in Latin illuminatus, participle of illumino (from Latin in, and lumen, light), and enlighten, coined with the French en, from the verb lighten, both denote the communica- tion of light; the former in the natural, the latter in the moral sense. We il- luminate by means of artificial Ughts; or, as in the case of mediaeval manu- scripts (though, in this sense, the term is now obsolete) by color: the sim illv^ minates the world by its own light: preaching and instruction enlighten the minds of men. Illumine is but a poetic variation of illuminate; as, the Sun of Righteousness illumined the benighted world; illuminations are employed as pubhc demonstrations of joy; no nation IS now termed enlightened but such as has received the light of the Gospel. ILLUSION. See Delusion; Fait- LACY. ILLUSTRATE. See Explain. ILLUSTRIOUS. See Distin- guished; Famous. ILL-WILL. See Hatred. IMAGE. See Likeness. IMAGINARY. See Ideal. IMAGINATION. See Fancy; Idea. IMAGINE. See Apprehend ; Think. IMBECILITY. See Debility. IMBIBE. See Absorb. IMITATE, Copy, Counterfeit. The idea of taking a likeness of some object is common to all these terms; but imitate (see Follow) is the gen- eric: copy (see that word) and counter- feit, through French contrefait, from the Latin contra, against, and facere, to make, signifying to make in opposition to the reaUty, are the specific terms: to imitate is to take a general likeness; to copy, to take an exact likeness; to counterfeit, to take a false hkeness: to imitate is, therefore, almost always used in a good or an indifferent sense; to copy mostly, and to counterfeit still oftener, in a bad sense: to imitate an author's style is at all times allowable for one who cannot form a style for himseK; but to copy an author's style would be a too slavish adherence even for the dullest writer. To imitate is applicable to every ob- ject, for every external object is sus- ceptible of imitation; and in man the imitative faculty displays itself aUke in the highest and the lowest matters, in works of art and moral conduct: to copy is appUcable only to certain ob- jects which wUl admit of a minute hkeness being taken; thus, an artist may be said to copy from nature. To counterfeit is appUcable to but few objects: we may counterfeit coin, which is an unlawful act, or we may counterfeit the person, the character, the voice, or the handwriting of any one for whom we would wish to pass, which is also an unlawful act except on the stage. Imitate, Mimic, Ape, Mock. — To IMPASSABLE 431 imitate is here the general term: to mimic, from the Greek tUfioQ, an ac- tor or mimic, and to a-pe, signifjang to imitate like an ape (Anglo-Saxon apa, Grerman affe), are boti species of vicious imitation. One imitates that which is deserving of imitation, or the contrary: one mimics either that which is not an authorized subject of imita- tion or which is imitated imperfectly or so as to excite laughter. A person wishes to make that his own which he imitates, but he mimics for the en- tertainment of others. To ape is a serious, though an ab- surd, act of imitation. To mock, Old French mocqtier, a Picard form for moucher, to wipe the nose, Latin mric- care, to blow the nose (from Latin mu- cus, Enghsh mticus), indicating a vulgar gesture of contempt, signifies to laugh at, and is an ill-natured and vulgar act of imitation. The ape imitates to please himself; the mocker Tnocks to insult others. IMMATERIAL. See Incorpo- real: Unimportant. IMMEDIATELY. See Directly; Now. IMMENSE. See Enormous. IMMINENT, Impending, Threat- ening. Imminent, in Latin imminens, from minere, to project, signifies rest- ing or coming upon. Impending, from the Latin pendere, to hang, signifies hanging upon or over. Threat, Anglo- Saxon threotan, to afflict, vex, urge, is allied to Latin trudere (found in intrude and obtrude), signifying to push, work, urge. All these terms are used in regard to some evil that is exceedingly near: imminent conveys no idea of duration; impending excludes the idea of what is momentary. A person may be in imminent danger of losing his life in one instant, and the danger may be over the next instant: but an impending danger is that which has been long in existelice and gradually approaching; we can sel- dom escape imminent danger by any eflForts of our own: but we may be successfully warned to escape from an impending danger. Imminent and im- pending are said of dangers that are not discoverable; but a threatening evil gives intimations of its own approach; we perceive the threatening tempest in the blackness of the sky; we hear the threatening sounds of the enemy's clash- ing sword. IMMODERATE. See Excessive. IMMODEST, Impudent, Shame- less. Immodest signifies the want of modesty: impudent and shameless sig- nify without shame. Immodest is less than either impudent or shameless: an immodest girl lays aside the ornament of her sex and puts on another garb that is less becoming; but her heart need not be corrupt until she becomes impudent: she lacks a good quahty when she is immodest; she is possessed of a positively bad quality when she is impudent. There is always hope that an immodest woman may be con- scious of her error, and amend; but of an impudent woman there is no such chance — she is radically corrupt. Im- pudent may characterize the person or the thing: shameless, from Anglo- Saxon sceamu, shame, and negative suffix, characterizes the person. A per- son's air, look, and words are impudent when contrary to all modesty: the per- son himself is shameless who is devoid of all sense of shame. See also Impertinent; Indecent. IMMUNITY. See Privilege. IMPAIR, Injure. Impair comes through Old French empeirer, from Late Latin impeiorare, compounded of the Latin in and peior, worse, signify- ing to make worse. Injure, from in, against, and iur, the stem of ius, right, signifies to majce otherwise than it ought to be. Impair seems to be in regard to in- jury as the species to the genus; what is impaired is injured, but what is inr- jured is not necessarily impaired. To impair is a progressive mode of in- juring: an injury may take place either by degrees or by an instantaneous act: straining of the eyes impairs the sight, but a blow injures rather than impairs the eye. A man's health may be im- paired or injured by his vices, but his limbs are injured rather than impaired by a fall. A person's circumstances are impaired by a succession of mis- fortunes ; they are injured by a sudden turn of fortune. IMPART. See Communicate. IMPARTIAL. See Neutral. IMPASSABLE. See Impervious. 432 IMPEACH IMPEACH. See Accuse. IMPEDE. See Hinder. IMPEL. See Actuate; Compel; Encourage. IMPENDING. See Imminent. IMPERFECTION, Defect, Fault, Vice. These terms are applied either to persons or to things. Imperfection, denoting either the abstract quaUty of imperfect or the thing which consti- tutes it imperfect, in a person arises from his want of perfection and the infirmity of his nature; there is no one without some point of imperfection which is obvious to others, if not to himself; he may strive to diminish it, although he cannot expect to get alto- gether rid of it: a defect (see Blemish) is a deviation from the general consti- tution of man; it is what may be natural to the man as an individual, but not natural to man as a species; in this manner we may speak of a de- fect in the speech, or a defect in temper. The fault and vice rise in degree and character above either of the former terms; they both reflect disgrace more or less on the person possessing them; but the fauU always characterizes the agent, and is said in relation to an individual; the vice, from Latin vitium, a vice or fault, characterizes the ac- tion and may be considered abstract- edly: hence we speak of a man's faults as the things we may condemn in him; but we may speak of the vices of drunk- enness, lying, and the like, without any immediate reference to any one who Practices these vices. When they are oth employed for an individual their distinction is obvious: the fault may lessen the amiability or excellence of the character; the vice is a stain; a single act destroys its purity; a habit- ual practice is a p)ollution. In regard to things, the distinction depends upon the preceding explana- tion in a great measure, for we can scarcely use these words without think- ing on man as a moral agent, who was made the most perfect of all creatures, and became the most imperfect; and from our imperfection has arisen, also, a general imperfection throughout all the works of creation. The word im- perfection is therefore the most un- qualified term of all: there may be imperfection in regard to our Maker, or there may be imperfection in regard to what we conceive of perfection; and in this case the term simply and gen- erally impUes whatever falls short in any degree or manner of perfection. Defect is a positive degree of imperfec- tion; it is contrary both to our ideas of perfection and to our particular inten- tion: thus, there may be a defect in the materials of which a thing is made; or a defect in the mode of making it: the term defect, however, whether said of persons or things, characterizes rather the object than the agent. Fault, on the other hand, when said of things, always refers to the agent: thus we may say there is a defect in the glass, or a defect in the spring; but there is a fault in the workman- ship, or a fault in the putting together, and the like. Vice, with regard to things, is properly a serious or radical defect; the former lies in the constitu- tion of the whole, the latter may lie in the parts; the former lies in essentials, the latter lies in the accidents: there may be a defect in the shape or make of a horse; but the vice is said in regard to his soundness or unsoundness, his docility or indocility. Imperfection, Weakness, Frailty, Fail- ing, Foible. — Imperfection has already been considered as that which in the most extended sense diminishes the moral perfection of man; the rest are but modes of imperfection varying in degree and circumstances. Weakness is a positive and strong degree of im- perfection which is opposed to strength; it is what we dq not so necessarily look for, and therefore distinguishes the in- dividual who is hable to it. Frailty is another strong mode of imperfection which characterizes the fragility of man, but not of all men in the same degree; it differs from weakness in re- spect to the object. A weakness lies more in the judgment or in the senti- ment; frailty Ues more in the moral features of an action. It is weak- ness in a man to yield to the persua- sions of any one against his better judgment; it is frailty to yield to intemperance or iUicit indulgences. Failings and foibles (from Old French foible, English feeble, Latin flebilis, doleful, from flere, to weep) are the smallest degrees of imperfection to IMPERVIOUS 433 which the human character is liable: we all have our failings in temper, and OUT foibles in our habits and our pre- possessions; and he, as Horace ob- serves, is the best who has the fewest. IMPERIOUS, Lordly, Domineer- ing, Overbearing. All these epithets imply an unseemly exercise or affecta- tion of power or superiority. Imperi- ous, from imperare, to command, char- acterizes either the disposition to command without adequate authority or to convey one's commands in an of- fensive manner: lordly (from Anglo- Saxon hlaford, lord, from hlaf, bread — English loaf — and weard, guard, Eng- lish ward, signifying the guardian of the loaf) characterizes the manner of acting the lord: and domineering, from dominus, a lord, denotes the manner of ruling like a lord, or rather of at- tempting to rule; hence a person's tem- per or his tone is denominated imperi- ous; his air or deportment is lordly; his tone is domineering. A woman of an imperious temper commands in order to be obeyed; she commands with an imperums tone in order to enforce obedience. A person assumes a lordly air in order to display his own importance; he gives orders in a domi- neering tone in order to make others feel their inferiority. There is always something offensive in imperiou^ness; there is frequently something ludi- crous in that which is lordly; and a mixtiu-e of the ludicrous and offensive in that which is domineering. These terms are employed for such as are invested with some sort of power, or endowed with some sort of superior- ity, however trifling; but overbearing is employed for men in the general relar tions of society, whether superiors or equals. A man of an imperious tem- per and some talent will frequently be so overbearing in the assemblies oi his equals as to awe the rest into silence and carry every measure of his own without contraciiction. See also Commandinq. IMPERTINENT, RuDE, Saucy, Impudent, Insolent. Impertinent, in Latin in, a privative prefix, and perti- nens, belongmg, signifies being or want- ing to do what it does not belong to one to be or do. Rude, in Latin rudis, rude, signifies literally unpol- ished, and, in an extended sense, wantr ing all culture. Sauq/ comes from savxx, in Latin sals, a, feminine of salsus, salt, signifying hterally full of sauce, pungent, and, in an extended sense, stinging like salt. Impudent (see Assurance). Insolent, from the Latin insolens, is a word of doubtful origin, possibly comp>ounded of in, against, and solens, from a root signifying to swell — referring here to the swelling of pride. Impertinent is alUed to 7-ude, as re- gards one's general relations in so- ciety, without regard to station; it is aUied to saucy, impudent, and insolent as regards the conduct of inferiors. He who does not respect the laws of civil society in his mtercourse with individuals, and wants to assume to himself what belongs to another, is impertinent: if he carry this imperti- nence so far as to commit any violent breach of decorum in his behavior, he is rude. Impertinence seems to spring from a too high regard of one's self: rudeness from an ignorance of what is due to others. Impertinent, in com- parison with the other terms, saucy, impudent, and insolent, is the most general and indefinite: whatever one does or says that is not compatible with one's station is impcrtineni; saucy is a sharp kind of impertinence: imn pudent an unblushing kind of imperti^ nence; insolence is an outrageous kind of impertinence, it runs counter to all established order: thus, the terms seem to rise in sense. A person may be imr- pertinent in words or actions: he is saucy in words or looks: he is impudent or insolent in words, tones, gesture, looks, and every species of action. IMPERVIOUS, Impassable, Inac- cessible. Impervious, from the Latin in, per, and via, signifies not having a way through; impassable, not to be passed through; inaccessible, not to be approached. A wood is imvervious when the trees, branches, ana leaves are entangled to such a degree as to admit of no passage at all: a river is impassable that is so deep that it can- not be forded: a rock or a mountain is inaccessible the summit of which is not to be reached by any path what- ever. What is imperyurus is so for a permanency; what is impassable is commonly so only for a time: roads 434 IMPETUOUS are frequently impassable in the winter that are passable in the summer, while a thicket is impervious during the whole of the year: impassable is likewise said only of that which is to be passed by living creatm-es, but impervious may be extended to inanimate objects; a wood may be impervious to the rays of the sim. IMPETUOUS. See Violent. IMPIOUS. See Irreligious; Sac- rilegious. IMPLACABLE, Unrelenting, Re- lentless, Inexorable. Implacable, from Latin in, privative, and placere, to please, signifies not to be softened or pleased. Unrelenting, from the Latin lentu^, slow, slack, soft, signifies not ren- dered soft. Inexorable, from oro, pray, signifies not to be turned by prayers. Inflexibihty is the idea expressed in common by these terms, but they differ in the causes and circumstances with which it is attended. Animosities are implacable when no misery which we occasion can diminish their force, and no concessions on the part of the of- fender can lessen the spirit of revenge : the mind or character of a man is unrelenting when it is not to be turned from its purpose by a view of the pain which it inflicts: a man is inexorable who turns a deaf ear to every solicita- tion or entreaty that is made to in- duce him to lessen the rigor of his sentence. A man's angry passions ren- der him implacable; it is not the mag- nitude of the offence, but the temper of the offended that is here in question; by implacability he is rendered insen- sible to the misery he occasions and to every satisfaction which the of- fender may offer him: fixedness of pur- pose renders a man unrelenting or re- lentless; an unrelenting temper is not less callous to the misery produced than an implacable temper; but it is not grounded always on resentment for personal injuries, but sometimes on a certain principle of right and a sense of necessity: the inexorable man ad- heres to this rule, as the unrelenting man does to his purpose; the former is insensible to any workings of his heart which might shake his purpose, the latter turns a deaf ear to all the solici- tations of others which would go to alter his decrees: savages are mostly implacable in their animosities; Titus Manhus Torquatus displayed an in- stance of unrelenting severity toward his son; Minos, JEacus, and Rhadaman- thus were the inexorable judges of hell. Implacable and unrelenting are said only of animate beings in whom is wanting an ordinary portion of the tender affections: inexorable may be improperly applied to inanimate ob- jects; justice and death are both rep- resented as inexorable. IMPLANT, Ingraft, Inculcate, Instil, Infuse. To plant is properly to fix plants in the ground; to implant is, in the improper sense, to fix prin- ciples in the mind. To ingraft, from graft, to make one plant grow on the stock of another, is to make particular principles flourish in the mind and form a part of the character. Inculcate, from Latin in and culcare, for calcare, or tread into, means to stamp into the mind. To instil, from French instiller, derived from Latin in and stillare, to drop into, is, in the improper sense, to make sentiments, as it were, drop into the mind. To infuse, from in and fu^us, past participle of fundere, to pour, is, in the improper sense, to pour principles or feelings into the mind. To implant, ingraft, and inculcate are said of abstract opinions or rules of right and wrong; instil and infuse of such principles as influence the heart, the affections, and the passions. It is the business of the parent in early life to implant sentiments of virtue in his child; it is the business of the teacher to ingraft them. Instil is a correspond- ing act with implant; we implant be- lief; we instil the feeling which is con- nected with this belief. It is not enough to have an abstract belief of a God implanted into the mind: we must likewise have a love, and a fear of Him, and reverence for His holy name and Word instilled into the mind. To instil is a gradual process which is the natural work of education; to infuse is a more arbitrary and immediate act. Sentiments are instilled into the mind, not altogether by the personal efforts of any individual, but likewise by col- lateral endeavors; they are, however, infused at the express will and with the express endeavor of some person. In- stil is applicable only to permanent sentiments; infuse may be said of any IMPRINT 435 partial feeling: hence we speak of in- fusing poison into the mind by means of insidious and mischievous publica- tions; or inftising jealousy by means of crafty insinuations, or infusing ardor into the minds of soldiers by means of spirited addresses coupled with military successes. IMPLICATE, Involve. Implicate, from plicare, to fold, denotes to fold into a thing; and involve, from volvere, to roll, signifies to roU into a thing: by which explanation we perceive that to implicate marks something less en- tangled than to involve: for that which is folded may be folded only once, but that which is rolled is turned many times. In application, therefore, to human affairs, people are said to be implicated who have taken ever so small a share in a transaction; but they are involved only when they are deeply concerned: the former is like- wise especially applied to criminal transactions, the latter to those things which are in themselves troublesome: thus a man is implicated in the gmlt of robbery who should stand by and see it done, without interfering for its prevention; he who is in debt in every direction is strictly said to be involved in debt. IMPLORE. See Beg. IMPLY. See Signify. IMPORT. See Signification. IMPORTANCE, Consequence, Weight, Moment. Importance, from in and portare, to carry, signifies the carrying or bearing with or in itself. Consequence, from the present partici- pial stem of consequi, to follow, or result, signifies that which follows or results from a thing. Weight, Anglo- Saxon gewiht, from wegan, to carrv, or lift (compare the phrase weigh anchor), hence to weigh, signifies the quantity that a thing weighs. Moment, from momentum, Latin movere, to move, sig- nifies the force that puts in motion. Importance is what things have in themselves; they may be of more or less importance, according to the value which is set upon them: this may be real or imreal; it may be estimated by the experience of their past utility or from the presumption of their utility for the future: the idea of importance, therefore, enters into the meaning of the other terms more or less. Conse- quence is the importance of a thing from its consequences. This term, therefore, is pecuharly apphcable to such things the consequences of which may be more immediately discerned either from the neglect or the attention: it is of corv- sequence for a letter to go off on a cer- tain day, for the affairs of an individual may be more or less affected by it; an hour's delay sometimes in the de- Earture of a military exp>edition may e of such consequence as to determine the fate of a battle. The term weight imphes a positively great degree of im- portance: it is that importance which a thing has intrinsically in itself, and which makes it weigh m the mind: it is apphed, therefore, to such things as offer themselves to deliberation; hence the counsels of a nation are al- ways weighty, because they involve the interests of so many. Moment is that importance which a thing has from the power in itself to produce effects or to determine interests: it is apphcable, therefore, only to such things as are connected with our prosperity or hap- piness: when used without any ad- junct, it imphes a great degree of importance, but may be modified in various ways, as a thing of no momerU, or small moment, or great moment; but we cannot say with the same propriety, a thing of small weight, and still less a thing of great weight: it is a matter of no small moment for every one to choose that course of conduct which will stand the test of a death-bed reflection. IMPORTANT. See Critical. IMPORTUNATE. See Pressing. IMPORTUNITY. See Souctta- TION. IMPOSE. See Decetvb. IMPOST. Sec Tax. IMPRECATION. See Maledio TION. IMPRINT, Impress, Engrave. Print and press are both derived from Latin primere, the former from the in- finitive, the latter from pressu^, the past pajliciple, signifying m the literal sense to press or to make a mark by pressing: to impress and imjtrinl are figuratively employed in the same sense. Things are impressed on the mind so as to produce a conviction: they are imprinted on it so as to pro- 436 IMPRISONMENT duce recollection. If the truths of Christianity be impressed on the mind, they will show themselves in a cor- responding conduct: whatever is im- printed on the mind in early life or by any particular circumstance is not readily forgotten. Engrave, fromFrench en and grave, imitating Old French en- graver, from Latin in and Old High German graban, to cut, or dig, cognate with English grave, to dig, expresses more in the proper sense than either, imprint, or impress and the same in its moral application; for we may truly say that if the truths of Christianity be engraven in the minds of youth, they can never be eradicated. IMPRISONMENT. See Confine- ment. IMPROMPTU. See Unpremedi- tated. IMPROVE. See Amend. IMPROVEMENT. See Progress. IMPRUDENCE. See Assurance. IMPUDENT. See Immodest; Im- pertinent. IMPUGN, Attack. These terms are employed synonymously only in re- gard to doctrines or opinions; in which case, to impugn, from in, against, and pugnare, to fight, signifies to call in question, or bring arguments against; to attack is to oppose with warmth. Sceptics impugn every opinion, how- ever self-evident or well-grounded they may be: infidels make attacks upon the Bible and all that is held sacred by the rest of the world. He who impugns may sometimes proceed insidiously and cir- cuitously to imdermine the faith of others: he who attacks always proceeds with more or less violence. To impugn is not necessarily taken in a bad sense; we may sometimes impugn absurd doc- trines by a fair train of reasoning: to attack (see Attack) is sometimes objec- tionable, either in the mode of the action or its object, or in both; it is a mode of proceeding which may be employed either in the cause of false- hood or of truth: when there are no arguments where-with to impugn a doc- trine, it is easy to attack it with ridicule and scurriUty: it is one's duty to attack an absurd or an erroneous, or a criminal doctrine, in the interest of truth and progress. IMPUTE. See Ascribe. INABILITY, Disability. Inability denotes the absence of ability (see Abil- ity) in the most general and abstract sense. Disability implies the absence of ability only in particular cases: the inabiliiy lies in the nature of the thing, and is irremediable; the disability Ues in the circumstances, and may some- times be removed: weakness, whether physical or mental, will occasion an inability to perform a task; there is a total inability in an infant to walk and act like an adult: a want of knowledge or of the requisite qualifications may be a disability; in this manner minority of age or an objection to take certain oaths may be a disability for filling a public office. INACCESSIBLE. See Impervious. INACTIVE, Inert, Lazy, Sloth- ful, Sluggish. A reluctance to bodily exertion is common to all these terms. Inactive (see Active) is the most gen- eral and unqualified term of all; it ex- presses simply the want of a stimulus to exertion. Inert is something more positive, from the Latin in, privative, and ars, art, without skill or mind; it denotes a specific deficiency either in body or in mind. Lazy (see Idle). Slothful comes from sloth, which is formed from the adjective slow, origi- nally slowth, and signifies fuU of slow- ness; and sluggish, from slug (a Scan- dinavian word signifying to droop, and hence, to be inactive, drowsy, heavy), denote an expressly defective tempera- ment of the body which directly im- pedes action. To be inactive is to be indisposed to action, that is, to the performance of any office, to doing any specific business: to be inert is somewhat more; it is to be indisposed to movement; to be lazy is to move with pain to one's self: to be slothful is never to move otherwise than slowly: to be sluggish is to move in a sleepy and heavy man- ner. A person may be inactive from a variety of incidental causes, as timid- ity, ignorance, modesty, and the Uke, which combine to make him averse to enter upon any business or take any serious step; a person may be inert from temporary indisposition; but lazijiess, slothfulness, and sluggishness are inher- ent physical defects: laziness is, how- ever, not altogether independent of the INCAPABLE 437 mind or the will; but slothfidness and sluggishness are purely the offspring of nature, or, which is the same thing, habit superinduced upon nature. A man of a mild character is frequently inactive. Some diseases, particularly of the melancholy kind, are accompanied with a strong degree of inertness, since they seem to deprive the frame of its ordi- nary powers to action, and to produce a certain degree of torpor; hence the term is properly applied to matter to express the highest degree of inactivity, which will not move without an ex- ternal impulse. Lazy people move as if their bodies were a burden to themselves; they are fond of rest and particularly averse to be put in action; but they will some- times move quickly, and perform much when once- impelled to move. Slothful people never vary their pace; they have a physical impediment in themselves to quick motion: sluggish people are with difficulty brought into action; it is their nature to be in a state of stupor. INADEQUATE. See Incapable. INADVERTENCY, Inattention, Oversight. Inadvertency, from advert, to turn the mind to, is allied to inailerv- lion (see Attentive) when the act of the mind is signified in general terms; and to oversight when any particular instance of inadvertency occurs, /n- advertency never designates a habit, but inattention does; the former term, therefore, is unqualified by the re- proachful sense which attaches to the latter: any one may be guilty of in- advertencies, since the mind that is oc- cupied with many subjects equally seri- ous may not be turned so steadily toward some others that may escape notice; but inattention, which designates a di- rect want of attention, is always a fault, and belongs only to the young, or such as are thoughtless by nature: since in- advertency is an occasional act, it must not be too often repeated, or it becomes inattention. An oversight is properly a species of inadvertency, which arises from looking over, or passing by, a thing: we pardon an inadvertency in another, since the consequences are never serious; we must be guarded against oversights in business, as their consequences may be serious. INANIMATE. See Lifeless. INANITY. See Vacancy. INAPPRECIABLE. See Atomic. INATTENTION. See Inadver- tency. INATTENTI\^. See Negligent. INBORN. See Inherent. INBRED. See Inherent. INCAPABLE, Insufficient, In- competent, Inadequate. Incapable, that is, not having capacity (see Abii/- ity); insufficient, or not sufficient, or not having what is sufficient; incompe- tent, or not competent (see Competent), are employed either for persons or for things: the first in a general, the last two in a specific sense: inadequate, or not adequate or equalled, is appUed most generally to things. When a man is said to be incapable it characterizes his whole mind; if he be said to have insufficiency and incom- petency, it regards the particular ob- jects to which the power is applied: he may be insufficient or incompetent for certain things; but he may have a capacity for other things: the term incapacity, therefore, implies a direct charge upon the imderstanding which is not impUed by insufficiency and irir- competency. Incapable is applied sometimes, in colloquial discourse, to signify the ab- sence of that which is bad; insufficient and inconvpeterU always convey the idea of a aeficiency in that wmch is at least desirable: it is an honor to a person to be incapable of falsehood, or incapable of doing an ungenerous action; but to be insufficient and in- competent are, at all events, qualities not to be boasted of, although they may not be expressly disgraceful. These terms are likewise applicable to thingSj in which they preserve a similar distinction: infideUty is inco- pable of affording a man any comfort: when the means are insufficient for ob- taining the ends, it is madness to ex- Eect success; it is a sad condition of umanity when a man's resources are iiicompetent to supply him with the first necessaries of life. Inadequate is relative in its significa- tion, like insufficient and incompetent; but the relation is different. A thing is insufficient which does not suffice either for the wishes, the purposes, or 438 INCESSANTLY the necessities of any one in particular or in general cases; thus, a quantity of materials may be insufficient for a particular building: incompetency is an insuffi,ciency for general purposes in things of the first necessity; thus, a person may be incompetent to support a family: inadequacy is still more par- ticular, for it denotes any deficiency which is measured by comparison with the object to which it referred; thus, the strength of an animal may be in- adequate to the labor which is required, or a reward may be inadequaie to the service. INCESSANTLY, Unceasingly, Uninterruptedly, Without Inter- mission. Incessantly and unceasingly are but variations of the same word, Latin cessare, to cease, a frequentative of cedere, to yield; in and un are both negative prefixes. Uninterruptedly (see Disturb). Intermission (see Subside). Continuity, but not duration, is de- noted by these terms: incessantly is the most general and indefinite of all; it signifies without ceasing, but may be apphed to things which admit of cer- tain intervals: unceasingly is definite, and signifies never ceasing; it cannot, therefore, be applied to what has any cessation. In familiar discourse, in- cessantly is an extravagant mode of speech, by which one means to denote the absence of those ordinary inter- vals which are to be expected; as when one says a person is incessantly talk- ing, by which is imderstood that he does not allow himself the ordinary intervals of rest from talking: unceas- ingly, on the other hand, is more lit- erally employed for a positive want of cessation; a noise is said to be un- ceasing which literally never ceases; or complaints are unceasing which are made without any pauses or intervals. Incessantly and unceasingly are said of things which act of themselves; wn- interruptedly is said of that which de- pends upon other things: it rains in- cessantly marks a continued operation of nature, independent of everything; but to be uninterruptedly happy marks one's freedom from every foreign in- fluence which is unfriendly to one's happiness. Incessantly and the other two words are employed either for per- sons or things; without intermission is, however, mostly employed for persons; things act and react incessantly upon one another; a man of a persevering temper goes on laboring vnthout inter- mission until he has effected his pur- pose. INCIDENT. See Circumstance; Event. INCIDENTAL. See Accidental. INCINERATION. See Cremation. INCIPIENT. See Elementary. INCITE. See Encourage; Excite. INCLINATION, Tendency, Pro- pensity, Proneness. All these terms are employed to designate the state of the will toward an object: inclination (see Attachment) denotes its first movement toward an object: tendency, through French from tendere, to stretch, is a continued inclination: propensity, from propensv^, past participle of the Latin pro, forward, and pendere, to hang, denotes a still stronger leaning of the will; and prone, from the Latin pronum, accusative of pronum, inclined toward, characterizes a habitual and fixed state of the will toward an object. The in- clination expresses the leaning, but not the direction of that leaning; it may be to the right or to the left, upward or downward ; » consequently we may have an inclination to that which is good or bad, high or low; tendency does not specify any particular direction; but it is frequently apphed to those things wliich degenerate or lead to what is bad; excessive strictness in the treat- ment of children has a tendency to damp their spirit : propensity and prone- ness both designate a downward direc- tioji, and consequently refer only to that which is bad and low; a person has a propensity to drinking, and a proneness to lying. Inclination is always at the com- mand of the imderstanding; it is our duty, therefore, to suppress the first risings of any inclination to extrava- gance, intemperance, or any irregular- ity: as tendency refers to the thing rather than the person, it is our busi- ness to avoid that which has a terp- dency to evil: the propensity will soon get the mastery of the best principles and the firmest resolution; it is our duty, therefore, to seek all the aids which religion affords to subdue every propensity: proneness to evil is inher- INCORPOREAL 439 ent in our nature, which we derive from our animal nature; it is the grace of God alone which can lift us up above this groveUing part of ourselves. See also Bent; Disposition. INCLINE. See Lean; Mehge. INCLOSE, Include. From the Latin indvdo (from in, in, and dav^ dere, to shut) are derived inclose and include, inclose being derived through Old French indore, past participle indos. The former expresses the proper, and the latter the improper signification: a yard is inclosed by a wall; particular goods are included in a reckoning: the kernel of a nut is inclosed in a shell; morality, as well as faith, is induded in Christian perfection. See also Circumscribe. INCOHERENT. See Inconsist- ent. INCOMPETENT. See Incapable. INCONGRUOUS. See Inconsist^ ent. INCONSIDERABLE. See Unim- portant. INCONSISTENT, Incongruous, Incoherent. Inconsistent, from in, privative, and consistent (Latin con, to- gether, and sistens, participle of sistere, to cause to stand), marks the unfit- ness of being placed together. In- congruous, from in, privative, and congruere, to suit, a Latin word of uncertain origin, marks the unsuit- ableness of one thing to another. In- coherent, from in, privative, con, to- gether, and hcerere, to stick, marks the incapacity of two things to co- alesce or be united to each other. Inconsistency attaches either to the actions or sentiments of men; incon- gruity attaches to the modes and quali- ties of things; incoherency, to words or thoughts; things are made inconsistent by an act of the will; a man acts or thinks inconsistently, according to his own pleasure: incongruity depends up>on the nature of the things ; there is some- thing very incongruous in blending the solemn service of the church with the extravagant rant of some self-styled reUgious leaders: incoherence marks the want of coherence in that which ought to follow sequentlv; extemporary effu- sions from the pulpit are often distin- guished most by their incoherence. INCONSTANT. See Changeable. ! INCONTROVERTIBLE. See In- dubitable. INCONVENIENCE, Annoy. Mo- lest. To inconvenience is to make not convenient (see Convenient). To an- noy comes from the Old French anoi, Modem French ennui, derived from the Latin phrase in odio, signifying in hatred, or dislike. To molest, from the Latin moles, a mass, or weight, signifies to press with a weight. We inconvenience in small matters, or by omitting such things as might be convenient; we annoy or molest by do- ing that which is positively painful: we are inconvenienced by a person's absence; we are annoyed by his pres- ence if he renders hunsdf offensive: we are inconvenienced by what is tem- porary; we are annoyed by that which IS either temporary or durable; we are molested by that which is weighty and oppressive; we are inconvenienced simply in regard to our circumstances; we are annoyed mostly in regard to our corporeal feelings; we are molested mostly in regard to our minds: the removal of a seat or a book may in- convenience one who is engaged in busi- ness; the buzzing of a fly or the stinging of a gnat may annoy; the impertinent freedom or the rude insults of ill-dis- posed persons may molest. INCORPOREAL, Unbodied, Im- material, Spiritual. Incorporeal (see Corporeal for derivation) marks the quaUty of not belonging to the body or having any properties in common with it; unbodied (for derivation see Corporeal) denotes the state of be- ing without the body or not inclosed in a body: a thing may therefore be in- corporeal without being unbodied; but not vice versd: the soul of man is in- corporeal, but not unbodied, during his natural life. Incorporeal is always used in regard to Uving things, particularly by way of comparison with corporeal or human beings: hence we speak of incorporeal agency, or incorporeal agents, in refer- ence to such beings as are supposed to act in this world without the help of the body; but immaterial is applied to inanimate objects; men are cor- poreal as men, spirits are incorporeal; the body is the material part of man, the soul his immaterial part: what- 440 INCREASE ever external object acts upon the senses is material; but the action of the mind on itself, and its results, are all immaterial: the earth, sun, moon, etc., are termed material; but the im- pressions which they make on the mind; that is, our ideas of them, are immaterial. The incorporeal and immaterial have always a relative sense; the spiritual is that which is positive: God is a spiritual, not properly an incorporeal nor immaterial Being: the angels are likewise designated, in general, as the spiritual inhabitants of heaven; al- though, when spoken of in regard to men, they may be denominated in- corporeal. ' See also Corporeal. INCREASE, Grow. Increase, from the Latin in, in, and crescere, to grow (whence crescent is derived), signifies to grow larger and stronger. Grow, Anglo-Saxon growan, signified to put forth green shoots; it is aUied to the word green. The idea of becoming larger is com- mon to both these terms, but the former expresses the idea in an un- qualified manner, and the latter an- nexes to this general idea also that of the mode or process by which this is effected. To increase is either a grad- ual or an instantaneous act; to grow is a gradual process: a stream increases by the addition of other waters; it may come suddenly or in course of time, by means of gentle showers or the rush- ing in of other streams; but if we say that the river or stream grows, it is supposed to grow by some regular and continual process of receiving fresh water, as from the nmning in of differ- ent rivulets or smaller streams. To increase is either a natural or an arti- ficial process; to grow is always natu- ral : money increases by artificial means ; com may either increase or grow: in the former case we speak of it in the sense of becoming larger or increasing in bulk; in the latter case we consider the mode of its increasing, namely, by the natural process of vegetation. On this ground we say that a child grows when we wish to denote the natural process by which his body arrives at its proper size; but we may speak of his increasing in stature, in size, and the like. For this reason hkewise in- crease is used in a transitive as well as intransitive sense; but grow always in an intransitive sense: we can increase a thing, though not properly grow a thing, because we can make it larger by whatever means we please; but when it grows it makes itseff larger. In their improper acceptation these words preserve the same distinction: "trade increases" bespeaks the simple fact of its becoming larger; but "trade grows" implies that gradual increase which flows from the natural concur- rence of circumstances. The affections which are awakened in infancy grow with one's growth; a natm-al and moral process is here combined. The fear of death sometimes increases as one grows old; the courage of a truly brave man increases with the sight of danger : a moral process is here indicated which is both gradual and immediate, but in both cases produced by some foreign cause. See also Enlarge. Increase, Addition, Accession, Aug- mentation.— Increase is here, as in the former article, the generic term: there will always be increase where there is augmentation, addition, and accession, though not vice versd. Addition is to increase as the means to the end: the addition is the artificial mode of making two things into one; the increase is the result: when the value of one figure is added to another, the smn is increased; hence a man's treasures experience an increase by the addition of other parts to the main stock. Addition is an intentional mode of increasing; accession is an accidental mode: one thing is added to another and thereby increased; but an acces- sion takes place of itself; it is the com- ing or joining of one thing to another so as to increase the whole. A mer- chant increases his property by add- ing his gains in trade every year to the mass; but he receives an accession of property either by inheritance or by any other contingency. In the same manner a monarch increases his do- minions by adding one territory to another, or by various accessions of territory which fall to his lot. When we speak of an increase we think of the whole and its relative magnitude at different times; when we speak of INDEMNIFY 441 an addition we think only of the part and the agency by which this part is joined; when we sf>eak of an accession we think only of the circumstance by which one thing becomes thus joined to another. Increase of happiness does not depend upon increase of wealth; the miser makes daily additions to the latter without making any to the former: sudden accessions of wealth are seldom attended with any good consequences, as they turn the thoughts too violently out of their sober chaimel and bend them too strongly on present possessions and good-fortune. Augmentation is a mode of increasing not merely in quantity or number, but also in value or in the essential ingredi- ent of a thing; it is therefore applied for the most part to the increase of a man's estate, possessions, family, in- come, or whatever is desirable. It may also be applied to moral ob- jects, as hopes, fears, joys, etc., with a like distinction. INCREDULITY. See Unbelief. INCULCATE. See Implant. INCURSION. See Invasion. INDEBTED, Obliged. Indebted is more binding and positive than obliged: we are indebted to whoever confers an essential service: we are obliged to him who does us any service. A man is indebted to another for the preserva- tion of his life; he is obliged to him for an ordinary act of civility: a debt, whether of legal or moral right, must in justice be paid; an obligation which is only moral ought in reason to be returned. We may be indebted to things; we are obliged to persons only: we are indebted to Christianity, not only for a superior faith, but also for a superior system of morality; we ought to be obliged to our friends who ad- monish us of our faults in friendly wise. A nation may be indebted to an individual, but men are obliged to one another only as individuals: the EngUsh nation is indebted to Alfred for the groundwork of its constitution; the little courtesies which pass between friends in their social intercourse with one another lay them under obligations which it is equally agreeable to receive and to pay. INDECENT, Immodest, Indeli- cate. Indecent is the contrary of de- cent (see Becoming), immodest the con- trary of modest (see Modest), indelicate the contrary of delicate (see Fine). Indecency and immodesty violate the fundamental principles of moraUty: the former, however, in external matters, as dress, words, and looks; the latter in conduct and disposition. A person may be indecent for want of either knowing or thinking better. Indecency may be a partial, immodesty is a posi- tive and entire breach of the moral law. Indecency belongs to both sexes; immodesty is pecuUarly apphcable to the misconduct of women. Indecency is less than immodesty, but more than indelicacy: they both re- gard the outward behavior. It is a great indecency for a man to marry a^ain very quickly after the death of his wife; but a still greater indecency for a woman to put such an affront on her deceased husband: it is a great indelicacy in any one to break in upon the retirement of such as are in sorrow and mourning. INDEED. See Ate. INDELICATE. See Indecent. INDEMNIFY, Compensate, Reim- burse. These terms all mean to make good that which has been lost, but they differ somewhat in the extent of their appUcation. Compensate, from Latin con, against, and pensare, to weigh, means, hterally, to weigh one thing with another; it is the most general of these three terms. It signifies to give back an equivalent for something lost, taken, or injured. Indemnify and reimburse have a similar meaning, but a more special application. Indemnify is derived from Latin in, privative, damnum, loss, and French fier, English fy, from Latin facere, to make. Hence it literally means to make free from loss. It signifies to make a payment to compensate for the loss of life or property. Reimburse is adapted from French rembourser L»y substituting Latin re, again, and in, in, for rem. Bourser comes from Latin bursa, a Eurse, Greek ^vp discrimi- nate) impUes that which is fixed, stated, beyond a doubt, anything that is unde- niable, indisputable, incontrovertible. Positive concerns that which is real, actual, substantial, existing in fact, and is applicable both to persons and to ob- jects. When, however, the term is re- lated to persons, as a belief or state- ment, while it may be advanced as absolutely positive, the premises or basic knowledge may be erroneous, and the conclusion, therefore, will not be in- fallible, though the person may believe it to be so. Sure implies conditions similar to those ttat are positive, and, Hterally, those that are absolutely fixed, estab- hshed beyond question, and unerring; yet in mortal mind the term at times appears" to belie itself, to be fluctuat- ing, as something that to-day has every evidence of being sure may to- morrow prove a delusion, but this is a mere mental misconstruction of the term. Unerring is a term that in com- mon usage is frequently misapplied. God alone is unerring, incapable of mistakes or failure. We speak of a marksman taking an unerring aim, but his action is not completed till his shot has struck its object, and in the mean- time a chance change of wind may alter its direction, and though the aim was direct the result is not an unerring shot. Associated with infallible is the sub- stantive infallibility, implying the state or quaUty of being exempt from error. At the (Ecumenical Council of the Ro- man CathoUc Church, held in Rome iq 1870, a dogma was decreed to the effect that when the Roman Pontiff, speaking ex cathedra, or in the discharge of his office, "defines a doctrine regard- ing "faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, (he) is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that his Church should be endowed," and "that there- fore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable." See also Omniscient. INFAMOUS, Scandalous. Infa- mous, hke infamy (see Infamy), is ap- plied to both persons and things; scan- dalous, only to things: a character is infanunis, or a transaction is infamous; but a transaction only is scandalous. Infamous and scandalous are both said of that which is calculated to excite great displeasure in the minds of all who hear it, and to degrade the of- fenders in the general estimation; but the infamous seems to be that which produces greater pubhcity and more general reprehension than the scandal- ous; consequently is that which is more serious in its nature and a greater violation of good morals. Some men of daring character render themselves infamous by their violence, their ra- pine, and their murders; the trick which was played upon the subscrib- INFORM 445 era to the South Sea Company was a scandalous fraud. Infamy, Ignominy, Opprobrium. — Infamy is the opp>osite to good fame; it consists in an evil report. Ignominy, from the privative in and Latin gnomin for gnomen, old form of nomen, name, signifies an ill name, a stained name. Opprobrium, a Latin word, compounded of ob, on, and probrum, disgrace, signi- fies the highest degree of reproach or stain. The idea of discredit or disgrace in the highest possible degree is common to all these terms: but infamy is that which attaches either to the peraon or to the thing; ignominy is thrown upon the person; and opprobrium is thrown upon the agent rather than the action. Infamy causes either the person or the thing to be iU spoken of by all; ab- horrence of both IS expressed by every mouth, and the ill report spreads from mouth to mouth: ignominy causes the name and the person to be held in contempt; it becomes debased in the eyes of others; opprobrium causes the peraon to be spoken of in severe terms of reproach, and to be shunned as something polluted. The infamy of a treacherous proceeding is increased by the addition of ingratitude; the ig- nominy of a pubUc punishment is in- creased by the wickedness of the of- fender; opprobrium sometimes falls upon the innocent, when circumstances seem to convict them of guilt. INFANTINE. See Childish. INFECTION. See Contagion. INFERENCE. See Conclttsion. INFERIOR. See Second; Subject. INFIDELITY. See Unbelief. INFINITE. See Boundless. INFIRM. See Weak. INFLUENCE, AuTHORiTT, Ascen- dency or Ascendent, Sway. Influence (see Credit). Authority, in Latin auc- toritas, from auctor, the author or prime mover of a thing (originally the in- creaser or grower, from augere, to in- crease), signifies that power which is vested in the prime mover of any busi- ness. Ascendency, from ascend (see Arise), signifies having the upper hand. Sway comes from Middle Eng- lish sweiyen, sway, a word with many Teutonic parallels, alUed to swagger. These terms imply power, under dif- ferent circumstances: influence is alto- gether unconnected with any right to direct; auihority includes the idea of right necessarily; suf)eriority of rank, talent, or property, pereonal attach- ment, and a variety of circumstances give influence; it commonly acts by perauasion, and employs engaging man- nera, so as to determine in favor of what is proposed: superior wisdom, age, office^ and relation give authority; it determmes of itself, it requires no collateral aid: ascendency and sumy are modes of influence, differing only in degree; they both imply an excessive and improper degree of influence over the mind, mdependent of reason: the former is, however, more gradual in . its process, and consequently more confirmed in its nature; the latter may be only temporary, but may be more violent. A peraon employs many arts, and for a length of time, to gain the ascendency; but he exerts a sway by a violent stretch of power. It is of great importance for those who have influence to conduct themselves con- sistently with their rank and station: men are apt to regard the warnings and admonitions of a true friend as an odious assumption of authority, while they voluntarily give themselves up to the ascendency wnich a valet or a mistress has gained over them, who exert the most unwarrantable sway to serve their own interested and vicious purposes. Influence and ascendency are said likewise of things as well as persons: true religion will have an influence not only on the outward conduct of a man, but on the inward affections of his heart; and that man is truly happy in whose mind it has the ascendency over every other principle. INFORM, Make Known, Ac- quaint, Apprise, The idea of bring- ing to the knowledge of one or more ?eraons is common to all these terms. nform, from the Latin informare, to shape within, signifies the creative power of knowledge working within the soul; it is therefore the generic term, and the rest specific: to inform is to communicate what has lately happened, or the contrary; but to make known is to bring to light what 446 INFORM has long been known and purposely concealed: to inform is to communi- cate directly or indirectly to one or many; to make knovm is mostly to communicate indirectly to many: one informs the public of one's intentions, by means of an advertisement in one's own name; one makes knoivn a fact through a circuitous channel and with- out any name. To inform may be done either per- sonally or otherwise; to acquaint and apprise are immediate and personal commimications. One informs the gov- ernment, or any public body, or one informs one's friends; one acquaints (for derivation see Acquaintance) or apprises (from Old French aprise, in- struction, compounded of Latin ad, and the past participle of prehendere, to seize, to take, signifying to take infor- mation to another) only one's friends or particular individuals: one is informed of that which concerns either the in- formant or the person informed; one acquaints a person with, or apprises him of, such things as pecuharly con- cern himself, but the latter in more spe- cific circxmistances than the former: one informs a correspondent by letter of the day on which he may expect to receive his order, or of one's own] wishes with regard to an order; one acqiiaints a father with aU the circumstances that concern his son's conduct: one apprises a friend of a bequest that has been made to him; one informs the magis- trate of any irregularity that occurs; one acquaints the master of a family with the misconduct of his servants: one apprises a person of the time when he will be obliged to appear. Inform may be applied figuratively to things; the other terms to persons only in the proper sense. Inform, Instruct, Teach. — The com- munication of knowledge in general is the common idea by which these words are connected with one another. Inform is here, as in the preceding article, the general term; the other two are specific terms. To inform is the act of persons in all conditions; to instruct and teach are the acts of superiors, either on one ground or another: one informs by vir- tue of an accidental superiority or pri- ority of knowledge; one instructs by virtue of superior knowledge or supe- rior station; one teaches (Anglo-Saxon tcecan, to show how to do, from the root foimd in Enghsh token) by virtue of superior knowledge rather than of station: diplomatic agents inform their governments of the pohtical transac- tions in which they have been con- cerned; government instructs (Latin in and structus, past participle of struere, to build up) its different functionaries and officers in regard to their mode of pro- ceeding; professors and preceptors i€ac/i those who attend pubUc schools to learn. To inform is appUcable to matters of general interest: we may inform oiu"- selves or others on anything which is a subject of inquiry or curiosity, and the information serves either to amuse or to improve the mind: to instruct is applicable to matters of serious concern, or to that which is practically useful; a parent instructs his child in the course of conduct he should pursue: to tea^h regards matters of art and science; the learner depends upon the teacher for the formation of his mind and the estabhsh- ment of his principles. To inform and to teach are employed for things as well as persons; to in- struct only for persons: books and read- ing inform the mind; history or experi- ence teaches mankind. Informant, Informer. — These two epithets, from the verb to inform, have acquired by their apphcation an im- portant distinction, the informant be- ing he who informs for the benefit of others, and the informer to the injury of others. What the informant commu- nicates is for the benefit of the individu- al, and what the informer conmaimicates is for the benefit of the whole. The in- formant is thanked for his civihty in making the communication; the infornv- er undergoes a great deal of odium, but is thanked by no one, not even by those who employ him. We may all be inform- ants in our turn, if we know of anything of which another may be informed; but none are informers who do not inform against the transgressors of any law. See also Attach^. Information, Intelligence, Notice, Ad- vice.— Information signifies the thing of which one is informed: intelligence, from the Latin inteUegere (from inter, between, and legere, to choose, signi- fying to choose between, hence to dis- INGENUITY 447 cem or understand), indicates that by which one is made to understand: no- tice, from the Latin nolilia, is that which brings a circumstance to our knowledge: advice (see Admonition) signifies that which is made known. These terms come very near to each other in signification, but differ in ap- pUcation: information is the most gen- eral and indefinite of all; the three others are but modes of information. Whatever is communicated to us is information, be it pubUc or private, open or concealed: notice, intelligence, and advice are mostly pubhc, but par- ticularly the former. Information and notice may be communicated by word of mouth or by writing; intelligence is mostly commimicated by writing or printing; advices are mostly sent by letter: information is mostly an in- formal mode of communication; no- tice, intelligence, and advice are mostly formal communications. A servant gives his master information, or one friend sends another information from the country; magistrates or officers give notice of such things as it concerns the pubhc to know and to observe; spies give intelligence of all that passes imder their notice; or intelligence is given in the pubhc prints of all that passes worthy of notice: a mihtary commander sends advice to his govern- ment of the operations which are going forward imder his direction; or one merchant gives advice to another of the state of the market. Intelligence, as the first intimation of an interesting event, ought to be early; advices, as entering into details, ought to be clear and particular; official advices often arrive to contradict non-official intel- ligence. Information and intelligence, when apphed as characteristics of men, have a further distinction: the man of in- formation is so denominated only on account of his knowledge; but a man of intelligence is so denominated on ac- count of his imderstanding as well as experience and information. It is not possible to be intelligent without infor- mation; but we may be well informed without being remarkable for intelli- gence: a man of information may be an agreeable companion, and fitted to maintain conversation; but an intelli- gent man will be an instructive com- E anion, and most fitted for conducting usiness. INFRACTION. See Infringe. INFRINGE, Violate, Transgress. Infringe, from Latin inf ringer e,fr anger e, to break, signifies to break into. Vio- late, from a hypothetical adjective based on the Latin vis, force, signifies to break with force. Transgress, from trans, across, and gredi (past participle gressus), to step, signifies to go beyond, or farther than we ought. Civil and moral laws and rights are infringed by those who act in opposi- tion to them : treaties and engagements are violated by those who do not hold them sacred: the bounds which are prescribed by the moral law are trans- gressed by those who are guilty of any excess. It is the business of govern- ment to see that the rights and privi- leges of individuals or particular bodies be not infringed; poUcy but too fre- quently runs counter to equity; where the particular interests of states are more regarded than the dictates of conscience, treaties and compacts are violated: the passions, when not kept imder proper control, will ever hurry on men to transgress the limits of right reason. See also Encroach. Infringement, Infraction. — Infringe- ment and infraction, which are both derived from the Latin verb infringo or frango, are 'employed according to the different senses of the verb in- fringe, the former being apphed to the rights of individuals, either in their domestic or pubhc capacity, and the latter rather to national transactions. Pohteness, which teaches us what is due to every man in the smallest con- cerns, considers any unasked-for inter- ference in the private affairs of another as an infringement. Equity, which en- joins on nations as well as individuals an attentive consideration to the inter- ests of the whole, forbids the infrac- tion of a treaty in any case. INFUSE. See Implant. INGENUITY, Wit. Ingenuity (see Ingenuous). Wit, from the Anglo- Saxon witt, knowledge, German xeissen, to know, signifies knowledge or under- standing. Both these terms imply acuteness of 448 INGENUOUS understanding, and differ mostly in its mode of displaying itself. Ingenuity comprehends invention; wit is the fruit of the imagination, which forms new and sudden conceptions of things. One is ingenious in matters either of art or science; one is witty only in matters of sentiment: things may, therefore, be ingenious, but not witty; or witty, but not ingenious; or both witty and ingenious. A mechanical invention, or any ordinary contrivance, is ingenious, but not witty: we say, an ingenious, not a udtty solution of a difficulty; a flash of vnt, not a flash of ingenuity: a untty hiunor, a unity conversation, not an ingenious humor or conversa- tion: on the other hand, a thought is ingenious, as it displays acuteness of intellect and aptness to the. subject; it is tmtty, inasmuch as it contains point and strikes on the understanding of others. Ingenuity is expressed by means of words or shows itself in the act; mechanical contrivances display ingenuity: wit can be only expressed by words; some men are happy in the display of their vnt in conversation. Sometimes the word unt is applied to the operations of the intellect gen- erally, which brings it still nearer in sense to ingenuity, but in this case it always implies a quick and sharp intel- lect as compared with ingenuity, which may be the result of long thought or be employed on graver matters. INGENUOUS, Ingenious. It would not have been necessary to point out the distinction between these two words if they had not been confounded in writing as well as in speaking. In- genuous, in Latin ingenuus, and ingen- ious, in Latin ingeniosus, are, either immediately or remotely, both derived from ingignere, to be inborn; but the former regards the freedom of the station and consequent nobility of the character which is inborn: the latter regards the genius or mental powers which are inborn. Truth is coupled with freedom or nobiUty of birth; the ingenuous, therefore, be- speaks the inborn freedom, by assert- ing the noblest right, and following the noblest impulse, of human nature, namely, that of speaking the truth; genius is altogether a natural endow- ment, that is, bom with us, indepen- dent of external circiunstances ; the in- genious man, therefore, displays his powers as occasion may offer. We love the ingenuous character on account of the qualities of his heart; we admire the ingenious man on account of the endowments of his mind. One is in- genuous as a man or ingenious as an author: a man confesses an action in- genuously; he defends it ingeniously. See also Frank; Naive. INGRAFT. See Implant. INGRATIATE. See Insinuate. INGULF. See Absorb. INHABIT. See Abide. INHERENT, Inbred, Inborn, In- nate. The inherent, from hcereo, to stick, denotes a permanent quality or property, as opposed to that which is adventitious and transitory. Inbred denotes that which is derived prin- cipally from habit or by a gradual process, as opposed to what is acquired by actual efforts. Inborn denotes that which is purely natural, in opposition to the artificial. Inherent is the most general in its sense; for what is inbred and inborn is naturally inherent; but aU is not inbred and inborn which is inherent. Inanimate objects have in- herent properties; but the inbred and inborn exist only in that which receives life; soUdity is an inherent, but not an inbred or inborn, property of matter: a love of truth is an innate property of the human mind; it is consequently inherent, inasmuch as nothing can to- tally destroy it. That which is in- bred is bred or nurtured in us from our birth; that which is inborn is simply born in us: a property may be inborn, but not inbred; it cannot, however, be inbred and not inborn. Habits, which are ingrafted into the natural disposi- tion, are properly inbred. Propensities, on the other hand, which are totally independent of education or external circumstances, are properly inborn, as an inborn love of freedom; hence, like- wise, the properties of animals are in- bred in them, inasmuch as they are derived through the medium of the breed of which the parent partakes. Inborn and innate, from the Latin natus, born, are precisely the same in meaning, yet they differ somewhat in application. Poetry and the grave style have adopted inborn; philosophy INJUSTICE ' 449 has adopted innate: genius is ivbom in some men; nobility is inborn in others: there is an inborn talent in some men to command, and an inborn fitness in others to obey. Mr. Locke and his followers are pleased to say there is no such thing as innaie ideas: and if they mean only that there are no sensible impressions on the soul until it is acted upon by external ob- jects they may be right: but if they mean to say that there are no inborn characters or powers in the soul which predispose it for the reception of cer- tain impressions, they contradict the experience of the learned and the un- learned in all ages, who believe, and that from close observation of them- selves and others, that man has, from his birth, not only the general char- acter which belongs to him in common with his species, but also those peculiar characteristics which distinguish indi- viduals from their earhest infancy: all these characters or characteristics are, therefore, not supposed to be pro- duced, but elicited, by circumstances; and ideas, which are but the sensible forms that the soul assumes in its con- nection with the body, are, on that ac- count, in vulgar language termed innate. INHUMAN. See Cruel. INIMICAL. See Adverse. INIQUITOUS. See Wicked. INJUNCTION. See Command. INJURE. See Impair. INJURY, Damage, Hurt, Harm, Mischief. All these terms are em- ployed to denote what is done to the disadvantage of any person or thing. The term injury (see Disadvantage) sometimes includes the idea of violence, or of an act done contrary to law or right, as to inflict or receive an injury, to redress injuries, etc. Injury is often taken in the general sense of what makes a thing otherwise than it ought to be: the other terms are taken in that sense only, and denote modes oiinjury. Damage,iromdamnum, loss, and a suffix, is that injury to a thing which occasions loss to a person or a diminution of value to a thing. Hurt comes from Old French hurter, to strike or dash against, hence to injure. Its ultimate origin is unknown; it signifies the injury which destroys the sound- ness or integrity of things: the harm 29 (see Evil) is the smallest kind of in- jury, which may simply produce in- convenience or trouble: the mischief is a great injury, which mere or less dis- turbs the order and consistency of things. Injury is appUcable to all bodies indiscriminately, physical and moral; damage to physical bodies only: hurt to physical bodies properly, and to moral objects figuratively. Trade may suffer an injury, or a building may suffer an injury, from time or a variety of other causes: a building, merchan- dise, and other things may suffer a damage if they are exposed to violence. Hurt is applied to, the animal body; a sprain, a cut, or bruise are Uttle hurts. It may be figuratively appUed to other bodies which may suffer in a similar manner, as a hurt to one's good name. Harm and mischief are as general in their apphcation as injury, and com- prehend what is physically as well as morally bad, but they are more partic- ularly apphcable to what is done in- tentionally by the person: whence ready to do harm or mischief is a char- acteristic of the individual. As apphed to things, harm and mis- chief are that which naturally result* from the object; when a thing is said to do harm or mischief, that imphes that it is its property. See also Injustice; Scathe. INJUSTICE, Injury, Wrong, /n- justice (see Justice), injury (see Disad- vantage), and wrong, from Late Anglo- Saxon vrrang, cognate with wring, mean- ing a hurt resulting from crushing or wringing, are all opposed to the right; but the injustice hes in the principle, the injury in the action that injures. There may, therefore, be injustice where there is no specific injury; and, on the other hand, there may be injury where there is no injustice. When we think worse of a person than we ought to think, we do him an act of injustice; but we do not, in the strict sense of the word, do him an injury: on the other hand, if we say anything to th^^ dis- credit of another, it will oe an injury to his reputation if it be beUevedj but it may not be an injustice, if it be strictly conformable to truth, and that which one is compelled to say. The violation of justice, or a breach of the rule of right, constitutes the in- 450 INNATE justice; but the quantum of ill which falls on the person constitutes the in- jury. Sometimes a person is dispos- sessed of his property by fraud or violence; this is an act of injustice; but it is not an injury if, in conse- quence of this act, he obtains friends who make it good to him beyond what he has lost: on the other hand, a per- son suffers very much through an- other's inadvertency, which to him is a serious injury, although the offender has not been guilty of injustice. A vxrong partakes both of injustice and injury; it is, in fact, an injury done by one person to another in ex- press violation of justice. The man who seduces a woman from the path of virtue does her the greatest of all vxrongs. One repents of injustice, re- pairs injuries, and redresses wrongs. INNATE. See Inherent, INNER. See Inward. INNOCENT. See Guiltless; Un- offending. INOFFENSIVE. See Unoffend- ing. INORDINATE. See Irregxtlar. INQUIRE. See Ask. INROAD. See Invasion. INSANITY. See Derangement. INSCRUTABLE. See Unsearch- able. INSIDE, Interior. The term in- side may be appUed to bodies of any magnitude, small or large; interior is peculiarly appropriate to bodies of great magnitude. We may speak of the inside of a nutshell, but not of its interior: on the other hand, we speak of the interior of St. Paxil's or the interior of a palace. This difference of application is not altogether arbi- trary: for inside hterally signifies the side that is inward; but interior sig- nifies the space which is more inward than the rest, which is enclosed in an enclosure, consequently cannot be ap- plied to anything but a large space that is enclosed. INSIDIOUS, Treacherous. Insid- ious, in Latin insidiostts, from insidioe, stratagem or ambush (from insidere, to lie in wait or ambush, from in, in, and sedere, to sit) , signifies as much as lying in wait. Treacherous is derived through Old French trecherie from Late Latin triccare, based on Latin tricoe, wiles, difficulties, by which the English trick may also be influenced, and signi- fies the disposition to deceive, to over- come by wiles. The insidious man is not so active as the treacherous man; the former only Mes in wait to insnare us when we are off our guard; the latter throws us off our guard by lulling us into a state of security, to get us more effectually into his power: an enemy may be denomi- nated insidious, but a friend is treach- erous. He who is afraid of avowing his real sentiments on religion makes insidi- ous attacks either on its ministers, its doctrines, or its ceremonies : he who is most in the confidence of another is capable of being the most treacherous toward him. See also Treacherous. INSIGHT, Inspection. The in- sight into a thing is what we receive: the inspection is what we give: one gets a view into a thing by an insight; one takes a view over a thing by an inspection. An insight serves to in- crease our own knowledge; inspection enables us to instruct or direct others. An inquisitive traveller tries to get an insight into the manners, customs, laws, and government of the countries which he visits; by inspection a master dis- covers the errors which are committed by his scholars, and sets them right. INSIGNIFICANT. See Unimpor- tant. INSINUATE, Ingratiate. Insin- uate (see Hint) and ingratiate, from gratus, grateful or acceptable, are em- ployed to express an endeavor to gain favor; but they differ in the circum- stances of the action. A person who insinuates adopts every art to steal into the good-will of another; but he who ingratiates adopts imartificial means to concihate good-will. A per- son of insinvxiting manners wins upon another imperceptibly, even so as to convert dislike into attachment; a person with ingratiating manners pro- cures good-will by manifest efforts. Insinvate and ingratiate may differ in the motive, as well as the mode, of the action: the motive is, in both cases, seK-interest; but the former is unlawful, and the latter allowable. In proportion as the object to be attained by another's favor is base, so is it INSNARE 451 necessary to have recourse to insinvr ation; when the object to be attained is that which may be avowed, ingra- tiating will serve the purpose. Low persons insinuate themselves into the favor of their superiors, in order to obtain an influence over them: it is commendable in a young person to wish to ingratiate himself with those who are entitled to his esteem and respect. In modern use, however, ingratiate clearly has begun to assume somewhat the same imfavorable connotation of in- sinuate. Insinuate may be used in the im- proper sense for imconscious agents; ingratiate is always the act of a con- scious agent. Water will insinuate it- self into every body that is in the smallest degree porous; there are few persons of so much apathy that it may not be possible, one way or an- other, to ingratiate one's self into their favor. Insinuation, Reflection. — These both imply personal remarks, or such re- marks as are directed toward an in- dividual; but the former is less direct and more covert than the latter. An insinuation always deals in half-words; a reflection is commonly open. They are both levelled at the individual with no good intent; but the insinua- tion is general, and may be employed to convey any unfavorable sentunent; the reflection is particular, and com- monly passes between intimates and persons in close connection. The in- sinuation concerns the honor, the moral character, or the intellectual endow- ments of the person: the reflection re- spects his particular conduct or feel- iilgs toward another. Envious people throw out insinuations to the oispar- agement of those whose merits they dare not openly question; when friends quarrel they deal largely in reflections on the past. lx>ISIPID, Dull, Flat. Insipid, in Latin insipidus, from in, privative, and sapere, to taste, signifies without savor. DuU (see Dull). Flat (see Flat). A want of spirit in the moral sense is designated by these epithets, which borrow their figurative meaning from different properties in nature : the taste is referrea to in the word insipid; the properties of colors are considered un- der the word dtdl; the property of siu"- face is referred to by the word flat. As the want of flavor in any meat makes it insipid and renders it worth- less, so does the want of mind or character in a man render him equally insipid and devoid of the distinguish- ing characteristic of his nature: as the beauty and perfection of colors con- sist in their brightness, the absence of this essential property, which con- stitutes dulness, renders them iminter- esting objects to the eye; so the want of spirit in a moral comp)osition, which constitutes its dulness, deprives it at the same time of that ingredient which should awaken attention: as in the natural world objects are either ele- vated or flM, so in the moral world the spirits are either raised or de- pressed, and such moral representa- tions as are calculated to raise the spirits are termed spirited, while those which fail in this object are termed flxd. An insipid writer is without sen- timent of any kind or degree; a dull writer fails in vivacity and vigor of sentiment; a. flxU performance is want- ing in the property of provoking mirth, which should be its peculiar ingredient. INSIST, Persist. Both these terms being derived from the Latin sislo, to stand, express the idea of resting or keeping to a thing; but insist signifies to rest on a point, and persist, from per, through or by, and sisto (see Continue), signifies to keep on with a thing, to carry it through. We insist on a mat- ter by maintaining it; we persist in a thing by continuing to do it: we insist by the force of authority or argument; we persist by the mere act of the will. A person insists on that which he con- ceives to be his right: or he insists on that which he conceives to be right: but he persists in that which he has no will to give up. To insist is, therefore, an act of discretion; to persist is mostly an act of folly or caprice: the former is always taken in a good or indiffer- ent sense; the latter mostly in a bad sense. A parent ought to insist on all matters that are of essential impor- tance to his children; a spoiled cnild ■persists in its foUies from perversity of humor. INSNARE, Entrap, Entangle, In- veigle. The idea of getting any ob- 452 INSOLENT ject artfully into one's power is com- mon to all these terms: to insnare is to take in, or by means of, a snare, from Anglo-Saxon sneare, a cord, string, or noose; to entrap is to take in a trap, from Anglo-Saxon treppe, a step, a trap being a contrivance into which an ani- mal steps — aUied to tramp; to entangle is to take in a tangle, which is a Scan- dinavian word, a frequentative of tang, sea-weed, and means to twist around and around like sea-weed; to inveigle, or to take by means of making blind, is avitiation of the French aveugle, bhnd, from Latin ab, without, and oculum, eye. Insnare and entangle are used either in the natural or moral sense; entrap mostly in the natural, sometimes in the figurative, inveigle only in the moral sense. In the natural sense birds are insnared by means of bird-Ume, nooses, or whatever else may deprive them of their hberty: men and beasts are en- trapped in whatever serves as a trap or an enclosure; they may be entrapped by being lured into a house or any place of confinement; all creatures are entangled by nets, or that which con- fines the limbs and prevents them from moving forward. In the moral sense, men are said to be insnared by their own passions and the allurements of pleasure into a course of vice which deprives them of the use of their facilities and makes them vir- tually captives; they are entangled by their errors and imprudences in diffi- culties which interfere with their moral freedom and prevent them from act- ing. They are inveigled by the artifices of others when the consequences of their own actions are shut out from their view, and they are made to walk like bhnd men. INSOLENT. See Impertinent. INSOLVENCY, Failure, Bank- ruptcy. Insolvency, from Latin in, not, and solvere, to loose, to discharge one's obligations, hence to pay, signi- fies the state of not being able to pay. Failure (see that word). Bankruptcy, modified etymologically from French banqueraute by knowledge of the second element, from the two words hanka and Tupta, signifies literally a broken bank. All these terms are in particular use in the mercantile world, but are not excluded also from general application. Insolvency is a state; failure, an act consequent upon that state; and bank- ruptcy is an effect of that act. Insol- vency is a condition of not being able to pay one's debts; failure is a cessation of business, from the want of means to carry it on; and bankruptcy is a legal surrender of all one's remaining goods into the hands of one's creditors, in consequence of a real or supposed in- solvency. These terms are seldom con- fined to one person or description of persons. As an incapacity to pay debts is very frequent among others besides men of business, insolvency is said of any such persons; a gentleman may die in a state of insolvency who does not leave effects sufficient to cover aU demands. Although failure is here specifically taken for a failure in busi- ness, yet there may be a failure in one particular undertaking without any di- rect insolvency: a failure may likewise imply only a temporary failure in pay- ment, or it may imply an entire failure of the concern. As a bankruptcy is a legal transaction, which entirely dis- solves the firm imder which any busi- ness is conducted, it necessarily im- plies a failure to the full extent of the term; yet it does not necessarily imply an insolvency; for some men may, in consequence of a temporaxy failure, be led to commit an act of bankruptcy who are afterward enabled to give a full dividend to all their creditors. INSPECTION, Superintendency, Oversight. The office of looking into the conduct of others is expressed by the first two terms, but inspection com- prehends little more than the preserva- tion of good order; superintendence in- cludes the arrangement of the whole. The monitor of a school has the inspec- tion of the conduct of his school-fel- lows, but the master has the superin- tendence of the school. The officers of an army inspect the men, to see that they observe all the rules that have been laid down for them; a general or superior officer has the superintend- ence of any miUtary operation. Fi- deUty is pecuUarly wanted in an in- spector, judgment and experience in a superintendent. Inspection is said of things as well as persons; oversight only of persons; one has the inspection of books in order to ascertain their ac- INSTRUMENT 453 curacy; one has the oversight of per- sons to prevent irregularity: there is an inspector of the customs and an overseer of the poor. See also Insight. INSPECTOR. See Censor. INSPIRE. See Animate; Thrill. INSPIRING. See Electric. INSTANCE. See Example. INSTANT, Moment. Instant, from instare, to stand over, signifies the point of time that stands over us, or, as it were, over our heads. Moment, from the Latin momentum, from mo- vere, to move, signifies properly move- ment, but is here taken for the small particle of time in which any move- ment is made. Instant is always taken for the time present; moment is taken generally for either past, present, or future. A duti- ful child comes the instant he is called; a prudent person embraces the favor- able moment. When they are both taken for the present time, instant ex- presses a much shorter space than mo- ment; when we desire a person to do a thing this instant, it requires haste: if we desire him to do it this moment, it only admits of no delay. Instanta- neous rehef is necessary on some oc- casions to preserve life; a moment's thought will furnish a ready wit with a suitable reply. Instant, Jiffy. — Jiffy is a coUoquial word of uncertain origin, differing in its meaning from moment, much as in- stant differs, but indicating a still briefer moment of time than instant. It cannot, however, be employed in serious writing. INSTIGATE. See Encourage. INSTIL. See Implant. INSTITUTE, Establish, Found, Erect. To institute, in Latin institutus, participle of instituo, from in and status ere, to place or appoint, signifying to dispose or fix for a specific end, is to form according to a certain plan; to establish (see 'Fix) is to fix in a certain position what has been formed; to found (see Found) is to lay the founda- tion of anything; to erect (see Build) is to make erect. La^vs, communities, and particular orders are instituted; schools, colleges, and various societies are established: in the former case some- thing new is supposed to be framed; in the latter case it is supposed only to have a certain situation assigned to it. The order of the Jesuits was in- stituted by Ignatius de Loyola; schools were established by Alfred the Great in various parts of his dominions. The act of instituting comprehends design and "method; that of establishing in- cludes the idea of authority. The In- quisition was instituted in the time of Ferdinand; the Church of England is established by authority. To institute is always the immediate act of some agent; to establish is sometimes the effect of circumstances. Men of pub- lic spirit instUvie that which is for the pubhc good; a communication or trade between certain places becomes established in course of time. An in- stitution is properly of a public nature, but establishments are as often private: there are charitable and literary insti- tuiions, but domestic establishments. To found is a species of instituting which borrows its figurative meaning from the nature of buildings and is apphcable to that which is formed after the manner of a building; a pubhc school is founded when its pecuniary resources are formed into a fund or foundation. To erect is a species of founding, for it expresses, in fact, a leading particular in the act of found- ing: nothing can be founded without being erected; although some things may be erected without being expressly founded in the natural sense; a house is both founded and erected; a monu- ment is erected, but not founded; so in the figurative sense, a college is founded and consequently erected: but a tri- bunal is erected, not founded. INSTRUCT. See Inform. INSTRUCTION. See Advice; Ed- ucation. INSTRUCTIVE. See DiDAcnc. INSTRUMENT, Tool. Instrument, in Latin itistrunienlum, from inslruo, signifies the thing by which an effect is produced. Tool comes from Anglo- Sax6n tol, an implement for working, signifying the thing with which one toils. These terms are both employed to express the means of producmg an end. An instrument is a tool of delicate or elaborate mechanism. Applied fig- uratively to persons, instrument is used mostly m a good sense, tool only in a 454 INSUFFICIENT bad sense. Individuals in high sta- tions are often the instruments in bring- ing about great changes in nations; spies and informers are the tools of government. INSUFFICIENT. See Incapable; Unsatisfactory. INSULT. See Affront; Indignity. INSUPERABLE. See Invincible. INSURRECTION, Sedition, Re- bellion, Revolt. Insurrection, from insurrectus, participle of surgere (Eng- lish surge), to rise up, signifies rising up against any power that is. Sedi- tion, in Latin seditio, compounded of sed, for se and itio, signifies a going apart, that is, the people going apart from the government. Rebellion, from Latin re, against, and helium, war, sig- nifies turning upon or against, in a hostile manner, that to which one has been before bound. Revolt, in French revolter, is most probably compoimded of re and volter, from volvere, to roll, signifying to roll or turn back from, to turn against that to which one has been bound. The term insurrection is general; it is used in a good or bad sense, according to the nature of the power against which one rises up: sedition and re- hellion are more specific; they are al- ways taken in the bad sense of un- allowed opposition to lawful authority. There may be an insurrection against usurped power, which is always justi- fiable; but sedition and rebellion are levelled against power universally ac- knowledged to be legitimate. Insur- rection is always open; it is a rising up of many in a mass; but it does not imply any concerted or any specifically active measure: a imited spirit of op- position, as the moving cause, is all that is comprehended in the meaning of the term: sedition is either secret or open, according to circumstances; in popular governments it will be open and determined; in monarchical gov- ernments it is secretly organized: re- bellion is the consummation of sedition; the scheme of opposition which has been digested in secrecy breaks out into open hostilities ana becomes re- bellion. Insurrections may be made by nations against a foreign dominion, or by subjects against their govern- ment: sedition and rebellion are carried on by subjects only against their gov- ernment. Revolt, Uke rebellion, signifies origi- nally a warring or turning against the power to which one has been subject; but revolt is mostly taken either in an indifferent or a good sense for resisting a foreign dominion which has been im- posed by force of arms. Rebel and revolt may be figuratively applied to the powers of the mind when opposed to each other: the wiU rebels against the reason. INTEGRAL. See Whole. INTEGRITY. See Honesty. INTELLECT, Genius, Talent. Intellect, in Latin intellectus, from inter, between, and the past participle of le- gere, to choose, meaning that which chooses between or judges, signifies the gift of imderstanding, as opposed to mere instinct or impulse. Genius, in Latin genius, from gignere, to be born, signifies that which is pecuharly born with us. Talent (see Faculty). Intellect is here the generic term, and includes in its meaning that of the two other terms; there cannot be genius and talent without intellect, but there may be intellect without any express genius o' talent. Intellect is the in- tellectual power improved and exalted by cultivation and exercise; in this sense we speak of a man of intellect, or a work that displays great intellect; genius is the particular bent of the intellect which is born with a man, as a genius for poetry, painting, music, etc. ; talent is a particular mode of intellect which qualifies its possessor to do some things better than others, as a talent for learning languages, a talent for the stage, etc. See also Understanding. INTELLECTUAL. See Mental. INTELLIGENCE. See Informa- tion. INTEMPERATE. See Excessive. INTEND. See Design. INTENT, Intense. Intent and in- tense are both derived from the verb to intend, Latin intendere, signifying to stretch toward a point or to a great degree : the former is said only of the person or mind; the latter qualifies things in general: a person is intent when his mind is on the stretch toward i an object; his apphcation is intense nSTTERCOURSE 455 when his mind is for a continuance closely fixed on certain objects; cold is intense when it seems to have reached its highest pitch. - See also Tenor. INTERCEDE, Interpose, Medi- ate, Interfere, Intermeddle. Inter- cede: from inter, between, and cedere, to go, signifies hterally going between; interpose, through French from Latin inter, between, and Late Latin pausare, to place, means placing one's self » be- tween; mediate, from Latin mediatus, past participle of mediare, based on mediv^, middle, means coming in the middle; interfere, through French from inter, between, and Latin ferire, to strike, means striking between; and irv- termeddle, through French from Latin inter, between, and miscvlare (the in- tercalated d being an Anglo-French development, which was brought over into Middle English) (Late Latin), Latin miscere, to mix, signifies med- dling or mixing among. One intercedes between parties that are unequal; one interposes between parties that are equal; one intercedes m favor of that party which is threat- ened with punishment; one interposes between parties that threaten each other with evil: we intercede with the parent in favor of the child who has offended, in order to obtain pardon for him; one interposes between two friends who are disputing to prevent them from going to extremities. One intercedes by means of persuasion; it is an act of covu-tesy or kindness in the person between whom and him on whose behalf the intercession is made to comply; one interposes by an exer- cise of authority; it is a matter of pro- priety or necessity in the parties to conform. The favorite of a monarch intercedes in behalf of some criminal, that his punishment may be mitigated ; the magistrates interpose with their authority to prevent the broils of the disorderly from coming to serious acts of violence. To intercede and interpose are em- ployed on the highest and lowest oc- casions; to mediate is never employed but in matters of the greatest moment. As earthly offenders, we require the intercession of a fellow-mortal; as of- fenders against the God of heaven, we require the intercession of a Divine Being: without the timely interposition of a superior, trifling disputes may grow into bloody quarrels; without the interposition of Divine Providence, we cannot conceive of anything impor- tant as taking place: to settle the affairs of nations, mediators may afford a salutary assistance; to bring about the redemption of a lost world, the Son of God condescended to be Medi- ator. All these acts are performed for the goodjof others; but interfere and inter- meddle are of a different description: one may interfere for the good of others or to gratify one's self; one never inter- meddles but for selfish purposes: the first three terms are, therefore, always used in a good sense; the fourth in a good or bad sense, according to cir- cumstances; the last always m a bad INTERCHANGE, Exchange, Rec- iprocity, hiterchange is a frequent and mutual exchange (see Change); ex- change consists of one act only; an interchange consists of many acts: an interchange is used only in the moral sense; exchange is used mostly in the proper sense: an interchange of civili- ties keeps alive good-will; an exchange of commodities is a convenient mode of trade. Interchange is an act; reciprocity is an abstract property : by an interchange of sentiment, friendships are engen- dered; the reciprocity of good services is what renders them doubly accept- able to those who do them and to those who receive them. INTERCOURSE, Commxtnication, Connection, Commerce. Intercourse, through French, from Latin intercur- sus, signifies, literally, a running be- tween. Communication (see Commu- nicate). Connection (see Connect). Commerce, from cum, and merces, mer- chandise, signifies, literally, an ex- change of merchandise, and generally an interchange. Intercourse and commerce subsist only between persons; communication and connection between persons and things. An intercourse with persons may be carried on in various forms; either b^ an interchange of civilities, which is a friendly intercourse; an exchange of 456 INTERDICT commodities, which is a commercial intercourse; or an exchange of words, which is a verbal and partial inter- course: a communication, in this sense, is a species of intercourse, namely, that which consists in the communication of one's thoughts to another, which may subsist between man and man or be- tween man and his Maker. A connection consists of a permanent intercourse; since one who has a regular intercourse for purposes of trade with another is said to have a connection with him, or to stand in connection with him. There may, therefore, be a par- tial intercourse or communication where there is no connection, nothing to bind or link the parties to each other: but there cannot be a connection which is not kept up by continued intercourse. The commerce is a species of general but close intercourse; it may consist either of frequent meeting and regular co-operation or in cohabitation: in this sense we speak of the commerce of men one with another, or the commerce of man and wife, of parents and chil- dren, and the hke. As it regards things, communication is said of places in the proper sense; connection is used for things in the proper or improp>er sense: there is said to De a communication between two rooms when there is a passage open from one to the other; one house has a connection with another when there is a common passage or thoroughfare to them: a communication is kept up between two countries by means of regular or irregular conveyances; a connection subsists between two towns when the inhabitants trade with one another, intermarry, and the like. INTERDICT. See Forbid. INTEREST, Concern. The inter- est (from the Latin interesse, to be among, or have a part or a share in a thing) is more comprehensive than concern (see Affair). We have an interest in whatever touches or comes near to our feeUngs or our external circvmistances; we have a concern in that which demands our attention. Interest is that which is agreeable; it consists of either profit, advantage, gain, or amusement; it binds us to an object and makes us think of it: con- cern, on the other hand, is something involuntary or painful; we have a con- cern in that which we are obliged to look to, which we are bound to from the fear of losing or of suffering. It is the interest of every man to cultivate a philosoph- ical temper: it is the concern of all to be on their guard against temptation. INTERFERE. See Intercede. INTERIOR. See Inside; Inward. INTERLOPER. See Intruder. INTERMEDDLE. See Intercede. INTERMEDIATE, Intervening. Intermediate signifies being in the midst, between two objects; intervening signi- fies coming between: the former is ap>- pli cable to space and time; the latter either to time or circumstances. The intermediate time between the com- mencement and the termination of a truce is occupied with preparations for the renewal of hostilities; intervening circumstances sometimes change the views of the belligerent parties, and dispose their minds to peace. INTERMENT. See Burial INTERMIT. See Subside. INTERN, Confine, Interne. In- tern, in French interne, from Latin internum, inward, from inter, within, between, and suffix -nus, Itahan and Spanish interna. Intern, as a substan- tive, signifies a student residing at a school, a boarder; in the more common form, interne, a physician or surgeon living at a hospital or similar institu- tion, in distinction from a visiting or consulting physician or surgeon; also, in war-times, to a person or a vessel de- tained at an appointed place, without permission to leave. Intern, as a verb, signifies to send and confine in the inte- rior of a country. Prisoners of war are interned at places more or less remote from the field of action, and captured war-ships and some other vessels are interned also at a distance from home ports. The former are usually held till exchanged, the latter till the close of the war. In the summer of 1915 there were about seventy Teutonic vessels of all kinds interned in the ports of the United States, because of the European war. INTERPOSE. See Intercede. INTERPRET. See Explain. INTERROGATE. See Ask. INTERVAL, Respite. Interval, in Latin intervallum, signifies, literally, the space between the stakes which formed INTRANSIGENT 457 a Homan intrenchment; and, by an extended application, it signifies any space. Respite, Old French respit, comes from Latin respedum. It re- ferred originally to the "resjpect had to a suit on the part of a judge," and so meant a delay, a reprieve. Every respite requu*es an interval; but there are many intervals where there is no respite. The term interval concerns time only; respite includes the idea of ceasing from action for a time; intervals of ease are a respite to one who is oppressed with labor; the in- terval which is sometimes granted to a criminal before his execution is in the most proper sense a respite. INTERVENTION, iNTERPOsmoN. The intervention, from inter, between, and the past participle of venio, to come, is said of inanimate objects; the interposition, from inter, between, and positus, past participle of pono, to place, is said only of rational agents. The light of the moon is obstructed by the intervention of the clouds; the life of an individual is preserved by the inter- position of a superior: human life is so full of contingencies that when we have formed our projects we can never say what may intervene to prevent their execution; when a man is engaged in an imequal combat, he has no chance of escaping but by the timely inter- position of one who is able to rescue him. INTIMACY. See Acquaintance. INTIMATE. See Hint. INTIMIDATE. See Fmghten; Overawe. INTOXICATION, Drunkenness, Infatuation, Intoxication, from the Latin toxicum (Greek to^ikov, a poison for arrows, from ro?a, arrows), signi- fies the state of being imbued with a poison. Drunkenness signifies the state of having drunk overmuch. In- fatuation, from fatuus, foohsh, signi- fies making foolish, or the state of being made foohsh. Intoxication and drunkenness are used either in the proper or the im- proper sense; infatvMion in the im- proper sense onJy; intoxication is a general state; drunkenness a particu- lar state; intoxication may be produced by various causes; drunkenness is pro- duced only by an immoderate indul- gence in some intoxicating Uquor: a person may be intoxicated by the smell of strong liquors, or by vapors which produce a similar effect; he becomes drunken by the drinking of wine or other spirits. In another sense, a dep- rivation of one's reasoning faculties is the common idea in the signification of aU these terms: intoxication and drunkenness spring from the intemper- ate state of the feeUngs; infatuation springs from the ascendency of the passions over the reasoning powers: a person is intoxicated with success, drunk with joy, infatuated by an excess of van- ity, an impetuosity of character, or a passion for one of the opposite sex. INTRANSIGENT, Communist, Nihilist, Socialist. Intransigent, in French intransigeant and Spanish in- transigente, is a compound of the Latin in, not, and transigo, to agree or settle,, and implies a person who is dissatis- fied with present conditions, esf>ecially of a social character, and who refuses to come to an agreement with others on questions of pubhc interest. These terms form a part of a considerable number of designations having a com- mon import, yet conveying different im- pressions according to conditions in the coimtries where they are most in vogue. An intransigent, intransigeant, and intransigente, applied to persons in France, Italy, and Spain, respectively, or an irreconcilable, representing at first a member of the Extreme Left in the Spanish Cortes and subsequently a member of the extreme Republican party in Spain, is one who opposes existing pohcies in a pohtical, economi- cal, and social sense. The communist beUeves in the doc- trine that all property should be held equally by all members of a community. The nihilist of Russiar beUeved in de- stroying existing institutions and gov- ernmental forms and pohcies, and in founding a new order of things gener- ally. The socialist of Germany, the United States, and other countries be- Ueves that society should be recon- structed on the basis of co-operation of labor and the community of prop- erty, so that there would be neither the really rich nor the really poor. The principles underlying these vari- ous doctrines have had earnest and emi- 458 INTRENCH nent advocates for many years, and, as in innumerable attempts to harmonize and improve social conditions, many pf the propagandists, through over- zeal, have been guilty of criminal ex- cesses, especially in France, Italy, and Russia. A fiuther exposition of movements for social betterment will be found in the article on Socialism. INTRENCH. See Encroach; Trench. INTREPID. See Bold. INTRICACY. See Complexity. INTRICATE. See Knotty. INTRIGUING. See Scheming. INTRINSIC, Real, Genuine, Na- tive. Intrinsic, in Latin intrinsecus, from intra, ^-ithin, and sequi, to fol- low, signified hterally following in- ward, that is, lying in the thing itself. Real, through French reel, or directly from Late Latin realis, from the Latin res, signifies belonging to the very thing. Genuine, in Latin genuinus, from gignere, to bring forth, signifies actually brought forth, or springing out of a thing. Native, in Latin nativus, and ^rialus, bom, signifies actually bom, or .arising from a thing. The value of a thing is either in- trinsic or real: but the intrinsic value is said in regard to its extrinsic value; the real value in regard to the artifi- cial: the intrinsic value of a book is that which it will fetch when sold in a regular way, in opposition to the extrinsic value, as being the gift of a friend, a particular edition, or a Particular type: the real value of a ook, in the proper sense, lies in the fineness of the paper and the costliness of its binding, and, in the improper sense, it hes in the excellence of its con- tents, in opposition to the artificial value which it acquires in the minds pf biblio- philes from being a scarce edition. The worth of a man is either genuine or native: the genuine worth of a man lies in the excellence of his moral char- acter, as opposed to his adventitious worth, which he acquires from the pos- session of wealth, power, and dignity: his native worth is that which is inborn in him, and natural, in opf>osition to the meretricious ana borrowed worth which he may derive from his situa- tion, his talent, or his efforts to please. INTRODUCE, Present. To irdro- duce, from the Latin intra, into, and ducere, to lead, signifies UteraUy to bring within or into any place; to pre- sent (see Give) signifies to bring into the presence of. As they concern per- sons, the former passes between equals, the latter only among persons of rank and power: one hterary man is intro- duced to another by means of a common friend; he is presented at court by means of a nobleman. As these terms concern things, we say that subjects are introdvxxd in the course of conversation; men's particu- lar views upon certain subjects are pre- sented to the notice of others through the medium of publication. INTRUDE, Obtrude. To intrude is to thrust one's self into a place; to obtrude, a use now practically ob- solete, is to thrust one's self in the way — ^both from trudere, to thrust. In- trude, therefore, literally corresponds to the slang phrase butt in. It is intru- sion to go into any society imasked and Uudesired; it is obtruding to put one's self in the way of another by joining the company and taking a part in the conversation without invitation or consent. An intruder is unwelcome because his company is not at all desired, but an obtruder may be no further unwel- come than as he occasions an inter- ruption or disturbance. In the moral application they pre- serve the same distinction. Thoughts which we wish to banish intrude some- times on the mind ; unpleasant thoughts obtrude themselves to the exclusion or interruption of those we wish to retain. See also Encroach. Intruder, Interloper. — An intruder thrusts himself in: an interloper (coined from inter, Latin, meaning within, and Dutch looper, English leap) runs in between and takes his station. The intruder, therefore, intrudes only for a short space of time, and in an unimpor- tant degree; but the wierZoper deprives another of his essential rights and for a permanency. A man is an intruder who is an unbidden guest at the table of another; he is an interloper when he joins any society in such manner as to obtain its privileges without shar- ing its burdens. Intruders are always INVENT 459 offensive in the domestic circle: inter- lopers in trade are always regarded with an evil eye. INTRUST. See Consign. INUNDATE. See Overflow. INVADE. See Encroach. INVALID, Patient. Invalid, in Latin invcdidus, signifies, literally, one not strong or in good health; jxitient, from the Latin pattens, suffering, sig- nifies one suffering under disease. In- valid is a general, and patient a particu- lar, term; a person may be an invalid without being a patient: he may be a patient without being an invalid. An invalid is so denominated from his wanting the ordinary share of health and strength; but the paiient is one who is laboring under some bodily suffering. Old soldiers are called in- valids who are no longer able to bear the fatigues of warfare: but they are not necessarily patients. He who is under the surgeon's hands for any wound is a patient, but not necessarily an invalid. INVASION, L^CTJRSiON, Irruption, Inroad. The idea of making a forcible entrance into a foreign territory is com- mon to all these terms. Invasion, from in, into, and vado, to go, expresses merely this general idea, without any particular qualification: incursion, (rova in and cursus, past participle of curro, to run, signifies a hasty and sudden in- vasion: irruption, from in, and ruptus, past participle of rumpo, to break, signi- fies a particularly violent invasion; in- road, from in and road, signifying the making a road or way for one's self, impUes the going farther into a coun- try and making a longer stay than by an incursion. Invasion is said of that which passes in distant lands; Alex- ander invaded India; Hannibal crossed the Alps and made an invasion into Italy: incursion is said of neighboring states; the borderers on each side the Tweed used to make frequent incur- sions into England or Scotland. Invasion is the act of a regular army; it is a systematic mihtary movement: irruption and inroad are the irregular movements of bodies of men ; the former is apphed particularly to uncultivated nations, and the latter, like incursion, to neighboring states: the Goths and Vandak made irruptions into Europe; the Scotch and English used to make inroads upon each other. These words preserve the same dis- tinction in their figurative appUcation. Invade signifies a hostile attack, and may be applied to physical objects or to spiritual objects; as to invade one's peace of mind, privileges, etc. Inroad denotes the progress into any body of what is bad; as the inroads of disease into the constitution, into the mind. INVECTIVE. See Abuse. INVEIGH. See Declaim. INVEIGLE. See Insnare, INVENT, Feign, Frame, Fabri- cate, Forge. All these terms are em- ployed to express the production of something out of the mind, by means of its own efforts. To invent (see Con- trive) is the general term; thp other terms imply modes of invention imder different circumstances. To invent, as distinguished from the rest, is busied in creating new forms either by means of the imagination or the reflective powers; it forms combinations either purely spiritual or those which are mechanical and physical: the poet in- vents imagery; the philosopher invents mathematical problems or mechanical instruments. Invent is used for the production of new forms to real objects, or for the creation of unreal objects; to feign is used for the creation of unreal objects or such as have no existence but in the mind: a play or a story is invented from what passes in the world: Mo- hammed's religion consists of nothing but inventions: the heathen poets feigned all the tales and fables which constitute the mythology or history of their deities. To frame, that is, to make according to a frame, is a species of invention which consists in the dis- position as well as the combination of objects. Thespis was the inventor of tragedy: Psalmanazar framed an en- tirely new language, which he pre- tended to be spoken on the island of Formosa; Solon framed a new set of laws for the city of Athens. To invent, frame, and feign are all occasionally employed in the ordinary concerns of life, and in a bad sense; fabricate is selaom, and forge never, used any otherwise. Invent is employed 460 INVERT for that which is the fruit of one's own mind and mostly contrary to the truth; to feign is employed for that whdch is unreal; to frame is employed for that which requires dehberation and arrangement ; to fabricate and forge are employed for that which is ab- solutely false and requiring more or less exercise of the inventive power. A person inverUs a lie, and feigns sorrow; invents an excuse, and feigns an at- tachment. A story is invented, inas- much as it is new and not before conceived by others or occasioned by the suggestions of others; it is framed, inasmuch as it requires to be duly disposed in all its parts, so as to be consistent; it ia fabricated, inasmuch as it runs in direct opposition to actual circumstances and therefore has re- quired the skill and labor of a work- man; it is forged (from Old French forge, a work-shop, Latin fabrica), in- asmuch as it seems by its utter false- hood and extravagance to have caused as much severe action in the brain as what is produced by the fire in a furnace or forge. See also Contrive; Find. INVERT. See Overturn. INVEST, Endue or Endow. To invest, from vestire, to clothe, whence EngUsh vestments is derived, signifies to clothe in anything. Endue or en- dow, from the Latin induo, signifies to put on anything. One is invested with that which is external: one is endued with that which is internal. We irir- vest a person with an office or a dig- nity: a person is endued with good quahties. To invest is a real external action; but to endue may be merely fictitious or mental. The king is in- vested with supreme authority; a lover endues his mistress with every earthly perfection. Endow is but a variation of endue, and yet it seems to have ac- quired a distinct office: we may say that a person is endued or endowed with a good understanding; but as an act of the imagination endow is not to be substituted for endue: for we do not say that it endows, but endues things with properties. See also Besiege. INVIDIOUS, Envious. Invidious, in Latin invidiosus, from invidia, or in, not, and videre, to see, signifies look- ing at with an evil eye: envious is literally only a variation of invidious. Invidious, in its common acceptation, signifies causing ill-will; envious sig- nifies having iU-will. A task is in- vidious that puts one in the way of giving offence; a look is envious that is full of envy. Invidious qualifies the thing; envious qualifies the temper of the mind. It is invidious for one au- thor to be judge against another who has written on the same subject: a man is envious when the prospect of another's happiness gives him pain. INVIGORATE. See Strengthen. INVINCIBLE, Unconquerable, Insuperable, Insurmountable. In- vincible signifies not to be vanquished (see Conquer): unconquerable, not to be conquered: insuperable, not to be overcome: insurmountable, not to be surmounted. Persons or things which can withstand all force are in the strict sense invincible; but as in this sense nothing created can be termed invincible, the term is employed to ex- press strongly whatever can withstand human force in general: on this groimd the Spaniards termed their Armada invincible. The quahties of the mind are termed unconquerable when they are not to be won over or brought under the control of one's own reason or the judgment of another: hence obstinacy is with propriety denomi- nated unconquerable which will yield to no foreign influence. The particu- lar disposition of the mind or turn of thinking is termed insuperable, inas- much as it baffles our resolution or wishes to have it altered; an aversion is insuperable which no reasoning or endeavor on our own part can over- come. Things are denominated in- surmountable, inasmuch as they baffle one's skill or efforts to get over them or put them out of one's way: an ob- stacle is insurmountable which in the nature of things is irremovable. Some people have an insuperable antipathy to certain animals; some persons are of so modest and timid a character that the necessity of addressing stran- gers is with them an insuperable objec- tion to using any endeavors for their own advancement; the difficulties which Columbus had to encounter in his dis- covery of the New World would have IRREGULAR 461 appeared insurmountable to any mind less determined and persevering. INVITE. See Attract; Call. INVOLVE. See Implicate. INWARD, Internal, Inner, In- terior. Inxoard signifies toward the inside, that is, not absolutely within: internal signifies positively within: in- ner, as the comparative of inward, sig- nifies more inward; and interior, as the comparative of internal, sigmfies more internal. Inward is employed more frequently to express a state than to qualify an object; internal to qualify the objects: a thing is said to be turned inward which forms a part of the inside: it is said to be internal as one of its characteristics; inward, as denoting the position, is indefinite; anything that is w in the smallest degree is inward; thus what we take in the mouth is inward in distinction from that which may be applied to the hps; but that is properly internal which lies in the very frame and sys- tem of the body; inner, which rises in degree on inward, is apphcable to such bodies as admit of specific de- grees of enclosure: thus the inner shell of a nut is that which is enclosed in the inward: so likewise interior is ap- plicable to that which is capacious and has many involutions, as the irv- terior coat of the intestines. IRE. See Anger. IRIDESCENT. See Nacreotts. IRONY. See Ridicule; Wit. IRRATIONAL, Foolish, Absurd, Preposterous. Irrational, compound- ed of in, not, ratio, reason, and a suffix, signifies contrary^ reason, and is em- ployed to express the want of the faculty itself, or a deficiency in the exercise of this faculty. Foolish (see Folly) signi- fies the perversion of this faculty. Ab- surd, from ab, and surdus, deaf, signifies that to which one would turn a deaf ear. Preposterous, from prae, before, and pos- ierus, behind, signifies, literally, that side foremost which ought to be be- hind, which is unnatural and contrary to common sense. Irrational is not so strong a term as foolish: it is applicable more frequently to the thing than to the person, to the principle than to the practice; foolish, on the contrary, is commonly appli- cable to the person as well as the thing; to the practice rather than the prin- ciple. Scepticism, to those who have faith, is the most irrational thing that exists; the human mind, from this viewpoint, is formed to believe, but not to doubt: he is, of all men, con- sidered most foolish who stakes his eternal salvation on his own fancied superiority of inteUigence and illu- mmation. Foolish, absurd, and pre- posterous rise in degree: a violation of common sense is implied by them aU, but they vary according to the d^ree of violence which is done to the under- standing :/ooZis/i is applied to anything, however trivial, which in the smallest degree offends our understanding: the conduct of children is therefore often foolish, but not absurd and preposter- ous, which are said only of serious things that are opposed to our judg- ment: it is absurd for a man to per- suade another to do that which he in like circumstances would object to do himself; it is preposterous for a man to expose himself to the ridicule of others and then be angry with those who will not treat him respectfully. IRRECONCILABLE. See Intran- sigent. IRREFRAGABLE. See Indubita- IRREGULAR, Disorderly, Inor- dinate, Intemperate. Irregttlar, that is, literally, not regular, marks merely the absence of a good quality; disor- derly, that is, literally, out of order, marks the presence of a positively baa quality. What is irregtuar may be so from the nature of the thing; what is disorderly is rendered so by some external circumstance. Things are planted irregularly for want of design: the best troops are apt to be disorderly in a long march. Irregular and dis- orderly are taken in a moral as well as a natural sense: inordinate, which sig- nifies also put out of order, is employed only in the moral sense. What is ir- regular is. or ought to be, contrary to the rule that is established; what is dis- orderly is contrary to the order that has existeti; what is inordinate is con- trary to the order that is prescribed; what is intemperate is contrary to the temper or spirit that ought to be en- couraged. Our habits will be irregu- lar which are not conformable to the 462 IRRELIGIOUS laws of social society; our practices will be disorderly when we foUow the blind impulse of passion; our desires will be inordinate when they are not under the control of reason guided by religion; our indulgences will be in- temperate when we consult nothing but our appetites. Young people are apt to contract irregular habits if not placed under the care of discreet and sober people and made to conform to the regulations of domestic life: children are naturally prone to become disor- derly if not perpetually under the eye of a master: it is the lot of human be- ings of all ages and stations to have inordinate desires, which require a con- stant check so as to prevent intemper- ale conduct of any kind. IRRELIGIOUS, Profane, Impious. As epithets to designate the character of the person they seem to rise in de- gree: irreligious is negative; profane and impioiLs are positive, the latter being much stronger than the former. All men who are not positively act- uated by principles of rehgion are ir- religious; profanity and impiety are, however, of a still more heinous nat- ure; they consist not in the mere ab- sence of regard for religion, but in a positive contempt of it and open out- rage against its laws; the profane man treats what is sacred as if it were pro- fane; what a believer holds in rever- ence and utters with awe is pronounced with an air of indifference or levity, and as a matter of common discourse, by a profane man; he knows no differ- ence between sacred and profane, but as the former may be converted into a som-ce of scandal toward others; the impious man is directly opposed to the pious man; the former is filled with defiance and rebellion against his Maker, as the latter is with love and reverence. When appHed to things, the term irreligious seems to be somewhat more positively opposed to religion; an ir- religious book is not merely one in which there is no religion, but that also which is detrimental to rehgion, such as sceptical or hcentious writ- ings: the epithet profane in this case is not always a term of reproach, but is employed to distinguish what is tem- poral from that which is expressly spir- itual in its nature; the history of na- tions is profane as distinguished from the sacred history contained in the Bible: the writings of the heathens are altogether profane as distinguished from the moral writings of Christians or the beUevers in Divine Revelation. On the other hand, when we speak of a profane sentiment or a profane joke, profane hps, and the Hke, the sense is personal and reproachful; impious is never appUed but to what is personal, and in the very worst sense; an impious thought, an impious wish, or an impious vow, is the fruit of an impious mind. IRREPROACHABLE. See Blame- less. IRREVERENT. See Sacrilegious. IRRITATE. See Aggravate; Worry. IRRUPTION. See Invasion. ISOLATE. See Segregate. ISSUE. See Arise; Consequence; Event; Offspring; Rise; Sally. JEALOUSY 463 JABBER, Gabble, Mumble. These are all imitative words signifying meth- ods of vocal expression. Between jab- ber and gabble there is httle difference except that suggested by the sound of the words; they are both derived from gab, to talk, itself an imitative word which has an interesting history. They signify the utterance of rapid, inarticulate sounds. Jabber is more frequently used to indicate that which is inarticulate, and suggests a greater rapidity and sharpness of utterance. Parrots and monkeys are said to jab- ber; ducks and geese, to gabble. Jobber is used especially of the sound of a foreign language; we speak of jabber- ing French, jabbering ItaUan, etc. Gabble is contemptuously apphed to the sound of any talk. Mumble sug- gests a different type of utterance. It is a frequentative of Middle English mum, which signifies the least sound made with closed hps; it means, ht- erally, to keep saying "mum, mmn." See also Babble. JADE. See Weaby. JAGGED, Cleft, Denticulated, Serrated, Uneven. Jagged is the ad- jective form of the substantive jag, a Scandinavian word signifying notch or tooth, and means notched or tooth- hke, signifying an uneven edge. An object that has been deft or spUt usu- ally exhibits irregular or rough edges or surfaces, as a rock that has been blasted; one that has become denticulated (from the Latin dentiadus, a small tooth) dis- plays projecting points; one that is ser- rated (from the Latin serro, to saw) shows protuberances or an irregular edge, as the cutting edge of a fine saw; and what- ever is uneven is more or less rough or ragged on its surface or edge. The Sierra Madre Moimtains in Mexico and the Sierra Nevada range in California are so called because they have serrated or saw-tooth ridges, and a leaf and other botanical growths that have sharp, straight-edged teeth, point- ing to the apex, are termed serrated. Jag also has the significance of a small load^ and from this is derived two American slang terms: a person who is thoroughly intoxicated is said to have a load on or to be carrying a load; another who is but partially in- toxicated is said to have a jag on. JAM. See Pack. JANGLE, Jar, Wrangle. A ver- bal contention is expressed by all these terms, but with various modifications: jangle is an imitative word of Scandi- navian origin; it conveys by its own discordant sound an idea of the dis- cordance which accompanies this kind of war of words. Jar is also an imita- tive word, which has parallels in the various Teutonic tongues; it means to utter SL harsh soimd, and comes from Middle English garren, to chide, Anglo- Saxon ceorian, to murmur, etc. Wrangle is a frequentative of wring; its original sense was to keep twisting on or urging; hence to argue vehemently. There is in jangling more of cross-questions and perverse replies than direct differences of opinion; those jangle who are out of humor with one another; there is more of discordant feeling and opposition of opinion in jarring: those who have no good-will to each other will be sure to jar when they come into collision; and those who mdulge themselves in jarring will soon convert affection into ill-will. Married people may destroy the good -humor of the company by jangling, but they destroy their domes- tic peace and feUcity by jarring. To wrangle is technically what to jangle is morally: those who dispute by a verbal opposition only are said to wrangle; and the disputcrs who engage in this scholastic exercise are termed wranglers; most disputations amount to httle more than wrangling. JAR. See Jangle. JAUNT. See Excursion. JEALOUSY, Envy, Suspicion. Jealousy comes from Late Latin zelo- sus, full of zeal, from Greek JqXof, zeal, and signifies zealous for that which 464 JEER is one's own, and hence fearful lest some one should take it away. Envy, in French envie, Latin invidia, from iv^ video, compomided of in, privative, and rridere, to see, signifies not looking at, or looking at in a contrary direction. We are jealous of what is our own; we are envious of what is another's. Jealousy fears to lose what it has; envy is pained at seeing another have that which it wants for itself. Princes are jealous of their authority; subjects are jealous of their rights; covirtiers are envious of those in favor; women are envious of superior beauty. The jealous man has an object of desire, something to get and something to retain; he does not look beyond the object that interferes with his enjoy- ment; a. jealous husband may therefore be appeased by the declaration of his wife's animosity against the object of Ms jealousy. The envious man sickens at the sight of enjoyment; he is easy only in the misery of others: all en- deavors, therefore, to satisfy an envi- ous man are fruitless. Jealousy is a noble or an ignoble passion, according to the object; in the former case it is emulation sharpened by fear; in the latter case it is greediness stimulated by fear; envy is always a base passion, drawing the worst passions in its train. Jealous is appUcable to bodies of men as well as individuals; envious, to the individuals only. Nations are jealous of any interference on the part of any other power in their commerce, govern- ment, or territory; individuals are en- vious of the rank, wealth, and honors of one another. Suspicion, from Latin suspicere, sub, under, and specere, to look, i.e., to look from under one's eyelids out of fear of being seen to look, denotes an apprehen- sion of injury, and, ^e jealousy, imphes a fear of another's intentions; but sus- picion has more of distrust in it than jealousy: the jealous man doubts neither the integrity nor the sincerity of his op- ponent; the suspicious man is altogether fearful of the intentions of another: the jealous man is jealous only of him who he thinks wishes for the same thing as he does, and may rob him of it : the sus- picious man is suspicious or fearful that he may suffer something from another. Jealousy properly exists between equals or those who have a common object of desire; but suspicion is directed toward any one who has the p>ower as well as the will to hurt; rival lovers axe jealous of each other, but one person is sus- picious of another's honesty, or parties entering into a treaty may be suspicious of each other's good faith. Jealousy cannot subsist between a king and his people in any other than in the anoma- lous and imhappy case of power being the object sought for on both sides; a king may then be jealous of his pre- rogative when he fears that it wUl be infringed by his people; and the people will he jealous of their rights when they fear that they will be invaded by the crown. According to this distinction, jealousy is erroneously substituted in the place of suspicion. Jealousy is concerned only in not losing what one wishes for; suspicion is afraid of incurring some positive evil. JEER. See Scoff. JEOPARD, See Hazakd. JEST, Joke, Make Game, Sport. Jest meant originally a story, a merry tale, from Old French geste, an exploit, from Latin gesta, past participle of ger- rere, to wage war — a geste being a tale of warUke deeds. Joke is derived from Latin iocus, a game. To make game signifies here to make the subject of game or play (see Play). To sport signifies here to sport with or convert into a subject of amusement. One jests in order to make others laugh; one jokes in order to please one's self. The jest is directed at the object; the joke is practiced with the person or on the person. One attempts to make a thing laughable or ridiculous by jesting about it, or treating it in a jesting manner; one attempts to excite good-hxmaor in others, or indulge it in one's self, by joking with them. Jests are therefore seldom harmless: jokes are frequently allowable. The most serious subject may be degraded by being timied into a jest; but melan- choly or dejection of the mind may be conveniently dispelled by a joke. Court fools and buffoons used formerly to turn their jests upon every subject by which they thought to entertain their employers: those who know how to joke with good-nature and discretion may contribute to the mirth of the JUDGE 465 ■company : to make game of is applicable only to persons: to make a sport of or ^port with is applied to objects in gen- eral, whether persons or things; both are employed, hkejest, in the bad sense of treating a thing more Ughtly than it deserves. JIFFY. See Instant. JILT. See Coquet. JITNEY. See Automobile. JOCOSE.' See Facetious; Jocular. JOCUND. See Lively. JOIN. See Add. JOKE. See Jest. JOLLITY. See Mirth. JOURNEY, Travel, Voyage. Jour- ney, through the French youmee, a day's work, from Latin diumata, the feminine past participle of Late Latin diumare, to sojourn, based on diumus, daily, sig- nifies the course that is taken in the space of a day, or in general any com- paratively short passage from one place to another. Travel is the same word as travail, to labor; it may be derived from Late Latin trepalium, a kind of rack for torturing martyrs made of three beams — tres pali. Voyage is de- rived through French from Latin viati- cum, provisions for a journey, based on via, a way, and originally signified any course or passage to a distance, but is now confined to passages by sea. We take journeys in different coun- ties in England; we make a voyage to the Indies, and travel over the conti- nent. Journeys are taken for domestic business; travels are made for amuse- ment or information: voyages are made by captains or merchants for purposes of commerce. We estimate journeys by the day, as one or two days' journey; we estimate travels and voyages by the months and years that are employed. The Israehtes are said to have jour- -neyed in the wilderness forty years, because they went but short distances at a time. It is a part of polite educa- tion for young men of fortune to travel into those countries of Europe which comprehend the grand tour, as it is termed. A voyage round the world, which was at first a formidable under- taking, has now become familiar to the mind by its frequency. JOVIALITY. See Glee; Mirth. JOY, Gladness, Mirth. The happy condition of the soul is designated by all these terms; but joy, from the Latin gaudia, joys, and gladness (see Glad) he more internally; mirth (see Festiv- ity) is the more immediate result of external circumstances. What creates jf>^ and gladness is of a permanent nat- ure; that which creates mirth is tempo- rary: yortance in drawing; correct- ness of dates enhances the value of a history. It has been justly observed by the morahsts of antiquity that money is the root of all evil; parti- sans seldom state correctly what they see and hear. JUTTING. See Salient. JUVENILE. See Youthful. 468 KEEN K KEEN. See Acute; Sharp; Trenchant. KEEP, Preserve, Save. The idea of having in one's possession is com- mon to all these terms; it is, how- ever, the simple meaning of keep (see Hold): to preserve, from prce, before- hand, and servare, to keep, that is, to keep for futm-e use, signifies to keep with care and free from all injury; to save, aUied to safe, is to keep laid up in a safe place and free from destruction. Things are kept at all times and under all circumstances; they are preserved in circumstances of peculiar difficulty and danger; they are saved in the moment in which they are threatened with de- struction: things are kept at pleasure; they are preserved by an exertion of power; they are saved by the use of ex- traordinary means: the shepherd keeps his flock by simply watching over them; children are sometimes wonderfully preserved in the midst of the greatest dangers; things are frequently saved, in the midst of fire, by the exertions of those present. Keep, Observe, FvXfil. — These terms are synonymous in the moral sense of abiding by and carrying into execu- tion what is prescribed or set before one for his rule of conduct; to keep is simply to have by one in such manner that it shall not depart; to observe, in Latin observe, compounded of ob, near, and servare, to keep, signifying to keep in one's view, to fix one's attention, is to keep with a steady attention: to ful- fil (see Accomplish) is to keep to the end or to the full intent. A day is either kept or observed: yet the former is not only a more familiar term, but it Ukewise imphes a much less solemn act than the latter; one must add, there- fore, the mode in which it is kept, by saying that it is kept holy, kept sacred, or kept as a day of pleasure; the term observe, however, imphes always that it is kept reUgiously: we may keep, but we do not observe a birthday; we keep or observe the Sabbath. To keep marks simply a perseverance or continuance in a thing; a man keeps his word if he does not depart from it: to observe marks fideUty and consideration; we observe a mle when we are careful to be guided by it; to fulfil marks the perfection and consummation of that which one has kept; we fulfil a promise by acting in strict conformity to it. Keeping, Custody. — Keeping is, as be- fore, the general term. Custody is in Latia custodia, from custos, a guardian, UteraUy a "hider," related to Greek Ktvduv, to hide. The first of these terms is, as before, the most general in its signification; the latter is more fre- quent in its use. The keeping amounts to Httle more than having purposely in one's possession; but custody is a par- ticular kind of keeping, for the purpose of preventing an escape : inanimate ob- jects may be in one's keeping; but a prisoner, or that which is in danger of getting away, is placed in custody: a person has in his keeping that which he values as the property of an absent friend: the oflScers of justice get into their custody those who have offended against the laws, or such property as has been stolen. KEY, Clue, Hint. These words represent the same idea imder different metaphors. A key, a clue, and a hint are all means of discovery. Key, from Anglo-Saxon cceg, is that which un- locks. Clixe signified originally a ball of thread, from Anglo-Saxon cliwen; hence a single thread by which the ball may be unrolled or a web untangled. Hint comes from Middle English hen- ten, to seize; it is that upon which one seizes as a possible aid to discovery. A clv^ is less certain than a key; and a hint less certain than a cltie. If a de- tective has found the key to a mystery, he is certain that he has succeeded in his case; if he has found a clue, he is hopeful, but not certain. If he has a hint to work upon, he may find a defi- nite clv£, but he has no reason for great optimism as yet. KIND 469 KILL, MtTRDER, Assassinate, Slay or Slaughter. Kill, from Anglo- Saxon cwelan, to die, means to cause to die, and is related to the verb qtteU. Murder, in Anglo-Saxon morth, Grerman mord, etc., is connected with the Latin mors, death. Assassinate, from Arabic hashashin, signifies to kill after the manner of an assassin, which word probably comes from the Levant, where, m the thirteenth century, there lived a prince who was called the "Old Man of the Mountains." He lived in a cas- tle between Antioch and Damascus, and brought up young men, whom he fed on the intoxicating drug hashish (whence ctssassin) and trained to lie in wait and kill passengers. Slay comes from Anglo- Saxon slean, to smite. To kill is the general and indefinite term, signifying simply to take away life; to murder is to kiU with open vio- lence and injustice; to assassinaie is to murder by sm-prise or by means of lying in wait; to slay is to kill in battle: to loll is appHcable to men, animals, and also vegetables; to murder and as- sassinaie to men only; to slay mostly to men, but sometimes to animals; to slaughter only to animals in the proper sense, but it may be appUed to men in the improper sense, when they are killed like brutes, either as to the niun- bers or to the manner of killing them. KIND, Species, Sort. Kind comes from Anglo-Saxon cynd, race, indicat- ing those united by ties of blood. Spe- cies, in Latin species, from specere, to behold, signifies literally the form or appearance, and in an extended sense that which comes under a particular form. Sort, in Latin sors, a lot, signi- fies that which constitutes a particular lot or parcel. Kind and species are both employed in their proper sense; sort has been di- verted from its original meaning by colloquial use: kind is properly em- ployed for animate objects, particularly tor mankind, and improjjerly for moral objects; species is a term used by phi- losophers, classing things according to their external or internal properties. Kind, as a term in vulgar use, has a less definite meaning than species, which serves to form the groundwork of science: we discriminate things in a loose or general manner by saying that they are of the animal or vegetable kind; oi the canine or feline kind; but we discriminate them precisely if we say that they are a species of the ar- butus, of the pomegranate, of the dog, the horse, and the like. By the same rule we may speak of a species of mad- ness, a species of fever, and the like; be- cause dieases have been brought under a systematic arrangement: but on the other hand, we should speak of a kind of language, a kind of feeling, a kind of influence; and in similar cases where a general resemblance is to be expressed. Sort may be used for either kind or species; it does not necessarily imply any affinity or common property in the objects, but simple assemblage, produced, as it were, by sors, chance: hence we speak of such sort of folks or people; such sort of practices; dif- ferent sorts of grain; the various sorts of merchandise: and in similar cases where things are sorted or brought together, rather at the option of the person than according to the nature of the thing. Kindred, Relationship, Affinity, Corv- sanguinUy. — ^The idea of a state in which persons are placed with regard to each other is common to all these terms, which differ principally in the nature of this state. Kindred signifies that of being of the same kin or kind. Relationship signifies that of holding a nearer relation than others (see Ck)N- nect). Affinity, from Latin ad, to, and finis, border, signifies that of coming close to each other's boundaries. Con- sanguinity, from sanguis, the blood, sig- nifies that of having the same blood. The kindred is the most general state here expressed: it may embrace all mankind or refer to particular famihes or •communities; it depends upon pos- sessing the common property of hu- manity: the philanthropist claims kin- dred with aJJ who are unfortunate, when it is in his power to reUeve them. Re- lationship is a state less general than kindred, out more extended than either affinity or consanguinity; it appUes to particular families only, but it applies to all of the same family, whether re- motely or distantly related. Affinity denotes a close relationship, whether of an artificial or a natural kind: there is an affinity between the husband and / 470 KINDNESS the wife in consequence of the mar- riage tie; and there is an affinity be- tween those who descend from the same parents or relations in a direct line. Consanguinity is, strictly speaking, this latter species of descent; and the term is mostly employed in all questions of law respecting descent and inheritance. See also Affectionate; Gracious; Relation. KINDNESS. See Benefit; Benev- olence. KINETIC, Active, Movable. These three terms signify "pertaining to motion," but they differ in their ap- Flication. Kinetic, from Greek Kivew, move, means "resulting from mo- tion," or "associated with motion," and is a scientific term. Kinetic en- ergy, for instance, is energy resulting from motion. Active, from Latin actus, past participle of agere, to do or drive, and a suffix, signifies a state of mo- tion, and further suggests motion ema- nating from within, not the result of force apphed from without. Movable means a capacity for being put in mo- tion— suggesting that the motion is a result of an external impetus. Hence none of these terms can be substituted for the other — closely aUied in their meaning as they seem to be. KINGDOM. See Empire. KINGLY. See Royal. KINSMAN. See Relation. KISS, Osculation. The difference between these two terms is not one of meaning, but of cutomary usage. Kiss, from Anglo-Saxon coss, is the familiar and homely word. It is employed in simple, sincere, emotional, or poetical expression. Osculation, from Latin osculum, a little mouth, is a self-con- scious and humorous periphrasis. It may be employed in scientific writing, as when the physiologist writes that "promiscuous osculation is a contribu- tory factor in this disease"; or it may be employed by the smart journalist as a humorous substitute for the famiUar Anglo-Saxon term. In this case, as in many others, the Latin furnishes the dignified and impersonal word, whose dignity, however, may be made to look like pomposity; the Anglo-Saxon fur- nishes the familiar and natural term. KLEPTOMANIA, Thievery. Here again the difference in meaning corre- sponds to a difference in derivation. Kleptomania is a scientific term, from Greek /cXiTrrof, I steal, and Latin mania, madness. Thievery comes from Anglo- Saxon theof, and indicates the act of taking another's property. Thiev- ery is the general and popular word and carries with it the suggestion of moral condemnation. Kleptomania is a specialized scientific word, suggesting an abnormal psychological condition. Kleptomania is an irresistible tendency to theft actuating people who are not tempted to it by necessitous circum- stances or any obvious and natural motive, and is regarded as a form of insanity. The thief steals because he wants or needs the object, or intends to exchange it for something that he wants or needs. The kleptomxiniac takes objects with which he may be already well provided and makes no apparent use of the stolen goods. Often he steals only a particular kind of ar- ticle— an article perhaps valueless in itself or useless to him. KNACK, Adroitness, Dexter- ity. Knack is an imitative word. It meant originally (1) a snap; (2) a snap with the finger-nail; (3) a jester's trick, a piece of dexterity. Knack is usually employed now to indicate a kind of skill or dexterity which does not result from practice and training, but is an ac- cidental gift or acquirement, or the re- sult of some unexplained trick. There is always something inexplicable about a knack; it cannot be imitated or re- duced to rules of procedure. Dexterity, on the contrary, from dexter, the right hand, signifies ease and skill in using the hand;- hence, by extension, any ease and skill in making or doing some- thing; it may be the result of inborn gifts or of training and practice. Dex- terity is uniform and reliable; a knack is casual and may be uncertain. Adroit- ness, from French a droit, Latin ad di- rectum, or, in a right manner, is prac- tically synonymous with dexterous; it indicates special quickness and clever- ness of action. For a further distinction between adroit and dexterous see Clever. KNAVISH. See Dishonest. KNELL, Toll. There is little dif- ference between" these two words. Both indicate the slow ringing of a bell to announce death or disaster. Toll sug- KNUCKLE c^^£^:tijj^ 471 gests by its sound a more solemn and a slower ringing. Knell is also used as a substantive to indicate figuratively the death or end of anything. KNOCK. See Rap. KNOTTY, Intricate, Perplexing. These words aU indicate the quality of being difficult under the image of entangled threads, but they differ from each other in the character of the im- age and the concreteness and vivid- ness with which it is suggested to the mind. A knot is the interweaving of two threads at one point in such a fashion as to tie them tightly together; knotty means full of knots, difficult to unfasten. Intricate, from Latin in and tricoe, wiles or hindrances, did not orig- inally suggest the image of interwoven threads so clearly as -perplexing, from Latin per, through, and pleocus, past participle of plectere, to weave, which meant woven through and through. Now intricate, which first meant full of hindrances, clearly suggests the physi- cal image of interwoven threads, and perplexing, which first suggested the physical image, is given the more gen- eral apphcation. Intricate is an objec- tive word; perplexing, a subjective word. Intricate describes the external object; perplexing indicates the state of mind induced by it. An intricate ques- tion becomes perplexing the minute some individual mind tries to solve it. Knotty is also an objective word, but more obviously metaphorical than in- tricate, and suggesting a somewhat different image. KNOW, Be Acquainted With. To know is a general term; to be acquainted with is particular. We may know things or persons in various ways; we may know them by name only, or we may know their internal properties or characters; or we may simply kruno their figure; we may know them by reix)rt, or we may know them by di- rect intercourse: one is acquainted with either a person or a thing only in a di- rect manner and by an immediate inter- course in one's own person. We know a man to be good or bad, virtuous or vicious, by being a witness to his ac- tions; we become acquainted with him by frequently being in his company. Knowledge, Science, Learning, Erur diticm. — Knowledge signifies the thing knovm, from Anglo-Saxon piawan, al- lied to Latin noscere, to knoWr~55ience, in Latin scierUia, from scire, to know, has the same original meaning. Learn- ing, from learn, signifies the thing learned. Erudition, in Latin eruditio, comes from Latin e for ex, out, and rudis, rude, and signifies to bring out of a stato of rudeness or ignorance, that is, the bringing into a state of perfection. Knowledge is a general term which simply impUes the thing known: science, learning, and erudition are modes of knowledge qualified by some collateral idea: science is a systematic species of knowledge which consists of rule and order; learning is that species^ofknowl- edge which one derives from schools or through the medium of personal in- struction; erudition is scholastic knowl- edge obtained by profound research: knowledge admits of every possible de- gree, and is expressly opposed to ig- norance; science, learning, and enu- dition are positively high degrees of knowledge. The attainment of knowledge is of it- self a pleasure independent o the many extrinsic advantages which it brings to every individual, according to the sta- tion of hfe in which he is placed; the pursuits of science have a peculiar in- terest for men of a peculiar turn. Learn- ing is less dependent on the genius than on the will of the individual; men of moderate talents have over- come the deficiencies of nature by labor and f)erseverance, and have ac- quired such stores of learning as have raised them to a respectable station in the republic of letters. Profound erudition is obtained by but few; a retentive memory, a patient industry, and deep p>enetration are requisites for one who aspires to the title of an ertt- dite man. Knowledge, in the imquali- fied and imiversal sense, is not always a good; we may have a knowledge of evil as well as good: science is good as far as it is founded upon experience; learn- ing is more generally and practically useful to the morals of men than sci- ence: erudition is alw^ good^ as is a profound knowledge of what is worth Knowing. KNOWN. See Public. KNUCKLE. See Quail. 472 LABOR LABOR, Take Pains or Trouble, Use Endeavor. Labor, in Latin labor, toil. To take pains is to expose one's self to pains (see Pain); and to take the trovhle is to impose trouble on one's self (see Affliction). Endeavor (see that word). The first three terms suppose the necessity for a painful exertion; but to labor expresses more than to take pains, and this more than to trouble: to use endeavor excludes every idea of pain or inconvenience: great difficul- ties to be conquered; great perfec- tion or correctness require pains; a concern to please will give trouble; but we use endeavors wherever any object is to be obtained or any duty to be performed. To labor is either a cor- poreal or a mental action ; to take pains IS principally an effort of the mind or the attention: to take trouble is an ef- fort of either the body or mind: a faith- ful minister of the Gospel labors to instil Christian principles into the minds of his audience, and to heal all the breaches which the angry passions make between them: when a child is properly sensible of the value of im- provement, he will take the utmost pains to profit by the instruction of the master: he who is too indolent to take the trouble to make his wishes known to those who would comply with them cannot expect others to trouble them- selves with inquiring into his necessi- ties: a good name is of such value to every man that he ought to use his best endeavors to preserve it unblem- ished. See also Work. LABORIOUS. See Active. LABYRINTH, Maze. Intricacy is common to both the objects expressed by these terms; but the term labyrinth has it to a much greater extent than maze: the labyrinth, from the Greek Xa^vpivQoQ, of Egyptian origin, was a work of antiquity which surpassed the maze in the same proportion as the ancients surpassed the modems in all other works of art; it was constructed on so prodigious a scale, and with so many windings, that when a person had once entered he could not find his way out without the assistance of a clue or thread. Maze is a word of doubtful origin; it was at first used to signify dreamy thought, dreamy perplexity, and then a structure of interweaving paths which induced such a state of mind. It is a modern term for a struct- ure similar to a labyrinth, on a smaller scale, which is frequently made by way of ornament in large gardens. From the proper meaning of the two words we may easily see the ground of their metaphorical appUcation: political and polemical discussions are compared to a labyrinth; because the mind that is once entangled in them is unable to extricate itself by any efforts of its own: on the other hand, that per- plexity and confusion into which the mind is thrown by unexpected or in- explicable events is termed a maze, because, for the tiine, the brain is bereft of its power to pursue its ordi- nary functions of recollection and com- bination. LACHRYMOSE. See Tearful. LACK. See Want. LACONIC, Brief, Concise, Pithy. All of these terms indicate speech which contains no unnecessary words, but they differ from each other in the idea that they suggest in addition to that common to them all. Brief, from Latin brevis, means simply short; the opposite of long — containing few words. Concise, from Latin cidere, con, intensive, and ccedere, to cut, means cut short — made shorter than it might naturally be — and suggests therefore a deliberate concen- tration in a small space. Pithy adds to this idea — it means full of pith. It does not necessarily mean short; but is usually connected with that idea — suggesting the concentration of much substance in a little space. Lor conic comes from AaKCDviKoc, from Aaxiav, a Laconian or inhabitant of Laconia — LANGUAGE 473 Laconians or Spartans being noted for their brevity of speech. It suggests not only the character of the speech — brief, to the point — but the manner of utterance. LADING. See Freight. LAG. See Linger. LAMBENT, Flickering, Gleam- ing, Twinkling. Lambent, from the Latin larnbo, to lick, signifies licking or playing about hke flames, hence, touching lightly, or gUding over. The term is most generally applied to light from any source as affected by exterior influences. Thus, we say that a Ught is flickering when it is moving with an imsteady and quick motion, swaying because of a sudden commotion in the air, and flickering out, especiaUy the Ught from a candle or a lamp, when the wick or the oil is nearly consumed: gleaming, when it emits shooting or darting rays or exhibits unusual bright- ness; and twinkling, when it is burn- ing unsteadily, shining with a tremu- lous, quivering effect, or exhibiting quick, spasmodic spurts, as the twink- ling of the stars. The term is often used in poetry to imply that which touches lightly or glides over. LAMENT. See Bewail; Com- plain; Deplore; Grieve; Wail. LAND, Country. Land, Anglo- Saxon land, signifies an open, even space, and refers strictly to the earth. Country, through Old French contree, from Late Latin contrata, the region lying opposite, comes from contra, op- posite. Compare German gegend, from gegen, opposite. The term land, there- fore, in its proper sense, excludes the idea of habitation; the term country excludes that of the earth, or the parts of which it is composed : hence we speak of the land as rich or poor, according to what it yields: of a country, as rich or poor, according to what its inhabi- tants possess: so, in like manner, we say, the land is ploughed for receiving the grain; or a man's land, for the ground which he possesses or occupies: but the country is cultivated; the coun- try is under a good government; or a man's country is dear to him. In an extended application, however, these words may be put for one an- other: the word land may sometimes be put for any portion of land that is under a government, as the land of liberty; and country may be put for any spot of earth or Une of country, together wth that which is upon it; as a rich country. LANDSCAPE. See View. LANGUAGE, Tongue, Speech, Idiom, Dialect. Language, through Middle French language, cased on langue, from the Latin lingua, a tongue. and a suffix, signifies, like the word tongue, that which is spoken by the tongue, Anglo-Saxon tunge. Speech is the act of speaking, or the word spoken. Idiom, in Latin idioma, Greek iSiwfia, from iSioc, proprius, proper, or peculiar, signifies a peculiar mode of speaking. Dialect, through French from Latin diciXectV£,GTQekSi(tK(.KToq,{ToraSiakiyofiat, to speak in a distinct maimer, signifies a distinct mode of speech. All these terms mark the manner of expressing our thoughts, but under dif- ferent circumstances. Language is the most general term in its meaning and apphcation; it conveys the general idea without any modification, and is ap- plied to other modes of expression be- sides that of words, and to other ob- jects besides persons; the language of the eyes frequently supplies the place of that of the tongue; the deaf and dumb use the language of signs; birds and beasts are supposed to have their pecuhar language: tongue, speech, and the other terms are appUcaole only to human beings. Language is eithc* written or spoken; but a tongue is con- ceived of mostly as something to be spoken: whence we speak of one's mother tongue. Speech is an abstract term, implying either the power of uttering articula,te sounds, as when we speak of the gift of speech, which is denied to those who are dumb; or the words themselves which are spoken, as when we speak of the parts of speech; or the particular mode of expressing one's self, as that a man is known by his sveech. Idiom and dialect are not properly a language, but the properties of language: idiom is the f>ecuhar construction and turn of a language, which distinguishes it altogether from others; it is that which enters into the composition of the lan- guage, and cannot be separate*! from it. A dialect is that which is engrafted 474 LANGUID on a language by the inhabitants of particular parts of a country, and ad- mitted by its writers and learned men to form an incidental part of the lan- guage; as the dialects which originated with the lonians, the Athenians, the iEoUans, and were afterward amalga- mated into the Greek tongue. Whence the word dialect may be extended in its application to denote any pecuhar manner of speech adopted by any com- munity. LANGUID. See Faint. LANGUISH. See Flag. LAPSE. See Slip. LARGE, Wide, Broad. Large (see Great) is applied in a general way to express every dimension; it implies not only abundance in solid matter, but also freedom in the space, or extent of a plane superficies. Wide, in Anglo- Saxon wid, signifies an open space unencumbered by any obstructions. Broad, in Anglo-Saxon hrad, has a similar meaning. Many things are large, but not wide; as a large town, a large circle, a large ball, a large nut: other things are both large and wide; as a large field, or a vnde field: a large house, or a wide house: but the field is said to be large from the quantity of ground it contains; it is said to be wide both from its figure and the extent of' its space in the cross directions; in hke manner, a house is large from its extent in all directions; it is said to be wide from the extent which it runs in front: some things are said to be wide which are not denomi- nated large, that is, either such things as have less bulk and quantity than extent of plane surface; as eW-toide cloth, a wide opening, a wide entrance, and the Uke; or such as have an ex- tent of space only one way; as a wide road, a wide path, a wide passage, and the hke. What is hroad is in sense, and mostly in application, wide, but not vice versd: a ribbon is broad; a ledge broad; a ditch is broad; a plank is broad; the brim of a hat is broad; or the border of anything is broad; on the other hand, a mouth is tvide, but not broad; apertures in general are wide, but not broad. Large is opposed to small; uride to close; broad to nar- row. In the moral application, we speak of largeness in regard to liberal- ity; wide and broad only in the figura- tive sense of space or size: as a unde difference; or a broad line of distinction. Largely, Copiously, Fully. — Largely is here taken in the moral sense, and, if the derivation given of it be true, in the most proper sense. Copiously comes from the Latin copia, plenty, signifying in a plentiful degree. FuMy signifies in a full degree; to the fuU extent, as far as it can reach. Quantity is the idea expressed in common by all these terms; but largely has always a reference to the freedom of the will in the agent; copiously quali- fies actions that are done by inanimate objects; fully qualifies the actions of a rational agent, but it denotes a degree or extent which cannot be surpassed. A person deals largely in things, or he drinks large draughts; rivers are co- piously supplied in rainy seasons; a person is fully satisfied or fully pre- pared. A bountiful Providence has dis- tributed His gifts largely among His creatures: blood flows copiously from a deep wound when it is first made: when a man is not fully convinced of his own insufficiency he is not prepared to hsten to the counsel of others. LASH. See Whip. LASS. See Virgin. LASSITUDE. See Fatigue. LAST, Latest, Final, Ultimate. Last and latest are both from latst, the superlative of Anglo-Saxon Icet, slow — Modern English late — allied to Latin lassu^, which is found in English words Uke lassitude. Final (see that word) . Ultimate comes from Latin ulti- matum, participle of ultimare, based on ultimus, the last. Last and ultimate concern the order of succession: latest^ the order of time; final, the completion of an object. What is last or ultimate is succeeded by noth- ing else : what is latest is succeeded at no great interval of time; what is final re- quires to be succeeded by nothing else. The last is opposed to the first; the ulti- mate is distinguished from that which immediately precedes it; the latest is opposed to the earliest; the final is opposed to the introductory or begin- ning. A person's last words are those by which one is guided; his ultimate object is sometimes remote or con- cealed from the view; a conscientious LAUGH 475 man remains firm to his principles to his latest breath; the final determination of difficult matters requires caution. Jealous people strive not to be the last in anything; the latest intelligence which a man gets of his country is acceptable to one who is in distant quarters of the globe; it requires reso- lution to take a final leave of those whom one holds near and dear. See also Uttermost. Lastly, At Last, At Length. — Lastly, like last, implies the order of suc- cession: at last or at length refers to what has preceded. When a sermon is divided into many heads, the term lastly comprehends the kist division. When an affair is settled after much difficulty, it is said to be at last settled; and if it be settled after a protracted continuance, it is said to be settled at length. LAST-TERMS. See Ultimatum. LATENT. See Secret. LATEST. See Last. LAUDABLE, Praiseworthy, Com- mendable. Lavdahle, from the Latin laudare, to praise, is in sense hterally praiseworthy, that is, worthy of praise or to be praised (see Praise). Conv- mendable signifies entitled to commen- dation, from Latin con, together, and mandare, to place in the hands of — that is to say, worthy of trust, hence worthy of praise. Lavdable is used in a general appli- cation; praiseworthy and commendable are applied to individuals: things are laudable in themselves; they are praise- worthy or commendable in this or that person. That which is laudable is en- titled to encouragement and general approbation; an honest endeavor to be useful to one's family or one's self is at all times laudable, and will insure the support of all good people. What is praiseworthy obtains the respect of all men: as all have temptations to do that which is wrong, the perform- ance of one's duty is in all cases praise- worthy, but particularly so in those cases where it opposes one's interests and interferes with one's pleasures. What is commendable is not equally as impMsrtant as the former two; it en- titles a person only to a temporary or partial expression of good-will and approbation; the performance of those minor and particular duties which be- long to children and subordinate per- sons is in the proper sense commendable. LAUGH, Kidicule. Laugh is the Anglo-Saxon word, from hlihan, an imi- tative word ; ridicule, from ridicidus, is the Latin term, from ridere, to smile or laugh. Both these verbs are used here in the sense for laughter, blended with more or less of contempt: but the former displays itself by the natural expression of laughter: the latter shows itself by a verbal expression: the for- mer is produced by a feeling of mirth on observing the real or supposed weakness of another; the latter is pro- duced by a strong sense of the absurd or irrational in another: the former is more immediately directed to the person who has excited the feeling: the latter is more commonly produced by things than by persons. We laugh at a person to his face; but we ridi- cule his notions by writing or in the course of conversation: we laugh at the individual; we ridicule that which is maintained uy him. Laughable, Ludicrous, Ridiculous, Comical, Comic, Droll. — Laughable sig- nifies exciting, or fit to excite, laughter. Ludicrovs, in Latin ludicrus, from /u- dvs, a game, signifies belonging to a game or sport. Ridiculous, exciting, or fit to excite, ridicule. Either the direct action of lartghter or a corresponding sentiment is in- cluded in the signification of all these terms: they differ principally in the cause which produces the feeling; the laughable consists of objects in general, whether personal or otherwise; the Zu- dicrous and ridiculous have reference more or less to that which is personal. What is laughable may excite simple merriment independently of all per- sonal reference, unless we admit what Mr. Hobbes, and after him Addison, have maintained of all laughter^ that it springs from pride. But without entering into this nice question, I am inclined to di-stinguish between the lattghable which arises from the reflec- tion of what is to our own advantage or plea.sure, and that which arises from reflecting on what is to the disadvan- tage of another. The tricks of a monkey or the humorous stories of 476 LAVISH wit are laughable from the nature of the things themselves, without any ap- parent allusion, however remote, to any individual but the one whose senses or mind is gratified. The Ztwii- crotLS and ridiculous are, however, spe- cies of the laughable which arise alto- gether from reflecting on that which is to the disadvantage of another; but the ludicrous has in it less to the dis- advantage of another than the ridicur- lou^. It is possible, therefore, for a person to be in a ludicrous situation without any kind of moral demerit, or the sUghtest depreciation of his moral character; since that which renders his situation ludicrous is altogether inde- pendent of himself; or it becomes iu- dicrous only in the eyes of incompe- tent judges. "Let an ambassador," says Mr. Pope, "speak the best sense in the world, and deport himself in the mc'st graceful manner before a prince, yet if the tail of his shirt happen, as I have known it happen to a very wise man, to hang out behind, more people wiU laugh at that than attend to the other." This is the Zit- dicTous. The same can seldom be said of the ridiculous; for as this springs from positive moral causes, it reflects on the person to whom it attaches in a less questionable shape and produces positive disgrace. Persons very rarely appear ridiculous without being really so; and he who is really ridiculous justly excites contempt. Droll and comical are in the proper sense apphed to things which cause laughter, as when we speak of a droll story, or a comical incident, or a comic song. They may be applied to the person; but not so as to reflect disad- vantageously on the individual, as in the former terms. LAVISH. See Extravagant. LAW. See Maxim; Ordinance. LAWFUL, Legal, Legitimate, Licit. Lawful is the adjective corre- sponding to law, a Scandinavian word from the root found in lie, a law being that which is laid down, which is fixed or established. Legal comes from Latin legalis, from lex, from the root found in legere, to collect — law being the collection of the customs and judgments of the people in one standard code of action. Legitimnte has the same derivation. They differ, therefore, according to the sense of the word law; lawful signifies the law in general, defined or undefined; legal, only the law of the land which is defined ; legitimate, the laws or rules of science as well as civil matters in general. Licit, from the Latin licet, it is allowed, is used only to characterize the moral quality of actions; the lawful properly implies conformable to or enjoined by law; the legal what is in the form or after the manner of law, or binding by law: it is not lawful to coin money with the king's stamp; a marriage was for- merly not legal in England which was not solemnized according to the rites of the Established Church: men's pas- sions impel them to do many things which are unlawful or illicit; their ig- norance leads them into many things which are illegal or illegitimate. As a good citizen and a true Christian, every man wiU be anxious to avoid everything which is unlawful: it is the business of the lawyer to define what is legal or illegal: it is the business of the critic to define what is legitimate verse in poetry; it is the business of the linguist to define the legitimate use of words : it is the business of the moraJist to point out what is illicit. LAX. See Loose. LAY, Take Hold Of, Catch, Seize, Snatch, Grasp, Gripe. To lay or take hold of is here the generic expression; it denotes simply getting into one's pos- session, which is the common idea in the signification of all these terms, which differ in regard to the motion in which the action is performed. To catch is to lay hold of with an effort. To seize is to lay hold of with violence. To snatch is to lay hold of by a sudden effort. One is said to lay hold of that on which one places his hand; he takes hold of that which he secures in his hand. We lay hold of anything when we see it faUing; we take hold of any- thing when we wish to lift it up; we catch what attempts to escape; we seize it when it makes resistance; we snatch that which we are particularly afraid of not getting otherwise. A person who is fainting lays hold of the first thing which comes in his way; a sick person or one that wants support takes hold of another's arm in walking; vari- ous artifices are employed to catch ani- LEAN 477 mals; the wild beasts of the forest seize their pre)^ the moment they come within their reach; it is the rude sport of a school-boy to snatch out of the hand of another that which he is not wiUing to let go. To lay hold of is to get in the posses- sion. To grasp and to gripe signify to have or keep in the possession; an eagerness to keep or not to let go is expressed by that of grasping; a fear- ful anxiety of losing and an earnest desire of keeping are expressed by the act of gripping. When a famished man lays hold of food he grasps it, from a convulsive kind of fear lest it should leave him: when a miser lays hold of money he gripes it from the love he bears to it, and the fear he has that it will be taken from him. See also Lie; Put. LAZY. See Idle; Inactive. LEAD, Conduct, Guide. Lead is the Anglo-Saxon word, originally ke- dan, corresponding to Latin ducere, foimd here in condtict, from cum, with, and ducere, to lead. For the origin of guide see Chaperon. All these terms are employed to de- note the influence which a person has over the movements or actions of some person. To lead is an unqualified ac- tion: one leads by helping a person on- ward in any manner, as to lead a child by the hand, or to lead a person through a wood by going before him. To con- duct and guide are different modes of leading, the former by virtue of one's office or authority, the latter by one's knowledge or power; as to conduct an army, or to conduct a person into the presence of another; to guide a traveller in an imknown country. These words may therefore be applied to the same objects: a general leads an army, inas- much as he goes before it into the field ; he conducts an army, inasmuch as he directs its operations; the stable-boy leads the horses to water; the coach- man guides the horses in a carriage. Condu^ and guide may also be ap- plied in this sense to inanimate objects; as the pilot conducts the vessel into the port, the steersman guu^s a vessel by the help of the rudder. In the moral apphcation of these terms, persons may lead or guide other persons, but they conduct things; as to lead a person into a course of Ufe; to guide him in a course of reading or study; to conduct a lawsuit, or any particular business. To lead, being a matter of purely personal influence, may be either for the benefit or injury of the person led. To conduct, supposing judgment and management, and to guide, supposing superior intelligence, are always taken in the good sense, unless otherwise qualified. Things as well as persons may lead, conduct, and guide, with a similar dis- tinction. Whatever serves as a mo- tive of action, or as a course and passage to a place or an object, leads. Whatever influences our conduct rightly conducts. Whatever serves as a rule or guide guides. As persons may sometimes be false guides, so things may furnish a false rule. LEADER. See Chief. LEADING. See CAKDiNAii; Su- preme. LEAGUE. See Axliance. LEAN, Meagre. Lean is the Anglo- Saxon word, from hlcene, originally bending or stooping, hence inclined to bend, or thin; meagre is probably a Latin word from macer, thin, Greek fiaicpoc, long, though it earlv appears in Anglo-Saxon as mceger, probably bor- rowed from the Continent. LAxm denotes want of fat; meagre want of flesh: what is lean is not al- ways meagre; but nothing can be meagre without being lean. Brutes as well as men are lean, but men only are said to be meagre: leanness is frequently connected with the temperament; meagreness is the consequence of star- vation and disease. There are some animals by nature inclined to be lean; a meagre, pale visage is to be seen perpetually in the haimts of vice and poverty. I^ean, Incline, Bend. — Lean^ in Anglo- Saxon hlaenan (see above), is derived from the root found in incline, from the Latin, Greek kkivta, I bend. Bend (see that word). In the proper sense, lean and incline are both said of the [xeition of bodies; bend is said of the shape of bodies: that which leans rests on one side, or 478 LEARNED in a sideward direction; that which inclines leans or turns only in a slight degree: that which bends forms a curva- ture; it does not all lean the same way: a house leans when the foundation gives way: a tree may grow so as to incline to the right or the left, or a road may incline this or that way; a tree or a road bends when it tm-ns out of the straight course. In another sense, the judgment leans, the wiU in- clines, the will or conduct bends, in consequence of some outward action. A person leans to this or that side of a question which he favors ; he inclines, or is inclined, to this or that mode of conduct; he bends to the will of an- other. It is the duty of a judge to lean to the side of mercy as far as is consistent with justice: whoever in- clines too readily to hsten to the tales of distress which are continually told to excite compassion will find himself in general deceived; an unbending tem- per is the bane of domestic felicity. LEARNED. See Academic. LEARNING. See Knowledge; Letters. LEAVE, Qtjit, Relinqxhsh. Leave is derived from Anglo-Saxon loefan, to leave, corresponding to the Latin lin- quere, found ia relinquish. Quit, in French quitter, from the Latin quietus, rest, signifies to rest or remain, to give up the hold of. Relinquish (see Aban- don). We leave that to which we may in- tend to return; we quit that to which we retiu"n no more: we may leave a place volimtarUy or otherwise; but we relinquish it imwiUingly. We leave per- sons or things; we quit and relinquish things only. I leave one person in or- der to speak to another; I leave my house for a short time; I quit it not to return to it. Leave and quit may be used in the improper as well as the proper sense. It IS the privilege of the true Christian to be able to leave all the enjoyments of this hfe, not only with composure, but with satisfaction; dogs have some- times evinced their fidelity, even to the remains of their masters, by not quit^ ting the spot where they are laid; prej- udices, particularly in matters of relig- ion, acquire so deep a root in the mind that they cannot be made to relinquish their Jiold by the most persuasive elo- quence and forcible reasoning. See also Cease; Desist. Leave, Take Leave, Bid Farewell or Adieu. — Leave is here general as before; it expresses simply the idea of separat- ing one's self from an object, whether for a time or otherwise; to take leave and bid farewell imply a separation for a perpetuity. Farewell is a native Eng- hsh expression meaning "May you fare well"; adieu is French, from the phrase a Dieu, Latin ad Deum, meaning "I commit you to God's keeping." To leave is an unqualified action; it is apphed to objects of indifference, or otherwise, but supposes in general no exercise of one's feeUngs. We leave persons as convenience requires; we leave them on the road, in the field, in the house, or wherever circum- stances direct; we leave them with or without speaking; but to take leave is a parting ceremony between friends, on their parting for a considerable time; to- bid farewell, or adieu, is a still more solemn ceremony, when the parting is expected to be final. When applied to things, we leave such as we do not wish to meddle with; we take leave of those things which were agreeable to us, but which we find it prudent to give up; and we bid farewell to those for which we still retain a great attach- ment. It is better to leave a question undecided than to attempt to decide it by altercation or violence; it is greater virtue in a man to take leave of his vices than to let them take leave of him ; when a man engages in schemes of ambition, he must bid adieu to all the enjoyments of domestic hfe. Leave, Liberty, Permission, License. — Leave as here used is a word of differ- ent origin, from Anglo-Saxon leof, dear, found in English lief — meaning here pleasure, hence freedom of will, hter- ally permission "to do as you please." Liberty is also taken for liberty granted, from Latin liber, free. Permission sig- nifies the act of permitting (see Allow) or the thing permitted. License, in Latin licentia, from licet, it is lawful, signifies the state of being permitted by law or authority. Leave and liberty may sometimes be taken as well as given; permission and license are never to be taken, but must LEGENDARY 479 always be granted, and that in an especial manner — the former by ex- press words, the latter by some ac- knowledged and mostly legal form. Leave is employed only on famiUar occasions; liberty is given in more im- portant matters: the master gives leave to his servant to go out for his pleas- ure; a gentleman gives his friends the liberty of shooting on his groimds: leave is taken in indifferent matters, particularly as it respects leave of ab- sence; liberty is taken by a greater, and in general an unauthorized, stretch of one's powers, and is, therefore, an infringement on the rights of another. What is done without the leave may be done without the knowledge, though not contrary to the wiU of another; but liberties which are taken without offering an apology are always calcu- lated to give offence. Leave respects only particular and private matters; liberty respects general or particidar matters, pubUc or private; as liberty of speech, liberty of the press, and the Uke. Leave and permission are both the acts of private individuals in special cases. The permission is a more for- mal and less famiUar act than leave; the permission is often an act of courtesy passing between equals and friends; the leave is properly said of what passes from superiors to inferiors: a person obtains leave of absence. The license is always general, or resting on some general authority; as the licenses given by government, and poetic li- censes. Whenever appUed to individ- uals it carries with it the idea of a special authority; as a license given by a landlord to the tenant to assign his lease. Leavings, Remains. — Leavings are the consequences of a voluntary act: they signify what is left: remmns are what follow in the com-se of things; they are what remains; the former is therefore taken in the sense to signify what has been left as worthless; the lat- ter is never taken in this sense. When many persons of good taste have the hberty of choosing, it is fair to ex- pect that the leavings will be worth little or nothing, after all have made their choice. By the remains of beauty ■which are discoverable in the face of a female we may be enabled to esti- mate what her personal gifts were. LEGAL. See Lawful. LEGENDARY, Fabulous, Myth- ical, Traditional. These are all ad- jectives signifying the quaUty of old stories handed? down from generation to generation either in oral or written form. Legendary comes from the ge- rimdive of Latin legere, to collect or read; it signifies worthy of being col- lected and read, or characteristic of old collections of tales. Fabulous, from Latin fabtda, a story, signifies story- Uke, with an emphasis upon the differ- ence between the story which is the product of the untrammelled imagina- tion and the plain reahty. Mythical comes from Greek fivOoc, a fable. Tra- dition comes from Latin Iradere, to hand down — signifying that which is handed down by word of mouth. Legendary and traditional differ from each other in the indication of the means of com- mimication; the one is written, the other is generally oral, though these distinctions are not strictly observed. We speak of "written tradition" and denominate as legends stories that have never been written. Traditional has more of truth and seriousness than legendary. A tradition is preserved as a record of some fact, and the changes that it undergoes are usually due to natural mistakes and failures of mem- ory; a legend is usually handed down because it is interesting — it makes a good story worthy of being read, and hence it may be improved by the im- aginations of successive generations. Mythical suggests less of fact and ve- racity. A mythical hero, a mythical land are those which exist only in the imagination of those who tell about them. Mythical sometimes refers espe- cially to the myths or old stories of the divinities and heroes preserved by va- rious nations. It therefore suggests stories of the supernatural, and has some of the digmty of a tradition or legend. Fabulous has none of this tra- ditional credibility and seriousness; something fabulous is a dehberate cre- ation of the imagination transcending all bounds of reality. However, there are several curious modifications of thepe words. Fabulous, while suggest- I ing the wildly extravagant, the appar- 480 LEGITIMATE ently impossible, etc., does not arouse the same degree of incredulity that is aroused by mythical. Mythical wealth is wealth which is said to exist but does not; f obvious wealth is wealth transcending all boimds of probabili- ty, with the implication that it does really exist. Mythical indicates that which is believed but does not exist; fabidous that which is not believed but does exist. There is always a distinct difference in the significance of these four words; they are interchangeable only within some definite Umits. The traditional splendor of a noble family, for instance, means splendor enduring from generation to generation both in memory and in reality; legendary splen- dor means splendor described in old stories, existent long ago, but not now; mythical splendor means that which is said to be but is not; fabidous splen- dor, splendor now existent but so great as to seem impossible. LEGITIMATE. See Lawful. LEISURE. See Idle. LENITY. See Clemency. LESSEN. See Abate. LET, Leave, Suffer. The re- moval of hindrance or constraint on the actions of others is implied by all these terms; but let, like the German lessen, to leave, is a less formal action than leave, and this than suffer, from the Latin suffero, to bear with, signify- ing not to put a stop to. I let a person pass in the road by getting out of his way: I leave a person to decide on a matter according to his own discre- tion, by decUning to interfere; I suffer a person over whom I am expected to exercise a control to go his own way. It is in general most prudent to lei things take their own course: in the education of youth, the greatest art hes in leaving them to follow the nat- ural bent of their minds and turn of the disposition, and at the same time not suffering them to do anything prej- udicial to their character or future in- LETHARGIC. See Sleepy. LETTER, Epistle. According to the origin of these words, letter, in Latin literae, signifies any dociunent com- posed of written letters; and epistle, in Greek kmaToKr], from kitiaTiXXto, to send, signifies a letter sent or addressed to any one; consequently the former is the generic, the latter the specific term. Letter is a term altogether fa- miliar; it may be used for whatever is written by one friend to another in domestic fife, or for the public docu- ments of this description which have emanated from the pen of writers, as the letters of Madame de Sevigne, the letters of Pope or of Swift; and even those which were written by the an- cients, as the letters of Cicero, Pliny, and Seneca; but in strict propriety those are entitled epistles, as a term most adapted to whatever has received the sanction of ages, and by the same rule, likewise, whatever is pecuharly solemn in its contents has acquired the same epithet, as the epistles of St. Paul, St. Peter, St. John, St. Jude; and by an analogous rule, whatever poetry is written in the epistolary form is denominated an epistle rather than a letter, whether of ancient or modern date, as the epistles of Horace, or the epistles of Boileau; and, finally, what- ever is addressed by way of dedication is denominated a dedicatory epistle. Ease and a friendly familiarity should characterize the letter: sentiment and instruction are always conveyed by an epistle. See also Character. Letters, Literature, Learning. — Letters and literature signify knowledge, de- rived through the medium of written letters or books, that is, information: learning (see Knowledge) is confined to that which is communicated, that is, scholastic knowledge. The term men of letters or the republic of letters comprehends all who devote themselves to the cultivation of their minds: lit- erary societies have for their object the diffusion of general information : learned societies propose to themselves the higher object of extending the bounds of science and increasing the sum of human knowledge. Men of letters have a passport for admittance into the highest circles; literary men can always find resources for themselves in their own society: learned men, or men of learning, are more the objects of respect and admiration than of imitation. LEVEL. See Aim; Even; Flat. LEVITY. See Lightness. LEXICON. See Dictionary. xnT 481 LIABLE. See Subject. LIBERAL. See Beneficent; Fkeb. LIBERATE. See Emancipate; Free. LIBERTY. See Freedom; Leave. LICENSE. See Leave. LICENTIOUS. See Loose. LICIT. See Lawful. LIE, Lay. By a vulgar error these verbs have been so confounded as to deserve some notice. To lie is neuter, and designates a state: to lay is active, and denotes an action on an object; it is properly to cause to lie; a thing lies on the table; some one lays it on the table; he lies with his fathers; they laid him with his fathers. In the same manner, when used idiomatically, we say a thing lies by us untd we bring it into use; we lay it by for some future purpose: we lie down in order to re- pose ourselves; we lay money down by way of deposit: the disorder lies in the constitution; we lay a burden upon our friends. See also Untruth. LIFE. See Animation. LIFELESS, Dead, Inanimate. Ldfe- less and dead suppose the absence of life where it has once been; inanimate supposes its absence where it has never been; a person from whom life has de- parted is said to be lifeless or dead; the material world consists of objects which are by nature inanimate. Life- less is negative : it signifies simply with- out life or the vital spark: dead is positive; it denotes an actual and com- plete change in the object. We may speak of a lifeless corpse when speak- ing of a body which sinks from a state of animation into that of inanimation; we speak of dead bodies to designate such as have undergone an entire change. A person, therefore, in whom animation is suspended is, for the time being, in appearance at least, lifeless, although we should not say dead. In the moral acceptation, lifeless and inanimate denote the want of that life or animation which is requisite or proper; dead implies the total vyant of moral feehng which ought to exist. See also i&ioGENic. LIFT, Heave, Hoist. These are all Teutonic words that have come into modem Enghsh through different Teu- tonic languages. Lift, Middle Enghsh 31 liften, is a Scandinavian word associ- ated with German luft, air, meaning to raise in the air. Heave is an Anglo- Saxon word from the root found also in Latin capere, to take. Hoist is a Dutch word, from Middle Dutch hy»- sen, to Uft up. The idea of making high is common to all these words, but they differ in the objects and the circumstances of the action; we lift with or without an effort: we heave and hoist alwavs with an effort; we lift a child up to let him see anything more distinctly; work- men heave the stones or beams which are used in a building; sailors hoist the long-boat into the water. To lift and hoist are transitive verbs; they require an agent and an object: heave is in- transitive; it may have an inanimate object for an agent: a person lifts his hand to his head; when whales are killed, they are hoisted into vessels; the bosom heaves when it is oppressed with sorrow; the waves of the sea heave when they are agitated by the wind. Lift, Raise, Erect, Elevate, Exalt. — The idea of making a thing higher than it was before is common to these verbs. To lift (see Lift) is to take up from a given spot by a direct ap- lication of force. To raise, a Scandi- navian word, meaning to cause to rise, to erect, from the Latm ereclum, supine of erigo; to elevate, from elevaius, par- ticiple of elevare, based on e, out, and levare, to raise, signify to make higher by a variety of means, but not necessar- ily by moving the object from the spot where it rests. We lift a stool with our hands, we raise a stool by giving it longer legs; we erect a monument by heaping one stone upon another; a mountain is elevated so many feet above the surface of the sea. Whatever is to be carried is lifted; whatever is to be situated higher is to be raised; what- ever is to be constructed above other objects is to be erected; and when the perpendicular height is to be described, It is said to be elevated. A ladder is lifted upon the shoulders: a standard ladder is raised against a wall; a scaf- folding is erected; a pillar is elevated above the houses. Lift and raise may sometimes be ap- pUed to the same objects: a stone may 482 LIGHTNESS either be lifted or raised, but lift is the more ordinary term ; so when raise and erect are apphed to the same objects, raise is the more famihar expression. Elevate is most usual in scientific lan- guage. All these terms, except erect, have likewise a moral application; exalt, from altiis, high, has no other. In this case lift is seldom used in a good sense; to raise is used in a good or an indifferent sense; to elevate is mostly, and exalt always, used in the best sense. A person is seldom lifted up for any good purpose, or from any merit in himself; it is commonly to suit the ends of party that people are lifted into notice or lifted into office; a person may be raised for his merits, or raise himself by his industry, in both of which cases he is entitled to esteem; so likewise one may be lifted up by pride, or raised in one's mind or estima- tion; one is elevated by circumstances, but still more so by one's character and moral qualities; one is rarely exalted but by means of superior endowments. In modern building construction the term elevator is synonymous with lift. LIGHTNESS, Levity, Flightiness, Volatility, Giddiness. lAghtness, from Anglo-Saxon leoht, light, signifies an abstract quahty. Levity, in Latin levitas, from levis, light, signifies the same. Volatility, in Latin volatilitas, from volare, to fly, signifies flitting, or ready to fly swiftly on. Flightiness, horn flighty and fly, signifies a readiness to fly. Giddiness is from Anglo-Saxon gidig, insane, possibly from Anglo- Saxon god, God, meaning possessed by a god, in which case it has the same origin as enthusiasm, from Greek lyOiog, a god within. Lightness and giddiness are taken either in the natural or metaphorical sense; the rest only in the moral sense; lightness is said of the outward carriage or the inward temper; levity is said only of the outward carriage: a light- minded man treats everything lightly, be it ever so serious; the lightness of his mind is evident by the lightness of his motions. Lightness is common to both sexes; levity is pecuharly striking in women; and in respect to them, they are both exceptional qualities in the highest degree: when a woman has lightness hf mind, she may easily tend toward vice; when there is levity in her conduct, she exposes herself to pubhc criticism. Volatility, flightiness, and giddiness are degrees of lightness which rise in signification on one another; vol- atility being more than lightness, and the others more than volatility: lightness and volatility are defects as they relate to age; those only who ought to be serious or grave are said to be light or volatile. When we treat that as light which is weighty, when we suffer noth- ing to sink into the mind, or make any impression, this is p, defective lightness of character; when the spirits are of a buoyant nature, and the thoughts fly from one object to another, without resting on any for a moment, this light- ness becomes volatility: a light-minded person sets care at a distance ; a volatile person catches pleasure from every passing object. Flightiness and giddi- ness are the defects of youth; they be- speak that entire want of command over the feelings and animal spirits which is inseparable from a state of childhood; a flighty child, however, fails only from a want of attention; but a giddy child, hke one whose head is in the natural sense giddy, is unable to collect itself so as to have any con- sciousness of what passes: a flighty person makes mistakes; a giddy person commits extravagances. See also Ease. LIKE. See Equal. LIKENESS, Resemblance, Simi- larity, SiMiLiTCTDE. Likeness denotes the quahty of being alike (see Equal). Resemblance, from resemble, compound- ed of re and semble, in French sembler, Latin simulo, from similis, hke, signi- fies putting on the form of another thing. Similarity, from a hypothetical Latin similaritas, extended from simil- is, and allied to English same, denotes the abstract property of likeness. Likeness is the most general, and at the same time the most famfliar, term of the three; it implies either external or internal properties: resemblance im- plies only the external properties: similarity the circumstances or prop- erties: we speak of a likeness between two persons; of a resemblance in the cast of the eye; of a resemblance in the form or figure; of a similarity in age and disposition. Likeness is said LIMIT 483 only of that which is actual; resem- blance may be said of that which is apparent: a likeness consists of some- thing specific; a resemblance may be only partial and contingent. A thing is said to be, but not to appear, like another; it may, however, have the shadow of a resemblance: whatever things are alike are alike in their es- sential properties; but they may re- semble one another in a partial degree or in certain particulars, but are other- wise essentially different. We are most like the Divine Being in the act of do- ing good; there is nothing existing in natiu-e which has not certain points of resemblance with something else. Similarity or similitude, which is a higher term, is in the moral appUcation, in regard to likeness, what resemblance is in the physical sense: what is cdike has the same nature; what is similar has certain features of similarity: in this sense feeUngs are alike, sentiments are alike, persons are alike; but cases are similar, circumstances are similar, conditions are similar. Likeness ex- cludes the idea of difference; similar- ity includes only the idea of casual likeness. Likeness, Picture, Image, Effigy. — In the former article likeness is considered as an abstract term, but in connection with the words picture and image it signifies the representation of likeness. Picture, in Latin pidura, from pingere, to paint, signifies the thing painted. Image, in Latin imago, from the root im, found also in imitari, Efiglish imi- tate, signifies an imitation. Effigy, in Latin effi^es, from ex, from, and firi- gere, to fashion, signifies that which is fashioned from or after the image of another thing. Likeness and picture, as terms of art, are both apphed to painting; but the term likeness refers us to the object of the art, namely, to get the likeness; and the picture to the mode of the art, namely, by painting; whence in famihar language an artist is said to take likenesses who takes or paints the portraits of persons; or in general terms an artist may be said to be happy in taking a likeness who can represent on paper the likeness of any object, but particularly that of per- sons. In other connections the word picture is most usually employed in re- gard to works of art, as to sketch a picture, to finish a picture, and the like. As a likeness may be given by other means besides that of painting, it may be taken for any likeness conveyed; as parents may be said to stamp or im- press a likeness on their children. Pict- ure may be figuratively taken for what- ever serves as a picture, as a picture of happiness. Image, as appears from its derivation, signifies nothing more than likeness, but has been usually ap- plied to such likenesses as are taken, or intended to represent spiritual ob- jects, whether on paper or in wood or stone, such as the graven images which were the objects of idolatrous worship: it has, however, been extended in its application to any likeness of one object represented by another; as chimren are sometimes the image of their parents. A likeness and a picture contain act- ual likenesses of the things which they are intended to represent; but an ef- figy may be only an arbitrary likeness, as where a human figure is made to stand for the figure of any particular man without any likeness of the in- dividual. This term is applied to the rude or fictitious pictures of persons in books, and also to the figiu-es of per- sons on tombstones or on coins, which contain but few traces of likeness. Or to the still ruder representations of in- dividuals who are held up to public odium by the populace. LIKEWISE. See Also. LIMB. See Member. LIMIT, Extent. Limit is a more specific and definite term than extent: by the former we are directed to the point where anything ends; by the latter we are led to no particular point, but to the whole space included: limits are in their nature something finite; extent is either finite or infinite: we therefore speak of that which exceeds limits or comes within the limits; and of that which comprehends the extent or is according to the extent: a pleni- potentiary or minister must not ex- ceed the limits of his instruction; when we think of the immense extent of this globe, and that it is among the smallest of an infinite number of worlds, the mind is lost in admiration and amaze- 484 LIMITED ment: it does not fall within the limits of a periodical work to enter into his- torical details; a complete history of any country is a work of great extent. See also Bound; Fix; Term. LIMITED. See Finite. LINEAGE. See Family. LINGER, Tarry, Loiter, Lag, Saunter. Linger is a frequentative of Middle EngUsh lengen, from Anglo- Saxon lang, Modern English long, meaning to keep lengthening the time it takes to do something. Tarry comes from Middle English tarien, to irritate, worry, or vex; hence to hinder or delay. Loiter comes from Middle Dutch leu- teren, to trifle. Lag is a Celtic word meaning late or sluggish. Saunter is a word of uncertain origin, perhaps con- nected with adventure, indicating idle, planless going. Suspension of action or slow move- ment enters into the meaning of all these terms: to linger is to stop alto- gether, or to move but slowly forward; to tarry is properly to suspend one's movement: the former proceeds from reluctance to leave the spot on which we stand; the latter from motives of discretion: one will naturally linger who is going to leave the place of his nativ- ity for an indefinite period; those who have much business to transact will be led to tarry long in a place: to loiter is to move slowly and reluctantly; but, from a bad cause, a child loiters who is im willing to go to school: to lag is to move slower than others, to stop while they are going on; this is seldom done for a good purpose; those who lag have generally some sinister and pri- vate end to answer: to saunter is alto- gether the act of an idler; those who have no object in moving either back- ward or forward will saunter if they move at all. LIQUID, Liquor, Juice. Liquid (see Fluid) is the generic term: liquor, which is but a variation from the same Latin verb, liquere, to be moist, whence liquid is derived, is a liquid which is inade to be drunk: juice, in French jus, Latin ius, broth, soup, is a liquid that issues from bodies. All natural bodies consist of liquids or soUds, or a combination of both: liquor serves to quench the thirst as food satisfies the hunger; the juices of bodies are fre- quently their richest parts; water is the simplest of all liquids; wine is the most inviting of all liquors; the orange produces the most agreeable juice. LIQUIDATE. See Fluid. LIQUOR. See Liquid. LIST, Roll, Catalogue, Register. List is derived through French liste, from Old High German lista, a border, hence a strip, a long strip on which names were written. Roll, from Latin rotula, a httle wheel, signifies in general anything rolled up, particularly paper with its written contents. Catalogue, in Latin catalogus, Greek KaraXoyof, from KaraXsyw, to write down, signifies a written enumeration. Register, from re, back, gerere (past participle gestum), to bring, signifies something brought back, a record returned by a messenger or official. A collection of objects brought into some kind of order is the common idea included in the signification of these terms. The contents and disposition of a list is the most simple; it consists of httle more than names arranged under one another in a long, narrow line, as a list of words, a list of plants and flowers, a list of voters, a list of visits, a list of deaths, of births, of marriages: roll, which is figuratively put for the contents of a roU, is a list rolled up for convenience, as a long roll of saints: catalogue involves more de- tails than a simple list; it specifies not only names, but dates, qualities, and circumstances. A list of books con- tains their titles; a catalogue of books contains an enumeration of their size, price, number of volumes, edition, etc. ; a roll of saints simply specifies their names; a catalogue of saints enters into particulars of their ages, deaths, etc.: a register contains more than either, for it contains events, with dates, act- ors, etc., in aU matters of public in- terest. See also Enroll. LISTEN. See Attend. LISTLESS. See Indolent. LITERATURE. See Letters. LITTLE, Small, Diminutive. Little comes from Anglo-Saxon lytel, from a Teutonic base meaning to stoop. For small see Atomic. Diminutive comes from Latin minus, and signifies made less. What is little is so in the LIVELY 485 ordinary sense in respect to size; it is properly opposed to great: the smaU is that which is less than others in point of bulk; it is opposed to the large: the diminutive is that which is less than it ought to be; as a person is said to be diminviive in stature who is below the ordinary statm-e. In the moral appUcation, little is fre- quently used in a bad sense, small and diminutive may be extended to other than physical objects without any change in their signification. LIVE. See Abide; Be; Exist. LIVELIHOOD, Living, Subsist- ence, Maintenance, Support, Sus- tenance. The means of living or sup- porting Ufe is the idea common to all these terms, which vary according to the circumstances of the individual and the nature of the object which consti- tutes the means. Livelihood was origi- nally livelode, literally life-leading — from Anglo-Saxon lif, life, and lad, a way, literally a leading. Subsistence comes from Latin sub, under, and sis- tere, to cause to stand — meaning that which bears one up. Support, from sub and portare, to bear, and sustenance, from sub and tenere, to hold, have simi- lar origins. Maintenance comes from manus, hand, and tenere, to hold, and signifies to hold ia hand, to control and support. A livelihood is that which is sought after by the day; a laborer earns a livelihood by the sweat of his brow: a subsistence is obtained by ir- regular efforts of various descriptions; beggars meet with so much that they obtain something better than a pre- carious and scanty subsistence: living is obtained by more respectable and less severe efforts than the former two; tradesmenobtain a good living by keep- ing shops^ artists procure a living by the exercise of their talents; mainte- nance, support, and sustenance differ frojn the other three, inasmuch as they do not comprehend what one gains by one's own efforts, but by the efforts of others: maintenance is that which is permanent: it supplies the place of living: support may be casual and vary in de^ee: the object of most public charities is to afford a maintenance to such as cannot obtain a livelihood or living for themselves; it is the business of the parish to give support, in time of sickness and distre&s, to all who are legal parishioners. Maintenance and support are always granted; but suste- nance is that which is taken or received : the former comprehend the means of obtaining food; sustenance compre- hends that which sustains the body and supplies the place of food. LIVELY, Sprightly, Vivacious, Sportive, Merry, Jocund. The ac- tivity of the heart when it beats high with a sentiment of gayety is strongly depicted by all these terms: the lively is the most general and literal in its signification; life, as a moving or active principle, is supposed to be inherent in spiritual as well as material bodies; the feehng, as well as the body which has a power of moving arbitrarily of itself, is said to have life; and in what- ever object this is wanting, this ob- ject is said to be dead: in Uke manner, according to the degree or circum- stances under which this moving principle displays itself, the object is denominated lively, that is, having life. Sprightly, originally spritely, from Latin spiritus, spirit, signifies full of spirit or the active breath of life; and vivacious, in Latin vivax, from vivere, to live, is the same as lively. Liveliness is the property of childhood, youth, or even maturer age; sprightliness is the pecul- iar property of youth; vivacity is a quahty compatible with the sobriety of years: an iafant shows itself to be lively or otherwise in a few months after its birth; a girl, particularly in her early years, affords often a pleas- ing picture of sprightliness; a vivacious companion recommends himself wher- ever he goes. Sportiveness, that is, fondness of or readiness for sport, is an accompaniment of liveliness or sprightliness; a sprightly child will show its sprightliness by its sportive humor; mirth, i. e., merriness (see CnEERFtrL), and jocundity, from jocundus or jucun- dus, and juvo, to delight or please, sig- nifying the state of being delighted, are the forms of liveliness whicn dis- play themselves in social life; the for- mer is a familiar quality, more fre- quently to be discovered in vulgar than in poUshed society: jocundity is a form of liveliness which poets have ascribed to nymphs and goddesses and other aerial creatures of the imagination. 486 LIVING The terms preserve the same sense when appUed to the characteristics or actions of persons as when apphed to the persons themselves: imagination, wit, conception, representation, and the like are lively; a person's air, man- ner, look, tone, dance, are sprightly; a conversation, a tmTi of mind, a so- ciety, is vivadovs; the muse, the pen, the imagination, are sportive; the meet- ing, the laugh, the song, the conceit, are merry; the train, the dance, are jocund. LIVING, Benefice. Living signi- fies, literally, the pecimiary resource by which one lives. Benefice, from Late Latin benefidum, based on classical benefacio, signifies whatever one ob- tains as a benefit: the former is ap- pUcable to any situation of life, but particularly to that resource which a parish affords to the clergyman; the latter is applicable to no other object: we speak of a living as a resource immediately derived from the parish, in distinction from a curacy, which is derived from an individual; we speak of a benefice in respect to the terms by which it is held, according to the ecclesiastical law: there are many liv- ings which are not benefices, although not vice versd. See also Livelihood. LOAD. See Clog; Freight; Weight. LOATH. See Averse. LOATHE. See Abhor. LOATHING. See Disgust. LOCALIZE. See Segregate. LOCKOUT. See Close. LODGE. See Harbor. LODGINGS, Apartments. For the derivation of lodging see Harbor. A lodging, or a place to lodge or dwell in, comprehends single rooms, or many rooms, or in fact any place which can be made to serve the purpose; apart- ments only suites of rooms: apart- ments, therefore, are, in the strict sense, lodgings; but all lodgings are not apart- ments: on the other hand, the word lodgings is mostly used for rooms that are let out to hire or that serve a temporary purpose; but the word apartments may be applied to the suites of rooms in any large house: hence the word lodging becomes on one ground restricted in its use, and apartments on the other: aU apartments to let out for hire are lodgings, but apartments not to let out for hire are not lodgings. LOFTINESS. See Pride. LOFTY. See High. LOITER. See Linger. LONELY. See Alone. LONG. See Desire. LONGING. See Yearn. LOOK, Glance. Look (see Air) is the generic, and glance (see Glance) the specific term; that is to say, a casual or momentary look: a look may be characterized as severe or mild, fierce or gentle, angry or kind: a glance as hasty or sudden, imperfect or sUght; so hkewise we speak of taking a look or catching a glance. Look, See, Behold, View, Eye. — Look, from Anglo-Saxon locian, signified orig- inally to peep through a hole. See is in Anglo-Saxon seon, to perceive by the eye. Behold, compounded of the in- tensive be and hold, signifies to hold or fix the eye on an object. View, from Middle French vetie, participle of veoir, based on the Latin video, signifies sim- ply what is seen. To eye, from the noun eye, Anglo-Saxon cage, allied to Latin oculus, eye, naturally signifies to examine with the eye. We look voluntarily; we see involun- tarily: the eye sees; the person looks: absent-minded people often see things before they are fully conscious that they are at hand : we may look without seeing, and we may see without looking: near- sighted people often look at that which is too distant to strike the visual organ. To behold is to look at for a continuance; to view is to look at in all directions; to eye is to look at earnestly and by side glances; that which is seen may disap- pear in an instant; it may strike the eye and be gone; but what is looked at must make some stay; consequently lightning, and things equally fugitive and rapid in their flight, may be seen, but cannot be looked at. To look at is the famiUar as well as the general term, in regard to the others; we look at things in general which we wish to see, that is, to see clearly, fuUy, and in all their parts; but we behold that which excites a moral or intellectual interest; we view that which demands intellectual attention; we eye that which gratifies any particular passion: LOOK 487 an inqmsitive child looks at things which are new to it, but does not behold them; we look at plants or finery or whatever gratifies the senses, but we do not behold them: on the other hand, we behold any spectacle which excites our admiration, our astonishment, oiu* pity, or our love: we look at objects in order to observe their external propn erties; but we view them in order to find out their component parts, their internal properties, their powers of motion and action, etc.: we look at things to gratify the curiosity of the moment or for mere amusement; but the jealous man eyes his rival in order to mark his movements, his designs, and his successes; the envious man eyes him who is in prosperity, with a ■ malignant desire to see him humbled. Look, Appear. — Look is here taken in the neuter sense: in the preceding article it denotes the action of persons striving to see; in the pr^ent case it denotes the action of things figura- tively striving to be seen. Appear, from the Latin ad, to, and parere, to come in sight, signifies to be present or at hand, within sight. The look of a thing implies the im- pressions which it makes on the senses, that is, the manner in which it looks; its appearance imphes the simple act of its coming into sight; the look of anji;hing is therefore characterized as good or bad, mean or handsome, ugly or beautiful; the appearance is char- acterized as early or late, sudden or unexpected: there is something very unseemly in the look of a clergyman affecting the airs of a fine gentleman; the appearance of the stars in an even- ing presents an interesting view even to the ordinary beholder. As what ap- pears must appear in some form, the signification of the term has been ex- tended to the manner of the appear- ance, and brought still nearer to look in its application: in this case the term look is rather more famiUar than that of appearance: we may speak either of regarding the look or the appearance of a thing, as far as it may impress others; but the latter is less colloquial than the former: a man's conduct is said to look rather than to appear bad; but on the other hand, we say a thing assumes an appearance, or has a certain appearance. Look is always employed for what is real; what a thing looks is that which it really is: appear, however, sometimes refers not only to what is external, but to what is superficial. K we say a person looks ill, it supposes some posi- tive and unequivocal evidence of ill- ness: if we say he appears to be ill, it is a less positive assertion than the former; it leaves room for doubt and allows the possibility of a mistake. We are at hberty to judge of things by their, looks, without being accused of want of judgment; but as ap- ■pearances are said to be deceitful, it becomes necessary to admit them with caution as the rule of our judgment. Look is employed mostly in regard to objects of sense; appearance concerns natural and moral objects indifferent- ly: the sky looks dark; an object ap- pears through a microscope greater than it really is; a f)erson s conduct appears in a more culpable Ught when interpreted by an enemy. Looker-on, Spectator, Beholder, Ob- server.— The looker-on and the spectator are both opposed to the agents or actors in any scene; but the former is still more abstracted from the objects he sees than the latter. A looker-on is careless; he has no part, and takes no part, in what he sees; he looks on because the thing is before him and he has nothing else to do: a spectator may likewise be im- concemed, but id general he derives amusement, if nothing else, from what he sees. A clown may be a looker-on who with open mouth gapes at all that is before mm, without understanding any part of it, but he who looks on to draw a moral lesson from the whole is in the moral sense not an uninterested spectator. The beholder has a nearer interest than the spectator; and the observer has an interest not less near than that of the beholder, but some- what different: the beholder has his fecUngs roused by what he sees; the observer has his imderstanding em- ployed in that which passes before him: the beholder indulges himself in contemplation; the observer is busy in making it subservient to some proposed object: every beholder of our Savnour's sufferings and patience was struck with the conviction of His divine character. 488 LOOSE not excepting even some of those who were His most prejudiced adversaries; every calm observer of our Saviour's words and actions was convinced of His divine mission. LOOSE, Vague, Lax, Dissolute, Licentious. Loose is a Scandinavian word. Vague, in Latin vagus, signifies wandering. Lax, in Latin laxv^, is al- lied to lack. Dissolvie, in Latin disso- lutu^, participle of dissolvere, signifies dissolved or set free. Licentious signi- fies having the license or power to do as one pleases (see Leave). Loose is the generic, the rest are spe- cific terms; they are all opposed to that which is bound or adheres closely: loose is employed either for physical, moral, or intellectual objects; vague only for intellectual objects; lax some- times for what is intellectual, but oftener for the moral; dissolute and licentious only for moral matters: what- ever wants a proper connection, or hnking together of the parts, is loose; whatever is scattered and remotely sep)- arated is vagv£: a style is loose where the words and sentences are not made to coalesce so as to form a regularly connected series; assertions are vagv^ which have but a remote connection with the subject referred to: by the same rule, loose hints thrown out at random may give rise to speculation and conjectm-e, but cannot serve as the ground of any conclusion; igno- rant people are apt to credit every vague rumor and to communicate it as a certainty. Opinions are loose, either inasmuch as they want logical precision or as they fail in moral strict- ness; suggestions and surmises are in- duced by the wanderings of the imagi- nation; opinions are lax, inasmuch as they have a tendency to lessen the moral obhgation or to loosen moral- ities. A loose man injures himself, but a lax man injures society at large. Dissolvieness is the excess of looseness; licentiousness is the consequence of laxity or the freedom from external constraint. Looseness of character, if indulged, soon sinks into dissoluiev^ss of morals ; and laxity of discipUne is quickly followed by licentiousness of manners. See also Slack. LOQUACIOUS. See Talkative; Voluble. LORDLY. See Imperious. LORD'S DAY. See Sabbath. LORD'S - SUPPER, Eucharist, Communion, Sacrament. The Lord's- Supper is a term of f amiUar and general use among Christians, as designating in hteral terms the supper of our Lord, that is, either the last solemn supper which He took with His disciples pre- vious to His crucifixion or the com- memoration of that event which con- formably to His commands has been observed by the professors of Chris- tianity. Eucharist is a term of pecuhar use among the Roman CathoUcs, from the Greek evxapi^ofxai, I give thanks, because personal adoration, by way of returning thanks, constitutes in their estimation the chief part of the cere- mony. As the social sentiments are kept alive mostly by the common participation of meals, so is brotherly love, the essence of Christian fellow- ship, cherished and warmed in the highest degree by the common partici- pation in this holy festival: hence, by distinction, it has been denominated the communion. As the vows which are made at the altar of oiu- Lord are the most solemn which a Christian can make, comprehending in them the entire devotion of himself to Christ, the general term sacrament, signifying an oath, has been employed by way of distinction for this ordinance. The Roman CathoMcs have employed the same term for six other ordinances; but the Protestants, who attach a simi- lar degree of sacredness to no other than baptism, apply this appellation only to these two. LOSE, Miss. Lose is in Middle Eng- Ush lesen. Miss comes from Anglo- Saxon missan, to fail to hit, from a base meaning to escape, avoid, etc., allied to Latin mittere, to send. To miss, prob- ably from the participle mis, wrong, signifies to put wrong. What is lost is supposed to be en- tirely and irrevocably gone; but what is missed may be only out of sight or not at hand at the time when it is wanted; health or property may be lost; one misses a coach, or one misses what has been mislaid. Things may be lost in a variety of ways independ- ent of the person losing; but missing is mostly by the instrumentality of the LOVE 489 person who misses. We lose an oppor- tunity which it is not in our power to use; we miss an opportunity when we suffer it to pass without using. LOSS, Damage, Detriment. Loss signifies the act of losing or the thing lost, from Anglo-Saxon los, destruction. Damage, in French dommage, Latin damnum, loss, signifies the thing taken away. Detriment (see Disadvanta- geous). Loss is here the generic term; damage and detriment are species or modes of loss. The person sustains the loss, the thing suffers the damage or detriment. Whatever is gone from us which we wish to retain is a loss; hence we may sustain a loss in our property, in our reputation, in our influence, in our intellect, and every other object of possession: whatever renders an object less serviceable or valuable, by any ex- ternal violence, is a damage; as a vessel suffers a damage in a storm: whatever is calculated to cross a man's purpose is a detriment; the bare want of a good name may be a detriment to a young tradesman; the want of pru- dence is always a great detriment to the prosperity of a famUy. LOT. See Destiny. LOUD, Noisy, High - sounding. Clamorous. Lovd comes from Anglo- Saxon hltid, heard from afar. Noisy, from noise, is derived from Old French noise, a debate or quarrel (something that gives rise to noise in our sense), perhaps from nausea. High-sounding signifies the same as pitched upon an elevated key, so as to make a great noise, to be heard at a distance. Clam- orous, from the Latin damare, to cry, signifies crying with a loud voice. Loud is here the generic term, since it signifies a great sound, which is the idea common to them all. As an epi- thet for persons, lovd is mostly taken in an indifferent sense; all the others are taken for being lo^id beyond meas- ure; noisy is to be lawlessly and un- seasonably lovd; high-sounding is to be lovd only from the bigness of one's words; clamorous is to be disagreeablv and painfully lovd. We must speak loudly to a deaf person in order to make ourselves heard: children will be noisy at all times if not kept under control: flatterers are always high- sounding in their eulogiums of princes: children will be damarous for what they want if they expect to get it by dint of noise; they will be turbulent in case of refusal if not under proper dis- cipline. In the improper application lovd is taken in as bad a sense as the rest; the loudest praises are the least to be regarded: the applause of a mob is always noisy; high-sounding titles serve only to excite contempt where there is not some corresponding qual- ity: it is the business of a party to be clamorous, as that serves the purpose of exciting the ignorant. LOVE, Friendship. Love (see Af- fection) is a term of very extensive import; it may be taken either in the most general sense for every strong and passionate attachment or only for such as exist between the sexes, in either of which cases it has features by which it is easily distinguished from friendship- — from Anglo-Saxon freond, modem English frieivi, from the verb freogan, to love. Love exists between members of the same family; it springs out of their natural relationship, and is kept alive by their close intercourse and constant interchange of kindnesses: friendship excludes the idea of any tender and natural relationship; nor is it, like love, to be found m children, but is confined to maturer years; it is formed by time, by circumstances, by con- gruity of character and mutual sym- pathy. Love always operates with ardor; friendship is remarkable for firmness and constancy. Love is pe- culiar to no station; it is to be found equally among the high and the low, the learned and the unJeamed: friendr- ship is of nobler growth; it finds ad- mittance only into minds of a loftier make: it cannot be felt by men of an ordinary stamp. Both love and friend- ship are gratined by seeking the good of the object; but love is more selfish in its nature than friendship; in in- dulging another it seeks its own grati- fication, and when this is not to be obtained it will change into the con- trary passion of hatred; friendship, on the other hand, is altogether disin- terested, it makes sacrifices of every description, and knows no limits to its sacrifice. 490 LOVELY Lover, Suitor, Wooer. — Lover signifies literally one who loves, and is applicable to any object; there are lovers of " money and lovers of wine, lovers of things individually and things col- lectively, that is, lovers of particular women in the good sense, or lovers of women in the bad sense. The suitor (from French suite, based ultimately on Latin sequi, to foUow) is one who sues and strives after a thing; the word is equally undefined as to the object, but may be employed for such as sue for favors from their superiors, or sue for the affections and person of a woman. The wooer (from Anglo-Saxon wogian, to court, of obscure origin) is only a species of lover, who woos or solicits the kind regards of a female. When apphed to the same object, namely, the female sex, the term lover is employed for persons of all ranks, who are equally ahve to the tender passion of love: suitor is a title adapted to that class of hfe where all the gen- uine affections of human nature are adulterated by a false refinement or entirely lost in other passions of a guilty natin"e. Wooer is a tender and passionate title, which is adapted to that class of beings that Uve only in poetry and romance. There is most sincerity in the lover, he simply proffers his love; there is most ceremony in the suitor, he proffers his suit; there is most ardor in the wooer, he makes his vows. LOVELY. See Amiable. LOVING. See AMOROtrs. LOW, Mean, Abject. Low (see Humble). Mean comes from Anglo- Saxon gemcene, German gemein, com- mon. Abject, in French abject, Latin abjectus, from ab, down, and jacere, to cast, signifies, literally, cast down or brought very low. Low is a much stronger term than mean; for what is low stands more di- rectly opposed to what is high, but what is mean is intermediate: the low is appUed only to a certain number or description; out mean, Uke common, is apphcable to the great bulk of man- kind. A man of low extraction falls below the ordinary level; he is op- posed to a noble man: a man of mean' birth does not rise above the ordinary level; he is upon a level with the majority. Abject expresses more than either of the others, for it denotes the lowest depression in a person's out- ward condition or position, as abject poverty. When employed to designate char- acter, they preserve the same dis- tinction; the low is that which is posi- tively sunk in itself; but the mean is that which is comparatively low, in regard to the outward circumstances and relative condition of the individ- ual. Swearing and drunkenness are low vices; boxing and cudgelling are low games; a misplaced economy in people of property is mean; a conde- scension for our own petty advan- tages to those who are beneath us is meanness. A man is commonly low by birth, education, or habits; but meanness is a defect of nature which debases a person in spite of every ex- ternal advantage. Abject, as a char- acteristic, is appUed particularly to the spirit. Slavery is most apt to pro- duce an abject spirit by depriving a man of the use of those faculties which elevate him above the brutes; poverty, fear, or any base passion may have the same effect. LOWER. See Reduce; Strike. LOWLY. See Humble. LUCID. See Clear. LUCKLESS. See Hapless. LUCKY. See Fortunate. LUCRE. See Gain. LUDICROUS. See Laughable. LULL. See Quell. LUNACY. See Derangement. LUSTRE. See Brightness. LUSTY. See Corpulent. LUXURIANT. See Exuberant. MAGISTERIAL 491 M MADNESS, Frenzy, Eage, Fury. Madness (see Derangement). Frenzy, in Latin phrenesis, Greek pr]v, the naidriff, heart, senses, signifies a disordered psychology. Rage is in French rage, Latin rabies, madness. Fury comes from Latin furia, madness. Madness and frenzy are used in the physical and moral sense; rage a.nd fury only in the moral sense: in the first case, madness is a confirmed derange- ment in the organ of thought; frenzy is only a temporary derangement from the violence of any disease or other cause: the former Ues in the system, and is, in general, incurable; the latter is only occasional, and yields to the power of medicine. In the moral sense of these terms the cause is put for the effect, that is, madness and frenzy are put for that excessive vio- lence of passion by which they are caused; and as rage and fury are species of this passion, namely, the passion of anger; they are, therefore, to madness and frenzy sometimes as the cause is to the effect: the former, however, are much more violent than the latter, as they altogether destroy the reason- ing faculty, which is not expressly im- pUed in the signification of the latter terms. Moral madness differs both in degree and duration from frenzy: if it spring from the extravagance of rage, it bursts out into every conceivable extravagance, but is only transitory; if it spring from disappointed love, or any other disappointed passion, it is as permanent as direct physical mad- ness; frenzy is always temporary, but even more impetuous than madness; in the frenzy if despair men commit acts of suicide, in the frenzri of distress and grief people are hurried into many actions fatal to themselves or others. Rage refers more immediately to the agitation that exists within the mind; fwry refers to that which shows itself outwardly: a person contains or stifles his rage; but his fury breaks out into some external mark of violence: rage will subside of itself; fury spends itself; a person may be choked with rage, but his fury finds a vent : an enraged man may be pacified; & furious one is deaf to every remonstrance. Rage, when applied to persons, commonly signifies highly inflamed anger; but it may be employed for inflamed passion toward any object which is specified; as a roye for music, a rage for theatrical per- formances, a fashionable rage for any whim of the day. Fury, though com- monly signifying rage bursting out, yet may be any impetuous feeling dis- playing itself in extravagant action; as the divine fury supposed to be pro- duced in the priestess of Apollo by the inspiration of the god, and the bacchanalian fury, which expression depicts the influence of wine upon the body and mind. In the improper ap- plication, to inanimate objects, the words rage and fury preserve a similar distinction: the rage of the heat de- notes the excessive height to which it is risen; the fury of the winds indi- cates their violent commotion and tur- bulence; so in like manner the raging of the tempest characterizes figurative- Iv its burning anger; and ihcfury of the flames marks their impetuous move- ments, their wild and rapid spread. See also Dkrangemext. MAGISTERIAL, Majestic, State- ly, Pompous, August, Dignified. Magisterial, from magister, a master, and majestic, from majestas, are both derived from magis, more, or major, greater, that is, more or greater than others; but they differ in this respect, that the magisterial is something as- sumed, and is therefore often false; the majestic is natural, and consequent- ly always real: an upstart, or an in- truder into any high station or office, may put on a magisterial air in order to impose on the multitude; but it will not be in his power to be majesHc. which never shows itself in a borrowed shape; none but those who have a superiority of character, of birth, or outward station can be majestic. Stately and pompoua (see Magnifi- 492 MAGNETIC cence) are most nearly allied to magisterial; august (from Augustus, the title of the Roman Caesars) and dig- nified to majestic: the former being merely extrinsic and assumed, the latter intrinsic and inherent. Magis- terial implies the authority which is assmned; stately regards splendor and rank; pompous regards personal im- portance, with all the appendage of greatness and power: a person is magisterial in the exercise of his office and the distribution of his commands; he is stately in his ordinary intercourse with his inferiors and equals; he is pompous on particular occasions of ap- pearing in pubMc: a person demands silence in a magisterial tone; he marches forward with a stately air; he comes forward in a pompous manner, so as to strike others with a sense of his importance. Majestic is an epithet that charac- terizes the exterior of an object; august is that which marks an essential char- acteristic in the object; dignified serves to characterize a person's action as tending to give dignity: a woman's form is termed majestic when it has something imposing in it suited to the condition of majesty or the most ele- vated station in society; a monarch is entitled august in order to describe the extent of his empire; a pubUc assembly is denominated au^u^t to be- speak its high character and its weighty influence in the scale of so- ciety; a reply is termed dignified when it upholds the individual and personal character of a man as well as his rela- tive character in the community to which he belongs: the former two of these terms are associated only with grandeur of outward circumstances; the last is appUcable to men of all stations who have each in his sphere a dignity to maintain which belongs to man as an independent moral agent. MAGNETIC. See Electric. MAGNIFICENCE, Splendor, Pomp. Magnificence, from magnus, great, and a weak form of facere, to do, signifies doing largely or on a large scale. Splendor, in Latin splendor, from splendere, to shine, signifies bright- ness of exterior. Pomp, in Latin pompa, Greek irofim}, a procession, from vifivHv, to send, signified a sending, an escort- ing, which, of course, was usually splen- did and gorgeous, because men honored with an escort were usually deemed worthy also of a certain splendor and ceremony in the accoutrements of the escort. Magnijicence lies not only in the num- ber and extent of the objects presented, but in their degree of richness as to their coloring and quality; splendor ia but a characteristic of magnificence, at- tached to such objects as dazzle the eye by the quantity of Ught or the beauty and strength of coloring; the entertainments of the Eastern mon- archs and princes are remarkable for their magnificence, from the inmaense number of their attendants, the crowd of equipages, the size of their palaces, the multitude of costly utensils, and the profusion of viands which consti- tute the arrangements for the banquet; the entertainment^ of Europeans pre- sent much splendor, from the richness, the variety, and the brUUancy of dress, of furniture, and all the apparatus of a feast, which the refinements of art have brought to perfection. Magnifi- cence is seldomer vmaccompanied with splendor than splendor with magnifi- cence, since quantity, as well as qual- ity, is essential to the one; but quality more than quantity is an essential to the other: a large army drawn up in battle array is a magnificent spectacle, from the immensity of their numbers and the order of their disposition; it will in all probability be a splendid scene if there be much richness in the dresses; the pomp will here consist in such large bodies of men acting by one impulse and directed by one will, hence military pomp; it is the appen- dage of power when displayed to public view: on particular occasions a monarch seated on his throne, surrounded by his courtiers and attended by his guards, is said to appear with pomp. See also Grandeur. MAGNIFICENT. See Superb. MAGNITUDE. See Size. MAIDEN. See Virgin. MAIM. See Mutilate. MAIN. See Cardinal; Chief. MAINTAIN. See Assert; Hold; Sustain; Uphold. MAINTENANCE. See Liveli- MALEDICTION 493 MAJESTIC. See Magisterial. MAKE, Form, Produce, Create. The idea of giving birth to a thing is common to all these terms, which vary in the circumstances of the action: to make (see Act) is the most general and unqualified term; to form (see Form) signifies to give a form to a thing, that is, to make it after a given form; to produce (see Afford) is to bring forth into the light, to call into existence; to create (see Cause) is to bring into existence by an absolute exercise of power; to make is the sim- plest action of all, and comprehends a simple combination by the smallest efforts; to form requires care and at- tention and greater efforts; to pro- duce requires time and also labor: whatever is put together so as to be- come another thing is made; a chair or a table is made: whatever is put into any distinct form is formed; the potter form^ the clay into an earthen vessel: whatever emanates from a thing so as to become a distinct ob- ject is produced; fire is often produced by the violent friction of two pieces of wood with each other. The process of making is always performed by some conscious agent, who employs either mechanical means or the simple exer- cise of power: a bird makes its nest; man makes various things by the exer- cise of his understanding and his limbs; the Almighty has made every- thing by His word. The process of forming does not always require a conscious agent; things are formed of themselves or they are formed by the active operations of other bodies; melted lead, when thrown into water, will form itself into various httle bodies; hard substances are formed in the hu- man body, which give rise to the disease termed the gravel. What is produced is oftener produced by the process of nature than by any express design; the earth produces all kinds of vegetables from seed; animals, by a similar process, produxx their young. Create, in this natural sense of the term, is employed as the act of an intelligent being and that of the Supreme Being only; it is the act of making by a simple effort of power, without the use of materials and without any process. Hence it has been extended in its ap- ' Elication to the making of anything y an immediate exercise of power. The creative power of the hmnan mind is a faint image of that Power which brought everything into existence out of nothing. They are all employed in the moral sense and with a similar distinction: make is indefinite; we may make a thing that is difficult or easy, simple or complex; we may make a letter or make a poem; we may make a word or make a sentence. To form is the work either of intelligence or of cir- cumstances: education has much to do in forming the habits, but nature has more to do in forming the disposition and the mind altogether; sentiments are frequently formed by young people before they have sufficient maturity of thought and knowledge to justify them in coming to any decision. To produce is the effect of great mental exertion, or it is the natural operation of things: no industry could ever produce a poem or a work of the imagination, but a history or a work of science may be produced by the force of mere labor. All things, both in the moral and in- tellectual world, are linked together upon the same principle of cause and effect by which one thing is the pro- ducer and the other the thing proditced: quarrels produce hatred, and kindness produces love, as heat produces in- flammation and fever^ or disease pro- duces death. What is created is not made by any natural process, but is called into existence by the creating power; small matters creaie jealousies in jealous minds. MALADY. See Disorder. MALEDICTION, Curse, Impreca- tion, Execration,\ Anathema. Male- diction, from Latin male/xM, and dicere, to say, signifies a saying ill, that is^ de- claring an evil wish against a person. Cwrse, Anglo-Saxon cursian, is the na- tive EngUsh term corresponding to malediction. Imprecation, from Latin in, in, and precari, to pray, signifies a praying down evil upon a f>erson. Execration, from the Latin execror, that is, e sacris excludere, signifies the same as to excommunicate, with every form of solemn imprecation. Anathema, in Greek avd9i/ta, signifies a setting up, hence a devotion, a curse, and thus 494 MALEFACTOR a putting out of a religious community as a penance. The malediction is the most indefi- nite and general term, signifying simply the declaration of evU; curse is a solemn denunciation of evil: the former is em- ployed mostly by men; the latter by some superior bemg as well as by men: the rest are species of the curse pro- noxmced only by men. The maledic- tion is caused by simple anger; the curse is occasioned by some grievous offence: men, in the heat of their passions, will utter maledictions against any object that offends them; God pro- nounced a curse upon Adam and all his posterity, after the fall. The term curse differs in the degree of evil pronounced or wished; impreca- tion and execration always imply some positive great evil, and, in fact, as much evil as can be conceived by man in his anger; the anathema concerns the evil which is pronounced according to the canon law, by which a man is not only put out of the Church, but held up as an object of offence. The male- diction is altogether an imallowed ex- pression of private resentment; the curse was admitted, in some cases, ac- cording to the Mosaic law; and that, as well as the anathema, at one time formed a part of the ecclesiastical dis- cipline of the Christian Church; the imprecation formed a part of the heathen ceremony of religion; but the execration is always the informal expres- sion of the most violent personal anger. MALEFACTOR. See Criminal. MALEVOLENT, Malicious, Malignant. These words have all their derivation from malu^, bad, that is, malevolent, wishing ill; malicious (see Malice), having malice; and malignant, from malus and gignere, to be born, having an inborn disposition that is bad. Malevolence has a deep root in the heart and is a settled part of the character; we denominate the person malevolent to designate the ruUng tem- per of his mind: malidou-sness may be applied as an epithet to particular parts of a man's character or conduct; one may have a malicious joy or pleas- ure in seeing the distresses of another: malignity is not so often employed to characterize the person as the thing; the malignity of a design is estimated by the degree of mischief which was intended to be done. Malice, Rancor, Spite, Grudge, Pique. — Malice, in Latin malitia, from malv^, bad, signifies the very essence of bad- ness lying in the heart; rancor (see Hatred) is only continued hatred; the former requires no external cause to provoke it, it is inherent in the mind; the latter must be caused by some per- sonal offence. Malice is properly the love of evil for evil's sake, and is, there- fore, confined to no number or quality of objects, and limited by no circum- stance; rancor depends upon external objects for its existence, and is con- fined to such objects only as are Uable to cause displeasure or anger; matice will impel a man to do mischief to those who have not injured him and are perhaps strangers to him; rancor can subsist only between those who have had siifficient connection to be at variance. Spite, from Old French despit, from Latin de, down, and a weakened form of specere, to look — to look down on, to despise — denotes a petty kind of mal- ice, or disposition to offend another in trifling matters; it may be in the tem- per of the person, or it may have its source in some external provocation: children often show their spite to one another. Grudge, from Old French grcmcher, to murmur, from an imitative base gru; and pique, from pike, denoting the prick of a pointed instrument, are em- ployed for that particular state of rancorous or spiteful feeUng which is occasioned by personal offences: the grudge is that which has long existed; the pique is that which is of recent date; a person is said to owe another a grudge for having done him an in- jury; or he is said to show pique to another who has made him an affront. MALICIOUS. See Malevolent; Satanic. MALIGNANT. See Malevolent; Virulent. MANAGE. See Concert; Con- duct; Wield. MANAGEMENT. See Care; Economy. MANGLE. See Mutilate. MANIA. See Derangement. MARK 495 MANLY, Manful. Manly, or like a man, is opposed to juvenile, and of course applied properly to youths; but manfid, or full of mannood, is opposed to effeminate and is applicable more properly to grown persons: a pre- matiu"e manliness in young persons is hardly less unseemly than a want of manfidness in one who is called upon to display his courage. MANNER. See Air; Custom; Way. MANNERS, Morals. Manners concern the minor" forms of acting with others and toward others; morals in- clude the important duties of life: manners have therefore been denomi- nated minor morals. By attention to good manners we render ourselves good companions; by an observance of good morals we become good mem- bers of society : in the former instance we gain the good-will of others, in the latter their esteem. The manners of a child are of more or less importance, according to his station in life; his morals cannot be attended to too early, let his station be what it may. See also Etiquette. MANOEUVRING. See Tactics. MARGIN. See Border. MARINE. See Maritime. MARINER. See Seaman. MARITIME, Marine, Naval, Nautical. Maritime and marine, from the Latin mare, sea, cognate with English mere, signifies belonging to the sea; naval, from navis, a ship, signifies belonging to a ship; and nau- tical, from nauta, a sailor, signifies be- longing to a sailor or to navigation. Countries and places are denominated maritime from their proximity to the sea or their great intercourse by sea; hence England is called the most mari- time nation in Europe. Marine is a technical term, employed by persons in office, to denote that which is officially transacted with regard to the sea in distinction from what passes on land; hence we speak of the marines as a species of soldiers acting by sea, as con- trasted with the maritime society: or of marine stores. Naval is another term of art as opposed to military, and used in regard to the arrange- ments of government or commerce: hence we Bf>eak of naval affairs, naval officers, naval tactics, and the like. NaiUical is a scientific term con- nected with the science of naviga- tion or the management of vessels: hence we talk of nautical instruction, of nautical calculations. The maritime laws of England are essential for the preservation of the naval power which it has so justly acquired. The marine of England is one of its glories. The naval administration is one of the most important branches of our govern- ment in the time of war. Nautical tables and a nautical almanac have been expressly formed for the benefit of all who apply themselves to natUiccU subjects. MARK, Print, Impression, Stamp. Mark comes from Anglo-Saxon mearc, Eossibly allied to mearc, signifying a oundarj' or limit, though this seems to be a different word. Print and impres- sion, both from the Latin premere, to press, signify the visible effect pro- duced by printing or pressing. Stamp signifies the effect produced by stamp- ing, from Anglo-Saxon stempan, to stamp on with the feet. The word Tnark is the most general in sense: whatever alters the external face of an object is a mark; a print is some specific mark, or a figure drawn upon the surface of an object; an im- pression is the mark pressed either upon or into a body; a stamp is the mark that is stamped in or upon the body. The mark is confineci to no size, shape, or form; the print is a mark that represents an object: the mark may consist of a spot, a line, a stain, or a smear; but a print describes a given object, as a house, a man, etc. A mark is either a protuberance or a depression; an impression is always a sinking in of the object: a hillock or a hole are both marks; but the latter is properly the impression: the stamp is an impression made in a specific manner and for a specific object, as the stamp of a seal on wax. The mark is- occasioned by every sort of action, gentle or violent, artificial or natural; by the voluntary act of a person, or the xmconscious act of inanimate bodies, by means of compression or friction, by a touch or a blow, and the like: all the others are occasioned by one or more of these modes. The print 496 MARK is occasioned by artificial means of com- pression, as when the 'print of letters or pictures is made on paper; or by accidental and natural compression, as when the Tprinl of the hand is made on the wall, or the 'print of the foot is made on the ground. The impression is made by means more or less violent, as when an impression is made upon wood by the axe or hammer; or by gradual and natural means, as by the dripping of water on stone. The stamp is made by means of direct pressure with an artificial instrument. Mark is of such universal appHca- tion that it is confined to no objects whatever, either in the natural or moral world; print is mostly applied to material objects, the face of which imdergoes a lasting change, as the print- ing Tna,de on paper or wood; impression is more commonly appUed to such natural objects as are particularly soMd; stamp is generally applied to Eaper or stiU softer and more yielding odies. Impression and stamp have both a moral apphcation: events or speeches make an impression on the mind; things bear a certain stamp which bespeaks their origin. Where the passions have obtained an ascen- dency, the occasional good im-pressions which are produced by reUgious ob- servances but too frequently die away; the Christian rehgion carries with it- self the stamp of truth. Mark, Sign, Note, S'ymptom, Token, Indication. — Mark (see above). Sign, in Latin signum, signifies the thing that points out. Symptom, in Latin symp- toma, Greek avpi-nTi>)fia, from iriwritv, to fall out in accordance, signifies what presents itself to confirm one's opinion. Token (see Betoken). Indication, in Latin indicatio, from indicare, to point out, signifies the thing which points out. The idea of an external object which serves to direct the observer is com- mon to all these terms; the difi'erence consists in the objects that are em- ployed. Anything may serve as a mark, a stroke, a dot, a stick set up, and the hke; it serves simply to guide the senses; the sign is something more complex; it consists of a figure or representation of some object, as the twelve signs of the zodiac, or the signs which are affixed to houses of enter- tertainment, or to shops. Marks are arbitrary; every one chooses his mark at pleasure: signs have commonly a connection with the object that is to be observed: a house, a tree, a letter, or any external object may be chosen as a mark: but a tobacconist chooses the sign of a redman; the innkeeper chooses the head of the reigning prince. Marks serve in general simply to aid the memory in distinguishing the situa- tion of objects or the particular cir- cumstances of persons or things, as the marks which are set up in a garden to distinguish the ground that is oc- cupied; they may, therefore, be pri- vate and known only to the individ- ual that makes them, as the private marks by which a tradesman distin- guishes his prices: they may Hkewise be changeable and fluctuating, accord- ing to the humor and convenience of the maker, as the private marks which are employed by the mihtary on guard. Signs, on the contrary, serve to direct the imderstanding; they have either a natural or an artificial resemblance to the object to be represented; they are consequently chosen, not by the wiU of one, but by the universal con- sent of a body; they are not chosen for the moment, but for a permanency, as in the case of language, either oral or written, in the case of the zodiacal signs, or the signs of the cross, the algebraical signs, and the Uke. It is clear, therefore, that many objects may be both a mark and a sign, ac- cording to the above illustration: the cross which is employed in books, by way of reference to notes, is a mark only, because it serves merely to guide the eye or assist the memory; but the figure of the cross, when employed in reference to the cross of our Saviour, is a sign, inasmuch as it conveys a dis- tinct idea of something else to the mind; so Ukewise little strokes over letters, or even letters themselves, may merely be -marks, while they point out only a dif- ference between this or that letter, this or that object; but this same stroke becomes a sign if, as in the first de- clension of Latin nouns, it is a sign of the ablative case; and a single letter af- fixed to different parcels is merely a mark so long as it simply serves this purpose; but the same letter, or suppose MARK 497 it were a word, is a sign when it is used as a sign. A mark may be something accidental, and mean nothing; but a sign is that to which a meaning is al- ways given: there may be marks on a wall occasioned by the elements or otherwise, but a sign is always the sign of something : a mark, if it consist of a sensible object, is only visible, but signs may be the object of hearing, smell, or any other sense: many things, therefore, may be signs which are not marks; when words are spoken and not written they are signs and not marks; and in like manner, the cross made on the forehead of a child in baptism is a sign, but not a mark. When mark and sign are both taken to denote something by which one forms a judgment, the former serves either to denote that which has been or which is, the latter to designate that which is or wiU be, as persons bear the marks of age, or the marks of violence; or we may judge by the marks of a per- son's foot that some one has been walk- ing in a particular place; hoarseness is a sign that a person has a cold ; when mariners meet with certain birds at sea, they consider them as a sign that land is near at hand. So likewise in appUcation to moral objects or matters of a purely intel- lectual nature; as a mark of honor, or a mark of distinction; an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. So Ukewise in appUcation to objects which serve as characteristics of the person, the mark illustrates the spring of the action I the sign shows the state of the mmd or sentiments; it is a Tnark of foUy or weakness in a man to yield himself implicitly to the guid- ance of an interested friend; tears are not always a sign of repentance. Note is rather a sign than a mark; but it is properly the sign which con- sists of marks, as a note of admira- tion ( !) ; or, in the moral sense, the sign by which the object is knowTi; as per- sons of note, that is, which have a note upon them, or that by which they are known. Symptom is rather a mark than a sign; it explains the cause or origin of complaints by the appearances they assimie, and is employed as a technical term only in the science of medicine: as a foaming at the mouth and an ab- horrence of drink are symptoms of canine madness; motion and respira- tion are signs of life; but it may like- wise be used figuratively in appUcar tion to moral objects. Token is a species of mark in the moral sense, indication a species of sign: a mark shows what is, a token serves to keep in mind what has been: a gift to a friend is a mark of one's affection and esteem: if it be perma- nent in its nature it becomes a token; friends who are in close intercourse have perpetual opportunities of show- ing each other marks of their regard by reciprocal acts of comtesy and kindness; when they separate for any length of time they commonly leave some token of their tender sentiments in each other's hands, as a pledge of what shall be as well as an evidence of what has been. Sign, as it respects indication, is said in abstract and general propositions: indication itself is employed only for the sign given by any individual; it bespeaks the act of the persons: but the sign is only the face or appearance of the thing. When a man does not hve consistently with the profession which he holds, it is a sign that his reUgion is built on a wrong foundation; parents are gratified when they ob- eerve the slightest indications of genius or goodness in their children. Mark, Trace, Vestige, Footstep, Track. — The word mark has already been considered at large in the preceding article, but it will admit of further illustration when taken in the sense of that which is visible, and serves to \ show the existing state of things; mark is here, as before, the most gen- eral and unqualified term; the other terms varjnng in the circumstances or manner of the mark. Trace, Middle French tracer, to follow, comes ulti- mately from Latin trahere, to drag. Vestige, in Latin vestigium, signifies, literally, a print of the foot. Footstep is taken for the place in which the foot has stepped, or the mark made by that step. Track, French trac, a beaten way, comes from a Teutonic verb meaning to scrape or shove. The mark is said of a fresh and un- 498 MARK interrupted line: the trace is said of that which is broken by time: a car- riage in driving along the sand leaves marks of the wheels, but in a short time all traces of its having been there will be lost; a mark is produced by the action of bodies on one another in every possible form; the spilling of a Uquid may leave a mark on the floor; the blow of a stick leaves a Tnark on the body; but the trace is a mark pro- duced only by bodies making a progress or proceeding in a continued course: the ship that cuts the waves and the bird that cuts the air leave no trace of their course behind; so men pass their Hves, and after death leave no traces that they ever were. The vestige is a species of mark or trace caused by the feet of men, or, which is the same thing, by the works of active industry; as the vestige of buildings: there are traces of the Roman roads still visible in England; there are many vestiges of Roman temples in Italy. In an extended and moral apphca- tion they are similarly distinguished. The mark serves to denote as well that which is as that which has been; as marks of desolation, or marks of an- tiquity: trace and vestige show the re- mains of something that has been; the former in reference to matters of in- tellectual research generally, the latter in reference to that which has been built up or pulled down, as there are traces of a universal affinity in all known languages; there are vestiges of ancient customs in different parts of England. Footstep is employed only for the steps of an individual : the track is made by the steps of many; it is the line which has been beaten out or made by stamping: the footstep is now common- ly and properly employed only for men and brutes; but the track is ap- pUed to inanimate objects, as the wheel of a carriage. When Cacus took away the oxen of Hercules, he dragged them backward that they might not be traced by their footsteps: a track of blood from the body of a murdered man may sometimes lead to the detec- tion of the murderer. In the metaphorical apphcation they do not signify a mark, but a course of conduct; the former implies one's moral feehngs or mode of deahng; the latter one's mechanical and habitual manner of acting: the former is the consequence of having the same prin- ciples; the latter proceeds from imita- tion or constant repetition. A good son will walk in the footsteps of a good father. In the management of busi- ness, it is rarely wise in a young man to leave the track which has been marked out for him by his superiors in age and experience. Mark, Badge, Stigma. — Mark is still the general and the two others specific terms; they are employed for what- ever serves to characterize persons ex- ternally, or betoken any part either of their character or circimistances: mark is employed either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; badge in an indifferent one; stigma in a bad sense: a thing may either be a mark of honor, of disgrace, or of simple distinction; a badge is a mark simply of distinction ; the stigma is a mark of disgrace. The mark is that which is conferred upon a person for his merits, as medals, stars, and ribbons are bestowed by princes upon meritorious officers and soldiers; or the Tnark attaches to a person, or is affixed to him, in conse- quence of his demerits; as a low situa- tion in his class is a mark of disgrace to a scholar; or a fool's cap is a mark of ignominy affixed to idlers and dunces; or a brand in the forehead is a mark of ignominy for criminals: the badge is that which is voluntarily as- siuned by one's self according to estab- lished custom; it consists of dress by which the office, station, and even re- ligion of a particular community is dis- tinguished: as the gown and wig are the badge of the legal profession; the gown and surphce that of clerical men : the imiform of charity children is the badge of their condition; the peculiar habit of the Quakers, or the Friends, is the badge of their religion : the stigma consists not so much of what is openly imposed upon a person as what falls upon him in the judgment of others; it is the black mark which is set upon a person by the pubhc, and is conse- quently the strongest of all marks, and one which every one most dreads and every good man seeks least to deserve. Mark, Butt. — The word mark has this additional meaning in common with MARRIAGE 499 the word btUt, that it unplies an object aimed at: the mark is hterally a mark that is said to be shot at by the marks- man with a gun or a bow. It is also metaphorically employed for the man who by his peculiar char- acteristics makes himself the object of notice; he is the mark at which every one's looks and thoughts are directed: the butt, derived through French from an Old Low German word meaning to beat, allied to EngUsh beat, is a species of mark in this metaphorical sense; but the former calls forth only general observation, the latter provokes the laughter and jokes of every one. Who- ever renders himself conspicuous by his eccentricities, either in his opinions or his actions, must not complain if he become a mark for the derision of the pubUc : it is a man's misfortvme rather than his fault if he become the butt of a company who are rude and unfeel- ing enough to draw their pleasures from another's pain. Mark, Note, Notice. — Mark is here taken in the intellectual sense, fixing as it were a mark upon a thing so as to keep it in mind, which is in fact to fix one's attention upon it in such a manner as to be able to distinguish it by its characteristic quahties: to mark is therefore altogether an intellectual act: to note has the same end as that of marking, namely, to aid the mem- ory, but one notes a thing by making a written note of it; this is therefore a mechanical act: to notice, on the other hand, from notitia, knowledge, is a conscious operation, signifying to bring to one's Imowledge, perception, or understanding by the use of our senses. We mark and note that which particularly interests us: the former is that which serves a present purp>ose; notice that which may be of use in future. The impatient lover marks the hours imtil the time arrives for meet- ing his mistress: travellers note what- ever strikes them of importance to be remembered when they return home: notice, which is a species of noting in small matters, may serve either for the present or the future; we may notice things merely by way of amusement, as a child will notice the actions of animals; or we may notice a thing for the sake of bearing it in mind, as a person notices a particular road when he wishes to return by the same way. See also Show. MARKSMAN. See Shabpshooteb. MARRIAGE, Wedding, Nuptials. Marriage, from to marry, denotes the act of marrying; wedding and nuptials denote the ceremony of being married. To marry is based on Latin maritus, from a root found also in masculine, sig- nifying a man, and means to be joined to a male; hence marriage compre- hends the act of choosing and being legally bound to a man or a woman; wedding, from wed, and the Anglo- Saxon weddian, to promise or betroth, implies the ceremony of marrying, in- asmuch as it is binding upon the parties. Nuptials comes ultimately from nupta, participle of the Latin nubere, to veil, because the Roman ladies were veiled at the time of mar- riage: hence it has been put for the whole ceremony itself. Marriage is an institution which, by those who have been blessed with the hght of Divine Revelation, has always been considered as sacred: with some persons, particu- larly among the lower orders of society, the day of their wedding is converted into a day of riot and intemperance: among the Roman CathoUcs in Eng- land it has been the practice to have their nuptials solemmzed by a priest of their own persuasion as well as by the Protestant clergyman. It is customary among many Itahans in the United States to have a civil marriage first and a rehgious one later, the couple hving apart in the interval. Marriage, Matrimony, Wedlock. — Marriage is oftener an act than a state: matrimony and wedlock both describe states. Marriage is taken in the sense of an act when we speak of the laws of mar- riage, the day of one's marriage, the congratulations upon one's Tnarriage, a happy or unhappy marriage, the fruits of one's marriage, and the like; it is taken in the sense of a state when we speak of the pleasures or pains of marriage; but m this latter case matrimony, which signifies a married life abstractedly from all agents ot acting persons, is preferable; so like- wise, to think of matrimony, and to enter into the holy state of matrimony, 500 MARTIAL are expressions foiinded upon the sig- nification of the tenn. As matrimony is derived from mater, a mother, be- cause married women are in general mothers, it has particular reference to the domestic state of the two parties; broils are but too frequently the fruits of matrimony, yet there are few cases in which they might not be obviated by the good sense of those who are engaged in them. Hasty mnrriages cannot be expected to produce happi- ness; young people who are eager for matrimony before they are fully aware of its consequences will purchase their experience at the expense of their peace. Wedlock is the Old EngHsh word for matrimony, and is in con- sequence admitted in law, when one speaks of children bom in wedlock; conformably to its derivation, it has a reference to the bond of union which follows the marriage: hence one speaks of hving happily in a state of wedlock, of being joined in holy wedlock. MARTIAL, Warfare, Warlike, Military, Soldier -like. Martial, from Mars, the god of war, is the Latin term for belonging to war: warlike signifies, hterally, like war (Old French werre. Modem French giierre, from Old High German werra, broil, confusion, aUied to EngHsh worse). In sense these terms approach so near to each other that they may be easily ad- mitted to supply each other's place; but custom, the lawgiver of language, has assigned an office to each that makes it not altogether indifferent how they are used. Warfare, from war and the Anglo- Saxon verb faran, modern fare, to go, means an expedition of war; hence is the carrying on of war, either by land or sea or both. It is also improperly ap- pUed to strife between poUtical and other factions. Martial is both a tech- nical and a more comprehensive term than warlike; on the other hand, war- like designates the temper of the indi- vidual more than martial: we speak of martial array, martial preparations, martial law, a court martial; but of a warlike nation, meaning a nation which is fond of war; a warlike spirit or tem- per, also a warlike appearance, inasmuch as the temper is visible in the air and carriage of a man. Military, from miles, signifies belonging to a soldier, and soldier-like, like a soldier {soldier being derived from Late Latin soldum, pay, from solidus, originally an adjective meaning hard; then "hard cash" or money, and signifying originally one who fights for money). Military, in comparison with martial, is a term of particular import, martial having al- ways a reference to war in general: and military to the proceedings con- sequent upon that : hence we speak of military in distinction from naval, as military expeditions, military move- ments, and the Uke; but in character- izing the men we should say that they had a martial appearance; but of a particular place that it had a military appearance, if there were many sol- diers. Military, compared with sol- dier-like, is used for the body, and the latter for the individual. The whole army is termed the military: the con- duct of an individual is soldier-like or otherwise. MARVEL. See Wonder. MASK. See Cloak. MASSACRE. See Carnage. MASSAGE. See Press. ' MASSIVE. See Bulky. MASTER. See Possessor. MATCH. See Tally. MATERIAL. See Corporal; Tan- gible. MATRIMONY. See Marriage. MATTER, Materials, Subject. Matter and materials are both derived from the same source, namely, the Latin materia, stuff for building. Sub- ject, in Latin subjectum, participle of svbicere, to he under, signifies the thing lying under and forming the founda- tion. Matter, in the physical appMcation, is taken for all that composes the sensible world, in distinction from that which is spiritual or discernible only by the thinking faculty; hence matter is al- ways opposed to mind. In regard to materials, it is taken in an indivisible as weU as a general sense; the whole universe is said to be composed of matter, though not of materials: on the other hand, materials consist of those particular parts of matter which serve for the artificial production of objects; and matter is said of those things which are the natural parts of the universe: a house, a table, and a chair consist MEAN 501 of materials, because they are works of art; but a plant, a tree, an animal body, consist of matter, because they are the productions of nature. The distinction of these terms in their moral appUcation is very similar; the matter which composes a moral dis- course is what emanates from the author; but the materials are those with which one is furnished by others. The style of some writers is so indif- ferent that it disgraces the matter by the maimer; periodical writers are fiunished with materials for their productions by the daily occurrences in the poUtical and moral world. Writers of dictionaries endeavor to compress as much matter as possible into a small space; they draw their materials from everv other writer. ilfo/ier seems to bear the same rela- tion to subject as the whole does to any particular part: the svbject is the groimdwork of the matter; the matter is that which derives from the subject: the matter is that which we get by the force of invention; the subject is that which offprs itself to notice: many per- sons may, therefore, have a svbject who have no matter, that is, nothing in their own minds which they can offer by way of illustrating this subject: but it is not possible to have matter without a subject; hence the word matter is taken for the substance and for that which is substantial; the subject is taken for that which engages the at- tention: we OT)eak of a svbject of con- versation and matter for deUberation; a subject of inquiry, a matter of curiosity. Nations in a barbarous state afford but httle matter worthy to be recorded in history; people who Uve a secluded life and in a contracted sphere have but few svbjects to occupy their atten- tion. MATURE. See Ripe. MAXIM, Precept, Rule, Law. Maxim (see Axiom) is a moral truth that carries its own weight with itself. Precept (see Command), rule (see Guide), and law (see Lawful), sig- nifying the thing laid down, all borrow their weight from some external cir- cumstance: the precept derives its au- thority from the individual delivering it; in this manner the precepts of our Saviour have a weight which gives them a decided superiority over every- thing else: the rule acquires a worth from its fitness for guiding us in our proceeding: the law, which is a species of rvie; derives its weight from the sanc- tion of power. Maxims are often pre- cepts, inasmuch as they are communi- cated to us by our parents; they are rules, inasmuch as they serve as a rule for our conduct; they are laws, inas- much as they have the sanction of con- science. We respect the maxims of antiquity as containing the essence of human wisdom; we reverence the pre- cepts of religion as the foundation of all happiness; we regard the rules of pru- dence as preserving us from errors and misfortunes; we respect the laws aa they are the support of civil society. MAY. See Can. MAZE. See Labyrinth. MEAGRE, See Lean. MEAN, PITIFUL, Sordid. For the derivation of these words see Low, for mean; Pity for pitiful; and Bare for sordid. The moral application of these terms to the characters of men, in their transactions with one another, is what constitutes their common signification. Whatever a man does in common with those below him is mean; it evinces a temper that is prone to sink rather than to rise in the scale of society: whatever makes him an object of pity, and con- sequently of contempt for his de- graded character, makes him pitiful: whatever makes him grovel and crawl, intent on low, vile aims, is sordid, from the Latin sorde^, dirty. Mean- ness is in many cases only relatively bad as it respects the disposal of our property: for instance, what is mean- ness in one might be generosity or prudence in another: the due estimate of circumstances is allowable in all, but it is meanness for any one to at- tempt to save, at the expense of others, that which he can conveniently afford either to give or pay: hence an undue spirit of seeking gain or advantage for one's self to the detriment of others is denominated a mean temper: it is mean for a gentleman to do that for himself which according to his cir- cumstances he might get another to do for him. Piiifidness goes farther than meanness: it is not merely that which d^rades, but unmans the person; it is 502 MEAN that which is weak as well as low: when the fear of evil or the love of gain prompts a man to sacrifice his char- acter and forfeit his veracity he be- comes truly pitifui; BUfil in Tom Jones is the character whom all pro- nounce to be pitiful. Sordidness is pe- culiarly apphcable to one's love of gain; although of a more corrupt, yet it is not of so degrading a nature as the former two: the sordid man does not deal in trifles like the mean man; and has nothing so low and weak in him as the pitiful man. A continual habit of getting money will engender a sordid love of it in the hvunan mind; but nothing short of a degraded character leads a man to be pitifvJ. We dislike a mean man: we hold a pitiful man in profound contempt: we hate a sordid man. Meanness de- scends to that which is insignificant and worthless: pilifulness sinks into that which is despicable : sordidness con- taminates the mind with what is foul. See also Base; Common; Design; Low. MEAN, Medium. Mean, as here used, is but a contraction of medium, , which signifies in Latin the middle path. The term mean is used ab- stractedly in all speculative matters: there is a mean in opinions between the two extremes: this mean is doubtless the point nearest to truth. Medium is employed in practical matters; com- putations are often erroneous from be- ing too high or too low; the medium is in this case the one most to be preferred. The moralist will always recommend the mean in all opinions that widely differ from each other: our passions always recommend to us some ex- travagant conduct either of insolent resistance or mean comphance; but discretion recommends the medium or middle course in such matters. MEANING. See Signification. MEANS. See Way. MECHANIC. See Artist. MEDDLE. See Intermeddle, un- der Intercede. MEDDLESOME. See Pragmati- cal. MEDIATE. See Arbitrate; In- tercede. MEDIOCRITY. See Moderation. MEDITATE. See Contemplate. MEDIUM. See Mean. MEDLEY. See Difference; Mixt- ure. MEEK. See Soft. MEET. See Fit. MEETING, Interview. Meeting, from to meet, is the act of meeting or coming into the company of any one: interview, compounded of inter, be- tween, and view, to view, is a personal view of each other. A meeting is an ordinary concern, and its purpose fa- miUar; meetings are daily taking place between friends: an interview is ex- traordinary and formal; its object is commonly business; an interview sometimes takes place between princes or commanders of armies. See also Assembly. MELANCHOLIC. See Hypochon- driacal. MELANCHOLY. See Dejection; Splenetic. MELODY, Harmony, Accordance. Melody, from Greek fieXtfjcia, from Greek /xeXoc, a song, and vSi), a song, signifies something intended to be sung. Harmony, in Latin harmonta, Greek apfiovia, concord, from ap/xoc, a joining, signifies the agreement of sounds. Ac- cordance denotes the act or state of ac- cording (see Agree). Melody signifies any measured or modulated sounds measured after the manner of verse into distinct members or parts; harmony signifies the suiting or adapting different modulated sounds to one another; melody is therefore to harmony as a part to the whole: we must first produce melody by the rules of art; the harmony which follows must be regulated by the ear: there may be melody without harmony, but there cannot be harmony without melody: we speak of simple melody where the modes of music are not very much diversified; but we cannot speak of harmony unless there be a variety of notes to fall in with one another. A voice is melodious, inasmuch as it is capable of producing a regularly modu- lated note; it is harmonious, inasmuch as it strikes agreeably on the ear and produces no discordant sounds. The song of a bird is melodious or has melody in it, inasmuch as there is a combina- tion of sounds in it which are admitted to be regular, and consequently agree- MEMORY 503 able to the musical ear; there is har- mony in a concert of voices and instru- ments. Accordance is, strictly speak- ing, the property on which both melody and harmony are founded; for the whole of music depends on an accordance of soimds. The same distinction marks accordance and harmony in the moral appUcation. There may be occasional accordance of opinion or feeling; but harmony is an entire accordance in every point. MEMBER, Limb. Member is the Latin term, from membrum, and limb the corresponding native EngUsh term from a root signifying a joint. Member is a general term applied either to the animal body or to other bodies, as a member of a family, or a member of a community: limb is ap- pKcable to animal bodies; Zimi is there- fore a species of member; for every limb is a member, but every member is not a limb. The members of the body com- prehend every part which is capable of performing a distinct office; but the limbs are those jointed members that are distinguished from the head and the body: the nose and the eyes are members, but not limbs; the arms and legs are properly denominated limbs. MEMOIRS. See Anecdotes. MEMORABLE. See Signal. MEMORIAL. See Monument. MEMORY, Remembrance, Recol- LEcnoN, Reminiscence. The same root, in Latin memor, mindful, memini, I remember, etc., is found in three of these words — memory, remember, and reminiscence. Re, in remember and reminiscence, signifies again — to call to mind again being the meaning of the words. Recollection, from re and collect (Latin con and legere, to bring to- gether), signifies to bring together in the mind again. Memory is the power of recalling images once made on the mind; re- mernbrance, recollection, and reminis- cence are operations or exertions of this power which vary in their mode. The memory is a power which exerts itself either, independently of the will or in conformity with the will; but all the other temis express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the memory exerts it- self, but we do not say that we have any remembrance or recollection of ob- jects. Remembrance is the exercise of memory in a conscious agent; it may be the effect of repetition or habit, aa in the case of a child who remembers his lesson after having learned it several times; or of a horse who remembers the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind, as happens to in- telligent beings continually as they exercise their thinking faculties. In these cases remembrance is an involun- tary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name and remembers that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a- particular tree, re- members all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree. Remembrarux is, however, likewise a volimtary act, ana the con- sequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to remember what it has been told by its parent, or of a friend who remembers the hour of meeting another friend in consequence of the interest which it has excited in his mind: experience teaches us, indeed, that scarcely any- thing in ordinary cases is more under the subservience of the will than the memory; for it is now become almost a maxim to say that one may remember whatever one wishes. The power of memory, and the aim- pie exercise of that f)ower in the act of remembering, are possessed in com- mon, though in different degrees, by man and animal; but recollection and reminiscence are exercises of the mevir ory that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judgment and understanding. To remernber is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to recollect IS to remember afresh, to remember what has been remembered before, to recall with an effort what may have been forgotten. Remembrarux busies itself with objects that are at hand; recol- lection carries us back to distant peri- ods: simple remembrance is engaged in things that have but just left the mind, I 504 MENACE which are more or less easily recalled, and more or less faithfiUly repre- sented; but recollection tries to re- trace the faint images of things that have been so long imthought of as to be almost obUterated from the mem- ory. In this manner we are said to remember in one half-hour what was told us in the preceding half-hour, or to remember what passes from one day to another; but we recollect the inci- dents of childhood; we recollect what happened in our native place after many years' absence from it. Remem- brance is that homely, every-day exer- cise of the memory which renders it of essential service in the acquirement of knowledge or in the performance of one's duties; recollection is that exalted exercise of the memxyry which affords us the purest of enjoyments and serves the noblest of purposes; the recollec- tion of all the minute incidents of child- hood is a more sincere pleasure than any which the present moment can afford. Reminiscence is altogether an ab- stract exercise of the memory, which is employed on purely intellectual ideas in distinction from those which are awakened by sensible objects: the mathematician makes use of reminis- cence in deducing unknown truths from those which he already knows. Remi- niscence among the disciples of Socrates was the remembrance of things purely intellectual, or of that natural knowl- edge which the souls had had before their union with the body; while the memory was exercised upon sensible things, or that knowledge which was acquired through the medium of the senses. Reminiscence, in its familiar application, signifies any event or cir- cumstance long past, which is brought or comes to the mind, and which is usually of a pleasurable nature. The Latins said that reminiscence be- longed exclusively to man because it was purely intellectual, but that mem- ory was common to all animals because it was merely the terminal point of the senses. That divine, though pagan philosopher, the high-winged Plato, fan- cied that our souls were at the first in- fusion abrasce tabulce, and that all our future knowledge was but a reminis- cence. MENACE. See Thkeat. MEND. See Amend. MENIAL, See Servant. MENTAL, Intellectual, Intelli- gent. There is the same difference between mental and intellectual as be- tween mind and intellect: the mind comprehends the thinking faculty in general, with aU its operations; the intellect includes only that part of it which consists of understanding and judgment: mental is therefore opposed to corporeal; intellectual is opposed to sensual or physical: mental exertions are not to be expected from all; in- tellectual enjoyments fall to the lot of comparatively few. Objects, pleas- ures, pains, operations, gifts, etc., are denominated mental; subjects, con- versation, pursuits, and the Uke are entitled intellectual. It is not always easy to distinguish our mental pleasm-es from those corporeal pleasm-es which we enjoy in common with animals; the latter are, however, greatly height- ened by the former in whatever degree they are blended: in a society of well- informed persons, the conversation wiU timi principally on intelleduxd sub- jects. Intelligent, from intelligens, imder- standing or knowing, is a characteristic of the person: an intelligent being or an inteUigence denotes a being purely spiritual or abstracted from matter. When appHed to individuals, it de- notes having a quick understanding of things, as an intelligent child. MENTION, Notice. Mention, from mens, mind, signifies here to bring to mind. Notice (see Mark). These terms are synonymous only inasmuch as they imply the act of calling things to another person's mind. We men- tion a thing in direct terms: we notice it indirectly or in a casual manner; we mention that which may serve as information; we notice that which may be merely of a personal or incidental nature. One friend mentions to an- other what has passed at a particular meeting: in the course of conversation he notices or calls to the notice of his companion the badness of the road, the wideness of the street, or the hke. MERCANTILE, Commercial. Both mercantile and commercial come from Latin merx, pay, salable goods. MINDFUL 505 Mercantile, from the same source, sig- nifies the actual transaction of business, or a transfer of merchandise by sale or purchase; commercial comprehends the theory and practice of commerce: hence we speak in a pecuUar manner of a mercantile house, a mercantile town, a mercantile situation, and the like; but of a commercial education, a commercial people, cowmeroaZ speculations, and the Mke. MERCENARY. See Hireling; Venal,. MERCIFUL. See Gracious. MERCY. See Clemency; Pity. MERGE, Combine, Include, Unite. These words all signify the union of two or more things, but they differ in the closeness of the union and the character of the image under which it is suggested. Merge, from Latin mergere, to sink into water, to dip, signifies the closest union — the absolute swallowing up of one thing by another. Include suggests a similar idea — from Latin in, in, and clavdere, to close — signifying to enclose. Merge, however, suggests more clearly the loss of iden- tity of the thing merged or swallowed up, and is a stronger word. Unite, from Latin unire, based on units, one, signifies to make one; it differs in the relation impKed between the two or more objects. The lesser can only be included or merged in the greater. Two equal things may be united. Combine (see Association and Connect) signi- fies a relation that is not so close as that indicated in unite — as is explained in the article oir Connect. MERRIMENT. See Glee. MERRY. See Lively. MERRY-ANDREW, See Zany. MESSAGE, Errand. Message, from the Latin missus, participle of mittere, to send, and a suffix, signifies the thing sent. Errand comes from Anglo-Saxon aerende, a message. The message is properly any commu- nication which is conveyed; the errand on which one person sends another is that which causes one to go: servants are the bearers of messages, and are sent on various errands. A message may be either verbal or written; an errand is limited to no form and to no circum- stance: one dehvers the message, and goes the errand. Sometimes the mes- sage may be the errand, and the errand may include the message: when that which is sent consists of a notice or intimation to another, it is a message; and if that causes any one to go to a place, it is an errand: thus it is that the greater part of errands consists of sending messages from one person to another. METAMORPHOSE. See Trans- figure. METAPHOR. See Figure. METHOD. See Order; System; Way. MILITARISM, Militancy, Mili- tary, Militant. Militarism and mili- tancy both come from Latin miles, a soldier, but they differ in their appU- cation. Militarism, and its corre- sponding adjective, signify the state of being under arms and prepared to engage in war. It refers to formal and governmental preparation for war. Militancy, and its adjective militant, signify merely the general disposition to fight for a cause, and may have nothing to do with the actual science of warfare. A militant individual is one who is ready to fight, either physically or with the pen or the tongue, for his cause; a military man is a man who is or has been a part of a regularly con- stituted army. See also PnEPARErxESS. MIMIC. See Imii vte. MINARET. See 1'urret. MIND. See Attend; Soul. MINDFUL, Regardful, Observ- ant. Mindful signifies that which we wish from others; regardful that which in itself demands regard or serious thought, particularly what re- gards the interests and feelings of others; observant implies both that which is communicated by others and that which carries its own obligations with itself: a child should always be mindful of its parents' instructions; they should never be forgotten: every one should be regardful of his several duties and obligations; they ought never to be neglected: one ought to be observant of the reUgious duties which one's profession enjoins upon him; they cannot with propriety be passed over. By being mindful of what one hears from the wise ancf good, one learns to be wise and good; oy being 506 MINGLE regardful of what is due to one's self and to society at large, one learns to pass through the world with satisfac- tion to one's own mind and esteem from others; by being observant of all rule and order, we afford to others a salutary example for their imitation. MINGLE. See Mix. MINISTER, Agent. Minister comes from miniis, less, as magister comes from magis, more, the one being less, and the other more, than others: the minister, therefore, is hteraUy one who acts in a subordinate capacity; and the agent (from ago, to act) is the one who takes the acting part: they both perform the will of another, but the minister performs a higher part than the agent: the minister gives his counsel and exerts his intellectual powers in the service of another, but the agent executes the orders or com- missions given him: a minister is em- ployed by government in pohtical affairs; an agent is employed by indi- viduals in commercial and pecuniary affairs, or by government in subordi- nate matters: a minister is received at court and serves as a representative for his government; an agent generally acts under the directions of the minister or some office of government: ambas- sadors or plenipotentiaries or the first officers of the state are ministers; but those who regulate the affairs respect- ing prisoners, the poUce, and the hke are termed agents. A minister always holds a pubhc character and is in the service of the state; the agent may be acting only for another individual, as a commercial agent. See also Clergyman. Minister, Administer, Contribute. — To minister, from the noun minister, in the sense of a servant, signifies to act in subservience to another, and may be taken either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense, as to minister to the spiritual wants or to minister to another's caprices and indulgences when we encourage them imneces- sarily. Administer, that is^ to minis- ter for a specific pm-pose, is taken in the good sense of serving another to his advantage: thus the Good Samari- tan administered to the comfort of the man who had fallen among thieves. ContribiUe (see Conduce) is taken in either a good or bad sense; we may contribute to the relief of the indigent or we may contribuie to the foUies and vices of others. Princes are sometimes placed in the unfortunate situation that those who should direct them in early Hfe only minister to their vices by every means in their power: it is the part of the Christian to administer comfort to those who are in want, consolation to the afflicted, advice to those who are feeble, and support to those who cannot uphold themselves: it is the part of aU who are in high stations to contribute to the dissemina- tion of rehgion and morality among their dependents; but there are, on the contrary, many who contribute to the spread of immorahty and a con- tempt of aU sacred things by the most pernicious example of irreligion in themselves. MINUTE. See Atomic; Circum- stantial. MIRACLE. See Wonder. MIRTH, Merriment, Joviality, Jollity, Hilarity. These terms all express that species of gayety or joy which belongs to company, or to men in their social intercourse. Mirth re- fers to the f eeHng displayed in the out- ward conduct : merriment and the other terms refer rather to the external ex- pressions of the feeling, or the causes of the feeUng, than to the feehng itself: mirth shows itself in laughter, in danc- ing, singing, and noise; merriment con- sists of such things as are apt to excite mirth: the more we are disposed to laugh the greater is our mirth; the more there is to create laughter the greater is the merriment: the tricks of Punch and his wife and the jokes of a clown cause much mirth among the gaping crowd of rustics; the amuse- ments with the swing or the merry- go-roimd afford much merriment to the visitants of a fair. Mirth is confined to no age or station; but merriment belongs more particularly to yoimg people or those of the lower station; mirth may be provoked wherever any number of persons is assembled; merri- ment cannot go forward anywhere so properly as at fairs or pubhc places. Joviality or jollity, and hilarity, are species of merriment which belong to the convivial hoard: joviality or jollity MIX 507 may accompany the pleasures of the table or any social entertainments; hilarity is the same thing qualified by the cultivation and good sense of the company; we may expect to find much joviality and joUity at a pubUc dinner of plain people; we may expect to find hilarity at a pubUc diimer of gentle- men: eating, drinking, and noise con- stitute the joviality; the conversation, the songs, the toasts, and the pubUc spirit of the company contribute to hilarity. See also Festivity; Glee; Joy. MISANTHROPICAL, Cynical. Misanthropical and cynical both indi- cate a hostile attitude to mankind in general. Misanthropical, from Greek fii(juv, to hate, and dvGpioirog, man, means hating mankind . Cynical comes from Greek KvviKog, which originally meant doglike, currish, snappish, and was the designation of a sect of Greek philosophers who affected to disbeheve in human goodness. Misanthropical imphes a morbid psychological condi- tion— often a nervous horror or fear of others, which has some definite ex- ternal cause. Cynical indicates an in- tellectual attitude — a disbeUef in the goodness of others, and a consequent tendency to sneer. The misanthrope makes himself miserable; the cynic makes others miserable. The misanthropical man separates himself from the rest of human society; the cynical man moves among men sneering. Cynicism is often a char- acteristic of men of the world who have seen much of the shams and self- ishness of society. The misanthropical man is often one who has suffered from some great shock to his belief in human nature. MISCARRIAGE. See Failure. MISCELLANY. See Mixture. MISCHANCE. See Calamity. MISCHIEF. See Evil; Injury; Scathe. MISCONSTRUE, Misinterpret. Misconstrue and misinterpret signify to explain in a wrong way; but the former connotes the sense of one's words or the application of one's actions: those who indulge themselves in a hght mode of speech toward children are liable to be misconstrued; a too great tenderness to the criminal may be easily misinter- preted in favor of the crime. These words may hkewise be employed in speaking of language in general; but the former implies the literal trans- mission of foreign ideas into our nar tive language; the latter the general sense which one affixes to any set of words, either in a native or foreign language: the learners of a language will imavoidably misconstrue it at times; in all languages there are am- biguous expressions which are liable to misinterpretations. Misconstruing is the consequence of ignorance; misin- terpretaiions of particular words are oftener the consequence of prejudice and voluntary blindness, particularly in the explanation of the law or of the Scriptures. MISDEED. See Offence. MISDEMEANOR. See Crime; Op- fence. MISERABLE. See Unhappy. MISERLY. See Avaricious. MISFORTUNE. See CAi^tMiTy; Evil. MISHAP. See Calamfty. MISINTERPRET. See Miscon- strue. MISMANAGE. See Bunqle. MISS. See Lose. MISTAKE. See Erroe. MISUSE. See Abuse. MITIGATE. See Allay. MIX, Mingle, Blend, CoNiix>UND. Mix is in Anglo-Saxon misdan, from Latin miscere, to intermingle. Mingle comes from Anglo-Saxon mengan, to mix, allied to among. Blend is a Scandinavian word meaning to mix together. Mix is here a general and indefinite term, signifying simply to put together: but we may mix two or several things; we mingle several objects: things are mixed so as to lose all distinction, but they may be mingled and yet retain a distinction: hquids mix so as to be- come one, and individuals mix in a crowd so as to be lost; things of different sizes are mingled together if they lie in the same spot, but they still may be distinguished. To blend is only partially to mix, as colors blend which fall into each other: to confound is to mix in a wrong way, as objects of sight are confounded when they are erroneously taken to be joined. To 508 MOAN mix and mingle are mostly applied to material objects, except in poetry; to blend and confound are mental opera- tions, and principally employed on spiritual subjects: thus, events and circumstances are blended together in a narrative; the ideas of the ignorant are confounded in most cases, but par- ticularly when they attempt to think for themselves. Mixture, Medley, Miscellany. — Mixt- v/re is the thing mixed. Medley comes from Old French medler, to mix or confuse. Miscellany, in Latin mis- cellaneus, from miscere, to mix, sig- nifies also a mixture. The term mixture is general; what- ever objects can be mixed wiU form a mixture: a medley is a mixture of things not fit to be mixed; and a miscellany is a mixture of many different things. Flour, water, and eggs may form a mixture in the proper sense, but if to these were added aU sorts of spices it would form a medley. Miscellany is a species appUcable only to intel- lectual subjects: the miscellaneous is opposed to that which is systematically arranged; essays are miscellaneous in distinction from works on one particu- lar subject. MOAN. See Groan; Wail. MOB. See People. MOBILITY. See People. MOCK. See Deride; Imitate. MODE. See Way. MODEL. See Copy. MODERATION, Mediocrity. Moderation (see Modesty) is the char- acteristic of persons; mediocrity (that is, the mean or medium) characterizes their condition: moderation is a virtue of no small importance for beings who find excess in everything to be an evil; mediocrity in external circumstances is exempt from all the evils which attend either poverty or riches. MODERN. See New. MODEST, Bashful, Diffident. Modest, in Latin modestus, from modus, a measure, signifies setting measm-e to one's estimate of one's self. Bashful signifies ready to be abashed (see Abash). Diffident (see Distrustfitl). Modesty is a habit or principle of the mind; bashfulness is a state of feeUng: modesty is at all times becoming; 6as/i- fulness is observed only in young girls or other young persons in the presence of their superiors: modesty discovers itself in the absence of everything assuming, whether in look, word, or action; bash- fulness betrays itself by a downcast look and a timid air: a modest deport- ment is always commendable; Si bashful temper is not desirable. Modesty is a proper distrust of our- selves; diffidence is a culpable distrust. Modesty, though opposed to assurance, is not incompatible with a confidence in ourselves; diffidence altogether un- mans a person and disquaUfies him for his duty: a person is generally modest in the display of his talents to others; but a diffident man cannot turn his talents to his own use. See also Humble. Modesty, Moderation, Temperance, Sobriety. — Modesty, in French modestie, Latin modestia, and moderation, in Latin moderatio, both come from modus, a measure, limit, or boundary, that is, forming a measure or rule. Temper- ance, in Latin temperantia, from tempus, time, signifies the observance of proper times and seasons — propriety, self- control. Sobriety (see Abstinent). Modesty hes in the mind and in the quality of feeUng; moderation in the desires: modesty is a principle that acts discretionally; moderation is a rule or Une that acts as a restraint on the views and the outward conduct: he who thinks modestly of his own acquire- ments, his own performances, and his own merits will be moderate in his ex- pectations of praise, reward, and rec- ompense; he, on the other hand, who overrates his own abilities and qualifi- cations will equall}' overrate the use he makes of them, and consequently be immoderate in the price which he sets upon his services: in such cases, there- fore, modesty and moderation are to each other as cause and effect; but there may be modesty without modera- tion, and moderation without modesty. Modesty is a sentiment confined to one's seK as the object, and consisting solely of one's judgment of what one is and what one does; but moderation, as is evident from the above, extends to ob- jects that are external of ourselves: modesty, rather than moderation, be- longs to an author; moderation, rather than modesty, belongs to a tradesman MOLLIFY 509 or a man who has gains to make and purposes to answer. Modesty shields a man from mortifi- cations and disappointments, which as- sail the self-conceited man in every direction: a modest man concihates the esteem even of an enemy and a rival. Moderation protects a man equally from injustice, on the one hand, and imposition, on the other: he who is moderate himself makes others so. Moderation is the measure of one's desires, one's habits, one's actions, and one's words; temperance is the adapta- tion of the time or season for particular feeUngs, actions, or words: a man is said to be moderate in his principles who adopts the medium or middle course of thinking; it rather quahfies the thing than the person: he is said to be temperate in his anger, if he does not suffer it to break out into any ex- cesses; temperance characterizes the person rather than the thing. A moderaie man in pohtics endeavors to steer clear of all party spirit, and is consequently so temperate in his lan- guage as to provoke no animosity. Moderation in the enjoyment of every- thing is essential in order to obtain the purest pleasure: temperance in one's indulgences is always attended with the happiest effects to the constitu- tion; as, on the contrary, any devia- tion from temperance, even in a single instance, is always punished with bodily pain and sickness. Temperance and sobriety have already been considered in their proper appUca- tion (see Abstinent), which will serve to illustrate their improper apphcation. Temperance is an action; it is the tem- pering of our words and actions to the circumstances: sobriety is a state in which one is exempt from every stimu- lus to deviate from the right course; as a man who is intoxicated with wine runs into excesses and loses that power of guiding himself which he has when he is sober or free from all intoxica- tion, so is he who is affected by any passion, in like manner, hurried away into irregularities which a man in his right senses will not be guilty of: sobriety is, therefore, the state of oeing in one's right or sober senses; and sobriety is, with regard to temperance, as a cause to the effect; sobriety of mind will not only produce moderation and temperance, but extend its in- fluence to the whole conduct of a man in every relation and circumstance, to his internal sentiments and his ex- ternal behavior: hence we speak of sobriety in one's mien or deportment, sobriety in one's dress and manners, sobriety in one's reUgious opinions and observances. Sober may also be ap- plied figuratively. MOISTURE, Humidity, Dampness. Moisture is a word of disputed origin. Humid comes from Latin humidtts, from the verb humere, to be moist. Damp- ness comes from the same root as the German dampf, a vapor. Moisture is used in general to express any small degree of infusion of a Uquid into a body; humidity is employed sci- entifically to describe the state of hav- ing any portion of such Uquid: hence we speak of the moisture of a table, the moisture of paper, or the moisture of a floor that has been wet; but of the humidity of the air or of a wall that has contracted moisture of itself. Dampness is that species of moisture that arises from the gradual contrac- tion of a Uquid in bodies capable of retaining it; in this manner a cellar is damp, or Unen that has lain long may become damp. MOLEST. See Inconvenience; Trouble. MOLLIFY, Appease,* Pacify, Soothe. These words ail mean to change from a state of wrath or dis- turbed emotion to one of peace. Mol- lify comes from Latin moUis, soft, ten- der, and a weak form of facere, to make. It signifies to make soft or mild. Appease comes from Old French a pais, Latin ad pacem, at peace, or rather to a state of peace. Modify, pacify (from Latin pax, peace, ana a weak form of facere. to make), and ap- pease differ from each other in t he degree of emotion suggested and the extent of the peace produced. To mollify is not so strong a word as to pacify, and to pacify does not suggest such dangeroua wrath as appease. Appease is used ee- pecially witn reference to persons or powers greater than ourselves. Men offered sacrifices in olden times to appease the gods; in the old fairy-talea beautiful maidens were offered as vio- 510 MOMENT tims to appease the voracity of dragons and sea-monsters, etc. Pacify suggests a less dangerovis anger or emotion. We appease the wrath that is dangerous to us; we pacify that which is merely- annoying or vexatious — as when we pacify a crying child. MoUify and soothe are more general expressions. To mollify is to make gentle that which was violent. To soothe, from Anglo- Saxon sooth, truth, meant to "say sooth" — ^to agree with or say "yes" to. Soothe is more suggestive of physical action than mollify. We may soothe a wound by the apphcation of heaUng salves, for instance, as weU as soothe a ruffled temper with gentle words. Mollify has only the moral application. Mollify impUes emotional excitement hostile to others which should be al- layed; soothe merely impUes any kind of disturbance. We mollify others for our own sakes; we soothe them for their own. MOMENT. See Importance; In- stant. MONAD, See Unit. MONARCH. See Prince. MONASTERY. See Cloister. MONEY, Cash. Money comes from the Latin moneta, a surname of Juno, in whose temple at Rome money was coined. Cash, from the French casse, a chest, signifies that which is put in a chest. Money is apphed to everything which serves as a circulating medium; cash is, in a strict sense, put for coin only: bank-notes are money; guineas and shillings are cash; all cash is therefore mxmey, but all maney is not cash. The only money the Chinese have are square bits of metal with a hole through the center by which they are strung upon a string: trav- ellers on the Continent must always be provided with letters of credit, which may be turned into cash, as convenience requires. MONOPLANE. See Aircraft. MONOPOLIZE, Absorb, Appro- priate, Engross. These words all mean to take complete or exclusive possession of something. Appropriate is the least emphatic. It comes from Latin ad, to, and proprius, one's own, and means to make completely one's own. Absorb (for derivation see Ab- sorb) goes further. It means not only to make one's own, but to swallow up entirely, so that the identity of the thing absorbed is lost. Engross and monopolize have similar meanings ex- pressed under commercial figures. En- gross is from the French en gros, in the gross, and means to buy up by the wholesale. Monopolize has a similar meaning. It comes from Greek /jlovoq and noATiv, to sell, and means to ob- tain the exclusive right of seUing. In ordinary usage there is httle difference between monopolize and engross. Mo- nopolize perhaps carries more of the sug- gestion of exclusiveness; engross more of absorption. MONSTER. See Wonder. MONSTROUS. See Enormous. MONUMENT, Memorial. Monvr ment, in Latin monumentum or moni- mentum, from moneo, to advise or re- •mind, and a suffix, signifies that which puts us in mind of something. Memo- rial, from memory, signifies the thing that helps the memory. From the above it is clear that these terms have, in their original deriva- tion, precisely the same signification, but differ in their collateral accepta- tions: monument is appUed to that which is purposely set up to keep a thing in mind; memorials are any objects which are calculated to caU a thing to mind: a monument is used to preserve a public object of notice from being forgotten; a memorial serves to keep an individual in mind : the monu- ment is commonly understood to be a species of building, as a tomb which preserves the memory of the dead, or a pillar which preserves the memory of some pubUc event: the memorial al- ways consists of something which was the property, or in the possession, of another, as his picture, his handwrit- ing, his hair, and the like. The Monu- ment at London was built to commem- orate the dreadful fire of the city in the year 1666: friends who are at & distance are happy to have some token of each other's regard, which they hke- wise keep as a memorial of their former intercourse. The monument, in its proper sense, is always made of wood or stone for some specific purpose; but in the improper sense anything may be termed a MOVING PICTURE 511 monument when it serves the purpose of reminding the public of any circum- stance: thus, the pyramids are moun- mcnts of antiquity; the actions of a good prince are more lasting monit- ments than either brass or marble. Memorials are mostly of a private nature, and at the same time such as remind us naturally of the object to which they have belonged; this object is generally some person. But it may likewise refer to some thing, if it be of a personal nature, or that by which persons are individually affected: our Saviour instituted the Sacrament of the Lord's-Supper as a memorial of His death. MOOD. See Humor. MORAL. See Virtuous/ MORALLY. See Ethical. MORALS. See Manners, a MORATORIUM. See Delay. morbid: See Sick. MOREOVER. See Besides. mortal. See Deadly. MORTIFICATION. See Vexa- tion. mortify. See Abash; Snub. MORTUARY. See Necropolis. MOTION, Movement. These are both abstract terms to denote the act of moving, but motion is taken generally and abstractedly from the thing that moves; movement, on the other hand, is taken in connection with the agent or thing that moves: hence we speak of a state of motion as opposed to a state of rest, of perpetual motion, the laws of motion, and the hke; on the other hand, we say, to make a movement, when speaking of an army, a general movement when speaking of an as- sembly. When motion is quaUfied by the thing that maves it denotes continued mo- tion; but movement impUes only a par- ticular motion: hence we say, the motion of the heavenly bodies; the motion of the earth; a person is in con- tinual motion, or an army is in motion; but a person who rises or sits down or goes from one chair to another makes a movement; the different movements of the springs and wheels of any instru- ment. MOTION PICTURE. See Mov- INQ Picture. MOTIVE. See Cause; Principle. MOTOR. See Automobilb. MOULD. See Form. MOUNT. See Arise. MOURN. See Grieve. MOURNFUL, Sad. Mournful (from Anglo-Saxon mcoman, to grieve, Mod- em English mourn) signifies full of what causes mourning; sad (see Dull) sig- nifies either a painful sentiment or what causes this painful sentiment. The difference in the sentiment is what con- stitutes the difference between these epithets: the mournful awakens tender and sympathetic feeUngs: the sad op- presses the spirits and makes one heavy at heart; a mmimful tale con- tains an account of others' distress; a sad story contains an account of one's own distress; a mournful event befalb our friends and relatives; a sad mis- fortune befalls ourselves. Selfish peo- ple find nothing moumfid, but many things sad: tender-hearted people are always affected by what is mournful, and are less troubled about what is sad. MOVABLE. See Kinetic. MOVABLES. See Goods. MOVE. See Go; Stir; Thrill. MOVEMENT. See Motion. MOVIES. See Moving Picture. MOVING, Affecting, Pathetic. The moving is in general whatever moves the affections or the passions; the affecting and pathetic are what move the affections in aifferent d^jrees. The good or bad feeUngs may be moved; the tender feelings only are affected. A field of battle is a moving spectacle: the death of a friend is an affecting spec- tacle. The affecting acts Dy means of the scenes as well as the understanding; the pathetic applies only to what is addressed to the heart: hence, a sight or a description is affecting; but an address is jxithdic. MOVING PICTURE, Motion Pict- ure, Cinematograph, Photoplay, Movie. As is the case with most names of recent inventions, these terms differ not in meaning, but in applica- tion and usage. They all indicate the invention whereby figures in motion are photographed, so that the move- ment is reproduced when the picture is thrown on a screen. Moving picture was the name first used for this in- vention, but motion picture has also come into general usage and has been 512 MULCT adopted by many of the corporations producing these pictures. Moving pict- ure seems to a purist a more desirable term, because moving is an adjective form, whereas in the case of motion picture a substantive is made to do dut3' as an adjective. But some people contend that motion picture is a more accurate word, since the pictures them- selves do not move; they are merely photographs of motion. The two terms, however, are used interchange- ably. Movie is a popular abbreviation of moving picture, and one which, per- haps, deserves to receive general recogni- tion as a new word, inasmuch as it is a spontaneous popular coinage to indicate a new invention, rather than a scien- tific name laboriously patched together out of Greek and Latin. Cinematograph is the technical term corresponding to moving picture, from Greek k'ivuv, to move, and ypdcpsiv, to mark or write. This is frequently shortened to cinema, which is also becoming a popular term for the moving picture, and is used among educated people sometimes as a more elegant substitute for movie. Photoplay differs somewhat from the other terms in its appUcation. It is applied to a particular moving-picture drama, a play in pictures. The other words are rather indiscriminately used to indicate individual moving-picture plays, moving-picture houses, or the rep- resentations of the moving picture. MULCT. See Fine. MULTIPLANE. See Aircraft. MULTITUDE, Crowd, Throng, Swarm. The idea of many is common to all these terms, and pecuhar to that of multitude, from the Latin rriuUus; crowd comes from Anglo-Saxon crvdan, to push; and throng from Anglo-Saxon thringan, to press; and swarm, like the German schwdrmen, to fly about, sig- nifies running together in numbers. These terms vary, either in regard to the object or the circumstance: multi- tude is applicable to any object; crowd, throng, and swarm are in the proper sense applicable only to animate ob- jects: the first two in regard to persons; the last to animals. A multitude may be either in a stagnant or a moving state; all the rest denote a multituJde in a moving state: a crowd is 'always press- ing, generally eager and tumultuous; a throng may be busy and active, but not always pressing or incommodious: it is always inconvenient, sometimes dangerous, to go into a crowd; it is amusing to see the throng that is per- petually passing in the streets of the city: the swarm is more active than either of the two others; it is com- monly applied to bees which fly to- gether in numbers, but sometimes to human beings, to denote their very great numbers when scattered about; thus the children of the poor in low neighborhoods swarm in the streets. MUMBLE. See Jabber. MUNIFICENT. See Beneficent. MUNITIONS. See Ammunition. MURDER. See Kill. MURMUR. See Complaint. MUSE. See Contemplate; Think. MUSTER. See Assemble. MUTABLE. See Changeable. MUTE. See Silent. MUTILATE, Maim, Mangle. Mu- tilate, in Latin mutilatus, from muiilus, Greek /ivriXoc, curtailed, docked, signi- fies to take off any necessary part. Maim, in Anglo-French mahaym, is a word of unknown origin. Mangle, in Anglo-French mahangler, is a frequen- tative of it. Mutilate has the most extended meaning; it implies the total or partial loss of any limb: mangle is applied to irregular wounds in any part of the body: maim is confined to wounds in the limbs, particularly the hands. Men are exposed to the danger of mutilation by means of cannon-balls; they run the risk of being mangled when attacked with the sword; they frequently get maimed when boarding vessels or storm- ing places. Mutilate and mangle are appUcable to moral objects; maim is employed in the natural or figurative sense. In this case mangle is a much stronger term than mutilate; the latter signifies to lop off an essential part; to mangle is to mutilate a thing to such degree as to render it useless or worthless. Every sect of Christians is fond of mutilating the Bible by setting aside such parts as do not favor its own scheme; and among them all the sacred Scriptures become literaUy mangled and stripped of all their most important doctrines. MYTHICAL 513 MUTINOUS. See Tumultuous. MUTUAL, Reciprocal. Mutiuil, in Latin mutuus, from mvio, to change, signifies exchanged so as to be equal, or the same, on both sides. Reciprocal, in Latin reciprocus, meant, literally, back and forth, from reco, back, and. proco, forward. Mutual supposes a same- ness in condition at the same time: reciprocal supposes an alternation or succession of returns. Exchange is free and volimtary; we give in ex- change, and this action is mutual: return is made either according to law or equity; it is obUgatory, and when equally obligatory on each in turn it is reciprocal. Voluntary disinterested services rendered by one person to an- other are muiual: imposed or merited services, returned from one to the other, are reciprocal: friends render one another mutual services: the ser- vices between servants and masters are reciprocal. The husband and wife pledge their faith to' each other mutu- ally; they are reciprocally boimd to keep their vow of fidelity. The senti- ment is mulualj the tie is reciprocal. MutuM apphes mostly to matters of will and opinion: a muiual affection, a mutual inclination to oblige, a mutual Si interest for each other's comfort, a mutvxd concern to avoid that which will displease the other — these are the sentiments which render the marriage state happy: reciprocal ties, reciproail bonds, reciprocal rights, reciprocal duties — ^these are what every one ought to bear in mind as a member of society, that he may expect of no man more than what in equity he is dis- posed to return. Muiual applies to nothing but what is personal; reciprocal is applied to things remote from the idea of F>er- sonahty, as reciprocal verbs, recivrocal terms, reciprocal relations, ana the like. MYSTERIOUS, Myotic. Mysten- ous and mystic are but variations of the same original, Greek (ivtrnjC; one who is initiated into a secret religious order; the former, however^ is more commonly appUed to that which is supernatural or veiled in an impenetrable obscurity; the latter to that which is natural, but concealed by an artificial or fantastical veil; hence we speak of the mysterious plans of Providence: myshc schemes of theology or mystic principles. See also Secret. MYTHICAL. See Legendaby. 514 NAB N NAB, Appropriate, Clutch, Grasp, Seize. Nab is a Scandinavian word signifying to snatch at. Al- though the term has a wide range of usage and has long been recognized in pohte language, in itself it is very near slang. A person by cunning, deceit, sharp practice may nab or appropriate from another credit for an achievement, some property, or other possession-con- quering nations appropriate, seize, take possession of territory belonging to a defeated opponent as a spoil of war, and this has heretofore been considered right and proper. To appropriate may be a slow action, one resulting from a more or less pro- longed parley or negotiation, but to seize imphes the real meaning of to nab. To didch also impUes a swift action, as a drowning person wiU clutch at anything hkely to save his life, a falling person wiU clutch, seize, lay hold of any near-by object that will save a complete fall. To grasp impMes actions both good and indefensible. It is a delight to grasp the hand of a friend; it is a great accomplishment to possess the intellectual capacity to grasp the spirit, truth, intent of a sub- ject readily; but it is not justifiable to grasp, lay hold of greedily, take sudden possession of that which belong to another without warrant or justifica- tion. NACREOUS, Iridescent, Opales- cent, Pearly, Polychromatic. These words all signify characterized by an interplay of colors, and derive their names and their respective differences from various substances. Nacreous, from nacre, mother-of-pearl (probably an Oriental word), takes its name from the inner covering of an oyster-shell and of certain other shells. It indi- cates a shining substance of the silvery gray color of the pearl, but shimmering with iridescent colors that appear and vanish as the light strikes it. Irides- cent, from Latin iris, Greek Ipic, the rainbow, signifies, Uterally, having all the colors of the rainbow. Polyct-x)- matic, from Greek iroXv, much, and xpw/ia, color, has a similar hteial meaning less metaphorically expressed. But iridescent suggests both changeful- ness and hght as well as color — an in- terplay of colors like light. Polychro- matic is a more prosaic word; it merely means having many colors. Opalescent (from Latin opalus, EngUsh opal, the name of a precious stone) means re- sembling an opal — that is, having an interplay of soft mUky-hued colors shot with flashes and gleams of fiery hght. Pearly, from pearl (French perle, a word of unknown origin), means re- sembling the lustrous sUvery white or silvery gray of the'pearl which is some- times touched with the faintest glow of color... NAIVE, iNGENtrous, Artless. These words all refer to an absence of pre- tence and sophistication, and are used, in a good sense, to describe naturalness and simphcity. Of these three words naMe is the most inclusive and the most difficult to define. It is an imper- fectly naturaUzed French word (from Latin naiivxis, native, inborn) which is almost always used in English with a feeUng that it expresses something that cannot be described in blunt Eng- lish terms. Ingenuous (from Latin root gen, in- dicating birth) meant originally the simphcity and frankness of a weU-bom youth, and indicates a quality of character. Artless means without art, and in- dicates primarily a mental character- istic. We say that a child is artless, that a young girl is artless, but that a youth is ingenuous. Artless conveys the impression of a certain innocence and ignorance of the world; ingenvxyus, the impression of an inborn disposition. Naive expresses the idea involyed in artless with a certain subtlety. It really differs from artless mainly in indicating a difference in the perceiver, rather than the quality perceived. It NAME 515 is faintly suggestive of that slight shade of tender-hearted amusement — of that complete sympathy of the heart, com- bined with a certain intellectual su- periority and detachment — with which the educated or experienced man views an expression of artlessness. There are only a few words in English whose ef- fectiveness depends so entirely upon an atmosphere imdefinable and un- translatable; the other words of this character are also French. NAKED. See Bare. NAMBY-PAMBY. See Simple. NAME, Call. Name comes from Anglo-Saxon nama. a name, aUied to Latin rwmen, a name. CaJl is a Scan- dinavian word. To (ujJl signijQes prop- erly to address one loudly, consequently we may name without calling, when we only mention a name in conversation; and we may call without naming. The terms may, however, be em- ployed in the sense of assigning a name. In this case a person is named by his name, whether by the proper patronymic or by some habitual vari- ant; he is caUed according to the char- acteristics by which he is distinguished. The Emperor Tiberius was namxd Tiberius; he was caUed a monster. William the First of England is najned WilUam; he is called the Conqueror. Name, Appellation, Title, Denomina- i ion . — Name (see above) . A ppellation, in French appellation, Latin appellatio, comes from Latin ad, to, and a stem meaning to speak, aUied to Anglo- Saxon and Modem Enghsh spell. Title, in French tilre, comes from Latin tituLus, a superscription on a tomb. Denomination signifies that which de- nominates or distinguishes. Name is a generic term, the rest are specific. Whatever word is employed to distinguish one thing from another is a name; therefore, an appellation and a title are a name, but not vice versd. A name is either conmaon or projjer; an appellation is generally a common name given for some specific purpose as characteristic. Several kings of France had the names of Charles, Louis, PhiUp; but one was distinguished by the ap- pellation of Stammerer, another by that of the Simple, and a third by that of the Hardy, arising from particular characters or circumstances. A title is a species of appellation, not drawn from anything personal, but conferred as a groimd of pohtical distinction An appellation may be often a term oi reproach; but a title is always a mark of honor. An appellation is given to all olajects, animate or inanimate; a title is given mostly to persons, some- times to things. A particular house may have the appellation of "the Cot- tage," or "the Hall," as a particular person may have the title of Duke, Lord, or Marquis. Denomination is to particular bodies what appellation is to an individual, namely, a term of distinction, drawn from their peculiar characters and cir- cimistances. The Christian world is spUt into a number of different bodies or communities, under- the denomina- tions of Catholics, Protestants, Cal- vinists, Presbyterians, etc., which have their origin m the peculiar form of faith and discipline adopted by these bodies. Name, Denominate, Style, Entitle, Designate, Characterize. — To name sig- nifies simply to give a name to, or to address or specify by the given name; to denominate (from Latin nomen, name) is to give a specific name upon specific ground, to distinguish by the name; to style, from the noun style or manner (see Diction), signifies to address by a specific name; to entitle is to give the specific or appropriate title. Adam named everything; we denominate the man who drinks ex- cessively "a dnmkard"; subjects «/ufe their monarch "His Majesty '; books are entitled according to the judgment of the author. To name, denominate, style, and en- title are the acts of conscious agents only. To designate, signifying to mark out, and characterize, signifying to form a characteristic, are usually said only of things, and agree with the former only inasmuch as words may either det- ignate or characterize: thus the word "capacity" is said to designate the power of holding; and "finesse" char- acterizes the people by whom it was adopted. See also Nominate. Name, Reputation, Repute, Credit. — Name is here taken in another sense for a name acquired in public by any 516 NAP peculiarity or quality in an object. Reputation and repute, from repulo, or re, back, and putare, to think, sig- nifies the thinking of or the state of being thought of, or esteemed by, by the pubhc. Credit signifies the state of being beheved or trusted in general, from Latin credere, to beheve or trust. Name impMes something more spe- cific than reputation; and reputation something more substantial than name; a name may be acquired by some casualty or by some quahty that has more show than worth; reputation is acquired only by time and built only on merit: a name may be arbitrarily given, simply by way of distinction; reputation is not given, but acquired, or follows as a consequence of one's honorable exertions. A physician sometimes gets a name by a single in- stance of professional sklU, which by a combination of favorable circum- stances he may convert to his own advantage in forming an extensive practice; but imless he have a com- mensurate degree of talent, this name will never ripen into a solid reputation. Name and reputation are of a more extended nature than repute and credit. The name and reputation are given by the public at large; the repute and credit are acquired within a narrow circle. Strangers, or it may be distant coimtries, hear of the name and the rep- utation oi anything; but only neighbors and those who have the means of per- sonal observation can know its re- pute and credit. It is possible, there- fore, to have a name and reputation without having repute and credit, and vice versa, for the objects which con- stitute the former are sometimes dif- ferent from those which produce the latter. A manufacturer has a name for the excellence of a particular article of his own manufacture a book has a name among would-be connoisseurs and pretenders to Uterature : a good writer, however, seeks to estabUsh his reputation for genius, learning, industry, or some praiseworthy characteristic : a preacher is in high repute among those who at- tend him: a master gains great credit from the good performances of his scholars. There is also this distinction between reputation and repute, that reputation signifies the act of reputing or the state of being reputed, repute signifies only the state of being re- puted. Name and repute are taken either in a good or bad sense; reputation mostly, and credit always, are taken in the good sense only: a person or thing may get a good or an ill name; a person or thing may be in good or ill repute; reputation may rise to different de- grees of height, or it may sink again into nothing; credit may likewise be high or low, but both reputation and credit, absolutely taken, imply that which is good. NAP. See Sleep. NARRATION. See Relation. NARRATIVE. See Accoxjnt; Re- lation. NARROW. See Contracted. NATAL, Native, Indigenous. Natal, in Latin natalis, from natus, born, signifies belonging to one's birth, or the act of one's being bom; but native, in Latin nativtis, hkewise from naiv^, signifies having an origin or be- ginning. Indigenous, in Latin indi- genus, from indu. Old Latin, within, and genitu^, bom, signifies born in a given place. The epithet ruUal is applied only to the circumstances of a man's birth, as his natal day; his natal hour; a natal song; a natal star. Native has a more extensive meaning, as it comprehends the idea of one's relationship by origin to an object; as one's native country, one's native soil, native village, or native place, native language, and the hke. Indigenous is a particular term used to denote the country where races of men are supposed to have first existed. It is also apphed to plants in the same sense. Native, Natural. — Native is to natural as a species to the genus: everything native is, according to its strict signifi- cation, natural; but many things are natural which are not native. Of a person we may say that his worth is native, to designate that it is some valuable property which is bom with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon his character; but we may say of his disposition that it is natural, as op- posed to that which is acquired or otherwise. The former is mostly em- ployed in a good sense, in opposition NECESSARY 517 to what is artful, assumed, and unreal; the other is used in an indifferent sense, as opposed to whatever is the effect of habit or circmnstances. When chil- dren display themselves with all their naiive simplicity, they are interesting objects of notice: when they display their natural turn of mind, it is not always that which tends to raise hu- man nature in our esteem. See also Intrinsic. Naturally, In Course, Consequently, Of Course. — The connection between events, actions, and things is expressed by all these terms. Naturally signifies according to the nature of things, and applies, therefore, to the connection which exists between events accord- ing to the original constitution or in- herent properties of things: in course signifies in the course of things, that is, in the regular order that things ought to follow: consequently signifies by a consequence, that is, by a neces- sary law of dependence, which makes one thing follow another: of course sig- nifies on account of the course which things most commonly or even neces- sarily take. Whatever happens nat- uraliy happens as it should do; what- ever happens in course, or in due course, happens as we establish it: whatever follows consequently follows as we judge it logical; whatever follows of course follows as we expect it. Children nat- urally imitate their parents: people nai- urally fall into the habits of those they associate with: both these circumstances result from the nature of things: who- ever is made a peer of the realm takes his seat in the uppec house in course; he requires no other quaUfications to en- title him to this privilege, he goes thither according to the established course of things; consequently, as a peer, he is admitted without question; this is a decision of the judgment by which the question is at once determined: of course none are admitted who are not peers; this results necessarily from the constituted law of the land. NATION. See People. NATIONAL. See Public. NATURALIZE, Acclimate, Orient. These words all mean to be- come at home in a new country. But naturalize, from the very beginning when it was coined as French natural- iser, has meant to acquire the standing of a naturai-hom citizen, to be placed on the same footing before law as a naiive of the country. It is sometimes used with an extended application to refer to the adaptation of plants, etc., to a new country. Acclimate means to become accustomed to the climate of a new country. It may also i be used figuratively in an extended ' sense to mean simply to become accus- tomed to. Orient is used as a verb to mean to adjust to new conditions — from French [s']orienter. It referred originally to the placing of churches so that the altar was at the east (Latin oriens, the place of the rising sun) ; hence it came to mean to place with reference to the points of the compass; to get one's bearings. NAUGHT. See Zero. NAUSEA. See Disgust. NAUTICAL. See Maritime. NAVAL. See Maritime. NEAR. See Close. NEAT. See Tidy. NECESSARIES. See Necessities. NECESSARY, Expedient, Essen- tial, Requisite. For necessary see Necessiti'. Expedient comes from Latin ex, out, and pedem (accusative), foot, and signified originally taking the foot out, hence aiding movement and action. Essential means containing that essence or property which cannot be omitted, from Latin essentia, being, derived from a 8upp>osititious stem from esse, the infinitive of the verb to be. Requisite signifies literally required (see Demand). Necessary is a general and indefinite term; things may be necessary in the course of nature; it is necessary for all men once to die; or things may be necessary according to the circum- stances of the case, or our views of necessity; in this manner we conceive it necessary to call upon another. Ex- pedient, essential, and requisite are modes of relative necessity: the ex- pediency of a thing is a matter of dis- cretion and calculation, and therefore not so sclf-evidently necessary as many things which we so denominate: it may be expedient for a person to con- sult another, or it may not, according as circumstances may present them- selves. The. requisite and the essential 518 NECESSITATE are more obviously necessary than the expedient; but the former is less so than the latter: what is requisite may be requisite only in part or entirely; it may be requisite to complete a thing when begim, but not to begin it; the essential, on the contrary, is that which constitutes the essence, and without which a thing cannot exist. It is req- uisite for one who would have a good hbrary to select only the best authors; exercise is essential for the preservation of good health. In aU matters of dis- pute it is expedient to be guided by some impartial judge; it is requisite for every member of the community to contrib- ute his share to the pubhc expenditure as far as he is able: it is essential to a teacher to know more than those he teaches. Necessities, Necessaries. — Necessity, in Latin necessitas, and necessary, in Latin necessarius, from necesse, sig- nify that which is indispensable. Necessity is the mode or state of cir- cumstances or the thing which circum- stances render necessary; the neces- sary is that which is absolutely and unconditionally necessary. Art has ever been busy in inventing things to supply the various necessities of our natm*e, and yet there are always num- bers who want even the first necessaries of life. Habit and desire create neces- sities; nature only requires necessaries: a voluptuary has necessities which are unknown to a temperate man; the poor have in general httle more than necessaries. Necessity, Need. — Necessity (see Necessary). Need is in Anglo-Saxon nied, and is the native English word corresponding to the Latin word necessitas. Necessity implies the thing wanted; need the condition of the person want- ing. There would be no necessity for punishments if there were not evil- doers; he is peculiarly fortunate who finds a friend in time of need. Neces- sity is more pressing than need: the former places one in a positive state of compulsion to act ; it is said to have no law, it prescribes the law for itself; the latter yields to circumstances and leaves in a state of deprivation. We are fre- quently under the necessity of going with- out that of which we stand most in need. From these two nouns arise two epi- thets for each, which are worthy of observation, namely, necessary and needful, necessitous and needy. Neces- sary and needful are both applicable to the thing wanted; necessitous sioA. needy to the person wanting: necessary is ap- plied to every object indiscriminately; needful only to such objects as supply temporary or partial wants. Exercise is necessary to preserve the health of the body; restraint is necessary to preserve that of the mind; assistance is needful for one who has not sufficient resources in himself: it is necessary to go by water to the Continent: money is needful for one who is traveUing. The dissemination of knowledge is necessary to dispel the ignorance which would otherwise prevail in the world; it is needful for a young person to attend to the instructions of his teacher, if he wishes to improve. Necessitous and needy are both ap- plied to persons in want of something important; but necessitous may be employed to denote an occasional want, as to be in a necessitous condition in a foreign country for want of remit- tances from home; needy denotes a permanent state of want, as to be needy either from extravagance or misfortune. NECESSITATE. See Compel. NECROPOLIS, Burial - ground. Cemetery, Graveyard, Mortuary. These words all indicate places where the dead are laid away. Burial-ground and graveyard are the native English terms; of these two graveyard is the more familiar word. It has more in- timate and solemn associations than the analogous term burial-ground. We speak of the burial-ground of the Indians, for instance, in indicating an object of merely archaeological in- terest. We speak of an Enghsh grave- ijard with some sympathetic realization of what it has meant to a community of people hke ourselves. Cemetery, from Latin coemeterium, Greek Koifi-qrijpiov, a sleeping-place, is a term which has large- ly replaced the older term graveyard in ordinary speech now. Being a more modem and sophisticated term, it natu- ralty has somewhat different connota- tions. We should speak of an old burial- ground in a little town as a graveyard; of NEGOTIATE J519 the park-like buriao-grounds in or near our cities as cemeteries. But this dis- tinction is not always observed. Ne- cropolis, from Greek v««fp6f, dead, and TToXtc, a city, means literally a city of the dead. It is a term applied to large and elaborate cemeteries near cities, or to burial-places of special dignity. Mortuary, from Latin mor- tuus, dead, is the term applied to a building or a room where dead bodies are kept for a time. NEFARIOUS. See Wicked. NEGLECT, Omit. Neglect (see Dis- hegard). Omit, in Latin omiito, or ob and mitto, signifies to put aside. The idea of letting pass or sUp, or of not using, is comprehended in the sig- nification of both these terms; the former is, however, a culpable, the latter an indifferent action. What we neglect ought not to be neglected: but what we omit may be omitted or other- wise, as convenience requires. These terms differ Ukewise in the objects to which thejr are applied; that is neglected which is practicable or serves for action; that is omitted which serves for intellectual purposes: we neglect an opportunity, we neglect the means, the time, the use, and the like; we omit a word, a sentence, a figure, a stroke, a circumstance, and the like. Negligent, Remiss, Careless, Thought- less, Heedless, Inattentive. — Negligence (see Disregard) and remissness con- cern the outward action: careless, heed- less, thoughtless, and inattentive the state of mind. Negligence and remissness consist in not doing what ought to be done; carelessness and the other mental de- fects may show themselves in doing wrong, as well as in not doing at all; negligence and remissness are, therefore, to carelessness and the others as the effect to the cause; for no one is so apt to be negligent and remiss as he who is careless, although negligence and remiss- ness arise from other causes, and care- lessness, thoughtlessness, etc., produce likewise other effects. Negligent is a stronger term than remiss: one is negli- gent in neglecting the thing that is ex- pressly before one's eyes; one is remiss in forgetting that which was enjoined some time previously: the want of will renders a person negligent; the want of interest renders a jjerson remiss: one is negligent in regard to business, and the performance of bodily labor; one is remiss in duty, or in such things as require mental exertion. Servants are commonly negligent in what concerns their naaster's interest; teachers are remiss in not correcting the faults of their pupils. Negligence, therefore, is the fault of persons of all descriptions, but particularly those in low condition; remissness is a fault peculiar to those in a more elevated station: a clerk in an office is negligent in not making proper memorandums; a magistrate, or the head of an institution, is remiss in the exercise of his authority to check irregularities. Careless denotes the want of care in the manner of doing things; thought- less denotes the want of thought or reflection about things; heedless de- notes the want of heeding or r^arding things^ inattentive denotes the want of attention to things. One is careless only in trivial matters of behavior; one is thoughtless in matters of greater mo- ment, in what concerns the conduct. Carelessness leads children to make mis- takes in their mechanical exercises, in whatever they commit to memory or to paper; thoughtlessness leads many who are not children into serious errors of conduct, when they do not think of, or bear in mind, the consequences of their actions. Thoughtless is applied to things past, present, or to come; careless to things present or to come. Careless is apphed to such things as require permanent care; thoughtless to such as require permanent thought; heedless and inattentive are applied to passing objects that engage the senses or the thoughts of the moment. One is careless in business, thoughtless in con- duct, heedless in walking or running, inattentive in listening : heedless children are unfit to go by themselves; inatten- tive children are unfit to be led by others. NEGOTIATE, Treat, Transact. The idea of conducting business with others is included in the signification of all these terms; but they differ in the mode of conducting it and the nature of the business to be conducted. Nego- tiate, from Latin negotium (from nef — for ne — not, and otium, leisure, signify- 52a NEIGHBORHOOD ing that which one does when one is not at leisure — i. e., business), is apphed in the original mostly to merchandise or traffic, but it is more commonly em- ployed in the comphcated concerns of governments and nations. Treat, from the Latin tractare, frequentative of irahere, to draw, signifies to turn over and over or set forth in all ways: these two verbs, therefore, suppose delibera- tion; but transact, from transactus, par- ticiple of transago, to carry forward or bring to an end, supposes more direct agency than consultation or delibera- tion; this latter is therefore adapted to the more ordinary and less entangled concerns of commerce. A congress carries on negotiations for the establish- ment of good order among different states; individual states treat with each other to settle their particular differ- ences. To negotiate mostly applies to political concerns, except in the case of negotiating bills: to treat, as well as transact, is said of domestic and private concerns : we treat with a person about the purchase of a house, and transact our business with him by making good the purchase and paying down the money. As nouns, negotiation expresses rather the act of dehberating than the thing deUberated: treatT/ includes the ideas of the terms proposed and the arrange- ment of those terms: transaction ex- presses the idea of something actually done and finished. Negotiations are sometimes very long pending before the preliminary terms are even pro- posed or any basis is defined; treaties of commerce are entered into by all civilized countries, in order to obviate misunderstandings and enable them to preserve an amicable intercourse; the transactions which daily pass in a great metropolis hke that of London are of so multifarious a nature, and so infinitely numerous, that the bare contemplation of them fills the mind with astonishment. Negotiations are long or short; treaties are advantageous or the contrary; transactions are honorable or dishonorable. See also Treat. NEIGHBORHOOD, Vicinity. Neighborhood, from neighbor (Anglo- Saxon neah, nigh, near, and gebur or bur, a husbandman, the same word as Dutch Boer, English boor), signified originally the place near by where other farmers hve. Vicinity, from vicus, a village, signifies the place which does not exceed in distance the extent of a village. Neighborhood, which is of Saxon origin, is employed in reference to the inhabitants, or in regard to inhabited places, to denote nearness of persons to each other or to objects in general: but vicinity, which in Latin bears the same acceptation as neighborhood, is employed in Enghsh to denote near- ness of one object to another, whether person or thing; hence the propriety of saying a populous neighborhood, a quiet neighborhood, a respectable neigh- borhood, a pleasant neighborhood, and to be in the neighborhood, either as it signifies the people or the country; but to live in the vicinity of a manufactory, to be in the vicinity of the metropolis or of the sea. NEOPHYTE. See Tyro. NEUTRAL, Impartial, Indiffer- ent. These words all indicate a dis- position not to take sides in a quarrel, but they differ in the amount of sym- pathy for the combatants implied in them. Indifferent signified originally not making a distinction or difference between things — implying such a lack of sympathy or interest that one thing seems much hke another. Here it in- dicates a lack of interest in either com- batant. Neutral, from Latin ne, not, . and uter, which of two, means not ask- ing which is right. It imphes com- plete intellectual detachment, but not necessarily lack of sympathy for one or both of the parties. It is the term apphed to the non-combatant nations in time of war. Impartial means not taking the part of either side. By derivation it has the same meaning as the other words, but it implies distinct sympathy with one or both combatants, which is not allowed to influence judgment. NEVERTHELESS. See However. NEW, Novel, Modern, Fresh, Re- cent. New, from Anglo-Saxon neowe, is the native English word correspond- ing to Latin nomis, whence novel is de- rived. Modem signifies belonging to the present mode, from Latin modus, manner. Fresh is derived from a NOBLE 521 Teutonic root which appears in Anglo- Saxon fersc, fresh; but its form is due to the feminine form of this same word in Old French — freis, masculine, fresche, feminine. All these epithets are applied to what has not long existed; new expresses this idea simply without any qualification; novel is something strange or imex- pected; the modem is the thing of to- day as distinguished from that which ex- isted in former time; the fresh is that which is so new as not to be the worse for use, or that which has not been before used or employed; the recent is that which is so new as to appear as if it were just made or done. Accord- ing to this distinction, new is most aptly appUed to such things as may be permanent or durable, as new houses, new buildings, new clothes, and the like; in such cases it is properly opposed to the old; the term may, however, be applied i generally to whatever arises or comes first into existence or notice, as new scenes, new sights, new sounds. Novel may be applied to whatever is either never or but rarely seen; the freezing of the river Thames is a novel- ty; but the frost in every winter is something new when it first comes. Modem is applied to that which is new, or springs up in the day or age in which we hve; as modem books, mod- em writers, modem science; a book is new which is just formed into a book and has not been used; it is modem at the time when it is first published; so likewise principles are new which have never been broached before; they are modem if they have been pubhshed lately or within a given period: the modem is opposed to the ancient. Fresh is said of that which may lose its color, vigor, or other perfection; as a fresh flower, the freshness of youth, etc. So pleasures or passions are fresh which have not lost their power by satiety; they are new\i they have but just sprung mto activity. Recent is appUed to those events or circumstances which have just hap- pened, as a recent transaction, or an occurrence of recent date. News, Tidings. — News implies any- thing new that is related or circulated; tidings, in its Anglo-Saxon form, meant simply anything that happened; but it acquired the Scandinavian sense of news, especially news that arrived in due time and season, that is timely. iVews is unexpected; it serves to gratify idle curiosity: tidings are expected; they serve to allay anxiety, m time of war the public are eager for news; and they who have relatives in the army are anxious to have tidings of them. NICE. See Exact; Fine. NIGGARDLY. See Avaricious; Economical. NIGH. See Close. NIGHTLY, NocTUKNAL. NighUy. immediately from the word night, ana noctumcU, from nox, night, signify belonging to the night, or the night season; the former is therefore more famiUar than the latter: we speak of nightly depredations to express what passes every night, or nighily disturb- ances, nocturnal dreams, nocturnal visits. NIHILIST. See Intransigent. NIMBLE. See Active. NINNY, Nincompoop. These are slang or colloquial terms meaning a simpleton, and are not clearly disUn- guished Irom one another. Ninny comes probably from Italian ninna, a lullaby to put a child to sleep, based on ninno, child. The origin of nincom- poop is supposed to be due to a vitia- tion of the Latin phrase non compos Tnentis. These words have been in the English language for centuries, but are so little dilferentiated from one an- other that it would be pedantry to make a distinction. Possibly ninny suggests more of silliness; nincompoop more of obtuseness, dulness. NIP, Bite, Pinch. A nip is some- thing between a bite and a pinch. In bUing the substance taken between the teeth is cut; in pinching, which usually refers to a pressure upon a substance caught between two fingers or an in- strument acting like the two fingers, i^ is simply bruised. To nip is to give a sharp, quick pinch. NOBLE, Grand. Noble, in Latin nobilis, from nosco, to know, signifying knowable, or worth knowing, is a term of general import: it simply im- plies the quality by which a thing ia distinguished for excellence above other 522 NOCTURNAL things: the grand (see Grandeuk) is, properly speaking, one of those quaU- ties by which an object acquires the name of noble; but there are many noble objects which are not denomi- nated grand. A building may be de- nominated noble for its beauty as well as its size; but a grand building is rather so called for the expense which is displayed upon it in the style of building. A family may be either noble or grand; but it is noble by birth; it is grand by wealth and an expensive style of hving. Nobleness of acting or thinking comprehends all moral ex- cellence that rises to a high pitch; but grandeur of mind is pecuharly appU- cable to such actions or traits as de- note an elevation of character, rising above all that is common. NOCTURNAL. See Nightly. NOISE, Cry, Outcry, Clamor. Noise is any loud sound; cry, outcry, and clamor are particular kinds of noises, differing either in the cause or the nature of the sounds. A noise pro- ceeds either from animate or inanimate objects; the cry proceeds only from animate objects. The report of a can- non and the loud sounds occasioned by a high wind are noises, but not cries; cries issue from birds, beasts, and men. A noise is produced often by accident; a cry is always occasioned by some particular circumstance: when many horses and carriages are going together they make a great noise; hunger and pain cause cries to proceed both from animals and himian beings. Noise, when compared with cry, is sometimes only an audible sound; the cry is a very loud noise; whatever disturbs si- lence, as the proverbial falling of a pin in a perfectly stiU assembly, is denomi- nated a noise; but a cry is that which may often drown other noises, as the cries of people selling things about the streets. A cry is in general a definite sound, but outcry and clamor are irregular sounds; the former may proceed from one or many, the latter from many in conjunction. A cry after a thief be- comes an ouicry when set up by many at a time; it becomes a clamor if ac- companied with shouting, bawling, and noises of a mixed and tumultuous nature. These terms may all be taken in an improper as well as a proper sense. Whatever is obtruded upon the public notice, so as to become the universal subject of conversation and writing, is said colloquially to make a noise; in this manner a new and good per- former at the theatre makes a noise on his first appearance. A noise may be either for or against; but a cry, outcry, and clamor are al- ways against the object, varying in the degree and manner in which they dis- play themselves: cry implies less than outcry, and this less than clamor. When the pubHc voice is raised in an audible manner against any particular matter it is a cry; if it be mingled with intemperate language it is an outcry; if it be vehement and exceedingly noisy it is a clamor: partisans raise a cry in order to form a body in their favor; the discontented are ever ready to set up an outcry against men in power; a clamor for peace in time of war is easily raised by those who wish to thwart the government. NOISOME. See Hurtful. NOISY. See Loud. NOMENCLATURE. See Diction- ary. NOMINATE, Name. Nominate comes from Latin nomen, name; name (see Name). To nominate and to name are both to mention by name; but the former is to mention for a specific purpose; the latter is to men- tion for a general purpose : persons only are nominated; things as well as per- sons are named: one nominates a per- son in order to propose him, or ap- point him, to an office; but one names a person casually, in the course of con- versation, or one names him in order to make some inquiry respecting him. To be nominated is a public act; to be named is generally private: one is nominated before an assembly; one is named in any place: to be nominated is always an honor; to be nam^d is either honorable or the contrary, ac- cording to the circumstances under which it is mentioned: a person is nominated for an office; he is named whenever he is spoken of. NON-CONFORMIST. See Here- tic. NON-PUTREFYING. SeeAsEpnft. NOTICE 523 NONSENSE. See Twaddle. NORMAL, Typical. Normal and typical are both words which are com- monly misxised. They are taken to mean average, ordinary, whereas they really mean the reverse. The normal person is one that conforms to the norm,, Latin norma, a carpenter's rule; that is to say, to the standard •£ hu- manity in any or all respects. This standard, however, is not obtained by taking the av'erage of aU people. As is shown by the medical standard in accordance with which the candidates for the army are tested, only one in four or five men corresponds sufficient- ly to the standard. Normal indicates what people would be if their develop- ment were not in any way hindered. Typical, from Greek rvxog, a mark, blow, stamp, has the same meaning as normal, with a sUght difference of con- notation in ordinary usage. A typical man is one who represents the standard to which others approximate more or less. The typical American is not the average or ordinary American. He is the one who represents the distinctive characteristics of Americans in their most characteristic form. Normal is generally used with reference to a par- ticular standard — a standard of health, for instance. Typical is used with ref- erence to distinguishing characteristics. A normal physique, for instance, is one that corTesp>onds to the general stand- ard, one that every one ought to have. A typical soldier's physique is one that represents the characteristics of the soldier unmodified by other influences. NOTE. See Mark. NOTED. NoTOMous. Noted (see Distinguished) may be employed either in a good or a bad sense; notori- ous is never used but in a bad sense: men may be noted for their talents or their eccentricities; they are notorious for their vices: noted characters excite many and divers remarks from their friends and their enemies; notorious characters are imiversally shunned. NOTHING. See Zero. NOTICE, Remark, Observe. To notice (see Attend) is either to take or to give notice: to remark, compoimded of re and mark (see Mark), signifies to reflect or bring back any mark to our own mind, or communicate the same to another; to mark is to rnark a thing once, but to remark is to mark it ^ain. Observe (see Looker-on) signifies either to keep a thing present before one's own view or to communi- cate one's view to another. In the first sense of these words, as the actioti concerns ourselves, to notice and remark require simple attention, to observe requires examination. To notice is a more cursory action than to remark: we may notice a thing by a single glance, or on merely turning our head; but to remark supjXNKS a reaction of the mind on an object; we notice a person passing at any time; but we remark that he goes past every day at the same hour: we notice that the sun sets this evening under a cloud, and we remark that it has done so for several evenings successively: we notice the state of a person's health or his manners in company; we remark his habits and peculiarities in domestic life. What is noticed and reinarked strikes on the senses and awakens the mind; what is observed is looked after and sought for: the former are often involuntary acts; we see, hear, and think because the objects obtrude themselves imcalled for; but the latter is intentional as well as voluntary; we see, hear, and think of that which we have watched. We remark things as matters of fact; we observe them in order to judge of them or draw conclusions from them: we remark that the wind lies for a lonr time in a certain quarter; we (A}serve that whenever it lies in a certain quarter it brings rain with it. People who have no particular curiosity may be sometimes attracted to notice the stars or planets when they are par- ticularly bright; those who look fre- auently will remark that the same star oes not rise exactly in the same place for two successive nights; but the astronomer goes further and obseryea all the motions of the heavenly bodies, in order to discover the scheme of the universe. In the latter sense of these words, as concerns the communications to others of what passes in our own minds, to notice is to make known our sentiments by various waj^; to remark and observe are to make them known only by means of words: to notice is a personal act 624" NOTION toward an individual, in which we direct our attention to him, as may happen either by a bow, a nod, a word, or even a look; but to remark and observe are said only of the thoughts which pass in our own minds and are expressed to others: friends notice each other when they meet; they remark to others the impression which passing objects make upon their minds: the observations which intelligent people make are always entitled to notice from young persons. See also Information; Mention. NOTION. See Conception; Opin- ion; Perception. NOTORIOUS. See Noted; Public. NOTWITHSTANDING. See How- ever. NOURISH, Nurture, Cherish. To nourish and nurture are but variations from the same verb nutrio. Cherish (see Foster). Things nourish, persons nurture and cherish: to nourish is to build up bodily strength to supply the physical necessities of the body; to nurture is to extend one's care to the supply of all its physical necessities, to preserve life, occasion growth, and in- crease vigor: the breast of the mother nourishes; the fostering care and at- tention of the mother nurtures. To nurture is a physical act; to cherish is a mental as well as a physical act: a mother nurtures her infant while it is entirely dependent upon her; she cherishes her child in her bosom and protects it from every misfortune, or affords consolation in the midst of all its troubles when it is no longer an infant. NOVEL, See Fable; New. NOVICE. See Tyro. NOW, Immediately, Straightway. Now is the general term, meaning at this present moment. Immediately sug- gests more of emphasis and action. It means in the moment following a given moment. Now is static; immediately suggests action, movement. Straight- way has the same meaning as immedi- ately, but a slightly different connota- tion. It is a somewhat archaic word associated with Biblical phraseology, and suggestive of poetry or a distinctly Uterary style. NOXIOUS. See Hurtful. NUMB, Benumbed, Torpid. Numb and benumbed come from the past participle of Anglo-Saxon niman, Mid- dle Enghsh nomen, to take, and sig- nify overtaken, hence overpowered, unable to move. There are but few things numb by nature, but there may be many things which may be be- numbed. Torpvd, in Latin torpidus, from torpere, to languish, is most com- monly employed to express the per- manent state of being benumbed, as in the case of some animals, which he in a torpid state all the winter; or, in the moral sense, to depict the benumbed state of the thinking faculty; in this manner we speak of the torpor of persons who are benumbed by any strong affection or by any strong external action. NUMBER. See Reckon. NUMERAL, Numerical. Numeral, or belonging to number, is apphed to a class of words in grammar, as a numeral adjective or a numeral noun: numerical, or containing number, is applied to whatever may concern num- ber; as a numerical difference, where the difference consists between any two numbers or is expressed by numbers. NUPTIALS. See Marriage. NURTURE. See Nourish. OBJECT 625 o OBEDIENT, Submissive, Obse- quious. Obedient (see Dutiful). Submissive denotes the disposition to submit (see Yield). Obsequious, in Latin obseguius, from obseqtior, or the intensive of ob, near, and sequi, to follow, signifies follovring diligently and with a fixed intention to please. One is obedient to command, sub- missive to power or the will, obsequious to persons. Obedience is always taken in a good sense; one ought always to be obedient where obedience is due: submission is relatively good; it may, however, be indifferent or bad: one may be submissive from interested motives or meanness of spirit, which is a base kind of submission; but to be submissive for conscience' sake, is the bounden duty of a Christian: obse- guumsness is never good; it is an ex- cessive concern about the will of an- other which has always interest for its end. Obedience is a course of conduct conformable either, to some specific rule or the express will of another; submission is often a personal act immediately directed to the individual. We show our obedience to the law by avoiding the breach of it; we show our obedience to the will of God, or of our parent, by making that will the rule of our life: on the other hand, we show submission to the person of the magistrate; we adopt a submissive de- portment by a downcast look and a bent body. Obedience is founded upon principle and cannot be feigned; sub- mission is a partial bending to another, which is easily affected in our outward behavior: the understanding and the heart produce obedience; but force or the necessity of circumstances gives rise to submission. Obedience and submission suppose a restraint on one's own will, in order to bring it into accordance with that of another; but obsequiousness is the consulting the will or pleasure of an- other: we are obedient from a sense of right; we are submissive from a sense of necessity; we are obsequious from a desire of gaining favor: a love of God is followed by obedience to His will; they are coincident sentiments that reciprocally act on each other so as to serve the cause of virtue: a sub- missive conduct is at the worst an in- voluntary sacrifice of our indepen- dence to our fears or necessities, the evil of which is confined principally to the individual who makes the sacrifice; obsequiousness is a voluntary sacrifice of ourselves to others for interested purposes. OBJECT, Subject. Object, in Latin objedxis, participle of ohicere, to lie in the way, signifies the thing that Ues in one's way. Subject, in Latin subjectus, participle of subicere, to lie under, signi- fies the thing forming the groundwork. The object puts itself forward; the subject is in the background: we notice the object; we observe..or reflect on the subject: objects are sensible; the subject is altogether intellectual: the eye, the ear, and all the senses are occupied with the surrounding objects; the mem- ory, the judgment, and the imagina- tion are supplied with subjects suitable to the nature of the operations. When object is taken for that which is intellectual, it retains a similar sig- nification; it is the thing that presents itself to the mind; it is seen by the mind's eye: the subject, on the con- trary, is that which must be sought for. and when foimd it engages the mental powers: hence we say an object of consideration, an object of delight, an ob/ecf of concern; & subiect of reneciion, a subject of mature deliberation, the subject of a poem, the subject of grief, of lamentation, and the like. When the mind becomes distracted by too great a multiplicity of (Ejects, it can fix itself on no one individual object with sufficient steadiness to take a survey of it; in like manner, if a child have too many objects set before it for the exercise of its powers, it will acquire a familiarity wnth none: such things are not fit subjects of discussioii. See also Aim; Find Fault. 526 OBJECTIVE Object, Oppose. — To object is to cast in the way, to oppose, from French opposer (Latin ob, against, and Late Latin pausare, to place, formed on Greek irdvcfig, pause), is to place in the way; there is, therefore, very lit- tle original difference, except that cast- ing is a more momentary and sudden proceeding, placing is a more premed- itated action; which distinction, at the same time, corresponds with the use of the terms in ordinary life: to object to a thing is to propose or start something against it; but to oppose it is to set one's self steadily against it: one ob- jects to ordinary matters that require no reflection; one opposes matters that call for dehberatlon and afford serious reasons for and against: a parent ob- jects to his child's learning the classics or to his running about the streets; he opposes his marriage when he thinks the connection or the circumstances not desirable. Objection, Difficulty, Exception. — Ob- jection (see Demur) is here a general term; it comprehends both the diffi/mlty and the exception, which are but species of the objection: an objection and a difficulty are started; an exception is made: the objection to a thing is in general that which renders it less de- sirable; but the difficulty is that which renders it less practicable; there is an objection against every scheme which incurs a serious risk: the want of means to begin or resources to carry on a scheme is a serious difficulty. Objection and exception both concern the nature, the moral tendency, or moral conocc^uence of a thing; but an objection mr.y be frivolous or serious; an exception is something serious: the objection is positive; the exception is relatively considered, that is, the thing excepted from other things, as not good, and consequently objected to. Objections are made sometimes to pro- posals for the mere sake of getting rid of an engagement: those who do not wish to give themselves trouble find an easy method of disengaging them- selves, by making objections to every proposition. We take exception at the conduct of others when we think it not sufficiently respectful. OBJECTIVE, Actual. Objective signifies outside of consciousness, be- longing to that which is presented to consciousness, as opposed to conscious- ness itseK. Actual, based on actv^, past participle of Latin agere, to do or act, signifies really existing as distinguished from an idea in the mind — that which is as compared with what we should hke to have it. According to these definitions, the two terms seem to have the same meaning, but objective is much more Hmited in its appUcation than actual. That which is objective is sim- ply outside of ourselves; that which is actual is that which really exists. Though, in one sense, actual implies that contrast between the thing beheld and the mind beholding indicated in objec- tive, that which is within the mind may also be thought of as actual. We speajk of "my actual thought," "my actual feeling — implying a contrast between reality and unreality within the mind itself. Again that which is objective is not necessarily actual or really ex- istent—as a whole school of philos- ophers'have pointed out. In common speech actual is a word of frequent and various uses; objective is a rather spe- cial and scientific term. OBLATION. . See Offering. OBLIGATION. See Duty. OBLIGE. See Bind; CoMPEii. OBLIGED. See Indebted. OBLIGING. See Civil. OBLITERATE. See Blot. OBLIVION. See Forgetfulness. OBLONG, Oval. Oblong, in Latin oblongus, from the intensive syllable ob, across, or over, signifies very long, longer than it is broad. Oval, from the Latin ovum, an egg, signifies egg- shaped. The oval is a species of the oblong: what is oval is oblong; but what is oblong is not always oval. Ob- long is pecuharly appUed to figures formed by right lines, that is, all rec- tangular parallelograms, except squares, are oblong; but the oval is applied to curvilinear oblong figures, as ellipses, which are distinguished from the circle: tables are oftener oblong than oval; gar- den beds are as frequently oval as they are oblong. OBLOQUY. See Reproach. OBNOXIOUS, Offensive. Ob-,ox- iou^, from ob, against, or in the way of, and noxious, signifies either being in the way of what is noxious or being OBSTINATE 527 very noxious or hateful. Offensive, from 06, against, and a stem fend, meaning to dash, signifies apt to give offeLce or displeasure. The obnoxious conveys more than the offensive, im- plying (though this use is now obso- lete) to receive as well as to give offence; a man may be obnoxious to evils as well as obnoxious to persons. In the sense of giving offence, ob- noxious implies as much as hateful, offensive Uttle more than displeasing: a man is obnoxious to a party to whose interests or principles he is opposed* he may be offensive to an individual merely on account of his manners or any particular actions. Men are ob- noxious only to their fellow-creatures, but they may be offensive, though not obnoxious, to their Maker. Persons only are obnoxious to others, thin^ as well as persons are offensive; dust is offensive to the eye; soimds are offensive to the ear; advice, or even one's own thoughts, may be offensive to the mind. See also Subject. OBSCURE. See Dark; Eclipse. OBSEQUIES. See Funeral. OBSEQUIOUS. See Obedient. OBSERVANCE. See Form; Ob- servation. OBSERVANT. See Mindful. OBSERVATION, Observance. These terms derive their use from the different, significations of the verb : ob- servation is the act of observing ob- jects with the view to examine them (see Notice): observance is the act of observing in the sense of keeping or holding sacred (see Keep). From a minute observation of the human body, anatomists have discovered the circu- lation of the blood and the soiu-ce of all the humors; by a strict observance of truth and justice a man acquires the title of an upright man. See also Remark. Observe, Watch. — Observe (see Guard). Watch (see Notice). These terms agree in expressing the act of looking at an object; but to observe is not to look after so strictly as is impUed by to tvatch; a general observes the motions of an enemy when they are in no particular state of ac- tivity; he uxUches the motions of an enemy when they are in a state of commotion; we observe a thing in order to draw an inference from it: we vxitch anything in order to discover what may happen: we observe with coolness; we uxUch with eagerness: we observe carefully; we tcatch narrowly: the conduct of mankind in general is observed; the conduct of suspicious individuals is watched. See also Keep; Notice; See. OBSERVER. See Looker-on. OBSOLETE. See Old. OBSTACLE. See Difficultt. OBSTINATE.CoNTUMACious, Stub- born, Headstrong, Heady. Ob^ir note, in Latin obstinatus, participle of obstino, from 06 and the stem found in stare, to stand, signifies standing in the way of another. Contumacious (see Contumacy). Stubborn, Middle Eng- lish stobum, comes from Anglo-vSaxon stybb. Modem English stub, and sig- nified originally like a stick or stub re- maining in the ground; hence not easi- ly moved. Headstrong signifies strong in the head or the mind; and heady, incUned, so to speak, to follow one s own head. Obstinacy is a habit of the mind; contumacy is either a particular state of feeling or a mode of action; ob- stinacy consists in an attachment to one's own mode of acting; contumacy consists in contempt of others: the obstinate man adheres tenaciously to his own ways, and opposes reason to reason; the contumacious man dis- putes the right of another to control his actions, and opposes force to force. Obstinacy interferes with a man's pri- vate conduct and makes him bUnd to reason; contumacy is an offenct* against lawful authority; the contumacious man sets himself against his superiors: when young people are obstinate they are re- calcitrant to education; when grown people are contumacious they are trou- olesome subjects to the king. The stubborn and the headstrong are species of the obstinate: the formej lies altogether in the perversion of the will; the latter in the porvorsion of the judgment: the stubborn person wills what he wills; the headstrong person thinks what he thinks. Stubbomttees is mostly inherent in a person's nature; a headstrong temper is commonly asso- ciated with violence and impetuosity 628 OBSTRUCT of character. Obstinacy discovers it- self in persons of all ages and stations; a stvbbom and headstrong disposition betrays itself mostly in those who are expected to conform to the will of an- other. Heady may be said of any who are fuU of conceit and bent upon following their own desires. OBSTRUCT. See Hinder. OBTAIN. See Acquire; Get. OBTRUDE. See Intrude. OBTUSE, Blunt, Dull. All these words have the same original meaning; they are aU opposed to sharp. Obtuse is the opposite of the sharp point of an angle of less than forty-five degrees; blunt (of imknown origin) is the oppo- site of a sharp point; dull is the opposite of a sharp edge, such as the blade of a knife. Dull and obtuse are also given a mental apphcation (see Dull), obtuse referring to particular cases of didness, not to the general character indicated by dtdl. Blunt has a moral application, referring to the manners and disposi- tion of one who is not finely responsive or adaptable to the feelings and con- ditions of those around him, who of- fends by rude telling of unsavory truth, etc. OBVIATE. See Prevent. OBVIOUS. See Apparent; Tan- gible. OCCASION, Opportunitt. Occon sion, in Latin occasio, from obcasio, from ob, in the way of, and cadere, to fall, signifies that which falls in the way so as to produce some change. Op- portunity, in Latin opportunitas, from opportunus {ob, near, and portus, har- bor) , signifies near the harbor or in ac- coraance with the desires or needs. These terms are applied to the events of life; but the occasion is that which determines our conduct and leaves us no choice; it amounts to a degree of necessity: the opportunity is that which invites to action; it tempts us to embrace the moment for taking the step. We do things, therefore, as the occasion requires, or as the op- portunity offers. There are many occasions on which a man is called upon to uphold his opinions. There are but few opportunities for men in general to distinguish themselves. Occasion, Necessity. — Occasion in- cludes, necessity excludes, the idea of choice or alternative. We are regu- lated by the occasion, and can exercise our own discretion; we yield or sub- mit to the necessity, without even the exercise of the wUl. On the death of a relative we have occasion to go into mourning if we do not wish to offer an affront to the family; but there is no express necessity: in case of an attack on our persons there is a necessity of self-defence for the preservation of hfe. Occasional, Casiud. — These are both opposed to what is fixed or stated; but occasional carries with it more the idea of infrequency, and casual that of un- fixedness, or the absence of all design. A minister is termed an occasional preacher who preaches only on cer- tain occasions; his preaching at a par- ticular place or on a certain day may be casual. Our acts of charity may be occasional, but they ought not to be casual. OCCULT. See Secret, OCCUPANCY, Occupation. These words derive their meaning from the different acceptations of the primitive verb occupy, the former being used to express the state of holding or pos- sessing any object, the latter to express the act of taking possession of, or the state of being in possession. He who has the occupancy of land enjoys the fruits of it: the occupation of a covmtry by force of arms is of Httle avail un- less one has an adequate force to main- tain one's ground. Both words are employed in regard to houses and lands, but when the term occupation is taken in the sense of a business it is suffi- ciently distinguished to need no illus- tration. See also Business. OCCUPY. See Hold. OCCUR. See Transpire. OCCURRENCE. See Event. ODD, Uneven. Odd, in Swedish udda, connected with the Dutch oed, and German oede, empty, deserted, signifying something wanted to match, seems to be a mode of the uneven; both are opposed to the even, but odd is said only of that which has no fellow; the uneven is said of that which does not square or come to an even point: of numbers we say that they are either I odd or uneven; but of gloves, shoes, OFFENCE 529 and everything which is made to cor- respond we say that they are odd when they are single; but that they are uneven when they are both dif- ferent: in like manner, a plank is un- even which has an unequal surface or disproportionate dimensions; but a piece of wood is odd which will not match or suit with any other piece. See also Particular. ODIOUS. See Hateful. ODOR. See Smell. OFFENCE, Trespass, Transgres- sion, Misdemeanor, Misdeed, Af- front. Offence is here the general term, signifying merely the act that offends (see Displease) or runs counter to something else. Offence is properly indefinite; it merely impUes an object without the least suggestion of the nature of the object; trespass and transgression have a positive reference to an object tres- passed upon or transgressed; trespass is contracted from trans and pa^s (from Latin passus, step), that is, a stepping beyond; and transgress, from trans and g'-essu^ (participle of gredi), a going eyond. The offence, therefore, which constitutes a trespass arises out of the laws of property; a passing over or treading upon the property of another is a trespass: the offence which con- stitutes a transgression derives from the laws of society in general, which fix the boundaries of right and wrong: whoever, therefore, goes beyond or breaks through these bounds is guilty of a transgression. The trespass is a species of offence which peculiarly ap- pU^ to the land or premises of individuals; transgression is a species of moral as well as political evil. Himters are apt to commit trespcLjSs in the eagerness of their pursuit; the passions of men are perpetually misleading them and causing them to commit various transgressions; the term trespass is sometimes employed improperly as regards time and other objects; transgression is always used in one uniform sense as regards rule and law; we trespass upon the time or patience of another; we transgress the moral or civil law. An offence is either pubUc or private; a misdemeanor, the negative of de- meanor, is a coined word from French de, Latin de, intensive, and French mener, to conduct — ultimately from Late Latin minare, to drive cattle, from minaii, to threaten — so that the word meant successively to drive with threats, to lead or conduct, to conduct one's self, and hence came to refer to manners and action. Misde- meanor is prop>erly a private offence, although improperly applied for an offence against public law, for it sig- nifies a wrong demeanor or an offence in one's demeanor against propriety; a misdeed \s always private, it signifies a wrong deed, or a deed which offends against one's duty. Riotous and dis- orderly behavior m company are seri- ous misdemeanors; every act of drunk- enness, lying, fraud, or immoraUty of every kind, is a misdeed. An offence is that which affects per- sons or principles, communities or in- dividuals, and is committed either di- rectly or indirectly against the person; an affront (from ad, to, and Jrontem, brow) is altogether personal, and is made directly in the presence of the 'person affronted; it is an offence against another to speak disrespect- fully of him in his absence; it is an affront to push past him with violence and rudeness. In this sense, whatever offence is committed against our Maker is properly an affront; and whatever offends Him indirectly may also be denominated an affront, as far as His will is opposed and His laws violated. Offender, Delinquent. — The offender is he who offends in anything, either by commission or omission ; the ddinquenl (from delinquere, to fail) signifies prop- erly he who fails by omission, but it is extended to signify failing by the viola- tion of a law. Tliose who go into a wrong place are offenders; those who stay away when they ought to go are delinquents: there are many offenders against the Sabbath who commit vio- lent and open breaches of decorum; there are still more delinquents who never attend a pubUc place of worship. Offending, Offensive. — Offending sig- nifies either actually offending or cal- culated to offend; offensive signifies cal- culated to offend at all times; a |>erson may be offending in his manners to a particular individual, or use an offend- ing expression on a particular occasion 530 OFFER without any imputation on his charac- ter; but if bas manners are offensive, it re- flects both on his temper and education. See also Obnoxious; Umbrage. OFFER, Bid, Tender, Propose. Offer (see Give) is employed for that which is hteraUy transferable, or for that which is indirectly communicable : bid (see Ask) and tender, Kke the word tend, from tendere, to stretch, signifying to stretch forth by way of offering, be- long to offer in the first sense. Propose, from French proposer, Latin pro, be- fore, and French poser, to place (from Late Latin pausare, Greek iravmc, not from Latin ponere), to place or set before, hkewise characterizes a mode of offering, and belongs to offer in the latter sense. To offer is a voluntary and discretionary act; an offer may be accepted or rejected at pleasure; to bid and tender are specific modes of offering which depend on circum- stances: one bids with the hope that one's offer will be accepted; one tenders from a prudential motive and in order to serve specific purposes. We offer money to a poor person as an act of charity or good-nature; we bid a price for the purchase of a house, as a commercial dealing subject to the rules of commerce; we tender a sum of money by way of payment, as a matter of discretion in order to fulfil an obhgation. By the same rule one offers a person the use of one's horse; one bids a sum at an auction; one ten- ders one's services to the government. To offer and propose are both em- ployed in matters of practice or specu- lation; but the former is a less definite and decisive act than the latter; we offer an opinion by way of promoting a discussion; we propose a plan for the deliberation of others. Sentiments which differ widely from the major part of those present ought to be of- fered with modesty and caution; we should not propose to another what we would be unwilling to do ourselves. We commonly offer by way of obliging; we conunonly propose by way of ar- ranging or accommodating. It is an act of puerility to offer to do more than one is enabled to perform; it does not evince a sincere disposition for peace to propose such terms as we know can- not be accepted. Offering, Oblation. — Offering, from offer, and oblation, from oblatio and oblatus, come both from offero, the one from the infinitive, the other from the past participle. The former is, however, a term of much more general and famihar use than the latter. Offerings are both moral and reUgious; oblation is rehgious only; the money which is put into the sacra- mental plate is an offering; the con- secrated bread and wine at the sacra- ment are an oblation. The offering in a religious sense is whatever one offers as a gift by way of reverence to a superior; the oblation is the offering which is accompanied with some par- ticular ceremony. The wise men made an offering to our Saviour, but not prop- erly an oblation; the Jewish sacrifices, as in general all religious sacrifices, were in the proper sense oblations. OFF-HAND. See Unpremeditated. OFFICE, Place, Charge, Func- tion. Office, in Latin, officium, from officio, signifies either the duty per- formed or the situation in which the duty is performed. Place compre- hends no idea of duty, for there may be sinecure places which are only nominal offices and designate merely a relationship with the government: every office, therefore, of a public nature is in reaUty a place, yet every place is not an office. The place of secretary of state is likewise an office, but that of ranger of a park is a place only, and not always an office. An office is held; a place is filled: the office is given or intrusted to a person; the pUice is granted or conferred : the office reposes a confidence and imposes a responsi- bility; the place gives credit and in- fluence: the office is bestowed on a man from his qualification; the place is granted to him by favor or as a re- ward for past services; the office is more or less honorable; the place is more or less profitable. In an extended appU cation of the terms office and place, the latter has a much lower signification than that of the former, since the office is always connected with the state or is some- thing responsible; but the place may be a place for menial labor: the offices are multipUed in time of war; the places for domestic service are more OLD 531 numerous in a state of peace and pros- perity. The office is frequently taken not with any reference to the place occupied, but simply to the thing oone; this brings it nearer in signification to the term charge (see Care). An office imposes a task or some performance: a charge imposes a responsibility; we have always something to do in an offi^x, always something to look after in a charge; the offi/x is either public or private, the charge is always of a private and personal nature: a per- son performs the offi^x of a magistrate or of a minister; he undertakes the charge of instructing youth or of being a guardian, or of conveying a person's property from one place to another. The office is that which is assigned by another; function is properly the act of discharging or completing an offi/x or business, from functus, participle of fungor, viz.,finem and ago, to put an end to or bring to a conclusion; it is ex- tended in its acceptation to the office itself or the thing done. In its strict sense, therefore, the offixx is performed only by conscious or intelligent agents who act according to their instructions; the function, on the other hand, is an operation either of unconscious or of conscious agents acting according to a given rule. The office of a herald is to proclaim public events or to communicate circumstances from one public body to another: a minister performs lus functions, or the body performs its functions. The word office is sometimes em- ployed in the same application by the personification of nature, which as- signs an offixx to the ear, to the tongue, to the eye, and the hke. In this case the word office is applied to what is occasional or partial; function to that which is habitual and essential. When the frame becomes overpowered by a sudden shock, the tongue will fre- quently refuse to perform its office; when the animal functions are impeded for a length of time, the vital power ceases to exist. See also Business. OFFICIOUS. See Active. OFFSPRING, Progeny, Issue. Offspring is that which springs from; progeny, that which is brought forth or out of; issue, that which issues or proceeds from; all used in relation to the family or generation of the human species. Offspring is a familiar term applicable to one or many chil- dren; progeny is employed only as a collective noim for a number; issue is used in an indefinite manner with- out particular regard to number. When we speak of the children them- selves we denominate them the off- spring; when we speak of the parents, we denominate the children their progeny. A child is said to be the only offspring of his parents, or he is said to be the offspring of low parents; a man is said to have a numerous or a healthy progeny, or to leave his progeny in circumstances of honor and pros- perity. The issue is said only in regard to a man that is deceased: he dies with male or female issue, with or without issue; his property descends to his male issue in a direct Une. OFTEN, Frequently. Often, or its contracted form oft, is an English word of unknown origm. Frequently, from Latin frequens, crowded or numerous, signifies a plurality or number of objects. An ignorant man often uses a word without knowing what it means; igno- rant people frequently mistake the meaning of the words they hear. A person goes out very often in the course of a week; he has frequently six or seven persons to visit him in the course of that time. By doing a thing often it becomes habitual: we frequently luc^ the same persons in the route which we often take. OLD, Ancient, Antiqite, Anti- quated, Old-fashioned. Obsolete. Old, in Anglo-Saxon eald, is perhaps from a root signifying to nourishj found in the word alma, fostering, in our phrase aima mater. Ancient, in French ancien. Late Latin antianus and an- tique, antiquated, all come from the Latin ante, before, signifying in general before our time. Old-fashioned signi- fies after an old fashion. Obsolete oomes from the Latin verb obsolucere, to Old signifies what has long existed and still exists; ancient, what existed at a distant period, but does not neces- sarily exist at present; antique, that which has been long ancient, and of 532 OLDER which there remain but faint traces; antiquated, old-fashioned, and obsolete, that which has ceased to be any longer used or esteemed. A fashion is old when it has been long in use; a custom is ancient when its use has long been past ; a bust or statue is antique when the model of it only remains; a per- son looks antiquated whose dress and appearance are out of date; manners which have gone quite out oi fashion are old-fashioned; a word or custom is obsolete which has grown out of use. The old is opposed to the new; some things are the worse for being old, other things are the better. Ancient and antique are opposed to modern: all things are valued the more for being ancient or antique; hence we esteem the writings of the ancients above those of the moderns. The antiquated is op- posed to the customary and established; it is that which we cannot Uke, because we cannot esteem it: the old-fashioned is opposed to the fashionable: there is much in the old-fashioned to Uke and esteem; there is much that is ridicu- lous in the fashion: the obsolete is opposed to the current; the obsolete may be good; the current may be vulgar and mean. See also Elderly. OLDER. See Senior. OLD TIMES. See Formerly. OLIO, Farrago, Hodge - podge. These are terms borrowed from various languages signifying a mixed food of some sort, and hence, figuratively, any jumble or mixture. They differ from each other in the exact character of the mixed dish indicated and in the fre- quency and extent of their use as figurative terms. Olio, a mistaken form for olia, is intended to represent Spanish olla, Latin olla, a round earthen pot or dish, and hence that which is frequently served in the dish — i. e., a mixture of different kinds of meat and vegetables. Farrago is a mixed food served to cattle. Hodge-podge is a corruption of hotch-pot, from French hocher, to shake, and pot (Anglo-Saxon pott). The Scotch form of hodge-podge, besides implying a mixture of various ingredients, means a thick broth of meat and vegetables. Of these three terms hodge-podge is the only one which has come into general colloquial use. OMEN, Prognostic, Presage. All these terms express some token or sign of what is to come. Omen, in Latin omen, prognostic, in Greek TrpoyvuxTTiKov, from irpo, before, and yvoffTiKog, good at knowing, signifies the sign by which one judges a thing beforehand, because a prognostic is rather a deduction by the use of the understanding. Presage (see Augur). The omen and prognostic are both drawn from external objects; the pres- age is drawn from one's own feelings. The omen is drawn from objects that have no necessary connection with the thing they are made to represent ; it is the fruit of the imagination and rests on superstition: the prognostic, on the contrary, is a sign which partakes in some degree of the quaUty of the thing denoted. Omens were drawn by the heathens from the flight of birds or the entrails of beasts — "Aves dant omina dira," Tibullus — and often from dif- ferent incidents; thus Ulysses, when landed on his native island, prayed to Jupiter that he would give him a double sign by which he might know that he should be permitted to slay the suitors of his wife; and when he heard the thunder and saw a maiden supplicating the gods in the temple he took these for omens that he should immediately proceed to put in execu- tion his designs. Prognostics are dis- covered only by an acquaintance with the objects in which they exist, as the prognostics of a mortal disease are known to none so well as the physician; the prognostics of a storm or tempest are best known to the mariner. In an extended sense, the word omen is also applied to objects which serve as a sign, so as to enable a person to draw a rational inference, which brings it nearer in sense to the prognostic and presage; but the omen may be said of that which is either good or bad; the prognostic and presage, when it ex- presses a sentiment, mostly of that which is unfavorable. It is an omen of our success if we find those of whom we have to ask a favor in a good humor; the spirit of discontent which pervades the countenances and dis- course of a people is a prognostic of some popular commotion. The imagination is often filled with strange presages. OPAQUE 533 When presage is taken for the out- ward sign, it is understood favorably, or in an indifferent sense. OMIT. See Neglect. OMNIPRESENT. See Ubiquitous. OMNISCIENT, All -KNOWING, All-seeing, All-wise, Infallible. Omniscient, a Latin compound of omnis, all, and sciens, knowing, from sdo, to know, in French omniscient, Spanish omnisciente, is the adjective form of omniscience, one of three attributes of Grod, the others being omnipresence, everywhere, and omnipotence, infinite Cower: it signifies universal, un- ounded, infinite knowledge and in- finite wisdom. In the application of the terms to God, the only proper one, all-wise, implies the quaUty we accord Him of possessing all the wisdom that has ever existed or ever can exist; all-knowing, the quaUty of possession of the fullest possible knowledge of all things; all-seeing, Uterally, the quaUty of seeing every person and thing; as a substantive, the Being who alone can see all persons and things — God; and infallible, the quaUty of being su- premely perfect, incapable of erring or faiUng in anything, of being at all times and under all conditions certain, sure, and indisputable. See also Infallible. ON, Upon. There is now Uttle dif- ference between these two words; euphony and rhythm generally deter- mine the choice between them on the part of a good writer. Upon is pre- ferred when motion into position is indicated, as in the sentence "Place the book upon the table"; on is pre- ferred when merely rest or supp>ort is to be indicated, as in the sentence, "The book is on the table." ONCE, Erst, Formerly. Once, from Anglo-Saxon an, one, means literally at one time, referring to a particular time in the past. Erst is the superlative corresponding to the E reposition and conjunction ere, Anglo- axon oer, before, and also means at a time before this. It is now used only in poetry or in poetic prose. Formerly is from the comparative form answer- ing to erst. It means before this time. It differs from once in emphasizing not the one time in the past, but the rela- tion of that time to the present. ONE, Single, Only. Unity is the common idea of aU these terms; and at the same time the whole significa- tion of one, which is opposed to none; single, in Latin singiUus, each or one by itself, probably contracted from sine angvlo, without an angle, because what is entirely by itself cannot form an angle, signifies that one which is abstracted from others, and is par- ticularly opposed to two, or a double which may form a pair; only, contracted from Anglo-Saxon an-lic, Uterally one- like, signifying in the form of unity, is employed for that of which there is no more. A person has one child is a positive expression that bespeaks its own meaning: a person has a sirigle child conveys the idea that there ought to be or might be more, that more were expected, or that once there were more: a person has an only chUd impUes that he never had more. See also Solitary. ONSET. See Attack. ONWARD, Forward, Progres- sive. Onward is taken in the Uteral sense of going nearer to an object: forward is taken in the sense of going from an object, or going farther in the line before one: progressive, from pro, forward, and gressus, past participle of grede, itself from gradtis, a step, has the sense of going gradually, or step by step, before one. A person goes onward who does not stand stiU; he goes forward who does not recede ; he goes progressively who goes forward at certain intervals. Onward is taken only in the proper acceptation of travelling; the traveller who has lost his way feels it necessary to go onward with the hope of arriving at some ix>int; forward is employed in the improper as weU as the proper appUcation; a traveller goes forward in order to reach his point of destination as quickly as possible; a learner uses his utmost en- deavors in order to get forward in his learning: progressively is employed only in the improper application to what re- quires time and labor in order to bring it to a conclusion; every man goes on progressively in his art, until he arrives at the point of perfection attainable by him. OPALESCENT. See Nacreous. OPAQUE, Dark. Opaque, in Latin 534 OPEN apacus, corresponds in meaning to the native English dark (Anglo-Saxon deorc); the word opaque is to dark as the species to the genus, for it expresses that species of darkness which is in- herent in soUd bodies, in distinction from those which emit light from them- selves or admit of hght into them- selves; it is therefore employed sci- entifically for the more vulgar and familiar term dark. On this groimd the earth is termed an opaque body in dis- tinction from the sun, moon, and other luminouq bodies: any soUd substance, as a tree or a stone, is an opaque body, in distinction from glass, which is a clear or transparent body. OPEN. See Candid; Fkank; Pub- lic; Tangible. OPENING, Aperture, Cavity. Opening signifies in general any place left open without defining any cir- cumstances; the aperture is generally a specific kind of opening which is considered scientifically: there are openings in a wood when the trees are partly cut away; openings in streets by the removal of houses; or openings in a fence that has been broken down; but anatomists speak of apertures in the skull or in the heart, and the naturalist describes the apertures in the nests of bees, ants, beavers, and the Uke; the opening or aperture is the commence- ment of an enclosure; the cavity is the whole enclosure: hence they are fre- quently as a part to the whole: many animals make a cavity in the earth for their nests, with only a small aper- ture for their egress and ingress. OPERATE. See Act. OPINIONATED, Opinionative, Conceited, Egotistical. A fondness for one's opinion bespeaks the opinion- ated man: a fond conceit of one's self bespeaks the conceited man: a fond attachment to himself bespeaks the egotistical jnan: a Uking for one's self or one's own is evidently the common idea that runs through these terms; they differ in the mode and in the object. P^ AA opinionated msii is not oiJr fond of Wf owji^pinion, but full of am own opinion; t>^ has an opinion on every- thing, which is the best possible opinion, and is therefore delivered freely to every one, that they may profit in forming their own opinions. A conceited man has a conceit or a fond opinion of his own talent; it is not only high in comparison with others, but it is so high as to be set above others. The conceited ipan does not want to follow the ordinary means of acquiring knowledge: his conceit suggests to him that his talent will supply labor, apphcation, reading, and study, and every other contrivance which men have commonly employed for their improvement; he sees by in- tuition what another learns by experi- ence and observation; he knows in a day what others want years to acquire; he learns of himself what others are contented to get by means of instruc- tion. The egotistical man makes him- self the darUng theme of his own con- templation; he admires and loves himself to that degree that he can talk and think of nothing else; his children, his house, his garden, his rooms, and the Uke, are the incessant theme of his conversation, and become invaluable from the mere circum- stance of belonging to him. An opin- ionated man is the most unfit for con- versation, which affords pleasure only by an alternate and equable commum-! cation of sentiment. A conceited ^Sa^^ is the most unfit for co-operation, where a junction of talent and effort is essential to bring things to a con- clusion; an egotistical i^lIS-is the most linfit to be a companion or friend, forSfls t|ICdoes not kno\5i kow tQjyalue or hke anything out of Hy^elf . VA» o^'^ 'Hft./ , Opinion, Sentiment, Notion. — Opin- ion, in Latin from opinor, think or judge, is the work of the head. Sentir ment, from sentio, feel, is the work of the heart. Notion, in Latin notio, from nosco, to know, is a simple operation of the thinking faculty. We fQjm opinions, we have senti- ments: we get notions. Opinions are formed on speculative matters; they are the result of reading, experience, and reflection: sentiments are enter- tained on matters of practice; they are the consequence of habits and cir- cumstances: notions are gathered from sensible objects and arise out of the casualties of hearing and seeing. One forms opinions on religion as respects its doctrines; one has sentiments on OPPOSE 535 religion as respects its practice and its precepts. The heathens formed opin- ions respecting the immortality of the soul, but they amoimted to nothing more than opinions. Christians enter- tain sentiments of reverence toward God as their creator, and of dependence upon Him as their preserver. Opinions are more liable to error than sentiments. The opinion often spriags from the imagination, and in all cases is but an inference or deduction which falls short of certain knowledge: opin- ions, therefore, as individual opinions, may be false: sentiments, on the other hand, depend upon the moral consti- tution or habits; they may, there- fore, be good or bad, according to the character or temper of the p>erson. Notions are still more liable to error than either; they are the immatured decisions of the iminformed mind on the appearances of things. The differ- ence of opinion among men on the most important questions of human Ufe is a sufficient evidence that the mind of man is very easily led astray in matters of opinion: whatever dif- ference of opinion there may be among Christians, there is but one sentiment of love and good-will among those who follow the example of Christ rather than their own passions: the notions of a Deity are so imperfect among savages in general that they seem to amount to Httle more than an indistinct idea of some superior invisible agent. OPPONENT. See Enemy. OPPORTUNE, Auspicious, Favor- able, Seasonable, Timely. Oppor- tune, the adjective form of opportunity, from the Latin opportunus, signifies that which is fit or convenient, either as to a time, place, or occasion. At*- spicious is a term appUed only to things, and such as are casual or only indicative of good, those having prom- ise of success or happiness, that are f>ropitious, the term being derived rom auspicium, an augury from birds, from aids, a bird, and: specere, to in- spect, hence, omens of success. Favorable impUes a condition that is propitious, advantageous, friendly, one that is wholly acceptable, as & favorable reply, a favorable day or time; season- able (from Late Latm satio, a sowing, from satus, past participle of serere, to sow, signifying the right time for sowing the seed), that which occurs or is done in a good or proper time, and so is specially welcome, that which belongs to a particular period of time, a benefit received in the time of need, in the nick of time; and timely, that which comes to pass at the right time, when most needed, when expected or promised. Differences between the terms seasonable and timely are criti- cally considered in the article on Timely. OPPORTUNITY. See Occasion. OPPOSE, Resist, Withstand, Thwart. The action of setting one thing up against another is obviously expressed by ail these terms, but they differ in the manner and the circum- stances. To oppose (see Contradict) is the most general and unqualified term; it simply denotes the relative position of two objects, and when ap- plied to persons it, does not necessarily imply any personal characteristic: we may oppose reason or force to force; or things may be opposed to each other which are in an opposite direction, as a house to a church. Resist, signify- ing, literally, to stand back, away from, or against, is always an act of more or less force when applied to persons; it is mostly a culpable action, as when men resist lawful authority; resistance is, in fact, always bad, unless in case of actual self-defence. Opposition may be made in any form, as when we op- gose a person's admittance into a house y our personal efforts: or oppose his admission into a society by a declara- tion of our opinions. Resistance is al- ways a direct action, as when we resist an invading army by the sword, or resist the evidence of our senses by den)ring our assent; or, in relation to things, when wood or any hard sub- stance resists the violent efforts of steel or iron to make an impression. With in tvithsland has the force of against, re in resist the force of back, but stand corresponds to siat, from Latin sistere, to stand. Thtoart is a Scandinavian word originally an ad- verb (compare a/Auwrt, meaning across), signifying across, in the contrary direc- tion, and thence developing into a verb meaning to cross, to work against. These words are modes of resistance ap- 536 OPPOSITE plicable only to conscious agents. To withstand is negative; it implies not to yiM to any foreign agency: thus, a person withstands the entreaties of another to comply with a request. To thwart is positive; it is actively to cross the will of another: thus humorsome people are perpetually thwarting the wishes of those with whom they are in connection. It is a happy thing when a young man can withstand the allure- ments of pleasm-e. It is a part of a Christian's duty to bear with patience the imtoward events of life that thwart his purposes. See also Combat; Object. OPPOSITE. See Adverse. OPPROBRIUM. See Infamy. OPPUGN. See Confute. OPTIMISTIC, Cheerful, San- guine. AU these terms mean in gen- eral hopeful, inclined to look on the bright side of things, but they differ in the suggested source of the hopeful- ness. Optimistic expresses an intel- lectual attitude, cheerfvl a moral at- titude, and sanguine a quality of temper having a physical basis. Optimistic comes from Latin optimus, best, and means seeing the best in everything. For cheerfvl see Cheer. Sanguine, from Latin sanguis, blood, meant originally full blooded, and describes the attitude to Ufe of the full-blooded people, of abounding animal spirits, who find easy what is hard for others, and are self-confident and bold, being conscious of their own capacity to face life and make the best of a situation. San- guine, being founded on a physical con- dition, indicates a hopefulness that is really less enduring and stable than that indicated in optimistic or cheerful. OPTION, Choice. Option is im- mediately of Latin derivation (from optare, to wish), and is consequently a term of less frequent use than the word choice, for the derivation of which see Choose. The former term im- plies an uncontrolled act of the mind; the latter a simple leaning of the will. We speak of option only as regards one's freedom from external constraint in the act of choosing: one speaks of choice only as the simple act itself. The option or the power of choosing is given; the choice itself is made: hence we say a thing is at a person's option, or it is his own option, or the option ia left to him, in order to designate his freedom of choice more strongly than is expressed by the word choice itself. OPULENCE. See Riches. ORACULAR, Authoritative, Dog- matical, Prophetic. Oracular, in Latin oraadaris, from oraculum, an oracle, and that from oro, to speak, imphed in its ancient sense that which related to an announcement from the gods in answer to some inquiry, a prophetic declaration, also to the places where such announcements were made, and to the deities making them. Such responses were closely allied to augury, but with this difference, that auguries could be taken anywhere, while the oracular places were defined and hm- ited. From the common beUef that the responses or answers were given by or through the influence of a certain divine afflatus, the people came to look upon them as authoritative, as proceed- ing from a source that could not be questioned, and, consequently, placed implicit confidence in them. Now, in ordinary language, that is avihoritaiive which proceeds from a source that has the power to act, com- mand, determine, and this source may be beneficial to aU imder its jurisdic- tion. Authoritative, therefore, has in general a good significance. Dogmat- ical, from Greek S6y}ia (Enghsh dogma) ^ an opinion, indicates an attempt to be authoritative — to express opinions with a show and assumption of authority not recognized by others; it has in general a somewhat derogatory im- pUcation. These words are allied to oracular through the common idea of expressing a judgment with a show of authority. Prophetic impUes an occurrence fore- told, predicted, or presaged, and here again we revert to the ancient oracles, as their chief announcements were declarations of what was about to happen and what the inquirers should and should not do. The prophets of Holy Writ were men divinely inspired, who frequently uttered predictions of coming events, both as warnings and encouragement to the people. ORAL. See Verbal. ORATION. See Address. ORATORY. See Elocution. ORDINANCE 537 ORB. See Circle. ORDAIN. See Appoint. ORDER, Method, Rule. Order (see Dispose) is applied in general to everything that is disposed; method, in French methode, Latin methodus, Greek fikQoSdc, from /itm and 6Wc, or a way after, signifying the ready or right way to do a thing; and ride, from Latin regula, a rule, and regere, to govern, direct, or make straight (the former expressing the act of making a thing straight or that by which it is made so, the latter the abstract quality of being so), are applied only to that which is done; the order lies in con- sulting the time, the place, and the object, so as to make them accord; the method consists in the right choice of means to an end; the rule consists in that which wiU keep us in the right way. Where there are a number of objects there must be order in the dis- position of them; where there is work to carry on, or any object to obtain, or any art to follow, there must be method in the pursuit; a tradesman or merchant' must have method in keeping his accounts; a teacher must have a method for the communication of in- struction: the nde is the part of the method; it is that on which the method rests; there cannot be method without ride, but there may be rule without method; the method varies with the thing that is to be done; the rule is that which is permanent and serves as a guide under all circumstances. We adopt the method and follow the rule. A painter adopts a cert&m method of preparing his colors according to the rules laid down by his art. Order is said of every complicated machine, either of a physical or a moral kind: the order of the universe, by which every part is made to har- monize with the other part, and all in- dividually with the whole collectively, is that which constitutes its principal beauty: as rational beings, we aim at introducing the same order into the moral scheme of society: order is, there- fore, that which is founded upon the nature of things, and seems in its ex- tensive sense to comprehend all the rest. Method is the work of the understanding, mostly as it is employed in the mechanical process; sometimes, however, as respects intellectual ob- jects. Rule is said either of mechani- cal and physical actions or moral con- duct. The term nde is, however, as before observed, employed distinctly from either order or method, for it ap- plies to the moral conduct of the incfi- vidual. The Christian reUgion contains rides for the guidance of our conduct in all the relations of human society. As epithets, orderly, methodical, and regular are appUed to persons and even to things according to the above distinction of the nouns: an orderly man, or an orderly society, is one who adheres to the established order of things; the former in his domestic habits, the latter in their public capac- ity, their social meetings, and their social measures. A methodical man is one who adopts method in all he sets about; such a one may sometimes run into the extreme of formality, by being precise where precision is not necessary: we cannot "speak of a methodical society, for method is alto- gether a personsd quality. A man is regular, inasmuch as he follows a cer- tain ride in his moral actions, and thereby preserves a uniformity of con- duct: a regular society is one founded by a certain prescribed rule. So we say, an orderly proceeding, or an orderly course, for what is done in due order: a regular proceeding, or a regular course, which goes on according to a pre- scribed nde: a methodical grammar, a methodical delineation, and the like, for what is done according to a given method. See also Appoint; Class; Com- mand; Direction; Dispose; Place; Succession. ORDINANCE, Decree, Edict, Law, Rule. Ordinance, in Old French ordenance, from the Latin ordo, order, signifies a rule of action, an observ- ance commanded, a religious rite or ceremony, a canon of the church,^ an enactment by a legislative bodv. Spe- cifically, the term means an orderly dis- position or arrangement, hence, a rule, custom, rite, ceremony, or observance established by an authority having jurisdiction over whatever may be af- fected by its action. Sovereigns, high political bodies, and courts issue decreet, which are simply orders to produce specified results. 538 ORDINARY The term edict (from Latin e for ex, out, and dictum, participle of dicere, to speak, signifying a formal "speaking out," to be heard by many people) is also apphed to rules and laws promul- gated in the same manner as a decree, but with this difference : a decree (from Latin de, from, and cretum, past parti- ciple of cemere, to separate, meaning to V separate truth from falsehood, good from bad, hence to judge) may be the award of an umpire, an arbitration, or a special authority designated to deter- mine a question in controversy, and may be the subject of review by a higher -authority, while an edict is the proclamation of that which takes on the form and force of a law, a man- date, a command. A law emanates from a regularly constituted authority, and has a power behind it to insure its respect and ob- servance, as a law or act of the United States Congress can be sustained, if necessary,^by the entire army and navy of the country. The relation of the term law to other synonymous terms is discussed in the articles on Lawful and Maxim. A ride differs from the preceding terms in that it is a direc- tion, a standard or guide; in law, an order by a court on a motion affecting parties to a suit, to regulate the practice of a court, or to establish a principle by a decision. This term is also further discussed in the article on Order. ORDINARY. See Common. ORGIES. See Saturnalia. ORIENT, Eastern. Orient is the Latin term; eastern, the Anglo-Saxon word. The former comes from the present participle of the verb oriri, to rise, signifying the quarter where the sun rises. Eastern also signifies the quarter where the sun rises; it may be allied to the stem of the Latin aurora, signifying the dawn. Orient differs from eastern in the poetic and imaginative connotations that it has acquired. Eastern is the hteral term, signifying from the east as a quarter of the heavens or of the earth. Orient signifies characteristic of the east — suggesting either the light and splendor of the sunrise or the rich lands of the east, whence came pearls and gold and spice and gorgeous fabrics in the old days. ORIFICE, Perforation. Orifice, in Latin orifidum or orifacium, from OS, mouth, and facere, to make, signi- fies a made mouth, that is, an opening made, as it were. Perforation, in Latin perforatio, from per, through, and forare, cognate with EngUsh bore, to pierce, signifies a piercing through. These terms are both scientifically employed to designate certain cavities in the human body; but the former signifies that which is natural, the latter that which is artificial: all the vessels of the human body have their orifices, which are so constructed as to open or close of themselves. Surgeons are frequently obliged to make per- forations into the bones: sometimes perforation may describe what comes from a natural process, but it denotes a cavity made through a solid sub- stance; but the orifice is particularly appUcable to such openings as most resemble the mouth in form and use. In this manner the words may be extended in their application to other bodies besides animal substances, and applied to other sciences besides anat- omy : hence we speak of the orifice of a tube, the orifice of any flower, and the like; or the perforation of a tree by means of a cannon-ball or an iron instrument. ORIGIN, Original, Beginning, Rise, Source. Origin and original are both derived from the Latin oriri, to rise, the former designating the ab- stract property of rising, the latter the thing that is risen; the first of its kind from which others rise. Origin refers us to the cause as well as the period of beginning; original is said of those things which give an origin to another: the origin serves to date the existence of a thing; the term original serves to show the author of a thing, and is opposed to the copy. The origin of the world is described in the first chapter of Genesis; Adam was the original from whom all the human race has sprimg. Origin has regard to the cause, be- ginning simply to the period, of exist- ence: everything owes its existence to the origin; it dates its existence from the beginning; there cannot be an origin without a beginning; but there may be a beginning where we do not OUTWARD 539 speak of an origin. We look to the origin of a thing in order to learn its nature: we look to the beginning in order to learn its duration. When we have discovered the origin of a quarrel, we are in a fair way of becoming ac- quainted with the aggressors; when we trace a quarrel to the beginning, we may easily ascertain how long it has lasted. Origin and rise are both employed for the primary state of existence, but the latter is a much more famiUar term than the former: we speak of the origin of an empire, the origin of a family, the origin of a dispute, and the like; but we say that a river takes its rise from a certain mountain, that certain disorders take their rise from particular circumstances which happen in early hfe: it is, moreover, observ- able that the term origin is confined solely to the first commencement of a thing's existence; but rise compre- hendfs its gradual progress in the first stages of its existence; the origin of the noblest families is in the first in- stance sometimes ignoble; the largest rivers take their rise in small streams. We look to the origin as to the cause of existence: we look to the rise as to the situation in which the thing com- mences to exist, or the process by which it grows up into existence. The origin and rise are said of only one object; the source is said of that which produces a succession of objects: the origin of evil in general has given rise to much idle speculation; the love of pleasure is the source of incalculable mischief to individuals, as well as to society at large: the origin exists but once; the source is lasting: the origin of every family is to be traced to our first parent, Adam; we have a never- failing source of consolation in religion. See also^iRSx; Germ; Primary. ORNATE, Adorned, Decorated, Embellished. For the distinction be- tween adorned, decorated, and embel- lished see the article on Adorn where the verbs of which these are participles are critically discussjd. Ornate dif- fers from these words in intensity, and in not so distinctly suggesting the ap- plication of something external in order to beautify. That which is ornate is very much adorned, decorated, or em- bellished; ornate is, as }t were in mean- ing, if not in form, the superlative of these words. Moreover, ornate sug- gests gorgeousness and elaborateness inherent in the very desigii or material, not simply apphed from without. ORNITHOPTER. See Aircrapt. ORTHODOX. See Evangelical. OSCILLATE. See Waq. OSCULATION. See Kiss. OSTENSIBLE. See Colorable. OSTENTATION. See Show. OSTRACIZE. See Proscribe. OUT, Abroad, Bbtond. All of these terms signify external to some- thing. Out, Anglo-Saxon ut, signifies external to something enclosed. We speak of being oui of the house, out of the city; of taking valuables out of a chest, etc. Beyond, from Anglo-Saxon geond, modem English yond, com- pounded with the prefix be, means external to some line or limit — on the other side of. Abroad, from Anglo- Saxon a (on) and brad, broad, means in the whole breadth of the land. It means out in the open, and suggests not the definite bounds, but the free- dom and space beyond the bounds. OUTCRY. See Noise. OUTDO. See Exceed. OUTLINE. See Syllabus. OUTLINES. See Sketch. OUTLIVE, Survive. To outliiye is literally to live out the life of another, to five longer: to survive, in French stimwe, Latin simper, beyond, and trivere, to hve, is to live beyond any given period; the former is employed to express the comparison between two Uves; the latter to denote a pro- tracted existence beyond any given term : one person is said properly to outlive another who enjoys a longer life; but we speak of surinving porsoiw or things, in an indefinite or unqualified manner: it is not an unqualified bless- ing to outlive all our nearest relatives and friends; no man can be happy in surviving his honor. OUTRAGE. See Affront. OUTSIDE. See Show. OUTWARD, External, Exterior. Outward, or inclined to the out, after the manner of the out, indefinitely de- scribes the situation; external, from the Latin extemus and extra^ is more definite in its sense, since it is em- 540 OVAL ployed only in regard to such objects as are conceived to be independent of man as a thinking being: hence, we may speak of the outward part of a building, of a board, of a table, a box, and the hke; but of external objects acting on the mind, or of an external agency. Exterior is still more definite than either, as it expresses a higher degree of the outward or external, the former being in the comparative and the latter two in the positive degree: when we speak of anything which has two coats, it is usual to designate the outermost by the name of the exterior; when we speak simply of the surface, without reference to anything behind, it is denominated external: as the ex- terior coat of a walnut, or the external surface of things. In the moral ap- phcation, the external or outward is that which comes simply to the view; but the exterior is that which is promi- nent and which consequently may con- ceal something: a man may sometimes neglect the outside who is altogether mindful of the inward: a man with a pleasing exterior will sometimes gain more friends than he who has more sohd merit. OVAL, See Oblong. OVER. See Above; Yonder. OVERAWE, Daunt, Frighten, In- timidate. Overawe, a compound of the English over and the verb awe (see Awe), signifies, as a transitive, to re- strain by fear or by superior influence. Awe, as a substantive, imphes a fear that is reverential, or a feeling of emo- tion inspired by the contemplation of something subHme, and, as a transitive, to strike, inspire, or impress with feel- ings of reverential respect, or to hold one back or restrain him from some improper act by fear or respect. Over- awe, in contradistinction, imphes not only the usual quality of awe, .but it assumes also the quaUty of a threat, an action that produces apprehension of something serious to come if some- thing else is or is not done previously. To daunt (see Dismay) a person is to check him in some proceeding by alarm- ing him, to thwart, deter, or prevent him in a purpose, and, in an extreme sense, to appall, dismay, cow, and sub- due him; to frighten one is to affright, terrify, shock with sudden fear, and scare him; to intimidate (from Latin timeo, I fear, timidu^, fearful) one is to put him into a state of fear, and this term appUes not only to an act that frightens a person, but to a series of actions that may affect him in his busi- ness and social relations, and on its application serves to restrain or check him in his regular course. The last term has had a very fre- quent apphcation of late to certain workmen who have been intimidated from pursuing their regular occupation by others striving to force them to join in a labor strike or some disturbing labor proceeding, the importunities to do so usually being backed up by vari- ous threats in case of a refusal. Thus operators in an industrial plant may be restrained from continuing at work by intimidations, threats, insinuations, and other acts that cause a fear of conse- quences, and by these acts are overawed into doing what is demanded of them. OVERBALANCE, Outweigh, Pre- ponderate. To overbalance is to throw the balance over on one side. To out- weigh is to exceed in weight. To pre- ponderate, from pro?, before, and pon- dv^, a weight, signifies also to exceed in weight. Although these terms ap- proach so near to each other in their original meaning, yet they have now a different apphcation: in the proper sense, a person overbalances himself who loses his balance and goes on one side; a heavy body ouiweighs one that is light when they are put into the same pair of scales. Overbalance and oui- weigh are hkewise used in the improp- er application; preponderate is never used otherwise: things are said to overbalance which are supposed to turn the scale to one side or the other; they are said to outweigh when they are to be weighed against each other; they are said to preponderate when one weighs down everything else: the evils which arise from innovations in society commonly overbalance the good; the will of a parent should outweigh every personal consideration in the mind, which will always be the case where the power of religion preponderates. OVERBEAR, Bear Down, Over- power, Overwhelm, Subdue. To overbear is to bear one's self over an- other, that is, to make another bear OVERFLOW 541 one's weight; to hear down is literally to bring down by hearing upon; to overpower is to get the jHrwer ever an object; to overwhelm, from whelm, a Scandinavian word signifying to over- turn, to cover with water, meant Uter- ally to drown, to submerge entirely; to subdve (see Conqxtek) is, literally, to lead imdemeath, in the elliptical sense of leading beneath a yoke. A man overhears by carrying himself higher than others, and putting to si- lence those who might claim an equal- ity with him; an overhearing demeanor is most conspicuous in narrow circles, where an individual, from certain casual advantages, affects a superiority over the members of the same com- munity. To bear down is an act of greater violence: one hears down op- position; it is properly the opposing force to force until one side yields, as when one party bears another down. Over-power, as the term imphes, belongs to the exercise of power which may be either physical or moral: one may be overpowered by another who in a strug- gle gets one into his power, or one may be overpowered in an argument when the argument of one's antagonist is such as to bring one to silence. One is overhome o** borne down by the exer- tion of individuals; overpowered by the active efforts of individuals, or by the force of circumstances; overwhelmed by circumstances or thing^ only : over- home by another of superior influence; borne down by the force of his attack; overpowered by numbers, by entreaties, by looks, and the like; and overwhelrned by the torrent of words or the im- petuosity of the attack. Overpower and overwhelm denote a partial superiority; suftdi^e denotes that which is permanent and positive: we may overpower or overwhelm for a time or to a certain degree; but to svbdtie is to get an entire and lasting superiority. Overpower and overwhelm are said of what passes between persons nearly on an equality; but subdue is said of those who are, or may be, reduced to a low state of inferiority : individuals or armies are overpowered or overwhelmed; indi- viduals or nations are subdued. In the moral or extended applica- tion, overhear and hear down both im- ply force or violence, but the latter even more than the former: one passion may be said to overhear another, or to overhear reason. Whatever bears down carries all before it. To overbear, overwhelm, and subdue are likewise appUed to the moral feel- ings, as well as to the external relations of things; but the former two are the effects of external circumstances; the latter follows from the exercise of the reasoning powers: the tender feehngs are overpowered; the mind is over- whelmed with painful feelings; the un- ruly passions are subdued by the force of rehgious contemplation: a p>erson may be so overpowered on seeing a dy- ing friend as to be unable to speak; a person may be so overwhelrned with grief, upon the death of a near and dear relative, as to be imable to at- tend to his customary duties; the passion of anger has been so com- pletely subdued by the influence of rehgion on the heart that instances have been known of the most irascible tempers being converted into the most mild and forbearing. See also Imperious. OVERCOME. See Conquer; Quell. OVERFLOW, Inundate, Deluge. What overflows simply flows over; what inundates (from in and undo, a via,ve)fl/yws into; what de/r^jres (through French from de, for dis, apart, awaj', and luere, to wash) washes away. The term overflow bespeaks abun- dance; whatever exceeds the measure of contents must flxnv over, because it is more than can be held: to inundate be- speaks not only abundance, but vehe- mence; when it inundates it .^oi»s in faster than is desired, it fills to an in- convenient height: to deluge bespeaks impetuosity; a deluge irresistibly car- ries away all before it. This explana- tion of those terms in their proper sense will illustrate their improper ap- plication: the heart is said to overflow with joy, with grief, with bittemeas, and the like, in order to denote the superabundance of the thing; a coun- try is said to be inutuialed by swarms of inhabitants when speaking of num- bers who intrude themselves to the annoyance of the natives; the town is said to be deluged with publications of different kinds when they appear in such 542 OVERHEAR profusion and in such quick succession as to supersede others of more value. OVERHEAR. See Hear. OVERPOWER. See Beat; Over- bear. OVERRULE, Supersede. To over- rule is, Mterally, to get the superiority of rule; and to supersede (from super and seder e), is to get the upper or superior seat; but the former is em- ployed only as the act of persons; the latter is appUed to things as the agents: a man may be overruled in his domestic government, or he may be overruled in a pubhc assembly, or he may be overruled in the cabinet; large works in general supersede the necessity •of smaller ones, by containing that which is superior both in quantity and quahty . OVERRULING. See Prevailing. OVERRUN. See Overspread. OVERSIGHT. See Inadvertency; Inspection. OVERSPREAD, Overrun, Ravage. To overspread signifies simply to cover the whole surface of a body; but to overrun is a mode of spreading, namely, by running; things in general, there- fore, are said to overspread which admit of extension; nothing can be said to overrun but what Uterally or figuratively runs: the face is overspread with spots; the ground is overrun with weeds. To overrun and to ravage (based on French ravir, Late Latin rapire, for rapere) are both employed to imply the active and extended destruction of an enemy; but the former expresses more than the latter: a small body may ravage in par- ticular parts; but immense numbers are said to overrun, as they run into every part; the Barbarians overran all Europe and settled in different coun- tries; detachments are sent out to ravage the country or neighborhood. OVERTHROW. See Beat; Over- turn. OVERTURN, Overthrow, Sub- vert, Invert, Reverse. To overturn is simply to turn over, an act which may be more or less gradual ; but to overthrow is to throw over, which will be more or less violent. To overturn is to turn a thing either with its side or its bottom upward; but to subvert is to turn that under which should be upward: to re- verse is to turn that before which should be behind; and to invert is to place that on its head which should rest on its feet. These terms differ accord- ingly in their appUcation and circum- stances: things are overturned by con- trivance and gradual means; infidels attempt to overturn Christianity by means of ridicule and falsehood : govern- ments are overthrown by violence. To overturn is said of small matters; to subvert only of national or large con- cerns: domestic economy may be over- turned; rehgious or political estabhsh- ments may be subverted: that may be oferfwmed which is simply set up ; that is subverted which has been established : an assertion may be overturned; the best sanctioned principles may by artifice be subverted. To overturn, overthrow, and subvert generally involve the destruction of the thing so overturned, overthrown, or sub- verted, or at least render it for the time useless, and are, therefore, mostly un- allowed acts; but reverse and invert, which have a more particular applica- tion, have a less specific character of propriety: we may reverse a proposition by taking the negative instead of the affirmative; a decree may be reversed so as to render it nugatory; but both of these acts may be right or wrong, according to circumstances: likewise, the order of particular things may be inverted to suit the convenience of parties; but the order of society can- not be inverted without subverting all the principles on which civil society is built. See also Beat. OVERWHELM, Crush. To over- whelm (see also under Overbear) is to cover with a heavy body, so that one should sink under it: to crush (see Break) is to destroy the consistency of a thing by violent pressure: a thing may be crushed by being overwhelmed, but it may be overwhelmed without be- ing crushed; and it may be crushed with- out being overwhelmed: the girl Tar- peia, who betrayed the Capitoline Hill to the Sabines, is said to have been overwhelmed with their arms, by which she was crushed to death: when many persons fall on one he may be over- whelmed, but not necessarily crushed: when a wagon goes over a body, it may be crushed, but not overwhelmed. OWN. See Acknowledge. OWNER, See Possessor. PAINT 543 PACE, Step. Pace, derived from Latin passus, step, is the Latin term corresponding to the native English step (from Anglo-Saxon step-pan), sig- nifying a stretch of the legs. As regards the act, the pace ex- presses the general manner of passing on or moving the body; the step im- plies the manner of setting or extend- ing the foot: the pace is distinguished by being either a walk or a run, and in regard to horses a trot or a gallop: the step is distinguished by being long or short, to the right or left, forward or backward. The same pace may be modified so as to be more or less easy, more or less quick; the step may vary as it is hght or heavy, graceful or vm- graceful, long or short: we may go a slow pace with long steps, or we may go a quick pa4x with short steps: a slow pace is best suited to the solemnity of a funeral; a long step must be taken by soldiers in a slow march. As regards the space passed or stepped over, the pace is a measured distance, formed by a long step; the step, on the other hand, is indefinitely employed for any space stepped over, but particularly that ordinary space which one steps over without an effort: a thousand paxxs was the Roman measurement for a mile; a step or two designates almost the shortest possible distance. PACIFIST, Conscientious Ob- jector, Slacker. These are words which the European war brought into special prominence in England and America. Pacifist and conscientiotcs objector signify one who does not believe in war, but pacifist puts the attitude in fjositive terms, conscientious objector in negative terms. A pacifist is one who beUeves in the establishment of world peace with some provision for an international court of arbitration, a league of nations to support the de- crees of such a court, etc. Conscientious objector was coined to describe those per- sons who, without having any theory concerning the establishment of a pa- cifi£ world, believe that war is morallv' wrong for them and refuse to fight, ft referred primarily to members of such religious sects as the Quakers. The two terms are practically interchange- able. Conscientious objector, being the more inclusive term, now seems to be gaining ground. Slacker is a slang term describing a man who refuses to do his share of the fighting, who is slack in his duty. It is a term of contempt often applied by others to those who would call themselves conscientious ob- jectors or pacifists. PACIFY. See Appease; Mollify; Quell. PAGAN. See Gentile. PAIN, Pang, Agony, Anguish. Pain is connected with the Latin pcena, a penalty. Pang is a word of uncer- tain origin. Agony comes fi^om the Greek dyuvia, a contest, signifjing the labor or pain of a struggle. Anguish, from the Latin angere, to choke (whence anger and anxiety are also derived), signifies the pain arising from choking. Pain, which expresses the feeling that is most repugnant to the nature of all sensible bemgs, is here the generic, and the rest specific, terms: pain and agony are applied indiscriminately to what is physical and mental; pang and anguish mostly signify that which ia mental: pain signifies either an in- dividual feehng or a permanent state; pang is only a particular feeling: agony IS sometimes employed for the individ- ual feehng, but more commonly for the state; anguish is always employed for the state. Pain is indefinite with regard to the degree; it may rise to the highest or sink to the lowest pos- sible degree; the rest are positively high degrees of pain: the pang is a sharp pain; the agony is a severe and permanent pain; the anguish is an overwhelming pain, PAINT, Depict. Paint and depict both come from the Latin pingere, to represent forms and figures: as a verb, to paint is employe*! either literally to 544 PAIR represent figures on paper or to repre- sent circumstances and events by means of words; to depict is used only in this latter sense, but the former word expresses a greater exercise of the imagination than the latter: it is the art of the poet to paint nature in lively colors; it is the art of the his- torian or narrator to depict a real scene of misery in strong colors. As nouns, painting describes rather the action or operation, and picture the result. When we speak of a good painting, we think particularly of its execution as to drapery, disposition of colors, and the like; but when we speak of a fine picture, we refer immediately to the object represented, and the im- pression which it is capable of produc- ing on the beholder: paintings are con- fined either to oil-paintings or paintings in colors: but every drawing, whether in pencil, in crayon, or in India ink, may produce a picture; and we have likewise pictures in embroidery, pict- ures in tapestry, and pictures in mosaic. Painting is employed only in the proper sense; picture is often used figm-atively: old paintings derive a value from the master by whom they were executed ; a well-regulated family, bound together by the ties of affection, presents the truest picture of human happiness. PAIR. See Both; Couple. PALATE, Taste. Palate, in Latin Taste, palatum, signifies the roof of the mouth. Middle English tauten, Old French tcecify, it is opposed to the general or indefinite; a particular day or hour, a particular case, a particular person, are expressions which confine one's attention to one precise object in distinction from the rest; singular, like the word particular, marks but one object, and that which is clearly pomted out in distinction from the rest; but this term differs from the former, inasmuch as the particular is said only of that which one has ar- bitrarily made particular; but the singular is so from its own properties: thus a place is particular when we fix upon it and mark it out in any man- ner so that it may be known from others; a place is singular if it have anything in itself which distinguishes it from others. Odd, in an indifferent sense, is opposed to even, and appUed to objects in general; an odd number, an odd person, an odd book, and the Uke: but it is also employed in a bad sense to mark objects which are totally dissimilar to others; thus an odd idea, an odd conceit, an odd whim, an odd way, an odd place. Eccentric is applied in its proper sense to mathematical lines or circles which have not the same centre, and is never employed in an improper sense: strange, in its proper sense, marks that which is unknown or unusual, as a strange face, a strange figure, a strange place; but in the moral application it i:; like the word odd, and conveys the unfavorable idea of that which is uncommon and not worth knowing; a sfrari^e noise designates not only that which has not been heard before, but that which it is not de- sirable to hear; a strange place may signify not only that which we have been unaccustomed to see, but that which has also much in it that is ob- jectionable. Particular, Individual. — Partiadar (see Peculiar). Individual, in French individual, Latin individuus, with a suffix, sipiifies that which cannot be divided. Both these terms are employed to express one object; but particular is much more specific than individual; the particular confines us to one ob- ject only of many; but individual may be said of any one object among many. A particular object cannot be misun- derstood for any other while it remains particular; but the individual object can never be known from other in- dividual objects while it remains only individual. Particular is a term used in regard to individuals, and is op- posed to the general: individual is a term used in regard to collectives, aJid is opposed to the whole or that which is divisible into parts. See also Circuihstantial; Exact; Special. PARTICULARLY. See EspectaIt LY. PARTISAN. See Follower. PARTNER. See Colleague. PARTNERSHIP. Sec Association. 548 PARTY PARTY. See Faction. PASS, Passport, Safe-conduct, Safeguard. Pass, in French passer, from Late Latin passare, from passus, a step, Spanish pasar, Italian passare, all virtually mean to step, to go; per- mission to go or come, evidenced by a ticket or other document issued by a competent authority. A passport is a warrant of protection issued by a government to one of its citizens to enable the bearer to visit or travel in another country without molestation. An emergency passport may be issued to a citizen of the United States happening to be in a foreign country, under specific circumstances, by certain representatives of the United States in that country. A safe-conduct may be an official warrant issued as above, or a convoy or guard to protect the bearer in or passing through a hostile or a for- eign country. To safeguard a person, a ship, or an important interest is to provide the subject with ample pro- tection in any of the above forms. In the second year of the European • war (1915) it was discovered that many passports issued by the United States government had been forged and had got into the hands of spies of the Teutonic powers. This led the govern- ment to adopt more rigorous regula- tions for the issue of such documents. PASSAGE. See Course. PASSING OVER. See Death PASSIONATE. See Angry. PASSIVE. See Patient. PASSWORD. See Shibboleth. PAST. See Bygone. PASTIME. See Amusement, PATCH. See Part. PATHETIC. See Moving. PATIENCE, Endurance, Resigna- tion. Patience applies to any troubles or pains whatever, small or great; resignation is employed only for those of great moment, in which our dearest interests are concerned: patience, when compared with resignation, is some- what negative; it consists in the abstaining from all complaint or indi- cation of what one suffers: but resig- nation consists in a positive sentiment of conformity to the existing circum- stances, be they what they may. There are perpetual occurrences which are apt to harass the temper, unless one regards them with patience; the mis- fortunes of some men are of so calami- tous a nature that if they have not acquired resignation they must inevita- bly sink imder them. Patience apphes only to the evils that actually hang over us; but there is a resignation connected with a firm trust in Providence which extends its views to futurity and pre- pares us for the worst that may happen. As patience lies in the manner and temper of suffering, and endurance in the act, we may have endurance and not patience: for we may have much to endure, and consequently endurance: but if we do not endure it with an easy mind and without the disturb- ance of our looks and words, we have not patience: on the other hand, we may have patience, but not endurance: for our patience may be exercised by momentary trifles which are not sufficiently great or lasting to con- stitute endurance. Patient, Passive, Submissive. — Pa- tient, from the Latin patiens, signifies, literally, suffering, and is apphed to things in general, but especially to what is painful. Passive, from the Latin passivus and passus, signifying, literally, suffered or acted upon, ap- plies to those matters in which per- sons have to act; he is patient who bears what he has to suffer without any expressions of complaint; he is passive who abstains altogether from acting when he might act. Patience is a virtue springing from principle; passiveness is always in- voluntary, and may be supposed to arise from want of spirit. Patience is therefore applicable to conscious agents only; passiveness is applicable to inanimate objects which do not act at all, or at least not ad- versely. Passive and submissive both refer to the wiU of others; but passive signifies simply not resisting; submissive sig- nifies positively conforming to the wiU of another. See also Invalid. PATTERN. See Copy; Example. PAUSE. See Demur. PAY. See Allowance. PEACE, Quiet, Calm, Tranquil- lity. Peace is derived through French PEACE 549 from Latin jxix. Quiet (see Easy). Calm (see Abate; Calm). Tranqui- lity is in Latin tranquillitas, from tranr- quillus, at rest. Peace is a term of more general application and more comprehensive meaning than the others; it applies either to communities or individuals; but quiet applies only to individuals or small communities. Nations are said to have peace, but not quiet; persons or families may have both peace and ?'uiet. Peace implies an exemption rom public or private broils; quiet im- plies a freedom from noise or interrup- tion. Every well - disposed family strives to be at peace with its neigh- bors, and every affectionate family will naturally act in such a manner as to promote peace among all its members: the quiet of a neighborhood is one of its first recommendations as a place of residence. Peace and quiet, in regard to individ- uals, have likewise a reference to the internal state of the mind; but the former expresses the permanent con- dition of the mind, the latter its transitory condition. Serious mat- ters only can disturb our peace; trivial matters may disturb our quiet: a good man enjoys the peace of a good con- science; but he may have unavoidable cares and anxieties which disturb his quiet. There can be no peace where a man's passions are perpetually engaged in a conflict with one another; there can be no quiet where a man is em- barrassed in his pecuniary affairs. Calm is a species of quiet, which affects objects in the natural or the moral world; it indicates the absence of violent motion as well as violent noise; it is that state which more im- mediately succeeds a state of agitation. As storms at sea are frequently pre- ceded as well as succeeded by a dead coZm, so political storms have likewise their calms, which are their attendants, if not their precursors. Tranquillity, on the other hand, is taken more abso- lutely: it expresses the situation as it exists at the present moment, indepen- dently of what goes before or after; it is sometimes applicable to society, sometimes to natural objects, and sometimes to the mind. The tran- quillity of the state cannot be pre- served unless the authority of the magistrates be upheld; the tranquillity of the air and of all the surrounding objects is one thing which gives the country its pecuhar charms; the tran- Sicillity of the mind in the season of evotion contributes essentially to pro- duce a suitable degree of reUgious fer- vor. As epithets, these terms bear tho. same relation to each other : people are peaceable as they are disposed to pro- mote peace in society at large, or in their private relations; they are quiet inasmuch as they abstain from every loud expression, or are exempt from any commotion in themselves; they are calm, inasmuch as they are exempt from the commotion which at any given moment rages around them; they are tranquil, inasmuch as they enjoy an entire exemption from everji-hing which can discompose. A town is peaceable as respects the disposition of the inhabitants; it is quiet as respects its external circumstances of freedom from bustle and noise: an evening is calm when the air is lulled into a par- ticular stillness which is not inter- rupted by any loud sounds: a scene is tranquil which combines everj'thing calculated to soothe the spirits to rest. Peaceable, Peaceful, Pacific. — Peace- able is used in the proper sense of the word peace, as it expresses an exemp- tion from strife or contest; but peace- ful is used in its improper sense, as it expresses an exemption from agita- tion or commotion. Persons or thin^ are peaceable; things, particularly m the higher style, are peaceful: a family is designated as peaceable in regard to its inhabitants; a house is designated as a peaceful abode as it is remote from the bustle and hurry of a multitude. Pacific signifies either making peace or disposed to make peace, ana is ap- plied mostly to what we do to others. We are peaceable when we do not en- gage in quarrels of our own; we aro pacific if we wish to keep peace or make peace between others. Hence the term veaceable is mostly employed for indiviaual or private concerns, and pacific most properly for national con- cerns: subjects ought to be peaceabUy and monarcha pacific. See also PACtn.sx; Unbuftubd. S50 PEARLY PEARLY. See Nacreous. PEASANT. See Countryman. PECULIAR, Appropriate, Partic- ular. Peculiar, in Latin pecidiaris, from peculium, private property, pe- cunia, money, and -pecus, cattle, in which property consisted, is said of that which belongs to persons or things; appropriate, signifying belong- ing, fitting (see Ascribe), is said of that which belongs to things only: the faculty of speech is peculiar to man, in distinction from all other an- imals; an address may be appropriate to the circumstances of the individual. Peculiar and particular (see Particu- lar) are both employed to distinguish objects; but the former distinguishes the object by showing its connection with others; particular distinguishes it by a reference to some acknowledged circumstance; hence we may say that a person enjoys peculiar privileges or particular privileges: in this case pe- culiar signifies such as are confined to him and enjoyed by none else; particular signifies such as are distinguished in de- gree and quality from others of the kind. See also Unique. PEDAGOGIC. See Didactic. PEEL, Pare. Peel, from the French peler, derived from Latin pellis, a skin, is the same as to skin or to take ofT the skin: to pare, from the Latin parare, to trim or make in order, signifies to smooth. The former of these terms denotes a natural, the latter an artificial, process: the former excludes the idea of a forcible separa- tion; the latter includes the idea of separation by means of a knife or sharp instrument: potatoes and apples are peeled after thej"- are boiled; they are pared before they are boiled; an orange and a walnut are always peeled but not pared; a cucumber must be pared and not peeled: in like manner, the skin may sometimes be peeled from the flesh, and the nails are pared. See also Skin. PEEVISH. See Captious: Splen- etic. PELLUCID, Transparent. Pellv^ cid, in Latin pelluddus, is compounded of per, through, and Iticidus, shining. Transparent, in Latin transparens, from trans, through or beyond, and parere, to appear, signifies that which admits fight through it. Pellucid is said of that which is pervious to the Ught or of that into which the eye can penetrate; transparent is said of that which is throughout bright: a stream is pellucid; it admits of the light so as to reflect objects, but it is not transparent for the eye. See also Diaphanous. PENALTY. See Fine. PENETRATE, Pierce, Perforate, Bore. To penetrate (see Discern- ment) is simply to make an entrance into any substance; to pierce is com- monly assumed to come through Old French pertuisier, from Latin per, through, and tundere, to beat. Per- forate comes from the Latin per, through, and forare, to pierce, which is the same word as the native English bore. To penetrate is a natural and gradual process; in this manner rust penetrates iron, water penetrates wood; to pierce is a violent, and commonly artificial, process; thus an arrow or a buUet pierces through wood. The in- strument by which the act of penetra- tion is performed is in no case defined; but that of piercing commonly proceeds by some pointed instrument: we may penetrate the earth by means of a spade, a plough, a knife, or various other instruments; but one pierces the flesh by means of a needle, or one pierces the ground or a wall by means of a pickaxe. To perforate and bore are modes of piercing that vary in the circumstances of the action and the objects acted upon; to pierce, in its peculiar use, is a sudden action by which a hollow is produced in any substance; but to perforate and bore are commonly the effect of mechanical art. The body of an animal is pierced by a dart; but can- non is made by perforating or boring the iron: channels are formed under- ground by perforating the earth; holes are made in the ear by perforation; holes are made in the leather, or in the wood, by boring; these last two words do not differ in sense, but in application, the latter being a term of vulgar use, though sometimes used in poeiry. To penetrate and pierce are likewise employed in an improper sense; to PEOPLE 551 perforate and bore are employed only in the proper sense. The first two bear the same relation to each other as in the former case: penetrate is, however, employed only as the act of persons; pierce is used in regard to things. There is a power in the mind to pene- trate the looks and actions, so as justly to interpret their meaning; the eye of the Almighty is said to pierce the thick- est veil of darkness. Affairs are some- times involved in such mystery that the most enlightened is unable to penetrate either the end or the beginning; the shrieks of distress are sometimes so loud as to seem to pierce the ear. See also Thrill. Penetration, Acuteness, Sagacity. — As characteristics of mind, these terms have much more in them in which they differ than in what they agree: penetralion is a necessary property of mind; it exists to a greater or less de- gree in every rational being that has the due exercise of its rational powers; acuteness is an accidental property that belongs to the mind only, under certain circumstances. As penetration (see Discernment) denotes the process of entering into substances physically or morally, so acuteness, which is the same as sharpness, from acutus, sharp, denotes the fitness of the thing that performs this process: and as the mind IS in both cases the thing that is spoken of, the terms penetration and acuteness are in this particular closely allied. It is clear, however, that the mind may have penetralion without having acute- ness, although one cannot have acute- ness without penetration. If by pene- tration we are commonly enabled to get at the truth which Ues concealed, oy acuteness we succeed in piercing the veil that hides it from our view; the former is, therefore, an ordinary, and the latter an extraordinary, gift. Sagacity is in Latin sagacitas, from sagire, to perceive by the senses. The term has been applied to animals which discover an intuitive wisdom, and also to children, or uneducated persons, in whom there is more penetration than may be expected from the narrow com- pass of their knowledge; hence, prop- erly speaking, sagacity is natural or uncultivated acuteness. PENITENCE. See Repentance. PENMAN. See Writer. PENURIOUS. See Economical PENURY. See Poverty. PEOPLE, Nation. People is de- rived through French from the Latin populus. The simple idea of numbers 18 expressed by the word people: but the term nation, from natio and ruxlus, bom, marks the connection of num- bers by birth; people is, therefore, the generic, and nation the specific, term, A nation is a people connected by birth; there cannot, therefore, strictly speaking, be a nation without a peo- ple: but there may be a people where there is not a nation. The Jews, when considered as an assemblage, under the special direction of the Almighty, are termed the people of God, but when considered in regard to their common origin, they are denominated the Jewish nation. The Americans, when spoken of in relation to the British, are a distinct people, because they have a distinct government; but they are not a distinct nation, because they have a common descent. On this ground the Romans are not called the Roman nation, because their ori- gin was so various, but the Roman people, that is, an assemblage living under one form of government. In a still closer application, people if taken for a part of the state, namely, that part of a state which consists of a multitude, in distinction from its government; whence arises a distinc- tion in the use of the terms; for we mav speak of the British people, the French or the Dutch people, when we wish merely to talk of the mass, but we speak of the British nation, the French nation, and the Dutch nation, when public measures are in question, which emanate from the government or the whole people. The English people have ever been remarkable for their attach- ment to liberty: the abolition of the slave-trade is one of the most glorious acts of pubUc justice which were ever performed by the British nation. Upon the same ground republican states are distinguished by the name of people: but kingdoms are commonly spoken of in history as nations. Hence we say the Spartan people, the Athenian people. the people of Genoa, the people of Venice, out the ruUions of Europe, the 552 PERCEIVE African nations, the English, French, German, and Italian nations. People, Populace, Mob. — People and populace are evidently changes of the same word to express a number. The signification of these terms is that of a number gathered together. People is said of any body supposed to be assembled, as well as really assembled: populace is said of a body only when actually assembled. The voice of the people is sometimes too loud to be disregarded; the populace in England are fond of dragging their favorites in carriages. Mob and mobility are from the Latin mobilis, signifying movableness, which is the characteristic of the multitude: hence Virgil's mobile vulgiis. (The word mobile was used in this sense in England at the end of the seventeenth century.) The term mob, therefore, designates not only what is low, but tumultuous. A mob is at aU times an object of ter- ror that mostly goes from bad to worse. Mobility, as an adjective, is used in its etymological sense to-day. People, Persons, Folks. — The term people has already been considered in two acceptations under the general idea of an assembly; but in the pres- ent case it is employed to express a small number of individuals: the word people, however, is always considered as one undivided body, and the word person may be distinctly used either in the singular or in the plural; as we cannot say one, two, three, or four peo- ple: but we may say one, two, three, or four persons: yet, on the other hand, we may indifferently say, such people or persons; many people or persons; some people or persons, and the like. With regard to the use of these terms, which is altogether colloquial, people is employed in general proposi- tions, and persons in those which are specific or referring directly to some particular individuals: people are gen- erally of that opinion; some people think so; some people attended: there were but few persons present at the entertainment; the whole company consisted of six persons. As the term people is employed to designate the promiscuous multitude, it has acquired a certain meanness of acceptation which makes it less suit- able than the word persons^ when peo- ple of respectability are referred to: were I to say of any individuals I do not know who the people are, it would not be so respectful as to say, I do not know who those persons are: in like manner one says, from people of that stamp one can expect nothing better; persons of their appearance do not frequent such places. Folks, Anglo-Saxon folc, is a homely and familiar word; it is not unusual to say good people or good folks; and in speaking jocularly to one's friends the latter term is likewise admissible: but in the serious style it is never employed except in a disrespectful manner: such folks (speaking of gamesters) are often put to sorry shifts. See also Public. PERCEIVE, Discern, Distin- guish. To perceive, in Latin percipio, or per, an intensive prefix, through, or thoroughly, and a weak form of capere, signifying to take hold of, is a posi- tive, to discern (see Discernment) a relative, action : we perceive things by themselves; we discern them amidst many others: we perceive that which is obvious; we discern that which is remote or which requires much attention to get an idea of it. We perceive by a person's looks and words what he intends; we discern the drift of his actions. We may per- ceive sensible' or spiritual objects; we commonly discern only that which is spiritual: we perceive hght, darkness, colors, or the truth or falsehood of any- thing; we discern characters, motives, the tendency and consequences of actions, etc. It is the act of a child to perceive according to the quickness of its senses; it is the act of a man to discern according to the measure of his knowledge and understanding. To discern and distinguish (see Dif- ference) approach the nearest in sense to each other; but the former signifies to see only one thing, the latter to see two or more in quick succession so as to compare them. We discern what lies in things: we distinguish things accord- ing to their outward marks; we discern things in order to imderstand their essences; we distinguish in order not to confound them. Experienced and discreet people may discern the signs PERISCOPE 553 of the times; it is just to distinguish between an action clone from inadver- tence and that which is done from de- sign. The conduct of people is some- times so veiled by art that it is not easy to discern their object: it is necessary to distinguish between practice and profession. See also Seb*. Perception, Idea, Conception, Notion. — Perception expresses either the act of perceiving or the impression produced by that act; in this latter sense it is analogous to an idea (see Idea). The impression of an object that is present €b us is termed a perception; the re- vival of that impression, when the object id removed, is an idea. A com- bination of ideas by which any image is presented to the mind is a conception (see Comprehend); the association of two or more ideas so as to constitute a decision is a notion (see Opinion). Perceptions are clear or confused, ac- cording to the state of the sensible organs and the perceptive faculty; ideas are faint or vivid, vague or dis- tinct, according to the nature of the perception; conceptions are gross or refined according to number and ex- tent of one's ideas; notions are true or false, correct or incorrect, according to the extent of one's knowledge. The perception which we have of remote objects is sometimes so indistinct as to leave hardly any traces of the image on the mind; we have in that case a perception, but not an idea: if we read the description of any object we may have an vdea of it; but we need not have any immediate perception: the idea in this case being complex, and formed of many images of which we have already had a perception. If we present objects to our minds, according to different images which have already been impressed, we are said to have a conception of them: in this case, however, it is not necessary for the objects really to exist; thej/ may be the product of the mind s operation within itself: but with re- gard to notions it is different, for they are formed respecting objects that do really exist, although perhaps the ■properties or circumstances which we assign to them are not real. If I look at the moon, I have a perception of it; if it disappear from my sight, and the impression remains, I have an idea of it; if an object, differing in shape and color from anything else which I may have seen, presents itself to my mindf, it is a conception; if of this moon I conceive that it is no bigger than what it app>ears to my eye, this is a notion which, in the present instance, assigns an unreal property to a read object. See also Sentiment. PERCEPTIBLE. See Tangible. PEREMPTORY. See Positive. PERFECT. See Accompushed; Complete. PERFECTLY. See Quite. PERFIDIOUS. See Faithless. PERFORATE. See Penetrate; Thrill. PERFORATION. See Orifice. PERFORM. See Effect; Exe- cute. PERFORMER. See Actor. PERIL. See Danger. PERILOUS. See Herculean. PERIOD. See Sentence; Time. PERISCOPE. Altiscope, Tele- scope. Periscope, a compound of the Greek vtpi, around, and oKorrttv, look, signifies, literally, a general view or a view on all sides, and, specifically, spectacles with concavo-convex glasses constructed to increase the distinct- ness of objects when viewed obliquely. As a substantive the term has a dis- tinctive application to a form of tele- scope by which an observer is enabled to see over a parapet, wall, and other parts of a fortification, known as an altiscope, from the Latin (Utus, high, and oKoirtiv, to see. It consists of a telescopic tube with a right angle at the top and a reverse right angle at the bottom, with mirrors arranged at these points. A periscope, with which term the world became more familiar during the great European war, is an improved form of the altiscope, having at the top a lenticular total-reflection prism instead of a mirror, and turning upon a vertical axis, so that it is capable of sweeping the entire horizon. It is the slender instrument that riaea above the surface from the body of a submarine when sufficiently siib- merged to be out of sight, with which 554 PERISH the navigator scans the horizon and directs the craft for attacking another vessel. PERISH, Die, Decay. To perish, in French perir, in Latin pereo, com- pounded of per and eo, signifying to go thoroughly away, expresses more than to die (see Die), and is appUcable to many objects; for the latter is prop- erly appUed only to express the ex- tinction of animal Ufe, and figuratively to express the extinction of life or spirit in vegetables or other bodies; but the former is applied to express the dissolu- tion of substances, so that they lose their existence as aggregate bodies. What perishes, therefore, does not al- ways die, although whatever dies by that very act perishes to a cer- tain extent. Hence we say that wood perishes, although it does not die; people are said either to perish or die: but as the term perish expresses even more than dying, it is possible for the same thing to die and not perish; thus a plant may be said to die when it loses its vegetative power; but it is said to perish if its substance crumbles into dust. To perish expresses the end ; to decay the process by which this end is brought about : a thing may be long in decaying, but when it perishes it ceases at once to act or to exist: things may, therefore, perish without decaying; they may likewise decay without perishing. Things which are altogether new, and have experienced no kind of decay, may perish by means of water, fire, lightning, and the like: on the other hand, wood, iron, and other substances may begin to decay, but may be saved from immediately perishing by the application of preventives. PERJURE. See Forswear. PERMANENT. See Durable. PERMISSION. See Leave. PERMIT. See Admit; Consent. PERNICIOUS. See Destructive; Hurtful. PERPETRATE, Commit. The idea of doing something wrong is common to these terms; but perpetrate, from the Latin per, intensive, and patrare, signi- fying thoroughly to compass or bring about, is a much more determined pro- ceeding than that of committing. One may commit offences of various degrees and magnitude; but one perpetrates crimes only, and those of the more heinous kind. Lawless banditti, who spend their hves in the perpetration of the most monstrous crimes, are not to be restrained by the ordinary course of justice; he who commits any offence against the good order of society ex- poses himself to the censure of others who, in certain respects, may be his inferiors. PERPETUAL. See Continual. PERPLEX. See Distress; Em- barrass. PERPLEXING. See Knotty. PERPLEXITY. See Quandary; Worry. PERSEVERE. See Continue. PERSIST. See Continue; Insist. PERSONS. See People. PERSPICUITY. See Clearness. PERSUADE, Entice, Prevail Upon. Persuade (see Conviction) and entice (see Allure) are employed to express different means to the same end, namely, that of drawing any one to a thing: one persuades a person by means of words; one entices him either by words or actions; one may persuade either to a good or bad thing; but one entices commonly to that which is bad; one uses arguments to persuade, and arts to entice. Persuade and entice comprehend either the means or the end, or both; prevail upon comprehends no more than the end: we may pers'dode without pre- vailing upon, and we may prevail upon without persuading. Many will turn a deaf ear to all our persuasions, and will not be prevailed upon, although per- suaded: on the other hand, we may be prevailed upon by the force of remon- strance, authority, and the like; and in this case we are prevailed upon with- out being persuaded. We should never persuade another to do that which we are not willing to do ourselves; credu- lous or good-natured people are easily prevailed upon to do things which tend to their own injury. See Exhort. PERTINACIOUS. See Tenacious. PERVERSE. See Awkward. PESSIMISTIC, Desponding, Gloomy. Pessimistic is a term derived, from the Latin pessimus, the worst. Desponding comes from Latin de, away. PIOUS 5oo and spondere, to promise, and means literally promising away, yielding up wholly, hence despairing. Gloomy comes from Middle English gloumen. to lower. These three words are usea to describe a disposition which is in- cl'ned to "look on the dark side of things," to give up hope. Pessimistic describes an intellectual attitude; de- sponding, an emotional state. The pessimistic man believes that things are worse than they are; the desponding man, holding such a belief, yields up all hope. Desponding indicates an ab- normal psychological condition, and is a much stronger word than pessimistic. We may feel pessimistic about all sorts of trivial matters^ we become despond- ing when somethmg vital to happiness has been taken away, thereby, as it were, destroying the emotional balance. Gloomy is a word descriptive of man- ner, mood, and temperament rather than of a distinct and positive emo- tional condition such as that indicated in desponding. The gloomy man re- sembles a lowering sky; the light and sunshine seem to have been obliterated. But the word means little more than a general absence of cheerfulness, and sug- gests rather a diffused sadness, often- times without cause or object, than an intense and absolute hopelessness. See also Optimistic. PEST. See Bane. PESTILENTIAL. See Contagious. PETITION. See Prayer- PETTY. See Trifling. PETULANT. See Captious. PHANTASM. See Hallucination. PHANTOM. See Vision. PHOTOPLAY. See Moving Pict- ure. PHRASE. See Diction; Sentence. PICK. See Choose. PICTURE,Print,Engraving. Pict- ure (see Paint) is any hkeness taken by the hand of the artist: the print is the copy of the painting in a printed state; and the engraving is that which is produced by an engraver: every engramng is a print; but every print is not an engramng; for the mcture, as in the case of woodcuts, may be prirUed from something besides an engraving. The term picture is sometimes used for any representation of a likeness, without regard to the process by which it is formed: in this case it is employed mostly for the representa- tions of the common kind that are found in books; but print and engrav- ing are said of the higher sp>ecimens of the art. On certain occasions the word engraving is most appropriate, as to take an engraving oi a particulai object; on the other occasions the word print, as a handsome print, or a large vrint. See also Radiograph. PIECE. See Part. PIERCE. See Penetrate; Thrill. PILE. See Heap. PILLAGE. See Rapine; Sack; Spoliation. PILLAR, Column. Pillar comes from Latin pila, a pier of stone. Col- umn is in Latin columna, allied to collis, hill, and cvlmen, a summit (whence our word culminate), indicating a shaft which reaches upward. Both words are applied to the same object, namely, to whatever is artificially set up in wood, stone, or other hard material; but the word pillar, having come first into use, is the most general in its application to any structure, w^hether rude or otherwise; the term column, on the other hand, is applied to what- ever is ornamental, as the Grecian order of columns. So in poetry, where simply a support is spoken of, the term pillar may be usea. But where grandeur or embellish* ment is to be expressed, the term column. Both terms are applied to other ob- jects having a similarity either of form or of use. Whatever is set up in the form of a pillar is so denominated; as, stone pillars in crossways, or over graves, and the like. Whatever is drawn out in the form of a column, be the material of which it is composed what it may, it is de- nominated a column; as a column of water, smoke, etc.; a column of men, a column of a page. Pillar is frequently employed in a moral application, and in that case it always impUes a support. PINCH. See Nip; Pbess. PINE. See Flag. PINNACLE. See TuBHBT. PIOUS. See Holt. 556 PIQUE PIQUE. See Malice; Umbrage. PITEOUS, Doleful, Woful, Rue- ful. Piteous signifies moving pity (see Pity). Doleful, or full of dole, in Latin dolor, pain, signifies indicative of much pain. Woful, or full of woe, signifies likewise indicative of woe (see Woe). Ry£ful, or full of ru£, comes from Anglo- Saxon hreowan, to be sorry, and sig- nifies indicative of much sorrow. The close alliance in sense of these words one to another is obvious from the above explanation; piteotis is ap- plicable to one's external expression of bodily or mental pain; a child makes piteous lamentations when it suffers from hunger or has lost its way; doleful applies to those sounds which convey the idea of pain; there is something doleful in the tolling of a funeral bell or in the sound of a muffled drum: woful applies to the circumstances and situa- tions of men; a scene is woful in which we witness a large family of young children suffering from sickness and want ; rueful applies to the outward in- dications of inward sorrow depicted in the looks or countenance. The term is commonly apphed to the sorrows which spring from a gloomy or dis- torted imagination, and has therefore acquired a somewhat ludicrous ac- ceptation; hence we find Cervantes's characterization of Don Quixote ren- dered in English as the knight of the rueful countenance. Pitiable, Piteous, Pitiful. — These three epithets drawn from the same word have shades of difference in sense and application. Pitiable signifies de- serving of pity; piteous, moving pity; pitiful, full of that which awakens pity; a condition is pitiable which is so distressing as to call forth pity; a cry is piteous which indicates such dis- tress as can excite pity; a conduct is pitiful which marks a character en- titled to pity. The first of these terms is taken in the best sense of the term pity; the last two in its unfavorable sense: what is pitiable in a person is independent of anything in himself; circumstances have rendered him piti- able; what is piteous and pitiful in a man arises from the helplessness and imbecility or worthlessness of his char- acter; the former connotes that which is weak; the latter that which is worth- less in him: when a poor creature makes piteous moans, it indicates his incapac- ity to help himself, as he ought to do, out of his troubles; when a man of rank has recourse to pitiful shifts to gain his ends, he betrays the innate meanness of his soul. See also Contemptible; Mean. Pity, Compassion. — Pity is con- tracted from Latin pietas, English piety, from pius, which signified at- tentive to all natural duties, and im- plied especially a religious devotion to the gods and to parents and family. Compassion, in Latin compassio, from con, with, and possum, past participle of pati, to suffer, signifies to suffer in conjunction with another. The pain which one feels at the dis- tress of another is the idea that is common to the signification of both these terms, but they differ in the ob- ject that causes the distress: the for- mer is excited principally by the weak- ness or degraded condition of the subject; the latter by his uncontrol- lable and inevitable misfortunes. We pity a man of weak understanding who exposes his weakness: we compassion- ate the man who is reduced to a state of beggary and want. Pity is kindly extended by those in higher condition to such as are humble in their out- ward circumstances; the poor are at all times deserving of pity, even when their poverty is the positive fruit of vice: compassion is a sentiment which extends to persons in all conditions; the Good Samaritan had compassion on the traveller who fell among thieves. Pity, though a tender sentiment, is so closely allied to contempt that an un- derstanding person is always loath to be the subject of it, since it can never be awakened but by some circumstance of inferiority; it hurts the honest pride of a man to reflect that he can excite no interest but by provoking a com- parison to his own disadvantage: on the other hand, such is the general infirmity of our natures, and such our exposure to the casualties of human life, that compassion is a pure and de- lightful sentiment that is reciprocally bestowed and acknowledged by all with equal satisfaction. Pity, Mercy. — The feelings one in- dulges, and the conduct one adopts, PLACE 557 tx)ward others who suffer through their own fault, are the common ideas which render these terms synonymous; but ■pity lays hold of those circumstances which do not affect the moral char- acter or which diminish the culpabiUty of the individual: mercy lays hold of those external circumstances which may diminish punishment. Pity is often a sentiment unaccompanied with action; mercy is often a mode of action unaccompanied with sentiment: we have or take ffUy upon a person, but we show mercy to a person. PUy is bestowed by men in their domestic and private capacity; m£rcy is shown in the exercise of power: a master has pity upon his offending servant by passing over his offences and afford- ing him the opportunity of amendment ; the magistrate shows mercy to a crimi- nal by diminishing his punishment. PUy lies in the breast of an individual and may be bestowed at his discretion : mercy is restricted by the rules of civil society; it must not interfere with the administration of justice. Young of- fenders call for great pity, as their offences are often the fruit of inexperi- ence and bad example rather than of depravity : meraj is an imperative duty in those who have the power of in- flicting punishment, particularly in cases where life and death are con- cerned. PUy and mercy are Ukewise applied to the animal creation with a similar dis- tinction: pily shows itself in relieving real misery and in hghtening burdens; mercy is displayed in the measure of pain which one inflicts. One takes pity on a poor animal to whom one gives food to relieve hunger; one shows it mercy by abstaining from beating it. These terms are, moreover, appli- cable to the Deity, in regard to His creatures, particularly man. God takes pity on us as entire dependents upon Him: he extends His mercy toward us as offenders against Him: He shows His pity by reUeving our wants; He shows His mercy by forgiving our sins. PITHY. See Laconic. PITILESS. See Heartless. PLACE, Station, Situation, Posi- tion, Post. Place, from Latin plaiea, Greek irXareta, a Isroad way, is the abstract or general term that compre- hends the idea of any given space that may be occupied: station (see Condi- tion) is the place where one stands or is fixed: situation, in Latin situs, a place, and position, from posit us, the past par- ticiple of ponere, to place, signify the object as well as the place; that is, thev signify how the object is put, aa well as where it is put. A ^ace or station may be either vacant or other- wise; a situation and a position neces- sarily suppose some occupied pltux. A place IS either assigned or not as- signed, known or unknown, real or supposed: a station is a specifically assigned place. We choose a place ac- cording to our convenience, and we leave it again at pleasure; but we take up our station and hold it for a given period. One inquires for a place which IS known only by name; the station is appointed for us, and is, therefore, easily found. Travellers wander from place to place; soldiers have always some station. The terms place and sUuation are said of objects animate or inanimate; station only of animate objects, or those which are figuratively considered as such; position properly of inanimate objects, or those which are considered as such: a person chooses a place; a thing occupies a place, or has a place set apart for it : a station or stated place must always be assigned to each per- son who has to act in concert with others; a sUuation or position is chosen for a thing to suit the convenience of an individual: the former is said of things as they stand with regard to others; the latter of things as they stand with regard to themselves. Tho sUuation of a house conii)rehend8 the nature of the place, whether on high or low ground, and also its relation to other objects, that is, whether higher or lower, nearer or more distant: the position of a window in a house is con- sidered as to whether it is straight or crooked; the position of a book is con- sidered as to whether it stands lean- ing or upright, with its face or back forward. SUuation is, moreover, said of things that come there of thoinselvos; position only of those things which have been put there at will. The sUua- tion of some tree or rock, on some ele- vated place, is agreeable to be looked S58 PLACID ^t or to be looked from. The faulty position of a letter in writing sometimes spoils the whole performance. Situation and position when applied to persons are similarly distinguished; the situation is that in which a man finds himself, either with or without his own choice; the position is that in which he is placed without his own choice. Place, situation, and station have an extended signification in respect to men in civil society, that is, either to their circumstances or actions; post has no other sense when applied to persons. Place is as indefinite as be- fore; it may be taken for that share which we personally have in society either generally, as when every one is said to fill a place in society, or par- ticularly for a specific share of its business, as to fill a place under gov- ernment: sitvMtion is that kind of place which specifies either ovu" share m its business, but with a higher im- port than the general term place, or a share in its gains and losses, as the prosperous or adverse sitvMion of a man: a station is that kind of place which denotes a share in its relative consequence, power, and honor, in which sense every man holds a certain station; the post is that kind of place. in which he has a specific share in the duties of society; the situation com- prehends many duties, but the post mcludes properly one duty only, the word being figuratively employed from the post or particular spot which a sol- dier is said to occupy. A clerk in a counting-house fills a place: a clergy- man holds a situation by virtue of his ofiice; he is in the station of a gentle- man by reason of his education as well as his situation: a faithful minister will always consider his post to be there where good is to be done. See Office; Put. Place, Dispose, Order. — To place is to assign a place to a thing; to dispose is to plcLce according to a certain rule; to order is to place in a certain order. To place is an unqualified act both as to the manner and circumstances of the action; to dispose is a qualified act; it is quahfied as to the manner; the former is an act of expediency or neces- sity; the latter is an act of judgment or discretion. Things are often placed from the necessity of being placed in some way or another: they are disposed so as to appear to the best advantage. We may place a single object, but it is necessary that there should be sev- eral objects to be disposed. One places a book on a shelf, or disposes a number of books, according to their sizes, on different shelves. To order and dispose are both taken in the sense of putting several things in some order, but dispose may be simply for the purpose of order and arrange- ment; ordering, on the other hand, comprehends command as well as regulation. Things are disposed in a shop to the best advantage, or, in the moral application, the thoughts are disposed; a man orders his family, or a commander orders the battle. Place, Spot, Site. — A particular or given space is the idea common to these terms; but the former is general and indefinite, the latter specific. Place isjhmited to no size or quantity; it may be large: but spot implies a very small place, such as, by a figure of speech, is supposed to be no larger than a spot: the term place is employed upon every occasion; the term spot is confined to very particular cases: we may often know in a general way the place where a thing is, but it is not easy after a series of years to find out the exact spot on which some event has happened. The place where our Sav- iour was buried is to be seen and pointed out, but not the very spot where he lay. The site is the spot on which any- thing stands or is situated; it is more commonly applied to a building or any place marked out for a specific purpose; as the site on which a camp had been formed. PLACID. See Calm. PLAIN. See Apparent; Even; Frank; Sincere; Tangible. PLAN. See Design; Premedi- tate; Syllabus. PLANNING. See Scheming. PLAUSIBLE. See Colorable. PLAY, Game, Sport. Play comes from Anglo-Saxon plegian, from plega, a fight, battle, sport. Ga?ne comes from Anglo-Saxon gamen, to play. Sport is derived from Old French disport, from PLEASURE 550 the phrase se desporter^iljaXm dia, apart, and portare, to carry), meaning to carry one's self away from work or annoyance. Play and game both include exercise, corporeal or mental, or both; but play is an unsystematic, game a systematic, exercise: children play when they merely nm after each other, but this is no game; on the other hand, when they exercise with the ball according to any rule^ this is a game; every garne, therefore, is a play, but every play is not a game: tnmdhng a hoop is a play, but not a game: cricket is both a play and a game. One person may have his play by himself, but there must be more than one to have a game. Play is adapted to infants; games to those who are more advanced in years. Play is sometimes taken for the act of amusing one's self with anything in- tellectual, and game for the act with which any game is played. Play and svort signify any action or motion for pleasvire, whether as it re- gards man or animals; but play refers more to the action, and sport to the pleasiu-e produced by the action. Game and sport both imply an object pursued, but game comprehends an object of contest which is to be ob- tained by artj as the Olympic and other games of antiquity. Sport comprehends a pleasurable ob- ject to be obtained by bodily exercise; as field sports, rustic sports, and the like. Game may be extended figuratively to any object of pursuit; as the game is lost, the game is over. Sport is sometimes used for the sub- ject of sport to another. Playful, Sportive.— Playfvl, or full of play, and sportive, disposed to sport, are taken in a sense similar to the primi- tive. Playfid is applicable to youth or childhood, when there is the greatest disposition to play. Sportive is appUed in a good sense to persons of maturer years. A person may be said to be sportive who indulges in harmless sport. PLAYER. See Actor. PLEAD. See Apologize. PLEADER. See Defender. PLEASANT. See Agrkeablb; Facetious. PI.EASE. See Satisfy. PLEASED. See Glad. PLEASING. See Agreeable. PLEASURE, Joy, Delight, Charm. Pleasure, through French plaisir, from the Latin placere, to please or give con- tent, is the generic term, involving in itself the common idea of the other terms. Joy (see Glad). Delight, from French deliter, Latin delectare, a fre- quentative of delicere, to allure (whence our adjective delicious is derived), sig- nifies what allures the mind. Pleasure is a term of most extensive use; it embraces one large class of our feelings and sensations, and is opposed to nothing but pain, which embraces the second class or division: joy and delight are but modes or modifications of pleasure, differing as to the degree ana as to the objects or sources. Pleasure, in its peculiar acceptation, is smaller in degree than either joy or delight, but in its universal acceptation it defines no degree: the term is indif- ferently employed for the highest as well as the lowest degree: whereas joy and delight can be employed only to express a positively high degree. Pleasure is produced by any or every object; everything by which we are surrounded acts upon us more or less to produce it; we may have pleasure either from without or from within: pleasure from the gratification of our senses, from the exercise of our affec- tions, or the exercise of our under- standings; pleasures from our own selves or pleasures from others: but joy is derived from the exercise of the affections; and delight either from the emotions or the imderstanding. In this manner we distinguish the pleas- ures of the table, social pleasures, or intellectual pleasures; the joy of meet- ing an old friend; or the delight of pur- suing a favorite object. Pleasures are either transitory or otherwise: joy is in its nature com- monly short of duration; it springs from particular events; it is pleasure at high tide, but it may come and go as sud- denly as the events which caused it: one's joy may be awakened and de- stroyed in quick succession. Delight is more fleeting even than joy, and much more intense than simple pleasure; de- light arises from a state of outward circumstances which is naturally leas 660 PLEDGE durable than that of joy; but it is a state seldomer attainable and not so much at one's command as either pleas- ure or joy. Pleasure, joy, and delight are likewise employed for the things which give pleasure, joy, or delight. Charm (see Attraction) is used only in the sense of what charms or gives a high degree of pleasure, but not a degree equal to that of joy or delight, though greater than of ordinary pleasure; pleasure in- toxicates; the joys of heaven are ob- jects of a Christian's pursuit; the de- lights of matrimony are lasting to those who are susceptible of true affection; the charms of rural scenery never fail of their effect whenever they offer themselves to the eye. See also Comfort. PLEDGE, See Deposit; Earnest. PLENIPOTENTIARY. See Am- bassador. PLENITUDE. See Fulness. PLENTIFUL, Plenteous, Abun- dant, Copious, Ample. Plentiful and plenteous, signifying the presence of -plenty, plenitude, or fulness, differ only in use, the former being mostly em- ployed in the famUiar, the latter in the grave, style. Plenty fills; abundance, in Latin abundantia (from abundo, to overflow, compounded of the intensive ab and unda, a wave, signifying, hter- ally, overflowing), does more, it leaves a superfluity; as that, however, which fills suffices as much as that which flows over, the term abundance is often employed promiscuously with that of plenty; we may say indifferently a plentiful harvest or an abundant har- vest. Plentiful is, however, a more familiar term than abundant: we say, therefore, most commonly, plenty of provisions; plenty of food; plenty of com, wine, and oil: but an abundance of words; an abundance of riches; an abundance of wit or humor. In certain years fruit is plentiful, and at other times grain is plentiful; in all cases we have abundant cause for gratitude to the Giver of all good things. Copious, in Latin copiosus, from copia, or con, together, and opes, wealth, signifying having a store, and ample, from Latin amplus, spacious, are modes either of plenty or abundance: the former is employed in regard to what is collected or brought into one place; the term ample is employed only in regard to what may be nar- rowed or expanded; a copious stream of blood, or a copious flow of words, equally designate the quantity which is collected, as an ample provision, au ample store, an ample share, marks that which may at pleasure be increased or diminished. PLIANT. See Flexible. PLOT. See Combination. PLUCK. See Draw. PLUNDER. See Rapine; Sack; Spoliation. PLUNGE, Dive. Plunge comes from a hypothetical Latin plumbicare, based on plumbum, lead, through French plonger, and means to fall into the water like the lead thrown out to plumb the depth. Dive, from Anglo-Saxon dyfan, to immerse, is aUied to dip, deep, etc. One plunges sometimes in order to dive; but one may plunge without div- ing, and one may dive without plunging: to plunge is to dart head foremost into the water: to dive is to go to the bot- tom of the water or toward it; it is a good practice for bathers to plunge into the water when they first go in, although it is not advisable for them to dive; ducks frequently dive into the water without ever plunging. Thiis far they differ in their natural sense; but in the figurative application they differ more widely: to plunge, in this case, is an act of rashness: to dive is an act of design: a young man hurried away by his passions will plunge into every extravagance when he comes into possession of his estate: a "nervy" speculator will often make a plunge in the stock or commodities markets for control of an interest. POINT. See Aim. POISE, Balance. For the deriva- tions of poise and balance see Counter- poise. To poise is ■ properly to keep the weight from pressing on either side; to balance is to keep the balance even. The idea of bringing into an equilibrium is common to both terms, but a thing is poised as regards itself; it is bal- anced as regards other things; a per- son poises a plain stick in his hand when he wants it to lie even; he POOR 661 balances the stick if it has a particular weight at each end: a person may poise himself, but. he balances others: when not on firm ground it is neces- sary to poise one's self; when two persons are situated one at each end of a beam they may balance one an- other. In the moral application they are similarly distinguished. See also Counteepoise. POISON, Venom. Poison, in French poison, Latin polio, a drink, is a gen- eral term; in its original meaning it signifies any potion which acts de- structively upon the system. Venom, in French venin, Latin venenum, is a species of deadly or mahgnant poison: a poison may be either slow or quick; a venom is always most active in its nature: a poison must be administered inwardly to have its effect; a venojn will act by an external application: the juice of the hellebore is a poison; the tongue of the adder and the tooth of the viper contain venom; many plants are unfit to be eaten on account of the paisorioMS quaUty which is in them; the Indians are in the habit of dipping the tips of their arrows in a venomous juice, which renders the shghtest woimd mortal. The moral application of these terms is clearly drawn from their proper ac- ceptation: the poison must be infused or injected into the subject; the venom acts upon him externally: bad prin- ciples are justly compared to a poison, which some are so unhappy as to suck in with their mother's milk; the shafts of envy are pecuharly venoynous when directed against those in elevated stations. POLITE, Polished, Refined. Po- lite, from Latin polire, to make smooth (see Civil), denotes a quality; polished, of a similar derivation, a state: he who is polite is so according to the rules of politeness; he who is polished is polished by the force of art: a polite man is, in r^ard to his behavior, a finished gentle- man;.but a rude p>erson may be more or less polished and yet not free from rudeness. Refined rises in sense, both in regard to polite and polished: a man is indebted to nature, rather than to art, for his refinement; but his politeness or his polish is entirely the fruit of edu- cation. Politeness and polish do not ex- tend to anything but externals; refine- ment appUes as much to the mind as the body: rules of conduct and good society will make a man poliie; lessons in dancing will serve to ^ve a polish; refined manners or principles will naturally arise out of refinement of men. As polish extends only to the ex- terior, it is less hable to excess than refinement: when the language, the walk, and deportment of a man are polished, he is divested of all that can make him offensive in social inter- course; but if his temper be refined beyond a certain boimdary, he loees the energy of character which is essen- tial for maintaining his dignity against the rude shocks of human life. See also Genteel; Well-bred. POLITICAL, PouTic. PolUicalhaa the proper meaning of the word polity, which, from the Greek iroXIrcia and TToXtf, a city, signifies the government either of a city or a country. Politic, like the word policy, has the improper meaning of the word polity, namely, that of clever management, because the affairs of states are sometimes managed with considerable art and finesse: hence we speak of political govern- ment as opposed to that which is ecclesiastic; and of politic conduct as opposed to that which is unwise and without foresight: in political ques- tions, it is not politic for individuals to set themselves up in opposition to those who are in power; the study of politics, as a science, may make a man a clever statesman, but it may not al- ways enable him to be truly politic in his private concerns. POLLUTE. See Contaminatb; Debauch. POLYCHROMATIC. See Nacbk- ous. POMP. See MAONincENCB. POMPOUS. See Magisterial; Theatkical. PONDER. See Think. PONDEROUS. See Heavy. POOR, Pauper. Poor and pauper are both derived from the Latin pau- per. Old French povre, poor. Poor is a term of general use; pauper is a term of particular use: a pauper is a poor man who lives upon alms or the relief of the parish: the former is, therefore, 562 POPULACE indefinite in its meaning; the latter conveys a reproachful idea. The word poar is used as a substantive only in the plural number; pauper is a sub- stantive both in the singular and plural : the poor of the parish are, in general, a heavy burden upon the inhabitants: I there are some persons who are not ashamed to hve and die as paupers. POPULACE. See People. PORTEND. See Auguk. PORTION. See Deal; Part. POSITION, Posture. Position (see also Place) is here the general term, posture the particular term. The posi- tion is that in which a body is placed in respect to other bodies: as the standing with one's face or back to an object is a position; but a posture is that position which a body assumes in respect to itself, as a sitting or reclin- ing posture. See also Tenet. POSITIVE, Absolute, Peremp- tory. Positive, in Latin positivu^, from jtositUrS, past participle of pono, to put or place, and a suffix, signifies placed or fixed, that is, fixed or established in the mind. Absolute, from Latin ab, away, and solutus, participle of solvere, to loosen, signifies uncontrolled by any external circumstances. Peremptory, in Latin peremptorius, from peremptor, a destroyer, per, utterly, and emere, to take, signifying to take away utterly, means removing all further question. Positive and absolute are employed for either things or persons; peremptory for persons only, or for that which is personal. What is positive has a de- terminate existence; it is opposed to what is negative, indeterminate, or precarious; as positive good, positive pleasure or pain; what is absolute is without dependence or connection, it is opposed mostly to the relative or conditional, as absolute existence, abso- Ivie justice. In regard to persons or what is per- sonal, positive apphes either to the as- sm-ance of a man or to the manner of his expressing that assixrance; a person may be positive in his own mind (see Confident), or he may make a positive assertion; absolute ap- plies either to the mode of acting or the circumstances under which one acts, as to have an absolute possession or command, to make an absolute promise; peremptory is applied to the natm-e of the action or the manner of performing it; a command may be peremptory, and a tone peremptory. A positive assertion will remove doubt if made by one entitled to credit; an absolute promise wQl admit of no reservation on the part of the person making it. A peremptory command ad- mits of no demur or remonstrance; a peremptory answer satisfies or puts to silence. See also Actual; Categorical; Confident; Definite; Infallible. POSSESS. See Hold. POSSESSIONS. See Goods. POSSESSOR, Proprietor, Owner, Master. The possessor has the full power, if not the right, of the present disposal over the object of possession; the proprietor and owner have the un- Umited right of transfer, but not al- ways the power of immediate disposal. The proprietor and the oumer are the same in signification, though not in appUcation, the first term being used principally in regard to matters of importance; the latter on famiUar oc- casions: the proprietor of an estate is a more suitable expression than the oum£r of an estate: the oumer of a book is more becoming than the proprietor. The possessor and the master are com- monly the same person when those things are in question which are sub- ject to possession; but the terms are otherwise so different in their original meaning that they can scarcely admit of comparison: the possessor of a house is naturally the master of the house; and, in general, whatever a man pos- sesses that he has in his power and is consequently master of; but we may have, legally, the right of possessing a thing over 'which we have actually no power of control: in this case, we are nominally possessor, but virtually not master. A minor, or insane person, may be both possessor and proprietor of that over which he has no control; a man is, therefore, on the other hand, appropriately denominated master, not possessor, of his actions. POSSIBLE, Practicable, Prac- tical. Possible, from the Latin posse, to be able, and a suffix, signifies prop- erly able to be done: practicable. POWER 563 compounded of Latin practicus, Greek TpaKTiKog, from the verb signifying to do, and a suffix, signifies to be able to put in practice: hence the differ- ence between possible and practicable is the same as between doing a thing at all or doing it as a rule. There are many things possible which cannot be called practicable; but what is prac- ticable must, in its nature, be possible. The possible depends solely on the power of the agent; the practicable depends on circumstances: a child cannot say how much it is possible for him to learn until he has tried; schemes have sometimes everything apparently to recommend them to notice, but that which is of the first importance, namely, their practicability. The practicable is that which may or can be practiced; the practical is that which is intended for practice: the former, therefore, apphes to that which men devise to carry into practice: the latter to that which they have to prac- tice: projectors ought to consider what is practicable; divines and moralists have to consider what is practical. The practicable is opposed to the imprac- ticable; the practical to the theoretical or speculative. POST. See Place. POSTPONE. See Delay. POSTURE. See Action; Position. POTENT. See Powerful. POTENTATE. See Prince. POUND. See Break. POUR, Spill, Shed. Pour meant originally to purify or clarify by press- ure, or pouring out, from Late Latin purare, Latin purus, pure. Spill is a Scandinavian word meaning to destroy or shed. Shed comes from Anglo- Saxon sceadan. We pour with design; we spill by accident: we pour water over a plant or a bed; we spill it on the ground. To pour is an act of convenience; to spUl and shed are acts more or less hurt- ful; the former is to cause to run in small quantities, the latter in large quantities: we pour wine out of a bottle into a glass; but the blood of a person is said to be spilled or shed when his life is violently taken away: what is poured is commonly no part of the body whence it is poured; but what is shed is no other than a component f)art; hence trees are said to shed their eaves, animals their hair, or human beings to shed tears. Hence the dis- tinction between these words in their moral application. POVERTY, Want, Penubt, In- digence, Need. Poverty, through French from Latin faupertatem, based on pauper, poor, which marks the con- dition of bemg poor, is a general state of fortune opposed to that of riches. Poverty admits of different states or degrees which are expressed by the other terms. Want, from the verb to toant, denotes, when taken absolutely, the ivant of the first necessaries, which is a permanent state, and a low state of poverty; but it may sometimes de- note an occasional vxint, as a traveller in a desert may be exposed to vxint; or it may imply the want of particular things, as when we speak of our vxints. Penury, in Latin penuria, aUied to Greek ireiva, hunger, signifying ex- treme want, is poverty in its most abject state, which is always supposed to be as permanent as it is wretched, to which those who are already poor are brought, either by misfortune or im- prudence. Indigence, in Latin indigentia, from indigere, from ind, for, and egere, to be in need, to u)ant, signifies the state of wanting such things as one has been habituated to or which are suited to one's station, and is properly applied to persons in the superior walks of life. Need (see Necessity) implies a present vxmt, or the state of wanting such things as the immediate occasion calls for: a temporary state to which persons of all conditions are exposed. POWER, Strength, Force, Au- thority, Dominion. Power, from Anglo-French poer, which in Middle English developed a w'. Late Latin potere, to be able, is the generic and universal term, comprehending in it that simple principle of nature which exists in all subjects. Strength, or the abstract quality of strong, and force (see Energy) are modes of power. These terms are all used either in a physical or a moral application. Power, in a physical sense, signifies whatever causes motion: strength that species of pouxr that lies in the vital and muscular parts of the body. Strength is there- 564 PRACTICABLE fore internal, and depends on the in- ternal organization of the frame; power on the external circumstances. A man may have strength to move, but not the power, if he be bound with cords. Our strength is proportioned to the health of the body and the firmness of its make: our power may be increased by the help of instruments. Power may be exerted or otherwise; force is power exerted or active; bodies have a power of resistance while in a state of rest, but they are moved by a certain force from other bodies. The word power is used technically for the moving force. In a moral acceptation, power, strength, and force may be applied to the same objects with a similar dis- tinction: thus we may speak of the power of language generally; the strength of a person's expressions to convey the state of his own mind ; and the force of terms, as to the extent of their meaning and fitness to convey the ideas of those who use them. Power is either public or private, which brings it into aUiance with author- ity (see Influence). Civil power in- cludes in it aU that which enables us to have any influence or control over the actions, persons, property, etc., of others; avihority is confined to that species of power which is derived from some legitimate source. Power exists independently of all right; avihority is founded only on right. A king has often the power to be cruel, but he has never the authority to be so. Sub- jects have sometimes the power of overturning the government, but they can in no case have the avihority. Power is indefinite as to degree; one may have httle or much power: do- minion is a positive degree of power. A monarch's power may be hmited by various circumstances; a despot exer- cises dominion over aU his subjects, high and low. One is not said to get power over any object, but to get an object into one's power: on the other hand, we get a dominion over an object ; thus some men have a dominion over the conscience of others. PowerfvJ, Potent, Mighty. — Powerful is fuU of power; potent, from the Latin potens, the present participle of the verb posse (whence possible is derived), sig- nifies, literally, being able or having power, and mighty signifies having might. Powerfvl is appHcable to strength as well as power: a powerful man is one who by size and build can easily overpower another; and a power- fvl person is one who has much in his power: potent is used only in this latter sense, in which it expresses a larger extent of power: a potent monarch is much more than a powerfvl prince: mighty expresses a still higher degree of power; might is power unlimited by any consideration or circumstance; a giant is called mighty in the physical sense, and genius is said to be mighty which takes everything within its grasp; the Supreme Being is entitled either Omnipotent or Almighty; but the latter term seems to convey the idea of boundless extent more forcibly than the former. See also Herculean. PRACTICABLE, See Possible. PRACTICE. See Custom; Exer- cise. PRAGMATISM, Practicalism, Humanism. These words all refer to a recent philosophy, "the most recent and (philosophically speaking) fashion- able 'ism' that the new century has produced, knowTi by some as Human- ism, and by others as Pragmatism^ ^ {Academy, August 4, 1906). The philosophy teaches that the whole meaning of a conception expresses it- self in practical consequences, either in the shape of conduct to be recom- mended or 6f experiences to be ex- pected, if it is true. In short, "if it works, it is true." This was called practicalism by some because the test of truth is its results in practice (ul- timately from Greek TrparTuv, to do; but William James, the American ex- ponent of the philosophy, gave it the name pragmatism, from the same Greek verb irpdrrtiv, which has the same meaning as practicalism but is a trifle more euphonious. Humanism, from Latin humxinus, pertaining to man, from homo, man, is applied to the philosophy because it judges truth not by abstract or theoretical principles, but simply by its practical outcome in human life. But the objection to the title humanism is that the word has already been applied to the work of the PREARRANGE 565 scholars of the Renaissance who revived the ideal of a perfect "human" life, on the basis of the Greek and Roman art, as contrasted with the spiritual ideal of the mediaeval theologians. Hence, when humanism is used for -pragmatism, there is confusion. As is the case with most new words, the difference between the synonymes is not one of meaning, but of customary usage. PRAISE, Commend, Applaud, Ex- tol. Praise, through French preis, is connected with our own word jrrice (Latin pretium), signifying to give a value to a thing. Commend, in Latin comtnendo, compounded of con, to- gether, and mandare, to put into the hands, signifies to commit to the good opinion of others. Applaud (see Applause). Extol, in Latin ex, be- yond, and tollere, to lift, signifies to Uft up very high. All these terms denote the act of expressing approbation. To praise is the most general and indefinite; it may rise to a high degree, but it gen- erally impUes a lower degree: we praise a person generally; we commend him particularly: we praise him for his dihgence, sobriety, and the Uke; we commend him for his performances, or for any particular instance of prudence or good conduct. To applaud is an ardent mode of praising; we applaud a person for his nobility of spirit: to exon the laws of civil society: a per- son makes high pretensions who esti- mates his merits and consequent deserts at a high rate; he judges of his daims according as they are suppKjrted by the laws of his country or the circumstances of the case: the pretension when denied can never be proved; the daim, when proved, can be enforced. PRETEXT. See Pretence. PRETTY. See BEAUTiFtTL. PREVAILING, Prevalent, Rul- ing, Overruling, Predominant. Pre- vailing and prevalent both come from the Latin prcevalere, to be strong above others. Ruling, overruling, and pre- dominant (from dominari, itself de- rived from dominus, lord) signify ruling or bearing greater sway than others. Prevailing expresses the actual state or quahty of a particular object: prev- alent marks the quahty of prevailing, as it affects objects in general. The same distinction exists between over- ruling and predominant. A person has a prevailing sense of reUgion; rehgious feehng is prevalent in a coimtry or in a community. There is always some prevailing fashion which some persons are ever ready to follow. The idea has of late years become prevalent. Prevailing and prevalent mark simply the existing state of superiority: ruling and predominant express this state in relation to some other which it has superseded or reduced to a state of inferiority. An opinion is said to be prevailing as respects the number of persons by whom it is maintained: a principle is said to be ruling as respects the superior influence which it has over the conduct of men more than any other. Particular disorders are prevalent at certain seasons of the year, when they affect the generahty of per- sons: a particular taste or fashion is predominant which supersedes all other tastes or fashions. PREVAIL UPON. See Persuade. PREVALENT. See Prevailing. PREVARICATE. See Evade. PREVENT, Anticipate. To pre- vent is hterally to come beforehand, from Latin prae, before, and venire, to come; and anticipate to take before- hand, from Latin ante, before, and a weakened form of the verb capere, to take. The former is employed for actual occurrences; the latter as much for calculations as for actions: to pre- vent is the act of a person toward other persons or things; to anticipate is the act of a being either toward himself or another. In this original and now ob- solete sense God is said to prevent man with His favor by interposing so as to direct his purposes to the right object. So also a man may prevent what is to happen by causing it to happen before the time. We anticipate the happiness which weare to enjoy in future; we anticipate what a person is going to say by saying the same thing before him. Prevent, in its modem use, is always taken in the sense of causing a thing not to be done: anticipate may also be so used, but with this distinction, that to prevent is to cause a thing not to be done or happen at all, and anticipate is to prevent another from doing it by doing it one's self. Prevent, Obviate, Predvde. — All these terms imply the causing something not to take place or exist. To prevent (see Hinder) is to cause something to hap- pen before, so as to render another thing impracticable. To obviate, from 06, be- fore, opposite, and via, way, signifies coming in the way so as to render the thing unnecessary or of no value. Pre- vent applies to events or circumstances in life; obviate to mental acts or objects: bad weather prevents a person setting out according to a certain arrange- ment; a change of plan obviates every difficulty. To predude, from Latin vrce and cluderej based on datidere, to shut, and signifying to shut out a possibiUty by the intervention of something else, is, like obviate, appUed to mental objects. To prevent and predude are rather the act of the thing than of the person; to obviate is rather the act of the per- son than of the thing. Circumstances 570 PREVIOUS may prevent or prednde anything from happening: a person obviates a diffi- culty or objection; so, according to this distinction, we may say either to obviate a necessity or to jpredude a necessity for anything, according as this is effected by any person or by any circmnstance. PREVIOUS, Preliminary, Prepar- atory, Introductory. Previous, in Latin prcevitcs, compounded of prce, before, and via, way, signifies leading the way or going before. Preliminary, from proB and limen, a threshold, sig- nifies belonging to the threshold or entrance. Preparatory and introdvc- tory signify belonging to a preparation or introduction. Previotis denotes simply the order of succession: the other terms, in addi- tion to this, convey the idea of con- nection between the objects which succeed each other. Previotis appUes to actions and proceedings in gen- eral; as a previous question, a previous inquiry, a previous determination: pre- liminary is employed only for mat- ters of contract: a preliminary arti- cle, a preliminary condition, are what precede the final settlement of any question: preparatory is employed for matters of arrangement; the disposing of men in battle is preparatory to an engagement; the making of marriage deeds and contracts is preparatory to the final solemnization of the mar- riage: introductory is employed for matters of science or discussion; as remarks are introductory to the main subject in question: compendiums of grammar, geography, and the like, as introductory to larger works, are useful to young people. Prudent people are careful to make every previous inquiry before they seriously enter into en- gagements with strangers: it is im- politic to enter into details until all preliminary matters are fuUy adjusted: one ought never to imdertake any im- portant matter without first adopting every preparatory measure that can facilitate its prosecution: in compli- cated matters it is necessary to have something introdiictory by way of ex- planation. See also Antecedent. PREY. See Booty. PRICE. See Cost; Value. PRIDE, Vanity, Conceit. Pride comes from Anglo^axon pryte, from pnd, proud, valiant, notable, which seems to be of French origin. It meant valiant, not9,ble; hence a con- sciousness of bieing valiant and notable. Vanity, Latin vanitas, comes from vanu^, empty, signifying a pride that has no basis in reahty. Conceit (see that word). The valuing of one's self for the pos- session of any property is the idea com- mon to these terms, but they differ either in regard to the object or the manner of the action. Pride is the term of most extensive import and ap- pUcation, and comprehends in its sig- nification not only that of the other two terms, but hkewise ideas pecuUar to itself. Pride is appUcable to every object, good or bad, high or low, small or great; vanity is appUcable only to small objects: pride is therefore good or bad: vanity is always bad, it is al- ways emptiness or nothingness. A man is proud who values himself for his possession of Hterary or scientific talent, for his wealth, his rank, his power, his acquirements, or his superi- ority over his competitors; he is vain of his person, his dress, his walk, or anything that is frivolous. Pride is the inherent quahty in man; and, while it rests on noble objects, it is his noblest characteristic; vanity is the distortion of one's nature resulting from inher- ent tendency or an injudicious educa- tion: pride shows itself variously, ac- cording to the nature of the object on which it is fixed; a noble pride seeks to display itself in all that can com- mand the respect or admiration of mankind ; the pride of wealth, of power, or of other adventitious properties, commonly displays itself in unseem- ly deportment toward others; vanity shows itself in false pretensions. Pride, in the hmited and bad sense, is always associated with strength and produces more or less violence; vanity is coupled with weakness. Conceit is that species of self-valua- tion that respects one's talents only; in so far, therefore, it is closely allied to pride; a man is said to be proud of that which he really has, but to be conceited of that which he really has not : a man may be proud to an excess PRINCE 571 of merits which he actually possesses; but when he is conceited, his merits are all in his own conceit; the latter is therefore obviously founded on false- hood altogether. As self-concet< is the offspring of ignorance and vanity, it is most frequently foimd in youth, but as it is the greatest obstacle to improve- ment, it may grow up with a person and go on with him through life. Pride, Haughtiness, Loftiness, Dig- nity.— Pride is employed principally as respects the temper of the mind: haugh- tiness (see Haughty) and loftiness (see High) concerns either the temper of mind or the external behavior. Dig- nity (see Honor) only the external behavior. Prid£ is, as before, the general term; the others are modes of pride. Pride, inasmuch as it con- sists purely of self-esteem, is a positive sentiment which one may entertain independently of other persons: it Ues in the inmost recesses of the human . heart, and mingles itself insensibly with our affections and passions. Haughti- ness is that mode of pride which springs out of comparison of one's self with others; the haughty man dwells on the inferiority of others: the proud man, in the strict sense, dwells on his own perfections. Loftiness is a mode of jnride which raises the spirit above ob- jects supposed to be inferior; it does not set man so much above others as above himself, or that which concerns himself. As respects the exterior, pride in the behavior is always bad. But it is taken in an indifferent sense in apphca- tion to animals or unconscious agents. Haughtiness in one's carriage, and loftiness in one's tone or air, are mostly unbecoming and seldom warranted. Dignity, which arises from a proper consciousness of what is due to one's self, is always taken in a good sense. It is natural to some men, and shows itself at all times; on other occasions it requires to be assumed. PRIMARY, Primitive, Pristine. Original. Primary, from primus and the suffix arius, signifies belonging to or Uke the first. Primitive, from the same ordinal, signifies being the first. Pristine, in Latin pristinus, from prius, signifies in former times. Original sig- nifies containing the origin, from the verb oriri, to rise or begin. The primary denotes simply the or- der of succession, and is therefore the generic term; primitive, pristine, and original include also the idea of some other relation to the thing that suc- ceeds, and are therefore modes of the primary. The primary has nothing to come before it; in this manner we speak of the vrimary cause as the cause which precedes secondary causes: the primitive is that after which other things are formed; in this manner a primitive word is that after which, or from which, the derivatives are formed; the pristine is that which follows the primitive, so as to become customary; there are but few specimens of the pris- tine purity of life among the professors of Christianity: the original is that which either gives birth to the thing or belongs to that which gives birth to the thing; the original meaning of a word is that which was given to it by the makers of the word. See also First. PRINCE, Monarch, Sovereign, Potentate. Prince, in French prince, Latin princeps, from primus and dapere, to take, signifies the man who takes the first place. Monarch, from Latin mon- archa (built on Greek iiovdpvqc, from fiovoc, alone, and apxttv, to rule), signi- fies one having sole authority. Poten- tate, from potens, p)owerful, signifies one having supreme power. Sovereign is derived from Latin superanus. Prince is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; every monarch, sov- ereign, and potentate is a prince, but not vice versd. The term prince is in- definite as to the degree of power: a prince may have a hmited or despotic p>ower; but in its restricted sense it denotes a smaller degree of power than any of the other terms: the term mon- arch does not define the extent of the power, but simply that it is undivided, as opposed to that species of power which is lodged in the hands of many: sovereign and potentate indicate the highest degree of power; but the former is employed only as respects the nation that is governed, the latter in respect to other nations: a sovereign is supreme over his subjects; a poteyitate is power- ful by means of his subjects. Every man having independent p)Ower is a prince', let his territory be ever so in- 572 PRINCIPAL considerable: Germany was divided into a number of small states, governed by their petty princes. Every one reigning by himself in a state of some considerable magnitude, and having independent authority over his sub- jects, is a monarch; kings and emperors, therefore, are all monarchs. Every monarch is a sovereign whose extent of dominion and number of subjects rises above the ordinary level; he is a po- tentate if his influence either in the cabinet or in the field extends very • considerably over the affairs of other nations. PRINCIPAL. See Chief; Su- preme. PRINCIPALLY. See Especially. PRINCIPLE, Motive. The prinr- ciple (see Doctrine) may sometimes be the motive; but often there is a prin- ciple where there is no motive, and there is a motive where there is no principle. The principle lies in conscious and un- conscious agents; the motive only in conscious agents; all nature is guided by certain principles; its movements go f6rward upon certain principles: man is put into action by certain mo- tives; the principle is the prime moving cause of everything that is set in motion; the motive is the prime moving cause that sets the human machine into action. The principle in its restricted sense comes stiU nearer to the motive, when it refers to the opinions which we form: the principle in this case is that idea which we form of things so as to regulate our conduct; the motive is that idea which simply impels to ac- tion: the former is therefore something permanent, and grounded upon the exercise of our reasoning powers; the latter is momentary and arises simply from our capacity of willing and think- ing: bad principles lead a man into a bad course of hfe; but a man may be led by bad motives to do what is good as well as what is bad. See also Chief. PRINT. See Mark; Picture. PRIOR. See Antecedent. PRIORITY, Precedence, Pre-emi- nence, Preference. Priority denotes the abstract quality of being before others: precedence, from proe, before, and cedere, to go, signifies the act of going before: pre-eminence signifies be- ing more eminent or elevated than others: preference signifies being put before others. Priority implies sim- ply the order of succession, and is ap- plied to objects either in a state of mo- tion or rest; precedence sigm&es priority in going, and depends upon a right or privilege; pre-eminence signifies prior-' ity in being, and depends upon merit; preference signifies priority in placing, and depends upon favor. The priority is applicable rather to the thing than the person; it is not that which is sought for, but that which is to be had: age frequently gives priority where every other claim is wanting. The im- moderate desire for precedence is often nothing but a childish vanity; it is a distinction that results from rank and power; a nobleman claims a precedence on all occasions of ceremony. The love of pre-eminence is laudable inasmuch as it requires a degree of moral worth which exceeds that of others; a general aims at pre-eminence in his profession. Those who are anxious to obtain the best for themselves are eager to have the preference: we seek for the prefer- ence in matters of choice. PRISTINE. See Primary. PRIVACY, Retirement, Seclu- sion. Privacy Literally denotes the ab- stract quahty of private (from the Latin adjective privatus, based on jrrivare); but when taken by itself it signifies the state of bemg private: retirement Mter- aUy signifies the abstract act of retiring: and seclusion that of secluding one's self: but retirement by itself frequently denotes a state of being retired or a Elace of retirement; seclusion, a state of eing secluded: hence we say a person fives in privacy, in retirement, in se- cluMon: privacy is opposed to pubhcity ; he who fives in privacy, therefore, is one who foUows no pubhc line, who fives so as to be fittle known: retire- ment is opposed to openness or freedom of access; he, therefore, who fives in retirement withdraws from the society of others, he fives by himself: seclusion is the excess of retirement; he who lives in seclusion bars aU access to himself; he shuts himself from the world. Privacy is most svutable for such as are in circumstances of humifiation, whether from their misfortune or their fault ; retirement is peculiarly agreeable PROCEEDING 573 to those who are of a reflective turn, but seclusion is chosen only by those who labor under some strong affection of the mind, whether of a reUgious or a physical nature. PRIVATE-CARRIER. See Com- mon-carrier. PRIVATE MEETING. See Cau- cus. PRIVILEGE, Prerogative, Ex- emption, Immunity. Privilege, in Latin privilegium, compounded of privies and lex, signifies a law made for any individual or set of individuals. Prerogative, from Latin ■prcerogativa (sc, triims or centuria), based on prce, be- fore, and rogare, to ask, was applied to the tribe or century to whom it fell by lot to vote first in the Comitia, which was asked first whom it would have for consul: hence applied in our language to the right of determining or choosing first in many particulars. Exemption, from the verb to exempt, and immunity, from the Latin immunis, free of public service, from in, not, and munis, not ready to serve, based on munu^, a pub- Uc office, are both employed for the ob- ject from which one is exempt or free. Privilege and prerogative consist of positive advantages; exemption and immunity of those which are negative: by the former we obtain an actual good, by the latter the removal of an evil. Privilege, in its most extended sense, comprehends all the rest: for prerogative, exemption, and im,munity are privileges, inasmuch as they rest upon certain laws or customs which are made for the benefit of certain individuals. In the restricted sense, the privilege may be enjoyed by many; the prerogative, which is a pecuhar and distinguished privilege, can be en- joyed only by a few. As they con- cern the public, privileges belong to the subject or are granted to him; preroga^ tives belong to the crown. It is the privilege of a member of Parliament to escape arrest for debt; it is the prerog- ative of the crown to be irresponsible for the conduct of its ministers; as respects private cases, it is the privilege of women to have the best places assigned to them; it is the prerogative of the man to address the woman. Privileges are applied to every ob- ject which it is desirable to have; prerogative is confined to the case of making one's election or exercising any special power; exemption is ap- phcable to cases in which one is ex- empted from any tribute or payment; immunity, because of its derivation above explained, is pecuharly applica- ble to cases in which one is freed from a service: all chartered towns or cor- porations have privileges, exemptions, and immunities: it is the privilege of the city of London to shut its gates against the king. See also Risht. PRIZE. See Capture; Value. PROBABILITY. See Chance. PROBITY. See Honesty. PROCEED. See Advance; Arise; Go. PROCEEDING, Process, Prog- ress. The first two of these words are based on Latin pro, forward, and the verb cedere, in the sense of go; the last on progredior, to advance. The man- ner of performing actions for the at- tainment of a given end is the com- mon idea comprehended in these terms. Proceeding is the most general, as it simply expresses the general idea of the manner of going on; the rest are spe- cific terms, denoting some particularity in the action, object, or circumstance. Proceeding is said commonly of such things as happen in the ordmary way of doin§ business; process is said of such things as are done by rule: the former is considered from a moral point of view; the latter from a scientific or technical standpoint: Freemasons have bound themselves by a law of secrecy not to reveal any part of their ■proceedings; the process by which paper is made has undergone considerable im- provements since its first invention. Proceeding and progress both refer to the moral actions of men; but the proceeding simply denotes the act of going on or doing something; the progress denotes an approximation to the end: the proceeding may be only a partial action comprehending both the beginning and the end; but the progress is applied to that which re- quires time and a regular succession of action to bring it to completion: that is a proceeding in which every man is tried in a court of law; that is a progress which one makes in learning. 574 PROCESS by the addition to one's knowledge: hence we do not talk of the proceeding of life, but of the progress of life. Proceeding, Transaction. — Proceeding signifies, Uterally, the thing that pro- ceeds; and transaction the thing trans- acted: the former, therefore, is used of something that is going forward; the latter of something that is already done : we are witnesses to the whole proceed- ing; we inquire into the whole transac- tion. The term proceeding is said of every event or circumstance which goes forward through the agency of men; transaction comprehends only those matters which have been dehberately transacted or brought to a conclusion: in this sense we use the word proceed- ing in apphcation to a disturbance in the street; and the word transaction to some commercial negotiation that has been carried on between certain per- sons. The term proceeding marks the manner of proceeding; as when we speak of the proceedings in a court of law: transaction marks the business transacted; as the transactions on the Exchange. A proceeding may be char- acterized as disgraceful; a transaction as iniquitous. Procession, Train, Retinue. — Pro- cession, from the verb proceed, signifies the act of going forward or before, that is, in the present instance, of going before others, or one before an- other. Train, from Old French troiin, Low Latin trahinare, a derivative of classical trahere, to draw, signifies the thing drawn after another, as in the modern train, a succession of cars; and in the present instance the persons who are led after, or follow, any object. Retinue, from French rctenue, past par- ticiple of retenir (from Latin re and tenere, to hold back, retain), signifies those who are retained as attendants. All these terms are said of any number of persons who follow in a cer- tain order; but this, which is the lead- ing idea in the word procession, is but collateral in the terms train and retinue: on the other hand, the procession may consist of persons of all ranks and stations; but train and retinue apply only to such as follow some person or thing in a subordinate capacity: the former in regard to such as make up the concluding part of some procession, the latter only in regard to the ser- vants or attendants on the great. At funerals there is frequently a long train of coaches belonging to the friends of the deceased, which close the pro- cession; princes and nobles never go out on state or pubhc occasions without a nmnerous retinue: the beauty of every procession consists in the order with which every one keeps his place and the regularity with which the whole goes forward; the length of a train is what renders it most worthy of notice; the number of a retinue in eastern nations is one criterion by which the wealth of the individual is estimated. PROCESS. See Proceeding. PROCLAIM. See Announce; De- clare. PROCLAMATION. See Decree. PROCRASTINATE. See Delay. PROCURE. See Get; Provide. PRODIGAL. See Extravagant. PRODIGIOUS. See Enormous. PRODIGY. See Wonder. PRODUCTION, Produce, Prod- uct. The term production expresses either the act of producing or the thing prodiLced; product and produce express only the thing produced: the produce tion of a tree from a seed is one of the wonders of nature; the product will not be considerable. In the sense of the thing produced, production is ajv plied to every individual thing that is produced, whether by nature or art, as a tree is a production or a painting is a production of art or skill: produce and product are properly apphcable to those productions of nature which are made to turn to account; the former in a collective sense, and in reference to some particular object, the latter in an abstract and general sense: the aggregate quantity of grain drawn from a field is termed the produce of the field; but corn, hay, vegetables, and fruits in general are termed prod- ucts of the earth: the naturaUst ex- amines aU the productions of nature; the husbandman looks to the produce of his lands; the topographer and traveller inquire about the produ^^ of different countries. There is the same distinction be- tween these terms in their improper as in their proper acceptation; the production is whatever results from PROFLIGATE 575 an effort, physical or mental, as a production of genius, a production of art, and the hke; the produce is the aggregate result from physical or men- tal labor: thus, whatever the hus- bandman reaps from the cultivation of his land is termed the prodiux of his labor; whatever results from any pubUc subscription or collection is, in Uke manner, the produce: the product is employed properly in regard to the mental operation of figures, as the product from multiplication, but may be extended to anything which is the fruit of the brain. Production, Performance, Work. — When we speak of anything as result- ing from any specified operation, we term it a production: as the production of an author, signifying what he has produced by the effort of his mind: Homer's Iliad is esteemed as one of the finest productions of the imagina- tion. When we speak of anything as executed or performed by some person, we term it a performance, as a drawing or a painting is denominated the per- formance of a particular artist. The term production cannot be employed without specifying or referring to the source from which it is produced or the means by which it is produced; as the qrroduction of art, the production of the inventive faculty, the production of the mind, etc. : but a perforrmnce may be spoken of without referring to the individual by whom it has been per- formed; hence we speak of this or that person's performance; but we may also say, a good performance. When we wish to specify anything that results from vxrrk or labor, it is termed a uxrrk: in this manner we speak either of the rjDork of one's hands or of a unxrk of the imagination, a work of time, a vxfrk of magnitude. See also Afford; Effect; Make. PROFANE. See Irreligious; Sac- rilegious. PROFESS, Declare. Profess, in Latin professus, participle of profiteor, compounded of pro and faieri, to speak, sigmfies to set forth or present to pub- lic view. Declare (see that word). An exposition of one's thoughts or opinions is the common idea in the sig- nification of these terms; but they differ in the manner of the action, as well as in the object: one professes by words or by actions; one declares by words only: a man professes to believe that on which he acts; but he declares his beUef in it either with his lips or in his writings. A profession may be general and partial; it may amount to little more than an intimation: a declaration is positive and exphcit; it leaves no one in doubt: a -profession may, therefore, sometimes be hypo- critical; he who professes may wish to imply that which is untrue: a dedara- lion must be either directly true or false; he who declares expressly com- mits himself upon his veracity. One professes either as respects single ac- tions or a regular course of conduct; one declares either passing thoughts or settled principles. A person professes to have walked to a certain distance, to have taken a certain route, and the like: a Christian professes to follow the doctrine and precepts of Christianity; a person declares that a thing is true or false, or he declares his firm belief in a thing. To profess is employed only for what concerns one's self; to declare is also employed for what concerns others: one professes the motives and principles by which one is guided: one declares facts and circmnstances with which one is acquainted : one pro- fesses nothing but what one thinks may be creditable and fit to be known; but one declares whatever may have fallen imder one's notice or passed through one's mind, as the case re- quires; there is always a particular and private motive for profession; there are frequently pubUc grounds for making a declaration. See also Business. PROFESSION. See Business; Vo- cation. PROFICIENCY. See Progress. PROFIT. See Advantage; Gain. PROFLIGATE, Abandoned, Rep- robate. These words have all a close connection. Profligate, in Latin proHi- gatus, participle of profligo, compounded of the prefix pro, forward, down, and fligare, to dash, signifies properly one dashed down and destroyed; nence, by extension, wretched and then vile, used as a term of extreme reproach: ao Cicero called Catiline " most profligate 576 PROFUNDITY and abandoned of all mortals." Aban- doned (see Abandon). Reprobate (see Reprove) signifies one thoroughly hard- ened to reproof. A profligate man is one completely overcome and ruined by his vices: an abandoned man is one abandoned to his passions: the reprobate man is one who has been reproved until he becomes in- sensible to reproof and cannot be di- verted from following his evil course. PROFUNDITY. See Depth. PROFUSE. See Extravagant. PROFUSION, Profuseness. Pro- fitsion, from the Latin profundo, to pour forth, ia taken in relation to un- conscious objects, which pour forth in great plenty; profxiseness is taken from the same, in relation to conscious agents, who likewise pour forth in great plenty: the term pro/imon, there- fore, is put for plenty itself, and the term profuseness as a characteristic of jjersons in the sense of extravagance. At the hospitable board of the rich there wiU naturally be a profusion of everything which can gratify the ap>- petite; when men see an unusual de- gree of profusion, they are apt to in- dulge themselves in profuseness. PROGENITORS. See Forefath- ers. PROGENY. See Offspring. PROGNOSTIC. See Omen. PROGNOSTICATE. See Fore- tell. PROGRESS, Progression, Ad- vancement. A forward motion is designated by these terms: but prog- ress and progression simply imply this sort of motion; advance and advance- ment also imply an approximation to some object: we may make progress in that which has no specific termi- nation, as progress in learning, which may cease only with Ufe; but the ad- vance is made only to some hmited point or object in view; as an advance in wealth or honor, which may find a ter- mination within the Ufetime. Progress and advance are said of that which has been attained; but progression and advancement may be said of that which one is attaining: the progress or the ad- vance has been made, or the person is in the act of progression or advance- ment: a child makes progress in learning by daily attention; the progression from one stage of learning to another is not always perceptible; it is not always possible to overtake one who is in advance; sometimes a person's advance- ment is retarded by circumstances than are altogether contingent: the first step in any destructive course pre- pares for the second, and the second for the third, after which there is no stop, but the progress is infinite. See also Proceeding. Progress, Proficiency, Improvement. — Progress is a generic term, the rest are specific; proficiency, from the Latin profido, compounded of pro, forward, and a weakened form of facere, to do^ signifies a state of progression — that is to say, a progress already made; and improvement, from the verb improve (see Amend), signifies an improved condi- tion— that is, progress in that which im- proves. The term progress here, as in the former paragraph, marks the stei) or motion onward, and the two others the point already reached: but prog- ress is apphed either in the proper or improper sense: that is, either to those travelling forward or to those going on stepwise in any work; proficiency is apphed, in the improper sense, to the ground gained in an art, and im- provement to what is gained in knowl- edge, or imderstanding, or abihties; when idle people set about any work it is difficult to perceive that they make any progress in it from time to time; those who have a thorough taste for either music or drawing will show a proficiency in it which is astonishing to those who are unacquainted with the circumstances; the improvement of the mind can never be so effectually and easily obtained as in the period of childhood. Progress and proficiency are applied to the acts of persons, but improvement denotes also the act or state of things; one must make progress or show pro- ficiency, but things admit of improve- ment. PROGRESSIVE. See Onward. PROHIBIT. See Ban. PROHIBITION. See Embargo. PROJECT. See Design. PROJECTING. See Salient. PROLETARIAT, The Masses, Hoi PoLLOi. Proletariat, from Latin pro- letarius, one who helped the state by PROMISE 577 his children only (from proles, off- spring), is a word which has come into general usage as a result of the popular interest in poUtical economy during the later nineteenth century. It refers to the lowest class in an organized so- ciety, the laborers who have no capital and are dependent on the work of their hands from day to day for subsistence. The term the masses (from mass, a lump of imorganized, unmolded matter, from Greek lidavtiv, to knead — that which may be or should be kneaded) is also a comparatively recent phrase. It has the same meaning as proletariat, but a slightly different meaning, em- phasizing not the existence of the lower order, as a distinct order, but as a great multitude outside of the distinct classes. Having been used somewhat contemptuously, it has been adopted as a name of honor by some of the leaders among "the masses," as the title of one of their organs in America, The Masses, shows. Hoi polloi is the Greek phrase ol ttoXXoi, transliterated with Roman letters. It means, hter- ally, "the many," and among the Greeks was opposed to "the few," as "the masses" were opposed by Glad- stone to "the classes. It has much the same connotations as the masses, but is generally used in a somewhat flippant and frivolous tone, whereas the phrase the masses is becoming a word to conjure with, to be uttered in all seriousness. See also Massage under I*ress. PROLIFIC. See Fertile. PROLIX. See Diffuse. PROLONG. See Delay. PROMINENT, Conspicuous. Prominent signifies hanging over; arn- spiciums (see Distinguished) sigm- fies easy to be beheld: the former is, therefore, to the latter, in some meas- ure, as the species to the genus; what is prominent is, in general, on that very account conspiciums; but many things may be conspicuous which are not expressly prominent: nothing is prominent but what projects beyond a certain line: everything is conspicuous which mav be seen by many : the nose on a man s face is a prominent feature, owing to its projecting situation; and it is sometimes conspicuous, according to the position of the person: a figiu-e 37 in a painting is said to be prominent if it appears to stand forward or before the others; but it is not properly con- spicuous unless there be something in it which attracts the general notice and distinguishes it from all other things; on the contrary, it is con- spicuous, but not expressly prominent, when the colors are vivid. PROMISCUOUS, Indiscriminate. Promiscuous, in Latin promiscuus, com- pounded of the prefix pro and miscere, to mingle, signifies thoroughly mingled. Indiscriminate, from the Latin in, priv- ative, and discrimen, a difference, signi- fies without any difference. Promiscuous is appUed to any num- ber of different objects mingled to- gether; indiscriminate is applied only to the action in which one does not discriminate different objects: a multi- tude is termed promiscuous, as char- acterizing the thing; the use of differ- ent things for the same purpose, or of the same things for different purposes, is termed indiscriminate, as char- acterizing the person: things become promiscuous by the want of design in anyone; they ax^ indiscrimiruite hy the express intention of some one: plants of all descriptions are to be found promiscuously situated in the beds of a garden: it is folly to level any charge indiscriminaiely against all the mem- bers of any community or profession. PROMISE, Engagement, Word. Promise, in Latin rrromissus, from pro- mitto, compoundea of pro, before, and the past participle of mittere, to send; that is, in this application, to pledge be- forehand, is specific, and consequently more binding than the engagement {ae& Business): we promise a thing in a- set form of words that are clearly and strictly understood; we engage in gen- eral terms that may admit of altera- tion: a promise is mostly uncondi- tional; an engagement is frequently conditional. In promises the faith of an individual is accepted upon his word and relied upon as if it were a^ deed: in engagements the intentions of an individual for the future are all that are either impUed or imderstood: on the fulfilment of promises often de- pend the most important interests of individuals; an attention to engage- ments is a matter of mutual conven- 578 PROMOTE ience in the ordinary concerns of life: a man makes a promise of payment, and upon his promise it may happen that many others depend for the fulfihnent of their promises: when engagements are made to visit or meet others, the failm-e to observe such engagements causes great trouble. As a promise and engagement can be made only by words, the word is often put for either, or for both, as the case requires: he who breaks his word in small matters cannot be trusted when he gives his word in matters of conse- quence. PROMOTE. See Encourage. PROMPT. See Diligent; Ready. PROMULGATE. See Publish. PRONENESS. See Inclination. PRONOUNCE. See Utter. PROOF, Evidence, Testimont. The proof (see Argument) is that which simpty proves; the evidence is that which makes evident (see Clear) ; the testimony, from testis, a witness, is a species of evidence by means of wit- nesses. In the legal acceptation of the terms proofs are commonly denomi- nated evidence, becau.se nothing can be admitted as proof which does not tend to make evident; but as what is proved is made more certain or in- dubitable than what is made evident, proof is more than evidence. Proof is likewise taken for the act of proving as well as for the thing that proves, which distinguishes it still further from evidence. Evidence comprehends whatever is employed to make evident, be it words or deeds, be it writing or discourse; testimony is properly evidence by words spoken, and more strictly understood by the person giving the evidence. In an extended application of these terms they are employed with a similar distinction : the proof is the mark or sign which proves: the evidence is the mark or sign which makes evident: the testimony is that which is offered or given by things personified in proof of anything. The proof is employed for facts or physical objects: the evidence is ap- phed to that which is moral ; testimony regards that which is personal. All that our Saviour did and said were evidences of his divine character, which might have produced faith in the minds of many, even if they had not had such numerous and miraculous proofs of his power. One friend makes a present to another in testimony of his regard: the proof and the testimony are some- thing external, or some outward mark or indication; the evidence may be in- ternal or lie in the thing itself, as the internal evidences of Christianity. See also Experience. PROP. See Staff. PROPAGANDA. See Spread. PROPENSITY. See Inclination. PROPER. See Right. PROPERTY. See Estate; Goods; Quality. PROPHESY. See Foretell. PROPHETIC. See Oracular. PROPITIOUS. See Auspicious; Favorable. PROPORTION. See Rate; Sym- metry. PROPORTIONATE, Commensu- rate, Adequate. Proportion, from the Latin proportio, compounded of pro, suitable to, in ratio with, and portio, a share, signifies having a portion, suit- able to, or in agreement with, some other object. Commensurate, from the Latin prefix com, based on cum, with, and mensuratus, the past participle of the post-classical mensurare, to meas- ure, I measure, signifies measiiring in accordance with some other thing, be- ing suitable in measure to something else. Adequate, in Latin adoeqitattis, participle of adoeqitare, from ad, to, and cequus, equal, signifies made level with some other body. Proportionate is here a term of gener- al use; the others are particular terms, employed in a similar sense, in regard to particular objects: that is propor- tionate which rises as a thing rises and falls as a thing falls; that is commensu- rate which is made to rise to the same measure or degree; that is adequate which is made to come up to the height of another thing. Proportionate is em- ployed either in the proper or im- proper sense; in recipes and pre- scriptions of every kind proportionate quantities must always be taken; when the task increases in difficulty and compUcation, a proportionate degree of labor and talent must be employed upon it. Commensurate and adequate are employed only in the moral sense, PROVE 579 the former to denote suitability of things in point of measure, the latter to denote the equahzing of powers: a person's recompense should in some measure be commensurate with his labor and deserts: a person's resources should be adequate to the work he is engaged in. PROPOSAL, Proposition. Pro- posal comes from propose, based on Latin pro and ponere, meaning to put forward, in the sense of offer: proposi- tion comes from propose, in the sense of setting down in a distinct form of words. We make a proposal to a per- son to enter into a partnership with him; we make a proposition to one who is at variance with us to settle the dif- ference by arbitration. PROPOSE. See Offer; Premedi- tate; Purpose. ^ PROPOSITION. See Proposal; Sentence. PROPRIETOR. See Possessor. PROROGUE, Adjourn. Prorogue, from the Latin prorogare, from pro, pubUcly, and rogare, to ask, means to propose an extension of office, to defer. Adjourn, from ad, to or until, and the French joumie, the day, signifies only to put off for a day, or some short period: the former is apphed to na- tional assemblies only, the latter is applied to any meeting. PROSCRIBE, B.\NiSH, Condemn, Denounce, Exile, Expel, Ostracize, Reject. Proscribe, in Latin proscribere, from pro, before, openly, and scribere, to write, is virtually to put beyond the protection of the law bv a written order. Banish, expel, ana exile are closely allied applications signifjang the act of driving or forcing a person from his country as a pimishment by authority. Corvdemn is to censure, blame, declare to be forfeited, pro- nounce or judge guilty. Denounce is to threaten or accuse publicly; in diplomacy it is the act of abrogating a treaty. Ostracize meant originally to banish by a vote written on a pot- sherd, from Greek 6